ROUTLEDGE

THE MONGOL WORLD

Edited by TIMOTHY MAY *and* MICHAEL HOPE

THE MONGOL WORLD

Drawing upon research carried out in several different languages and across a variety of disciplines, *The Mongol World* documents how Mongol rule shaped the trajectory of Eurasian history from Central Europe to the Korean Peninsula, from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth century.

Contributing authors consider how intercontinental environmental, economic, and intellectual trends affected the Empire as a whole and, where appropriate, situate regional political, social, and religious shifts within the context of the broader Mongol Empire. Issues pertaining to the Mongols and their role within the societies that they conquered therefore take precedence over the historical narratives of those societies. Alongside the formation, conquests, administration, and political structure of the Mongol Empire, the second section examines archaeology and art history, family and royal households, science and exploration, and religion, which provides greater insight into the social history of the Empire – an aspect often neglected by traditional dynastic and political histories.

With 58 chapters written by both senior and early-career scholars, the volume is an essential resource for all students and scholars who study the Mongol Empire from its origins to its disintegration and legacy.

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In memory of David O. Morgan and Thomas T. Allsen, two scholars who profoundly shaped the study of the Mongol Empire and inspired the scholars who contributed to this volume. We all stand upon the shoulders of David and Tom, and they are sorely missed.

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Patrick Wing (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is Associate Professor of History at the University of Redlands. His scholarship examines political identity and ideology in the Mongol Empire and its successor states in Iran, as well as in the Mamluk Sultanate. He is the author of *The Jalayirids: Dynastic State Formation in the Mongol Middle East* (2016).

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ABBREVIATIONS

PRIMARY SOURCES

AMW	Anonymous. (1865) *Annales monastici II: Annales Monsterii De Wintonia, A.D. 519–1277, Annales Monasterii De Waverleia, A.D. 1–1291*. Ed. H.R. Luard. London: Longman, Roberts, and Green.
Bar Hebraeus	Bar Hebraeus. (1932) *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l-Faraj*. 2 Vols. Trans. E.A. Wallis Budge. Amsterdam: APA-Philo-Press.
BS	Anonymous. (2005) *Baharistan-i Shahi*. Trans. K. N. Pandita. Srinagar: Kashmir News Network.
CM	Paris. Matthew. (1882) *Chronica Majora* (CM). Ed. H.R. Luard. Vol. 6. London: Longman & Company.
EMC	Master Rogerii. (2010) "Epistola in Miserabile Carmen Super Destruction Regni Hungarie Per Tartaros Facta". Pp. 132–229. In Janos M. Bak, Martyn Rady, Laslo Veszpreny (eds. and trans.), *Anonymous and Master Roger*. New York: Central European University Press.
DDG	Cherepnin, L.V., ed. (1950) *Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel'nykh kniazei XIV – XVI vv*. (*DDG*). Moscow and Leningrad: Akademiia nauk SSSR.
DVL	*Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, sive Acta et Diplomata res venetas graecas atque levantis illustrantia* (*DVL*). Pars I, a. 1300–1350. Ed. G.M. Thomas. Venice, 1880; Pars II, a. 1351–1454. Ed. R. Pedrelli. Venice, 1899.
HA	Anonymous. *Hudud al-'Alam: The Regions of the World, A Persian Geography, 372 A.H.-982 A.D.* (1937) Trans. V. Minorsky. London: Luzac.
HCGK	Pelliot, Paul and Louis Hambis, trans. (1951) *Histoire des campaignes de Gengis Khan. Chen-wou ts'in-tcheng lou*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

HBSS	Thomas of Split. (2006) *History of the Bishops of Salona and Split*. Ed. and Trans. Damir Karbic, Mirjana Matijevic Sokol, and James Ross Sweeney. New York: Central European University Press.
HWC	Juvaini, Ata Malik. (1958, 1997). *The History of the World-Conqueror*. Trans. J.A. Boyle. 2 Vols. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
IL	Anonymous. (1998) *Ipat'evskaia letopis' [Hypatian Chronicle]*. In A. A. Shakhmatov (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 2. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury.
JS	*Jinshi*. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1975.
KFT	Ibn al-Athir. (1979) *Al Kamil fi al-Tarikh*. Vol. XII. Beirut: Dar Sadr.
KFTR	Ibn al-Athir. (2008) *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi'l-ta'rikh*. Pt. 30: *The Years 584–629/1193–1231, The Ayyubids after Saladin and the Mongol Menace*. Trans. D.S. Richards. Burlington: Ashgate.
LA	Anonymous. (2000) *Letopis' Avraamki [Avraamka's Chronicle]* LA. In A. F. Bychkov and K. N. Bestuzhev-Riumin (eds.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 16. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury.
LL	Anonymous. (1997) *Lavrent'evskaia letopis' [Lavrentian Chronicle*] LL. In E. F. Karskii (eds.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 1. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury.
LS	Toghto et al. (1974) *Liao shi*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
MA	Anonymous. *Mu'izz al-Ansab*. MS. Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Persan 67.
MDBL	Zhao Hong. (1975) *Meng-Da Bei-Lu: Polnoe Opisanie Mongolo-Tatar*. Trans. Nikolai Ts. Munkuev. Moscow: Academy of Sciences (Nauka).
N1L	Anonymous. (2000) *Novgorodskaia Pervaia letopis' [Novgorodian First Chronicle]* N1L. In A. N. Nasonov (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 3. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury.
N4L	Anonymous. (2000) *Novgorodskaia Chetvertaia letopis' [Novgorodian Fourth Chronicle]* N4L. In F. I. Pokrovsky (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 4. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury.
NKL	Anonymous. (2002) *Novgorodskaia Karamzinskaia letopis' [Novgorodian Karamzin Chronicle]* NKL. In A. G. Bobrov (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 42. St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin.
Nasawi	Al-Nasawi, Muhammad ibn Ahmad. (1953) *Sirat al-Sultan Jalal al-Din Mankubirti*. Ed. Hafiz Ahmad Hamdi. Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi.
Nesawi	En-Nesawi, Mohammed. (1895) *Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-din Mankobirti*. Trans. O. Houdas. Paris: Publications de l'École des langues orientales vivantes.

P3L	Anonymous. (2000) *Pskovskaia Tret'ia letopis' [Third Pskov Chronicle]* P3L. In A. N. Nasonov (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 2. Moscow: Iazyki slavianskoi kul'tury.
PRP	*Pamiatniki russkogo prava*
PSL	Liu Minzhong. (1989) *Ping Song Lu*. V. 117 of *Congshu Jicheng Xubian*. Taipei: Xin Wenfeng Chuban Gongsi. 695–99.
PSRL	*Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (1843–2007). 43 vols. St. Petersburg/Petrograd/ Leningrad and Moscow: Arkheograficheskaia komissiia, Eduard Prats, Nauka, and Arkheograficheskii tsentr.
RDA	Rashid al-Din Faḍlullah. (1965, 1980.) *Jami' al-tavarikh*. A.A. Alizadeh (ed.) Moskow: NAUKA.
RDB	Rashid al-Din. (1971) *The Successors of Genghis Khan: Translated from the Persian of Rashīd al-Dīn*. Trans. J.A. Boyle. New York: Columbia University Press.
RDK	Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah Hamadani. (1983) *Jami' al-Tavarikh*, Edited by Bahman Karimi. Tehran: Iqbal.
RDRM	Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah Hamadani. (1994) *Jami' al-Tavarikh*. Edited by Muhammad Rawshan and Mustafa Musavi. 4 vols. Tehran: Nashr-i Alburz.
RDT	Rashiduddin Fazlullah. (1998, 1999) *Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jami'u't-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles*. 3 vols. Trans. W.M. Thackston. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Printing Office.
RDT2	Rashiduddin. (2012). *Classical Writings of the Medieval Islamic World: Persian Histories of the Mongol Dynasties, Volume 3, by Rashiduddin Fazlullah* [Rashid al-Din]. Trans. Wheeler M. Thackston. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd./Palgrave Macmillan.
RHC/DA	Dulaurier, E. (1869, 1906) *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Documents Arméniens (RHC/DA)*. 2 vols. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale.
Rubruck	Rubruck, William. (1990, 2009). *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255*. Translated by Peter Jackson. London: The Hakluyt Society; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
S1L	Anonymous. (2000) *Sofiiskaia Pervaia letopis' [Sophia First Chronicle]*. In S. N. Kisterev (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Vol. 1. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury.
SHM	Anonymous. (2006) *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*. Translated by Igor De Rachewiltz. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill.
SHMC	Cleaves, Francis Woodman, trans. (1982) *The Secret History of the Mongols, for the First Time Done into English out of the Original Tongue*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
SHMO	Onon, Urgunge, trans. (2015). *The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan*. Ulaanbaatar: Bolor Sudar.

SP	Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah Hamadani. *Shu'ab-i Panjganah*, MS. Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmad III, Catalogue No. 2937.
SS	*Songshi*. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1977.
SSJSBM	*Songshi jishi benmo*. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1977.
SWQZL	He Qiutao. (1985) "Sheng Wu Qin Zheng Lu (Bogda Bagatur Bey-e-Ber Tayilagsan Temdeglel)." In Asaraltu (ed.) *Bogda Bagatur Bey-e-Ber Tayilagsan Temdeglel*. Monggol Tulgur Bicig-un Cubural, Qayilar: Obor Monggol-un Soyul-un Keblel-un Qoriy-a: Kolun Boyir Ayimag-un Sinquva Bicig-un Delgegur tarqagaba. 3–95.
TOA	Li, Chih-Ch'ang. (1931) *Travels of an Alchemist: The Journey of the Taoist Ch'ang-ch'un from China to the Hindukush at the Summons of Chingiz Khan*. Trans. A. Waley. London: George Routledge & Sons.
TMM	Dawson, Christopher. (1955). *The Mongol Mission, Translated by a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey*. London: Sheed & Ward.
TN	Juzjani, Minhaj Siraj. (1964–65). *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*. 2 Vols. Ed. 'Abd al-Hayy Habibi. Kabul: Anjuman-i Tarikh-i Afghanistan.
TNR	Juzjani, Minhaj Siraj. (1970). *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri (A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia)*. 2 Vols. Trans. H.G. Raverty. New Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint Corp., 1970.
TR	De Bridia, C. (1965, 1995) "The Tartar Relation". Pp. 19–106. Tr. George D. Painter. In R.A. Skelton, Thomas C. Marston, and George Painter (eds.), *The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
TZSL	*Taizu shilu*. In *Ming shilu* [*Veritable Records of The Ming*] (1961–66) Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishiyuyan yanjiusuo, 133vols.
Umari	al-'Umari, Ibn Fadl Allah. (1968) *Das Mongolische Weltreich: Al-'Umari's Darstellung der Mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masalik al-Abṣar fi Mamalik al-Amṣar*. Ed. Klaus Leich. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
USp	*Uigurische Sprachdenkmäler*
XTJ	Bi Yuan (1987, 1994) *Xu Zizhi Tongjian*. Beijing: Zhonghua.
YRZJZLSY	Wang Deyi et al, eds., *Yuanren Zhuanji Ziliao Suoyin*, 5 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1987.
YS	Song Lian. (1976) *Yuan shi*. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
ZZL	*Zhaozhong lu*. In Zhou Guangpei, ed., *Songdai biji xiaoshuo* 26.216–47. Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1995.

EDITED VOLUMES

ASRME	Biran, Michal, Jonathan Brack, and Francesca Fiaschetti, eds. (2020) *Along the Silk Roads in Mongol Eurasia: Generals, Merchants and Intellectuals*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

CAE	Rossabi, M., ed. (1983) *China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbours, 10th-14th Centuries*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
BLGKH	Komaroff, L., ed. (2006) *Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan*. Leiden: Brill.
CHI5	Boyle, J. A. (ed.) (1968) *The Cambridge History of Iran 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CHI6	Jackson, P., and L. Lockhart (eds.) (1986) *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Vol. 6. Cambridge University Press
CHIACA	Di Cosmo, N., A. J. Frank, and P. B. Golden (eds.) (2009) *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CHCAR	Franke, H. and D.C. Twitchett, eds. (1994) *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CP	Wright, A. F. and Denis C. Twitchett, eds. (1962) *Confucian Personalities*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
ED	Clauson, G. (1972) *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkic (ED)*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
EI2	*Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd Edition.
EI3	*Encyclopedia of Islam*, 3rd Edition.
EIr	*Encyclopedia Iranica*
EMLCH	Rybatzki, V., A.Pozzi, P.W. Geier, & J.R. Krueger (ed.) *The Early Mongols: Language, Culture and History: Studies in Honor of Igor De Rachewiltz on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday*. Bloomington: Senior Research Institute of Inner Asian Studies
EMME	Atwood, C.P. (2004) *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*. New York: Facts on File, Inc.
HHPMCAME	Pfeiffer, J., S.A. Quinn and E. Tucker (eds.) *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: Studies in Honor of John E. Woods*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
GKME	Fitzhugh, W., M. Rossabi, & W. Honeychurch, eds. (2013) *Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire*. Washington: The Mongolian Preservation Foundation and Arctic Studies Center, Smithsonian Institution, and University of Washington Press.
ITDV	Khakimov, R.S., and M. Usmanov, eds. (2009, 2014) *Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen v semi tomakh* [*History of Tatars from the Most Ancient Times in Seven Volumes*]. Kazan′: Institut istorii Mardzhani.
MME	De Nicola, B. and C. Melville, eds. (2016). *The Mongols' Middle East: Continuity and Transformation in Ilkhanid Iran*. Leiden: Brill.
MTO	Amitai, R. and M. Biran, eds. (2005) *Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*. Leiden: Brill.
MTRCCL	Durand-Guedy, D., ed. (2013) *Turko-Mongol Rulers, Cities and City Life*. Leiden: Brill.

NACC	Amitai, R. and M. Biran, eds. (2015) *Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change. The Mongols and Their Eurasian Predecessors*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
NAIH	May, T., D. Bayarsaikhan, and C. P. Atwood, eds. (2021) *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*. Leiden: Brill.
PPTK	Pfeiffer, J. ed. (2014) *Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th – 15th Century Tabriz*. Leiden: Brill.
RDAM	Akasoy, A., Charles Burnett, and Ronit Yoeli-Tlalim, eds. (2013). *Rashid al-Din: Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*. London: The Warburg Institute.
RPAIA	Charleux, I., G. Delaplace, R. Hamayon and S. Pearce, eds. *Representing Power in Ancient Inner Asia: Legitimacy Transmission and the Sacred*. Western Washington University: Center for East Asian studies.
SPP	*Srednevekovye pamiatniki Povolzh'ia*. (1976) Moskva: Nauka.
SRIa	*Slovar' russkogo iazyka XI-XVII vv*
SYMT	Smith, P. J. and R. von Glahn, eds. (2003) *The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
TDVİA	*Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. Vols. 1–44 (1988–2013). Istanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi.
TLGK	Komaroff, L. and S. Carboni, eds. (2002) *The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353*. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art.
VITMEI	Gleave, R. and I.T. Kristó-Nagy (eds.) *Violence in Islamic Thought from the Mongols to European Imperialism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
WIAH	Di Cosmo, N. ed. (2002) *Warfare in Inner Asian History (500–1800)*. Leiden: Brill.
ZOVMI	Khakimov, R.S. et al. Eds. (2016) *Zolotaia Orda v mirovoi istorii* [*The Golden Horde in World History*]. Kazan': Institut istorii Mardzhani.

JOURNALS

AEMA	*Archivum Eurasiae medii aevi*
AM	*Asia Major*
AOH	*Acta Orientalia Hungarica*
ASEA	*Asiatische Studien – Études Asiatiques*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
BSYS	*Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies*
CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal*
CAS	*Central Asian Survey*
CSSH	*Comparative Studies in Society & History*
EAH	*East Asian History*
GHR	*Golden Horde Review*
HJAS	*Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*

HUS	*Harvard Ukrainian Studies*
IA	*Inner Asia*
JAH	*Journal of Asian History*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JCES	*Journal of Central Eurasian Studies*
JCMH	*Journal of Chinese Military History*
JEMH	*Journal of Early Modern History*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JSAI	*Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JSYS	*Journal of Song-Yuan Studies*
JWH	*Journal of World History*
MRDTB	*Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*
MS	*Monumenta Serica*
MSR	*Mamluk Studies Review*
MSt.	*Mongolian Studies: The Journal of the Mongolia Society*
OREAH	*Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*
PFEH	*Papers on Far Eastern History*
PNAS	*Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*
TSR	*The Silk Road*
ZS	*Zentralasiatische Studien*

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INTRODUCTION

Michael Hope and Timothy May

Mongolia is intimately tied to its imperial past in the popular historical imagination. It was, after all, the imperial founder, Chinggis Khan (d. 1227), who in 1206 first unified the peoples to the north of China to form the *Yeke Monggol Ulus* (the Great Mongol State). His household provided the foundation for the early Mongol government, his proclamations were adopted as early Mongol law (*jasaq*), and his many military victories fused together the nomadic peoples of eastern Inner Asia in a new identity and a new ethnonym – Mongol. Today Chinggis Khan is ubiquitous in Mongolia, where his image and name adorn everything from stamps to cigarette packets and hotels, constantly reminding the people of their grand imperial past. Those outside of Mongolia have likewise come to associate it with empire, some might say to the detriment of other aspects of Mongolian history. Yet such was the scale of the Mongol Empire, stretching from the Korean Peninsula in the east to the Danube River and the Mediterranean Sea in the west, that it has played a critical role in shaping modern notions of what empires are. The Mongols, alongside the Romans, the Han, and the British, are immediately summoned to our mind when we invoke the word 'empire'. Mapping out the contours of the Mongol Empire – its formation, administration, culture, and legacy – is, therefore, a fruitful endeavour for historians of global history and world systems, as much as it is for those more keenly focused upon the history of the steppe and Mongolia itself. The present volume will look to provide an expansive overview of the Mongol Empire's history, from the rise of the Mongol state to its imperial expansion and its legacy, in addition to opening new lines of inquiry into the social, cultural, and economic dynamics of the Mongol imperium.

This volume appears at a critical juncture in the historiography of the Mongol Empire, which is enjoying unprecedented attention from the international academic community. The growing popularity of world history, combined with the emergence of an independent democratic Mongolian republic in 1991, has coincided with the maturation of this research field. Meanwhile, the limitations placed on earlier researchers, whether conceptual or practical, are gradually being surmounted to produce new and innovative studies. This development is exemplified by the growing tendency of historians to branch out of their regional studies clusters

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and embrace broader educational and analytical paradigms. The biggest hurdle to studying the Mongol Empire has traditionally been linguistic, as it would require a polyglot of rare talent to master all of the languages and scripts in which Mongol history was written. Nevertheless, it is possible to study some of the key languages – chief among them Persian and Chinese – in order to write a more comprehensive history of the empire. The insight provided by such a multilingual approach was perhaps best practiced by the great Thomas Allsen but has become far more popular amongst other contemporary scholars, not least of all Paul D. Buell, Michal Biran, Kim Hodong, and their students. Their expertise has helped to advance studies into the social, economic, and cultural history of the Mongols, which David Morgan identified as the next frontier of research on the Mongol Empire, complementing more traditional research on political and military history.[1] There has likewise been a proliferation in the number of histories on women in the Mongol Empire, which scholars have long been cognisant of but have only recently started to discuss expansively, with notable monographs by the likes of Anne F. Broadbridge, Bruno De Nicola, and Bettine Birge among them. Their research has contributed to a fundamental recalibration of our understanding of how the empire functioned. We are, therefore, standing on the cusp of a dramatic reconceptualization of the mechanics and composition of the Mongol Empire.

Exciting work is also being done to expand the available source material that historians have at their disposal. New sources are few but significant, and the last two decades have seen the publication of the anonymous thirteenth-century *Akhbar-i Mughulan*, the near contemporaneous *Nizam al-Tavarikh* of Qadi Baydawi, and the fourteenth-century compendium, known as the *Safina-yi Tabriz*. We might also add to this list the recent scholarship by Yoni Brack, Dorothea Krawulsky, and Stefan Kamola (among others) into the production of Rashid al-Din's *Jami' al-Tavarikh*, which has seen a greater use of the Persian scholar-bureaucrat's religious texts, as well as his history of the world, to develop a clearer picture of how this central figure shaped Mongol historiography in his own time.[2] This work into the written historical sources has been complemented by equally exciting developments in the material history of the Mongol Empire, which includes research into art and architectural history as well as archaeological research. These studies have the potential to reveal a great deal about people who might otherwise have gone unmentioned or unnoticed in the literary sources, including female patrons and beneficiaries, as well as commoners. Chroniclers in this period, with few exceptions, viewed history as the story of great warriors and kings, only mentioning others in exceptional circumstances – al-Dhahabi's reporting of the birth of quintuplets in Baghdad is one example that leaps to mind.[3] But an analysis of the material culture has the potential to inform us of the daily lives of common people. The chapters produced in this volume draw upon and expand these lines of inquiry to produce original research that will advance our knowledge of the broader Mongol Empire.

The *Routledge Mongol World* is, however, also intended to provide an accessible overview of the topic that intersects with other fields – both geographic and thematic. With that in mind, this volume addresses some of the core debates and questions that are currently occupying experts: How are nomadic states formed and constituted? Why did the Mongol Empire disintegrate? To what extent did the Mongols interact

with their subject populations, and what did such interactions produce? And who ruled the Mongol Empire? None of these questions permits easy or concise answers, yet by engaging with these topics we hope to spur students and academics alike to probe the similarities and differences between the Mongols and other historical empires, both on the steppe and beyond. For an empire as vast as the Mongols, the best way to achieve this objective is to invite collaboration from experts across the discipline. We are confident that this volume has assembled an appropriate balance between seasoned leaders in the field and up-and-coming academics to advance the conversation about one of history's most important empires. Over the coming chapters they will demonstrate that the Mongols did more than just sack and burn; they enhanced transcontinental connections, facilitating the exchange of ideas, technologies, and goods on a scale not seen again until the nineteenth century. By testing old systems and ideologies, the Mongol Empire reshaped the map of Eurasia to give birth to the early modern age.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Mongolia was by many standards an odd place for the largest contiguous empire in world history to emerge. It lacks many ingredients that we might associate with other historical empires. Situated between the Altai Mountains in the west, the Khinggan Mountains to the east, the Sayan Mountains to the north, and the Gobi Desert to the south, the Mongolian plateau lacks many of the advantages that other historical empires possessed. Far from any coastline, the region has low precipitation rates and harsh winters, with arctic winds blowing south out of Siberia causing the temperature to drop below 40 degrees centigrade. The lack of a coastline also renders Mongolia less accessible to maritime trade and settlement, and although the region is watered by a number of river systems, most snaking northward in the direction of Lake Baikal, none of them is particularly large. These conditions have meant that, although farming is certainly possible in many parts of Mongolia, mobile herding (nomadic pastoralism) has been practiced by the region's inhabitants, alongside hunting, fishing, and trading, since the late Neolithic Period. Extended families migrated between seasonal pastures, with competition for water and grazing land increasing during the Bronze Age, when the process of rudimentary state formation is documented across Asia.[4] Although Mongolia shared in many of the broader transcontinental economic and social trends of its neighbours, most notably China, the steppe remained relatively sparsely populated. Indeed, the lack of a strong agrarian economic base or a large population made Mongolia an unlikely place for empire building, but the nomads did possess a number of natural advantages. Mongolia's climate and isolation provided it with natural protection against its neighbours, and the nomads' reliance on animals, especially horses, provided the Mongols with a mobility that was unmatched by many sedentary civilizations.[5] Drawing upon these factors, Mongolia has played host to a string of regional empires dating from the second century BCE, including the Hunnu (Xiongnu, 209BCE-216CE) Empire, the Sarbi (Xianbei, third-fourth century CE), the Göktürk Empire (552–657 and 682–744CE), the Uyghur Empire (744–840CE), and the Khitan Liao (916–1125CE), many of which projected their power across the steppe into Central Inner Asia and south towards China.

Like many earlier empires on the steppe, the Mongol Empire was forged through conquest. Historically, the steppe has passed through periods of greater and lesser integration in which the nomadic population formed large empires before they broke apart into smaller, competing political formations. The extent to which this cycle was the inevitable product of the mobile herders' lifeway is debatable, but it is clear that the periods of lesser integration tended to coincide with an increased militarization of the nomadic population.[6] This was certainly the case after the collapse of the Khitan-Liao Empire (916–1125), which ruled over northern China, Manchuria, and Mongolia and against which the Inner Asian nomads began to form larger political and military groupings. The fall of the Khitan-Liao created a power vacuum, resulting in the movement of people and a competition for precedence on the steppe. The Mongols were just one of the groups who contested control of the Mongolian Plateau during this period, emerging under the leadership of Qabul Khan and his successors sometime in the early twelfth century between the Onan and Kerulen rivers in the northeast of Mongolia. This was a time of great peril as the lack of a central power enabled the rise of a feuding culture in which blood debts, temporary alliances, and oaths regulated social and political life. Yet it was also a time of great dynamism and opportunity in which new reputations could be forged and in which new leaders emerged. Modern historians have tended to downplay the role of individual genius in explaining historical change, yet in a society where personal relations, honour, and reputation played such a big part, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Chinggis Khan was a central component in the unification of his people. Shaped by a turbulent and at times tragic upbringing, Chinggis Khan drew upon his experiences to initiate a new political union, built around unflinching loyalty to him. Between 1184 and 1206 he not only defeated his rivals on the steppe, but integrated the conquered people into his union, discarding their earlier tribal identities and replacing them with a sense of shared Mongol unity.

Having brought together the people to the north of the Gobi Desert, Chinggis Khan embarked upon one of the most remarkable military expansions in world history. His armies passed into eastern Siberia and northern China before shifting westward and entering East Turkistan, the Ferghana Valley, Mawarannahr, Khwarazm, and the Qipchaq Steppe. Advanced divisions penetrated even further, raiding across Iran and the Pontic Steppe before returning to Mongolia in 1224. Chinggis Khan's immediate successors added to these achievements, nearly doubling the territory and population under Mongol control. At its height, the Mongol Empire incorporated over 22,000,000 sq. km of territory, spanning most of the known world.[7] The Mongols therefore exceeded the earlier nomadic empires by combining the rule of the steppe with the rule of the sown, imposing direct control over the agrarian civilizations of Iran, China, Mawarannahr, and Russia. The question of why the Mongols needed to conquer so much territory has plagued historians since its inception. Most of the contemporary sources attributed the Mongol conquests, like most other important historical changes, to an act of God. Whether Chinese, Islamic, or European, those who survived the Mongol invasions believed that God/Heaven had decided to impose a new world order to address the sinfulness or decadence of the earlier rulers. Modern historians have come up with a number of alternative explanations, which include but are not limited to the desire to achieve control of trans-continental trade routes, an imperial ideology of world domination, climatic shifts, and the need to

compensate for socio-economic deficiencies within the nomadic political economy.[8] Yet many of these explanations continue to perpetuate the same kind of determinism inherent in the earlier primary sources. More recently, one of the present volume's editors has pointed out that it is extremely unlikely that either Chinggis Khan or his contemporaries ever conceived of amassing such a large empire from the beginning. Rather, the Mongols started a series of wars with neighbouring states to protect their new union. The success of these campaigns caused the Mongols to pivot, during the rule of Chinggis Khan's successors, toward an ideology of world domination.[9] It is, however, certain that by the middle of the thirteenth century the Mongols had embraced the idea of world empire, and they aggressively pushed their claims to new territory in the Mediterranean, Central Europe, and even South and Southeast Asia.

Whilst conquest and the control of other people may be the most familiar characteristic of empires, it is not what distinguishes them from other political formations. Empires are typically defined by their uniqueness, most often characterised by their superlative claims to power (whether military, political, spiritual, or cultural). Empires recognise no natural limits to their power, nor do they willingly acknowledge the presence of peers or equals. This kind of exceptionalism was present in the inscriptions of Darius I at his palace in Susa, it was present in the imperial rituals of the Han Dynasty, and it may be glimpsed in contemporary American claims to cultural and political uniqueness. Yet the Mongols were the exemplars of this type of ideology, viewing themselves as the bringers of a new universal order, decreed by Eternal Heaven, in which the entire world would recognise Chinggisid rule. These claims manifested most commonly in the threatening and seemingly maniacal messages contained in the Mongol correspondence with foreign powers, such as the Mamluks of Egypt, the Papacy, and the Sultanate of Delhi, among others. The message of Chinggis Khan's grandson, Hülegü, to the Ayyubid ruler of Damascus, al-Nasir Yusuf, in 1259 is a prime example:

> We are the army of God, through us He punishes the despots and tyrants[. . . .] and we have bled the land, orphaned the children, destroyed the worshippers, and made them taste torment, we have made their great [ones] small, and their commanders prisoners. Do you think that you will be safe from us? In a short time you will know what there is to be known, you have been warned.[10]

This text, though undoubtedly modified by the Syrian writer al-Suyuti for dramatic effect, does nevertheless convey the same belligerent and uncompromising tone that we find in most other Mongol letters calling for submission.[11] The Mongols believed that Heaven had made them the supreme rulers of the world, and those who failed to recognise this fact needed to be punished, not just subdued.

Yet this same universalism produced a number of other interesting results, most especially in the creation of an imperial culture. From its inception, the Mongol Empire drew upon the resources, manpower, and expertise of their conquered territories in order to preserve and grow their state. The Mongols themselves were a diverse group, including semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers from the ecotone border with the Siberian forests, Turkic-speaking traders based close to the Silk Road, and the former allies and confederates of the Jin Empire in northern China. The Mongols also encouraged a diverse array of people to enter service, even as their

lands were conquered. It needs to be remembered that the Mongols probably had a population no greater than one million people at the beginning of the thirteenth century, many of whom were too old or too young to enter military service.[12] It was, therefore, impossible for the Mongols to conquer and then govern such a vast population, let alone territory, without the cooperation of local magnates, officials, and religious leaders. Indeed, the ability of the Mongols to include and incorporate new people into their empires is one of the most important yet least appreciated aspects of their imperial expansion. Provided that a person submitted to the khan and paid regular tribute, they could expect to retain their property, status, and most importantly, their lives. This inclusiveness made the Mongol court (*ordu*) a highly cosmopolitan and vibrant environment, where envoys, missionaries, and merchants encountered people and ideas from all over the world. European messengers sent to the qa'an (supreme ruler) in the first half of the thirteenth century report seeing Korean princes, Nizari Isma'ilis, and French craftsmen, among others.[13] The Mongols took the best of what their subjects had to offer by way of tribute and technical knowledge and projected it outwards in an affirmation of Mongol universalism. Perhaps some of the best examples of this imperial culture were the debates organised by Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251–9) and several of his successors between the various religious leaders of their empire. The Flemish friar William of Rubruck claimed to have participated in one such debate, in which he, along with some less-than-helpful Nestorian Christians, allied with the Muslims to defeat Buddhist monks in a debate about the transmigration of souls.[14] By refereeing these debates, the qa'an situated himself as the supreme arbiter of divine knowledge and, therefore, universal power across his vast empire.

The movement of people, goods, and ideas that stemmed from this Mongol universalism reshaped the economic map of Eurasia. For a very brief period, most of this vast expanse was ruled by a single government that was favourably disposed towards international commerce, with Mongol princes and princesses often providing the finance for merchants to bring them exotica and luxury items from the farthest reaches of the empire. This trade initially passed overland via the famous Silk Roads, which connected the producers and market towns of East Asia, Inner Asia, the Near East, North Africa, South Asia, and Europe. Though few merchants would have ever traversed the entire length of the journey from east to west (or for that matter from south to north), some did, accelerating the transcontinental exchange which had already been under way for over a millennium prior to Mongol rule. This trade was damaged by the breakup of the Mongol Empire into a number of autonomous regions between 1260 and 1264, but much overland trade continued via the Qipchaq steppe. Moreover, the maritime Silk Roads were revived after the Mongol conquest of the Southern Song dynasty in 1279, which saw trade across the Indian Ocean increase in volume and value. Scholars are only now beginning to appreciate the contribution of the Mongol Empire to this process, which saw the spread of distillation technology, pulse medicine, and cartographic information throughout the empire.[15] There was also an exchange of goods, like *materia medica*, especially plants and food; experimentation with new strains of rice and even new fibres was carried out. Whilst silk was shipped west to the Near East with porcelain from China and ramie from Korea, cotton was sent east from central Inner Asia, and gold brocade (known as *nasij*) was sent to Europe.[16] New patterns of consumption

and style were pioneered by the Mongols, who were always among the first to flaunt new trends.

The combination of the Mongol conquests and the enhanced trade carried out through 'the Chinggis Exchange' transformed the demographic map of Eurasia. Many old centres of population, government, and trade, such as Baghdad, Quanzhou, and Constantinople, were complemented by emergent centres, such as Moscow, Tabriz, and Andijan, which benefitted from the patronage of Mongol rulers as well as their proximity to the new networks of exchange. Likewise, the migration of different populations, either voluntary or forced, saw the rise of new ethnonyms and identity groups, such as the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. The spread of ideas and culture was no less profound as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were characterised by the growing Islamization of much of Inner, Southeast, and South Asia, as well as the spread of Neo-Confucianism throughout China, Vietnam, and the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, the potential for the Mongol Empire to serve as a conduit for ideas was identified earliest by the Persian bureaucrat, 'Ala al-Din 'Ata Malik Juvayni, who argued that the empire had reinvigorated Islam:

> And as for the children of the polytheists, some have fallen into the hands of the Moslems in the baseness of servitude and have attained the dignity of Islam. . . . And because of the auspiciousness of the blessings of the people of the faith, wherever the eye roameth, it seeth from the multitude of believers in the One God a vast city and in the midst of the darkness a bright light.[17]

These changes were no less profound for those living outside of the Mongol Empire, who had to re-evaluate their place in the world in relation to the Mongols. This was most true of Europe, which, shortly after the crusades, was introduced to new worlds and potential new converts to Christianity. European merchants, especially the Genoese and Venetians, were given unprecedented access to Mongol ports in the Black Sea and further inland to the Volga River and Iran, which improved European knowledge about the more distant recesses of Asia and allowed men like Marco Polo and Francesco Balducci Pegolotti to write detailed guidebooks for fellow traders on how to make their way east, what to buy and where, and all the different weights, measures, and currencies employed over the route. These books contained fantastic accounts of the wealth to be found in the Mongol court:

> To this city also are brought articles of greater cost and rarity, and in greater abundance of all kinds, than to any other city in the world. For people of every description, and from every region, bring things (including all the costly wares of India, as well as the fine and precious goods of Cathay itself with its provinces), some for the sovereign, some for the court, some for the city which is so great, some for the crowds of Barons and Knights, some for the great hosts of the Emperor which are quartered round about; and thus between court and city the quantity brought in is endless.[18]

The stories of the wealth and power of the qa'ans fired the European imagination and pushed for new exploratory excursions, which played no small part in the European discovery of the Americas. Marco Polo's travelogue was read widely among the

navigators and conquistadors of the fifteenth century, with Christopher Columbus and Hernan Cortes both deriving inspiration from his work.

Nevertheless, the Mongol Empire only remained a unified entity for a short period of time. The steppe empires of eastern Inner Asia were often regarded as the shared property of the imperial family and their vassals, a practice which saw the earlier Hunnu and Gök Türk empires divided between eastern and western branches. The Mongol qa'ans also apportioned shares (*qubi*) to imperial relatives, in addition to *ordu*s (camps) and, in some cases, entire dominions (*ulus*es). The qa'ans were, therefore, expected to consult with their relatives on matters of imperial policy, as much as they were expected to oversee and manage the business of state. One of the great strengths of Chinggis Khan and his successors had been their ability to win support from a diverse constellation of actors, both Mongol and foreign, for their imperial enterprise, yet this same independence of action also fed centrifugal tendencies that emerged in the mid-thirteenth century. With individual princes building power bases far from the imperial centre and no clear system of succession, divisions emerged and resulted in bloody purges in 1251 before a civil war in 1260 saw the empire fracture into four divisions, each ruled by a descendant of Chinggis Khan: the Jochid Ulus (Golden Horde) ruled the territory between the Danube and the Irtysh River; the Ilkhanate controlled the area between the Amu Darya and Euphrates rivers; the Yuan, which was notionally the superior branch, included Mongolia, Tibet, Korea, and China; whilst the Middle Empire incorporated the Tarim Basin, Mawarannahr, and everything between.[19] Though these separate states each continued to pay lip-service to the idea of a unified Mongol Empire and occasionally agreed to temporary alliances, they were *de facto* autonomous states, which spent more time fighting one another than their neighbours. The division of the empire halted imperial expansion across most of the empire, with the notable exception of the Yuan in southern China.

These successor states continued to flourish for the better part of a century, during which time they developed along separate political, cultural, and economic trajectories. In each case, there was a cross-cultural fertilization and assimilation of the Mongols and their subject population. In Iran, the Qipchaq Steppe, and Mawarannahr, this meant the conversion of the Mongols to Islam, whereas the Yuan embraced Tantric Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. There was also a greater willingness to learn the languages of the conquered people, albeit these were not always spoken at court. The Jochids quickly began to speak a strain of Qipchaq Turkic, while the Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 1295–1304) not only spoke Persian, but also assumed the Perso-Islamic title of '*Padshah-i Islam*' (Emperor of Islam). In some cases, the perceived identification of the court with a region created further tensions and internal divisions, as was the case between Qubilai and his relatives in Mongolia, who came to believe that he had neglected them after moving the capital to Daidu (modern Beijing). Yet the Mongol successor states continued to correspond with one another, and all retained their former reverence for the laws and principles (*jasaq* and *yosun*) of Chinggis Khan. Imperial rituals and culture therefore continued to maintain the illusion of unity, even if political interests divided them in actuality.

The Mongolian successor states began to disintegrate at different points throughout the fourteenth century, and although they had long been ruled separately, their decline can be traced to a number of shared causes. The fourteenth century was a turbulent time across Eurasia, with the plague spreading west from China

to Europe and North Africa, decimating anywhere between a third to a half of the total population, with marked severity between 1346 and 1354.[20] The plague was followed by what climate historians have termed a Little Ice Age, which only reached its nadir in the 1370s.[21] These factors, combined with other regional catastrophes, decimated the Mongols' revenues, making it difficult to maintain a functioning government. With the imperial centres weakened, growing regionalism took hold as princes and non-Chinggisid commanders (*qarachu*) began to carve out small islands of influence with which to challenge their former leaders. The Ilkhanate disintegrated in 1335 and was followed soon after by the Chaghadaid rulers of the Middle Empire in 1346. The Yuan were pushed back to Mongolia by the Ming, who formed a new dynasty in China beginning in 1368. Meanwhile, the Jochid Ulus was wracked by a period of division and civil war, known as the War of Five Contenders, beginning in 1359. Hence, with the exception of the Yuan, none of the Mongol successor states was conquered by a new empire or people. This allowed the Mongols to reconstitute themselves in many parts of the former empire, most notably the Jochids under the leadership of Toqtamish, the Chaghadaids in East Turkistan, and the Northern Yuan in Mongolia. Yet it also allowed the formation of new hybrid dynasties, such as the Noqais and the Jalayirids, which were founded by the descendants of Mongol commanders, though infused with a devotion to Islam. The most significant of these hybrid dynasties was the one founded by Timur, who, in a military career spanning more than four decades, managed to conquer most of the former Ilkhanate, Middle Empire, and the Qipchaq Steppe, sounding the death knell for what was left of the Jochid Ulus.

It should not, however, be forgotten that Timur was himself of Mongol descent, and his rise to power was premised upon Mongol rituals, symbols, and principles of legitimate authority. Indeed, it seems that the most important and enduring Mongol legacy was to shape the political configuration of Eurasia at the beginning of the fifteenth century. There is, therefore, a great deal that research of the Mongol Empire has to tell us about the birth of the early modern age. This is as true of the European experience as it is of states and civilizations further east. Until very recently, historians were prone to dismiss the Mongols as barbaric invaders and interlopers who disrupted the natural historical evolution of the peoples with whom they came into contact. More recently, however, historians of the Islamic core territories have probed the influence that the Mongols exerted on the formation of the later Gunpowder Empires, namely the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire, and the Safavid Empire. These studies have provided a greater recognition of the role that Mongol universalism played, albeit with Timurid mediation, in the development of new millenarian claims to divine-right monarchy among these dynasties. Their rulers could claim a direct connection with the Chinggisids, whether through blood descent, as was the case for the Mughals, or through the intellectual genealogy that tied them back to thinkers at the Mongol court, who portrayed the khans as divinely inspired revivers of Islamic law and belief (*mujadid*s), as lords of the auspicious conjunction (*sahib qiran)*, or as messianic guides and protectors (*mahdi*).[22] A similar influence was exercised on most other early modern successors to the Mongol Empire, including the Russian Empire, where historians have documented the institutional debt that the tsars owed to the Mongols, inheriting titles, offices, and even much of their army and aristocracy from the Mongols.[23] Likewise, in Ming China,

an early rejection of the foreign rulers was quickly replaced by a more nuanced assessment of Mongol rule in the hopes of incorporating the former territories of the exiled Yuan dynasty.[24] Yet the clearest claim to an enduring Mongol legacy can be found in Inner Asia, much of which continued to be ruled by descendants of Chinggis Khan into the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Only European colonialism and the Industrial Revolution forced a shift towards a new governing paradigm, this time dictated by the empires of northwestern Europe.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

The themes introduced above will be expanded upon throughout the forthcoming chapters in three sections dedicated to the topics of Conquest and State Formation, the Social History of the Mongol Empire, and the Mongols in World History. The first section begins by addressing the life and career of Chinggis Khan and the Mongol conquests (Isenbike Togan and Timothy May). These subjects have been the topic of much revision over past years with a number of excellent biographies produced on the imperial founder by Ruth Dunnell, Michal Biran, and Timothy May, among others.[25] The history of the Mongol conquests has also seen a great deal of debate, with historians traditionally treating the campaigns against the Near East, East Asia, and the Qipchaq Steppe/Europe as separate fronts. More recently, however, Alexander V. Maiorov and Stephen Pow have suggested that the initial Mongol foray into the Caucasus and the Pontic Steppe, as well as the later campaigns against the Caucasus, the Qipchaq, and Rus' in 1236, may have been part of a much larger 'Western Campaign.'[26] Their arguments are given credence by the fact that all campaigns were planned centrally by the qa'an and his advisors until the dissolution of the empire following the death of Möngke Qa'an in 1259. Their chapters on the invasion of Europe and the invasion of the Rus' will be partnered with chapters on the Mongol conquests of the Qara Khitai, the Qipchaqs, the Jazira, Rum, and Syria by Timothy May, whose 'tsunami strategy' still prevails in most scholarship on Mongol campaign strategy.[27] The campaigns against the Qara Khitai, the Qipchaqs, and the Jazira have been under-researched by historians who have traditionally focused upon the so-called 'core territories' of Asia. There is, however, a growing appreciation that the conquest of central Inner Asia held no less significance for the Mongols and played a decisive role in the formation of the early Mongol state.[28] These campaigns will therefore be brought into focus in this study alongside the Mongol conquest of Transcaucasia, which will be detailed by John Latham-Sprinkle, whose recent discovery of the former Alan capital of Magas helps to orient the later Mongol invasions of the region in 1220–3 and 1238–40. New light will also be shed on the Mongol conquests of Iran (Beatrice Forbes Manz) and China (David Curtis Wright).

The Mongol conquest was rapid, both during the lifetime of Chinggis Khan and then under his successors, who gradually built an administrative structure to incorporate these new people and territories over the course of the thirteenth century. The foundation was laid by Chinggis Khan, whose household guard, or *keshig* (Michael Hope), served as the most important component of government and whose proclamations came to form the basis of early common law (*jasaq*, Denise Aigle). Chinggis Khan also set up the framework for other logistical infrastructure, such

as the postal system (*jam*, Hosung Shim), courts and judges (*jarqu* and *jarquchin*, Florence Hodous), and marriage alliances with confederate families (*quda*, Anne F. Broadbridge), who retained some authority in the empire. These institutions were all expanded and developed further by Chinggis's descendants as part of the four Chinggisid successor states: the Jochid Ulus (Roman Hautala), the Yuan (Xiaolin Ma), the Ilkhanate (George Lane), and the Middle Empire (Michael Hope). Indeed, Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene's chapter on the terms *ulus* (state) and *irgen* (people) will elucidate how the growth of at least two of these successor states was initiated by Chinggis Khan himself, when he appointed his eldest sons Jochi and Chaghadai as 'princes in charge of *ulus*,' thereby giving them armies and pastures separate from, though still nominally subject to, the *qa'an*.

What life was like inside the Mongol Empire will be discussed under the heading of the Social History in the Mongol Empire. This topic incorporates a number of different discussions about the relationship between the Mongols and their subjects, gender relations within the Mongol Empire, and daily life in the Mongol Empire. These topics naturally intersect and overlap. It would, for example, be difficult to discuss gender relations within the Mongol Empire without querying how these processes played out in Islamic Iran, where the Turks and Mongols pushed women into more prominent positions of authority.[29] On the other hand, recent analysis of Yuan-period juridical manuals by Bettine Birge shows that Mongol policies to maintain the integrity of military households played a role in diminishing the rights of wives and widows in China.[30] Chapters on elite women and consort families (Anne F. Broadbridge and Bruno De Nicola) will explore the intersection of gender, imperialism, and cultural exchange in the Mongol Empire. Religion was also a key area of dialogue between the conquered population and the Mongols, who were eager to avoid offending local deities, whilst at the same time using religion and religious officials as a device to consolidate control. Chapters on Nestorian Christianity (Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog), Islamization (Ishayahu Landa), Buddhism (Brian Baumann), Judaism (Na'ama O. Arom), Daoism, and Confucianism (Jesse Sloane) will highlight the often complex relationship between the Mongols and the religious leaders and intellectuals whose power grew as a result of close ties to the imperial court. These ties often resulted in direct patronage of religious officials but also of the institutions that they oversaw. In the Islamic world (Sheila Blair), these took the form of mosques, madrasas, and *khanaqa*s, whilst in China (Shane McCausland) we see favour shown towards a constellation of Confucian and Buddhist temples, academies, and shrines, in addition to the production of portraits, carpets, and hangings, which were intended to glorify both deities and the patron. Such patronage appears to have been a long-standing tradition among the nomads, with archaeological research in Mongolia uncovering sites of temporary shrines and even palaces dating to the period of Chinggis Khan's rise (Ulambayar Erdenebat, Jargalan Burentogtokh, and William Honeychurch). These ruins testify to the complexity of life on the steppe, even after the Mongol conquest, with the nomads moving between temporary summer and winter capitals in the Jochid Ulus (Daniel C. Waugh) and indeed throughout the rest of the empire as well.

Where the Mongols derived their wealth and how it was apportioned are also critical to understanding relationships of patronage and production. Initially, the Mongols ruled their conquered territories according to their own principles, dividing

the population into decimal units through a census and assigning Mongol divisions the revenue of a population centre. This military government was highly exploitative in many regions, especially those where the Mongols continued to engage in hostilities with the local rulers. Yet even during the reign of Chinggis Khan there was a shift towards a more centralised and bureaucratic style of government, which was expanded by his successors, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241) and Möngke (r. 1251–9).[31] Under this system, Mongol governors (*daruqachin*) were appointed to population centres to administer a census and oversee tax collection, usually in coordination with native officials. These *daruqachin* would also ensure that the existing office holders in a submitted territory remained loyal to the state. The taxes often went by a number of different names and could vary between different regions of the empire, hinting at the sometimes pragmatic, sometimes rushed process through which they were imposed (István Vásáry). The reign of Möngke saw increased coherence and centralization and in many instances local officials and princes, such as the Rurikids of Russia, amassed great power as they were deputised by the khans. Merchants were also appointed to oversee this process, in addition to supplementing the wealth of royal treasuries through trade partnerships (*ortoq*) (Colleen C. Ho and Paul D. Buell). There was not, however, a unitary financial system, as illustrated by the inconsistent minting of Mongol coins (Judith Kolbas), which may have been intended to mitigate any further destabilization following the initial conquests. Nevertheless, the Mongols did employ their coinage to disperse political messaging to their newfound subjects and, from the beginning of the fourteenth century, moves were made to standardise currency, weights, and measures in order to facilitate greater trade across the empire. With this trade came a number of new innovations in the field of medical science (Paul D. Buell), astral science, and cartography (Hyunhee Park), which further entwined wealthy Mongol patrons with intellectual and artisanal leaders throughout the empire.

The nature of these interactions and their lasting effects will be covered in the third section of the book under parts dedicated to The Mongols in the Eyes of the Conquered, Beyond the Borders of the Mongol Empire, and The Mongol Legacy. For the most part these topics can only be probed from the perspective of the conquered people, since little survives from the Mongols themselves, especially in the later years of the empire when the Mongols began to patronise the production of manuscripts in the vernacular or sacred languages of the subject people. Nevertheless, we are able to glean some of the authentic Mongol viewpoints from correspondence, such as those between the Chinggisids and the Papacy, which have been preserved in the Vatican archives (Antti Ruotsala). These letters show an evolving attitude towards the Pope and the other European potentates as the empire evolved from a unified and expansionary entity to a series of competing polities seeking for allies outside their borders. Although the traditional Mongol claims to universal sovereignty are preserved in the Mongol correspondence with Rome, they were nuanced by the desire of the Ilkhans in particular to find partners against the Mamluks. In other sources we can see how the Mongols influenced the writing of history, with the Persian (Michael Hope) and Tibetan monastic chronicles (Soyoung Choi) clearly drawing upon now-lost Mongol sources to advance a new trend of world history, necessitated by the universal ambitions of the Mongol rulers. Elsewhere, in Korea (Lee Kang Hahn), Russia (Donald Ostrowski), China (Morris Rossabi and Michael C. Brose), and even the Caucasus (Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog), views of the Mongols

and Mongol rule altered violently over time based upon fluctuations in relations between the Mongols and those writing the histories.

The reach of the Mongol Empire was not, however, confined to the territories under its control. Indeed, merchants, scholars, missionaries, and refugees passed freely back and forth between the Mongol Empire and its neighbours, resulting in a rich cultural exchange with the wider world. These interactions included tribute missions from Southeast Asia, the incorporation of Mongol troops into the Lithuanian aristocracy, and the production of polyglot phrasebooks in Yemen.[32] In some cases, substantial Mongol populations settled in the periphery of the Mongol Empire, acting as vessels of cultural transmission beyond the empire. Large diaspora communities settled in the Delhi Sultanate (Michael Hope) and in the Mamluk Empire (Josephine van den Bent), most being political refugees or captives enslaved after battles. In both cases, the Mongols appear to have retained their ethnic identity long after they had converted to Islam, as it marked them out as belonging to the martial elite of those communities. In other parts of Eurasia, the Mongols were either reluctant or unable to settle, as was the case with Japan (Li Narangoa), Vietnam, Indonesia, and Burma (James A. Anderson), which were repeatedly invaded by the Mongols but never fully integrated into the empire. Nevertheless, later generations would build national founding myths upon the heroism displayed in resisting the Mongol armies. Indeed new identities were often formed as much in response to the threat of Mongol invasion as they were by assimilation into the Mongol Empire. Precisely when or if this Mongol influence ever abated is the topic of the final section of the book, which charts the continuation of Chinggisid rule in Mongolia (Ippei Shimamura), while the Mongol legacy is also traced under the Ming (Qiu Yihao), the Timurids (Evrim Binbaş), and across the Near East (Patrick Wing).

NOTES

1 Morgan 2015, 279.
2 Krawulsky 2011; Kamola 2019; Brack 2016.
3 al-Dhahabi 1999, XLVII, 38.
4 Honeychurch and Makarewicz 2016, 346; Fletcher 1986, 11–50; Lane 2006, 17.
5 Bosson 2013, 47.
6 Sneath 2007, 4; Di Cosmo 2002, 179.
7 May 2017, 78.
8 Jenkins 1974, 217–226; Fletcher 1986, 11–50; Barfield 1989; De Rachewiltz 1973, 21–36; Golden 1982, 37–76.
9 May 2017, 89.
10 Al-Suyuṭi 2013, 719.
11 Voegelin 1940–1, 378–413.
12 May 2007, 28.
13 *TMM*, 63–65, 158, 176.
14 *TMM*, 192.
15 Park 2021; Lane 2006, 141; Park 2012.
16 Allsen 1997; Lane 2004, 92.
17 *HWC*, 14.
18 Polo/Yule 1903, I, 414–415.
19 Jackson 1978, especially 222–244.

20 Schamiloglu 1993, 448–449.
21 Brook 2010, 53.
22 Binbaş 2014, 277–303.
23 Halperin 2003, 481–497; Ostrowski 2002; Vásáry 2017, 252–270.
24 Serruys 1957, 137–190; Rossabi 2013, 200–223; Robinson 2020, *passim*.
25 Dunnell 2010; Biran 2007; May 2021.
26 Pow 2016, 31–51.
27 May 2017, 90–91.
28 Biran 2008, 202; Morgan 1982, 133.
29 Bayani 1974, 9–32.
30 Birge 2017, 185–189.
31 Allsen 1987, 80; May 2018, 144–150.
32 Kolodziejczyk 2011, 9; Jackson 2017, 393; Fiaschetti 2019, 271–285.

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SECTION I

CONQUEST AND STATE FORMATION

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SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

CONQUEST AND STATE FORMATION

Michael Hope and Timothy May

Such was the transformative impact of Chinggis Khan and his successors upon the history of Eastern Inner Asia that it is often easy to forget that the Mongol Empire did not appear in a vacuum but was rather one in a succession of empires that rose to dominate the Eurasian steppes between the seventh century before the common era and the eighteenth century of the common era. The discussion of why these empires formed and how they differed from contemporary agricultural empires to the south has coloured contemporary interpretations of the Mongols. In most cases, we are forced to explore these empires from the perspectives of outsiders, due to the relative sparsity of written sources surviving from the steppe. This has traditionally led historians to exaggerate the separation between the steppe and the sown, the nomads and the farmers, muddying the role of border markets and cultural interlocutors in the formation of new political paradigms. Yet the Mongols fly in the face of such juxtapositions, as they built their empire in part through the integration and exploitation of the technologies, resources, and manpower of the people whom they encountered and conquered. Any effective appraisal of the Mongol Empire must, therefore, have an appreciation of the debt Chinggis Khan and his successors owed to earlier dynasties and neighbours, whilst still acknowledging the many novel aspects of their imperial enterprise.

Following the shift from hunting-gathering to pastoralism in Mongolia some 5,000 years ago, the first empire was formed towards the end of the third century before the common era. The Hunnu (Xiongnu) Empire (240BCE–118CE) first entered the pages of history in the Chinese sources of the Han Dynasty (202 BCE–220CE), whose northern border they threatened. Their successors, the Sarbi (Xianbei) (third-fourth century CE), the Rouran (330–552), the Türk (552–744), the Uyghurs (745–840), and the Khitan (907–1125), maintained the same connection with China and Chinese history. It is, therefore, only natural that historians have sought the origins of the steppe empires in the ebb and flow of relations between these two great civilizations. This relationship was primarily one of commerce and exchange. The nomadic pastoralists, who largely depended upon their animals for

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their livelihoods, were seen to have a fundamentally different mode of subsistence to the sedentary agriculturalists of the south, which in turn fostered trade between the two groups. It has even been suggested that this was a dependent relationship on the part of the nomads, who would otherwise be unable to sustain themselves solely on the produce of their animals. This view, though still widely held, has become increasingly nuanced of late as historians begin to appreciate that the Mongolian plateau integrated a variety of different lifeways.[1]

Nevertheless, their proximity to China allowed the largely pastoral people of Mongolia to acquire grains and crafted goods, such as metal tools, weapons, and fabric, in return for skins and furs from the taiga region to the north, in addition to felt, slaves, animals, and animal products. The most important of these animals was the horse, which flourished in large numbers in Mongolia and became a necessary component of most pre-modern armies by the Middle Ages. As luxury items, horses could command hefty prices, in some instances as much as 1 million bolts of silk, which the nomads could then use to trade with other regional powers.[2] Indeed, there is strong evidence that the Hunnu and their predecessors were a central node in a trade corridor linking East Asia to the Mediterranean, with early innovations, such as wheat, barley, and possibly even the wheel entering China via trade routes that connected East Asia to the Middle East and Central Asia via the steppe.[3] The prosperity that these trade routes brought to the nomads made their preservation of paramount importance and may have provided the impetus to the formation of the first states in Mongolia. Doubtless, the wealth created through trade exaggerated both social and economic stratification among the nomads, but the desire to control the terms of trade would have also stimulated some rudimentary organization. When such control and even the trade itself was jeopardised, the nomads often resorted to armed raiding to take what they required by force.[4] The rise of nomadic states and then empires has, therefore, been tied intimately to the goal of expanding and exploiting trade routes, especially those with China.

Trade was, of course, only one aspect of the rise and fall of steppe empires, which were often outside of human control. The ability to sustain transhumant communities across the steppe was also dependent upon good weather. A precipitous drop in temperatures could have a devastating impact upon not only trade but also upon the pastures and water sources that the herders needed to survive. Regulating access to summer and winter pastures, typically found along the river systems of central and northern Mongolia, was one of the primary functions of a successful steppe ruler and could often be quite challenging. Recent analysis of pasturelands in Mongol-ruled Iran and Anatolia suggests that seasonal camps often changed on a yearly basis, depending upon the number of animals and the amount of precipitation. A leader had to know the size of his flocks and manage the stages of his migration, never overstaying too long in any one location.[5] The larger the population of people and animals, the greater the challenge. Yet even a well-managed society could be undone by natural disasters, such as *zhud*s (arctic storms that last for days on end). Shortage of grazing land or water could then precipitate conflict and the configuration of military and political factions. Gareth Jenkins famously analysed paleoclimatic data alongside chronicle accounts to demonstrate that just such a period of trouble pervaded most of the twelfth century when Chinggis Khan was beginning his career.[6] Improved conditions in the thirteenth century increased the amount of

available pastureland to the south, thereby allowing the Mongols to embark upon their campaigns of expansion.[7] We should of course be cautious about ascribing cause and effect to the natural environment, and climatic shifts on their own are never sufficient to explain the trajectory of history. Desiccation and periods of extreme heat or cold are prone to produce a number of possible outcomes depending upon other factors. Nevertheless, climate clearly played a significant role in shaping the political history of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire.

Whether through periods of climatic or economic strain, the early nomads were susceptible to displacement and disruption, causing an increased militarization of the steppe. Poverty or the threat of poverty caused the nomads to compete for what was available, despoiling the camps of their rivals for anything that they could live off. These raids would in turn impoverish their victims, pushing them towards a similarly predatory existence, which resulted in the rise of larger unions of people, led by individuals who demonstrated the military prowess and charisma necessary to sustain an armed following.[8] These circumstances appear to have prevailed during the rise of the Hunnu, who were sandwiched between the much larger Han and Yuezhi configurations to the south and north respectively. A similar situation emerged in the third century of the common era when economic pressure from China, combined with the weakening of Hunnu and Han power, saw the emergence of a number of military and political groupings, many of which were led by the Sarbi. Though most of these warring states passed into historical obscurity without making much of an impression upon the written records, at least one group, the Tabghach, would go on to establish control over much of northern China and Inner Mongolia and form the Northern Wei dynasty.

Many of these unions were led by elite families that often claimed descent from mythical anthropomorphic ancestors who passed on their charisma to their descendants, legitimising their right to rule. There typically was not, however, a fixed protocol for determining succession, which could pass to any male relative who won the acclaim of his people. In some instances, women could also claim leadership of a nomadic union, typically on behalf of a deceased husband and his heirs. The primary function of a leader was, however, to maintain the livelihood and security of those who followed him, and leadership was, therefore, fundamentally a military position. Demonstrated martial ability was a key criterion for aspiring leaders, and it was not uncommon for princes to be expected to prove themselves through raids and adventures, described by the Turkic term '*qazaqliq*,' before coming to the throne. Adventurous young princes (*qazaq*s) could build a following and a reputation for themselves by leading raids against ancestral enemies or against wealthy settlements, which would sometimes result in the formation of new political unions.[9]

The idea that the steppe went through periods of greater and lesser militarization, centralization, and consolidation leads us to the conclusion that nomadic political associations were highly versatile and adaptable. Indeed, some historians have even seen the utility of treating nomadic empire-building as a cyclical process, one in which empire is less an end point than the closest period to the beginning of a new cycle.[10] Whether or not nomadic state formation can be considered cyclical, it does seem that new empires tended to form with many of the components of their predecessors. In some cases, this debt to earlier imperialism was not hard to locate, as was the case with the revival of the Great Türk Empire (552–630) under the

leadership of Elterish Qaghan (r. 682–692) or its successor, the Uyghur Khaghanate, in 745. Despite being incorporated into both the first and second iterations of the Türk Empire, the Uyghurs nevertheless retained a sense of their own autonomy and asserted their control over Mongolia following the final collapse of the Second Türk Empire in 744. Yet they continued to express their authority over this territory and its people using the same titles, institutions, and ceremonies as their predecessors. Basing themselves in the Orkhon River Valley, the former centre of the Türk Empire, the Uyghurs were one of a number of successor dynasties to claim some connection to the earlier empire, the others being the Khazars, Qarluq, and Oghuz. The same process can perhaps be seen earlier among the states claiming succession from the Hunnu, most notably the Hephthalites and Western Huns.[11]

The immediate predecessors and potential models for the Mongols were the Khitan, who laid claim to both northern China and the eastern Eurasian steppe from 907 until 1125. The Khitan were themselves a proto-Mongolic people, who are noted as early as the eighth-century Turkic Orkhon Inscription and in the Chinese sources nomadising to the east of the Mongolian plateau. Under the leadership of their founder, Abaoji, the Khitan unified their homeland to the south of Manchuria before conquering the adjacent Bohai (Manchuria and northern Korea) and Mongolia. In 938, they captured 16 northern prefectures of the Chinese Song Dynasty, thereby situating themselves at the crossroads of Chinese and steppe culture.[12] The expansion of the Khitan-Liao Empire appears to have stimulated the formation of new groupings in Mongolia itself, either to defend against possible Khitan aggression, as was probably the case in the north, or to reap the benefits of dealing with the Khitan, as appears to have predominated in the south. Several of the nomadic statelets that were present during the childhood of Chinggis Khan, such as the Naiman and Kereit, were already present on the steppe by the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, testifying to this process.[13] Shortly after the Jurchen Jin toppled the Khitan in northern China, the rump of the Khitan Empire passed west to establish a new state, known as Qara Khitai (1124–1218). This territory, along with the earlier Khitan domains, was conquered and integrated into the Mongol Empire, where many Khitan officials found employment. These officials brought with them their former expertise of ruling an empire that spanned both nomadic and sedentary civilizations; thus, they played a critical role in developing the institutions to govern the latent Mongol Empire, not least the office of *daruqachi* (governor/overseer), who was charged with ensuring the loyalty of conquered territories, and possibly even the tradition of having women rule as regents after the death of their husbands until a council of notables (*quriltai* – also a Khitan institution) could determine a successor.[14]

It was through their connection with the Khitan and also their ongoing rivalry with the Jin Empire to the south that the Mongols incorporated imperial traditions from the Chinese. Abaoji himself was said to have done away with his traditional Khitan titles and adopted the more grandiose Confucian term 'Son of Heaven.' The Mongols likewise appropriated Chinese titles as a means to assert their primacy on the steppe, often in partnership with the Jin, who played the various nomadic principalities off against one another to prevent the emergence of a stronger unified opponent to the north. Both Chinggis Khan and his ally, Toghril Khan, assumed Chinese titles in recognition of their alliance with the Jin against the Tatars in 1202.

More Chinese innovations were to follow with the Mongol expansion south to conquer the Jin, which began in 1211 and culminated in the conquest of the northern capital of Zhongdu (modern Beijing) in 1215, before the capitulation of the regime during the rule of Chinggis's son and heir Ögödei in 1234. These campaigns saw the integration of not only Chinese, Khitan, and Jin officials into the Mongol Empire but also their soldiers as well. Easily the most celebrated of these officials was Yelu Chucai, a Khitan official in the service of the Jin, who transferred his allegiance to Chinggis Khan and his successors. Under his stewardship, the Mongols in northern China shifted from conquerors to rulers, imposing a fixed tax upon the agrarian and herding populations based upon a census. His role in shaping the administrative foundations of Mongol-ruled China clearly marks Yelu Chucai apart, but he was simply one of many tens of thousands of scribes, soldiers, merchants, and craftsmen whom the Mongols adopted into their government from Europe, the Near East, Central Eurasia, and East Asia, along with their earlier imperial traditions.

Probably the greatest borrowing on the part of the Mongols was their adaptation of the earlier Turkic ideology of divine mandate, centred around the heavenly deity, Köke Möngke Tengri (Blue Eternal Heaven/Sky). It has been suggested that even this may have been a borrowing from China, though the veneration of Heaven is so old that it is hard to distinguish which aspects may have been indigenous to the Turko-Mongolians and which belonged to the Chinese.[15] Most likely the two traditions cross-pollinated over a period of time before crystalising into two separate traditions. Köke Tengri (Heaven) was, in any case, a prominent part of both Hunnu and Türkic imperial ideology and was invoked in the Orkhon Inscriptions as a foil for the power of the khan and the benefits that his rule brought to the Türkic people.[16] Violations of the order of the khaghan were interpreted by the same source as implying 'chaos' in the state of Heaven and Earth. The same deity was invoked in the titulature of both the Uyghurs and their eventual conquerors, the Kirgiz.[17]

Tengri was, however, only the most pre-eminent of a whole series of regional and elemental deities, to which we might also add ancestral spirits. Veneration of the ancestors and regional deities both featured prominently in the early life of Chinggis Khan, who claimed special favour from Mount Burqan Qaldun. He believed that the mountain had afforded him protection from his enemies, and he enjoined his successors to sacrifice and show similar reverence to it after he was gone. Indeed, the mountain is still viewed by many experts as the most likely location for Chinggis Khan's as-yet-undiscovered tomb. Yet following the coronation of Chinggis Khan as ruler of the *Yeke Monggol Ulus*, the cult of Burqan Qaldun receded in importance in relation to Tenggerism. Chinggis is said to have prayed to Tengri before embarking upon his campaigns against the Jin and the Khwarazmshah, and the "will of Tengri" became a common formula to express Mongol authority in correspondence with foreign powers. Imperial edicts, letters, and the court histories, written for the most part in Chinese and Persian, show that the "will of Tengri" was to grant the Mongols universal dominion over the entire world, or in the words of Güyük Khan's letter to Pope Innocent IV, "From the rising of the sun to its setting, all the lands have been made subject to me." The appropriate response to this announcement was to "come at once and serve."[18] Though this message became more nuanced in later generations as the Mongols sought foreign allies in their civil wars, the impression is that the Mongols believed that the entire world had been given over to their rule

and that those who refused to recognise this fact were not simply adversaries but rebels against heaven's will.

Even during Chinggis Khan's lifetime, the Mongol expansion took place in a highly systematic way. Campaigns were coordinated centrally by the qa'an, though typically leadership on the ground was delegated to junior princes and commanders. This allowed the Mongols to fight a number of wars on multiple fronts. During the reign of Ögödei, for example, campaigns were launched concurrently against northern China, the Near East, and Central Asia (the Qipchaqs), whilst during the reign of Möngke, new waves of expansion were initiated into southern China, Korea, South Asia, and the Middle East. To what extent these campaigns were meant to overlap or even serve a unitary purpose has come under serious question recently.[19] Several of these campaigns operated in close proximity, such as the Middle East and Western campaigns of 1231 to 1241, which may have overlapped in the Transcaucasus; and the campaigns against South Asia and the Middle East (1251–1259), which intersected in Afghanistan. The later division of the empire into autonomous khanates has led historians to analyse these campaigns separately, yet this would have been far from clear between 1231 and 1259 when they were taking place. Soldiers, tax officials, and even conquered people saw themselves as answerable to the qa'an alone, and he presumably had the final say on the objectives and targets of these campaigns. There are even several clear examples of the Mongols pursuing strategic priorities over several generations. The Mongols' Middle Eastern frontier is a prime instance. The *Secret History of the Mongols* claims that Chinggis Khan himself charged Chormaqan Noyan with conquering Baghdad following the campaign against the Khwarazmshah (1219–1224), but it was not until the reign of Ögödei that he was actually dispatched with an army to mop up the remaining Khwarazmshah forces and impose permanent control over Iran. Ögödei's heir, Güyük, likewise inaugurated his rule by dispatching a new commander, Eljigidei Noyan, with a plan to subjugate Iraq, a plan that was delayed by his untimely death until the reign of his cousin Möngke (1251–9). The Mongol campaigns were, therefore, at least to some extent, concerted and coordinated.

The qa'an's nomadic troops were supplemented by a large contingent of non-Mongol auxiliaries, who were incorporated into the Mongolian decimal system and made up a sizeable portion of the Mongol army. As early as 1206, Chinggis Khan had already welcomed Muslims, Khitans, Hoyin Irgen (Forest People), and Turks into his army. Indeed, these non-Mongolian troops were almost a necessary ingredient to his success. His victory over the rebellious Qori Tümed in 1209 was achieved through an alliance with their neighbours, the Oirat. Likewise, Chinggis Khan's campaigns against the Jin saw the formation of new Khitan and Han divisions numbering in the tens of thousands. There was even a short-lived Khitan state established in the Liaodong Peninsula, after the completion of Chinggis's first campaign against the Jin in 1213. Moreover, the conquest of the Koryo state was only achieved after senior northern families had submitted to the Mongols and attended their *quriltai*s.[20] Even in the Islamic world, the vassal rulers of Fars, Kirman, Sistan, Herat, Mazandaran, and Luristan sent contingents to help in the eventual overthrow of the 'Abbasid caliphate in 1258.[21] Though the Mongols retained control of the most senior offices and institutions, they very quickly became a minority within their own empire. How they managed to balance their power against the interests and beliefs of their

conquered population will be covered in Part III of this book. For now, however, it is simply enough to note the important role that such units played in the initial expansion of the Mongol Empire.

This somewhat loose and decentralised governance structure allowed the Mongols and other steppe empires to expand very rapidly, but it also made them very brittle and susceptible to equally speedy collapse. It was, therefore, not an external but rather an internal challenge that saw the empire disintegrate in 1260 into several regional factions, each governed by an independent khan. These khanates retained a strong sense of shared identity and maintained a Chinggisid prince on the throne, whilst ruling in accordance with the *jasaq* and *yosun* (laws and traditions) of Chinggis Khan. They even flirted with the possibility of returning to a more cooperative style of government, albeit they had become *de jure* independent states. The root of this separation lay with the politics of succession, which, as noted earlier, was never satisfactorily resolved throughout the history of the Mongol Empire. The only smooth transition of power occurred after the death of Chinggis Khan himself in 1227, shortly after having confirmed the designation of his third son Ögödei as his successor. Matters were slightly simplified by the fact that his eldest son, Jochi, had predeceased him and his other two sons, Chaghadai and Tolui, were not willing to challenge the will of the great imperial founder.

Chinggis Khan's choice of Ögödei was far from haphazard and may reveal a great deal about how he conceived the empire would be run. Having already granted his two eldest sons *ulus*es (domains) to the west of the Mongolian homeland along with sizeable armies,[22] it was apparent that any ruler would need to govern in a collaborative, collegial style. Ögödei's claim to rule was therefore based upon his status as a deal-maker, someone to bring consensus to the rapidly growing empire and its ruling family. Even during Chinggis Khan's lifetime, Ögödei had distinguished himself as a peacemaker, in sharp contrast to his more belligerent brothers. Known for his love of drinking, Ögödei could be both affable and charming and was loved by his relatives, albeit he also demonstrated a capacity for cruelty and single-mindedness when appropriate. The tragedy for the Mongol Empire was that the third generation of Mongol rulers failed to heed Ögödei's example. Following his death in 1241, a number of possible successors presented themselves. The machinations of Ögödei's widow, Töregene Khatun, ultimately ensured that the throne would pass to his son Güyük, but the new qa'an was not universally loved. He had an ongoing feud with his cousin, Batu, the son of Jochi, who failed to attend his coronation, and when Güyük died whilst marching westward in 1248, there was some speculation that he had been murdered.[23] In any case, Güyük's death saw the question of the succession reassert itself, and this time Batu and his allies successfully campaigned to have the throne pass from the line of Ögödei to the line of his younger brother Tolui. This transition, which was no doubt intended by Batu to outmanoeuvre his rivals amongst the descendants of Ögödei and Chaghadai, was presented in later histories as a natural decision, one that might have even been forecast by Chinggis Khan himself.[24] The violence it occasioned suggests otherwise. Batu had refused to come to Mongolia to attend the *quriltai* to decide upon the new khan, pleading illness and infirmity. Instead, he held a smaller gathering in his own territory, Ala Qamaq, where he designated his cousin Möngke as qa'an. He then sped Möngke back to Mongolia in the presence of his brother Orda and a large army. Those who refused to

attend the coronation of Möngke or acquiesce to this coup were swiftly purged after he was enthroned in 1251. The Chaghadaid and Ögödeid lines of Chinggis Khan's descendants were the most heavily hit, with most of the adult men suffering execution and the junior princes placed under house arrest at the qa'an's court. The upshot was an empire dominated by Möngke in the east and Batu in the west, "two eyes in one head," as the new qa'an explained to the Franciscan friar William of Rubruck.[25]

Yet the blood-letting was far from over, and a final dramatic schism was to take place not long after the death of Möngke in 1259. His passing once again caused the question of the succession to raise its head, though this time the list of candidates had been severely diminished. By this point, Batu was long dead and his family were occupied with their dominions in the west, leaving Möngke's brothers as the sole contenders for his realm. Möngke had, however, already dispatched his younger siblings, Hülegü and Qubilai, to expand the empire's frontiers in the Middle East and China respectively, which for practical reasons removed the possibility of Hülegü launching a successful claim. He received news of his brother's death whilst in Syria and wisely calculated that he would be better served consolidating his control of the Islamic core territories than forcing his unlikely candidacy to his brother's throne. This left Qubilai, who had been engaged in war with the Southern Song dynasty alongside Möngke, and the youngest of Tolui's sons, Ariq Böke, at that time serving as custodian of Mongolia. This posting appears to have given Ariq Böke an advantage, and the list of his supporters in many cases overlaps with the names of Möngke's former household staff, suggesting his popularity with the existing order. He also parachuted his own candidates to take control of the former Ögödeid and Chaghadaid dominions in Central Eurasia, providing him with a lifeline to further military reinforcements and revenues. Yet his brother Qubilai controlled northern China and the armies assembled there. Mongolia had become dependent upon tribute and supplies from China to sustain the new imperial capital, Qaraqorum, and its hangers-on in the years since Chinggis Khan's death. The concentration of power on the steppe must have created huge new pressures on the pastureland of Mongolia, making it reliant on merchants transferring food and other necessities from neighbouring territories.[26] Qubilai therefore utilised his position to cordon off Mongolia and prevent further supplies from passing through. This forced Ariq Böke to look for aid from his Chaghadaid ally, Alghu, but when his exactions became too heavy, even this option was closed to him, and he eventually surrendered to his brother late in 1263.

The civil war between Ariq Böke and Qubilai lasted for nearly four years, but its consequences proved to be permanent. Though Ariq Böke had been captured in 1263, his allies in the Jochid Ulus and even in the Ögödeid realm failed to immediately recognise Qubilai's claims. Moreover, the conflict for the throne gave rise to other regional struggles between the Toluids and the Jochids and eventually between the Toluids and the Chaghadaids, who felt that they had been treated unfairly during the decade of Möngke's supremacy and wanted to press their claims to the land and people in the Middle East and East Turkistan. These conflicts left the Mongol Empire in a state of permanent division, with Hülegü establishing his control between the Oxus and Euphrates rivers; the Jochids retained control of the land between the Danube and the Irtysh rivers, while the Chaghadaids controlled what lay between the Amu Darya River and the Tarim Basin. Qubilai inherited

a truncated empire, consisting of Mongolia, Korea, northern China, Tibet, and Yunnan, to which he would add southern China in 1279. Most successor states, even the Jochids, eventually came to view Qubilai as the great khan and senior ruler of the former Mongol Empire, but his ability to influence events in the more westerly khanates was limited at best. The next century would see the Mongolian successor states come to terms with ruling smaller, ideologically far more homogenous territories, balancing the earlier Mongol vision of universalism with the new reality of limited sovereignty.

NOTES

1 Honeychurch and Makarewicz 2016, 343; Honeychurch 2015, 54; Jagchid and Symons 1989, 24; Vladimirtsov 1948, 52–54.
2 Beckwith 2009, 22.
3 Buell et al. 2020, 79.
4 Togan1998, 11; Ratchnevsky 1992, 160; Khazanov 1978, 124; Barfield 1989, 9.
5 Smith 1999, 40.
6 Jenkins 1974, 217–226.
7 Pederson et al. 2014, 4375–4379.
8 Di Cosmo 2002, 179.
9 Lee 2015, *passim*.
10 Barfield 1989, 11; Atwood 2008, 64; Sneath 2007, *passim*.
11 Golden 1992, 80, 83; Findley 2005, 38, 50–51, 75.
12 Biran 2005, 13–14; Wittfogel 1949, 59–60; Mote 2003, 37–40.
13 Togan 1998, 63.
14 Buell 1979, 133; Morgan 1982, 129, 133; Endicott-West 1989, 26.
15 De Rachewiltz 1973, 30; De Rachewiltz 2007, 113–137; Roux 1956, 49–82; Golden 1992, 37–76.
16 Ross and Thomsen 1930, 862, 865, 867, 869.
17 Aydın 2018, 36, 44; Golden 1982, 45.
18 *TMM*, 85–86.
19 For example see Pow 2018, 46.
20 Biran 2015, 152–181; Henthorn 1963, 73; Robinson 2009, 28; May 2018, 57.
21 Hope 2016, 100; Smith 2012, 130.
22 See Chapter 21, Lkhamsuren Munkh-Erdene, 'Mongol State Formation and Imperial Transformation.'
23 Rubruck, 167.
24 Kim 2013, 109; De Rachewiltz 1965, 197.
25 Rubruck, 238.
26 Vladimirtsov 1948, 166–167.

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Rubruck, See List of Abbreviations.
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PART I

CHINGGIS KHAN AND STATE FORMATION

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CHAPTER ONE

MONGOLIA BEFORE CHINGGIS KHAN*

Isenbike Togan

INTRODUCTION

Mongolia is part of Inner Asia but also of Asia in general, and in that sense takes part in the patterns of Asian history with its periods of universalism and localism following one another in alternation up to the emergence of the Mongolian Empire in the 13th–14th centuries.[1] In the periods of universalism empires coexisted across Asia: the first period saw the Qin-Han in China, the Xiongnu in the steppe (ca. 200BCE-200CE) and the Roman Empire in the west (until 395CE). In the second phase of universalism we see the Tang, the early Türk, the Uyghurs, (ca 550–850) Byzantium and the Islamic empires. These were all multiethnic, multicultural political entities established along trade routes, yet they had differing trade policies.

The nomadic empires in the north ruled over a vast area and favored redistribution of surplus in a power-sharing arrangement. Moreover, they promoted free trade, the profits of which were collected and redistributed locally. Sedentary states or empires in turn were interested in accumulation of surplus at a center and preferred to control trade with the outside world by making use of their bureaucracy. Another way in which the eastern and western parts of Asia differed was in terms of their outlook towards religions. During the first millennium, in the eastern parts of Asia, different religions coexisted under the umbrella of the imperial state. Western Asia was the cradle of religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, with monotheism clearly dominant.

In the periods of localism, there was not such a difference between eastern and western Asia. It was instead a world of many political actors of diverse denominations. On the whole, we see the emergence of lesser groups, both sedentary and nomadic, while leadership was mostly in the hands of more or less one ethnic group. These groups were open to trade, as well as to the cultural and spiritual influences brought by these traders. Periods of localism were politically unstable but intellectually exciting times that were also conducive to the emergence of new spiritual movements and the creation of new aesthetic patterns.

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Localist periods (220–550 and 950–1206) are marked by principalities, sultanates, khanates, chiefdoms and even smaller groups. They occur after the collapse of empires. Furthermore, while small polities emerged in the sedentary regions, clans, tribes, tribe segments and retainer groups existed in the steppe. It was within the shadow of conflicts among the steppe people that they made incursions into the sedentary regions along the trade routes, contributing to the fragmentation of the political structures. They did not venture into conquests. It was among pastoral nomadic people of the second localist period that Chinggis Khan became a leader and rose to eminence.

METHODOLOGY

Starting from the second half of the 18th century, western ethnographic literature described the nomadic population of Inner Asia as tribes. In these descriptions, "tribe" is a category for people who have remained "primitive, underdeveloped" since ancient times. In this view "unchangingness" was prevalent both diachronically (time) and synchronically (space). If differences were observed, they seemed to be regional and were reflected in tangible heritage, that is in the attire, utensils or customs of the people concerned. The travelers' as well as the scholars' interest was in the "simple, pure" and exotic.

Historians of the 19th and 20th centuries were actually not familiar with the notion of tribe in terms of their own socialization. The historical people concerned, on the other hand, often have many different terms for similar groupings. Sometimes these people do not even bother to define a term, as they are themselves familiar with it. For instance the present-day Kazakhs use the term *ru* for all categories under a *zhuz*, one of the three main divisions among the Kazakhs. A "tribe" as well as its subdivisions can be called *ru*. It is for us outsiders to figure out what they mean. What is clearly apparent for an insider needs to be neatly categorized by the outsider so that it is understandable. Our need to categorize leads to a concern with terminology. Additionally, we tend to look at categories and terminologies as static and unchanging aspects of human organization. We take notions such as tribe as unchanging entities. However, the actors in historical societies use different terms for those concepts we understand to be one static unit. Through history, Inner Asian nomads lived and experienced these notions in different forms; they did not feel the need to bring all these different forms under one neat umbrella. Apparently, it was felt that one specific term would blur differences and nuances. For us, on the other hand, such terms represent useful categories. Scholars have scrutinized whether tribes were kinship groups. Moreover, the question of what kind of terminology was used by the indigenous people such as the Mongols has been another concern.[2]

In the present study, instead of using today's terminology as an analytic category, the usage and the terminology of the sources themselves have been employed. This kind of approach will be seen in the case of Chinese as well as Persian sources. The analytic tool in the present study is the socio-political structure of these pastoral nomads. This structure has been defined as kin and non-kin groups and has been derived from historical texts. As a result, what historical texts tell us in their own terms represents the warp and weft of their own times. They make us aware of notions such as common descent, seniority by life cycle, stratification and hierarchy.

The kin groups emphasize common descent, while the non-kin groups appear as stratified and hierarchical. Some seem to be semi-stratified. The emerging picture is not a one-way "anarchy" as Vladimirtsov described it.[3]

In this paper, taking its lead from Chinese sources, terminology is used with the following translations: *xing* 姓 (clan), *bu* 部 (tribe), *buluo* 部落 (tribe segments or retainer groups).[4]

What the sources say about terminology

Historians mostly rely on Chinese sources for the earlier periods, both localist and universal. While for the universalist periods, there are indigenous sources for the steppe and the sown, for the localist periods we have only Chinese sources, as Chinese regimes were very much interested in their neighbors, irrespective of their political formations.

In both of the localist phases, relations between the different smaller actors as well as their relations with China set the tone for this time span. Records in Chinese for the first localist period come from the *Wei Dynastic History*, which was written in 554 and covers 386–550. This source stands out because it employs distinct terminology for kin and non-kin groups.[5]

This distinction is supported by the mythological references appearing in this work. According to the mythology, the Rouran, a qaghanate (3rd–6th c.) founded by ethnically and structurally mixed groups with proto-Mongol overtones, were descended from a bald person who had been ousted from his own community. According to Yahontov, the two characters making up the name *rouran* 柔然 were pronounced as *nonor* at that time.[6] Based on this reconstruction, Klyashtorny is inclined to see a relationship between the name of the Rouran and the Mongolian word *nökör*, meaning "companion, retainer".[7] Members of the political entity that emerged from the followers of the bald ancestor were therefore not related to each other by kinship. The composition of the *nökör* groups, as well as the structure of the Rouran khaghanate as a polity,[8] consisted of non-kin groups. Chinese sources related to this period use the term *buluo* 部落 – pronounced *nonor* at that time – when referring to the Rouran population. This postulation is strengthened by the Khitan pronunciation of *buluo* as *no'or*.[9] In other words, the Chinese terms *rouran* and *buluo* were pronounced as *no'or* by the proto-Mongol Rouran and the Khitan. These historical records do not distinguish between the rulers and the ruled; both were referred to as *rouran* (pronounced *nonor*) at that time. The Mongols, however, used *nökör*[10] for the non-kin individual who was a companion to or retainer of a leader.

The term *buluo* emerged after the dissolution of the Xiongnu and came to denote tribe segments or retainer groups. They did not have names but were known by their affiliation to a leader.[11] These segments sometimes developed into polities, as among the Rouran. In these cases, their sources of livelihood were not so much pastoral production but military activities, incursions, looting, booty and control of trade routes. The Northern Wei, on the other hand, consisted of ethnic groups which had names and harbored subdivisions. Sometimes they also gave protection to conglomerations consisting of kinship groups (*xing*) such as the "High Carts".[12]

The composition of these groupings varied according to time and place. But it seems that these three groups, that is the *xing* (clans), *bu* (tribes with subunits) and *buluo* (tribe segments or retainer groups),[13] which emerged during the times of the first localist period, carried on their existence even beyond the second universalist phase (ca. 550–850).

A BRIEF SURVEY OF PRE-CHINGGISID EAST ASIA

The interaction of these three groups in shaping polities was not uniform. One could say that while in the localist periods we have more or less autonomous units, universalist periods present two distinct models. The first of these is represented by the Early Türk, who made an alliance with a powerful clan to strengthen the center but otherwise relied heavily on the retainer groups with whose help they were able to incorporate the tribes with names such as the Bayarqu and Tatar. This model was based on control of manpower and trade routes. The second model is the Uyghur model, where a special relationship to land was developed, leading to sedentarization. This model was not so much based on manpower but on domination over land and trade, which was achieved by the use of force as well as by contact with China. The ensuing Khitan period offered a compromise with a dual administration over the nomadic north and the more settled south.

By the 6th and 7th centuries, the Türk emerged from the ashes of the Rouran. The early Türk were not distinguished by kinship groups constituting "tribes" but by retainer groups referred to as *buluo* and by certain clans. They had no specific names but were known under the name of the leader to whom they were attached. They were warriors who lived on booty. In the periphery, these *buluo* extended their domination over tribes referred to as *bu* in our sources. These were confederative clan groups with names such as Bayarqu. In addition to their own leaders, these groups were ruled by an *elteber* (tax-collecting chief) or by a member of the ruling Türk dynasty. The prince who had his own warriors was called *shad*. Independent kinship groups, such as the Toquz Oghuz (*jiu xing*), were producers raising livestock who engaged in warfare only when conditions compelled them. In general, they had temporary leaders chosen by the people. As a result, they sought protection from the larger Türk polity and became the backbone of the new political formation.[14]

The Ashina, the ruling dynasty of the early Türk,[15] brought these three groups under one umbrella. Their success was in their ability to merge these three groups into one in an interdependent manner. The emerging political centers – constituting sections of a partitioned administration – were predatory in their quest for the control of trade routes across Asia. The *buluo* (retainer groups), called *bodun* in Turkic, were the driving force for conquests and control points for trade. They were not tribes consisting of kinship groups as they are sometimes referred to in modern scholarship. They did not have names but were attached to leaders. Yet because the attachment of the members of a *buluo* to their leaders was in general voluntary, they could vote with their feet and leave when dissatisfaction came on the horizon. The center's dependence on the *buluo* was both its strength as well as its weakness. Therefore, the political center saw the feeding and clothing of the *buluo* as its duty, a task which could only be fulfilled by booty acquired through invasions and conquests.

Towards the middle of the 8th century, the early Türk lost their hegemony on two counts: one, over-taxation of the "tribes" (*bu*), such as the Bayarqu and Uyghur, led to revolts in the periphery. Secondly, harsh treatment of the *buluo* by the new leadership led to their decamping and the isolation and abandonment of their leaders. Drought and famine also accompanied severe frost (*jut*) for three successive years.[16] These problems led to the 50-year-long interval between the first and the second qaghanates (630–682). In the second state, they tried to overcome these difficulties by overreliance and excessive pressure on the many Oghuz (*xing*), in this case the Toquz Oghuz.

The pattern established by the Early Turk was later emulated by others, with some modifications.[17] For instance, the Uyghurs emerged as a polity in which a single kinship group (*xing*) assumed hegemony over the other kinship groups. This was a new stratagem as they were aware that they could not solely rely on the *buluo*, who had proved not to be dependable as they could always vote with their feet. Acknowledging the Early Türk heritage, the Uyghurs took control of trade with their Sogdian associates in 744.

The Uyghurs (Huihe) were one of the many Oghuz, known as Toquz Oghuz in Islamic sources after their takeover in 744.[18] Little is known of them before their rise. As far as we know, they were located to the north of the Early Türk. In the second half of the 6th century, they came under Early Türk domination. Nevertheless, there was unrest, and in 605, the Türk Qaghan achieved a striking victory over the Oghuz, the Uyghurs being among them.

The Sui Dynasty reached out to the Uyghurs as part of a Chinese policy of befriending the distant to control the nearby. The leaders of one of the clans, the Yaghlaqar, were mentioned among those contacted.

The Uyghurs were a loose confederation of ten clans.[19] Their social organization as well as their customs differed considerably from the Early Türk.[20] It seems they resented Türk rule and are mentioned in 627 among the tribes revolting against heavy taxation. Meanwhile, they seem to have made use of their superior horses and acquired a taste for exchange (silk for horse). After the Eastern Türk were completely defeated in 630, the road to China was blocked by the new polity, the Xue Yantuo. While earlier the Uyghurs had been living in a survival mode, by 646 they seem to have been willing to use force against their Xue Yantuo neighbors and consequently defeated them.[21] Accepting prefecture status through their contact with China, the Uyghurs gradually organized themselves under one leader.[22] The Chinese prefecture system that they adopted produced hierarchical relationships.

In the year 685, a famine forced a large-scale migration of the Oghuz, such as the Huihe, Qibi, Sijie (İzgil) and Hun; they settled in the Liang and Gan prefectures (Gansu and southwest Shaanxi). This event provided them with a further taste of the sedentary lifestyle, in which agriculture and trade played a more important role. Thus, when the Uyghurs took over the rule from the Early Türk in 744, some were already acquainted with aspects of sedentary life. We understand then why they headed towards Gansu and Turfan after they were ousted from Mongolia by the Kirgiz in 844.

The development of hierarchies and a leadership group brought centralization. The organization into prefectures, on the other hand, developed the concept of domination over land, which was largely foreign to the nomads. They had always

prioritized control of manpower. Land accompanied the conquest of people and was not a goal in itself. The Uyghurs moved away from earlier practices. Their partnership with the Sogdians, as well as their settlement in the Gansu region in the 680s, made them more familiar with trade routes. One would assume that to secure their access to these routes they would have used the nomadic practice of making pits for storage along the routes.[23] This was also a way for opening new routes. These two factors (prefectural organization and their claim to trade routes) made them develop a new kind of relationship to land which entailed expansion and domination. In this new trend, they were unlike any other nomadic empire. This is why they built fortified cities and other strongholds way into the north of present-day Mongolia. These fortifications provided protection for trade goods and agricultural production from the Kirgiz and other rival groups. Alliance (Sogdians) and diplomacy also changed trade patterns. Domination of trade routes and profits became their practice rather than their direct control, as in the Early Türk model, which first brought danger and then offered protection.

These changes were apparently not cherished by other nomads, such as the Kirgiz, who conquered them in 844. Consequently, the remaining Uyghurs migrated towards the southwest and settled in the Gansu and Turfan regions. Their earlier association with the Sogdian traders brought them into contact with sedentary life, which allowed them to settle into trading, agriculture and animal husbandry in their new home. While in Mongolia proper, they had adopted Manichaeism. In their new habitat, they came under the influence of Buddhism. As devout Buddhists, they also left a legacy of written literature and many documents. Today, scholars in Germany, Russia and Japan have spent a lifetime deciphering the fragments found in the Turfan Basin, which illuminate the social, cultural and religious life of the Uyghurs in the 9th–12th centuries.

The Kirgiz, who came to occupy the earlier Türk and later Uyghur territory, did not settle in these lands, as assumed by later historians. Michael Drompp sees the Kirgiz "breaking the Orkhon tradition". They remained aloof of "imperial" ideals. Earlier they were subjects of First and Second Türk qaghanates.[24] They had not been happy under Türk rule. Drompp mentions a decree by the Sui emperor that indicates the tremendous resentment felt by the Kirgiz against Türk domination: the emperor claimed that the Kirgiz were "gnashing and grinding their teeth, waiting for their opportunity".[25] It seems that their opportunity to break the domination of the Türk and Uyghur empires came in 844, after which we do not see any new polities ruling over Eurasia until the second half of the 12th century. After 844, smaller nomadic groups (*xing, bu, buluo*) dominated the scene. In areas close to sedentary centers, the Khitan (Liao) and the Jürched (Jin) emerged.

The Khitan established the Liao dynasty, which ruled through a dual administrative structure, consisting of nomadic and settled halves.[26] The *Liao shi* (*Liao Dynastic History*), which was written during the subsequent Mongol Yuan dynasty, provides an elaborate description of how the Khitan governed the nomads. The fine distinction between kinship and non-kinship groups apparent in early Tang historiography is not to be found in the *Liao shi*.

After the Kirgiz intervention (840) in Inner Asian affairs, tribal groups such as the Qai (Xi), Tatar and Khitan, who had earlier been willing to seek protection from the Early Türk, the Uyghurs and also sometimes from China, were left

without a strong Inner Asian political formation to extend protection. This protection against would-be enemies also functioned as an umbrella at the macro level, allowing traditions on the micro level to continue to exist. In order to regulate their interaction with the outside world (i.e. trade), they needed to band together. At this point we know of eight tribes designated as *bu*. They had subdivisions designated as *shilie* 石烈, usually translated as "clan". In fact they were kinship groups.[27] They were not united under one ruler, but they would unify when necessity arose. In other words, their leaders were temporary, having been elected for a short period. These eight groups preferred to send emissaries to the Chinese court one by one.[28] By the Tang era (618–907), they had come under the leadership of one clan.[29] It was a system benefitting each one of them. It is in this light that we see the Khitan emerge under Abaoji's rule. The transformation from tribe to state has been taken up in detail by Cai Meibiao, who states that Abaoji, like those before him, made use of alliances as well as of a base consisting of non-tribal elements. The alliance was with the Xiao clan/tribe, who were related to the Uyghurs and Abaoji's own Yelü clan. The base was comprised of captives and slaves, in other words, foreigners.[30] In the south, the captives seized from the Chinese were settled in walled towns. In the north (Mongolia), captives from the tribal people like Xi, Khitan and others comprised most of the enslaved population. This was a political compromise to reconcile the different social and political structures. By 924, Liao authority had extended in the north as far as the Orkhon area in Mongolia. This is how in 1124 Yelu Dashi was able to assemble tribal populations of that region.[31] In both cases, there was corvée labor. Thus, Abaoji's state rested on a division between the dependent populations of agriculturalists and herders, with an overarching ruling strata created by the alliance of the Ila/Yelü and Xiao clans/tribes. The alliance entailed reciprocal marriage patterns similar to the earlier alliance between Ashina and Ashide (Early Türk) or the later Borjigid and the Qonggirat.

More than 300 years passed from the Kirgiz takeover in 844 to the emergence of Chinggis Khan as undisputed leader in 1206. During this time, there was no unifying authority, and different groups were roaming around in the Eurasian steppe. In the absence of a unifying and central authority groups split further and, as the 14th-century Persian historian Rashid al-Din says, "over a period of nearly four hundred years numerous branches of them appeared and they outnumbered all other nations".[32]

These 300 to 400 years take us back to the demise of the Early Türk in 734 and the Uyghurs in 840. He further says that,

> with the passage of time, branches and sub-branches have divided off from these branches, and in every new era new branches have come into being, and each one has acquired a name and an epithet for some reason or the other.[33]

READING RASHID AL-DIN'S *COMPENDIUM OF CHRONICLES* ON ITS OWN TERMS

When we read his work with today's understanding of concepts such as nations, ethnicities and nation-states, some of his wording seems difficult to understand. For instance, according to Rashid al-Din's view, the Mongols were a branch of the

Turks. He says, "for at that time the Mongol branch was one of the Turkic peoples,[34] whereas now, because of their great fortune, might and magnificence, all the other people have been subsumed under the name Mongol".[35]

We can understand this statement in the context of, say, a political group such as Americans, for example, who are composed of people that come from different backgrounds. He then speaks of Turkic peoples who were ancient Mongols.[36] Following his logic, these original Mongols must have become Turkic during Early Türk rule, when they were strong. Rashid al-Din wrote about "people who are called Mongols at this time [like the Jalayir I.T.] but whose name was not originally Mongol, since this word was coined after their time".[37]

This statement gives us a time perspective. It seems that Rashid al-Din identifies these shifts in terms of hegemony and says:

> Because of their might, others in the area became known by their name, since most Turks are called Mongols, as it was before when the Tatars were dominant and all were called Tatar. Among the Arabs, Indians, and Cathaians they are still known as Tatars.[38]

Rashid al-Din seems to state that the nomads of that time had shifting ethnic and linguistic identities. But, taking the example of the Tatars, we can say that linguistic distinctions were not important. We know that the Tatars were composed of both Turkic- and Mongolian-speaking groups.[39] There is also the possibility that we should read Rashid al-Din's statements, which are problematic from today's perspective, as representing structural differences. One could, therefore, say "Turk" would denote stratified structures and "Mongol" would stand for non-stratified groupings. Such an assumption would make room for transformations from one form to the other.

PERCEPTION OF RASHID AL-DIN'S CATEGORIES FROM A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

Rashid al-Din speaks of four different structural groups in four chapters. The main features of each group are presented below according to Rashid al-Din's order.

- Ch.2 "Turkic peoples that are now called Mongols but in times past had separate names, epithets, languages and their own leaders and commanders". . . . Their "name was not originally Mongol since this word was coined after their time".[40]
- Ch.3 "Turkic peoples which had separate monarchs and leaders but which do not have a close relationship to the tribes mentioned in the previous division or to the Mongols yet are close to them in physiognomy and language . . . and each has branched off into various subdivisions".[41]

These two groups, which existed before the Mongols, had more than one ruler. From a structural perspective, they were both stratified as they had subdivisions with specific names. The difference between them was that the former were living in scattered groups while the latter were more compact chiefdoms. We hear the names of some of these groups when the first Qara-Khitai ruler moved towards the west in

1124. Reaching the Orkhon River, he met the ancestors of some of the people whom we know from the 13th century, such as the Merkit, Qonggirat and the Jajirat. The Qara-Khitai ruler assembled the chiefs of 18 such groups who were not under a united leadership.[42]

These two groups, consisting of stratified and hierarchically organized societies, had come to recognize hierarchies other than age as they had transformed into, or were in the process of becoming, chiefdoms.

- Ch.4 Turkic peoples that were anciently Mongol. This chapter contains two sections. The original Mongols gradually divided into two groups:

    i. The *Törölkin* ("natives"). They[43] originated from two persons who went to Ergene-Qun. They multiplied there; each of the branches took a particular name and epithet and "are known generically by the word Mongol, as are others who resemble them. In short, the beginning of the usage of this term was during their time".[44]

Natives were "Mongols in general". They lacked a common ancestor. Groups under different names, such as the Qonggirat, had a golden vase as an ancestor. Rashid al-Din goes to great pains to give a meaning to "the golden vase" as an ancestor. In the end he found this phrase illogical.[45] Structurally they were semi-stratified or scattered kinship groups with many leaders, each ruling over their own clusters.

ii. The Nirun (backbone).[46] They "came into being from a single origin".[47]

In contrast to the Törölkin, who had no common ancestor, here the emphasis is on *the* ancestress Alan Qo'a, who gave birth to Bodonchar, the Chinggisid ancestor. Moreover, in contrast to other groupings, kinship degrees and generations are given in detail for the Nirun.[48] The Persian text emphasizes the fact that origin is "apparent and the descent lines are clear".[49] Thus, they consisted of the peoples that "branched off from the three sons of the wife of Dobun Bayan, Alan the Fair (Alan Qo'a), who were born after the death of her husband. Dobun Bayan was of the original Mongols".[50]

CHARACTERISTICS OF KIN AND NON-KIN GROUPS

Excluding the chiefdoms like the Kereit, which had already formed a political group with a substrata, rulers and the ruled, the others had kin groups at their core.[51] A careful reading of the historical accounts, like Rashid al-Din's *Compendium of Histories* and *The Secret History of the Mongols*, leads us to distinguish semi-stratified kinship groups with many leaders (like the Jalayir and Qonggirat) who lived in clusters and the Nirun, who seem to have lived according to kinship principles. There were also others who were scattered like the forest people. They all functioned as social, political and economic units. Of these, the kinship groups like the Jalayir, Tatar (classified as Turkic groups who were now Mongols and had subdivisions with specific names), as well as the Törölkin (Turkic tribes anciently Mongol) and the Nirun, had many leaders, each ruling over their own cluster. It was only among the Nirun that kinship ties between different clusters were strong.

The Nirun were non-stratified, closely knit groups. For instance, the Tayichi'ut and the Borjigin spoke of kinship ties among themselves to the Jin authorities, whereas among the Qonggirat (Törölkin) of Dei Sechen and Terge Emel, such bonding did not exist. It is among the former group that Temüjin grew up.[52]

A non-kinship organization that is not enumerated by Rashid al-Din consisted of the followers and retainers of a leader called *nökör*.[53] Temüjin is a successful example of a person leading such a group. At this juncture, members of groups consisting of retainers, such as the Kereit, the Naiman and Temüjin's polity, were rivals. They did not depend on their clansmen and other kinship connections but on their followers (*nökör*), who came from diverse backgrounds.

In *The Secret History of the Mongol*s structural differences as well as varieties of leadership are mentioned as features still lingering from earlier times. What we have here is oral history, poetic passages that reflect the situation earlier. In one scene, Chinggis Khan's wife, Börte, became worried about succession.[54]

She said:

> When your body, like a great old tree,
> Will fall down,
> By whom will they let govern people, [by whom will they be governed I.T.]
> Who are like tangled hemp?
> When your body like the stone base of a pillar,
> Will collapse,
> By whom will they let govern your people,
> Who are like a flock of birds?[55]

De Rachewiltz, who commented on these lines, states: "By comparing the subject people to tangled hemp and flock of birds, Börte indicated that they are troublesome and difficult to rule".[56]

In this study, on the other hand, these lines are interpreted as describing the makeup of the society before the creation of the army of conquest. The fact that these lines are uttered by two different persons in exactly the same poetic form would indicate that they have been used by the author in a proverbial manner. Thus, there is no doubt that these lines refer to earlier times.

Here the catchwords are *netkel* and *tuyal*. *Netkel* appears in Chinese gloss as *luan ma* 亂麻, which is translated by Cleaves as "entangled hemp" and by Haenisch as *wirrer Hanf*, "wild hemp".[57] In Cleaves' translation, *netkel* is descriptive and neutral, whereas in Haenisch's translation it has negative connotations, similar to De Rachewiltz.

Actually, what is being described here as entangled hemp seems to refer to the kinship groups. These groups were referred to earlier in history as *xing*, translated as clan in general.[58] They were entangled in terms of kinship. Because of these entangled relationships, they have also been called *baw* ("tie") in later history. These groups were self-sufficient and thus were able to survive by themselves. If they agreed, they could also be the backbone (*nirun*) of a larger political structure.[59] When overpowered, they knew how to bend and bow like the bamboo. As they wanted to hold on to what they had in terms of property and traditions, they were inclined to negotiate and to compromise. As a result, political structures could benefit from their cooperation.

The flock of birds, on the other hand, seems to refer to the *nökör*, who initially had volition and could decide for themselves whom they would serve. This is how they formed the retinue of a would-be leader. But they could also leave the leader in the same fashion. This is why they are referred to as a flock of birds. The *nökör*, the *buluo* of earlier times,[60] attached themselves to a leader as long as it was beneficial for them. Otherwise, they dispersed, voting with their feet. Like birds, they gathered when there was food; when nothing remained, they flew away. This is why these lines could not refer to Chinggis Khan's era, because members of the army of conquest were not permitted to leave their units. These lines from *The Secret History*, on the other hand, support the above postulation about the society's division into kin and non-kin groups.

The kin groups in turn were divided into real and fictive ones. The Nirun always referred to their genealogy in real generational terms. The Törölkin, on the other hand, did not supply us with specific historical information. Moreover, one of the stories of origin (of the Qonggirat) going back to a golden vessel is a good illustration of kinship as ideology. The real kinship groups were non-stratified and regarded age as determining status. But those who claimed fictive kinship, like the Törölkin, were semi-stratified.

Chiefdoms, on the other hand, were stratified political formations. Kinship did not necessarily refer to blood relationships but to ideology covering social, political and economic relations.[61] Additionally, there were the *nökör* who assembled around a *küriyen*, "an encampment around which the carts are drawn up in the form of a circle for protection", and appeared as commanders and members of the future army of conquest.[62]

EFFECTS OF MOBILITY AND IMMOBILITY ON STRUCTURE

None of these groups had fixed structures or locations. Inner Asian society of the 12th century was fluid, with shifting alliances, both sedentary and nomadic. Among the Inner Asian nomads, both tribalization (political regrouping) and dissolution of these formations occurred. From the division of the Mongols and Turks into non-stratified and stratified groups, we can follow the transformation from one to the other in historical records. Understanding "Turkic" and "Mongol" as structural differences, we can say that during the rule of the Early Türk ("400 years ago") some of the earlier non-stratified kinship groups (Mongol) transformed themselves into "tribe segments" or were transformed by the dominant political structure into members of the *bodun* or *buluo*. In other words, they were incorporated into a stratified society. After the demise of the Early Türk and the Uyghurs, they did not take part in conquests or migrations, but remained in one place (Ergene-Qun) and became non-stratified ("300 years ago").

On the one hand, there were those like the Nirun (Mongols) who were in the process of tribalization; there were also many people who were, so to say, out "on the steppe"[63] and who followed a particular leader because it was beneficial to do so. The strife and the conflict arising from these four types (stratified, non-stratified, chiefdoms and *nökör*) of organizations and the ensuing migrations is the story of *The Secret History of the Mongols*. The opening of the story gives us

a glimpse of the problems and alliances that characterized this period of political fluctuation.

> [There] were the two brothers,
> Duua the Blind and Dobun the Clever.
> In the middle of Duua's forehead there was one great eye.
> With this eye Duua could see a place so far away. . .
> Looking out from the mountain [Duua said]
> "In the middle of a band of people I see coming this way,
> at the front of a black cart,
> there's a fine-looking woman," he said.
>
> . . .
>
> Dobun came to marry
> Khorilartai's daughter, Alan the Fair.
> So Alan the Fair came to live with Dobun.[64]

It was this Alan the Fair who gave birth to Bodonchar;[65] he was born by a divine light and thus was not a descendant of Dobun Mergen.[66] He was the ancestor of Temüjin, the later Chinggis Khan. By stating that these events happened 300 years ago, Rashid al-Din takes us back into the 9th century when political unity in Inner Asia was broken by the Kirgiz.

The story above is a good illustration of migrations that took place due to conflicts and the formation of new alliances in societies that gave refuge to newcomers. This was a nomadic pastoral society, whose method of survival was moving away from an unfavorable situation, rather than engaging in warfare, making incursions or invading sedentary strongholds. Although intertribal warfare also took place at times, it did not set the tone. In the excerpt above, we see two Mongolian groups strengthen their alliance by way of marriage. Alan the Fair, the maiden Dobun Mergen was going to marry, was of the Qorolas, *i.e.* of the Törölkin, according to Rashid al-Din.[67] In the *Secret History*, she was of the Qori Tümed who lived in the north. There is, however, no agreement whether it was west or east of Lake Baikal.[68] This northern area was rich in game and fur and provided them with a livelihood. When neighboring clans restricted hunting in this region, the resulting tension could not be resolved by marriage alliances. The conflict caused them to move to the southeast, to the region around the sacred mountain of Burqan Qaldun, where the Borjigin of Dobun Mergen resided.[69] The ban on hunting reflected a worldview where might made right. In such a world, the not-so-mighty simply moved away. In addition to the ban on hunting, another source of conflict was control of summer and winter pastures. Increase in flock size necessitated more land, especially since some pastures were over-grazed. Although tensions such as the ban on hunting or control of pastures existed, these types of problems were not necessarily resolved by warfare but by moving away from the source of tension and taking refuge with other people, where one would find protection. Giving protection to those who were disadvantaged was another trait frequently seen in the historical narratives.[70]

SURVIVAL METHODS IN THE STEPPE

The pastoral nomads had been migrating between their winter and summer pastures without leadership since the middle of the 9th century. The last time they had been united was under Uyghur rule in 742–840.[71] They were not only a society on horseback but also had ox-driven carts. The circular nomadic tents (*gers*, also called *yurts*) placed on the carts were actually their homes. When they were not traveling, they placed the carts or the yurts in a circular arrangement to protect the animals that provided milk and were kept inside the circle. Other animals such as sheep, cattle and horses were generally free to move about in herds, and in the summer, they spread out and used the land extensively. In the winter, on the other hand, land was used more intensively, as the horses stamped on the thin sheet of ice with their hooves, breaking the ice and making holes in order to feed on the grass that lay underneath. After the horses had broken the sheet of ice, cattle and sheep grazed on what was left over. The horses were free to roam around, but their owners watched from afar. This kind of herding, where the animals would be left on their own, free to roam around, also served as a means to make the horses strong enough to brave the weather conditions and find food on their own. But when a severe winter set in with a thick layer of ice, and the horses were not able to break through the thick ice sheet with their hooves, it spelled disaster for all the animals as well as the people. These times, called *zhud* (*jut*), were also causes of migrations en masse.

Although horse meat was favored, in general they ate lamb and mutton or hunted wild game. They also drank *airagh* (*kumiss*), fermented mare's milk. When *kumiss* was made, the leather jars were filled with mare's milk during the day, then all night they would beat the jars till the milk had fermented. In addition to the preparation of meat, women also gathered various kinds of herbs.[72]

When settled, they set down their yurts so that the doors faced south, allowing the sunlight from the east, south and west to seep in, while outside of the tent, they referred to the southern part of the tent as the front and the north as the back. The place of honor was for the master of the house and for the guests in the north, facing the entrance of the tent. Male guests and male members of the family sat to the right (west) of the master and women to the left (east).

This gendered division of the tent was also accompanied by an age hierarchy, where elders took their places towards the north – the seat of honor – while the younger ones sat close to the entrance.[73] In the center of the yurt was the family hearth connected to the smoke hole at the top. The hearth, with the burning stove, signified the family. It was also a channel to connect with those in the family who were not alive, the ancestral spirits. The keeper of the family hearth was the youngest son (*otchigin*), who inherited the family possessions after all his elder brothers were married off. While the hearth signified the living family, the smoke hole through which the smoke of burnt offerings left the tent was a channel to reach ancestral spirits. Ancestors also occupied an important place at the entrance, as idols in the form of men.[74] At times, they offered libations to these idols.

Animal sacrifice also provided a means to venerate ancestral sprits. Women played an important role in these ceremonies. Women of the kin group would gather, cut up meat, divide it among themselves and then burn it.[75] Such ceremonies could also be

used in the expulsion of people from the group or the clan. By not inviting someone to the ceremony or not allowing them to participate in the sacrifice, women made it clear that the other party was unwanted. In other words, people not only moved away as a matter of choice, but also because of expulsion. Decamping was another form of expulsion, in which people moved away and abandoned the unwanted. These were all passive forms of conflict resolution.

Kinship groups emphasized seniority and one's place in the life cycle. The intricate terminology used by Mongolian kinship groups for their blood relationships shows how intertwined they were.[76]

STRUCTURAL CONFLICT LEADING TO TRIBAL STRIFE

By the 12th century, these methods of survival changed as the structure and social composition of the tribal societies changed. Before the 12th century, some groups that were organized according to kinship lacked a designated leader, and anyone from the group could become the commander through seniority or dominance. Members of the stratified kinship groups, on the other hand, often had more than one leader. At the beginning of the 12th century, however, we witness the emergence of chiefdoms. These chiefdoms were found in areas where there was contact with sedentary civilizations in the form of encroachments by agriculturalists, military expansion or relations with trade and trade routes.[77] Gradually these chiefdoms acquired the form of independent rule and character and had political structures with hierarchical forms. We see this situation when Kereit Ong Khan's son Senggüm raised an objection to the proposed marriage of his sister to Temüjin, saying:

> If a kinswoman of ours goes to them, she would have to stand by the door and only face towards the back of the tent; but if a kinswoman of theirs comes to us, she would sit at the back of the tent and face towards the door,[78]

implying that the Borjigid of Temüjin did not know how to value their women and would request services from a new bride, whereas the Kereit would offer the seat of honor to the new bride. *The Secret History* embellishes this incident by saying twice, "imagining himself to be very important, he spoke disparagingly of us" (*SHM* §165). The leaders of chiefdoms were referred to as khans, and they themselves were khanates. According to Rashid al-Din, these chiefdoms were the Kereit, Naiman, Tangut and Uyghur, among others. Some were Mongolian-speaking, some Turkic, and others were bilingual. With respect to the Kereit, who were most probably bilingual, we have more detailed information. They had a ruling family at the top, followed by retainers and common soldiers led by the commanding elite who constituted "the center". The larger tribal layer consisting of various subgroups, on the other hand, constituted the periphery.[79] Earlier, when there was no "center", in the event they were discontented, tribal people could decamp and thereby "vote with their feet". The creation of a "center" made it possible for the leaders to have a military force (*cherig*), dependent on the center, the "great middle". The creation of the center also started to be an impediment against shifting alliances; as a result, the concept of loyalty emerged as a novelty.[80] While earlier, might and dominance were occasionally the rule, with the emergence of chiefdoms and the center, methods of enforcement and coercive power

started to become more and more visible. Competition between chiefdoms was frequently encountered. Competition was over manpower and over the control of trade routes. However, these were all novelties that did not yet change the complete picture.

NOTES

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1 Togan 1998, 1–16; Frye 1962, 252–255.
2 Lindner 1982; Rykin 2004; Atwood 2015; Sneath 2007.
3 Vladimirtsov 1934, 62; Morgan 1987, 63.
4 Rudy Lindner with his seminal article (1982) was the forerunner of the idea of non-kinship tribes but does not differentiate between different structures among "tribal" groups.
5 Togan 2015.
6 Pulleyblank 1991, 264, 267; Schuessler 2009, 180 (13–48/ 1115 and 2009, 180 (24–36/217) and 258 (24–36/217).
7 Klyashtorny 2005, 55–56.
8 For the Rouran see Golden 2013.
9 I am grateful to Miao Runbo 苗润博 for supplying the above references on the basis of his research on early Liao history.
10 The term *nökör is* glossed in *SHM* with *bandang* (伴當), usually translated as "companion" (Haenisch 1962, 119). For references on the *nökör* see De Rachewiltz 2004, 256–257.
11 Togan 2015; Atwood 2015, 74.
12 Pulleyblank 1990.
13 For the terms *bu* 部, *buluo* 部落 and *xing* 姓and their historical evolution see Togan 2015.
14 Togan 2013.
15 For the Ashina see Klyashtorny 1998.
16 Di Cosmo 2017.
17 The Xue Yantuo (7th c.) and later the Uyghurs (8th c.) followed this pattern.
18 Drompp 2017; Chen Hao 2018.
19 Hamilton 1955, 41–44.
20 Liu Mau-tsai 1958, I: 350–351 and 127–129.
21 Drompp 2017.
22 Drompp 2017.
23 Qiu Yihao 2012, 626; Dankoff 1982, I: 123).
24 They had also acknowledged the Xue Yantuo rule during the interim period of the Early Türk (630–680).
25 Drompp 2002.
26 Kradin 2014, 151–162; Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng 1949.
27 Cai Meibiao 2012, 275–276.
28 Cai Meibiao 2012, 257.
29 Cai Meibiao 2012, 262–263.
30 For the different categories of slaves (*bo'ol*) see De Rachewiltz 2004, 505–506.
31 Wittfogel and Feng 1949, 634.
32 RDT, 26.
33 RDT, 24.
34 W. Thackston translated the *aqwām* of Rashid al-Din sometimes as "nations", sometimes as "tribes". I have used "peoples".
35 RDT, 79–80.

36 RDT, 25.
37 RDT, 25.
38 RDT, 26.
39 Klyashtorny 1992; Olbricht and Pinks 1980.
40 RDT, vii, 10 and 25. These were the Jalayir and branches, Sönit, Tatar, Merkit, Kürlü'üt, Oyirat, Tümed and Forest Uriangqai.
41 See RDT, vii, 25, 61. They were the Kereyit (Jirgin, Tongqayit, Toba'ut and Albat), the Naiman, the Önggüt, the Tangqut, the Uyghur, the Bekrin, the Kirgiz, the Qarluq and the Qipchaq. RDK, 26.
42 Biran 2005, 26–29; Wittfogel and Feng 1949, 100–112 and 633–634.
43 For instance, the Uriangqai and the Qonggirat.
44 RDK, 111; RDT, 79.
45 RDT, 79.
46 The word *niru'un* or *nirun* means "backbone, spine". In fact, this group, from which Temüjin comes, was going to be the backbone of the later state and empire. Understanding the term *nirun* in this way suggests that these terms were generated retrospectively. Rashid al-Din, however, explains the term as "pure loin" (RDT, 98).
47 They are introduced in RDT, vii, 10, 26 and discussed in detail in I: 98–112.
48 RDT, 79, 98.
49 RDK, 111.
50 RDK, 111.
51 Togan 1998.
52 Togan 2006.
53 The term *nökör* is usually translated as "companions, retainers". Thackston uses "liege men" for this term.
54 According to the argument put forward in this paper, these verses reflect the situation from earlier times.
55 *SHM* §245.
56 De Rachewiltz 2004, 882.
57 Haenisch 1941, 122.
58 Togan 2015.
59 Togan 2013.
60 Togan 2015.
61 Rykin 2004.
62 De Rachewiltz 2004, 387.
63 *SHM*, §33–35.
64 Kahn 1984, 3–10.
65 Rykin 2010
66 Skrynnikova 2010, 4.
67 It is probable that Rashid al-Din or his informant wanted to establish a parallel with Chinggis Khan's mother, who was a Qorolas.
68 RDT, 57; De Rachewiltz 2004, 248; Skrynnikova 2010.
69 De Rachewiltz 2004, 229.
70 Togan 1998, 163–166.
71 Golden 1992, 155–173.
72 *SHM*, §74.
73 Kahn 1984, 78–79, *SHM*, §165.
74 *TMM*, 9.
75 *SHM*, §71.
76 Earlier they were called *omogh*, translated as "clan" in general. For a recent study on *omogh* see Rykin 2004, 2011, 25–47; Atwood 2015.

77 Scott 1975; Di Cosmo 2015.
78 *SHM* §165.
79 Togan 1998, 125.
80 Togan 1998, 72.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE RISE OF CHINGGIS KHAN

Timothy May

The primary figure in the history of the Mongol Empire is Chinggis Khan. Yet even Chinggis Khan is but a title meaning "firm, fierce, or resolute ruler" or perhaps even "oceanic ruler".[1] Without the rise of Temüjin, the man who became Chinggis Khan, it is unlikely that there would have been a Mongol Empire. His efforts not only unified the various tribal confederations of the Mongolian steppe, but his reforms to society and steppe warfare transformed the Mongol Empire from just another steppe empire into an entity whose vibrations are still felt today. Yet, it was hardly apparent to anyone that Temüjin would become one of the most important figures in history or that the Mongol Empire would be more than an ephemeral steppe polity with fleeting regional influence rather than a hyper-power extending across most of Eurasia and influencing the world centuries after his death.

YOUTH

Temüjin was born in 1162 to Yisügei, a minor but rising figure among the Borjigid Mongols, and his wife Hö'elün. Their marriage was unusual by most standards, although not uncommon for steppe nomadic society. Yisügei, aided by his brothers, kidnapped her as she traveled with her new husband, Chiledü of the Merkit.[2] Resigned to her fate, Hö'elün became Yisügei's wife. Chiledü escaped but did not (to our knowledge) attempt to rescue her, suggesting that Yisügei was powerful enough to deter such an endeavor.

During this time, the Mongols were at war with the Tatars, a powerful confederation in eastern Mongolia. Many of the Tatar tribes had ties to the Jin Empire of northern China. Although the Mongols tended not to fare well against the Tatars, Yisügei enjoyed at least a modicum of success, which made him a figure of some importance.

During these wars, Hö'elün gave birth to her son at the same time that Yisügei earned a victory over the Tatars and captured one of their leaders, named Temüjin. To the modern reader it may seem odd to name the first child after an enemy leader, but Temüjin's capture was deemed auspicious, and so the child was named Temüjin.

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It was the custom that the child was named after the first thing the mother saw after giving birth.[3]

Although Temüjin was Hö'elün's first son, he was Yisügei's second. Yisügei's other wife, Suchigil, gave birth to Bekter a couple of years prior to Temüjin.[4] Despite this, Hö'elün appears to have been Yisügei's primary wife, although the rationale for this remains murky. Besides his half-brother, Temujin had other siblings as well. In 1164, Hö'elün gave birth to another son named Qasar, in 1166 to Qachi'un, and to Temüge in 1168. Temüjin also had a younger sister named Temülün, born around 1170. Bekter was not Suchigil's only son. He had a younger brother named Belgütei, born around 1165.[5] We know he was younger than both Temüjin and Qasar, but we do not know just how much younger. The evidence at hand suggests that Belgütei was older than Qachi'un.

When Temüjin was age nine, Yisügei decided to seek a bride for his son.[6] This did not mean that Temüjin would marry immediately but rather that Yisügei sought a favorable bride. Marriages could take time, as often the marriage included an alliance, thus requiring considerable negotiations.

Yisügei sought to procure a wife for Temüjin from among the Olqunu'ut, Hö'elün's people, perhaps an effort to mend fences for her kidnapping a decade before. En route, however, he encountered the Qonggirat, who were known for the beauty of their women. Their leader, Dei Sechen, convinced Yisügei to consider his daughter, Börte, who may have been slightly older than Temüjin. Furthermore, he told Yisügei that he had a dream that portended Yisügei and Temüjin's arrival and forecasted greatness for Temüjin. They agreed upon the marriage, and Temüjin was left with Dei Sechen.[7]

On Yisügei's homeward journey, he encountered a camp. It proved to be a Tatar camp. Despite being enemies, it was custom on the steppe to offer hospitality to fellow strangers to ease the strain of travel and as a good-will gesture. By custom, the host offered food and shelter. Animosity had to be set aside. In this instance, the Tatars violated custom. Although they did not directly attack Yisügei – to be sure, he did not travel alone but with a small entourage – the Tatars poisoned his food or drink so that the effects were not immediate but manifested on the homeward journey. Thus, by the time he arrived home, Yisügei was critically ill. He sent Mönglik, one of his men and a brother-in-law (or *quda*, in-law, vis-a-vis Suchigil, Mönglik's sister), to retrieve Temüjin.[8] Although Mönglik was successful in retrieving Temüjin, Yisügei died shortly after Temüjin arrived at home.

With Yisügei's death, his family began a downward spiral that would have doomed most people. For Temüjin, it became the crucible in which a leader was forged. The cascading consequences of Yisügei's death were not felt immediately, and it appears that Hö'elün led Yisügei's people in the short term. At a *quriltai* or congress of the Mongols, however, her situation changed dramatically. Typically, at a *quriltai* the various Mongol lineages met, made major decisions regarding the greater confederation, and also selected a khan as leader. At this time (c. 1171–72), the Mongols lacked a khan to preside over affairs and settle disputes. Indeed, the *quriltai* may have been held to select a new khan as Ambaqai's successor, Qutula Khan, died in 1161.[9] Sacrifices to the gods and ancestors also occurred at the *quriltai*, usually conducted by the leading women. It was in this event that the fortunes of Temüjin's family began to wane as the widows of Ambaqai Khan prevented Hö'elün

from participating – a clear sign that Hö'elün's status (and that of her family) had diminished.[10] This cast an ominous shadow across the *quriltai* and heralded events to come.

As the *quriltai* ended, still without a khan, the Tayichi'ut, another branch of the Mongols (and the people of Ambaqai), attempted to force Yisügei's people to leave with them. Charaqa, one of Yisügei's supporters and the father of Mönglik and Suchigil, intervened and was rewarded with a spear in his back. Despite Charaqa's mortal wound, Hö'elün grabbed Yisügei's standard and rallied the majority of the people, convincing and shaming them into staying. This collective guilt proved temporary as most then left under the cover of darkness, taking with them the majority of the livestock as well.[11]

These actions effectively ostracized the family of Yisügei. If we are to believe *The Secret History of the Mongols*, the family was abandoned by all including Mönglik. Thus, Hö'elün and Suchigil were left to fend for themselves and their seven children. Without their herds and flocks, they were destitute, possessing only a small number of horses. If all of the horses had been taken, it would have been tantamount to a death sentence. Thus, they foraged for food such as wild onions, berries, and small game. They even resorted to fishing – an uncommon practice among the steppe nomads.[12] Battling starvation, the family survived in a precarious state. Nonetheless, the two mothers attempted to hold their family together, and Hö'elün told them stories of Alan Qo'a and the Parable of the Arrows to teach them the importance of unity. In this parable, Alan Qo'a's five sons (two from her husband, three from a heavenly being) quarreled. She gave each an arrow, which they easily broke. She then bundled five arrows together, which none could break. With this example, she instructed them that just like the arrows, individually they were weak, but together, they were strong and no one could defeat them.[13]

Naturally, the children did not heed the wisdom of their parents. Bekter, the eldest, hoarded food for himself and stole game that Temüjin and Qasar caught. As a result, Qasar and Temüjin murdered Bekter. The latter asked them to spare his younger brother Belgütei.[14] It is unclear if Belgütei was even in danger. He was younger than Temüjin and even Qasar, and there is no indication that he took part in Bekter's actions. In later life, Belgütei does not appear to have held any grudge against his half-brothers.

The motives for Bekter's murder may have consisted of more than just the theft of food. Bekter was older than Temüjin and approaching the age when he could marry Hö'elün. The Levirate tradition existed among the nomads in which a son or brother could marry a man's widows, as long as they were not direct blood relatives.[15] As neither of Yisügei's two brothers sought to marry Hö'elün, the door was open for Bekter. When Hö'elün learned of her sons' actions she was livid and castigated both Qasar and Temüjin, asking how they could do such a thing, particularly when they had no friends but their shadows.[16]

Not long afterwards, riders came. The family fled into the mountains and woods. Qasar, a talented archer, valiantly defended them by shooting arrows while they took refuge in a narrow defile, limiting their enemies' approach. Their attackers, the Tayichi'ut, declared that they only sought Temüjin, most likely due to the act of fratricide. How the Tayichi'ut learned of this remains a mystery and perhaps indicates that the family of Yisügei was not as isolated as *The Secret History* indicates.

Although Temüjin attempted escape, the Tayichi'ut captured him. At their camp, he became a slave and wore a cangue, which prevented him from fleeing. While he wore it, he could not easily feed himself or sleep. For his maintenance, the Tayichi'ut also rotated him through the households of the commoners, a number of whom were his father's former people. Some took pity on him, released him from the burden of the cangue, and tended to the sores caused by it.[17]

Eventually, Temüjin attempted to escape. During a night of festivity, Temüjin used his cangue to knock his guard unconscious and fled. He hid in a river, using his cangue as a flotation device. The Tayichi'ut searched for him but failed, although a commoner named Sorqan Shira spotted him. The man, however, directed the search away from Temüjin. Temüjin repaid the man's kindness by appearing at his tent. From here, he essentially blackmailed Sorqan Shira, although Sorqan's family seemed sympathetic to Temüjin's cause. His sons burned the cangue in their fire to hide the evidence and hid Temüjin as the search continued. For his escape, Sorqan Shira provided Temüjin with a horse, some food, a bow, and a few arrows – enough to hunt or defend himself but insufficient for rash actions.[18] Discovery would mean devastation for Sorqan Shira and his family.

Temüjin eventually located his family and escaped the Tayichi'ut. Most likely, his captivity had been a punishment for the murder of Bekter, as murder is a crime in any society. In steppe custom, however, punishment usually involved compensation. As his family was indigent and Suchigil and Belgütei were part of it, perhaps Temüjin had to work off his debt to society among the Tayichi'ut. The Tayichi'ut did apparently consider executing him but decided against it due to his youth.[19]

Even with the time served, Temüjin's family remained marginalized. One day, the Tayichi'ut rustled their horses. Only one remained, as Belgütei had taken it with him to hunt marmots. When he returned, Temüjin took the horse and rode in pursuit of the thieves. He followed their trail until he came across a boy of roughly the same age as he was. Temüjin asked him if he had seen the culprits. The boy, Bo'orchu, who had been milking the mares of his own herd, not only showed Temüjin the trail, but he put aside his chores and joined Temüjin in the pursuit. Eventually they found the horses as the rustlers made camp for the night. The two boys then craftily set about retrieving the horses. Although the thieves attempted to recover their ill-gotten booty, a few well-placed arrows persuaded them to cease their pursuit.[20]

Once they arrived at Bo'orchu's camp, they found a relieved father, who had no idea to where his son had disappeared. Temüjin offered Bo'orchu half of the horses for aiding him. Bo'orchu refused, saying that they were not his to take and that he did not help Temüjin out of desire for a reward. Naqu Bayan, Bo'orchu's father, was impressed by Temüjin's generosity and bravery and told the boys to pledge their friendship to each other.[21] The two boys became *anda*, a bond akin to blood brotherhood.

This episode reveals much about Temüjin's character – his tenacity, his charisma, as well as his generosity. His friend's refusal is also notable but hints at the wealth of Bo'orchu's family. Naqu Bayan means "Naqu the Rich." Bo'orchu had been milking mares when the livestock thieves rode by – it would not have been difficult for them to steal those horses as well. As evinced by Naqu Bayan's concern at his son's absence, Bo'orchu had been alone when doing this. The fact that the thieves did not steal Bo'orchu's horses indicates that the thieves targeted the weak (Temüjin) and

not the wealthy, like Naqu, who had the means to retaliate. The thieves undoubtedly viewed Temüjin as "easy pickings".

MARRIAGE AND SERVICE

With his meager herd of horses restored, Temüjin returned to his family. Not long afterwards, Temüjin, accompanied by Belgütei, traveled to Dei Sechen to marry his promised bride, Börte. The marriage occurred, and part of the dowry included a luxurious sable cloak.[22] The marriage was curious and reveals that Temüjin's situation may not have been as dire as *The Secret History* indicates. Why would Dei Sechen give his daughter to one such as Temüjin if there seemed to be little hope of a future? We must remember that Dei Sechen originally persuaded Yisügei to consider Börte. Dei Sechen sought a strategic marriage alliance. If *The Secret History* is to be believed, Temüjin would have been incapable of providing this. It seems more likely that Temüjin's status had improved somewhat – perhaps he gained more than just his eight horses? Although he had not returned to the level of his father, his fortunes had still improved considerably.

This is further evinced by Bo'orchu joining Temüjin. He probably arrived with a few of his own people. Temüjin also received Jelme, the son of Jarchi'udai, who had pledged the boy into Yisügei's service many years earlier.[23] The fact that he held to his pledge at least five years later is telling.

Temüjin took the cloak to the camp of Toghril, the khan of the powerful Kereit confederation in central Mongolia.[24] Toghril was not only an important figure in the Mongolian steppes, but he was also Yisügei's *anda*. Indeed, Yisügei even assisted Toghril's efforts in gaining his throne.[25] It is quite likely that Temüjin had been in Toghril's camp before as a child. As such, Temüjin used his father's relationship and the sable cloak to secure a position as a *nökör* of Toghril. A *nökör* was what one might term a bondsman or a vassal. There was a level of reciprocity involved. Toghril could expect Temüjin's loyalty and service, while Temüjin could expect protection and a share in the plunder when they fought enemies.

Temüjin did not have to wait long to test this relationship. One morning, raiders attacked Temüjin's camp. Fearing it was the Tayichi'ut once again, Temüjin and his family fled for their lives. As the riders approached, it became clear that they were not Tayichi'ut but Merkit. Having learned of Temüjin's recent marriage, they now sought to avenge themselves for the abduction of Hö'elün by kidnapping Börte. As the Merkit's numbers were far greater than Temüjin's supporters, he and most of the camp fled. Unfortunately, Börte and Suchigil were among those who were unable to flee. Although they attempted to hide, the Merkit discovered them and carried them off. Börte was given to Chilger-Bökö, the younger brother of Chiledü, Hö'elün's original husband. Suchigil meanwhile was given to a commoner due to her age.[26]

Although becoming a *nökör* to Toghril did not provide Temüjin sufficient protection against the depredations of enemies, it offered him recourse for revenge. Thus, Temüjin rode to Toghril's camp and requested his khan's support. Toghril granted it and commanded Jamuqa of the Jadaran to gather his men as well.[27] Jamuqa was not only Toghril's war leader, but also Temüjin's *anda* from childhood, when they apparently made the *anda* pledge sometime before Yisügei's death. It is apparent that the two young men's lives took two very different routes.[28] Whereas Jamuqa became

the leader of the Jadaran, developed his abilities, and secured a position within the retinue of a powerful leader, Temüjin's youth was spent without a father and in a precarious state of existence. He had to coax the Kereit leader through guilt and presents into extending his protection to Temüjin and his family.

Toghril and Jamuqa assembled a sizeable army, while Temüjin could only contribute a relative handful of fighters. Assembling the army and then marching to the Merkit territory, just south of Lake Baikal, took months as they also constructed rafts to cross rivers. Furthermore, sightings by scouts, hunters, and fishermen ensured that the Merkit were aware of their approach. Nonetheless, the Kereit still took the Merkit camp by surprise, attacking at night.[29]

Toghril, Jamuqa, and Temüjin gained a great victory over the Merkit, including an impressive amount of plunder. Most importantly, Temüjin recovered Börte. Suchigil, however, was not found, although Belgütei searched for her, wreaking vengeance upon any Merkit unfortunate enough to cross his path. According to *The Secret History of the Mongols*, she fled into the forest, ashamed of her lowly status.[30] Whereas Börte became the wife or concubine of an aristocrat, Suchigil was the wife or perhaps even slave of a commoner. Having been the wife of Yisügei, an aristocrat, the shame of her fallen status was apparently too much for her to bear in the presence of her son. She also may have been ashamed of being raped as, undoubtedly, both she and Börte were.

Afterward, the allies returned to their pastures. Temüjin joined Jamuqa for several possible reasons. The first was to become reacquainted with his *anda*. Another reason was that it put Temüjin in close proximity to his relatives, such as his uncles Daritai, Altan, and Quchar, who had joined Jamuqa. Moreover, after the Merkit attack, it was very clear that Temüjin lacked the strength to protect his people. Thus, by joining Jamuqa, he gained immediate protection while also staying in his traditional homeland, rather than moving to central Mongolia, where Toghril's pastures were located. Finally, with Yisügei's death and the subsequent ostracization, Temüjin never learned the arts of war. While he certainly knew how to ride and shoot, he lacked the knowledge to lead men in battle effectively. Thus, staying with Jamuqa also served as an apprenticeship.[31]

Their time together went well for a while, but the two eventually split, partially on the advice of Börte, who may have also been jealous of the time Temüjin spent with Jamuqa instead of her and their children – a daughter, Qojin (born prior to the Merkit attack), and their son, Jochi, who was born in Jamuqa's camp.[32] Thus, they left Jamuqa's camp. To Temüjin's surprise, he soon found himself with many more people than what he started with. These included his uncles but also a sizeable number of commoners. They joined Temüjin for a number of reasons. The commoners found Temüjin to be much more generous than Jamuqa, especially in his distribution of plunder after the victory over the Merkit.[33] Jamuqa clung to the tradition in which the aristocracy received the largest share and then distributed the remainder based on social status. Meanwhile, Temüjin's uncles and other aristocrats joined for other reasons. At the time, the Borjigids still lacked a khan. As they had been part of Jamuqa's camp, it is clear that they needed Jamuqa's protection, and they had no desire to see a Tayichi'ut khan. Being in Jamuqa's camp, none of Temüjin's uncles (or anyone else) could lay claim to the title. With Temüjin's falling out with Jamuqa, a door opened. Altan, Daritai, and others raised Temüjin to the

throne and made stylized oaths to serve him.[34] Despite their seeming devotion to the much younger Temüjin, in all likelihood, this was simply a ploy to prevent conflict among the various contenders. In selecting Temüjin, they hoped to have a pliable pawn. Temüjin found support among the commoners but lacked experience and thus would be dependent on his uncles and the aristocracy. More importantly, unlike Jamuqa, Temüjin was at least of the proper bloodline.

Despite congratulatory messages from both Toghril and Jamuqa, harmony did not endure. From the *The Secret History*, we know that Jamuqa saw through the oaths of Temüjin's uncles and queried why they waited until they were no longer in Jamuqa's camp to make Temüjin khan.[35] Before long, the two *anda* were at loggerheads. A relative of Jamuqa died during a livestock rustling event, leading to war.[36] In the resulting battle of Dalan-baljut, fought near the Onan River in 1187, Temüjin was soundly defeated. Indeed, he disappeared from the historical sources for ten years. That two *nökörs* of Toghril could engage in warfare is admittedly perplexing, but there was a valid reason. After a power struggle between Toghril and his brother Jaqa Gambu, their uncle Erke Qara intervened and seized the throne. Thus, like Temüjin, Toghril (and Jaqa Gambu) lived in exile.[37]

This ten-year stretch (1186–1196) is a missing period in Temüjin's life as we have no clear understanding of what happened. We do know from the *Mengda Beilu* that Temüjin ended up in the Jin Empire.[38] How or why is unclear. Regardless of the activities during his exile, based on his success when he returned to Mongolia in 1196, it is apparent that Temüjin learned much during his absence.

RETURN OF THE KHAN

He returned as a subject or client of the Jin Empire. Based on the fact that he now had ties to the Chingsang, a high-ranking official in the Jin court, we can surmise that after his defeat by Jamuqa, Temüjin took refuge near the Jin border and eventually entered Jin service, perhaps as a *jüyin*, a border guard, as did numerous other groups on the border, including Tatars.[39]

It is also apparent that Temüjin gained more military training and experience while in the Jin Empire as his ability as a leader and commander substantially improved when he returned. Furthermore, he assisted in the reconciliation of Jaqa Gambu, with whom he became *anda*, and Toghril. He aided them in defeating Erke Qara, and Toghril regained the throne among the Kereit.[40]

His status in the Jin Empire undoubtedly helped his fortunes in Mongolia. Temüjin appears to have returned as the khan of the Borjigids. Along with the Kereit, he joined the Jin in a pincer attack on the Tatars, who had transformed from loyal *jüyin* to a frontier menace.[41] The attack proved successful and cemented Temüjin's status as Borjigid khan, while Toghril affirmed his pre-eminence over the Kereit. They both received titles from the empire. Toghril became *wang* (king), placing him in the Jin hierarchy, while Temüjin received the office of *jeutau* – or Pacification Commissioner – further hinting at his status as *jüyin*.[42] It is apparent that the return of Toghril and Temüjin in 1196–1197 had less to do with the internal politics and fortunes of tribal leaders in Mongolia than might be assumed. Rather, they were pawns in the Jin Empire's efforts to control events in the steppes. Adhering to the centuries-old policy of using barbarians to control barbarians, the Jin made Toghril and Temüjin

their "men in Mongolia". As the senior figure, Toghril had greater status, whereas Temüjin was a relative newcomer but with potential.[43]

Not only did they neutralize the Tatars in conjunction with the Jin, but they also moved against the Naiman in western Mongolia. It is apparent that by this point the relationship between Toghril and Temüjin was different. Despite the disparity in titles awarded by the Jin Empire, the two were on more equal footing, although Toghril was of greater status. Still, their relationship was substantially different, as when they marched into Naiman territory it was as partners, each leading their own forces.

At the time, the Naiman confederation was divided between two khans, each ruling on opposite sides of the Altai Mountain range. In their first encounter, Temüjin and Toghril defeated Buyiruq Khan, one of the Naiman leaders.[44] When they penetrated deeper into Naiman territory they encountered Kökes'ü-sabraq, a Naiman commander of some renown. As night rapidly approached, both sides eschewed battle, made their camps, and waited for dawn to engage in battle. When the sun rose, Temüjin found that Toghril had deserted him. Oddly, Kökes'ü-Sabraq did not seek battle with Temüjin but went in pursuit of Toghril.[45]

Why did Toghril abandon the field of battle without informing Temüjin? Toghril fell victim to rumors spread by those jealous of Temüjin's new standing. Among them was Jamuqa, now back in the service of Toghril. Also, Toghril's son Senggüm became increasingly envious of Temüjin, perhaps fearing that Temüjin would become the next leader of the Kereit. Both conspired and told Toghril that Temüjin made an alliance with the Naiman to divide Toghril's domain between them.[46] The fact that the Naiman pursued Toghril and not Temüjin's army may have only increased Toghril's concern. There is only circumstantial evidence that such an agreement existed between the Naiman and Temüjin. It is more likely that the Naiman pursued Toghril because they viewed him as a greater threat, while Temüjin was still a relative unknown, whose only success came with the aid of the Jin Empire.

Abandoned, Temüjin began marching back to his own pastures in the Onan-Kerulen basin. Soon he received a desperate plea from Toghril, hard-pressed by the Naiman. Despite Toghril's desertion, Temüjin's own sense of loyalty was great, and he dispatched his four *külüg* (stallions), who broke the Naiman and saved Senggüm, who had suffered a grievous wound in the encounter. The *dörben külüg* or Four Stallions were Bo'orchu, Muqali, Boroqul, and Chila'un-ba'atur, four of Temüjin's stalwart companions, who each commanded a *minggan* or unit of 1000. These were, in effect, elite troops. Not only did they defeat the Naiman, but they also rescued Toghril's wives and children.[47]

This victory only improved Temüjin's standing. Indeed, with the defeat of the Tatars in 1197, Temüjin became the major power in the eastern part of Mongolia, just as Toghril reigned supreme in central Mongolia. Their alliance worried other groups whose own power and indeed freedom diminished before the Borjigid-Kereit union. To this end, and undoubtedly due to envy, Jamuqa left Toghril's service and rallied other nomads to form a confederation against Toghril and Temüjin. In addition to his own Jadaran, Jamuqa recruited other Mongols concerned with the ascendency of the Borjigids, such as the Tayichi'ut. Tatars also joined, demonstrating the seriousness of their 1197 defeat. The Naiman also joined, undoubtedly still smarting from Toghril and Temüjin's foray into their territory. As Toghril's dominion extended into

the Orkhon Valley, he was well-positioned to menace the Naiman. From the Siberian forests came the Oirat. While the latter did not involve themselves in the matters of the steppe, at times steppe rulers extended their influence into the taiga around Lake Baikal and even to the Yenisei Basin. Jamuqa was chosen as the leader of the confederation with the title of Gur Khan or Universal Ruler.[48]

The Gur Khanid confederation clashed with the Kereit-Borjigid forces in 1201 at the Battle of Köyiten. Here the Naiman and Oirat employed weather magic in a bid to impede their enemies. While the sources indicated they were successful in summoning a storm, the weather magic backfired and the storm primarily affected their own positions.[49] In the end, Toghril and Temüjin prevailed and defeated the confederation. The fragility of this confederation meant that the various components split and fled to their own pastures. Jamuqa even plundered his own army in an effort to find some victory in his defeat.[50] Toghril and Temujin pursued their enemies, each choosing a target. Toghril defeated the Jadaran leader; he did not kill Jamuqa but instead reintegrated the Jadaran into the Kereit confederation.[51] Jamuqa failed as a khan, but he remained a talented commander whom one did not simply discard.

Meanwhile, Temüjin pursued the Tayichi'ut, engaging them in battle near the Onan River. Although he defeated them, victory was not complete and many escaped, in part due to Temüjin suffering a near-mortal neck wound. Thanks to the quick thinking of Jelme, a former slave, Temüjin recovered.[52] Still, with the decisive defeat, the Tayichi'ut ceased to be an immediate threat to Temüjin. He also gained new people with his victory, including the family of Sorqan Shira, who had aided him when he was a Tayichi'ut captive. Furthermore, he acquired Jebe, the name he gave to the man who slew his horse (and perhaps wounded him). Jebe would become one of Temüjin's greatest generals.[53]

With the Gur Khanid confederation shattered, Temüjin now turned to deal with the Tatars in 1202. In this, he acted alone as Toghril spent the year neutralizing the Merkit. As he moved on the Tatars, Temüjin also instituted some military reforms. It is apparent that he sought a clear and decisive victory. To achieve this, he decreed for no one to plunder until victory was achieved.[54] This proved key, and the victory was complete with the Mongols routing the Tatars and pursuing them to their camps, leading to the extermination of the Tatar leadership. The commoners, however, were incorporated into the Mongol union. Although *The Secret History* records that all males taller than the linchpin of a cart wheel were killed, this referred to the aristocracy, as the commoners were part of the plunder – tribal identity was based less on ethnicity and more on loyalty to leading lineages.[55]

Despite the decree against doing so, some did plunder before victory was secured. Chief among the offenders were Daritai, Altan, and Quchar – Temüjin's uncles. He sent men to strip them of their plunder. Incensed, the three departed to Toghril's camp and complained of Temüjin's practices. This is not surprising as Temüjin's actions were on the more radical side and included advocacy for a more equal distribution of plunder.[56] Indeed, Temüjin's success proved that he was quite different from most of the steppe aristocracy, undoubtedly due to his unconventional childhood. He certainly had more sympathy for the commoners. This ultimately led to conflict with Toghril and the Kereit.

In the meantime, however, Temüjin proposed that his son Jochi marry the daughter of Senggüm, Toghril's son, thus binding the families together. It appears that Toghril

Map 2.1 Mongolia in the 12th century
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

seriously entertained the idea. Indeed, there were rumors that after Temüjin's rescue of Toghril from the Naiman, the Kereit leader considered Temüjin as perhaps a better heir than Senggüm.[57]

WARS OF UNIFICATION

Unfortunately, Temüjin's rise to power also created numerous enemies. His uncles still bore grievances against Temüjin. He clearly was no longer the malleable dupe they had supported long ago. Indeed, he seemed to have no regard for the advice of his uncles; instead, he took counsel with his companions, many of whom were commoners or even former servants. Then there was Jamuqa. The wily Jadaran remained in Toghril's service despite his failed attempt to rise to power. Jamuqa proved that while he was a capable commander and could carry out orders, he did not listen to those he viewed as beneath him. Most importantly, he was very much a traditionalist when it came to matters of hierarchy. Finally, Senggüm also conspired against Temüjin. He rejected the marriage proposal, perhaps concerned that Temüjin might supplant him, or perhaps he found the Mongols to be socially and politically inferior. He viewed the proposal as a one-way exchange – the Mongols received a Kereit princess, but how did the Kereit benefit?

Swayed by their words, Toghril turned against Temüjin. The Mongols' enemies plotted to lure Temüjin into a trap to avoid a pitched battle. Thanks to some Kereit who overheard the plans and apparently held Temüjin in high regard, he was informed of the scheme.[58] Temüjin found it difficult to believe their claims but eventually learned the truth. As a result, the Kereit and the Mongols fought in 1203 at Qalqajit Sands. Although the Kereit gained the upper hand and defeated the Mongols, their victory was short-lived as prior to the battle, Temüjin had established a rendezvous point should defeat occur. Gathering his forces, Temüjin counter-attacked and defeated the Kereit.[59] Had the Kereit followed up their attack while Temüjin's forces slowly gathered, Temüjin may have been a footnote in history. Instead, he procured supplies and swore an oath with several non-Mongols, who aided him. They sealed their pledge by drinking the muddy waters of Lake Baljuna. These non-Mongols, who became known as the Baljuntu, included many Central Asians and a few Khitans from the Jin Empire.[60]

The Mongols counter-attacked while the Kereit were celebrating their victory. Toghril and Senggüm clearly had not anticipated that Temüjin could assemble an army so quickly, demonstrating their contempt for his abilities. Although the Mongols defeated the Kereit, both Toghril and Senggüm escaped, fleeing in different directions. Toghril fled towards the Naiman. A Naiman scout failed to recognize Toghril and killed him. Senggüm, meanwhile, escaped to Xi Xia, a traditional refuge for Kereit leaders in times of trouble and, indeed, where Toghril had fled in 1186.[61]

With the Kereit defeated, Temüjin incorporated them into his people. Unlike with the Tatars, he did not execute the aristocracy, primarily because he knew many of them personally and had fought alongside them for many years. Indeed, he had even been *anda* with Jaqa Gambu, Toghril's brother.[62] Thus, he went down a different path and tied the Kereit to himself through marriage alliances, including several with Jaqa Gambu's daughters. Temüjin married Ibaqa, while his youngest son married Sorqoqtani, and Jochi married Begtütmish.[63] As for Chaqa, Senggüm's daughter, who was indirectly responsible for the downfall of the Kereit khanate, she disappeared from history. Perhaps she escaped with her father, was given to someone else, or possibly even died in the struggle.

Temüjin also took the time to organize his affairs. He developed his *keshig*, or bodyguard, with day and night guards as well as *qorchi*, or quiver bearers. He also formally began to organize his military units and assigned some commanders.[64]

Meanwhile, to the west, the Naiman learned of the recent developments, not least through the discovery of Toghril's death. When the Naiman leadership discovered his body, they took his skull and showed it proper veneration, undoubtedly to propitiate Toghril's spirit.[65] The power of the spirit was commensurate with the status of the individual in the mundane world. As a khan, Toghril's spirit would have been quite powerful.

The Naiman then planned to march against the Mongols and deal with them decisively.[66] One senses that this was in part to avenge Toghril, but also that they saw an opportunity to dominate the steppes of Mongolia. The Naiman may have conspired to seize the Orkhon Valley, which had long been the base of authority for any steppe empire going back to the Xiongnu. The Kereit had controlled it previously, but their defeat left it ripe for the taking.[67]

To this end, the Naiman summoned others to join them, such as the Önggüt, who dwelled in the steppes of modern Inner Mongolia.[68] The Naiman and the Önggüt shared some similarities in that both had converted to Nestorian Christianity, or at least some of their elites had. Both confederations also were more culturally sophisticated than the Mongols. The Önggüt had long served as *jüyin* for the Jin and benefitted from close contacts with the wealthy empire.[69] For the Naiman, they had close ties with the Qara Khitai and were former subjects of that empire. Although no longer vassals, they still had amiable or at least non-hostile ties with the Qara Khitai. Furthermore, the Naiman also had their own writing system adopted from the Uyghurs and Nestorian Christian missionaries.[70]

Yet, perhaps due to mutual ties to the Jin Empire, rather than cooperating with the Naiman, the Önggüt revealed the Naiman plan to Temüjin, thus sparing the Mongols from surprise.[71] Indeed, the Mongols decided to make their own surprise attack against the Naiman. This was a drastic move as the Mongols set out in early spring, before their horses had time to fatten and recover from the winter. It was a risky move but important. The longer they waited, the stronger the Naiman became. In addition to the Önggüt, the Naiman summoned others, such as the Merkit and the Oirat, who had joined them in the Gur Khanid confederation against Toghril and Temüjin in 1201.[72] The Merkit also had marriage alliances with the Naiman. Thus for the Mongols, waiting allowed for the Naiman strength to grow and perhaps attract some of the recently defeated enemies such as the Tatars and any disaffected Kereit. The remnants of the Tayichi'ut rallied to the Naiman as did other Mongols who rejected Temüjin's rule, including the irrepressible Jamuqa.[73] Indeed, the Naiman's actions appear to be a reaction to the consolidation of the steppe under Temüjin and Jin authority. The fact that many flocked to the Naiman demonstrates the growing concern at Temüjin's power.

The Mongols marched quickly to intercept the Naiman before they reached Mongol territory. Fittingly, the battle took place near the Orkhon Valley in the foothills of the Khangai mountains, approximately 88 km southeast of modern Kharkhorin, the eventual location of Qaraqorum, the Mongol Empire's capital.[74] In the process, Temüjin also discussed how to approach the battle with his commanders, unveiling new tactics.[75]

Meanwhile, the Naiman had their own discussions. They learned of the Mongol approach from their scouts, who spotted the Mongols' campfires and reported to Tayang Khan, the Naiman leader, that "their camp fires are more numerous than the stars. The Mongols are, therefore, many".[76] Additionally, the scouts brought scrawny horses that had strayed from the Mongols in search of grass to show Tayang Khan. The Mongols' condition was pitiful. Based on this intelligence, the majority of the Naiman, including Güchülüg, Tayang Khan's son, wanted to attack the Mongols immediately. Tayang Khan, however, counseled caution, undoubtedly concerned by the Mongols' seemingly large numbers. Instead, he suggested that the Naiman engage in a feigned retreat and pull the Mongols farther west, thus allowing the Naiman not only to choose the battlefield, but also to exhaust the Mongols' horses further.[77]

Tayang's son and the venerable general Kökse'ü-Sabraq called Tayang an old woman and accused him of being afraid of a few dirty Mongols.[78] Overruled, Tayang had no recourse but to follow the more aggressive policy, which is exactly

what Temüjin wanted. While Tayang Khan's plan had no certainty of success, it was sound. The Mongols had already marched over approximately 1247 km, beginning on 17 May 1204 from the Or Bend of the Khalka River.[79]

As the Mongols' horses had little time to fatten after the privations of winter, they were in poor shape. Still, it is likely that the strays that the Naiman found were intentionally released. The Mongols also had every man start a campfire to obscure their numbers.[80] Their ruses were to stall for time so that they could rest and recover from the long march. Undoubtedly, if the Naiman knew that the Mongols' horses were in a weakened condition and that Temüjin's army was numerically inferior, they would have attacked the Mongols immediately. With the delay, Temüjin rested his horses and bought time to assess the battlefield at Chakirma'ut. As the Naiman were based in the hills, they held the high ground. The steep terrain, however, meant that the Naiman could not use it as a defensive ground, as the Mongols could simply withdraw and wait them out or blockade the area. The high ground, however, did provide the Naiman commanders a better view from which to direct the battle as depicted in *The Secret History*. Due to the Naiman's superior numbers, Temüjin needed to prevent the Naiman from deploying their troops so that they might outflank the Mongols – a key tactic used by all nomadic armies. To this end, the Mongols marched in *qaragana* (bush) formation: small units spread over a wide area, scattered like the *qaragana* (*Caragana arborescens*) bush across the steppe. This allowed them to adapt quickly to the next stage of battle but also avoid ambushes. As the Naiman emerged from the hills, the Mongols deployed in lake formation, spread over a large area, preventing the Naiman from deploying their full strength and overlapping the Mongol flanks. The Mongols then attacked with the *shi'uchi* or chisel tactic.[81] Here, wave after wave of Mongols attacked, shooting arrows as they closed, and then retreated so the next wave could attack, thus providing a continuous rain of arrows. Although the Naiman were also horse-archers, they could not fire their arrows as easily due to being hemmed in, which forced them to shoot at areas rather than at targets. Furthermore, the Naiman were being shot at along their entire front, thus the Mongols continued to chip away at the Naiman, forcing them to retreat. Again, their superior numbers became a hindrance as they clogged the passes in the hills, limiting their maneuverability. Thus, the Mongols forced the Naiman back to the Naqu Cliffs, pressing them so closely that the Naiman began to fall off the precipice, where they "piled up like logs" at the foot of the mountain.[82]

Tayang Khan was killed in the battle even though he was not at the front. Instead, he directed or observed from a strategic position, joined by Jamuqa, who served as the narrator of the events as recorded in *The Secret History*.[83] Güchülüg escaped by fleeing west, where he sought to rally the Naiman. There, factions of the Merkit joined.[84] One group of Merkit submitted, however, under the leadership of Dayir Usun, who offered his daughter Qulan in marriage to Temüjin. Many of these Merkit later rebelled, but the Mongols defeated them. Any survivors were then dispersed among the Mongol regiments. Though Temüjin had agreed to keep this faction of the Merkit intact under the leadership of Qulan's father, he did not tolerate betrayal or rebellion.[85]

Although Jamuqa escaped the battle, he was eventually captured as well. His own men betrayed him and took him captive, handing him over to his old *anda*. For their reward, Temüjin executed them. If men betrayed their leader, how could

Temüjin trust them? Although *The Secret History* depicts Temüjin and Jamuqa in a lengthy dialogue, in which Temüjin offered to let Jamuqa be his right hand and Jamuqa said he should be executed as Temüjin would otherwise never rest easy, it is doubtful events truly went this way.[86] In reality, Temüjin probably executed Jamuqa without remorse, as Jamuqa had been a rival and a stalwart opponent of Temüjin's for 12 years.

The Tayichi'ut also submitted. Tarqutai, their leader, who also took Temüjin captive as a youth, was executed. With the defeat of Tarqutai and Jamuqa, Temüjin now finally ruled the Mongols. With this, there was little question as to who was now the dominant power in the steppe. In 1206, Temüjin would be crowned Chinggis Khan, ruler of the Yeke Monggol Ulus.

NOTES

1 See De Rachewiltz 1989 for full discussion.
2 *SHM*, §55–56.
3 *SHM*, §59; Clark 1978, 36; RDT2, 109; RDT, 139, 152; RDK, 210, 231; RDRM, 311; *HCGK*, 1.
4 The ages of Bekter and Belgütei are never provided in the sources. However, events related to Bekter's death lead to the conclusion that he must have been the eldest son, as will be discussed. See Ratchnevsky 1992, 15, 24.
5 De Rachewiltz 2004, 324–325; Ratchnevsky 1992, 18; Moses 1986.
6 Moses 1986, 290 points out that the age might be symbolic and that Temüjin may have been older.
7 *SHM*, §63.
8 *SHM*, §67–69.
9 Togan 1998, 71.
10 *SHM*, §70–71; De Rachewiltz 2004, 341–435.
11 *SHM*, I, §71–75; RDT2, 114; RDT, 159; RDK, 241; RDRM, 325–327; *HCGK*, 18.
12 *SHM*, §75.
13 *SHM*, §17–22, 77.
14 *SHM*, §77–78.
15 Dunnell 2010, 24; Weatherford 2004, 23–25.
16 *SHM*, §78.
17 *SHM*, §81.
18 *SHM*, §81–87; RDK, 133; RDRM, 174–175; RDT, 93–94; RDT2, 66.
19 *SHM*, §81–87; RDK, 133; RDRM, 174–175; RDT, 93–94; RDT2, 66.
20 *SHM*, §90–93, 95; Clark 1978, 39.
21 *SHM*, §93.
22 *SHM*, §94, 96.
23 *SHM*, §95, 97.
24 *SHM*, §96.
25 *SHM*, §95, 105; Togan 1998, 70–73.
26 *SHM*, §100–102; 110–112; RDT2, 104; RDRM, 299–300; RDT, 146; RDK, 223. Rashid al-Din has the rather implausible story that the Merkit took Börte and then gave her to Toghril (perhaps as tribute). He treated her as a daughter-in-law and returned her to Temüjin.
27 *SHM*, §104–107.
28 May 2006, 273–286.
29 *SHM*, §109–110.

30 *SHM*, §112.
31 May 2006, 274–278.
32 May 2018, 31.
33 *HCGK*, 148–149; *SHM*, §120–126.
34 *SHM*, §120–126.
35 *SHM*, §127.
36 *SHM*, §128; RDT2, 114; RDRM, 327; RDT, 160; RDK, 242; *HCGK*, 24–25; *SWQZL*, 10.
37 *SHM*, §129; Ratchnevsky 1992, 49–51; RDT2, 114–115; RDRM, 327–332; RDT, 160–161; RDK, 243–245; *HCGK*, 35–37; *SWQZL*, 10. Togan 1998, 80–87. The *SWQZL* and Rashid al-Din depict Temüjin as defeating Jamuqa.
38 *MDBL*, 49; Ratchnevsky 1992, 50.
39 Togan 1998, 85–86; Ratchnevsky 1992, 49–50.
40 RDRM, 387–390; RDK, 285; RDT, 187; RDT2, 133; *HCGK*, 224; Ratchnevsky 1992, 49–51; May 2021, 503, Kindle; Togan 1998, 87–90.
41 *HCGK*, 191–192.
42 *SHM*, §134; De Rachewiltz 2004, I, 491–493; RDT2, 117; RDT, 164–165*; RDK*, 250; RDRM, 338; *HCGK*, 191–192.
43 May 2021, 561.
44 *SHM*, §158; RDT2, 125–126; RDT, 176–177; RDK, 268–269; RDRM, 365–366; *HCGK*, 294. *The Secret History* indicates that they killed Buyiruq Khan, but we see him appear at events such as the Battle of Köyiten. Thus, either he was not killed, or Buyiruq Khan is a title used by Naiman khans.
45 *SHM*, §159–162; RDT2, 126–127; RDRM, 367–368; RDT, 177–178; RDK, 269–270; *HCGK*, 294–296.
46 *SHM*, §160; RDT2, 126–127; RDT, 178–179; RDK, 270; RDRM, 367–368.
47 *SHM*, §163; RDRM, 369–370; RDT2, 127; RDT, 178–179; RDK, 270–272; *SWQZL*, 18–19.
48 *SHM*, §141; RDT2, 129; RDT, 182; RDRM, 377–378; RDK, 276–278; *SWQZL*, 22–23.
49 *SHM*, §142–144; RDT2, 130; RDT, 183; RDRM, 379–381; RDK, 278–279. Also, see Molnar 1994.
50 *SHM*, §144.
51 *SHM*, §144.
52 *SHM*, §145; May 2016.
53 *SHM*, §147.
54 *SHM*, §153.
55 *SHM*, §153*;* May 2018, 36; Lindner 1982; Sneath 2007.
56 *SHM*, §153.
57 *SHM*, §164–166.
58 *SHM*, §169.
59 *SHM*, §170; RDT2, 131–136; RDT, 184–192; RDRM, 381–396; RDK, 280–292; *SWQZL*, 27–28.
60 *SHM*, §182–183, 208; Cleaves 1955.
61 *SHM*, §188; RDT2, 136; RDT, 192; RDRM, 396–398; RDK, 291–292.
62 *SHM*, §186; Togan 1998, 78–79, 84, 89,
63 *SHM*, §186; RDT2, 45; RDT, 175; RDRM, 118; RDK, 265.
64 *SHM*, §191–192.
65 *SHM*,§189; RDT2, 136; RDT, 192; RDRM, 397; RDK, 265.
66 *SHM*, §189–190; RDT2, 142; RDT, 201; RDRM, 414–415; RDK, 303.
67 Moses 1974.
68 *SHM*, §190.
69 Ratchnevsky 1992, 109.

70 Ratchnevsky 1992, 94.
71 *SHM*, §190.
72 RDT2, 142–143; RDT, 201–202; RDRM, 416; RDK, 304.
73 *SHM*, §195; RDT2, 143; RDT, 202; RDRM, 416–417; RDK, 304; *SWQZL*, 38.
74 *SHM*, §194; RDT2, 143; RDT, 201–202; RDRM, 416–417; RDK, 303–304.
75 *SHM*, §195.
76 *SHM*, §194.
77 *SHM*, §194; RDT2, 142–143; RDT, 202; RDRM, 416; RDK, 304; *SWQZL*, 5–36.
78 *SHM*, §194; RDT2, 143; RDT, 202; RDRM, 416–417; RDK, 304.
79 *SHM*, §192–193; RDT2, 143; RDT, 201; RDRM, 416; RDK, 303.
80 *SHM*, §193.
81 *SHM*, §195; De Rachewiltz 2004, 704–705.
82 *SHM*, §196; RDT2, 143; RDT, 202; RDRM, 417–418; RDK, 305.
83 *SHM*, §194–196.
84 RDT2, 143–144; RDT, 203–204; RDRM, 418–419; RDK, 305–308.
85 *SHM*, §198; *SWQZL*, 38–39.
86 *SHM*, §200–201; RDT2, 212; RDRM, 610.

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RDK, See List of Abbreviations.

RDRM, See List of Abbreviations.

RDT, See List of Abbreviations.

RDT2, See List of Abbreviations.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE EARLY MONGOL STATE*

Isenbike Togan

The steppe and the sown can be understood in history through their different ways of organizing economics and politics. In sedentary states, mostly with centralized administrations, these areas were completely separate. In the steppe, however, they overlapped due to environmental factors and lifestyle. The establishment of a state and later an empire in the steppe was dependent on internal and external factors. While internal homogeneity among the core population was necessary, long-distance trade played a crucial role as an external factor. The aspiration of newly established political entities was to acquire control over the transcontinental trade routes that we call Silk Roads. To be able to control trade, benefit from the profits, and develop peaceful or warlike relationships with peoples along these routes, economics had to be brought under the umbrella of politics. In the establishment of the Early Mongol state, we see that policies addressing the external factors were put forward only after internal factors had been dealt with. The practice of "partitioned administration" was an important tool in solving problems stemming from external factors, such as trade.

INTERNAL FACTORS

The non-stratified and stratified nomadic societies inhabiting the steppe region coexisted, competed, and fought. Conflicts occurred mostly because of structural differences as well as disputes over pasturelands and the exchange of goods. A retrospective overview of the situation compels us to focus on a hitherto insignificant unit, that is the Qiyat-Borjigid of the Nirun – meaning backbone – group,[1] which produced Chinggis Khan. But before that, let us look at the geographical distribution of these groups.

Following historical sources whose perspectives were shaped by Chinggis Khan's later success, we will first look at the three-river region of the Onon-Kerülen and Tula in today's eastern Mongolia. At that time (11th–12th c.), however, this region was inhabited by the Jalayir and some of the Törölkin who numbered about 70 *küren*.[2] Rashid al-Din tells us that at that time a *küren* was about a thousand tents.

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Rashid al-Din provides a lively account concerning the Kerülen's proximity to the Jin Empire (1115–1234), in which the Jin invaded the steppe and dispersed the Jalayir.[3]

Remnants of this branch of the Jalayir escaped towards the north, where they damaged the pasturelands of Chinggis Khan's ancestress, Monolun/Nomolun, and killed her.[4] Earlier, the sons of Monolun had each taken a bride from a different tribe and had gone to live with them. By that token, we understand that uxorilocality was the norm. Sons joined their wives' people. Because of this only one son, Qaidu, who was not present because he was visiting his uncle, remained. He and his uncle decamped and moved from their original homeland to the east of Lake Baikal, to Barghujin Tögüm.[5] According to Skrynnikova this homeland was the Amur region.[6]

They migrated from east of Baikal (Amur) southwest to the Onan region. This is how Chinggis Khan's ancestors came to the Onan-Kerülen area. The former inhabitants, the Jalayir, became their *ötegü boghol*;[7] they are described as having ten large divisions, or branches, each of which became a separate and numerous group. The names of these divisions are given by Rashid al-Din.[8] The Borjigid, the Tayichi'ut, and the Salji'ut were descended from Qaidu.[9] In other words, according to Rashid al-Din they were related through the fifth generation. The ancestors of the Tayichi'ut, according to Rashid al-Din, however, were located "near the territory of Cathay, Cathaian idioms and titles gained currency among them".[10]

The information given by Rashid al-Din on the Tayichi'ut is not uniform. He indicates that among the Tayichi'ut "each clan had its own separate commander and leader, but they were all in accord. In every age and epoch they elevated a monarch or a khan from amongst themselves and followed him".[11] He describes them as numerous and powerful, which seems to be true as this statement is confirmed by the *Shengwu qinzhenglu*.[12] Rashid al-Din seems to refer to the time when Ambaqai and Qutula had been elected as *qa'an*. Ambaqai, a grandson of Qaidu, was ambitious and wanted to establish marital relations with the Tatars and contacts with China. He failed in both cases. His request for a Tatar bride was rejected, and they delivered him to the Chinese court. Apparently, Ambaqai had committed a breach of etiquette, since it was typical for the elders of the community to make marriage arrangements. Instead, Ambaqai had gone by himself to the Tatar tribes in order to choose one of their daughters as a wife. They were offended, saying, "How can he ask for our daughters like this?"[13] The Tatars seized him and several of his followers and sent them to the Chinese court, where he was killed.

Ambaqai's reign suggests a growth of male dominance, derived from strong leadership and force. The Tatars, in this case those of Buir Nor, were "followers and obedient to Altan Khan" [the Jin ruler]. When he was about to be executed by being nailed to a wooden donkey, Ambaqai said:

> You did not take me with manliness and virtue or with your own troops. Others captured me and brought me to you. If you kill me in such a vile and mean way, you will make enemies of Qada'an Taishi, Qutula Qa'an, Toda'a, and Yesügai Bahadur's sons, who are kinfolk to our clans and the Mongol nation, and you will stir up a vendetta, for they will certainly rise up to requite my blood. It is unwise of you to do this.[14]

Here we note two important points. First, we see that patrilineality is being emphasized. Gone were the days of Alan the Fair (Alan Qo'a), Mongholjin, Boroghchin Qo'a, and Monolun. In fact, the killing of Monolun symbolizes the trend towards the emergence and supremacy of the male line, starting with Qaidu Khan. Moreover "vendetta" (*ös*) is brought to the forefront, a phenomenon that will disappear with the early Mongol state.[15] Vengeance was not initiated by clans/tribes but by the state apparatus, as will be elaborated in the following pages. The tendency towards patriarchy, on the other hand, would not disappear. It was strengthened during the process of state formation.

After Ambaqai Qa'an's death at the hands of the Jin, there was uncertainty as to who would be the next leader. Eventually, Qabul Khan's son Qutula, not Ambaqai Qa'an's son, was chosen as leader. As Skrynnikova has shown, until that time they had a matrilineal genealogy. Starting with Qabul Khan (the third-generation ancestor, that is great-grandfather), the patrilineal Qiyat emerges in the sources.[16] They began "to be called Qiyat-Borjigin".[17] The process of deciding who was going to be the leader was not easy, as seen from conflicting reports of the election, not "appointment," of Qutula.[18]

Elections can be taken as a sign of lateral succession. This could be a strict lateral principle, as we see among the Early Türk, or a loose lateral, as Ambaqai Qa'an's succession implies. Within this loose lateral convention, another branch of Qaidu Khan's sons, that of Bai Singhor (the line of Chinggis), started to gain precedence. Ambaqai's successor was not his own son but a cousin, Qabul Khan's son Qutula. Qabul Khan also had his own encounter with the Jin dynasty, in which he wanted to display his power.[19] These leaders were chosen not so much because of their place in the genealogy but for their bravery and courage. Yet Rashid al-Din's statement regarding Qutula's election indicates an awareness of lateral succession. He says about Qabul Khan's son Qutula, "The fifth son was Qutula Khan. Despite the existence of his brothers, he ruled after his father [Qabul Khan]".[20]

By these words Rashid al-Din implies that leadership should have gone to one or more of his elder brothers before Qutula. Both Qutula and his father Qabul had brothers older than themselves. But the election did not mean that there was only one ruler. The brothers of Qabul Khan each had their own following. Qabul Khan was *primus inter pares*. During this phase we can see that the Borjigid and the Tayichi'ut leaders cannot easily be separated. They were "brethren" descended from Alan Qo'a and Qaidu Khan.

At another place Rashid al-Din states that the "Tayichi'ut never had a ruler or leader therefore they were overthrown"[21], which is confirmed by the *Shengwu qinzhenglu*.[22] Here he means they did not have "only one ruler", but they had leaders, plural. As a result, when we hear of Qutula Qa'an's election by Yisügei – Chinggis Khan's father – and others, and how he was made to sit on the felt mat and was raised above their heads, we can perceive that he was the strongman among others. What is noteworthy at this juncture is the election process. Thackston uses the words "elevation, appointment" for this process. It would seem the Persian *bar neshastand*[23] makes it clear that they made him sit [on the felt mat]. In another instance the word "elevated" (*nasb*) is used as we can see in the passage quoted above.[24]

An election process, albeit an unsuccessful one, is described in detail after Ambaqai Qa'an's death at the hands of the Jin emperor:

> His relatives, sons, and the commanders of the Tayichi'ut gathered to elect someone as ruler in his stead. They deliberated for a time, unable to decide on anyone. Finally one day when they had assembled they said to Nurdu Bilgashi, one of their cousins and a great tribal leader, "What say you in this regard? Whom do you consider worthy?" "Let Tarqutai Qiriltuq say," he replied. [Tarqutai Qiriltuq], also one of the cousins and the son of Adal Khan, said, "What can I say? Let Mätügün Sachan say. 'Should I leap like a sparrow into a snare so that my foot may get caught in a trap? The black swallow went on top of a tree and did [not] fall into a snare'! What qualifications have I, a common slave, to speak? You lords speak wise and good words so that we commoners can be kept amused like a colt that drinks the milk of two mares and gets full and fat. If you agree in council on one person, everything and all the people will be as you wish. If you do not agree, all sorts of dissention and strife will befall your nation." In this regard he spoke many rhymed words, proverbs, and homilies and left the gathering, weeping. At that session no one was elected ruler.[25]

This passage shows that not everybody had a say in the election process. The elders' opinion carried more weight. Although Mätügün Sechen says that he is a common person, the epithet *sechen* (wise orator) implies that he was respected. But it seems that seeing the differences of opinion, he did not want to be partial to one group or person. Yet he seems to show an inclination towards "one-person" rule. These words, coming from a member of the non-stratified Nirun group, show a tendency towards a "one-headed" rule that is noteworthy as the Nirun were in general against one-man rule. He therefore removed himself from the site of conflict like a black sparrow. We understand that before the state was established there were lords in plural (*padishan*) and commoners (*qarachu*).[26]

After Ambaqai's death, the election process presented difficulties, as the newly elected leader, Qutula Qa'an, was a son of Qabul Khan. To avenge the death of Ambaqai Qa'an, he made incursions into the Jin Empire and defeated the forces that he encountered before returning with plunder. On his return journey, the Dörben tribe captured him; however, he managed to escape and returned to his camp as they were preparing a mourning ceremony for him.[27] After Qutula's death, his brother Bartan Ba'atur is mentioned, not because of his deeds but because he was the grandfather of Chinggis Khan. In fact, for those years when no leader is mentioned, Rashid al-Din says: "although there are many stories about Qabul Khan's sons other than Bartan Ba'atur, in this history we will content ourselves with this much and the stories of Bartan Ba'atur and his sons will be written in a separate section".[28] Bartan Ba'atur's son Yisügei emerges at this instance (towards the middle of the 12th century) as a person who developed a close relationship with the Kereit rulers and had many fights with the Tatars.

In Rashid al-Din's account, Yisügei appears as a powerful leader who helped the Kereit Ong Khan on different occasions. Ong Khan's problems were his brothers. Apparently, following the steppe custom of lateral succession, these brothers were fighting for their own rights. However, Toghril Ong Khan was ambitious and greedy.

He wanted to rule by himself. We can see from his relations with his son Senggüm that he was not in favor of lateral succession, but rather a lineal one, transmitting his position and power to his son. As he was also for centralization of authority, his preference for lineal succession is understandable. We see a similar trend with the Naiman. In other words, chiefdom-like formations were in the process of transforming from horizontal, reciprocal power relations to vertical ones. Chinggis Khan later utilized this model.

Yisügei also must have seen the merits of lineal succession, as we do not hear any claims from his brothers. One can surmise that Yisügei sought to expand his horizon by establishing relations outside of his immediate kin. *The Secret History* tells us that this expansion saw him recognize the superiority of Ong Khan. His young son Temüjin and his companion Jamuqa were serving as "hostages" while they played on the frozen Tula River around 1176. Their competition for leftovers – a sign of aspiration – from Ong Khan confirms this assumption. The custom of receiving and eating the leftovers of an esteemed elder demonstrated the elder's favor. Yisügei was extending aid, not as Ong Khan's equal but as his *anda* (blood brother) in a time of distress.[29] That Yisügei had greater ambitions can also be seen from his fight with the Tatar chief Temüjin, who was killed at about the same time as a son was born to Yisügei. The Tatar chief's name was given to the newborn son. The location given by Pelliot is in the vicinity of Buir Nor. After the death of Monolun, the Borjigid had left their earlier homeland east of Baikal and settled around Kerülen under the leadership of Qaidu Khan. After this move we encounter them as a warrior society in which men excelled by their ability to fight, bravery, and courage. Men were praised as warriors, and this made them aware of the importance of the male line.[30]

The priority given to martial virtues and bravery coincided with a shift towards patrilineality. For instance, until the third ancestor, Qabul Khan, the Borjigid leaders did not carry the added identification of Qiyat, which in actual fact was the affiliation of Dutum Menen, Alan Qo'a's husband.[31] The male line, that is her husband Dutum Menen's clan, gained precedence, while the female ancestress and her clan (the Qori Tümed or Qorolas) became insignificant.[32] Rashid al-Din repeatedly emphasizes the importance of kinship relations in his account on the Nirun. This awareness also covered collateral branches. That is why Ambaqai Qa'an said to the Jin ruler: "The Mongol tribes, all of which are related to me [by male line], will rise up in revenge".[33] Furthermore, Rashid al-Din, while speaking of Alan the Fair as an ancestress, emphasizes fathers and forefathers:

> The many clans and tribes descended from Alan Qo'a are so numerous that if the individuals were to be counted they would exceed a million, yet each of them has a clear and unambiguous family tree, for it is a Mongolian custom to preserve one's relationship to one's fathers and forefathers, and every child born is taught and inculcated with his genealogy like all others in that nation. There is not one among them who does not know his tribe and lineage. Nations other than the Mongols do not have such a custom – except for the Arabs, who also keep their genealogy.[34]

We can see that the switch from a female ancestress to a male ancestor took place right after Alan Qo'a. In fact, prior to the killing of Monolun we hear of other

ancestresses. But after their migrations we do not have accounts of ancestresses until Chinggis Khan's mother, Hö'elün. A study by Pavel Rykin gives us a list of terms of ancestral categories.[35] Male ancestors going back seven generations are each mentioned with a separate term; relations of the wife are given but not her ancestors; female ancestors from the mother's side are also not mentioned. Among the Early Türk, on the other hand, we do not encounter these detailed kinship terms for ancestors.[36] This means that the earlier genealogies of matrilineal descent were not a continuation of an Inner Asian tradition. We do not know whether there were any oral traditions in which the ancestresses were referred to by name, rather than addressing them with a specific kinship term. Until recently among the Kirgiz, a mother would teach her daughter(s) the line of ancestresses. Unfortunately, there are no written records of this practice as it was only an oral tradition.

This shift toward male genealogies coincided with the warrior-males and their progeny seizing power over the Qiyat-Borjigid. These men used force in their relations with others. First, the Jalayir became their *ötegü boghol*. Then we see them trying to establish relations with the Jin in the south. Between the Jin Empire and the Kerülen, where they were located, they dealt with the Tatars, who became their adversaries.

Among the neighboring groups we see both the non-stratified Nirun (Backbones) and partially stratified Törölkin (Natives). The development of kinship ideology among the Törölkin is referred to with the following words:

> For years they and their progeny remained there, multiplying through intermarriage. Each branch of them became known by a specific name and epithet, and they became an *omaq* (The word *omaq* means to be of a specific "bone" and lineage). Those *omaqs* also branched out, and at this time the Mongol tribes report that those who came into being from these branches are more closely related to each other, and they are the Dürlükin [i.e. Törölkin I.T.] Mongols.[37]

The Törölkin, who are regarded by Rashid al-Din as coming from former Turkic people, are described here as becoming a kinship society. Apparently, before they went into Ergene-Qun, they were more like the *bodun* of the Early Türk, who were not so much attached to tribes but were connected to the state.[38] But by remaining sedentary and multiplying through intermarriage, they became a kinship society, albeit with remnants of traditions from earlier times such as recognition of hierarchy. This trend was especially prominent among the Qonggirat from the Törölkin, who later became the in-laws of Chinggis Khan.[39] The Qonggirat were closely related to the Qorolas, Olqunu'ut, and the Ikires. According to Rashid al-Din, the Qorolas were of Alan Qo'a's tribe, whereas the Olqunu'ut were Hö'elün Eke's people. Relations with this branch of the Törölkin were in general amiable. Rashid al-Din says that they used the Chinese term *fujin*, which means "lady", to address their women. Their territory was near China so they used terminology borrowed from their southern neighbors.[40] Qonggirat groups from the Törölkin were located both in the north and in the south.[41] The southern group became the future in-laws of the Golden Lineage of Chinggis Khan. The *Altan Urugh* (literally "golden seed") refers to the golden (imperial) lineage of Chinggis Khan.

The Tatars were another group in the south and southeast, who also lived in scattered groups. There were the Alchi Tatar, the Buir Nor Tatar, and four other

Tatar groups. The Alchi Tatar had 70 subgroups.[42] Buir Nor is located at the easternmost frontier of present Mongolia, whereas the Hulun Nor to the north of it is in the modern PRC. In other words, the Tatar groups occupied the regions along a belt to the northeast of China, the then Jin (1115–1234) territories. While the Qiyat-Borjigid had friendly relations with the Qonggirat, their relations with the Tatars were strained and competitive. These tensions can be dated to the first half of the 12th century, when Ambaqai Qa'an was taken prisoner by the Tatars and sent to the Jin court. We can surmise that the Qiyat-Borjigid were showing a tendency towards closer relations with the Jin, and the Tatars were in the way. The Tatars were not in conflict with everyone. They were in alliance with the Qatagin, Salji'ut, Tayichi'ut, and Dörben. These were all from the Nirun groups.[43]

The Tatar had opted for submission to Jin China, while according to Rashid al-Din, the Qiyat-Borjigid's encounter with the Jin had not been friendly. Tatar relations with the Jin, however, were also not always friendly. In one instance:

> One of the Tatar clans, whose leader and chief was Me'üjin Sä[ü]ltü, had done rebellious battle with the Altan Khan, the king of Cathay. The king of Cathay mounted his army, put his great officer Chingsang at the head, and sent them off to war. Since [the Tatars] did not have the power to resist, they took fright and withdrew in rout. [Chinggis Khan] learned of this, mounted immediately along with the soldiers who were around him, and attacked them, killing many and plundering everything they had. It is well known that among the trophies taken in that battle were a silver cradle, a brocade quilt, and other fine items. In those days the Tatars were the wealthiest of the nomads.[44]

The date of this incident is 1202.[45] It is noteworthy because it gives us valuable information about the structure of Tatar society. We are told that they lived in scattered groups and did not have a unifying leader or any rules governing succession. When they were attacked they did not have the power to resist. They preferred to escape from skirmishes and to withdraw. Instead of an open battle, they preferred to ambush their adversaries. We also learn that they were numerous and occupied a large amount of land. They were also among the wealthiest people, as can be seen from the booty taken. They were in possession of silver mines.[46] The wealth must have come from commerce. Their location was conducive to trade, but they blocked the path to Chinggis Khan as he sought to build up his own commercial networks. Their interest and investment in trade apparently went back to earlier times and extended as far west as the eastern parts of present Xinjiang.[47] In terms of their structure, they were like the Tayichi'ut who were also scattered and had no unifying leader, although they began to see the benefits of a single ruler. The Tatars had a strong sense of kinship and knew their genealogy, even after they were dispersed.[48]

They knew how to stick together, but when it came to following a leader they could vote with their feet.[49] When they were finally defeated in 1202 many were killed, but some of the survivors went on to become important commanders in the Mongol Empire.[50]

The major difference between the Tatars and the Tayichi'ut was that the former had developed commercial relations, while the Tayichi'ut seem to have been more warlike, similar to their brethren the Qiyat-Borjigid. Kinship between the

Qiyat-Borjigid and the Tayichi'ut did not guarantee an amiable and peaceful relationship. Rashid al-Din noted that sometimes relatives are like scorpions (*aqraba aqrab*). Neither of these groups were traders or great producers [craftsmen]. Warfare and booty were very important for them, and they soon became rivals. As a group based on power relations, they had to get rid of the weaker elements that might burden them. This was the case with Yisügei's people.[51] After Yisügei was ambushed and killed by the Tatars, the Tayichi'ut under Tarqutai Qiriltuq became the foremost adversaries of his family. The Tayichi'ut homeland seems to have been more towards the south, as their ancestor Charaqa Lingqum carried a Chinese title. Rashid al-Din claimed that their proximity to China caused them to adopt Chinese customs. But they were also very close to the Qiyat-Borjigid, with whom they competed, despite their blood ties.[52] According to the *Shengwu qinzhenglu*, the Tayichi'ut were numerous and occupied vast territories. They were the most important adversary of Chinggis Khan, who annihilated them in 1202.[53] Not all of the branches were enemies; some submitted of their own free will.[54] The Tayichi'ut, however, were not a homogenous kinship group, but "ethnically heterogeneous, that together constituted a super-ethnic commonality or polity (*ulus irgen*)".[55]

West of the Qiyat-Borjigid towards the Irtysh, the lands of the Tula-Orkhon-Selenge river basins were occupied by the Kereit, the Merkit, and the Naiman. In the northern belt along the Angara and Oka-Yenisei river valleys, the Oirat, the Kirgiz, and the forest people, like the Forest Uriangqai, were nomadic. Among these northern groups, the Oirat were known from ancient times.

The Qori Tümed, who appear at the beginning of *The Secret History* as Alan Qo'a's people, were located to the west of Lake Baikal.[56] According to Rashid al-Din, Alan Qo'a's people were the Qorolas, who were also located in the north along the shores of Lake Baikal.[57] As we can see, these so-called steppe nomads all nomadized along Mesopotamian-like three-river valleys. The eastern three-river valley of Onon-Kerülen-Tula seems to be more suitable for scattered habitation. However, the Tula-Orkhon-Selenge region seems to be better suited to denser habitation and thus the creation of hierarchical relationships. Unlike the forest region, the peoples located in the river valleys south of Lake Baikal were horse breeders, due to the well-watered grasslands, especially in western end of the Tula-Orkhon-Selenge valley. The location was in the middle of the northern and eastern river valleys, as well as the settled lands in the south, which was advantageous for the exchange of animals and goods. As horses could not be hoarded, any excess amount needed to be exchanged. The choice of this area for the later Mongol state is another indication of the region's centrality. The center of activity for the Qiyat-Borjigid and later Chinggis Khan's *a'urugh* (base camp) was in eastern Mongolia, but it was not the region chosen as the seat for the later state.

EARLY STATE

It was among these kinship rivalries that the young Temüjin grew up. No wonder that he opposed larger kinship groups with all their social, political, and economic components. He built his own army in such a way as to transcend these "parochial" interests.

During those years (before 1202) he showed a willingness for compromise and alliance. He tried to rally support from close kin, the Nirun in particular, and some Törölkin groups like the Qonggirat also were allies of the young Temüjin. According to Rashid al-Din, Temüjin used this alliance to appeal to other Nirun, like the Salji'ut, who had remained hostile. Temüjin emphasized the value of alliances among kin in a message to the Salji'ut. The messenger said, "many *aqwam* [people] like the Qonggirat,[58] the Tatar, and the Törölkin who are unrelated to us have all become friendly and united with us. Let us who are *aqa-ini* and blood relations to each other, unite and be friends." The Salji'ut did not respond favorably to this approach and were defeated in the ensuing battle. Many of them were killed; "few of them remained. Since those who remained were relatives, they submitted and became subservient and some of them became clients (*ta'bi*) of other Mongol tribes".[59]

Another alliance that survived from earlier times was the one between Temüjin and the Kereit ruling house and especially with Ong Khan and his brother Jaqa Gambu. The relationship that had started with Temüjin's father, Yisügei, continued on and off with Temüjin until 1206, when he was enthroned as Chinggis Khan. This relationship was one of the main pillars of the new polity, albeit Ong Khan's support waxed and waned because of the vicissitudes of his life. It was on the basis of this support that struggles, fights, and campaigns were carried out.

It was also the drive for vengeance that shaped Temüjin's early years. He first fought against the Tatar, who killed his father, and the Tayichi'ut, who deserted Yisügei's group. During all these endeavors, he became known for his fairness, which was in evidence after his family suffered the theft of their horses. Temüjin pursued the thieves and retrieved the horses with the help of a young man, to whom he offered half the herd by way of reward.[60] His commitment to fairness was also described later by followers of the Tayichi'ut:

> After a while, the above-mentioned tribes united, saying, "The commanders of the Tayichi'ut harass us and are aggressive toward us for no reason. This prince [Temüjin] would give the shirt off his back and the steed on which he rides. The person who can maintain the territory, keep the army, and guard the *ulus* is he".[61]

or:

> The Tayichi'ut tribe left us and dispersed, paying no attention to us. Genghis Khan, without prior cause, showed us such favor and goodness. He is a ruler who takes care of his subjects and knows how to command. All along the way they expressed their thanks to Genghis Khan, and they spread the word to all the clans.[62]

But Temüjin's sense of fairness also caused problems with other leaders, who feared their subjects would gravitate towards the energetic young leader. Until then, ordinary tribesmen had been left out of any redistribution, but now they acquired "a share" of booty. Equal distribution of the spoils was a new concept, which Temüjin decreed before the battle against the various Tatar groups in 1202.[63]

Sharing spoils with the common people angered many senior kinsmen, who believed that Temüjin deprived them of their rights. In some cases, he even seized dues and imposts that he believed were taken unlawfully. This kind of "confiscation" was unprecedented. Temüjin's intrusion into the redistributive rights of clan elders was one of the dividing lines between the old and the new orders (Togan 1998: 99). Until then leaders were used to keeping what they acquired for themselves. As a result, they did not appreciate these new ways. Strife with his relatives and, in the end, with the Kereit Khan were all about Temüjin's new redistributive practices. Fairness, equitable redistribution, and loyalty, rather than kinship ties, were the basis of the new polity. Fairness in redistribution worked against the earlier kinship system. Temüjin succeeded by reducing corporate structures to individuals loyal to himself and appealing to their sense of fairness.

The new system was, however, far more centralized, concentrating power in the hands of one leader. In this respect, Temüjin was emulating the Kereit model.[64] Unlike the tribal groups, which had many heads and practiced lateral succession, the new trend was lineal. Lateral succession required consultation and consensus, whilst lineal succession paved the way for direct appointment and the use of force in the transmission of power. In passages related to Kereit Ong Khan there are no references to election or council. On the contrary, both Ong Khan and his son spoke of "governing". When contemplating what would happen after he died, Ong Khan said:

> I have grown old,
> When shall I ascend to the heights–
> I have grown ancient, and having grown ancient,
> When I shall ascend the cliffs–
> Who will govern all my people?[65]

Senggüm extended this view to Temüjin, saying that after Ong Khan reached old age:

> will he suffer thy people which thy father Qurchaqus Buirugh Qan, with labour, assembled in so great a quantity to be governed by us? By whom and how will he suffer [them] to be governed?[66]

In both cases, power resided with the leadership; no agency was given to people. Kereit Ong Khan eliminated his brothers and their claim to rule by favoring his son.[67] When his son did not live up to his expectations, he accepted Temüjin's offer to become a second shaft to his rule and thus share power. The Kereit khanate also developed a political structure that was not based on kinship but rather soldiers called *cherig*. The symbol of this center was the *a'urugh*, the semi-permanent abode of immobile possessions and the seat of the women and children.[68] Today Chinggis Khan's *a'urugh* has been turned into a museum, displaying some of the goods that were found there.[69] Its location in the Köde'ü Aral is more noteworthy than the goods it contains. This "island" (*aral*) was between three rivers. The rivers, one of them being the Kerülen, constituted the walls and ditches of a "river fortress". It would seem that this location has acquired a sacredness, which may also be due to the natural spring situated there. The royal encampments (*ordo*) became a symbol of the dynasty, which permeates the literature of the Mongol empire.[70] The best-known

are the four *ordos* of Chinggis Khan's four wives, hence the geographical name Ordos for the land between the bend of the Huanghe River.

The Chinggisid court was supported by personal followers (*nökör*). The imperial center was further strengthened by taking a token child from each defeated group. For instance, this was the case with Shigi Qutuqu from the Tatar and Küchü from the Tayichi'ut. According to Rashid al-Din, they were given to the care of Börte Fujin, while *The Secret History* claims that they were entrusted to the care of Hö'elün.[71] The significance of these babies, raised in the khan's household, was not only the relationship they had to the ruling house but also the emphasis on mother-son relationship.[72] This new relationship replaced the earlier ones, which were based on age and age sets within kinship groups. The former emphasis on kinship in the fifth or third generation lost its significance. At that time, all the people in a given generation of one's kinship group were more or less equals. The new order abandoned the kinship structure and substituted a single superior, be it a mother, a commander, or the supreme commander, the khan. This political centralization had a counterpart in the lives of ordinary people. The earlier horizontal relationships were transformed into vertical relationships, which were hierarchical.[73] Recognition of status hierarchy, rather than age, became the norm. With these vertical relationships, two new values emerged; these were personal loyalty and obedience. Hierarchical relationships meant that respect was no longer shown to elders (male or female) as before but to superiors. Compassion and care were also shown to junior members of the hierarchy. Even the relationship between a mother and her offspring was incorporated into the hierarchical relationships of the new order.

Loyalty and obedience were secured through fairness and equitable redistribution of resources. Former leaders would not share their profits. For instance, as late as 1198, the Kereit Ong Khan made a raid on the Merkit and took a large amount of booty and prisoners, but he did not share them with Chinggis Khan.[74] This was Ong Khan's major weakness. Although he regarded Temüjin as his son, he was not willing to share.

Equitable redistributive practices and fairness were the basis of the newly established army of conquest. The *nökör*s who had attached themselves to Temüjin in the early stages of his career were the kernel of the new army. The number of followers grew to 13 *küren*.[75] The German translation of *küren* as "Wagenburg" causes us to imagine a "fortress of carts". Initially there were 13 such "cart fortresses". In the beginning these *küren* consisted mostly of Nirun, the kin group. There were also people from other groups. The *ötegü boghol*, the earlier attached households and groups like the Jalayir, were also part of this inner group. With the support of his followers, Temüjin was elected as khan of the Borjigid in the late 1180s and early 1190s. This election happened in the absence of his lord, the Kereit Ong Khan, who was pleased about this new development which did not present a threat to him.[76] Temüjin experienced many ups and downs in the two decades following his election, but in spite of these difficulties he was able to increase his followers.

It was only after the south/southeast (Tatar in 1196) and northwest (Merkit in 1198) were secured that the threat presented by the Tayichi'ut could be tackled (1200). As the history of the Borjigid was interwoven with the Tayichi'ut, there was always the possibility that they could destroy Temüjin's union from inside. After the Tayichi'ut were defeated in 1200, Temüjin achieved a string of successes. First, the

patrilineal Naiman together with the coalition under Jamuqa were defeated in 1201 with Kereit support. The battle known as Köyiten, meaning cold, ended with the Naiman being frozen after using the magic stone, *jada*, to manipulate the weather.[77] This victory made it more and more evident that Chinggis Khan presented a threat to the Kereit khanate. Consequently, on the following night, Ong Khan and his company decamped. Thus ended the power-sharing arrangement between the two men. After this success, Chinggis entered an alliance with Jaqa Gambu, though only for a short period. When Jaqa Gambu joined forces with Chinggis Khan, the Kereit were completely subordinated to the new hierarchy.[78]

It was not only the Kereit khan who feared Chinggis Khan. The leaders of the many-headed groups showed their resentment and fear in different ways. The objection that was raised against Chinggis' one-man rule and his policies of fair distribution became apparent during and after the Tatar campaign. This expedition was not at all well-received. The main opposition came from the ranks of the Jürkin, the kinsmen of Temüjin. Their opposition, sometimes called "the revolt of the Jürkin or the Yurki", demonstrated that they perceived this whole venture as a challenge and even a danger to their own existence and position. In earlier times, fighting did not bring annihilation; it was simply a mechanism for changing the balance of power between different groups. This was, for example, one of the main lines of opposition to Toghril Ong Khan.[79] Chinggis Khan's monopolization of power, on the other hand, meant the inevitable annihilation and destruction of other contending powers. This spirit of resentment and opposition gradually developed into a coalition of the Nirun and the Törölkin, who chose Jamuqa as Gür Khan (universal ruler), but in actual fact they were for ruling "themselves". It was a coalition of the many-headed groups. Their joint venture presented a formidable force at Alqui (1203), but they were defeated by Temüjin and his followers. Later on Chinggis Khan spoke of the problem of many heads in an analogy which compared the segmentary kinship groups to a many-headed snake:

> One night, when it was bitterly cold, the heads desired to creep into a hole in order to ward off the chill. But as each head entered the hole another head would oppose it; and in this way they all perished. But another snake, which had but one head and a long tail, entered the hole and found room for his tail and all his limbs and members, which were preserved from the fury of the cold.[80]

This was a fight between the many-headed snake and the one-headed snake. With the visible and invisible support of the Kereit khanate, the adversaries (Merkit in 1198, Tayichi'ut in 1200–1201, Naiman in 1201, and Tatar in 1202) were going to be defeated. After Ong Khan's death the Merkit and the Naiman, together with Jamuqa, were defeated (1204), this time by Chinggis Khan without any outside support.[81] In this way, exchange routes to China, and eventually to the west, were opened. From then on, trade and trade routes, as well as the safety of merchants, were major aims. This can be seen by the fact that Chinggis repeatedly sent Jafar Khoja, a Muslim trader, to Jin China to negotiate a peace.[82] Later Chinggis sent a caravan, led by the Muslim secretary Mahmud Yalavach, to the west. These Muslim traders, as well as Hasan, a merchant engaged in fur trade, were Chinggis Khan's companions. They were present at the covenant of Baljuna, where, after a defeat (Qalqajit Sands),

they swore to stick together and to achieve success.[83] Muslim traders had been trying to achieve a modus vivendi with China to facilitate trade. From the Ghaznavids on, this interest was not reciprocated in China.[84]

Earlier, commerce and warfare were carried out by different groups. For instance, the Tatars were skilled traders, while the Nirun (Mongols) were fierce warriors. Chinggis Khan was able to combine the two in his army of conquest. The army followed along the earlier trade routes and would be influential in opening new ones.[85] Indeed, their dictum of *il* and *bulgha* would initiate trade wars. Anyone who submitted (*il*) would be under protection, while those who did not respond to the call for surrender were regarded as *bulgha* (rebels).

Actually, the incorporation of subjugated people began with nomadic populations. Temüjin's armies incorporated both nomadic tribesmen and sedentary subject populations. Yet only the nomads were split into smaller groups and sent in different directions, a situation referred to as "distribution" or "scattering". The Mongolian terminology shows clearly how this was accomplished. It seems there were two ways of distributing defeated people. One was "to share the people concerned among themselves". This was used for the Kereit, who were the strongest adversary, being Chinggis Khan's former overlords. We read in *The Secret History* that they were shared among the "shareholders of power". The term used here is *tüge'eldü*, a reflexive form of the verb "share, *tügelge*, to cause to distribute", which in its reflexive form means "sharing among each other".[86]

In this connection Juvaini tells us the following:

> When the matter of Ong Khan had been disposed of and the tribes of the Mongols had, some by choice and some by compulsion, been reduced to his command and rendered submissive and obedient to his orders, he divided the tribes and the peoples of the Mongols and the Naiman, as well as all the armies, between the aforesaid sons; and to each of his other younger sons and his brothers and kinsmen he allotted their share of armies.[87]

The short-term implications of this sharing were the destruction of tribal structures and the creation of an army of conquest. The long-term implications were that the people who were "shared among each other" constituted the first seeds of the later aristocratic appanage holders, as listed in the chapter on annual grants in the *Yuan shi*.[88] We have a long list of the ruling family as well as important commanders who received troops. There we can see that the shared tribespeople were in small groups.[89]

The other method was to scatter defeated enemies, to distribute them in different directions so that no one was left, an age-old method. In both cases, the phrase "no one left" is emphasized. We also know of a selection of "two out of a group of ten" in a later campaign. To ensure that kinship relations were completely broken up, "Chinggis Khan ordered two men taken out of every ten Mongols" when they were campaigning in the Jin territory.[90] Prevention of kinship alliances was the main goal. Yet in spite of these methods, we know that some of the Kereit escaped via Siberia to the west.

The main objective of Chinggis Khan's detribalization policy was the destruction of nodes of stratification in the steppe society, as well as the dissolution of kinship structures which functioned as political units. Detribalization was carried out in four stages: 1. breaking up structures, 2. abandonment of volition, 3. leaving decision-making

to the highest commander, and 4. mobilization in long-range operations (conquests) with a share in the booty. These policies were only directed at chiefdom-like structures (Naiman, Kereit, Merkit) and loosely organized kinship groups with many heads.

The defeated people who were incorporated into the army of conquest did not face the dictum *il* or *bulgha*. This was a method developed later for sedentary groups.

Members of the army of conquest all submitted to their superiors and commanders. The army was divided up according to a decimal system, and members were not permitted to change their unit or location.[91] The units were called *aimag* and their commanders were the *noyan, noyad* in the plural.[92] In one instance, when they asked how long the expedition was, they were given the answer "forever". This was the "army law" (*junfa*), known in general as *jasagh*. Gone were the days of shifting alliances that determined success or failure in earlier times. They were replaced by submission and obedience. Any person who did not obey was punished severely. In other words, members of the army of conquest lost their earlier volition. This loss, however, was compensated by economic gains brought by the equitable redistribution mentioned above. They received a share from the booty but had no power beyond what was assigned to them. Earlier, the composition of groups like the Tayichi'ut would change as different contingents joined or left them. The most dramatic change brought by the Early Mongol state was the absence of volition. Additionally, the army was no longer constituted on the basis of kinship and tribe – with a few exceptions[93] – as before.[94] Chinggis Khan had suffered from the opposition of his kin, and so the new order did away with the kinship system to ensure loyalty to the Monggol *ulus*, as the early state was called.[95] Loyalty, which was shown earlier to Chinggis Khan's person, was now extended to the Monggol *ulus*, the state.

While the separation of politics from economics was an impediment to structures based on kinship, it was not a valid practice for the Golden Lineage, members of which acted and functioned in the spirit of kinship. The new state was formed under a dynasty. Without the dynasty there was no early state. This dynasty, which was ruled according to the prerogatives of family law, functioned by redistributing "shares" of people and lands.[96] We see these old privileges in the sphere of inheritance, in the role of seniority irrespective of gender, in the persistence of traditions of volition, and in the continued use of consent and struggles over the principles of redistribution.[97] In other words, the Borjigid, as well as the members of the dynasty, retained the hierarchical kinship relations of the former days; they reserved for themselves that which the others had been deprived of, that is, the privileges of a kinship society.

The dynasty bypassed the collateral branches for the succession. Chinggis Khan's brothers were part of the ceremonies related to the succession process but did not attain supreme rule.[98] It was not a lateral process; there was a gradual development towards a lineal succession by excluding Chinggis Khan's brothers.

One would be inclined to see echoes of Chinese practices, as *The Secret History* speaks of the affairs of the cap or hat to describe dynastic politics. In this passage where Chaghadai and Jochi, first in contest and later in cooperation, come to an agreement, they say:

> It is Ögödei *among us* who is steady and reliable: let us *therefore*, agree on Ögödei. As Ögödei is close to *our* father the Qan, if *the Qan* instructs him on the great array of the "teachings of the hat", this will be fine.[99]

Francis Cleaves translates the passage slightly differently, saying:

> Ögödei is honest. Let us say Ögödei. Ögödei being at the side of the father the Qan, if [the latter] make [him] to recognize the precepts of the hat [i.e. the sign of imperial authority] of which the appearance is great [i.e. as seen from afar], it will do.[100]

The word translated as "hat" here is *malaqai*. Actually, the best way to understand this passage is to translate *malaqai* as "leadership", as for instance in Turkic sometimes a word for headgear can also have the meaning of leadership. It is quite probable that the 13th-century Mongolian term also harbored such a meaning. Cleaves' understanding as "sign of imperial authority" is closer to the Turkic expression. From Ögödei's words we understand that this decision taken by the council of sons was actually favored by Chinggis. Ögödei says:

> When *my* father the Qa'an [favoring me] tells speak what am I to say? How can I say that I am not able *to do so*? I shall say that I will certainly try according to *my* ability. [. . .] Chinggis Qa'an declared as follows: "If Ögödei speaks such words, *that* will do".[101]

Here we are witnessing a council of brothers with their father, Chinggis Khan. But it was not an election. In earlier days the election process was expressed as "whom will your *ulus* support as your successor" or "by whom will they let themselves to be governed".[102]

In the translation of these earlier passages both Cleaves and De Rachewiltz give agency to Chinggis Khan but not to the people. The wording of this passage, speaking of preference and election by the people, harkens back to the old days when we hear people's volition expressed in the phrase, "Whom do you consider worthy?"

The establishment of the army of conquest, separation of politics from the economy, and linear succession all point to centralization and one-man command. This one-man command was only possible after Temüjin was declared "Chinggis Khan" in 1206. One could even say that he declared himself the sole ruler as he was able to establish himself above every issue and party. The driving force behind this process was the common goals that were shaped by the highest command, supported by the strength of Eternal Heaven. As a result, the destruction of nodes of power in the tribal world left the highest command with an unparalleled concentration of power. He became the Grand Arbitrator who had special connections to Eternal Heaven.[103]

NOTES

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1 For these names and terms see Chapter 1, "Mongolia before Chinggis Khan."
2 RDT, 119.
3 RDT, 119.
4 To the Black Mountain in RDT, 119.
5 RDT, 119–120.

6 Skrynnikova 2010, 12, 15.
7 For the term *ötegü boghol*, "slaves from earlier times", see *TMEN*, I, 160–162, no. 40.
8 RDT, 37.
9 For the Salj'iut see I. Togan 2007.
10 RDT, 121.
11 RDT, 123.
12 *HCGK*, 139.
13 RDT, 130.
14 RDT, I: 130.
15 Fletcher 1986, 14; RDT, 44, 45.
16 RDT, 126.
17 Skrynnikova 2010, 7.
18 RDT, 130.
19 RDT, 127–128; Ratchnevsky 1997, 510.
20 RDT, 127.
21 RDT, 123.
22 *HCGK*, 139–141.
23 Thackston has here "appointed", while the Persian text has *bar nishastand*, "sitting on something".
24 RDT, I: 107. For this ceremony see Sultanov 2001.
25 RDT, 131.
26 RDT, 131. Thackston has translated the *qarachu* of the text as "common slave".
27 RDT, 129–131.
28 RDT, 132.
29 For *anda* see I. Togan 1998, 183; *TMEN*, I, 149–152.
30 Skrynnikova 2010, 17.
31 RDT, 26.
32 Skrynnikova 2010, 7.
33 RDT, 45.
34 RDT, 116.
35 Rykin 2011.
36 Vovin and McCraw 2011.
37 RDT, 80.
38 Togan 2015.
39 Cleaves 1951.
40 RDT, 134.
41 Togan 2006.
42 RDT, 47.
43 RDT, 46.
44 RDT, 46.
45 Togan 1998, 91.
46 Ratchnevsky 1997, 4–5.
47 Klyashtorny 1992.
48 RDT, 47.
49 RDT, 159.
50 *SHM* §133–134, Togan 1998, 91.
51 *SHM*, §69–76.
52 RDT, 144. See for a different understanding Skrynnikova 2010, 20–21.
53 RDT, 159; *SHM* §133–134.
54 RDT, 162; *HCGK*, 139–140.
55 Skrynnikova 2010, 23; RDT, 121.

56 De Rachewiltz 2004, 246–247.
57 RDT, 79–80, 87–88.
58 The Persian text of RDK has Qatagin (99); RDMA, 477 has Qonggirat. RDRM, I, 185 have also Qongrat. As the wording is about non-kin people who have "joined us", Qatagin being of the Nirun could not be mentioned here.
59 RDT, 99.
60 *SHM* §92.
61 RDT, 162.
62 RDT, 162.
63 *SHM* §153.
64 Togan 1998, 108–121; Munkh-Erdene 2011.
65 *SHM* §166, De Rachewiltz 2004, 164.
66 *SHM* §167.
67 Togan 1998, 88, 93.
68 See De Rachewiltz 2004, 1249–1250.
69 Preliminary report 2009–2010. Qiu Yihao has studied the *a'urugh* in detail (2012, 31–37).
70 For the locations of the different *ordo* see Qiu Yihao 2012, 309–314.
71 In the 17th-century *Altan Tobchi*, it is Börte who is given the task.
72 *SHM* §214; Haenisch 1941, 103; *SHMC*, 155; De Rachewiltz 2004, 802.
73 Godelier 1977; Maus 1954.
74 Togan 1998, 90.
75 For *küren* see Togan 1998, 133, 150.
76 *SHM*, §126.
77 Togan 1998, 98; Ratchnevsky 1997, 62. For an explanation of the *jada* stone see Ratchnevsky 1997, n. 90 and De Rachewiltz 2004, 525.
78 *SHM*, § 208.
79 Togan 1998, 86.
80 *HWC*, 41–42.
81 Ratchnevsky 1997, 82–88.
82 Ratchnevsky 1997, 107, 110, 113.
83 Cleaves 1955.
84 Togan 1998, 47–59.
85 *TOA*, 59, 72.
86 *SHM*, §186–187.
87 *HWC*, 41.
88 Togan 1973.
89 Togan 1979, 32, n. 39.
90 RDT, 278.
91 Togan 1998, 135; *HWC*, 32.
92 Atwood 2015, 68.
93 Togan 1998, 127, 136, 138.
94 Togan 1998, 127, 136, 138.
95 For the development from *ulus* to khanate see Jackson 2000.
96 Togan 1973; for a discussion of economics under the Mongols see Schurmann 1956.
97 Togan 1998, 142–143.
98 Olbricht and Pinks 1980, 88; Wang Guowei 1962, 465–46.
99 *SHM*, §255.
100 *SHMC*, 195.
101 *SHM* §255.
102 *SHM* §245 and §255.
103 *SHM* §202; Togan 1998, 135–141.

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RDA, See List of Abbreviations.

RDK, See List of Abbreviations.

RDRM, See List of Abbreviations.

RDT, See List of Abbreviations.

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PART II

THE MONGOL CONQUESTS

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF XI XIA

David Curtis Wright

Chinggis Khan began and ended his campaigns against sedentary states with attacks on the Tangut state of Xia (later known as Xi Xia or Western Xia), first subjugating it in 1209 and ultimately destroying it completely in 1227. The Tanguts, a pastoral nomadic people whom Chinese historical notices describe as descendants of the western Qiang of Han dynasty times, also numbered Tibetans among their ancestors. They were not concerned with bloodlines as the fundamental basis of their identity; indeed, intermarriage was not prohibited by any Tangut law the way it had been among the Jurchens.[1] Linguistic studies tentatively identify Tangut speakers as descendants of various Tibeto-Burmese peoples. The Tangut state of Xia was established in 982 and formally proclaimed as a dynasty in 1038. The Tanguts were deeply influenced by the dominant cultures of their much larger continental Asian neighbours: Turko-Mongolian, Chinese, and Indic-Tibetan. The Tanguts themselves had their own name for their dynastic state, which translated into Chinese meant something like "The Great State of White and High."[2] Their multi-ethnic state was headed by a Tangut monarch who ruled over a diverse population with Tanguts at the core, followed by Chinese, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Khitans, and other Turko-Mongolian peoples. The Xia was always an economically, ecologically, and culturally diverse state with both nomadic and agricultural populations. Religiously the Xia royal family and court extensively patronized a syncretic brand of Tangut Buddhism that blended elements from Tibetan Tantrayana and Chinese Mahayana traditions.[3]

At its height the Xia state, which territorially encompassed the Ordos, Gansu Corridor, and parts of modern Ningxia, Gansu, northern Shaanxi, eastern Qinghai, northeastern Xinjiang, and southwest Inner Mongolia, had a population of around three million people. It financed itself through taxes on agricultural and animal husbandry production, as well as on trade, both domestic and international. At the height of the Xia's power, Tanguts and the various other peoples of their state manned a very effectively integrated military, with cavalry, foot soldiers, archers, artillery, and even amphibious troops. Some Tanguts became sedentary agriculturalists during Xia times,

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but nomadic Tangut warriors in the northwestern reaches of Xia territory were the most esteemed and honoured segment of Xia's population.[4] The Tanguts behaved both as the ruling group over the sedentary segment of the Xia state and also as a pastoral nomadic people, maintaining complex relations with other steppe peoples. Indeed, "Tangut-Kereyid contacts, which were quite lively in the latter half of the 12th century, suggest that by the 13th century the Xia state engaged in rather complex and many-sided relations with their steppe neighbors."[5] The Tanguts gave refuge to a fugitive Kereit prince overthrown by Temüjin's (Chinggis Khan's) father in the 1170s. Another Kereit prince in exile among the Tanguts was honoured by them as Jaqa Gambu (more or less "elder state counselor"), and his brother was none other than Toghril (Ong Khan), Temüjin's own sworn father. What is more, Temüjin's family had taken in several of Jaqa Gambu's daughters in marriage, including Sorqoqtani Beki,[6] the wife of Tolui and the mother of Möngke, Qubilai, and Hülegü. Another of Jaqa Gambu's daughters, Gürbelchin Ghuua, married the last Tangut king and is thought to have murdered Chinggis Khan in 1227.[7]

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

In 1205, estimating Xia to be a weaker sedentary state than Jin, Chinggis Khan made the conquest of Xia his first priority,[8] a conquest that would eventually open the way for an attack on China.[9] Since "the Tanguts had a large army and fortified towns which the Mongols did not understand how to attack," their "initial . . . campaigns against the Tanguts were . . . in the nature of mere raids."[10] According to Rashid al-Din, Chinggis Khan's first clashes with the Tangut came in 1205 (which would have been a year before the great *quriltai* of 1206, when he was actually declared Chinggis Khan), when his forces besieged, captured, and plundered two Tangut cities; raided other areas of the Tangut realm; and drove away their animals, which were presented to Chinggis. By February 1207 the Tanguts were refusing to pay tribute or heed orders, so Chinggis Khan once again set out to do battle with them, this time capturing Tangut territories and returning in triumph.[11]

But the actual situation was more complicated and involved than Rashid al-Din's cursory account of it. In 1205 and 1207, Chinggis Khan launched two small sorties into Xia territory, seemingly only for feeling out Xia defences. In April 1209, however, he advanced with his forces southward from Heishan, a jurisdiction approximately 400 kilometres northeast of the Xia capital at Zhongxingfu[12] (modern Yinchuan), and from there entered the Gansu (Hexi) Corridor. His objective was of course Zhongxingfu, but Xia forces, which consisted of both cavalry and infantry, put up unexpectedly stout resistance and forced the Mongols to retire, although at enormous casualty rates. It was a Pyrrhic victory for the Xia. Chinggis Khan then wanted to wait and lure Xia forces out into the open for another costly battle, but Xia would not fall for this. At this time "the Mongols were still relatively inexperienced in besieging fortified cities,"[13] but by August an impatient Chinggis Khan feigned retreat and put a large number of his men in ambush. This time, for reasons that are not altogether clear, the Xia cooperated nicely by falling completely for the ancient stratagem. Xia forces suffered devastating losses and defeat, and their commander was captured. Then in the fall of 1209 the armies of Chinggis Khan

launched a major campaign against the Xia,[14] entering the Gansu Corridor from the north, defeating all Tangut resistance, approaching the Xia capital city of Zhongxingfu virtually unopposed, and ultimately surrounding it. By the end of October Chinggis Khan, once again growing impatient, ordered the waters of the Huanghe River diverted into the city, with the expected devastating results: by January 1210 the Xia capital was in desperate straits and teetering on the verge of collapse and defeat. But just at this critical juncture, the dikes the Mongols had built to divert the river collapsed (or perhaps had been breached by the Tanguts[15]), and the resultant floodwaters forced the Mongols to lift the siege and retire to higher ground. Nonetheless, the apparently chastised and timorous Tangut ruler Xiangzong (r. 1206–1211; known to the Mongols as Burkhan Khan) opted to submit to the Mongols rather than continuing pointless and futile resistance against them. He came to peace terms and gave one of his daughters to Chinggis Khan to wife, promising to be the right-hand vassal of the Mongols and Chinggis Khan but hastening to add that this would be as a sedentary people living behind walls who could no longer wage war as swift nomadic cavalry.[16] Burkhan Khan's admission that the Xia in the early thirteenth century could no longer field a potent fighting cavalry force is important. The Xia's self-identification as a primarily sedentary civilization by this time was based on demographic, ecological, and tactical realities that Burkhan Khan was frankly and realistically accepting and acknowledging.

This was the great khan's first attack on a sedentary state, and it was a victorious and successful one. He then marched on the Jurchen state of Jin, and the Xia also turned on Jin and attacked it. The *Secret History*'s account of the Xia's promise of vassalage to Chinggis Khan and the Mongols was largely in terms of supplying the material needs of Mongol armies on campaign:

> But if Činggis Qa'an show favour to us, we the Tang'ut people,
>
> > We shall bring forth many camels
> > Reared in the shelter of the tall feather-grass:
> > We shall turn them into government property
> > And we shall give *them to you*.
> > We shall weave woollen material and make satin,
> > And we shall give *them to you*.
> > Training falcons to fly loose *at game*,
> > We shall gather them
>
> And all the best ones we shall send *to you*.[17]

Again according to the *Secret History*, Chinggis Khan eventually concluded that Burkhan Khan (actually his third successor) had gone back on his word. In 1219, as he was proceeding westward on his campaign against Muḥammad of Khwārazm and approaching Zhongxingfu, Chinggis Khan dispatched envoys to the Xia ruler[18] calling on his state to live up to its commitment to him, which he understood to include sending him troops (who would have been infantry or auxiliary forces and not cavalry). Before Burkhan Khan could respond, his minister Asha Gambu, who

had a military background,[19] replied preemptively and cheekily that if Chinggis needed Xia troops to defeat Khwārazm, he did not deserve to be khan!

> While riding out [to fight], Chinggis Qahan sent emissaries to Burqan [Burkhan] of the Tangqut [Tangut] people to say: "You said, 'I wish to be your right hand.' The Golden Rein [of my authority] has been severed by the Sarta'ul people. I am riding out to settle scores [with the rebels]. Become the right hand [of my army] and ride out." After [Chinggis Qahan] had sent [this message], before Burqan [Burkhan] could utter a word, Asha-gambu said: "Since [Chinggis Qahan's] might is impotent, why did he go so far as to become Qan?" He therefore refused to provide extra soldiers. With boastful words, he sent back [the emissaries].[20]

Incensed at the sheer effrontery and hubris of this response, Chinggis Khan neither forgot it nor allowed it to distract him from his more immediate task at hand. There would, Blue Eternal Heaven willing, be another day to reckon with Xia perfidy and inconstancy:

> Chinggis Qahan said: "How can I allow Asha-gambu to speak to me in this way?" He also said: "What difficulties would we encounter if I at once sent [soldiers] to make a detour in his direction? But we are intent on [subduing] a different people for the time being. That is enough. If I am protected by Eternal Heaven, when I return, I shall definitely pull firmly on [my] Golden Rein and [settle] this [other matter]."[21]

THE SECOND CAMPAIGN

The Mongols did not completely ignore the Xia between 1209 and 1225. They viewed the Xia mainly as a source of hardy mounted warriors to be called up for service at their pleasure, and they made heavy annual demands for Xia troops. In 1217 the Xia refused the Mongols' increasingly burdensome demands for military supplies, and in response the Mongols surrounded Zhongxingfu for several months before withdrawing. Between 1221 and 1223 the Mongol general Muqali traversed Xia territory at will with heavy forces en route to his attacks on the Jin capital of Nanjing (modern Kaifeng), all the while demanding more and more Xia troops and treating the Xia population haughtily. In response, later in 1223 the Xia actually allied with the Jin against the Mongols, and this contributed to the Mongols' growing resolve to call their erstwhile and inconstant ally to account.[22]

In 1225, his campaigns in Central Asia over, Chinggis Khan (now in his sixties) finally returned to the Gansu Corridor and the approaches to the Xia capital at Zhongxingfu. It is certainly true that "The accounts of Chinggis's last campaign against Hsia [Xia] and of his death are extremely confused and full of conflicting details,"[23] and this makes piecing together the history of the last two years of his life difficult, if not impossible. But at a minimum it seems quite clear that he now had evening the score with Xia and its ruler foremost in mind, the fact that neither Xiangzong (r. 1206–1211) himself nor his immediate successor, Shenzong (the Burkhan Khan mentioned above; r. 1211–1223), were the Xia emperor notwithstanding. Shenzong's successor, Xianzong (r. 1223–1226), faced the initial brunt of Chinggis Khan's incursion into the Gansu Corridor until he died, possibly of fright, at the age of forty-five

in 1226.[24] The last Xia emperor, the feckless Modi (r. 1226–1227), did not fare much better. He was killed in the spring of 1227 when he surrendered himself and the city to the Mongols after a six-month siege on Zhongxingfu.

The order in which Mongol forces captured the cities of the Gansu Corridor in 1226 and 1227 did not correspond with neat movements from west to east but instead proceeded somewhat haphazardly, perhaps according to the Mongols' estimation of their relative importance and priority. In the summer of 1226, Chinggis Khan went to the Hunchui Mountains[25] to escape the summer heat, and during this time Suzhou and Ganzhou (Xuanhuafu) were taken. So enraged was Chinggis Khan at Suzhou's rebuff of his attempts to negotiate its peaceful surrender that he had every living being in the city slaughtered, sparing only 106 Tangut families at the special pleas of a Tangut officer in his command. Soon thereafter, when Mongol forces approached Ganzhou, a Tangut officer in Chinggis Khan's armies named Chaghan (an ethnic Tangut who at the age of fifteen was adopted by Chinggis Khan as his fifth son and thereafter did much to further the Mongol cause under both Chinggis Khan and Ögödei[26]) attempted to persuade his father, who was in charge of Ganzhou's defences, to surrender by shooting arrows into the city with written surrender summonses wrapped around them. When Chaghan's father was about to heed the call to surrender, he and his entire family were murdered by Xia diehards in the city. An incensed Chinggis Khan ordered a general massacre when Ganzhou was taken, but Chaghan then interceded on behalf of the city, and in the end only a few of its military commanders were killed. In the fall the Mongols captured Xiliangfu, which surrendered with very minimal resistance, and then they proceeded eastward until they reached some crossings of the Yellow River. By this time the Mongols, freshly returned from their campaigns in Central Asia, had a very strong and capable siege train, and capturing Suzhou and Ganzhou was relatively easy for them.[27]

On 29 November 1226, Chinggis Khan attacked Lingzhou (Xipingfu; known to the Mongols as Dürmegei), which was just southeast of Zhongxingfu and across the Yellow River, well within the political and economic heartland of Xi Xia. On 5 December 1226, Chinggis Khan temporarily left off with the siege of Lingzhou and crossed the Yellow River to engage a large Xi Xia force that had been sent to defend the capital of Zhongxingfu, and he ended up completely routing it. He then returned to and captured Lingzhou later in the month, after which he directed his forces at Yanzhouchuan, a city he captured with a great general slaughter of its inhabitants. He then ordered his troops to exterminate the Tanguts as a people, but very soon afterwards, on 16 December 1226, a conjunction of the five planets was visible in the southwest, a phenomenon which, for a time at least, he supposedly interpreted as a sign against further wanton slaughter and rapine by his forces; thus he rescinded his gruesome decree.[28]

Chinggis Khan's genocidal decree against the Tanguts might also have extended to the Chinese, H. Desmond Martin speculates.[29] Several of Chinggis Khan's lieutenants and ministers had been complaining that the Chinese were useless to the Mongol state and should therefore all be exterminated and their territory allowed to revert to natural grasslands for the use of the Mongols and their animals. His Khitan advisor Yelü Chucai (1190–1244),[30] traditionally and consistently lauded in Chinese history as a civilizing and moderating Confucian influence on the Mongol khans Chinggis and Ögödei, successfully remonstrated with the great khan against

this course of action on practical utilitarian grounds (as opposed to humanitarian ones): The Chinese peasantry, he argued, produced massive revenues for the *Yeke Monggol Ulus* from agricultural and commercial taxes and the proceeds from state monopolies on salt, liquor, and iron. Annually the Chinese produced 500,000 taels of silver, 80,000 bolts of silk, and more than 400,000 bushels of millet as revenue, sufficient to supply the Mongols with all of their needs. How therefore could they be said to be useless?[31]

Meanwhile, during all this time Ögödei and Chaghan had been attacking Nanjing (modern Kaifeng), the Jin capital.[32] This was because Chinggis Khan reckoned that after the conquest of Lingzhou, Xia defences were so weakened that he could afford to direct the majority of his forces into Jin territory.[33]

In mid-January through mid-February 1227, Chinggis Khan left forces besieging Zhongxingfu and personally led forces across the Yellow River in an attack on Jishizhou in the far western reaches of Jin territory. Between mid-February and mid-March, Mongol forces broke into Lintaofu in Jin territory, and between mid-March and mid-April, Xining in the far southern reaches of Xia territory was taken, as was Shazhou. Between mid-April and mid-May Chinggis Khan captured Deshun in Jin territory, approximately 300 kilometres due south of Zhongxingfu. The Mongols besieged the very lightly defended Deshun for twenty days and nights before it was finally captured, and its valiant defenders committed suicide. Meanwhile the Mongol besiegement of the Xia capital at Zhongxingfu continued, but Chinggis Khan seems not to have participated directly in it, opting instead in mid-June to go to the nearby Liupan Mountains to escape the summer heat. Even from here, however, he dispatched Chaghan to Zhongxingfu in an attempt to secure its peaceful surrender, but to no avail. On 11 August 1227 Chinggis Khan began to feel indisposed, and on 18 August 1227 he passed away. The Mongols prevented news of his death from reaching Zhongxingfu, but soon thereafter they succeeded in capturing Zhongxingfu and executing the last Tangut monarch. Some accounts paint a gruesome picture of the aftermath of the city's fall and the Tangut king's execution:

> Mongol troops sacked the Tangut capital [and], as customary, slaughtered many of its inhabitants and ravaged the Tangut imperial tombs, in revenge for Chinggis's death or perhaps, as Igor de Rachwiltz [sic: Rachewiltz] speculates, to transform them into guardian spirits accompanying the khan in his afterlife. The reputation of the Xia rulers as powerful Buddhist kings suggested special handling. Killing such a vessel of religious potency, whom the *Secret History* refers to by what were evidently native epithets of Burkhan khan (Buddha king) or Ilukhu Burkhan (victorious Buddha), required proper ritual preparation. Hence, Chinggis Khan (or his surrogates) gave the surrendered Tangut king the nickname Shidurghu, "Upright," in order to turn the former enemy into a protective spirit (if it was not a derisive commentary on the Tangut ruler's lack of loyalty, a death sentence rite, in short).[34]

Other accounts have some Mongol commanders wanting to put Zhongxingfu to the sword after its capture, but as at Ganzhou, Chaghan interceded successfully on behalf of the city's population in general, although this time pillaging and rape did occur.[35]

WHOLESALE MONGOLIAN MASSACRES OF TANGUT AND XIA PEOPLE?

The *Secret History* has Chinggis Khan sending envoys to the last Xia emperor in high dudgeon in 1227 and calling him to account:

> In the past, you, Burqan [Burkhan], said, "We, the Tang'ut people, shall be your right wing." Although told so by you, when I sent you a request *for troops*, saying that I was going on a campaign because the Sarta'ul people had not agreed to my proposal, you, Burqan [Burkhan], did not keep your promise and did not give me troops, but came out with mocking words. As I was moving in a different direction at the time, I said that I would call you to account later. I set out against the Sarta'ul people and being protected by Eternal Heaven I brought them duly under submission. Now I have come to call Burqan [Burkhan] to account for his words.[36]

The *Secret History* then has Modi responding that he had not conveyed the mocking words, and then the Xia minister who did convey them, Asha Gambu, angered and provoked Chinggis Khan once again with arrogant challenges and chest-beating. The great khan, now ill with the effects of advancing age, nonetheless went to war with Asha Gambu and wiped his forces out. When Chinggis Khan finally approached the Xia capital he renamed the Xia emperor Shidurghu (which in this context meant "subdued one" or subjugated one"[37]) and then had him put to death by suffocation. Again according to the *Secret History*, a great holocaust then ensued: "He [Chinggis Khan] then destroyed the mothers and fathers of the Tangquts even to the seed of their seed."[38] But accounts of a complete slaughter of ethnic Tanguts in Zhongxingfu and elsewhere by victorious Mongol armies are problematic and contradictory. According to a chronicle of Song and Yuan history compiled from primary sources in the eighteenth century, there was indeed a general pattern of widespread slaughter in the Xia cities the Mongols captured, with only one or two people out of every hundred escaping death by digging holes or cavities in the city walls and hiding in them; the bones of the vast majority of the people were scattered everywhere.[39] Mongol commanders made off with girls and material wealth in the Xia cities they conquered, but after the capture of Lingzhou, Chinggis Khan's virtuous Khitan advisor Yelü Chucai, this same chronicle would have us believe, took only a few books along with rhubarb and Bactrian camels.[40] He then used the rhubarb to treat soldiers in the Mongol armies who had fallen ill, thus saving some ten thousand of them.[41] Accounts of wholesale slaughter of the Tangut as a people are, however, contradicted by Rashid al-Din, who describes Chinggis's incendiary attack on the city and records a great slaughter of Xia military men, but then has Chinggis Khan manifesting his contempt for the devastated and defeated Shidurghu ("Shadurghu"), now powerless because his military had been annihilated, by paying him no further heed and blithely bypassing his capital city altogether:

> When he reached the Tangqut [Tangut] territory, he took most of the cities, like Ganzhou, Suzhou, and Hezhou. He besieged the city of Dömägäi and hurled fire into it, and as it was burning, the ruler of that land, Shadurghu by name,

> who was called [I]llu[qu Burq]an in the Tangqut language, and the great city that was his residence was called Äriqai in the Tangqut language but Eriqyaya in the Mongol language, came out with five hundred thousand men to do battle with the Mongols. Genghis Khan went out against him in battle. In that region are many *na'ur*s formed from the Qara Mörän (Yellow River), and they were all frozen over. Genghis Khan stood on the ice and ordered the soldiers to cross. Many were killed during the crossing. They say that three dead men were stood on their heads, for it is an established custom among the Mongols to stand one dead man on his head for every hundred thousand killed.[42]

The basic contours of Rashid al-Din's account are accepted by the Persian historian Khwandamir (b. 1475), who adds that Chinggis Khan's last words on his deathbed were these:

> *Since little is left of my life, my death must be kept secret. No one must cry out. It would be best for all to keep silent. As soon as Shidurqu comes out of the city, spill his blood! And destroy his army so that your rule may be secure.*[43]

At any rate, even if a wholesale slaughter of civilians in the city of Zhongxingfu did take place, the Tangut as a people were nonetheless not wiped out:

> Despite this picture of total devastation painted here, many Tangut survived the fall of Hsia and entered Yuan service. As *se-mu* (Western and Central Asians) they enjoyed a status and privileges superior to those accorded to either the Jurchens or the Khitans, let alone the Chinese. Central China (Hopei and Anhwei) harbored small communities of Tanguts who evidently continued to use their script until the end of the Ming period.[44]

The Tangut as a people did not disappear, even though what eventually became of them centuries later is still unknown. Tangut communities, language, and civilizational forms survived into mid-Ming times.[45]

THE DEATH OF CHINGGIS KHAN

The particulars of how Chinggis Khan died are likewise difficult to ascertain because of the several differing accounts of his death given in the *Yuanshi*, *Secret History*, Juvaini, Rashid al-Din, Marco Polo, and John of Plano Carpini.[46] Perhaps the most fanciful and bizarre account of all is, ironically enough, from a seventeenth-century Mongolian-language chronicle:

> After capturing and executing the Tangut king, Chinggis took the king's wife, the Tangut queen Gürbelčin γuua (Mongolian for "Lizard-like Beauty"), as a concubine. Not pleased with this novel form of courting, Gürbelčin γuua made plans to kill her new captor and husband. She placed a small sharp piece of metal into her sexual organ, and after Chinggis Khan imposed himself on her, she mortally wounded him in his sexual organ.[47]

Another seventeenth-century Mongolian chronicle *Erdeni-yin Tobči* seems to have this version of the great khan's death in mind, although it and other contemporaneous Mongolian chronicles hint very cautiously and delicately at its specifics:

> In the *Erdeni-yin Tobči* we find the Tangut King, just prior to his execution, making the following statement to Chinggis Khan: *Gürbelčin γuua-yi minu či beye-degen abqu bügesü bükü beye-yi inu sayitur negjijü üjegdekü̈i*, "If thou takest unto thyself the body of my Gürbelčin γuua, inspect her entire body thoroughly and it shall be seen." . . . The agglutinative suffix *-kü̈i* is what Poppe labeled the "nomen futuri," which expresses an action which will take place in the future. The sense of "it shall be seen" in *üjegdekü̈i* is, then, unmistakable.[48]

Subsequent Mongolian historians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dismissed this version as a libel of Chinggis Khan perpetrated by Western Mongols. Its particulars are indeed extremely unlikely, if not outright impossible, but if there is a kernel of truth in the account it might be that the great khan was wounded or assassinated in some way by the Tangut queen. Similar accounts among the Kazakhs have also been discovered by folklorists.[49]

THE CONQUEST OF XI XIA IN RETROSPECT

The eighteenth-century chronicler Bi Yuan (1730–1797) listed Chinggis Khan's conquest of Xia as the final and crowning achievement of the great khan's life.[50] He also noted with discernible measures of both admiration and poignance that the Mongols brought 200 years (actually almost 250 years) of Xia history to an end. His strong implication was that over this time Xia had artfully and manfully managed to survive and flourish, at one time or another submitting to or resisting one or more of the three states of Song, Liao, and Jin, all according to Xia's sophisticated and accurate assessments of the relative power of these states vis-à-vis Xia.[51]

Among the Mongols of Chinggis Khan's day, the war with Xia was the most dramatic in their history, and even though it is relatively unknown to Muslim or Western historians, "the conquest of Hsi Hsia [Xi Xia] is better known to the Mongols than any other of Chingis Khan's exploits." The Mongols have never forgotten that their great khan died while on campaign against Xia, and today

> The Mongols still call many of the cities of Kansu [Gansu] and Ninghsia [Ningxia] by the names under which their ancestors knew them, and speak of the Yellow River as the Khatun Gol (River of the Queen), in memory of the suicide of the Tangut queen Gürbeljin Goa [Gürbelčin γuua], whom they believe to have murdered Chingis Khan.[52]

Chinggis Khan died during his campaign against Xia with the clear sense of an unfinished campaign against an even greater prize: the Jurchen state of Jin. Even as he lay dying, he still had conquest on his mind and laid out his tactics for conquering Jin and capturing its capital.[53] And with this the great khan breathed his last. His sons and grandsons would continue his project of conquest and go on to build the largest empire the world has ever known.

NOTES

1 Franke and Twitchett 1994, 40; Franke 1994, 281.
2 Dunnell 1996.
3 On the Tanguts and their state of Xia, see Dunnell 1996; Dunnell 1994, 154–158; and Mote 1999, 249–264.
4 Qin et al. 1998; Mote 1999, 259–260.
5 Dunnell 1989, 56. On the Kereit state as the foundation of the Chinggisid state, see Munkh-Erdene 2011.
6 On Sorqoqtani Beki, see Broadbridge 2018, *passim*.
7 Dunnell 1994, 206.
8 Shi 1998, 36.
9 Ratchnevsky 1991, 104.
10 Ratchnevsky 1991, 103.
11 RDT2, 144.
12 Some scholars (for example, Mote 1999, 254) have persisted in referring to the Xia capital as Xingqing or Xingqingfu, but I follow Dunnell's reasoned exhortation to refer to the Xia capital as Zhongxingfu. On this, see Dunnell 1989.
13 Ratchnevsky 1991, 104.
14 The *Secret History* garbles the chronology here by incorrectly placing the Mongol campaigns against Xia after those on Jin, whereas they actually took place before them. See *SHM*, §249; De Rachewiltz 2004, 902–903.
15 Ratchnevsky 1991, 104.
16 YS 1.4; Martin 1950, 113–120; Shi 1998, 36–37.
17 *SHM*, §249.
18 Actually, it was the predecessor of the Tangut ruler then in power who had made this commitment, but of course Chinggis Khan still considered it binding (Dunnell 1994, 210, n. 119).
19 Gambu means "commander of an army." De Rachewiltz 2004, 938.
20 *SHMO*, §256.
21 *SHMO*, §256. Kwanten expresses some doubt about this episode precipitating the second Mongol-Tangut war (Kwanten 1973, 33–34).
22 Mote 1999, 255.
23 Dunnell 1994, 210.
24 Dunnell 1994, 213.
25 Location undetermined.
26 *HWC*, 256, n. 26; De Rachewiltz 2004, 433.
27 YS 1.23–24; XTJ 163.4450; XXSS 42.41–44, 42.48–51; Martin 1950, 292–294.
28 XTJ 164.4462; YS 1.24; XXSS 42.64; Martin 1950, 294–296.
29 Martin 1950, 296.
30 On Yelü Chucai, see De Rachewiltz 1993.
31 YS 146.3458.
32 YS 1.124.
33 Shi 1998, 47.
34 Dunnell 2010, 88.
35 XTJ 164.4459–60; YS 1.24–25; XXSS 42.75, 77–78; Martin 1950, 297–308; Mote 1999, 256.
36 *SHM*, §265.
37 De Rachewiltz 2004, 976.
38 *SHMO* 268.
39 XTJ 164.4462; XXSS 42.65.

40 De Rachewiltz (1993) is generally skeptical of standard Confucian hagiographies of Yelü Chucai and sees him as much more of a Buddhist than a Confucian.
41 XTJ 164.4462–4463; XXSS 42.76.
42 RDT2, 186.
43 Khwandamir 2012, 2.25–26. See also *HWC*, 180–183 for an account of the great khan's death that pertains to his succession by Ögödei and says nothing about the Tanguts. The *Yuan shi* in turn contradicts Khwandamir's account of Chinggis Khan's last words on his deathbed. It has the great khan issuing instructions on how to conquer Jin and says nothing of Xia (YS 1.25). See also XTJ 164.4463 for essentially the same account as contained in the YS.
44 Dunnell 1994, 214.
45 Mote 1999, 256–257.
46 On the various historical accounts of the death of Chinggis Khan, see Wright 1997.
47 Wright 1997, 428.
48 Wright 1997, 429–430.
49 Wright 1997, 432.
50 XTJ 164.4463.
51 XTJ 164.4462.
52 Martin 1950, 289.
53 SSJSBM 90.1007 (YS 1.25, XTJ 164.4463). See also Li 1988, 1.129–130.

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XTJ, See List of Abbreviations.
YS, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF THE JIN EMPIRE, 1211–1234

David Curtis Wright

In 1206, the year of Chinggis Khan's great *quriltai*, historically Chinese territory was divided under the control of three different states: Xi Xia (1038–1227), Jin (1115–1234), and Southern Song (1127–1279). The Mongol conquest of China began early in the thirteenth century with Chinggis Khan's attacks on the Xi Xia and the Jin, two hybrid states that straddled Chinese and non-Chinese regions. Chinggis Khan himself did not live to see the final defeat and conquest of the Jin. His top priority after his campaigns in Central Asia was the destruction of the Xi Xia, which he accomplished shortly before his death in 1227. His son and successor Ögödei conquered the Jin in 1234, and thereafter the Mongol campaigns against China were prosecuted intermittently until the final Mongol triumph over the Southern Song in 1279.

The enormous wealth of the Jin and the territory that produced it were tempting targets for the Mongols. Its population was, according to its 1207 census, 53,532,151 individuals in 8,413,164 households, or 6.33 persons per household.[1] As a conquest dynasty, it had a mixed economy of agriculture and sericulture in Chinese areas and cattle breeding, pastoral nomadism, hunting, and fishing in the north. Like many previous dynasties, it raised revenue through agricultural taxes and government monopolies on major commodities such as salt, iron, wine, and tea. It used both metallic and paper currency and introduced a commercial tax in 1180. In 1171 the annual tax revenue in grain was nine million *dan*,[2] or around 540 million kilograms.[3]

In 1208, on the eve of the wars with the Mongols, the Jin had approximately 4.6 million square kilometres of territory, extending from the Huai River in the south and north and northeastward into Manchuria all the way to the Khingghan Mountains at approximately 56 degrees of latitude. The Jin's control of the Pacific coast extended southward to the vicinity of modern Vladivostok.

The Jin shared several characteristics with other conquest dynasties or alien states that ruled significant amounts of historically Chinese territory. They typically straddled both steppe and sown, or the pastoral nomadic world to the north and the agricultural world of the Chinese to the south, ruling over both. Imperial China had several such states, such as the (Northern) Wei (386–535) led by the Tabghach,

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

Map 5.1 North China in the Jin Empire
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

and especially during the tenth through fourteenth centuries, when three such states (the Khitan state of Liao from 907 to 1125, the Jurchen state of Jin from 1115 to 1234, and the Tangut state of Xia from 1038 to 1227) ruled large tracts of historically Chinese territory. China's last dynasty, the Qing (1368–1644), was also a conquest dynasty, this time led by the Manchus, the ethnic and linguistic cousins of the Mongols. Over the last 950 years of imperial Chinese history, then, from 960 to 1911, conquest dynasties ruled some or all of the historically Chinese territory for seventy percent of the time. Conquest dynasties were the norm and not the exception over the last thousand years of imperial Chinese history.

The Jin ruled China through more deliberative and less autocratic methods than the Chinese; deployed dualistic forms of government, one for the Chinese and one for non-Chinese, with legal jurisdiction assigned by ethnicity (cf. *jus sanguinis*) rather than locality (cf. *jus soli*); and endorsed and applied multiple languages in official discussions and in administrative documents. The state of Jin that the Mongols began attacking in earnest in 1211 was, then, a hybrid state in its own eyes and also those of the Mongols.

The Mongol conquest of the Jin may be divided into four distinct phases or stages. During the first, which lasted from 1208 through 1218, Chinggis Khan personally led and participated in campaigns. During this time, the Mongols suffered some defeats in their engagements with the Jin. The initial intention of this stage does not seem to have been territorial acquisition, but taking and holding territory apparently became more important, as in 1215 when Chinggis Khan left behind occupying forces after capturing Zhongdu. The second period, 1218–1223, was largely a holding operation conducted by Muqali while Chinggis Khan and his main force were campaigning in Central Asia. During the third period, from 1223 to 1230, the Mongols suspended their campaigns against the Jin. It was during the fourth period, from 1230 to 1234, that the Jin were finally overcome and annihilated.

THE JIN AND MONGOL MILITARIES

The Jin military's system of organization was extensive and complicated. Separate ethnic armies included Jurchen, Khitan, Parhae,[4] and Han. Troops were also assigned to units with separate specified functions, among them the imperial bodyguard, garrison, state farms, and city defence units. Finally, armies were divided by type, with cavalry as the Jin's main force, but they also possessed significant infantry forces. There were also some naval and artillery units.[5]

After 1206 Chinggis Khan organized his forces into units of ten, one hundred, one thousand, and ten thousand. As is well known, this decimal system of military organization did not originate with him but was used by the Jurchens, Khitans, and other pastoral nomadic peoples all the way back to the Xiongnu. Chinggis Khan applied the system not only to streamline his forces but also to replace old kinship ties of identity with new decimalized military ones. In so doing he succeeded at "meld[ing] an inchoate collection of tribes and confederations into a single army with a hierarchical yet responsive, command structure."[6] Chinggis Khan's bodyguard or *keshig* was an elite force charged with guarding and serving the khan as well as with various administrative and military command tasks. From its origins as the personal bodyguard of the khan, it eventually evolved into an important institution that by the time of Qubilai Qa'an (1260–1294) numbered 12,000.[7]

Outside of the *keshig*, the main forces in the Mongol military[8] were the Mongol Army, the Tammachi Army, the Han Armies, and the Newly-Adhered Armies. Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing claims that the Mongol Army and the Tammachi Army were manned by ethnic Mongols, while the Han Armies included Northern Chinese in a broad sense (Han, Khitan, Jurchen, and even Koreans), and the Newly-Adhered Armies were composed of Southern Chinese.[9] But the actual ethnic compositions of these military units were often not so clear-cut. The Mongol Army was indeed originally composed of Mongols who had submitted to Chinggis Khan and joined his forces by 1206, but later, as the empire expanded, people from other ethnic groups, for example Tanguts, were also incorporated into the Mongol Army.

The Tammachi Army, which was instituted by 1218 at the very latest and included primarily Mongols, served as the vanguard of the advancing Mongol Army, and also sometimes as garrisoning forces. The Tammachi Army occasionally included non-Mongols, for example Han and *Semu* people.

After Chinggis Khan's campaign against the Jin began, many Han people from the Central Plains who had surrendered to the Mongols were organized into the Han Armies, which occasionally also included ethnic Khitans and Jurchens. Finally, after 1274, when the Mongols commenced their major campaigns against the Southern Song, people from southern China who submitted to the Mongol/Yuan cause were organized into Newly-Adhered Armies. Military units under the Mongols were in turn made up of cavalry, infantry, naval, pontoon bridge, artillery, crossbowmen, and construction corps.[10]

REASONS FOR JIN DEFEAT AND MONGOL VICTORY

The Mongols, frequently described in historical materials as being vastly outnumbered by Jin forces, nonetheless prevailed against them much more often than not. The reasons for this are complex and defy monocausal or reductionist analysis. Following are several factors or causes behind the ultimate Jin demise and Mongol victory in 1234, ranked tentatively in my initial estimates of their relative importance.

The Mongols retained and brought into full play their excellence at swift mobile warfare. Their superior mobility and speed enabled them to mount and withdraw from sieges more or less at will; capture and retain control of key frontier passes; ambush Jin forces out in the field, as they did near Dengzhou and later along the way to Junzhou in the summer of 1232; and intercept and destroy reinforcements the Jin sent to besieged cities, as at Zhongdu in 1215. Because of their preference for swift and mobile warfare, the Mongols mounted sieges only reluctantly when they saw no other way of capturing a key urban centre. They generally took advantage of alternative methods that presented or suggested themselves, as they did in 1234 when they broke the dikes of the Huanghe River at Cunjindian, thus inundating Kaifeng with water and silty mud and causing massive destruction in the city. The Jin were unable to do anything even remotely as devastating to the Mongols.

The Jin waged a mostly defensive warfare against the Mongols from fixed positions, something the ancient strategist Sunzi strongly discouraged: "Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth, [while] those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of

Heaven."[11] But in fact the Jin had little choice but to do so because their empire was more of a city-based state than a nomadic polity in fine fighting form. The Jin had to protect their cities and did not have the extensive mobility and freedom to roam that the Mongols did. The Jin Empire was largely unable to take the fight to the Mongols and for the most part had to wage debilitating defensive warfare.

The Mongols were well-blooded, the Jin forces decidedly less so. Members of the Mongols' cavalry and infantry forces were seasoned and hardened battle veterans, and Jin cavalry and infantry could not match the combat experience and tactical superiority of the Mongols. In 1231, when Tolui was overawed at the sight of 100,000 fielded Jin cavalry and infantry at Tongguan, Sübedei reminded him of an important fact: "These people are city-dwellers who can't endure strenuous work. If we continuously provoke them into exhaustion, we can win the battle."[12] Tactical inferiority was more of a liability for the Jin than their numerical superiority in the number of men under arms was an asset.

Mongol sieges against Jin cities seem on balance not to have been the debilitating quagmires that Sunzi cautioned against. ("Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities."[13]) They seem to have been mounted more to isolate cities from the outside world, cutting off their supply lines and channels of communication, than to break through their walls and put them to the sword. Isolating cities and starving them out, as the Mongols did in Kaifeng in 1234 in particular, were effective tactics. What is more, sieges on cities were not particularly costly for the Mongols in terms of casualties because many Jin cities had low numbers of defenders.

Psychological setbacks seem to have been important contributing factors to Mongol victories and Jin defeats. Strings of decisive Mongol victories were discouraging to the Jin, as were Jin defeats, such as the debacle at Tongguan in 1230 (see the following section), which greatly reduced Jin morale and fighting spirit. Defections to the Mongols, especially by Khitan and prominent Han Chinese, cannot but have been encouraging to the Mongols and conversely discouraging to the Jin. For the Mongols, their successive victories meant that they were doing the will of Heaven. They may, for example, have seen the epidemic that killed over 900,000 people in Kaifeng in 1232 as Heaven's assistance to them.

Lastly, there remains the Song's fateful decision in October 1233 to decline a Jin overture to ally against the Mongols. Counterfactual history now seemingly more acceptable or at least tolerable than it used to be,[14] we may perhaps speculate that if the Song had accepted the proposed alliance, the Jin might have been saved or at least seen their doomsday clock set back a few more increments of time.

STAGE ONE, 1208–1218: FIRST CAMPAIGNS AND THE REMOVAL OF THE JIN CAPITAL

There seem to have been not one but several possible reasons for Chinggis Khan's decision to commence hostilities against the Jin. First, after 1206 he was of course no longer interested in remaining a vassal of the Jin, regardless of how ambiguous and indeterminate this vassalage might have been in practical terms. Second was

simply the Jin's enormous wealth, which may well have seemed to the great khan to cry out for plundering. Third was perhaps a desire to avenge the Jin's earlier torture-slaying of Ambaghai Khan,[15] Chinggis Khan's kinsman and senior patriarch of the Tayichi'ud lineage of the Mongols. Fourth could have been Chinggis's longing to exact revenge upon the reigning Jin monarch, who earlier had grievously insulted him.[16] The first hostilities between the Mongols and the Jurchen state of Jin date all the way back to skirmishes from 1206 through 1208, with the Jin generally prevailing. Hostility between the two commenced in 1210, when Chinggis Khan broke off tributary relations with Jin, which had begun in 1195. Fighting began in earnest in 1211, after Chinggis Khan had subdued the Xia and secured commitment from it to assist in future Mongol military operations. Chinggis led armies into Jin territory, and in August 1211 his general Muqali scored a massive victory against Jin forces at Yehuling (Wild Fox Range). Chinggis and his generals then continued capturing Jin garrisons and fortifications, including the key strategic pass at Juyongguan (Chabchiyal in Mongolian), which guarded the approaches to the then Jin capital at Zhongdu (more or less modern Beijing), approximately fifty kilometres to the south-east. According to an important biography of Chinggis Khan, this campaign was quite a "gamble" for Chinggis because of how vastly the Jin's forces outnumbered his own:

> When Genghis Khan [Chinggis Khan] launched his attack the Chin [Jin] army had a nominal strength of 600,000 – some 120,000 mounted archers, which were the equal of the Mongol cavalry, and almost 500,000 infantry; Genghis Khan had probably no more than 65,000 of his own troops and an auxiliary Onggut force of 10,000. Moreover, Genghis' position in Mongolia was not yet so secure that an uprising by the more recently subjugated tribes could be discounted.[17]

Nevertheless, Chinggis Khan was supremely confident of the ultimate outcome of the contest because, he said, Heaven had promised him victory.[18]

According to the *Secret History of the Mongols*, the campaign against Juyongguan was led by Jebe (d. 1223),[19] one of Chinggis Khan's "four dogs of war," his most fearsome, skilled, and trusted lieutenants.[20] Seeing that Juyongguan was very stoutly defended, Jebe resorted to classic feigned retreat tactics to draw the garrisoned Jin troops out onto open terrain, where of course the Mongols would have the advantage. The Jin forces completely fell for this, and at a key ridge Jebe doubled back with his forces and defeated Jin warriors, who were so numerous that they "choked the valleys and mountains." Forces led by Chinggis Khan then joined in the slaughter:

> Chinggis Khan, following closely behind with the main body of [his army], forced the Kitads to withdraw and overcame the powerful and courageous soldiers of the Juyins of the Khitans and the Jins, slaughtering them until they were piled [like] rotten logs all the way [back] to Chabchiyal.[21]

The victorious Mongol armies then reached all the way to the approaches of Zhongdu, which they plundered.

Meanwhile, by early 1212 Mongol armies had devastated vast stretches of Jin territory farther to the east:

> In the two Hebei circuits[22] and in Shandong, for several thousand *li* the people had been almost completely killed off, and [the Mongols] made off with everything they could get their hands on: gold, silk, boys, girls, cattle, horses, and sheep. Houses and cottages were burnt to the ground, and the inner and outer city walls were heaps of ruins. Only [the jurisdictions of] Daming, Zhending, Qing, Yun, Pi, Hai, Wo, Shun, and Tongzhou were not broken through, and this because they had forces that stoutly defended them.[23]

But then they withdrew from Jin territory, abandoning the earlier territorial gains that they may not have originally intended to hold for long, their main purpose not being territorial conquest per se but intelligence, reconnaissance, loot, and also to feel out Jin defences. They did, however, attack the Jin again in the autumn of 1212 and in 1213, recapturing Juyongguan despite Jin efforts at reinforcing it. The Mongols then penetrated deep into Jin territory, this time reaching as far west as Shanxi.

In late 1213, the main Mongol forces withdrew once again, but this time they retained control of all key frontier passes and left forces surrounding Zhongdu to cut off its supply chains and communication lines. The unnerved Jin emperor offered gold, horses, silk, and one of his daughters to Chinggis Khan as wife in exchange for peace. The Mongols agreed to this and withdrew completely in the spring of 1214. A high official in the Jin court had apprised the Jin emperor Xuanzong (r. 1213–1224) of the desperate situation and argued that further resistance was, for the time being at least, futile:

> The destiny of Heaven and Earth ordains that the time has come for a change in [the dynasty that occupies] the great throne. The Mongols have advanced in strength, overcoming the best soldiers of our powerful and courageous Juyin of the Khara-Kitads and of the Jurchens, slaughtering them all. They have also captured our trusty Chabchiyal [Pass]. If we again array our soldiers and send them forth and if the Mongols again overcome them, [our men] will scatter to their various cities.[24]

But the Mongols and Jin were soon at war again, this time precipitated by the Jin's refusal to allow Chinggis Khan's ambassador to Southern Song China passage through Jin territory. A major battle took place at Tongguan, a key pass at the great eastward bend of the Yellow River approximately 375 kilometres due west of Kaifeng, one that the Jin emperor had fortified with large numbers of his best crack troops under his most skilled and trusted commanders, ordering them to hold the pass at all costs. Chinggis himself led the Mongol attack on Tongguan, along with his youngest son Tolui, who slaughtered so many "Kitads" (Jin troops; "Cathayans") that once again they piled up "like heaps of rotten logs." Pleased with how well Tolui had acquitted himself on the battlefield, Chinggis rewarded him handsomely. Terrified by the slaughter, the Jin emperor and his court abandoned their demonstrably vulnerable capital at Zhongdu and moved it approximately 550 kilometres

south-southwest to Kaifeng, which was the Jin's Southern Capital (Nanjing Kaifeng Fu). The Jin troops left behind at Zhongdu were, according to the *Secret History*, abandoned without provisions and reduced to cannibalism.[25]

On 26 June 1214[26] Chinggis Khan became so enraged at the Jin having withdrawn its capital southward to Kaifeng that he renewed his plans to move on Kaifeng and take it.[27] Meanwhile, he had ordered Muqali[28] into Manchuria in order to cut off Zhongdu from Liaodong to its east. In mid-June through early July 1214, other Mongol forces captured Gubeikou (northeast of modern Miyun, Beijing), Jingzhou (Zunhua in modern Hebei), Jizhou (Jinji County in modern Tianjin), Tanzhou (Miyun in modern Beijing), Shunzhou, and other jurisdictions in quick succession. Several Mongol generals wanted to put all these cities to the sword, but their commander rejected this, reasoning that other cities would more quickly surrender if they found out that these cities had been spared. Meanwhile, in the northeast Muqali had captured three jurisdictions. The Jin commander of Tongzhou then surrendered, and his forces were combined with Mongol forces to help besiege Zhongdu. The beleaguered Zhongdu sent anxious word of its desperate extremities to Kaifeng, and in response the Jin emperor Xuanzong sent many tens of thousands of troops to its aid, most but not all of whom the Mongols intercepted and destroyed. By the summer of 1215 the situation in Zhongdu was so desperate that the Jin commander there committed suicide, and soon the Mongols entered and occupied the city.[29] Chinggis Khan withdrew after Zhongdu's wealth was proclaimed his and was then emptied,[30] leaving occupying forces behind. This time his purpose seems to have been both loot and territorial conquest. Perhaps his greatest prize from his Zhongdu campaign, Fritz Mote notes, was the ethnic Khitan Yelü Chucai (1190–1243), a high-ranking Jin official, Confucian scholar, and descendant of the Khitan Liao royal family who patiently influenced the Mongols to take up Confucian administrative reforms in the areas of China they had conquered.[31] Starting in 1218, Chinggis Khan took him into his entourage, where he remained in Chinggis Khan's service and that of Ögödei until Ögödei's death in 1241.[32]

Meanwhile, in 1212 the Mongol general Jebe had captured the Jin's Eastern Capital (Dongjing; modern Liaoning[33]) and by 1214 had taken Jin positions along the Liao River. By 1216, a large portion of Manchuria was in Mongol hands, largely due to the defection by the Khitan leader Yelü Liuge and his forces.[34] Both Khitan and Chinese defectors from the Jin to the Mongol cause played key roles in the ultimate victory of the latter. Some of the best-known Chinese defectors included Shi Tianze (1202–1275),[35] who lived to see the beginning of Qubilai Qa'an's final assault on the Southern Song in 1274, and Zhang Rou (1190–1268) and his son Zhang Hongfan.[36]

Internal strife among the Mongols prevented the completion of their conquest of Jin at this time, as did the Mongols' campaigns against other fractious nomadic groups and also against the Khwarazmshah.

STAGE TWO: HOLDING OPERATIONS BY MUQALI, 1218–1223

Since the autumn of 1213, the Mongol general Muqali (1170–1223), "unquestionably one of the leading Mongol personalities and a superb leader,"[37] had been "ferociously destroying all [Jin forces] he faced,"[38] and by late 1216 he completed the

elimination of Jurchen Jin forces in the Liao River Valley. Pleased with his performance, Chinggis Khan then put Muqali in charge of capturing the territory remaining under Jin control. From Zhongdu (now renamed Yan) and the Western Capital (Xijing; modern Datong), Muqali launched a three-pronged attack into Shanxi, Hebei, and Shandong with a multiethnic force that consisted of Mongols, Chinese, Khitan, and surrendered Jurchen Jin troops. The centre force invading Hebei faced stiff resistance, and several cities there had to be taken by force in very bloody battles because they had refused to surrender. By 1218, after a protracted and difficult struggle, Muqali left occupying forces in Hebei and focused on Shanxi, capturing Taiyuan (the main Jin stronghold there) by the autumn of 1218. He then returned to Hebei, and the remaining Jin holdout cities there, including Daming, surrendered by the fall of 1220. In October of the same year, he also captured Ji'nan in Shandong, thus completing each of the three prongs of his campaign into the Jin realm. His conquests had been made all the easier by the Jin Empire's extraordinarily foolish decision to launch attacks against Southern Song China even though it was being attacked on its north by the Mongols!

The Jin court sent an embassy to Chinggis Khan (then in Central Asia) for tentative peace talks, but the hostilities continued because the Jin refused to accept Mongol terms: the Jin emperor was to accept the diminished title of prince (*wang*) and recognize Chinggis Khan as his sovereign.[39] Muqali ratcheted up his pressure on the Jin in mid-1221 by launching major offensives into Shaanxi and Gansu, west of the earlier offensives. His forces crossed into the Ordos with Xia assistance and support, and by the spring of 1222 he had captured major cities in Shaanxi. He then proceeded eastward to Shanxi, where Jin counter-offensives were underway. After dealing effectively with these, he returned once again to Shaanxi, where several cities remained defiant and refused to surrender.

Mongol attacks on the city of Chang'an (west of the modern city of Xi'an in Shaanxi) and on Fengxiang (approximately 140 kilometres west-northwest of then Chang'an; Fengxiang County in modern Shaanxi) in late 1222 and early 1223 both ended in failure for Muqali. On 4 December 1222, he led Mongol forces across a pontoon bridge on the Yellow River and captured Tongzhou (modern Lizhou in Shaanxi), and as a result its high-ranking Jin officials killed themselves. He also captured Pucheng (in modern Shaanxi) and then launched an attack on Chang'an but failed to take it. It was defended by a Jin army at a claimed strength of 200,000 troops. The Mongols then divided their troops, with part of them continuing to surround Chang'an and part proceeding to the west to impede possible Jin reinforcements attempting to arrive from Tongguan to relieve the beleaguered but uncaptured city. On 28 December 1222, Muqali led several hundred thousand troops in an attack on Fengxiang to the west but did not take it immediately. He attacked again on 18 January 1223 with the same failed results, and after his third assault on Fengxiang (begun on 6 February 1223) likewise ended in failure, he and his forces withdrew to fight another day.[40]

STAGE THREE: CAMPAIGNS SUSPENDED, 1223–1230

It was during this crucial and difficult moment that Xia auxiliaries withdrew their support of Mongol operations in Shaanxi. Incensed at this treachery, Muqali launched

a punitive attack on the Xia frontier and then returned once again to Shanxi, where he died in the spring of 1223, but not before urging his younger brother to finish his incomplete task.[41] With this and with Chinggis Khan's determination to destroy the perfidious state of Xia, the Mongol campaigns against the Jin were largely put on hold for a few years. (Over these years the Jin did, however, lose their two capitals in Manchuria – the Eastern Capital or Dongdu at Liaoyang and the old Supreme Capital or Shangdu[42] farther north, on the Sungari River.[43]) During this interregnum, the Jin reconciled with the Xia, with peace negotiations beginning in 1224. A peace treaty was concluded in 1225 in which the status of the Xia was raised, with the Xia no longer considered or treated as a vassal to the Jin.

STAGE FOUR: ANNIHILATION UNDER ÖGÖDEI, 1230–1234

After the death of Chinggis Khan in 1227 and the *quriltai* of 1229 that proclaimed Ögödei the new Qa'an, Ögödei's first order of business seems to have been the conquest of the Qipchaq steppes and the Rus' principalities. Before this was finally accomplished, however, he also launched offensives in the Middle East and against Korea.[44] Even so, he did not forget his father's unfinished business with the Jin, and he commenced operations against them in 1230.[45] It seems, however, that the Jin were still more powerful than Ögödei and his generals had anticipated, and a new and comprehensive plan for their conquest was drawn up the next year, one that once again involved a three-pronged attack southward. The left or eastern force was led by the grand old warrior Sübedei (c. 1175–1248)[46] and assembled in Shandong, while the centre force was under the leadership of Ögödei himself and would move into Shanxi, and the right or western force would proceed into Shaanxi under the command of Tolui, Chinggis Khan's youngest son by his principal wife.

The Persian historians Juvaini and Rashid al-Din both write of supernatural intervention on behalf of the Mongols and massive Jin reinforcements at Tongguan in eastern Shaanxi, the same key strategic pass where Tolui had fought alongside his father Chinggis almost two decades previously. Both Persian and Yuan sources claim that when Tolui arrived at Tongguan he encountered a massive force of 100,000 Jin cavalrymen. (Sübedei's biography in the *Yuan shi* has it as 100,000 cavalry and infantry.[47]) Tolui was awed by their sheer numbers, but as described previously, Sübedei assured him that as city-dwellers, they were no match for Mongol cavalry. The Jin forces had begun boasting confidently about how they would "encircle these Mongols and their king, and take them prisoner, and do this and that to their womenfolk."[48] According to Juvaini and Rashid al-Din, among the Mongols was a wizard who conjured up storms and winter-like chills (during the summertime) against the "Khitayan army" of the Jin. (Sübedei's biographies in the *Yuan shi* simply note the snowstorm without attributing it to wizardry.[49]) Tolui then commanded his men, "Now is the time for battle and good fame; you must be men." His forces then "fell upon the Khitayans like lions attacking a herd of deer and slew the greater part of that army." The Mongol forces were then ordered to "commit the act of the people of Lot with all the Khitayans who had been taken prisoner" (in other words, to sodomize them) in reprisal for their boastful talk of what they would do to Mongol women.[50]

The debacle at Tongguan was debilitating for the Jin armies, and they were never the same again. Further, the battle at Mount Yu (Yushan, approximately 350 kilometres southwest of Kaifeng and 35 kilometres west of Dengzhou) fought in January 1232 also ended in a Mongol victory. Mongol forces led by Tolui captured Raofeng Pass[51] (approximately twenty kilometres east of Shiquan in modern Shaanxi province), crossed the Han River, and attacked eastward from Jinzhou (Ankang in modern Shaanxi province) in preparation for the coming Mongol attack on Kaifeng, which was still a good 700 kilometres to the northeast from Jinzhou. Jin forces trying to meet and engage the Mongols as they crossed the Han River on 18 January 1232 arrived at Mount Yu, where they divided their forces and occupied strategic positions, placing infantry at the front of the mountain and cavalry at the rear of it. Tolui then sent forth small numbers of cavalrymen to feel out the strength of the Jin positions and found, at the cost of several dead Mongol cavalrymen, that they were strong. The Mongols then divided into three forces and outflanked the Jin by going around the foot of the mountain and taking up positions at its rear. There the Jin forces engaged them but were beaten back, and the Mongols then took up hidden positions to spy on the Jin forces. After the Jin forces had spent four fruitless days searching for the whereabouts of the Mongols, on 22 January 1232 they began withdrawing to Dengzhou for provisions, only to meet with an ambush and surprise attack by the Mongols, who prevailed over them and scattered them in confusion. The Jin commander concealed this defeat of his and made false reports of achieving great victories.[52]

Tolui's force ultimately proceeded to the south and southwest of Shaanxi and entered Sichuan, where it asked the Song governor to allow Mongol passage across Song territory to mount an attack on the Jin capital at Kaifeng. (When Song leave was denied him, he moved his forces through anyway and marched on Kaifeng in early 1232.) By summer all three forces had converged on the city, where Sübedei assumed command over them. Their combined forces opened a roadway to Junzhou, thus allowing Jin forces to escape northward. Mongol troops waiting in ambush attacked the Jin armies, massively defeating them and practically wiping out all the Jin generals. In late March through mid-April of 1232 the Mongol attacks on the city continued, with Sübedei first compelling and driving prisoners of war as well as women and children to carry firewood on their backs and fill the moats before attacking the walls. The battle raged for sixteen days and nights, but the Mongols failed to capture the city, and Sübedei withdrew his forces and encamped between the Yellow and Luo Rivers. The two brothers Ögödei and Tolui then took seriously ill and withdrew together, the former ultimately surviving and the latter dying later that year. The *Secret History* has shamans discovering that the two brothers had fallen gravely ill because "The spirit-lords of the Kitad [Jin] people's lands and waters were raging violently against you [Ögödei Qa'an] because their lands and waters have been destroyed and their kinsmen plundered." Then Tolui, not wanting Ögödei to perish because that would harm the unity of the Mongols and give the Jin the satisfaction of revenge, offered himself up to die in his brother's place to placate the angry Jin deities. In the event, Ögödei did recover and Tolui passed away.[53]

Sübedei later launched another strong siege of the Jin capital, one that finally began to tell, and in early 1233 the Jin emperor Aizong (r. 1224–1234) fled. The city's Jurchen and Chinese population fiercely resisted the Mongol forces and their

Chinese allies, and in the fighting gunpowder weaponry was extensively used on both sides in mechanically hurled explosive munitions. (Neither side used propellant for rockets.[54]) The Mongols, for their part, deployed relatively simple field mangonels, catapults, or ballistae originally designed to hurl stones.[55] Counterweighted trebuchets did not make the scene until the 1270s, when mechanical artillerists from the Middle East introduced them to Qubilai. The Jin defenders used bombs against Mongol men and horses to deadly effect, and another weapon called a "fire lance" that used charcoal, iron filings, sulphur, and niter to emit flames over three metres in length was also deployed against the Mongols.

At length, Sübedei's siege of Kaifeng put the city in the direst of straits, and eventually it was cut off from communication with the outside world. The price of grain skyrocketed, and dead bodies were everywhere. Even the daughters of gentry were reduced to begging for food in the marketplace, and eventually men were eating their own wives and children. Everything made of leather was boiled and eaten, and the imposing residences of the elite were dismantled and used as firewood for cooking.[56] In desperation the Jin reached out to the Song and proposed an alliance against the Mongols in October 1233: "The Mongols have destroyed forty states, and when they arrived at the Xi Xia, the Xia also perished. Now they have reached us [the state of Jin], and if we perish the Song will be next. 'When the lips perish the teeth are exposed.'[57] This will be the natural course of things." The Song, however, declined the proposal.[58]

In addition to starvation, deliberate flooding of the city by Mongol forces contributed materially to its collapse in morale and ultimate surrender. Song chronicles record that in September 1233, when the Song officials Zhao Kui and Quan Zicai were in Kaifeng, the Mongols breached the dikes of the Yellow River at Cunjindian (near Kaifeng), flooding the city and drowning many Song troops.[59] A Qing-period study of the influences topography has on military strategy and operations (written between 1630 and 1660 by the geographer Gu Zuyu [1631–1692] and finally published in 1692) also notes this deliberate flooding,[60] as does a late Yuan-period work published in Zhizheng 21 (1361), which adds that the flood disrupted food supply chains.[61] Almost all educated people in Kaifeng today point to this deliberate flooding of their city as one of its greatest historical tragedies.

Virulent contagion may also have contributed to Kaifeng's already weak defences (with not even forty thousand troops to defend it) and its ultimate decision to surrender. An epidemic broke out in the city in May and June 1232, and over the course of fifty days or so, more than 900,000 people died of disease![62]

The desperate and demoralized capital finally surrendered to the Mongols on 29 May 1234 and opened its gates to Sübedei. It had been the previous and normal practice for the Mongols to put cities to the sword that had launched even one arrow or projectile at them in resistance. After taking over Kaifeng, Sübedei sent a messenger to Ögödei requesting approval for the general butchery of the city, pointing out that he had lost many officers and men in taking it. When Ögödei's Khitan advisor Yelü Chucai learned of this he remonstrated with the Khan, arguing in very practical terms that ultimately proved persuasive that the Mongols had been fighting long and hard to capture Jin territory and people and that the land would be quite useless and unbeneficial without the people to work it. Ögödei then issued an edict

that the Jin royal clan was to be exterminated but that all the rest of the city's population was to be spared.[63]

Meanwhile, farther to the south, the desperate fugitive Jin emperor and his skeleton retinue had been appealing to the Song court for relief and aid, but the Song, seeing in the situation an opportunity to recover territories long since lost to the Jin, rejected the overture and instead formed an expedient and opportunistic alliance with the Mongols against the Jin, an alliance that mainland Chinese military historians are fond of discussing and debating.[64] In early 1234, combined Mongol and Song forces converged on the helpless and hapless emperor's hiding place in Caizhou, two hundred kilometres due south of Kaifeng and approximately seventy kilometres north of the Southern Song border at the closest point. According to the basic annals section of the *Jin shi*, Aizong hanged himself at the Orchid Pavilion (*Youlan Xuan*) on 9 February 1234. When the remaining Jin court officials heard of his death, they wept and gave him the posthumous title Aizong, "Bemourned Ancestor." The city fell before the wailing for him was even over, and his close personal attendants cremated his remains and had them scattered on the Ru River.[65] (More than five hundred Jin officials and military officers then committed suicide by jumping into the Ru River and drowning.[66]) Juvaini and Sübedei's *Yuan shi* biography have Aizong perishing in Kaifeng by burning himself to death (along with his wives and children, according to Juvaini), and in so doing, concludes Juvaini, he "lost both this world and the next."[67] Rashid al-Din, on the other hand, more or less tallies with the *Jin shi* basic annals' version and has the fugitive Aizong fleeing Kaifeng to a succession of several towns, ultimately to commit suicide by hanging himself outside of his provisional throne room. Rashid al-Din insists at some length that his version of the events here is correct and that the account of Aizong being burned to death is inaccurate.[68] The basic annals section of the *Yuan shi* has Aizong hanging himself and then his body being cremated, after which Song forces retrieved his ashes and took them back to Song territory.[69]

For its part the Southern Song, heretofore a passive observer of these events, decided to take advantage of them by attempting to make good on its revanchist ambitions. It took the extraordinarily ill-advised and ill-considered step of attacking and attempting to "recover" Henan. The Mongols easily fought the Song forces off, and nothing came of the Song's opportunistic venture except perhaps a revelation to the Mongols of the Song's military weakness and ineptitude.

It took the Mongols, Fritz Mote noted, twenty years to defeat the Jin, a state that by no means went quietly into the night:

> Emperor Aizong . . . struggled valiantly to restore his civil and military authority in order to resist the Mongol invaders. At the end his armies mostly stood their ground and fought to the death against a fearsome enemy. The last remnant of the Jin dynasty was slowly ground down to final extinction. It perished with honor.[70]

For his part, Ögödei viewed his conquest of the Jin as the signal achievement of his reign and first among his four great accomplishments. (The other three were non-military: establishing postal relay stations, digging wells in waterless regions, and deploying spies and garrison commanders in all cities under Mongol rule.) He

also pointed to four faults in his reign: allowing himself to be conquered by drink (first and foremost[71]), taking away women from an uncle, doing secret harm to one Dokholkhu,[72] and confining wild beasts in his own lands so that they would not move into the lands of his brothers.[73] His nephews Möngke and Qubilai, sons of the brother who sacrificed himself that Ögödei might live and lead the Mongols, would go on to add to and even outdo these accomplishments for the *Yeke Monggol Ulus* by conquering the Middle East and the rest of China.

NOTES

1 Franke 1994, 278.
2 Reading 石 here correctly as *dan* and not *shi*.
3 On the Jin economy, see Franke 1994, 291–304.
4 Parhae (Balhae, Bohai, Po-hai) was a multi-ethnic state of Tang Chinese, Korean, and Tungusic peoples founded by a successor to Korea's Koguryŏ (Goguryeo) dynasty in 698.
5 Gao 2002, 206.
6 May 2007, 88.
7 For the *keshig* see Hsiao 1978, 33–50; Li 1988, 3.1807–1811; and May 2007, 88–98.
8 On the division and organization of Mongol armies see Hsiao 1978, 3–63; Li 1988, 3.1803–1816; and May 2007, 72–188.
9 Hsiao 1978, 16.
10 Li 1988, 3.1803–1807.
11 Sawyer 1994, 238.
12 YS 121.2977 (Pow and Liao 2018, 61).
13 Sawyer 1994, 232.
14 See, for example, Tetlock 2006.
15 On the capture and execution of Ambaghai Khan, see *SHM*, §53, 71.
16 Franke 1994, 251–252.
17 Ratchnevsky 1991, 108.
18 Ratchnevsky 1991, 108–109.
19 On Jebe, see Pow 2016.
20 The other three were Jelme (ca. 1160 -?), Sübedei (1175–1248), and Khubilai.
21 *SHMO*, §247.
22 Hebei East Circuit and Hebei West Circuit.
23 SSJSBM 85.950; Mote 1999, 246.
24 *SHMO*, §248.
25 *SMMO*, §251.
26 Dates converted according to Hong 2004.
27 XTJ 160.4335. Yuan 1994, 755 claims that this was simply an "excuse" or pretext for Chinggis Khan to push his campaigns farther south, but this underestimates the fury Chinggis Khan felt when people went back on their word to him or showed signs of disloyalty, deception, or insincerity.
28 On Muqali see De Rachewiltz 1993a, 3–8 and Martin 1950, 239–282.
29 XTJ 160.4332–4354; Yuan 1994, 755; Shi 1998, 39–42.
30 *SHM*, §252.
31 Mote 1999, 245–246.
32 On Yelü Chucai, see De Rachewiltz 1993b and 1960.
33 At approximately 41.95 degrees N and 122.53 E.
34 On Yelü Liuge, see ZGZD 1.754.
35 On Shi Tianze, see Hsiao 1993A, 27–45.

36 On Zhang Rou, see Hsiao 1993B, 46–59.
37 De Rachewiltz 1993a, 7.
38 SSJSBM 85.949.
39 According to *SHM* 253 (SHMO, 252–253; SHMC, 188–189), the Jin emperor submitted to Chinggis Khan and sent his son to him to act as a sentry captain, and Chinggis Khan and his forces therefore withdrew through Juyongguan.
40 XTJ 162.4411–4413; Yuan 1994, 757.
41 De Rachewiltz 1993a, 7.
42 45.6 N 122.8 E.
43 Mote 1999, 246.
44 On the Mongol conquest of Korea, see Huang 2000, Ledyard 1964, and Henthorn 1963.
45 *SHM*, §271.
46 On Sübedei, see Pow and Liao 2018 and Buell 1993.
47 YS 121.2977 (Pow and Liao 2018, 60).
48 RAB, 36; RAT 3.223; YS 121.2977 (Pow and Liao 2018, 61).
49 YS 121.2977, 122.3008–3009 (Pow and Liao 2018, 61 and 71).
50 *HWC*, 192–193; RDB, 35–39; RDT2, 223–224. Atwood 2015 contains thoughtful and painstaking analysis of the historiographical issues and difficulties involved in reconciling discrepancies in Mongolian-origin accounts (Mongolian, Sino-Mongolian, and Perso-Mongolian) on the one hand and Jin-origin accounts on the other.
51 Approximately 33.1 degrees N and 109.3 degrees E.
52 XTJ 165.4509–4510.
53 *SHMO*, §272; Yuan 1994, 757.
54 Haw 2013 argues that true rockets launched by their own propulsion did not appear until 1272 and the Mongol siege on Xiangyang.
55 Tao 2003, 186.
56 SSJSBM 90.1021.
57 *Chunwang chihan* 唇亡齒寒, an idiom still in common use in colloquial Chinese today.
58 SSJSBM 91.1031.
59 XTJ 167.4566; SSSJSBM 92.1041.
60 Gu 1692, *juan* 47, Henan 2. https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=576594&searchu=%E8%B6%99%E8%91%B5 (accessed 8 July 2020).
61 Chen 1361, *juan* 22 www.guoxuemi.com/sk/123734zasj/217350/ (accessed 8 July 2020).
62 Shi 1998, 51.
63 XTJ 167.4541; Franke 1994, 263–264.
64 See, for instance, Hu and Zou 1992, 71–76; Cai 1989, 125–126; and Han 1998, 350–353.
65 JS 18.402–403.
66 XTJ 167.4556.
67 *HWC*, 195; YS 121.2977 (Pow and Liao 2018, 61–62).
68 RDB, 40–41; RDT2, 225. Rashid al-Din then gives the exact month for when "all of the countries of Khitai" were conquered: Jumada I, 631 (2 February – 3 March 1234).
69 YS 2.33.
70 Mote 1999, 248.
71 Indeed, Rashid al-Din called Ögödei a pleasure-loving winebibber (RDB, 17; RDT2, 215).
72 On the "mysterious Mongol figure" Dokholkhu (Doqolqu), see Atwood 2015, 241–260.
73 *SHM*, §281.

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RDT2, See List of Abbreviations.
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SHMC, See List of Abbreviations.
SHMO, See List of Abbreviations.
SS, See List of Abbreviations.
SSJSBM, See List of Abbreviations.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF THE SONG EMPIRE, 1234–1279

David Curtis Wright

The kingdoms of China were the last, greatest, longest, and most difficult of all the Mongol conquests. Indeed, "It began before any other major Mongol conquest of sedentary civilizations and continued long after the others had been completed."[1] All told, from Chinggis Khan's earliest skirmishes with the Tanguts in 1205 and the Jin in 1206 to the final massive naval battle between Yuan and Song forces in March 1279, the conquest was accomplished over seven decades of intermittent, piecemeal prosecution punctuated by brief and intense offensives with cavalry, infantry, mechanical artillery, and (in the last decade) warships.

THE MONGOLS' GREATEST STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ADVANTAGES: MOBILITY AND SWIFTNESS

In his gratuitously harsh review of Timothy May's *The Mongol Art of War*, Denis Sinor criticized May's comparison of the swift and mobile warfare of the Mongols with Germany's Blitzkrieg. "Contrary to his [May's] view," Sinor wrote in 2007, "I think that the idea of the Blitzkrieg of World War II is basically different from the Mongol concept of warfare. What characterized the long-range Mongol campaigns was slow advance that could take years preceding the final onslaught."[2] But May was not arguing that the Mongols were seldom, if ever, careful and methodical in planning their campaigns:

> Sinor confuses long-term strategy with short-term tactical execution, and May is essentially right at the tactical level. Strategically, Qubilai Khan was a careful man who had a long-term planning horizon, and it took him thirty years of trying before he finally conquered all of China in 1279. But the final concerted campaigns against Song China, when they did come in the mid to late 1270s, were indeed executed very swiftly. Mongol Yuan battles waged against Song China during this time were swift and decisive engagements in which mobility was an indispensable factor and signal contribution to victory.[3]

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What is more, Sinor implicitly and teleologically assumed that the Mongols always or usually prepared slowly and methodically. But the campaigns against China were by no means planned and contemplated consistently over seven decades and were instead launched contingently and by fits and starts over long intervals with little fighting.

Decades earlier than May, B. H. Liddell Hart had already identified speed and mobility as the chief tactical advantages of the Mongols.[4] Hart's comments, which were mostly about Chinggis Khan and Sübedei,[5] were correct about the importance of speed and mobility. He only erred, through no fault of his own,[6] in attributing these qualities only to Mongol cavalry:

> During the final conquest of Song China in the 1270s, swift mobility was not limited to Mongol cavalry. After the Mongol Yuan forces finally took Xiangyang and Fancheng in 1273, their commanders (who were both Mongols and Han Chinese) instinctively took very well to warships as vehicles for swift tactical mobility. What Mongol horses had for decades been on land, Yuan ships were now on water, both on the Yangzi River and, from 1277 through 1279, along China's southeastern and southern coasts. And on the water, as on the land, Yuan forces racked up victory after victory not because of force majeure or overwhelmingly superior numbers, but because of superior speed and mobility.[7]

INTERLUDE

After the fall of the Jin in 1234, Ögödei's governance over northern China was greatly influenced by Yelü Chucai (1189–1243), a Khitan who previously served as an administrative advisor to Chinggis Khan and Ögödei. At Yelü Chucai's advice, Ögödei reduced the administrative functions of Mongol military commanders and turned them over to civilian officials in order to effectively tax Chinese peasants and fund his empire. Yelü Chucai administered tax collection in northern China, and in this capacity he is well-remembered in Chinese history for dissuading Ögödei from depopulating northern China and converting it to pasturelands. His arguments were in utilitarian rather than emotional or moral terms: if regular and systematic Chinese methods of taxation were employed, revenues would greatly increase for the khan. Ögödei assented to this, and the revenue results were just as the Khitan had predicted.[8]

After Ögödei drank himself to death in 1241 and his second wife Töregene[9] became regent of the empire, there was a limited but successful Mongol campaign launched against Shouzhou (Anhui) in 1245. But thereafter the Mongols were mostly too preoccupied with succession crises to attend to serious campaigns against Song China.

THE GREAT TOLUID ENTERPRISE: MÖNGKE'S CAMPAIGNS

This all changed, however, with Möngke's enthronement in 1251. To finance his planned conquests, the new Toluid khan conducted a thorough census of the entire realm, and effective taxation ensued. Campaigns against the Middle East, Korea, and southwestern China were decided upon at Möngke's *quriltai* in 1251, and he

was eager to proceed with them. This was politically important for him, since "it was difficult for disgruntled princes to challenge Möngke's authority at a time when the empire was engaged in carrying out Chinggis Khan's mandate to his people to conquer the world. Most Mongols, whatever their other differences, generally agreed that the principal business of the Mongolian empire was to conquer and subdue."[10]

Möngke's younger brother Hülegü reached Khurasan in 1256 and Baghdad in 1258. Meanwhile Prince Yekü's Korea campaigns eventually led to Korea's recognition of Mongol overlordship in 1259.[11] In China, Möngke attempted a western flank attack to avoid an arduous and risky frontal assault directly southward. He ordered his younger brother Qubilai to attack the Nanzhao or Dali kingdom to the south in Yunnan, which he subdued by early 1254. Meanwhile, in autumn 1252 Yuan forces broke into the Sichuan Basin and established a major foothold there. In the summer of 1256, Möngke and Qubilai launched massive offensives into Song China, and by 1259 three Mongol columns were attacking Song China: Möngke's on the west into Sichuan, Qubilai's in the centre into Hubei and the city of Ezhou at the confluence of the Han and Yangzi Rivers, and an eastern column making for Anhui. This ominous tripartite attack may well have doomed Song China, but in August 1259 Möngke died in Sichuan, likely of wounds and infection received during his siege on Diaoyu Fortress, an objective he ultimately failed to capture despite his best efforts.[12] (The much-ballyhooed Song victory at Diaoyu is widely celebrated and commemorated in China today.[13])

THE GREAT TOLUID ENTERPRISE: BAYAN'S CAMPAIGNS

Even though "the Mongolian campaigns throughout Eurasia came to a standstill after Möngke's death,"[14] Qubilai knew the eventual conquest of southern China would be very difficult, but he was not uniformly bellicose towards the Song. In 1260, he sent Hao Jing to propose that China recognize Qubilai (and not the Song emperor) as Son of Heaven, in return for a high degree of autonomy. The Song responded by detaining him under indefinite house arrest. Two decades later, Qubilai used Hao's continuing detention as a *casus belli* for attacking the Song.[15]

The Xiangyang quagmire

Minor clashes ensued, followed by a major one in Sichuan in 1265. Then Qubilai's siege of the strategically important city of Xiangyang on the Han River and its twin sister Fancheng across the river dragged on from 1268 to early 1273. On 31 January 1273, the final attack on Fancheng began, and when Yuan forces using siege ladders broke into the city on 2 February they butchered every last person there, sparing none. They then piled the dead bodies into high heaps for Song defenders across the Han River in Xiangyang to see, and this did indeed frighten and dishearten them.[16]

To prevail at Xiangyang, the Mongols had to learn logistics, logistics interdiction, naval tactics (from Chinese, Korean, and Jurchen naval experts), and siegecraft with counter-weight trebuchets crewed by Middle Eastern artillerists. The artillery made the biggest difference, and by spring 1273, the Song defender Lü Wenhuan exited Xiangyang and defected to the Yuan.[17]

Different warfare, different warrior: Bayan the Baarin

Resolving to avoid future quagmires and protracted, debilitating attacks on walled cities whenever possible, Qubilai opted in 1274 for warfare that was "a combination of nomadic ways of swift, mobile warfare and reluctance to attack fortified city walls on the one hand and the Chinese strategist Sunzi's preferences for largely the same things on the other."[18]

The man Qubilai chose for the job, Bayan of the Ba'arin, was a veteran of Hülegü's campaign in Persia in the 1250s, who had returned to China in 1265 in his late twenties.[19] Bayan began his campaign in October 1274 down the Han River (a Yangzi tributary) with a multi-national force of Mongol cavalry, Chinese infantry, Middle Eastern artillerymen, and warships with mostly Mongol captains. His purpose was to reach the Yangzi and thence Jiangsu and Zhejiang, whence he would launch coordinated land and sea attacks on the Southern Song capital at Lin'an (modern Hangzhou).

The intent of Bayan and his khan was not the destruction of the Lower Yangzi or its conquest per se, but its submission to the Yuan, peacefully if at all possible. Qubilai counseled Bayan to avoid bloodshed whenever he could and told him about Cao Bin (931–999), an official of the Later Zhou during the Five Dynasties period (907–960), who switched his allegiance to the Song and campaigned against holdouts in Sichuan. "The one person in times past who excelled in securing southern China," Qubilai said, "was Cao Bin. If you can avoid killing, you too shall be a Cao Bin." Cao Bin's Song generals had wanted to put recalcitrant Sichuan cities to the sword, but Cao stayed his hand. Later it was said that he never indiscriminately killed anyone in his conquest of southern China.[20] Bayan seems for the most part to have taken Qubilai's admonitions to heart, and much more often than not, the cities his forces approached along the two rivers submitted peacefully as his forces neared them.

But Bayan did not live up to the purportedly bloodless ideal of Cao Bin; during his Yangzi campaigns at least three Song cities were put to the sword: Shashi (Hu'nan), Changzhou, and Zhenchao (Anhui). Further, between cities there were many bloody riverine naval battles. Crossing the mighty Yangzi with large numbers of Yuan forces was an important objective of Bayan's, and he understood the Song's reliance on it as a major psychological and strategic barrier.

Bayan sets out

In October 1274, Bayan and his combined forces set out from Xiangyang and Fancheng on the Han River. The first jurisdiction they encountered was Yingzhou, which they simply bypassed by flooding a side creek. His Chinese lieutenants objected strenuously to leaving Yingzhou uncaptured, but Bayan overruled them: "I know all about when to slacken and when to hasten in using troops," he said and then alluded to cautions in Sunzi's *Art of War* about the risks and folly of attacking walled cities: "What is more, military writers regard attacks on walled cities as the lowliest of plans.[21] How could the use of our troops be only for this one city? If we attack this city, we shall lose [our momentum] for greater things." With this, the matter was dropped.[22]

The first battle waged by Bayan's forces was at Shayang, which refused his summons to surrender. To establish credibility of threat in his future battles on the Han and Yangzi Rivers, he had to respond. He ordered his Muslim artillerymen to hurl incendiary munitions into the city, and a large portion of it was soon alight. He slaughtered the city's garrison but spared its civilian population.[23]

The next city was Xincheng, and Bayan ordered it to surrender with the visual incentive of laying out the heads of the Shayang defenders at the foot of city's walls. His archers then shot written warnings wrapped around arrows into the city. When there was no immediate response, he made ready to attack on 26 December 1274, but then the troops in the city mutinied and surrendered. Their commander committed suicide, and Bayan was moved by his courage and loyalty. The commander was eventually given a posthumous title, and a shrine to him was built on the spot where he perished with honour.[24]

At the next city his forces approached, Bayan sent in messengers promising not to harm so much as "a fine autumn hair" in the city if it surrendered peacefully. It did, and Bayan was true to his word, his Chinese lieutenants' objections that his forces would not even enter the city notwithstanding.[25]

Crossing the Yangzi

Up ahead was the confluence of the Han and Yangzi Rivers at Hankou, and it was protected by the massive Yangluo Fortress. This was a key objective he knew he would have to take, and its Song commander refused summonses to surrender. Bayan then reluctantly deployed his siege artillery around it on 9 December 1274, all the while likely dreading a repeat of the quagmire a few years earlier at Xiangyang. But two nights later a brilliantly unorthodox thought occurred to him: was it really necessary to take the fortress at all? What if he could simply bypass it the way he had bypassed Yingzhou? He counselled secretly that night with the Mongol commander Aju (1227–1281),[26] his chief lieutenant:

> The Song generals are now of the mind that I must capture this Yangluo Fortress in order to cross the Yangzi. What is more, this fortress is indeed very strong, and attacking it would be to labour in vain. If tonight three thousand of your heavy cavalry rode in ships against the current and travelled upstream, [you could] hasten to observe their deployment. I anticipate that upstream, although they have made preparations, they are not strong. We should make plans to attack their weak points. On the morrow at dawn, cross over and [make a] surprise attack [on] the south shore of the [Yangzi] River and quickly dispatch a man to report to me.[27]

Aju readily agreed, and they quickly identified Qingshanji on the southern bank of the Yangzi as their objective. If they could transport three thousand cavalry across the Yangzi on the few boats they then had on the river, it would be an enormous psychological victory for the Yuan against the Song, which was relying on the river as a massive obstacle to further Yuan attacks. In the night, he launched a massive diversionary attack on Yangluo Fortress while Mongol commanders actually did get three thousand cavalrymen aboard the boats and succeeded in crossing the river and

landing at Qingshanji on its southern bank! The light Song defences there were no match for them, and the Yuan cavalrymen stood and fought as infantry until their horses arrived.

Qubilai was elated the next morning, and Zhang Shijie, the commander of the Song forces, was devastated. During his diversionary attack, Bayan managed to get many of his warships out onto the Yangzi, where a large battle ensued with the Song navy. The Muslim artillerists who had set up counter-weighted trebuchets on the shore to attack Yangluo Fortress were now ordered to turn them about and shoot munitions out onto the water. The Song ships remained tightly grouped together, while the smaller and faster Yuan warships scattered. The amassed Song warships were easy targets, and Yuan artillery "sank all the ships," reported a biographical notice on Abu Bakr (son of Isma'il) in the *Yuan shi*.[28] The end result of it all was a massive victory for the Yuan, with one Yuan source narrating that "Almost all of the tens of thousands of Song troops were killed or wounded, and their floating bodies completely covered and flowed down the river."[29]

As Song defenders at Yangluo Fortress watched all this helplessly, morale disintegrated "like a shattered ceramic tile."[30] Hanyang, one of the three cities at the key confluence of the Han and the Yangzi, surrendered peacefully, while Ezhou put up a stout fight. One of its commanders named Zhang Shanweng (doct. 1262) steadfastly refused to surrender, and when he was finally captured he remained defiant and unsubmissive. Several Yuan commanders wanted him executed, but Bayan, moved by his loyalty and courage, called him an "upright man" (*yishi*) and ordered him released unharmed.[31]

Down the Yangzi

On 25 January 1275, the Yuan juggernaut proceeded eastward down the Yangzi, peacefully capturing cities as it approached them because they obeyed Bayan's surrender summonses. Bayan lightly garrisoned surrendered cities with stern warnings never to revert to the Song. On 16 March 1276, his navy fought another gargantuan battle with the Song navy, this time at Dingjiazhou, which was defended by five thousand Song warships and 130,000 men. Bayan again ordered his Muslim artillerymen to hurl kinetic stone munitions (not explosive ones) at the Song navy from the riverbanks, and to great effect, both tactical and psychological. The Song navy's will to fight evaporated and its surviving warships sailed farther down the river. Yuan cavalry and infantry operating on both riverbanks greatly routed Song forces.[32] Meanwhile more fighting under separate command in Hubei was also going well for the Yuan.[33]

Yuan forces conquered several more cities and jurisdictions along the Yangzi down to Jiankang (Nanjing), which surrendered on 30 March 1275, as did Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. On 8 April 1275, the city of Changzhou surrendered but reverted to the Song only a week later, a tragic and fatal mistake. On 21 May 1275, Qubilai ordered Bayan to suspend campaigns because of hot weather and return north. (He might also have wanted Bayan's help in confronting his recalcitrant cousin Qaidu.[34]) His trusted Mongol lieutenant Aju remained behind and won a massive naval battle at Jiaoshan, an island in the middle of the river. Meanwhile, in Hubei on 2 May 1275 the Uighur general Ariq Qaya (1227–1286),[35] not under

Bayan's command, had butchered the town of Shashi because it did not surrender. This was his ominous warning to Jiangling, the nearby provincial capital.[36] There was also fighting in Hu'nan; in August 1275 Ariq Qaya attacked Hu'nan from his station at Ezhou, besieging Tanzhou (modern Changsha) in September and capturing it in January 1276 after a ghastly orgy of suicide in the city.[37] Qubilai returned to the Yangzi in the fall, capturing Zhenjiang on 14 November 1275. He and Aju formulated plans for capturing the Southern Song capital at Lin'an and decided that they would advance in three columns, two overland and one on the sea, ultimately to merge simultaneously at the city.[38]

Putting Changzhou to the sword

First, there remained Changzhou's perfidy, which Qubilai could not ignore. He knew he had to make a grisly example of Changzhou in order to show the terrible consequences for defection back to the Song. Chinggis Khan himself abominated this kind of inconstancy, and so did his successors and their lieutenants.[39] On 5 December 1275, Qubilai's archers shot arrows into the city with messages tied to them:

> To the supreme commander, general officers, lieutenants, and ordinary soldiers of Changzhou: Changzhou is a city that has already submitted to our Great Yuan, but all of you have come and occupied it once again. The Chief Grand Councillor [Bayan] is leading troops and approaching your city for a four-pronged attack, and you are as vulnerable as brittle dried wood. But for the sake of our sovereign [Qubilai], who delights in life and abhors killing, we must first summon you to come [and surrender]. For many days we have sent people to exhort you, but they have not been heeded. Your troops and civilians need not have misgivings about having submitted to us and then rebelling once again; your officers and men need not fear that they have resisted and striven with our troops. If within the next few days they leave your city and submit to us in order to preserve its living souls, then we shall not inquire into any of your former crimes and shall not indiscriminately slaughter a single person.[40]

Bayan waited for only one day to conclude that Changzhou meant to defy him to the end. He broke into the city on the morning of 6 December 1275 and, a Yuan source says laconically, "slaughtered the city."[41] Centuries later the Qing scholar and historian Bi Yuan (1730–1797) gave more of the gruesome details: Bayan's forces compelled people to carry dirt and stone to use in constructing ramparts by the city walls, and afterwards laid the people themselves like bricks into them:

> Wroth, Bayan ordered the surrendered [former Song official] Wang Liangchen to press the residents outside the walls into transporting earth and building up ramparts, and when the earth arrived he made ramparts out of it and the people. Further, after killing them he fried their oil and made it into [incendiary] munitions [by] burning their shields and bidents.[42] He attacked [Changzhou] day and night without stopping. . . . Bayan commanded that all of its [Changzhou's] people be slaughtered.[43]

The massacre at Changzhou was indeed "autumn's grim harvest,"[44] and it is seared into the memory of every resident of the city today. In the early twentieth century, there still survived near the city's old eastern gate an earthen mound over six yards in height and half an acre in surface area that contained the dead bodies that Yuan armies had piled up. Dry bones often protruded from it, and it was known as the "Myriad People Burial Pit" (*Wanren Keng*). Today the site no longer exists, having been completely obliterated and levelled for Changzhou's main office of the Bank of Construction and Commerce (*Gongshang Yinhang*).[45]

Approaching Lin'an and receiving the Song surrender

On the same day as the Changzhou massacre, the Mongolian commander Cherig Temür and the myriarch Khaidu[46] captured Wuxi, approximately 130 kilometres north of Lin'an. On 11 December 1275, Yuan troops led by the Mongol Alaghan[47] broke through the strategically important Dusong Pass, fifty kilometres northwest of Lin'an, and this led to mass defections to the Yuan and panic at the court in Lin'an. That same day, naval forces led by Dong Wenbing (1217–1278)[48] arrived at Jiangyin, approximately 185 kilometres north of Lin'an on the southern bank of the Yangzi. Bayan's planned three-pronged assault on Lin'an was shaping up nicely, and he wanted it to go as smoothly and non-violently as possible, his spectacular brutality at Changzhou notwithstanding. In late December 1275, the Song sent a missive to Bayan imploring him not to attack Lin'an now, while the empress dowager was still in mourning for the previous Song emperor, who had died in 1274. (Attacking a state during national mourning was indeed long frowned-upon in Chinese military culture.[49]) But Bayan paid such Chinese taboos no heed and replied tartly, "Of old, your [state of] Song obtained its empire from the hands of a boy, and it will be lost from the hands of a boy.[50] This is the way it is going to be. Why more talk from you?"[51]

On 29 December 1275, Bayan sent a surrender summons to Lin'an. The Song temporized for a few weeks, but by early February, they had submitted their official imperial jade governmental seal and a formal written instrument of surrender (*xiangbiao*) to Bayan in unambiguous gestures of utter capitulation.[52] Bayan then took the Song's imperial seal and sent it to Shangdu. On 12 February 1275, still outside of Lin'an, he sent Yuan officials to Lin'an to give instructions to the grand empress dowager, and two days later in response she sent several high Song officials to see Bayan, including hyper-patriot blowhard Wen Tianxiang (1236–1283),[53] a newly appointed Grand Councilor. Meanwhile, she had sent out orders to all Song jurisdictions that had not yet submitted to the Yuan indicating that they were to do so forthwith and as one. In this audience with Bayan, Wen Tianxiang did his best to pretend, in a display of self-importance and wishful thinking, that the Song had not really just surrendered after all and attempted to get Bayan to agree to terms less than surrender. Bayan, of course, would have none of this, and he dismissed all Song officials except for Wen Tianxiang, whom he detained because he had correctly sized him for what he was: a mercurial hothead who harboured obstreperous ambitions and purposes.[54]

On 18 March 1276, Bayan finally entered Lin'an himself and stayed there for a few days. He did not sack Lin'an or put it to the sword because it had surrendered

peacefully, and the magnificent city survived to bedazzle Marco Polo a few years later. But he did put one last city to the sword: Zhenchao, about 280 kilometres northwest of Lin'an, on the northern bank of the Yangzi. In March 1276, all of Huaixi (Anhui) surrendered except for Zhenchao, which a year earlier had reverted to Song control after declaring for the Yuan. Perhaps because it knew the fate that awaited it for this perfidy, Zhenchao fought through to the bitter end and was put to the sword.[55]

On 19 March, Bayan threw a grand banquet in Song government buildings in Lin'an for his Yuan victors, and on 27 March, a large Yuan military contingent entered the imperial palace and summoned the Song emperor and empress dowager to hear Qubilai's decree that formal and involved surrender ceremonies would not be necessary. With this, the Song empress dowager said to the young Song emperor, "You should thank the Son of Heaven [i.e., Qubilai Qa'an] for his humanity and mercifulness in sparing our lives and not killing us. You should face the direction of his palace and do obeisance in gratitude."[56] Then the Yuan military moved out the young emperor and the grand empress dowager, along with all of their attendants, and closed down Song government buildings and treasuries. On 29 May 1276, the young emperor and the empress dowager arrived at Shangdu, along with a retinue of several thousand people, and on 14 June 1276, they left Shangdu through the West Gate and travelled for five *li* on the grasslands to a makeshift shrine. There the young Song emperor, his empress (wife), and the empress dowager (his mother) did obeisance to their ancestors, thus informing them that their dynasty had come to an end. Zhao Xian (the young Emperor Gongdi) lived on in Yuan captivity until his death in 1323.[57]

CHASING DOWN THE FUGITIVE SONG LOYALIST REGIME, FEBRUARY 1276 – MARCH 1279

But it was not all over. On 4 February 1276, the very day the Song's child emperor handed over the formal written surrender to Bayan, diehard Song loyalists spirited two male children (ages eight and four) of the royal blood out of Lin'an and fled. Over the next three years, Yuan forces would doggedly pursue and battle the fugitive Song loyalist regime in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi provinces, finally managing to catch up with it and destroy it in a massive naval battle off the coast of Yaishan (Guangdong) on 20 March 1279.[58]

At first, however, it looked like the Song regime might even prevail and re-establish itself. It made the coastal city of Fuzhou in Fujian its headquarters, and on 14 February 1276 it installed an eight-year-old boy (Zhao Shi) as emperor Duanzong. On 14 June 1276 it renamed Fuzhou Fu'an, which sounded more auspicious, and many people flocked to Fu'an.[59] On 16 July 1276, Yuan forces responded by taking Guangzhou, a major city in southern Guangdong, to prevent it from falling into Song loyalist hands. By midsummer 1276, Song forces had recovered several cities Yuan forces had previously taken, including Nanfeng, Yihuang, Ningdu, and Qianshan. Several other cities followed suit and did not wait for Song forces to recover them: Chuzhou, Taizhou, and Wuzhou. By late summer, Song forces had recovered substantial stretches of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and Yuan forces in Lin'an were so alarmed that they began taking precautions to prevent Lin'an from falling.

But by late summer and early fall, things began going badly for the Song loyalist cause once again. In mid-August 1276, three hundred Yuan cavalry and seven hundred infantrymen easily defeated a force of militiamen at Nanfeng and then, in reprisal for the city's perfidious reversion to Song control, put it to the sword. Song counter-offensives also went badly elsewhere in Zhejiang and Jiangsu, with the Mongol general Sodu[60] recapturing Wuzhou and then advancing into Fujian, capturing Jianning.[61]

The Yuan coastal navy comes into its own

On the sea, on the other hand, right from the start things had gone swimmingly for the new Yuan navy and its Mongol captains, who were very quick studies at naval warfare. In the summer of 1276, a Mongol captain named Qaradai (1237–1307)[62] won every engagement he fought off the northern coast of Zhejiang. Qaradai was a veteran of the sieges at Xiangyang and Fancheng and of the great naval engagement at Jiaoshan on the Yangzi in July 1275, when he captured two Song warships. At that time the Mongol general Aju, who led the Yuan forces at Jiaoshan, was so impressed with Qaradai that he ordered one hundred large Song-style seagoing White Hawk (*Baiyao*) warships built and then gave Qaradai command over them. Like other Mongol captains, Qaradai took readily to naval warfare. He commanded and manoeuvred his warships as if they were cavalry and readily grasped the importance of mobility and speed on the water (rivers and coastlines) better than any Song naval commander ever did. Late in the summer of 1276, he fought a large naval battle at Zhoushan Island and captured over three hundred Song battleships. In the fall, a Song fleet attempted to wrest control of Zhoushan Island, but he fought it off victoriously. From October through December 1276, the Yuan launched a massive and coordinated three-pronged attack on Fu'an, with the Mongol captains Qaradai and Alaghan commanding naval forces and marines, and Sodu and the Uighur general Ariq Qaya attacking the city from different directions on land. The Yuan general Dong Wenbing and Alaghan attacked Rui'an (the regime's new name for Wenzhou) and captured it, but not before the fleeing Song set a good portion of the city alight in order to deny its material wealth to the Yuan. When Dong Wenbing and Alaghan entered the city, they immediately issued orders to Yuan troops to extinguish the flames, and their efforts saved half the city. The people of the city sang a little ditty about this:

南軍放火北軍救
The Southern Armies lit the flames,
The Northern put them out.

異事稀奇古無有
Such strange, bizarre, uncommon things
The ancients were without.[63]

Meanwhile, from October through December 1276, Yuan forces had recovered much of northern Fujian, and they also entered and recovered Fu'an peacefully and changed its name back to Fuzhou. By 21 December 1276, the Song regime in

Fuzhou had had enough and fled aboard a massive flotilla bound for Quanzhou. The Yuan warships patrolling in the area did not detect the fleeing Song flotilla because of fog. In Quanzhou, Zhang Shijie, a man who had been leading Song resistance against the Yuan for many years and was suffering from what we today would probably call shellshock, combat fatigue, or post-traumatic stress disorder, could not get along with Pu Shougeng,[64] the local shipping magnate and tycoon. The chemistry between the two men became so bad that the regime had to move on to Chaozhou (in Guangdong), where it arrived in January 1277. There the vindictive Zhang Shijie simply nationalized and confiscated all of Pu Shougeng's ships. Thereafter Pu hated Zhang for the rest of his life and even switched sides to the Yuan to spite Zhang. He surrendered Quanzhou to the Yuan in late 1276.[65]

Meanwhile, Alaghan had been busy with his portion of the Yuan offensive. In January 1277, he attacked the coastal Fujian city of Xinghua, halfway between Fuzhou and Quanzhou, and the next month it surrendered to him. Xinghua would soon revert again to Song control, and it paid a heavy price for doing so, as also would Chaozhou, a city not far from the coastline of southeastern Guangdong, which had surrendered to the Yuan on 22 February 1277. Elsewhere Ariq Qaya had attacked the strategically essential city of Jingjiang (Guangxi province; modern Guilin) from his base in Hu'nan. Ariq Qaya patiently endured the killing of his envoys *four* times before finally resolving to take the city and put it to the sword. After a long fight, during which Ariq Qaya's forces drained Jingjiang's moats and scaled its walls without the use of artillery, his forces broke into the city and wiped it out by burying all of the residents alive. After that, he took the rest of Guangxi easily.[66]

The little empire strikes back

In March 1277, Qubilai severely depleted Yuan forces in the south because he needed them to quell a rebellion in Mongolia.[67] In the aftermath, it was not long before Song resistance forces multiplied and attacked like opportunistic viruses. They soon recaptured Xinghua, which had earlier surrendered to Yuan, and killed its garrisoning Yuan general, an act the Mongols would not forget. In May 1277, the Song recovered Guangzhou, and the next month an emboldened Zhang Shijie was launching counterattacks in Guangdong and Fujian. Wen Tianxiang recovered most of his home province of Jiangxi. In July 1277, Song loyalists even succeeded in retaking Rui'an/Wenzhou, unnervingly close to Lin'an as far as the Yuan were concerned.[68]

But by the summer and fall of 1277, Yuan troops returned and quickly recovered territory lost to Song pretenders. In the summer of 1277, Yuan forces cleaned out Jiangxi and reversed all of the gains made earlier there by Wen Tianxiang. (Wen Tianxiang showed his true colours by abandoning even his wife, children, and concubines and making a run for it when Yuan troops were approaching.) By late 1277, all was quiet on the Jiangxi front as minor anti-Yuan uprisings in Guangxi and Hu'nan were also crushed during this time, and it had become readily apparent that the fight had boiled down to Fujian and Guangdong.

The (partial) Xinghua massacre

In October 1277, Yuan ground and naval offensives began. On the sea, things went smashingly for the Yuan. Captain Qaradai's naval and marine forces approached Rui'an (renamed Wenzhou after the Yuan captured it), ordered its defending general to surrender, and captured five Song warships. On land, in November 1277 Sodu was determined to recapture Xinghua. The Song defender of the city originally said he would surrender peacefully, but then he went back on his word and shut the city's gates. As Sodu approached the city, he once again summoned it to surrender, but the response was a hail of arrows. Sodu then constructed large siege ladders and began deploying artillery. On 11 November 1277, he ordered his troops to scale the city's walls, and they did so successfully. But even so, street-to-street fighting was fierce and cost Sodu the lives of a thousand of his troops. When the city was finally taken and Sodu went to meet its commanding defender, his response was to hurl imprecations and abuse at his captors. This so enraged Sodu that he had the man drawn and quartered, and then he ordered the city put to the sword. Sodu's Jurchen advisor and lieutenant Wugusun Ze remonstrated with Sodu against butchering the entire city, but the apoplectic Sodu would not listen. Then Wugusun Ze altered his approach and advised sparing the city because its wealth and resources (human and otherwise) would prove useful in keeping Quanzhou under Yuan control and out of the hands of Zhang Shijie, whose forces were besieging it.[69] Sodu assented to the logic of this and had the slaughter stopped, but not before more than thirty thousand of the city's inhabitants had already been massacred and the rest had fled. Wugusun Ze's intervention saved part of Xinghua's population not by special pleading to the Mongol general Sodu for clemency or mercy, but by appealing to his desire for swift victory. The strategy did seem to work; soon thereafter, a discouraged and disheartened Zhang Shijie lifted his siege of Quanzhou and fled to Guangdong. By the end of 1277, Sodu succeeded in recapturing Zhangzhou, and after this it was down to a fight over Guangdong.[70]

The Song loyalist regime runs (again)

As for the fugitive Song loyalist regime, during all this it had changed its headquarters several times, according to the incompetent Zhang Shijie's assessments of the danger the court was in, and would continue to do so until its ultimate destruction in March 1279.

Sodu then concentrated on capturing coastal towns in Guangdong, but he bypassed Chaozhou for the moment. Meanwhile, the Yuan navy was racking up victory after victory, its fleet of smaller and faster warships completely outclassing the larger and slower Song navy. On 3 January 1278, the Mongol general Taici'u (1244–1280)[71] arrived at Guangzhou and besieged the city, which was then back in Song hands. The Song attempted to ship aid to the beleaguered city, but the ships were stopped and fell into Yuan hands. Later that month, Qaradai's fleet arrived at Xiangshan (southern Guangdong, near the Pearl River Estuary), where the fugitive Song court was then headquartered, and Qaradai won a naval engagement off its waters, yet again capturing more Song warships. The Song court then fled to Jing'ao (southwest of the Macao Peninsula). Qaradai's fleet once more won a naval battle

there, this time capturing two hundred more Song warships and several members of the Song royal clan. In February 1278, when almost all of Guangdong had been taken, Taici'u ordered Sodu to attack and besiege Chaozhou. Sodu's forces finally broke through its defences and entered the city on 23 March 1278. Sodu then put it to the sword, but some of its occupants did escape the slaughter. In March 1278, the Song court fled to Gangzhou (location undetermined; some place in southern Guangdong), and on 14 July 1278 it fled from there to Yaishan, where it would make its last stand.[72]

Choosing the right man for the job (again)

While planning the final campaign against the Song pretenders in the summer of 1278, Qubilai selected Zhang Hongfan (1238–1280)[73] to command the entire operation, over both Mongol and Chinese land and naval forces. Zhang hesitated, concerned that as a Han Chinese his command over Mongol forces might "skew regulations and measures" (*guai jiedu*; i.e., discipline and morale). He suggested a joint command with a Mongol, but Qubilai rejected this because he was not convinced that such inter-ethnic joint commands were always viable. Qubilai knew and trusted Zhang Rou (1190–1268),[74] Zhang Hongfan's father, and recalled how a previous joint command between him and the Mongol commander Chaghan[75] had not worked out:

> Do you remember the matter of your father and Chaghan? They broke through [and captured] Anfeng. Your father left troops occupying it, but Chaghan was unwilling to do this. After the troops withdrew [at Chaghan's insistence], the Song again took possession of the city and [our troops] well-nigh lost their basis for advance and retreat.[76]

Zhang Hongfan left on campaign on 28 November 1278, leading naval forces along the Fujian and Guangdong coastline while Chinese infantry and Mongol cavalry operated on land. His fleet arrived at Chaoyang and captured Wen Tianxiang, whom Zhang respected and treated well as a guest. His purpose was eventually to deliver Wen to Qubilai.[77]

Zhang Hongfan left Chaoyang on 14 February 1279 and soon spied out the whereabouts of the Song loyalist regime. He then appointed Li Heng (1236–1285)[78] over a smaller fleet of light coastal patrol craft. In Yaishan, Zhang Shijie learned that Zhang Hongfan knew his location but refused to flee again, resolving this time to stay and fight: "Lo these many years have we voyaged upon the seas. Now must we decide betwixt us and them the victor and vanquished."[79] He then made the tactical blunder of his life: tying his thousand or more warships in a long straight line and anchoring them with sterns facing outwards to the sea and the prows inward towards the shore, making it all the more difficult to flee. He then placed the boy emperor in the middle of this great wall at sea.[80]

Zhang Hongfan repeatedly asked his captive Wen Tianxiang to write a surrender summons to Zhang Shijie. Wen finally did write something, a poem with concluding lines familiar to every educated Chinese:

人生自古誰無死
Since ancient times, when do we find
A man who never meets his end?

留取丹心照汗青
My loyal heart I leave behind
On history's pages to resplend.

With this, Zhang Hongfan laughed and dropped the matter.[81]

THE GREAT NAVAL BATTLE OFF YAISHAN, 20 MARCH 1279

Knowing that there were six months of food stores aboard the line of warships and that he was too badly outnumbered to attack it without softening it up first, Zhang Hongfan waited for thirst to take its effect. The partially provident Zhang Shijie had thought to store food but not fresh water aboard his warships.[82] Zhang Hongfan essentially besieged the immobilized Song navy, which, unlike medieval castles, had no well. Barely a week into the siege, the Song sailors were reduced to drinking seawater, which sickened and incapacitated many of them.[83]

Zhang Hongfan attacked on 20 March 1279 in the wee hours, ordering Li Heng to take his smaller and faster craft north of the line of ships and south of the shoreline and then attack southward while other flotillas, including Zhang Hongfan's, attacked simultaneously from the south and west. He planned this in close synchrony with the tides so that Li Heng's ships would attack southward with the ebb. Li Heng attacked at dawn, and a great clash ensued with "arrows and projectiles obscuring the sky." After a while, the battle dissolved into boarding operations with hand-held weapons.[84] This was "not so much as a naval battle, but rather as a form of floating trench warfare."[85]

At noon, Yuan squadrons to the south joined the battle, with cries of fighting men "shaking the heavens." For whatever reason, in the mêlée and fog of battle, the colours of one Song warship were stricken, and seeing this as a clear gesture of surrender, the large majority of Song warships followed suit and struck their own colours. With this, the Song's will to fight evaporated. The Song prime minister forced his wife and children at sword point to kill themselves by jumping into the sea and then joined them, as did the seven-year-old boy emperor Zhao Bing (posthumously Di Bing; 1272–1279). Large numbers of government officials and harem women soon followed their emperor and prime minister in suicide by jumping into the sea.[86]

The aftermaths of the battle were horrendous, with estimates of 100,000 or more bodies floating in the sea.[87] (The young emperor was assumed to have drowned, but his body was never found.) This was how the Song ended, perishing with a bang and not, like the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), a whimper. The largest land empire the world has ever known reached its greatest extent with a gargantuan battle at sea.[88]

NOTES

1 Wright 2012, 1.
2 Sinor 2007, 123–124.
3 Wright 2015, 67.
4 Hart 1927, 32–33.
5 On Sübedei, see Buell 1993; Pow and Liao 2018.
6 In Hart's day there were very few, if any, studies of the Mongol/Yuan navy.
7 Wright 2015, 68.
8 On Yelü Chucai, see De Rachewiltz 1993 and 1962.
9 On Töregene, see Broadbridge 2018, *passim*.
10 Allsen 1994, 400.
11 The definitive work in English on the Mongol conquest of Korea is still Henthorn 1963. See also Huang 2000.
12 Liu 1991; Li 1988 v. 2, 723–733; and SSJSBM 3.1053–1057.
13 Indeed, in China it is famous as the only battle site where a Mongol khan died.
14 Rossabi 1994, 421.
15 On Hao Jing and his story, see Lynn 1993.
16 Li 1988, 2.1058–1060.
17 On Xiangyang, see, inter alia, Li 1988, v. 2, pp. 945–1144 and SSJSBM v. 3, pp. 1131–1141.
18 Wright 2013, 141.
19 For Bayan, see Hsiao 1993a. For an annotated translation of Bayan's YS biography, see Cleaves 1956.
20 For a biography of Cao Bin, see SS 258.8977–83.
21 Bayan's allusion here is, of course, to Sunzi's *Bingfa* 16 (Sawyer and Lee Sawyer 1993, 177).
22 PSL 1.2; SSJSBM 106.1142–43; XTJ 180.4929–30.
23 PSL 1.2–3.
24 PSL 1.3; SS 450.13250–51; XTJ 180.4931; SSJSBM 106.1143.
25 PSL 1.3–4; XTJ 180.4932.
26 Biography YS 128.3119–24.
27 PSL 1.5; YS 127.3102.
28 YS 203.4544.
29 PSL 1.5.
30 PSL 1.5.
31 Zhang Shanweng has a brief entry in SS 454.13347, in the "loyal and righteous" (*zhongyi*) section.
32 XTJ 181.4942–43; SSJSBM 106.1148–49; Li 1988, 2.1185–88; SS 127.3104–05; SS 451.13268; YS 128.3122; PSL 1.8; Li 1970, 11.430–431; Shi 1998, 14.193; Yuan 1994, 1.805.
33 Li 1988, 2.1212–1217.
34 Li 1988, 2.3106. Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing also argues along these lines; see Hsiao 1993a, 593. But fear of the threat from Qaidu might have been overblown; Michal Biran argues in her biography of Qaidu that his ultimate purpose was neither to usurp power from his cousin Qubilai nor to protect the traditional pastoral nomadic lifestyle and ecology, but to "establish for the house of Ögödei a state commensurate with the other Mongol states" (Biran 1997, 112).
35 Biography YS 128.3124–28.
36 Li 1988, 2.1214.
37 On the fighting in Hu'nan, see Li 1988, 2.1279–1286.
38 PSL 2.11–12; XTJ 182.4966; SSJSBM 106.1156; YS 127.310607; Li 1988, 2.1231.

39 On the reasons for the punishment of Changzhou for reverting back to Song control, see Wright 2013.
40 PSL 2.13; Wright 2013, 155.
41 PSL 2.13.
42 *Cha*; for an illustration of a Song bident, see Zhou 2010, 302.
43 XTJ 182.1968.
44 Davis 1996, 98–103.
45 Wright 2005, 114–116.
46 Not, of course, Qubilai's cousin.
47 Biography YS 129.3147–49.
48 Biography YS 156.3667–76.
49 This prohibition is in the ancient Chinese military classic *Sima Fa* (Sawyer and Lee Sawyer 1993, trans., 126).
50 This is a sardonic reference to how the First Song emperor seized his empire in 960 from the hands of a boy monarch from a previous minor dynasty and how the empire would now be taken from another boy.
51 PSL 2.14; YS 127.3108.
52 YS 9.177.
53 Biography SS 418.12533–41. For a biography in English, see Brown 1986; for one in German, see Huber 1976.
54 PSL 2.16; XTJ 182.4977–78; SSJSBM 107.1160; YS 9.176.
55 Li 1988, 2.1292–1294.
56 XTJ 182.4981.
57 On Zhao Xian's subsequent life in Yuan captivity, see the nonpareil Kai 2018.
58 The best account of this period is the monumental Li 1988, v. 2, q.v.
59 Fuzhou is a simple place name, but with "an" added to it in place of "zhou," it is a binome meaning something like "Prosperity and Tranquility."
60 Biography YS 129.3150–53.
61 Li 1988, 2.1390–91; XTJ 183.4994–95; SSJSBM 108.1170.
62 Biography YS 132.3215–17.
63 Li 1988, 2.1391. The ditty was recorded on Dong Wenbing's *shendaobei*, the text of which can be viewed at http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_b77a68fa0102w8jv.html (accessed 31 March 2021).
64 On Pu Shougeng, see Kuwabara 1928 and 1935.
65 XTJ 183.4995.
66 Li 1988, 21393–21394; XTJ 183.4996–97.
67 Biran 1997, 40–41.
68 Li 1988, 2.1415; XTJ 183.5001; SSJSBM 108.1174.
69 YS 163.3831–32.
70 Li 1988, 2.1433–34; YS 47.943–44; YS 129.3152, 3154; YS 163.3831–32; SSJSBM 108.1176.
71 Biography YS 135.3272–75.
72 Li 1988, 2.1435–1437, 1440; YS 129.3152; YS 129.3155; YS 132.3215–17; YS 135.3274–75; YS 163.3831–32; SS 47.943–44; SSJSBM 108.1177; XTJ 183.5007–11. Strangely, Li does not mention the massacre of Chaozhou, but it is recorded in SSJSBM 108.1177 and XTJ 183.5010–11.
73 Biography YS 156.3679–84; Hsiao 1993c.
74 Biographies YS 147.3471–76; Hsiao 1993b.
75 Biography YS 120.2955–57.
76 XTJ 184.5016.
77 YS 156.3682–83; XTJ 184.5019–21; YS 128.3128; SS 47.944–45; SSJSBM 108.3128.

78 Biography YS 129.3155–59.
79 SS 156.3683; SS 451.13274; ZZL 45B-46A; SSJSBM 108.1180–81; XTJ 184.5025.
80 SS 47.945; SSJSBM 108.1181; XTJ 184.5025.
81 XTJ 184.5025; SSJSBM 108.1181.
82 ZZL 46B / 26.243B.
83 XTJ 184.5026; YS 156.3683.
84 YS 156.3683; XTJ 184.5026.
85 Huber 1985, 122.
86 YS 156.3683, 129.3158; XTJ 184.5027–28; SS 47.945; SSJSBM 108.1128; Li 1988, 3.1483; Zhang 1993, 125.
87 SS 47.945–46; YS 129.3158; XTJ 184.5027; SSJSBM 108.1182. Davis 1996, 222, n. 14 questions these casualty estimations as exaggerations.
88 For the Battle of Yaishan, see Buell 1985, Huber 1985, Lo 2012 (chapter parts), Nakajima 2017, and Wright 2007.

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SS, See List of Abbreviations.
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XTJ, See List of Abbreviations.
YRZJZLSY, See List of Abbreviations.
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ZZL, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CONQUEST OF QARA KHITAI AND WESTERN SIBERIA

Timothy May

During the lifetime of Chinggis Khan, Mongol expansion was largely targeted at stabilizing Mongolia as well as tying up loose ends. This included hunting down those who might pose a challenge to Chinggis Khan's new order on the Mongolian plateau, such as competing aristocratic lineages. Additionally, there was a need to prevent those external foes who had meddled in steppe affairs from regaining influence in Mongolia. This included, of course, major players such as the Jin Empire, but also other powers both large and small. In dealing with these two issues, Chinggis Khan acquired control over much of western Siberia as well as pushing farther into the steppes of modern Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan and southwest into Xinjiang.

In addition to smaller polities, the Mongols would also encounter the Qara Khitai Empire, located largely in modern Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Xinjiang, which had regular ties to Mongolia. Its founder, Yelü Dashi (r. 1124–1143), passed through Mongolia after fleeing the destruction of the Liao Empire by the Jurchen, who established the Jin Empire. For much of the empire's history, the Qara Khitai considered the Naiman of western Mongolia as tributaries. Both the Naiman and Kereit leaders also took refuge in Qara Khitai territory when necessary.[1] As such, it was known to the denizens of the Mongolian plateau as a powerful entity. While it once exerted considerable influence in Mongolia, over the decades this ability diminished. Still, the legacy and memory of the Liao Empire provided the Qara Khitai respect among the nomads in the eastern steppes, which they could wield for their benefit. In the late twelfth century and early thirteenth century, however, the Qara Khitai's power waned and some of their clients began to test the limits of the ruler Zhilugu Gur Khan's (1178–1211) authority. While the star of Zhilugu Gur Khan's fortune slipped to its nadir, Chinggis Khan's steadily ascended towards its zenith. Yet, the destiny of either empire was not obvious or initially intertwined.

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THE BATTLE OF THE IRTYSH RIVER

The Mongol conquest of the Qara Khitai Empire occurred in 1218, although the events that led to the event as well as the conquest of western Siberia were set in motion by the Mongol victory over the Naiman tribe at the Battle of Chakirma'ut in 1204. With the defeat, a Naiman prince named Güchülüg fled west to join those Naiman who nomadized on the other side of the Altai Mountains. Although a single confederation, the Naiman tended towards a north-south bifurcation, with the Altai Mountains serving as the dividing line between pastures in Mongolia and what is now Xinjiang, PRC, Kazakhstan and Russia.[2] He was joined by the Merkit led by Toqto'a Beki after their defeat by Chinggis Khan at the source of the Qaradal Huja'ur (source, spring) near the Selenge River.[3] While some of the Merkit under Toqto'a fled to the Irtysh, another faction, the Qo'as Merkit led by Dayir Usun, submitted, demonstrating their new loyalty by marrying Dayir Usun's daughter, Qulan, to Chinggis Khan.[4] Despite the marriage, the Merkit remained dangerous, and indeed some of the newly pacified Merkit rebelled.[5]

Chinggis Khan dispatched Chimbai, the son of Sorqan Shira, along with Boroqul to quell the Merkit rebellion while he crossed the Altai in pursuit of Toqto'a Beki and the other Merkit.[6] It is not clear if the rebellion occurred before or after Chinggis Khan pursued Toqto'a Beki; nonetheless, it demonstrated that an often-overlooked threat to Chinggis Khan and his newly won empire came not from sedentary powers but rather from refugees located either in those states or in the steppes to the west. Several leaders fled Mongolia after their forces met defeat, including Senggüm of the Kereit, Toqto'a Beki of the Merkit and Güchülüg of the Naiman. All three, while defeated, still represented a charismatic older order on the steppe that could attract dissatisfied elements in Chinggis Khan's new state, as well as their former followers, who had only recently been incorporated into the new social structure. Mongol westward expansion began as an effort to eliminate these threats, particularly as Toqto'a Beki and Güchülüg had joined Buyiruq Khan, the Naiman ruler on the southwestern side of the Altai, thus forming a new and potentially dangerous confederation on the frontier of Chinggis Khan's domains.[7] Furthermore, any of the refugee princes could serve as a proxy which a sedentary neighbor might use to exert influence in Mongolia. Indeed, much of Chinggis Khan's rise to prominence came from his own role as a proxy for the Jin Empire.[8] Thus, as Thomas Allsen observed, "As a matter of policy, the Mongols always made a great effort to run to ground any leader or chieftain who opposed them".[9] As many other leaders discovered, the Mongols extended this policy to those who sheltered these refugees. Indeed, Chinggis Khan's pursuit of the Merkit led him to attack Buyiruq Khan in 1206. The Mongols not only killed Buyiruq Khan but also took possession of his family, flocks and herds, as well as other possessions. Güchülüg and Toqto'a Beki, however, once more eluded capture.[10]

After being enthroned in 1206 and stabilizing his new state, Chinggis Khan dispatched his son Jochi to bring the Hoyin Irgen into his orbit in 1207. The Hoyin Irgen was a designation literally meaning "the Forest People" and referred to the various Turko-Mongolian people inhabiting the regions between the Irtysh and Angara Rivers, including the Yenisei Valley. Jochi proceeded to the Yenisei Valley in the modern Russian oblasts of Tuva and Krasnoyarsk and secured the submission of the Kirgiz as well as other tribes between the Yenisei and Lake Baikal in 1207–1208.

The Oirat ruler, Quduqa Beki, submitted and secured a marriage alliance between his son and Chinggis Khan's daughter, Chechiyegen.[11] Quduqa Beki had fought Chinggis Khan at the Battle of Köyiten as part of Jamuqa's confederation, and he also joined the Naiman at Chakirma'ut, thus his decision to submit included a modicum of self-preservation.[12] He even acted as a guide to lead Jochi to the Kirgiz and other Hoyin Irgen tribes and later showed Chinggis Khan where Toqto'a Beki and Güchülüg had taken refuge.[13] His actions brought the submission of all of the tribes that surrounded the Merkit's native pastures south of Lake Baikal and by the Selenge River. As the exact chronology is unclear, part of the Merkit move west may have been not only to avoid Mongol domination, but also to avoid entrapment, as with the conquest of the Naiman territory, their own pastures would have been hemmed in by the Mongols. Finally, Jochi's campaign would also prevent the Merkit from returning to their *nuntuq* (territory/pastures) via a northerly route. Indeed, although the battle of the Irtysh River took place in 1208 and Jochi departed for the Hoyin Irgen in 1207, it appears that the campaign against the Hoyin Irgen was part of a larger operation to destroy the Naiman-Merkit alliance.

HUNTING THE MERKIT

While the Naiman and the Merkit fled Mongolia to avoid incorporation into the *Yeke Monggol Ulus*, their presence in western Siberia created a potential threat. However, Chinggis Khan did not permit them sufficient time to effectively establish a power base from which to threaten Mongolia. In 1208, Chinggis Khan led his army to deal with the Naiman and Merkit where the two groups had joined forces at the Irtysh River. The Mongols engaged the alliance in battle and decisively defeated them where the Bukhtamra River branches from the Irtysh River, killing the Merkit leader Toqto'a Beki in the process.[14] The surviving Naiman and Merkit dispersed and fled. While Chinggis Khan returned to Mongolia, he left Mongol forces in the region led by Sübedei (and perhaps Jebe) to pursue their enemies. After the Battle of the Irtysh, the chronology becomes confused in the sources. There have been attempts to reconstruct the events beginning with Barthold, but more recently by Paul D. Buell and Christopher P. Atwood.[15] What follows is another interpretation, which by necessity is brief, albeit a longer study is forthcoming.

The Merkit, led by Qudu and Chila'un, fled southwards and eventually entered Uyghuristan (consisting of much of Xinjiang) but were defeated at the Jam River by either the Mongols or by a Mongol-Uyghur force, driving them away.[16] The Merkit then fled through the lands of the Qara Khitai, with some fleeing to the lands of the Qangli nomads while others joined Güchülüg, who escaped from the Irtysh debacle by a different route. Along their flight from the Jam, the Merkit encountered a pursuing Mongol force near the Chu River (a tributary of the Syr Darya flowing through Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan) commanded by Sübedei, who defeated them once again. After the defeat, Qudu, now the leader after Toqto'a's death, and the remaining Merkit fled west to the Ölberli.[17] The Ölberli arrived in the region in the early twelfth century, perhaps as a ramification of the demise of the Liao Empire and the rise of the Jin. As their original homeland was in modern Jehol (in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, PRC), they may have been originally affiliated with the early Qara Khitai.[18] No matter their origins, the Ölberli were now a part of the Qangli or Eastern Qipchaq confederation.

Map 7.1 The Mongol Empire circa 1215
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

Even this safety proved temporary as the Mongols tracked the Merkit down in 1209 and sought their extradition through diplomacy. The Mongol envoys demanded their return; however, the Ölberli refused as they had already granted Qudu sanctuary. To rectify the matter, Sübedei continued the pursuit of Qudu and the Merkit, but by this point, if not earlier, he had been reinforced by Jochi, who, after gaining the submission of the Hoyin Irgen, moved southwest into the steppes.[19] This resulted in a battle between the Mongols and the Ölberli. The Mongols won, slaying Qudu.[20] However, rather than attempting to incorporate the Ölberli into their empire, the Mongols returned to Mongolia after encountering the Khwarazmian forces also operating in the region. The dates for these battles are quite confused as the sources conflated many events, thus some events that took place hundreds of miles and many years apart are described together, but 1209 seems the most logical, in my opinion.[21]

A key factor for this date is that in 1209, Muhammad entered the steppes from Jand to deal with Qangli or Qipchaq raiders.[22] His timing corresponded with the season when Qara Khitai officials would arrive at his court to collect his tribute for the Gur Khan Zhilugu. Muhammad had his mother deal with the officials, thus allowing him to maintain plausible deniability in submission to the infidel.[23] While in the steppes near the Irghiz River, he encountered the battlefield where the Mongols destroyed the Merkit and Ölberli and decided to pursue them, undoubtedly hoping to gather plunder. He successfully caught up with the Mongols and sought to engage them in battle. The Mongols attempted to negotiate a peace, stating that they had orders not to engage the Khwarazmian Sultan in battle.[24] This is fairly logical, and they probably had the same orders to avoid the Qara Khitai since Chinggis Khan undoubtedly had little desire to engage in wars with either state, particularly when he was occupied in Xi Xia for much of 1209, as discussed in chapter 4 of this volume by David Curtis Wright. Nonetheless, Muhammad attacked the Mongol army. The battle was a draw, with the Mongols withdrawing under the cover of night, but the ferocity of the Mongols (who were outnumbered), according to Nasawi, "filled Muhammad's heart with terror".[25]

QARA KHITAI

Meanwhile Güchülüg continued his flight and evaded the Mongols by fleeing into the Empire of Qara Khitai. He had good reasons for doing so. Although Chinggis Khan had returned to Mongolia and Sübedei continued to hunt the Merkit, Chinggis Khan positioned an army under the command of the *guregen* (son-in-law) Toquchar in the vicinity of the Irtysh River.[26] He was well-positioned to guard the approach to Mongolia, but also to strike the Naiman should they stay in the steppes immediately west of Mongolia.

In 1209, Chinggis Khan also appointed Qorchi, an individual who prophesied Temüjin's ascendency, as his governor over the Hoyin Irgen. At the *quriltai* of 1206, Qorchi was appointed the *noyan* of three *minggan*s of Ba'arin, his people. He was later appointed as a *tümen-ü noyan* or commander of ten thousand, probably in 1209. In addition to his own Ba'arin, other Mongol troops from the Chinos and Adarkin comprised part of his army, and men from the Tö'ölös and Telengüt augmented them. The latter two *minggan*s came from the Hoyin Irgen. He was to make his headquarters along the Irtysh River, probably further north and away from

the pastures that Toquchar occupied. He was then assigned with the task of "reducing the People of the Forest to submission".[27] Qorchi's authority was so great that per his instructions from Chinggis Khan, "Those who act without his agreement, he should not hesitate to *kill them*".[28] While this phrase may have been rhetorical, it certainly implies that Qorchi had complete authority and was answerable only to Chinggis Khan himself, which may also indicate that Qorchi was not a *daruqachi* or *jarquchi*, but rather a *tammachi*.[29] Qorchi's assignment also informs us that Jochi did not complete the reduction of the Hoyin Irgen, thus indicating that his forces were deployed elsewhere after his initial successes. Qorchi's deployment thus allowed Jochi to shift his forces into the steppes to reinforce Sübedei, demonstrating that Chinggis Khan placed hunting down the Merkit as a priority. Furthermore, it indicates that the Mongols increased their permanent military presence outside of Mongolia in Siberia, something that did not happen with Xi Xia. Finally, we see the rudiments of the expansion and organization of Mongol rule. Indeed, the deployment of Toquchar and Qorchi to these positions must raise the question of whether these forces were *tamma* or proto-*tamma* units.[30]

With the increasing Mongol presence along the Irtysh, the Naiman and Merkit had no choice but to flee farther away from Mongolia. With the southern territories of Siberia coming under Mongol control, the Merkit fled into Uyghuristan while Güchülüg headed towards the core domains of the Qara Khitai in modern Kirgizstan. It also appears that after the Battle of the Irtysh River, the Naiman forces fractured into smaller bands, with some entering the vicinity of Beshbaliq and Kocha and plundering there before later joining Güchülüg in the core territories of Qara Khitai.[31] Despite the pillaging of the domains of his vassals, the Gur Khan Zhilugu welcomed Güchülüg. He also eventually married the Naiman prince to his daughter, Qonqu. For this, the Nestorian Christian Güchülüg converted to the Buddhism of the Qara Khitai.[32]

This warm embrace of the Naiman caught the Uyghurs and the Qarluqs near Almaliq off guard. Despite Güchülüg's misdeeds, Zhilugu Gur Khan saw opportunities in the Naiman prince. The fortunes of the Empire of Qara Khitai had waned since its formation in 1125. While it was no longer at its zenith, it still boasted enough might and prestige to keep most of its vassals in line as well as to garner the respect of the nomads beyond its borders. Yet it was clear that Qara Khitai's influence had declined. With Güchülüg's arrival, the Gur Khan hoped to revive the fortunes of the empire with a dynamic leader, who also brought additional veteran troops.

Zhilugu's decision had consequences. In 1209 and 1211, the Uyghur and Qarluqs submitted to Chinggis Khan. The Idiqut (Uyghur royal title; lit. "Sacred Majesty") of the Uyghurs married Chinggis Khan's daughter Al-Altan, and the Mongol ruler recognized him as his fifth son – an indication of the Idiqut's high status in the social hierarchy of the *Yeke Monggol Ulus*.[33] Additionally, Toquchar moved his army closer to Almaliq so it was well-positioned to come to the aid of the Qarluqs or the Uyghurs if need be. Despite the depredations of Güchülüg in the region, one cannot dismiss the possibility that Toquchar's appearance in the steppe may have been a factor in the submission of the Uyghurs and Qarluqs, as his army represented another group of dangerous nomads just lurking beyond the horizon. Toquchar's very presence may have induced at least Ozar of Almaliq to consider submitting to Chinggis Khan, not only for protection from Güchülüg but also to reduce the threat of a Mongol attack. Indeed, according to *The Secret History*, shortly after the Battle of the Irtysh River,

Chinggis Khan dispatched Qubilai Noyan to subdue the Qarluqs. However, Arslan Khan, the Qarluq leader, submitted in 1211 before battle was joined. In return, he became a *güregen* or son-in-law of Chinggis Khan by marrying a Chinggisid princess, although this did not happen immediately.[34] The Uyghurs had other reasons for deserting the Gur Khan. Their taxes had increased, reflecting the dire straits of the empire. Also, the tax collectors became increasingly disrespectful and haughty. Their actions alone did little to persuade the Uyghurs to remain loyal to the Qara Khitai. Furthermore, the Idiqut of the Uyghurs was well aware of Chinggis Khan's success in Xi Xia. With Mongol forces posted to the east as well as to the north after the Irtysh and Jam river battles, surely the possibility of Mongol invasion must have lurked in the shadows of the Idiqut's mind. The fact that the Gur Khan's rule became more oppressive nudged the Idiqut to seek a new overlord.

Yet the Uyghurs, Qarluqs and Almaliq were not the only recalcitrant vassals. A larger threat to the Qara Khitai was Khwarazm, which had submitted to Qara Khitai not long after Yelü Dashi, the founder of the empire, defeated the Seljuk Sultan Sanjar at the battle of Qatwan Steppe in 1144. With the protection of the Qara Khitai, the nascent Khwarazmian sultanate expanded at the expense of Seljuk princelings and other potentates in Iran. They also called upon Qara Khitai support against the Ghurid Empire, based in Ghur in modern Afghanistan, as the two rival Muslim powers vied for dominance in Khurasan and influence in Mawarannahr.[35]

Taking advantage of the assassination of the Ghurid leader Shihab al-Din, the Khwarazmshah Sultan Muhammad II moved into Ghurid territories. The Khitans did not oppose his actions, perhaps because he handed them the city of Tirmidh, the entry into Afghanistan from Mawarannahr. Viewing their reluctance to expand deeper into Afghanistan as a sign of weakness, Muhammad began to plot against his overlords. He conspired with local potentates in Mawarannahr to liberate them from their infidel rulers. War began in 1209–1210. Qara Khitai forces then attacked, and indecisive warfare began until the rulers of Bukhara and Samarqand switched sides after securing their positions from the Gur Khan. Despite the betrayal, Muhammad escaped defeat. He quelled a rebellion in his own territories and somehow retained Bukhara. Thus, the two sides came to an uneasy peace in 1210.[36]

Zhilugu's warm welcome allowed Güchülüg to gather his dispersed people. With his position secure, Güchülüg began to conspire against his father-in-law. He found a willing accomplice in Muhammad Khwarazmshah, who also sought to secure Mawarannahr and become fully independent of the Qara Khitans.

GÜCHÜLÜG'S USURPATION

Perhaps the true cause of peace between the Gur Khan and the Khwarazmshah was that Güchülüg raided the imperial treasury while Zhilugu marched on Samarqand to quell a rebellion there in 1210. Zhilugu withdrew from Mawarannahr upon learning of Güchülüg's treachery, and his retreat allowed Muhammad to enter Samarqand as a liberator from Qara Khitai (and Buddhist) tyranny.

Meanwhile, war erupted between Zhilugu and Güchülüg. Both sought support from Muhammad and offered him the same form of compensation – control of Mawarannahr. Muhammad courted both without making too grand gestures and bided his time to see how he could take advantage of the situation. Yet he waited

too long. In 1211, Güchülüg ambushed Zhilugu and captured him. Güchülüg then assumed the throne with Zhilugu reluctantly abdicating.[37] He died in 1213. Despite Güchülüg's usurpation of the throne as Zhilugu's son-in-law, there do not seem to have been any objections by the Qara Khitai elite or Zhilugu's daughter, as the sources provide no evidence of any opposition to Güchülüg's machinations. Furthermore, as Muhammad did little to achieve the overthrow of Zhilugu Gur Khan, Güchülüg, now on the throne, had no inclination to cede Mawarannahr to Muhammad or to honor the Sultan's request for a portion of the Qara Khitai treasury. As a result, the Syr Darya River became a frontier of simmering hostility as both rulers consolidated their rule and acquisitions, knowing that war would erupt. At one point, Güchülüg even challenged Muhammad to single combat. Muhammad did not take the bait but evacuated the frontier to create a buffer zone with his unpredictable neighbor, although his efforts were not completely successful.[38]

Meanwhile, the Mongols, although keen to hunt down former enemy leaders, did not invade Qara Khitai until after 1216. This was a deliberate decision by Chinggis Khan. In 1209, his armies had just concluded major operations against the Merkit as well as in Siberia and against Xi Xia. War against the Jin Empire began in 1211 and would continue with brief hiatuses until 1234. It was during one of these lulls in 1216 that Chinggis Khan dispatched Jebe with troops to end the presence of Güchülüg.[39]

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF QARA KHITAI

Jebe's mission occurred because Güchülüg began to threaten Almaliq, the Qarluqs and the Uyghurs, even killing Buzar, the Qarluq ruler of Almaliq.[40] Despite securing the throne, Güchülüg lacked the ability or at least the vision to rule a state. He increased taxes and permitted his troops to be predatory. Responding to this threat to the vassals of the *Yeke Monggol Ulus*, Jebe passed through Uyghuristan, where he gathered additional troops and served as a reminder of Chinggis Khan's power. He then did the same with the Qarluqs. With his augmented army, Jebe defeated one of Güchülüg's armies in 1218, which then led to other vassals submitting to the Mongols. Güchülüg, perhaps reminded of his previous defeats by the Mongols, then abandoned open engagement and decided that rather than fighting the Mongols and his rebellious subjects, he would evade them – perhaps either hoping to escape to greener pastures or rally his forces. In any case, some of his former subjects joined the Mongols in their manhunt. Güchülüg's efforts failed and he was killed in Badakhshan (northern Afghanistan) by a former vassal.[41]

The vassal, Isma'il, presented Güchülüg's body to Jebe, who then paraded the head across the empire. Many cities only opened their gates after this demonstration, so great was their fear of Güchülüg's rule. Thus, the Mongols were viewed as liberators, especially as Jebe issued an edict that all should practice their own religion and not interfere with those of others – one of Güchülüg's perceived offenses.[42]

THE HOYIN IRGEN REBELLION AND THE END OF THE MERKIT

While the destruction of Güchülüg took place, two other operations were in motion. The first was the quelling of a revolt among the Hoyin Irgen. In 1216, while the

Mongols were occupied against the Jin, rebellion flared up among the Hoyin Irgen against Chinggis Khan's representative in the North, Qorchi. It is suggested that the rebellion was caused by Qorchi's rapacious behavior, which included accumulating women. In January or February of that year, the Qori-Tümeds, led by Botoqui Tarqun, the wife of their former leader Darduqul-Soqor, seized Qorchi. Quduqa Beki of the Oyirad was sent to negotiate Qorchi's release; however, the Qori-Tümed also made him a prisoner.[43]

Chinggis Khan then sent his trusted aide Boroqul to squash the rebellion in 1217–1218. En route, however, the Qori Tümeds ambushed and killed him.[44] Chinggis Khan was greatly angered upon receiving the news of Boroqul's death and almost led the campaign of retribution himself, but calmer heads prevailed. Dörbei Doqshin of the Dörbet was then given a command to pacify the Qori Tümed. In addition, Jochi also marched against the Hoyin Irgen in 1217–1218, specifically to punish the Kirgiz, who failed to contribute troops to Dörbei's army, an open act of rebellion.[45] Thus the northern frontier of the nascent Mongol empire rose in rebellion. With the majority of the Mongolian army engaged in the south against the Jin, failure to quell the Forest People's rebellion threatened the cohesion of the empire.

In August of 1217–1218, Dörbei Doqshin followed the route of Boroqul. He feinted towards the direction of Boroqul's death but then took a different route, requiring his troops to cut a path through the forest.[46] Thus, Dörbei Doqshin surprised the Tümeds along the Oka River (Irkutsk Oblast) and freed the prisoners. In addition to crushing the Tümed rebellion, he also sent Botoqui Tarqun to Chinggis Khan and returned to the emperor in the spring of 1217–1218.[47] Quduqa-Beki received the defeated Botoqui as a reward for his service. Qorchi resumed his position as the *daruqachi* or *tammachi* of the region. Additionally, Jochi quelled the Kirgiz rebellion and restored order in the region.[48]

The rebellion of the Hoyin Irgen is notable, not only as the first major rebellion against the rule of Chinggis Khan but also as a campaign the Mongols fought in unfamiliar terrain outside the steppe. However, it is unclear if they altered their tactics. Other than the brief mention that the Mongols had to cut paths through the forests and surprise the enemy, there is no information on how they fought in the forests. Nonetheless, the fact that they quelled the rebellion does indeed demonstrate that they performed well outside of the steppe.

In addition to this, Sübedei was once again active in the steppes to the west of the Altai. He did not join Jebe but resumed his hunt of the Merkit. A final group, led by Qal-Toqan, who had splintered from the main body after the battle of the Jam River, fled in a different direction from those who found refuge among the Ölberli. They fled into the steppes and took refuge among the Qipchaqs farther west. Sübedei may have been joined by Toquchar in this campaign. It also seems likely that Jochi, having finished with the Kirgiz and with the restoration of order among the Hoyin Irgen, including the reinstatement of Qorchi's authority, was once again on the move towards the southwest.

In any case, the Mongols forced a final battle against the Merkit and destroyed the last group at the Üyük River, which is a small river found between the Itil (Volga) and the Yaik (Ural) Rivers. These Merkit joined the Qipchaq there. In this battle, Jochi and Sübedei destroyed the Merkit as well as soundly defeating the Qipchaq in the region.[49]

CONCLUSIONS

With the defeat of Güchülüg, the Mongols acquired the former domains of the Qara Khitai, with their frontier pushed to roughly the Syr Darya River, thus making the Khwarazmian Empire the Mongols' neighbor. Furthermore, with the push by Jochi and Sübedei to the Yaik River, the whole region north of the Syr Darya was dominated by the Mongols, at least militarily. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the Mongols attempted to assert their control of the region between the Itil and Yaik Rivers. With the war against the Jin Empire still ongoing and rebellions among the Hoyin Irgen combined with the destruction of the "rebel" Naiman and Merkit, Chinggis Khan was not interested in antagonizing any new neighbors. He did, however, seek commercial relationships.

Indeed, trade began between the Mongol Empire and the Khwarazmian Empire in 1215, when a Khwarazmian caravan encountered Chinggis Khan besieging Zhongdu.[50] The Mongols attempted to establish trade relations with the Khwarazmians by sending their own caravan, which largely consisted of Central Asian merchants but was financed by Chinggis Khan as well as members of his family. Unfortunately, the governor of Otrar, a border city north of the Syr Darya, massacred the caravan in what has become known as the Otrar Incident in 1218. Allegedly, the massacre took place because of suspicions of espionage.[51] Undoubtedly, the Mongols had spies in the caravan and extracted intelligence from the merchants about Khwarazm simply by casual questioning. Indeed, Muhammad Khwarazmshah had done the same when the Zhongdu caravan returned.[52] Diplomatic efforts failed, and a livid Chinggis Khan notified the Khwarazmshah that his only recourse was war.

While Beatrice Forbes Manz discusses the conflict in Chapter 11 of this volume, it is an open question as to why Muhammad Khwarazmshah initiated a war. Undoubtedly, he felt threatened by the presence of Jebe in the Ferghana Valley and other Mongol forces commanded by Sübedei and Jochi lurking to the north. Yet we have evidence that the previous battle (whether 1209 or a later date) made him well aware that the Mongols were not to be trifled with – and indeed their relatively quick defeat of Güchülüg and acquisition of Qara Khitai amply proved that. So why would he consent to a massacre, which would surely demand retribution? There are numerous reasons that include avarice and familial ties between the Sultan and the governor of Otrar that precluded an easy solution, but also evidence that suggests that the 1209 date is the correct first encounter between the Mongols and the Khwarazmians. In the years after 1209, Muhammad enjoyed considerable success. Not only did he secure Mawarannahr and fend off some efforts by Güchülüg, but Muhammad finally toppled the Ghurid Empire in Afghanistan in 1215–1216, pushing his borders to the Hindu Kush and perhaps even to the Indus River (the extent of Khwarazmian control in the region is nebulous). Finally, his armies dominated most of Iran and even threatened Baghdad. Indeed, he was called a "Second Alexander". With his military reputation restored, the Qara Khitai and Ghurids (previously the two biggest obstacles to his power) defeated and now the establishment of the most powerful Islamic polity (indeed one of the most powerful polities in the world regardless of faith or culture), one can see his confidence had grown. Thus, it appears that he sought to redeem himself against the Mongols and deal with them on his terms rather than during a random encounter in the steppes.

Unfortunately for him, Muhammad's confidence and pride did not grow into wisdom but hubris, leading to a war that would eradicate his nascent empire from the face of the earth.

NOTES

1 Biran 2005, 46 & 64–65.
2 De Rachewiltz 2004, 721.
3 *SHM*, §196, 197; De Rachewiltz 2004, 723–725; *RDT2*, 144; RDRM, 419.
4 *SHM*, §197; *RDT2*, 143; RDRM, 418–419.
5 *SHM*, §198; *RDT2*, 144; RDRM, 419.
6 *SHM*, §198; *RDT2*, 144; RDRM, 419.
7 *RDT2*, 144; RDRM, 421.
8 May 2021, 973, Kindle.
9 Allsen 1983, 10.
10 *RDT2*, 144; RDRM, 421.
11 *SHM*, §239; *SWQZL*, 39–40; RDRM, 422–423; *RDT2*, 144–145.
12 *RDT2*, 143; RDRM, 416.
13 *RDT2*, 145; RDRM, 422–423.
14 *SHM*, §198; RDRM, 422–424; *RDT2*, 145; RDK, 427; RDT, 289.
15 See Barthold 2012; Buell 1992; Atwood 2017.
16 Barthold 2012, 361–362. Also see p. 362, fn 2 on the location of the battle site; Atwood 2017, 38–40. Atwood identifies the river as the modern Zhen or Emba River. According to Atwood, the Uyghurs did not participate in this battle.
17 *SWQZL*, 38–39; Allsen 1983, 8.
18 Golden 1992, 278; Golden 1986.
19 *SHM*, §199; *SWQZL*, 40 & 49–50. According to the *SHM*, in 1205, Chinggis Khan sent Sübedei with the iron cart after Qudu and Chila'un. Chinggis Khan ordered him to pursue them relentlessly. Buell 1992, 9–11 provides a detailed full discussion of Sübedei's legendary Iron Cart Campaign and the problem with its dates.
20 *SHM*, §236; 43; *SWQZL*, 40; Juvayni 1912, 51–52; *HWC*, 69.
21 See the corresponding arguments in Buell 1992; Atwood 2017.
22 *TN*, II, 149; *TNR*, II, 1096–1097.
23 *HWC*, 357–358; Juvayni 1916, 89–90.
24 Juvayni 1912, 51–52, Juvayni 1916, 101–104; *HWC*, 69–70, 370–372; Nasawi, 44–45; Nesawi, 18–19.
25 Juvayni 1912, 51–52, Juvayni 1916, 101–104; *HWC*, 69–70, 370–372; Nasawi, 44–45; Nesawi, 18–19.
26 RDRM, 441; RDK, 320; RDT, 213; *RDT2*, 151; *SWQZL*, 49–50.
27 *SHM*, §207.
28 *SHM*, §207.
29 *SHM*, §207; De Rachewiltz 1997, 118. The verb in section 207, which discusses Qorchi's initial assignment, indicates that he was probably a *daruqachi*, but the actual position title is never mentioned.
30 See Buell 1980; May 2016, and May 2015 for more on the *tamma*.
31 *SWQZL*: 40–41; RDK: 320; RDT: 213; *RDT2*, 145–146; RDRM, 423–425.
32 RDT, 162; RDK, 461; *RDT2*, 161–162; RDRM, 460–461.
33 *SWQZL*, 40–41; RDRM, 440–441; RDK, 320; RDT, 213; *RDT2*, 150–151. For the title Idiqut see Brose 2007, 68–70.
34 SHM, §235; RDT, 213; RDK, 320; *RDT2*, 150–151; RDRM, 440–441; *SWQZL*, 40–41.

35 Biran 2005, 60–63, 65–70; Barthold 1992, 336–360.
36 Biran 2005, 70–74.
37 *HWC*, 63–64, 360–361; Juvayni 1912, 46–48; Juvayni 1916, 92–93.
38 Biran 2005, 82–83.
39 *SWQZL*, 50; *SHM*, §237.
40 Juvayni 1912, 56–58; *HWC*, 74–76.
41 *HWC*, 68; Juvayni 1912, 50.
42 *HWC*, 66–67; Juvayni 1912, 50; Biran 2005, 194–196.
43 *SHM*, §241. At the 1206 *quriltai*, Qorchi received the northern regions of Chinggis Khan's realm to govern for his past loyalty and actions. As part of this, he was promised that he could gather thirty wives from amongst his subjects. Quduqa Beki went, as he knew their customs and would be a better negotiator than a Mongol from the steppes.
44 *SHM*, §240.
45 RDRM, 575; RDK, 429–430; RDT, 290–291; *RDT2*, 198.
46 *SHM*, §240. He ordered his men to take axes, adzes, saws and chisels in addition to their weapons. The *Secret History of the Mongols* mentions that Dörbei followed the path of the Red Bull or *hula'an buqa*, thus indicating that Dörbei traveled through the forests as only the animals traveled, not as would an army.
47 *SHM*, §240.
48 RDRM, 575; *RDT2*, 198.
49 Atwood 2017, 43.
50 *TNR*, II, 966; *TN*, II, 103.
51 *HWC*, 79–81; Juvayni 1912, 61–62; *TNR*, I, 272, II, 966–667; *TN*, I, 311; *TN*, II, 103–104; Nasawi, 86–87; Nesawi, 57–58.
52 *TN*, II, 650; *TNR*, II, 963–965.

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HWC, See List of Abbreviations.

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Nasawi, See List of Abbreviations.

Nesawi, See List of Abbreviations.

RDK, See List of Abbreviations.

RDRM, See List of Abbreviations.

RDT, See List of Abbreviations.

RDT2, See List of Abbreviations.

SHM, See List of Abbreviations.

SWQZL, See List of Abbreviations.

TN, See List of Abbreviations.

TNR, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONQUEST OF THE DASHT-I QIPCHAQ

Timothy May

Although the Mongols entered the Qipchaq Steppe, or Dasht-i Qipchaq, as it was known in the Persian sources, in pursuit of the Merkit after the Battle of the Irtysh River (1208), their conquest of the region did not truly begin until 1218–1219 in connection with the Khwarazmian campaign. The Qipchaq Steppes included not only the steppes between the Irtysh River and the Yaik (Ural River), but the entirety of the Caspian and Pontic Steppes, thus encompassing a region that stretched from the Altai Mountains to the Carpathian Mountains. It gained its name from the predominant nomadic group, the Qipchaqs. Qipchaq is a Turkic ethnonym that applied to several confederations in the region that shared language and culture but not political unity, as they failed to coalesce into an empire. The Qipchaqs were also known as the Cumans/Qumans (Latin) or Polovtsy (Church Slavonic), as well as other derivatives. The variety of names reflects the various terminologies used by the societies that interacted with them, such as the Rus' principalities, Hungary, Georgia, and the Khwarazmshahs, but also the fact that steppe nomadic confederations tended to include a variety of ethno-lingual groups as well as subgroups. Due to this diversity, the leadership of a particular group could change, with the primary identity stemming from the dominant clan at the time.[1]

Their dominance began in the late eleventh century as the Qipchaqs began to exit southern Siberia as part of the Kimek confederation. Their emergence from southern Siberia pushed the Pechenegs and Oghuz west and also contributed to the latter's move into the Middle East (most notably as the Seljuk Turks). Despite being one identity (group), the Qipchaqs never unified into a coherent state. Instead, the Qipchaqs existed as three to five independent confederations spread across the Dasht-i Qipchaq. At the most basic division, there was the Quman confederation in the Pontic Steppes (the western portion of the Dasht-i Qipchaq), the Qipchaq-Qangli in the region between the Yaik (Ural) and Syr Darya Rivers, and the Qipchaqs of Western Siberia (closer to the Irtysh).[2] This grouping does not appear to have been permanent, and by the thirteenth century, scholars believe that the Qipchaqs developed into five separate confederations located in the steppes of Kazakhstan,

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the Volga-Ural region, the North Caucasian Steppes, and then the Don, Donets, Dnieper, and Danube River region (where one or two different confederations may have existed).[3]

INITIAL ENCOUNTERS

It is clear that the Mongols' first forays into the steppes were not intended as conquests but rather to suppress and capture rebels – namely, those Naiman and Merkit who fled after the Mongol victory at Chakirma'ut and had yet to submit to Chinggis Khan. This failure to yield to Chinggis Khan was not the key issue. Nomads had for centuries fled west from the steppes of Mongolia due to power fluctuations. Rather, for Chinggis Khan, the continued existence of viable aristocratic lineages that could challenge his own legitimacy or, rather, offer alternatives to his rule could only be viewed as a threat. In some ways, the situation was reminiscent of the Gök Turks' attitude to the Avars, the remnants of the Rouran, whom the Turks defeated to assume power in Mongolia in 552–555.[4]

While the Naiman prince, Güchülüg, fled to the territories of Qara Khitai, a logical destination for the Naiman considering their long ties with the empire, and rallied his people there, the Merkit had fewer options. With no other recourse but to flee west, the Merkit finally reached the steppes north of the Aral Sea and the Caspian region. Here they sought and received refuge from the Qangli.[5]

In 1209, Sübedei's army tracked down the Merkit. Reinforced by Jochi, who had been subduing various members of the Hoyin Irgen in Siberia, Sübedei requested that the Ölberli, the leading lineage among the Qangli, remit the Merkit to them, as the latter had escaped. The Ölberli refused and thus a battle began, resulting with the destruction of the Ölberli and the Merkit refugees.[6] The fact that Sübedei and Jochi sought the extradition of the Merkit and not the submission of the Qangli demonstrates that this foray was not one of conquest. This interpretation is confirmed when withdrawing Mongols later encountered Muhammad Khwarazmshah and his army.

The Khwarazmians had entered the steppes to punish Qipchaq or Qangli raiders. Despite the Qangli nomads comprising a significant portion of the Khwarazmian military due to Sultan Muhammad's mother being a Qangli princess, Sultan Muhammad II Khwarazmshah still had his share of problems with nomadic raiders on his frontiers.[7] These may have been Ölberli, other Qipchaqs, or perhaps even the Merkit, who may have pillaged the Khwarazmian frontier in their flight from the Mongols. Muhammad entered the steppes to punish the Ölberli for their raids. When his scouts found the carnage of the battlefield from the Mongol victory, Muhammad set off in pursuit to discover who perpetrated such a deed.

Slowed by their prisoners and booty, which undoubtedly included significant numbers of livestock such as slow-moving sheep, the Mongols left an easy trail to follow. Before long, the Khwarazmians caught up with them. Rather than engaging in battle, Sübedei and Jochi sent envoys to the Sultan informing him that they did not want to fight with him. Indeed, they had received orders form Chinggis Khan to perform their mission and not engage with other powers, specifically the Khwarazmian Empire.[8] Their sole mission was to deal with the Merkit, and the envoys explained that they merely sought to return to Mongolia unimpeded.

Muhammad Khwarazmshah, however, had other plans. Perhaps enticed by the loot that the Mongols gained, Muhammad sought to engage them in battle. The Mongols obliged and fulfilled Muhammad's wish, yet it did not play out as he anticipated. Despite having a numerical advantage, the Khwarazmians found themselves hard pressed by the Mongols. As night fell, the two weary armies retired to their respective camps with the unspoken promise of battle the following day. As dawn broke, the Khwarazmian forces awoke to find that their mysterious opponents had disappeared. The Mongols had withdrawn under the cover of night. The Khwarazmshah, shaken by the ferocity of the Mongols, chose not to pursue.[9]

As they had indicated, the Mongols had no desire to fight Muhammad. Sübedei and Jochi had completed their mission and simply wished to return to Mongolia. As this was not an operation to conquer the region, the Mongols did not seek battle with opponents other than the Merkit. They could engage those who sheltered their enemies as well as defend themselves, but as they had nothing further to gain by staying in the region, the Mongols pragmatically exited when the opportunity arose.

ACQUISITION OF THE EASTERN DASHT-I QIPCHAQ

Bolstering the view that the Mongols did not seek conquest in their hunt for the Merkit is the fact that, although they entered the Dasht-i Qipchaq in 1208–1209, Chinggis Khan demonstrated little interest in the region afterwards. The Mongols did, however, accept the submission of the Qarluqs who occupied the cities of Almaliq and Beshbaliq, as well as the region of the Ili River basin.[10] After Güchülüg usurped the throne of Qara Khitai and consolidated his power, he sought to bring the Qarluqs and perhaps the Uighurs back into the orbit of the empire. His attacks on the Qarluqs attracted the attention of Chinggis Khan, who dispatched the general Jebe in 1216 to deal with the situation. Additionally, intelligence regarding other Merkit survivors reached the Mongols, which led to Sübedei leading another army into the Dasht-i Qipchaq. Once again, Jochi joined Sübedei after dealing with rebellious Kirgiz in the Yenisei basin in Siberia.[11] In this offensive, Jochi and Sübedei engaged the Merkit and the Qipchaq confederation at the Üyük River, located between the Volga and Ural Rivers. Again, Sübedei did not linger to seize control of the region, but with the conquest of Qara Khitai, the Mongols pushed their frontier to the Syr Darya and largely dominated the steppe between Lake Balkhash and the Yaik (Ural River) by *de facto*.

Their control of the eastern portion of the Dasht-i Qipchaq became *de jure* during the Khwarazmian War (1219–1224). With the conquest of Qara Khitai in 1216, the Mongols now bordered the Khwarazmian Empire. Despite lingering ideas that Chinggis Khan sought to conquer the world, he actually sought to avoid unnecessary hostilities with Khwarazm and to develop a commercial relationship with the Central Asian empire. Nonetheless, in 1218 Muhammad Khwarazmshah sanctioned the massacre of a Mongol-sponsored caravan.[12]

While also at war with the Jin Empire, Chinggis Khan prioritized the punishment of the Khwarazmian Empire. While Mawarannahr suffered the wrath of Chinggis Khan, the Qangli also attracted the Mongols' gaze. As mentioned earlier, the Qangli often served in the Khwarazmian military due to the dynasty's marriage ties with them.[13] With the looming war, the Mongols sought to prevent the Khwarazmians

from procuring additional troops from the Qangli, which would be necessary not only for the defense of the Khwarazmian realm but also for a Khwarazmian counter-offensive.

The effort to prevent steppe elements from aiding the Khwarazmians was carried out by Jochi. While Chaghadai and Ögödei attacked Otrar, Jochi led armies along the Syr Darya. Jochi marched west, capturing towns on both sides of the river, including Sighnaq, Özkend, Barjligh-Kent, Ashnas, and Jand.[14] These frontier towns served as not only trading centers but also staging points from whence the Khwarazmshah made forays against the nomads.[15] Furthermore, Sighnaq had been the urban center of the Qangli in the twelfth century and probably still served as their major point of commercial contact with the sedentary world, and, consequently, as a communications conduit between the Sultan and the steppe.[16]

While Jochi led his army northwest along the Syr Darya, another army commanded by several *noyans* (Alaq Noyan, Sögedü, and Taqai) marched southeast up the Syr Darya. At Fanakat, they found a Qangli army that offered stiff resistance for three days.[17] While they successfully captured Fanakat, the performance of the Qangli troops stationed in the area demonstrated that they were a formidable enemy, hence why the Mongols sought to eliminate them from Khwarazmian service. The determined resistance of the Qangli at the Mongol siege of Samarqand (1221) only reinforced this perception.[18]

From Sighnaq, Jochi led his forces to Urgench (Gurganch) in Khwarazm, where he was joined by Chaghadai and Ögödei. The three successfully captured the city, but whereas Chaghadai and Ögödei then proceeded to join their father in present-day Afghanistan, Jochi marched north to the Aral Steppes (1221–1222). Allsen indicates Jochi sought to subdue not only the Qangli, but also the Saqsin, Suqlav, and Bulghars.[19] While he undoubtedly instigated operations against the Qanglis and others (perhaps any other group in the region), there is little evidence to support the claim that he threatened Bulghar on the Volga River. It is certain, however, that he did assume control of the region north of the Aral Sea, as when the Mongols withdrew the majority of their army from Mawarannahr. With the completion of the Khwarazmian campaign, Chinggis Khan ordered Jochi to set out from the Dasht-i-Qipchaq "driving the game in front of him (which for the most part was wild asses)". The game that Jochi drove was used to provision the army.[20] The fact that he could perform a *nerge* or circle hunt also demonstrates that the area was no longer hostile, as, in order to perform this hunt, the Mongol forces would have been extended over miles of territory and quite vulnerable to a sudden attack. His presence also prevented additional Qangli and Qipchaqs from aiding the Khwarazmians or coalescing into a unified resistance. According to Baybars al-Mansuri, Jochi proved adept at manipulating clan and tribal rivalries among the tribes of the Dasht-i Qipchaq.[21] It is likely that his father then tasked Jochi with bringing all of the steppes east of the Yaik (Ural) under Mongol authority, as he was still in the region in 1224 when the reconnaissance in force commanded by Sübedei and Jebe returned. Jochi also appears to have died there (1225).[22]

While some sources criticize Jochi's actions in the region, saying that he remained in the steppes and spent most of his time on the hunt, these sources miss or distort Jochi's purpose. He did indeed hunt, but his prey included the Qangli as well as other tribes. By using the *nerge*, a hunting circle that extended for miles, Jochi not only

drove game but also flushed out any resistance. Furthermore, his hunting expeditions served as cover for scouting and intelligence-gathering, particularly as the Mongols reached the Yaik River and entered the Caspian Steppes. Finally, hunting kept Jochi in the region so that his forces could assist another operation if need be.

RECONNAISSANCE IN THE PONTIC STEPPES

While Jochi left Urgench for the Aral Steppes, Sübedei and Jebe hunted Muhammad Khwarazmshah as he abandoned Mawarannahr to the Mongols. Although the Khwarazmshah eventually died on an island in the Caspian in a desperate gambit to elude the Mongols, Sübedei and Jebe continued west rather than rejoining Chinggis Khan. With the Mongol ruler's permission, they performed a reconnaissance to learn more about the western world that they had so recently entered.[23] They battled their way through Georgia, another state that frequently employed Qipchaq mercenaries (1222). Then, on the northern side of the Caucasus Mountains, they found their path impeded by an alliance of As (Alans) and Qipchaq nomads. The Mongols successfully split the alliance by appealing to the shared culture and customs of the Mongols and Qipchaqs (Turks) while pointing out the alien qualities of the As (Iranian) nomads. The Mongols provided the Qipchaqs with money and other goods as incentive to not aid the As, whom the Mongols then destroyed.[24]

Having divided the two, the Mongols defeated the As and then turned on the Qipchaqs. The Qipchaqs broke and fled, some seeking shelter and assistance from their allies among the Southern Rus' and some moving into Transcaucasia and even the Sultanate of Rum.[25] The Mongols stayed in the region, presumably on the steppes between the Black Sea and the Caspian, to rest, finding the pasturage ideal. They also sent forays out, sacking the port of Sudaq in Crimea, which was a city the Qipchaqs ruled or received tribute from, causing further flight by Qipchaqs and others.[26] The sack of this city had far-reaching consequences that will be discussed later. Those who fled to the Rus' sought their aid, which eventually led to the battle of the Kalka River in 1223, from which the Mongols emerged victorious, albeit with the possible loss of Jebe.[27] A few reports, however, viewed the Mongols as being defeated by the Rus' and repelled by Qipchaqs.[28] Despite having a battle-hardened army of veterans, Sübedei found no respite as his passage across the Caspian Steppes was contested by other Qipchaqs as well as the Bulghars and other groups at the Volga River.[29] Indeed, Sübedei's crossing of the steppes and then the Volga and Yaik was as fraught with peril as the journey of Xenophon's Ten Thousand. It should be noted, however, that unlike Xenophon's Greeks, the Mongols did not simply seek safe passage, but they also attempted to acquire the submission of some groups in the region, such as the Saqsin and the Bortas.[30] Indeed, the Bulghars' hostile actions may have been triggered by Mongol efforts to strip away tributary polities as well as the disruption of the trade route to Sudaq.[31] Regardless of the cause, the last stage of their journey was hard-pressed as the Bulghars and others, having learned the folly of fighting the Mongols directly, engaged in guerilla warfare. Indeed, Ibn al-Athir records that the Mongols even fell for feigned retreats, perhaps a sign of over-confidence from their numerous victories on this campaign.[32] The Bulghars were undoubtedly aided by others including Qipchaqs, as it appears that the Mongols' route was near the city of Saqsin on the lower Volga, forty days' march south of Bulghar.[33] Fortunately, Jochi's



Map 8.1 The Mongol Empire at the time of Chinggis Khan's death (1227)
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

presence on the eastern bank of the Yaik River ensured that Sübedei's army reached a safe haven in 1224.[34] Shortly after his rendezvous with Jochi, Sübedei requested permission to form an army of the recently conquered (including Qipchaqs, Qanglis, Naiman, and Merkit) as a *tamma* to conquer the Dasht-i Qipchaq. Chinggis Khan agreed to the proposal. Although Sübedei began to form the army, a rebellion in Xi Xia delayed the execution of his scheme.[35]

EARLY OPERATIONS IN THE VOLGA-YAIK

Although Sübedei continued east to report to Chinggis Khan, Jochi remained in the Aral Steppes until his death in 1225. His death undoubtedly stalled further expansion across the Yaik River. Even so, the Mongol presence east of the Yaik placed those on the western bank on notice, and there was considerable defensive activity by the Bulghars, Bashkirs, Mordvins, and the Qipchaq confederation of the Volga region. Indeed, there formed a coalition of groups to resist further Mongol expansion. Favereau posits that Bachman, the Qipchaq Khan in the Volga region, was the leader.[36] While there is insufficient evidence to confirm this, it is credible, as the Mongol threat was real and imminent, and Bachman Khan's later actions demonstrate his ability to lead such a movement. Regardless, Bachman did actively resist the Mongols in this period, but it is uncertain if he initiated the resistance or simply became a leader due to his success.[37] Between Sübedei's western ventures and the Jochid presence across the Yaik, the nomads of the Dasht-i Qipchaq were under pressure. Furthermore, the Mongol expansion hurt the Bulghars economically, which also affected the Qipchaqs. Not only did the Mongols' domination of Siberian tribes east of the Yaik impinge upon the Bulghars' control of the fur trade, but the reduction of Urgench, at least temporarily, removed a key market for the fur trade that fueled Bulghar commerce, from which the Qipchaqs also benefited via the caravan routes.[38]

Indeed, the Mongol invasion curtailed the Bulghars' economic capability, not only through the destruction of the Khwarazmian Empire, but also through their acquisition of territory and people east of the Yaik River. While the Mongols were always willing to engage in trade, the Bulghars could no longer gather tribute in pelts from these Siberian groups. Thus, the trade routes to the west, to the Pontic port of Sudaq, became more important, as well as their ties to the Qipchaqs in the west, whose acquiescence was necessary for any caravan traversing the steppes from the Volga to the Black Sea. The Bulghars had established trade connections in Sudaq in the twelfth century in response to the decline of routes and markets following the fall of the Saljuqs as well as the establishment of Qara Khitai.[39] Thus, Sübedei and Jebe's sack of Sudaq only a few years after the destruction of Urgench and other Khwarazmian cities undoubtedly dealt a heavy blow to the Bulghars' economy and influence. Indeed, Janet Martin stated that, "With the arrival of the Mongols even this much reduced fur trade network [Sudaq] disappeared".[40]

Despite the lull in Mongol operations in the west between 1225 (Jochi's death) and 1229 (Ögödei's ascension to the throne), Sübedei had not forgotten the Yaik frontier. After the reduction of Xi Xia, he received permission to form an army on the western frontier. The death of Chinggis Khan in 1227 delayed this campaign, but after Ögödei came to the throne, Sübedei's plans took shape.[41]

He returned to the Yaik and engaged in some skirmishes. Yet before he could begin major operations, he was recalled to Mongolia to take part in the final reduction of the Jin Empire. Still, the *tamma* that Sübedei stationed along the Yaik remained there, either commanded or reinforced by Köketei and Sönitei, who were dispatched there shortly after Ögödei's ascension to the throne. Their offensives against the Qipchaqs and Saqsin caused the latter to flee to the Bulghars.[42] Additionally, the Mongols forced the Bulghars to abandon their forts on the western banks of the Yaik by 1229.

With these advances, the Bulghars then attempted to forge an alliance with the Rus' of Vladimir-Suzdal, their western neighbor and often rival. The northern Rus' appeared oblivious to the Mongol threat, despite the massive defeat of the southern princes at the Kalka River. Regardless, the Bulghars continued their coalition with the Qipchaqs and others in the Volga Region.[43] Soon, however, Jochi's son, Berke, crossed the Yaik with reinforcements and occupied the region between the Yaik and the Volga, shattering the Volga coalition.[44] Some of the defeated joined the Mongols, both willingly and unwillingly. Furthermore, the defeat and loss of pasture also made continued resistance unsustainable for some nomads, forcing them to relocate farther west.

THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN

Despite the Mongols' hold over the steppes east of the Volga River, the Qipchaqs and Bulghars received some respite as Berke consolidated his control over the territory between the Yaik and Volga Rivers rather than continuing his push westward. This period of calm was short-lived. With the defeat of the Jin in 1234, a *quriltai* led to the planning of another western campaign with the specific intent of bringing the Dasht-i Qipchaq under Mongol dominion.[45] While the conquest of the Rus' and the subsequent invasion of Central Europe has received the lion's share of attention, the reduction of the Dasht-i Qipchaq was the primary focus of the Mongols. The Mongols certainly directed their armies against the Rus, but the Qipchaqs and other steppe groups were of considerably more importance. Not only were the Qipchaqs a formidable opponent, accustomed to fighting in much the same manner as the Mongols, but also, being nomads, they had a better understanding of steppe warfare tactics and strategies. Furthermore, they often served as mercenaries or allies for many of the sedentary states bordering the Dasht-i Qipchaq. By neutralizing them, the Mongols also eroded the military capabilities of these sedentary states as well. Of particular importance was the destruction of Bachman, leader of the Qipchaq confederation in the lower Volga region. Indeed, despite the Mongol successes west of the Yaik, they had failed to dislodge Bachman Khan and indeed, he appears to have successfully fended off Mongol probes. Continued success could have led to the resurgence of another anti-Mongol coalition.[46] To this end, after the quriltai that authorized the Western Campaign, Sübedei led an army west comprised of numerous princes and their troops. As the war would also expand the ulus of the Jochids, the heirs of Jochi figured prominently in the campaign.

In February 1236, a grand army drawn from the forces of the Chinggisid family assembled between the Itil and Yaik Rivers, joining the forces of the Jochid princes Batu, Orda, and Shiban. Although the campaign was touted as one to expand the

Jochid domains with Batu holding command, Sübedei wielded true operational command, and one can sense he viewed it as an effort to bring the whole of the Dasht-i Qipchaq under Mongol control.[47] Indeed, the conquest not only fit the idea of Heaven's Will (for the Mongols to rule the world), but also secured valuable nomadic troops for their armies as well as securing pastures, always necessary for the expansion of the flocks and herds of the nomads who formed the core of the Mongol military.

Sübedei sent the main body of the army with Batu, Shiban, and Boroldai against the city of Bulghar as well as the Bashkirs on the Volga River. The city of Bulghar continued to prove resilient in the face of Mongol invasion but ultimately succumbed after Batu stormed it in 1236 with great slaughter. Bulghar, as well as its sister cities of Suvar and Bilar, suffered severe damage.[48] Both the Bulghars and Bashkirs succumbed to the Mongols. With these victories, contingents then split off from the main force to mop up resistance from any neighboring tribes or other polities. Meanwhile Orda marched with one such force and attacked the Mordvin tribes known as the Bartas and Baqshi.[49]

With one Mongol force attacking Bulghar and the northern tribes, Sübedei led another force against the tribes of the southern Volga. His primary target was Bachman Khan, the leader of the Qipchaq confederation of the Caspian Steppes. As indicated earlier, Bachman had led resistance to the Mongols' expansion across the Yaik River but also attacked Sübedei's army when it returned from his reconnaissance in force in 1224.

The attack on Bulghar also assisted in isolating Bachman. Using a *nerge*, the Mongols pushed the Qipchaqs before them as they drove south and constricted their movements, preventing them fleeing west. Isolated, Bachman fled to an island near the mouth of the Volga River. The Mongols were able to access the island and captured him. They resorted to using boats and waiting for low water to reach the island, probably due to their inexperience with crossing deep and wide rivers. Möngke, the son of Tolui and the future Qa'an, led the operation against Bachman Khan, who was executed by Möngke's half-brother Böchek.[50] By 1237, all resistance to the Mongols on either side of the Volga River had been eliminated. The Mongols then paused their campaign to rest as well as to divide the region into zones of administration.

Batu, the leader of the Jochids, assigned the front from the Aral Sea to the Irtysh to his elder brother Orda, with the western border being the Sari Su River and the southern border formed by the Talas and Qari Su Rivers. Shiban meanwhile received the pastures around the Yaik River and Ural Mountains. The northern borders remained ill-defined. There is evidence that the Jochids stretched their authority to the Arctic Sea, although they did not commit significant resources to that end at the time. The sparsely inhabited taiga and tundra of Siberia could wait until other more potent threats had been eliminated.[51]

With the Qipchaqs of the Caspian Steppes crushed, the Mongols now pushed west. Most of the Mongol forces marched against the Rus', but Mongol groups did remain in the steppes organizing the recently subdued Qipchaqs into functioning military units. These then reinforced the Mongols in 1238 when the conquest of the Pontic Steppes began, including the region between the Caspian and Black Seas. In this region, Möngke, Qadan, and Güyük all marched along with other princes

against the Alans and Circassians. Meanwhile, Berke operated in the steppes north of the Crimean peninsula. Shiban, Büri, and Böchek subdued Crimea.[52] As with Sübedei's western reconnaissance, this invasion set off another round of mass migrations to escape the Mongol onslaught. Although many of the Qipchaqs fled to Hungary under Köten Khan, the same Qipchaq khan who fought the Mongols at the Kalka River, Berke was successful in subduing those who remained. Indeed, the defeat and conquest of the Qipchaqs created a glut of slaves in the Genoese slave markets in Kaffa and other cities in the Crimean peninsula.

While Qadan b. Ögödei marched against the Cherkes or Circassians, Möngke led the operations against the Alans, although Rashid al-Din indicates he also captured the Circassian leader Tuqfas while assisting Qadan.[53] In the early phases, Möngke focused on isolating the Alan communities and subduing them one by one. These were then enlisted into the Mongol army to assist with the conquest. The Alans included both nomadic and sedentary elements. The Alan capital of Magas proved quite formidable, and armies under Güyük, Büri, and Qadan converged on the city. Another commander named Baqadai was sent to raze the fortifications of Derbend. It should be kept in mind that these operations were coordinated with Chormaqan's conquests of Armenia and Georgia, thus preventing military aid or escape routes for anyone.[54]

As with other conquests, those who submitted voluntarily remained in their positions, while those who resisted were crushed. Despite their successes, the Mongols never fully conquered the mountainous region. Even in 1242, some resistance continued in the steppes between the Caspian and Black Seas. Shinqor b. Jochi and Köten had to suppress this rebellion. It is unclear if this Köten was the son of Ögödei Qa'an. These Qipchaqs apparently chose to rebel while the main Mongol forces were still in Central Europe. While the Mongols defeated them, they dispatched another army under Ila'udar to pursue those who escaped the battle as they fled towards Derbend and the Caucasus Mountains.[55] Undoubtedly, these Qipchaqs, Alans, and Circassians, as well as others, are those whom William of Rubruck references as causing trouble in this region in the 1250s.[56] This rebellion, which is only mentioned in passing, nonetheless shows that resistance against Mongol authority continued in the steppes, and also that the Mongols left forces to deal with such situations and did not simply send all of their forces into Central Europe. The region gradually came under increased Mongol control, particularly in the 1260s, when the Caucasus became a contested zone due to the conflict between the Toluid Ilkhans and the Jochids.

The Mongols were not quite finished with the Qipchaqs yet. Those who nomadized between the Don and the Danube took flight west. The first wave arrived in 1237 and crossed the Danube into the kingdom of Bulgaria. While King Ivan Asen II (r. 1218–1241) had controlled previous Qipchaq incursions, the fear of the Mongols served as a powerful motivator for the Qipchaqs. Not only did they overwhelm the Bulgarians, but they then continued their flight until reaching Thrace.[57]

A large wave of refugees arrived in Hungary in 1241. These (allegedly 40,000 Qipchaqs) were led by Köten Khan, the very same Qipchaq leader who lost to the Mongols at the Kalka River.[58] While the Hungarian King Bela IV (r. 1235–1270) had plans for the Qipchaqs to augment his forces against the Mongols, many of his vassals did not trust them. Indeed, many of them viewed the Qipchaqs as a Mongol

vanguard.[59] The Qipchaqs' behavior, which was often destructive, did not help matters. As the Mongols began their invasion, distrust increased. Hungarian barons executed Köten, believing him to be in league with the Mongols. In retaliation and undoubtedly fearful of the Mongols, the Qipchaqs then pillaged and plundered their way through Hungary.[60] They fought through the frontier defenses and then entered Bulgaria. While some settled, others continued their flight through the Balkans to escape the Mongols.[61]

As a veteran of battles against the Mongols, Köten was unlikely to be their confederate. Still, the suspicion of the Qipchaqs made the fears of the Hungarian nobility a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead of providing additional soldiers, the Qipchaqs became a destructive force across Hungary. Thus, they ultimately weakened the kingdom. Additionally, the two waves of Qipchaqs entering Bulgaria did similar destruction, leaving it vulnerable to eventual Mongol attack.

CONCLUSION

The Mongol conquest of the Dasht-i Qipchaq had great ramifications. It considerably expanded their empire not only in terms of territory, but also in resources. This included not only material resources, but perhaps most importantly humans and animals. By conquering the Qipchaqs, the Mongols acquired their pastures and livestock, including the horse – the most important and crucial aspect of Mongol warfare. Additionally, the Qipchaq were incorporated into the Mongol military. While travelers such as Plano Carpini's party and William of Rubruck often described areas where the Qipchaqs formerly dwelt, in truth they still dwelled there, but now as Mongols.[62] Still, other observers more familiar with the pre-Mongol Dasht-i Qipchaq well understood that the Mongols capitalized on the Qipchaq manpower to reinforce their troops. Indeed, Thomas of Split insinuated that they conquered the Qipchaqs for that very purpose.[63]

Accounts of the conquest of the Dasht-i Qipchaq seem muddled and out of order in virtually all of the sources. Yet, while muddled, they may not be as confused as they seem. Several sources state that Güyük attacked various parties on his return to Ögödei after being recalled. While it is tempting to believe that the Mongols subdued the region, one must also consider the possibility that after the Mongol army moved farther west, some groups continued to resist or at least felt that the threat was over, much like after the Battle of the Kalka River. Thus, as Mongol troops returned east, they also engaged in suppression operations.

Despite the conquest and destruction of the region, the Mongols never eradicated the Qipchaqs, Alans, or any other group. Indeed, the Qipchaqs continued to be a large presence in what became the Jochid Ulus. The Qipchaq dialect became the lingua franca of the region even as other dialects like Bulghar died out. While the Mongols conquered the Dasht-i Qipchaq and Mongolian was used in the Jochid court due to its prestige, the wide use of Qipchaq served as the basis from which many modern Turkic languages in the region of the Dasht-i Qipchaq stem.[64]

NOTES

1 Lindner 1982, 701.
2 Golden 1992, 278.

3 Golden 1992, 278.
4 Pohl 2018, 36–38.
5 *SWQZL*, 38–39; Allsen 1983, 8.
6 *SHM* §236; 43; *SWQZL*, 40; Juvayni 1912, 51–52; *HWC*, 69.
7 *TN*, 149; *TNR*, 1096–1097; Golden 1992, 280.
8 Juvayni 1912, 51–52, Juvayni 1916, 101–104; *HWC*, 69–70, 370–372; Nasawi, 44–45; Nesawi, 18–19.
9 Juvayni 1912, 51–52, Juvayni 1916, 101–104; *HWC*, 69–70, 370–372; Nasawi, 44–45; Nesawi, 18–19.
10 *SWQZL*, 40–41; RDK, 320; RDT, 213; RDRM, 423–425; *RDT2*, 145–146; Golden 1992, 199.
11 RDRM, 575; *RDT2*, 198.
12 *HWC*, 79–81; Juvayni 1912, 61–62; *TNR*, 272, 966–967; *TN*, 103–104, 311; Nasawi, 86–87; Nesawi, 57–58.
13 Golden 1992, 280; *HWC*, 91, 121, 465; Juvayni 1912, 70, 95; Juvayni 1916, 198.
14 *HWC*, 83–90; Juvayni 1912, 65–70.
15 *HWC*, 304–305, 309, 349–350, 370; Juvayni 1916, 34–35, 40, 82, 101–102.
16 Golden 1992, 278.
17 *HWC*, 91; Juvayni 1912, 70.
18 *HWC*, 119–121; Juvayni 1912, 93–95.
19 Allsen 1983, 12–13.
20 *HWC*, 139–140; Juvayni 1912, 110–111.
21 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 4–5.
22 *HWC*, 149; Juvayni 1912, 116; *TNR*, 1101; *TN*, 71; *TR*, 62–63.
23 *TN*, 369, 653; *TNR*, 277, 987–989; Nasawi, 101–102; RDK, 365; RDT, 249; RDRM, 505, 531, 534; *RDT2*, 176, 184–185.
24 RDK, 362; RDT, 248; *KFT*, 385–386; *KFTR*, 222. al-Hadid 1963, 78; al-Nuwayri 1975, 321.
25 *KFT*, 386; *KFTR*, 222–223; Tsepkov 2001, 495–497; Tsepkov 2000, 98–99; Zenkovsky 1984, 194–195; al-Nuwayri 1975, 321.
26 *KFT*, 386; *KFTR*, 223; Rubruck, 70; *TMM*, 93.
27 Michell and Forbes 1914, 65; Tsepkov 2001, 495–497; Tsepkov 2000, 98–99; Zenkovsky 1984, 194–195; Pow 2017, 31–51; al-Nuwayri 1975, 322; Perfecky 1973, 28–30; *KFT*, 387–388; *KFTR*, 223–224.
28 Thomae achidiconi Spalatensis 2006, 252; Thomas of Split 2006, 253, *EMC*, 136–137.
29 *KFT*, 388.
30 *KFT*, 388; Allsen 1983, 11, 13; al-Nuwayri 1975, 323.
31 *KFT*, 388–389; *KFTR*, 224.
32 *KFT*, 388–389; *KFTR*, 224.
33 *KFT*, 388–389; *KFTR*, 224.
34 Allsen 1983, 11; *HWC*, 149; Juvayni 1912, 116.
35 Buell 1993, 19–20.
36 Favereau 2021, 77.
37 Allsen 1983, 17–18; *HWC*: 553–554; Juvayni 1937, 9–12.
38 Martin 1986, 24–25.
39 Martin 1986, 25–27.
40 Martin 1986, 27.
41 *HWC*: 190; Juvayni 1912, 150;
42 *HWC*, 190; Juvayni 1912, 150; RDRM, 638; RDK, 455; *RDT2*, 223; RDT, 313; Allsen 1983, 14–15. Although Juvayni and Rashid al-Din place Sübedei here in 1229–1230, Sübedei's participation in the Jin campaign until 1234 makes this impossible.
43 Allsen 1983, 14–15; Zenkovsky 1984, 299, 304.

44 *TN*: 717–718.
45 *HWC*, 268–269; Juvayni 1912, 224–225.
46 Allsen 1983, 18.
47 *HWC*, 268–269; Juvayni 1912, 224–225; RDT, 324–326; RDK, 473–474; *RDT2*, 230; RDRM, 664; *TMM*, 28–29; *TR*, 78.
48 *HWC*, 269; Juvayni 1912, 224; Michell and Forbes 1914, 81; RDRM, 666; *RDT2*, 231; RDK, 474; RDT, 325; Martin 1986, 27; *TMM*, 30. Here, Juwayni and Rashid al-Din (who most likely simply copied Juwayni) muddle the campaigns against Bulghar and the Bashkirs with the invasion of Hungary and Bulgaria.
49 RDT, 327; RDK, 476; Rubruck, 138; *TMM*, 30, 131.
50 RDK: 474–476; RDT: 325–326; *RDT2*, 231–232; RDRM, 667–668; Juvayni 1912, 224: *HWC*: 553–554; Juvayni 1937, 9–12; Zenkovsky, vol. 2, 1984, 307; Allsen 1983, 18–19.
51 Allsen 1987; Allsen1983; *TMM*, 30; *TR*, 72–75.
52 RDRM, 669; RDK, 476; *RDT2*, 232; RDT, 327.
53 RDRM, 669, 826; RDT, 476; *RDT2*, 232, 285; RDT, 327.
54 May 2012, 129–151.
55 RDRM, 678–679; *RDT2*, 236.
56 Rubruck, 112, 257, 259; *TMM*, 42, 116, 209, 210.
57 Vasary 2005, 64.
58 *EMC*, 136–137.
59 *EMC*, 138–140.
60 *EMC*, 140–141, 172–173, 174–175; Vasary 2005, 65.
61 *EMC*, 176–177; Vasary 2005, 65.
62 Rubruck, 70, 111–113, 128–129; *TMM*, 93, 116, 125.
63 *HBSS*, 254–255, *TR*, 80–81.
64 Schamiloglu 2017, 335–336.

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CHAPTER NINE

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF RUS'

Alexander V. Maiorov

By necessity brief, this essay cannot hope to give a detailed or exhaustive description of the Mongol conquest of Rus' or to consider and evaluate all the facts currently known to modern historical science. For this reason, we will have to address only those issues that are most important for explaining our own understanding of the events connected with the Mongol invasion as reflected in the sources available to us, particularly the Old Russian chronicles. The information about the Mongols, whom the Russians usually called *Tatars*, is incomplete and often contradictory, and it generates considerable disagreement among researchers. Some controversial and unresolved questions with regard to the history of the Mongol conquest of Rus' will therefore also be discussed in this essay.[1]

BATTLE OF THE KALKA RIVER (1223)

The Battle of the Kalka River is usually perceived as the first clash between the Russians and the Mongols, serving as a kind of prologue to the conquest of Rus' that followed a decade and a half later. It is important to take into account, however, that contemporaries regarded the campaign of 1223 differently: the invasion by the *tümens* of Jebe and Sübedei into the steppes of Eastern Europe was rather understood as the final episode in the Mongol conquest of the Khwarazmian Empire.

Al-Nasawi, the secretary and biographer of Sultan Jalal al-Din, the heir to Muḥammad II Khwarazmshah, writes the following:

> Qipchaq tribes were connected with the house of the Khwarazmshahs by friendship and love, as both in the old days and now they have only had children born to mothers proposed as wives and introduced to this house from [the house of] the Qipchaq lords. Therefore, Chinggis Khan and his sons did everything they could to totally destroy the Qipchaqs, as they were the backbone of the Khwarazmshahs' force, the root of their glory and the basis for the numerousness of their troops.[2]

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Most probably, the military expedition led by Jebe and Sübedei was, first and foremost, a scouting mission.[3] Their mobile corps was also supposed to destroy the remaining Qipchaq (called Polovtsy in the Rus' sources) groups and then return to Khwarazm; fighting against the Rus' princes or pursuing any large-scale military operations in the steppes between the Dnieper and the Volga was not part of the Mongol plans at that time.[4]

According to Ibn al-Athir, the Mongols, after crossing the Caucasus Mountains, faced the combined forces of the Alans and Qipchaqs. Appealing to their shared ethnic origin, the Mongols managed to convince the Qipchaqs to abandon their allies. When the Alans, left alone to face the enemy, were defeated, the Mongols suddenly attacked the Qipchaqs, inflicting heavy losses on them. Looking for military assistance, the Qipchaqs turned to the Rus' princes.[5]

The Russian take on the first encounter with the Mongols is represented in *The Tale of the Battle on the Kalka*, created in south Rus' shortly after the events described in it.[6] The original version of *The Tale* came down to us as part of the senior summary of the *Novgorod First Chronicle*, where it was probably incorporated as early as the mid-1220s.[7]

In response to the request for help from the Qipchaqs, a coalition of Rus' princes headed by the three strongest princes of south Rus' – Mstislav Mstislavich the Daring of Halych, Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev and Mstislav Svyatoslavich of Chernigov – marched to meet the Mongol army that had entered the Azov steppes. On the way, the Rus' princes encountered the Mongol ambassadors, who said:

> We are not going to take your land, neither your towns, nor your villages, because we have not come here against you, but we, by the will of God, have come here against our slaves and horse-keepers, the infidel Polovtsy; and you should have peace with us.[8]

The princes ordered the ambassadors to be executed and continued their march. Despite the first successes of the Rus' advance detachments, the Rus' and Qipchaq army was defeated, suffering heavy losses in the decisive battle on the Kalka River (probably a tributary of the Kalmius River, which flows into the Sea of Azov to the west of the Don). According to the generally accepted chronology, the battle took place on 31 May 1223, although other dates could be suggested as well.[9] It was probably during one of the first clashes with the Qipchaq that the Mongol general Jebe Noyan was killed.[10]

The story produced by the Novgorod chronicler is filled with eschatological motifs: the Rus' people suffered punishment for their sins before God, with the Mongols serving as God's chosen instrument. Another version of the same theme can be found in the *Laurentian Chronicle*: 'the all-merciful God wished to destroy and punish the godless sons of Ishmael, the Polovtsy, in order to avenge Christian blood.'[11] Thus, according to God's design, the Mongols were to become an instrument of punishment not for the Russians but for the Polovtsy, who were guilty of spilling the blood of Christians. Through the words of the Tatar ambassadors, the chronicler invites the Rus' princes to join the punishers of the Polovtsy. Not recognizing God's intention, the Rus' princes reject the offer of the Tatars, taking the side of the Qipchaqs. As a result, God punishes the Russians for making the wrong

choice.[12] In this later interpretation, we can see how the chronicler belatedly regrets that the Rus' princes, who knew nothing about the Mongols, inadvertently took the dangerous path of military confrontation with them. The eschatological explanation of the Mongols' origin presented in *The Tale of the Battle on the Kalka*[13] and based on a new interpretation of the seventh-century Revelations of Pseudo-Methodius, known to Russian scribes since the beginning of the twelfth century, became widespread in the west among the Latin authors, trying to explain the devastation of Eastern Europe in 1237–1242 by a hitherto unknown people, the Mongols.[14]

MONGOLS IN NORTHEAST RUS' (1237–1238)

In 1235, the Mongol rulers, led by their Qa'an, Ögödei, decided on a military expedition to conquer lands in Europe (The Great Western Campaign). After invading Volga Bulgharia (1236), the Mongol armies led by Chinggis Khan's grandson Batu came to the borders of Rus'.

One of the most disputable questions here is the number of Mongolian troops that took part in the invasion of Rus' lands. The real strength of their armed forces was a military secret of the Chinggisids, and it was prohibited to be disclosed under pain of death. Today this number can be established only by way of logical reasoning, using indirect data and taking into account the mobilization capabilities of the Mongolian empire. In our opinion, the total number of Mongol armies marshalled against Rus' did not exceed 60,000 people.[15]

Northeast Rus' (the Principalities of Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal) did not constitute the strategic goal of the Western Campaign. The Hungarian Dominican friar Julian, who visited Suzdal in the autumn of 1237, learned from Grand Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich and other informants that the Hungarian kingdom was the most important goal of the Mongol invasions in the west: 'Many report as correct, and the Prince of Suzdal conveyed in words through me to the Hungarian king that the Tatars, day and night, confer together on how to come and conquer the kingdom of Hungarian Christians.'[16] Consequently, the plans of the Mongols to go to war against Hungary were known in Rus'. The source of this information – the ultimatum letter of the Mongolian Khan to the Hungarian king, quoted by Friar Julian – leaves no doubt about its reliability. Around this time, King Béla IV of Hungary granted refuge to the Qipchaqs, whom the Hungarians called Cumans, who had refused to recognize the power of the Mongols, which caused the anger of the Khan and, probably, his decision to attack Hungary.[17]

At the same time, before embarking on their invasion of Europe, the Mongols obviously sought to secure their northern flank and rear and also to increase their material and human resources. This explains the demands of the invaders that seemed so shocking to the people of Rus': coming to the borders of the lands of Ryazan (in late autumn of 1237), the Mongols, through envoys, demanded 'a tenth share of everything: people, princes, and horses.'[18] Thus, the people of Ryazan were given a chance to submit peacefully through mobilization of their people and livestock to the Mongolian army, as well as providing hostages from among the princes. According to the information of John of Plano Carpini, the papal ambassador to the Mongols, such an ultimatum was usual practice with the conquerors, who in

exchange for peace demanded that their opponents should give 'a tenth of everything, both in people and in property.'[19]

The princes of Ryazan responded with a definitive refusal, possibly underestimating the military strength of the Mongols or hoping that people from the steppe would not be able to conduct effective military operations in the forest zone during the winter period. The Russian winter and severe frosts, however, turned out to be an important advantage for the Mongols. The lands of northeast Rus', covered with dense forests and marshes, were difficult to traverse for large cavalry units at any time of the year except for winter, when the rapid movement of the mobile Mongolian armies over the frozen river courses became possible.

After their conquest of China, the Mongols started using incendiary projectiles, containing coal, sulphur and saltpetre.[20] Such incendiary projectiles, launched by catapults, were widely used during assaults on Rus' urban settlements and showed their effectiveness during winter frosts. The low temperatures typical of Russian winters made extinguishing fires more difficult due to lack of water and increased oxygen concentrations in the atmosphere. On 21 December 1237, after a seven-day siege followed by an assault, the burning Ryazan was taken by the Mongols. Many other Rus' cities shared the same fate.[21]

In the posthumous panegyric to the Vladimir-Suzdal Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich, the *Laurentian Chronicle* also mentions the peace proposals made by the Mongols: 'The blood-thirsty villains sent their envoys to him, calling on him: "Make peace with us." He did not want that, as the prophet says: "A glorious war is better than a shameful peace."'[22]

Apparently, the story of Yuri's contacts with the Mongols, which we find in the *Chronicle*, was changed and polished over time; as a result, the account telling us about the Mongolian envoys acquired a new meaning: the Prince rejected the Mongolian peace proposals, since he had discerned their deceitful nature. However, there is another phrase in the *Chronicle* before the words just mentioned, which directly concerns the contacts of Yuri Vsevolodovich with the Tatars: 'he sent the godless Tatars away, after presenting them with gifts.' This fragmentary comment indicates that Prince Yuri, most likely, accepted the Mongolian peace proposals, agreeing to all their demands.[23]

Believing the promises of the Mongolian envoys, Yuri Vsevolodovich hoped, until the last minute, that if he did not interfere in the war of the Mongols in the south, be it against the Qipchaqs or Ryazan, he would be able to avoid the invasion, safely sitting it out in the forests beyond the Oka River. Whatever the case, it seems that the Prince of Vladimir-Suzdal did everything he could to avoid a direct confrontation with the Mongols. The departure of the Prince from Vladimir the day before the Mongolian assault on the capital city was perceived by his contemporaries as fleeing from the fight: the Prince 'left Vladimir and fled towards Yaroslavl.'[24] Yuri's further plans apparently did not include fighting a major battle with the enemy; in any case, we cannot consider the clash with one of the Mongolian detachments on the Sit' River, in which Yuri died ingloriously, as such a major battle (4 March 1238).

If Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal indeed had some negotiations with the Mongols and reached an agreement with them, accepting their conditions, what could have caused the invaders to attack northeast Rus' and massacre both the

Grand Prince himself and his sons? It seems that the sources provide an opportunity for us to answer this question.

It is very likely that Batu's wrath was provoked by the unexpected confrontation between the Mongols and the people of Vladimir near Kolomna (early January 1238). The Prince of Ryazan's brother Roman Igorevich with his retinue, pursued by the Tatars, withdrew towards the border of Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal. In Kolomna, Roman met with a detachment sent by Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal, which, however, was sent there not to help Ryazan but only to protect the borders of the Principality of Vladimir. This outpost unit waited near the border to observe the outcome of the fight between the people of Ryazan and the Tatars. Somewhere near the city, a battle took place, in which Roman Igorevich and the Vladimir commander Eremei Glebovich were both killed. The son of Grand Prince Vsevolod Yurievich, who led the Vladimir army, was not injured in the battle and returned safely to his father.[25]

The battle at Kolomna had another consequence, which seems to have played a fatal role for the future of the whole northeast Rus'. If most researchers are correct in thinking that Rashid al-Din's *Compendium of Chronicles* mentions Kolomna under the name *Ika/Eka* (i.e. *Town on the Oka River*), then Kölgen, the youngest son of Chinggis Khan, was killed there. Immediately after the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols 'took the town on the Ika also. Kölgän was wounded there and died.'[26] The death of Chinggis Khan's son in the confrontation at Kolomna could not have been left without consequences by the Mongols, and these consequences were catastrophic for the whole of northeast Rus'.

The sources indicate that the death of Chinggis Khan's family members was always punished by the Mongols with extreme cruelty. In such cases, retaliation, which was obviously ritual in nature, came upon the heads not only of those who ruled the lands fighting against the Mongols, but also upon all the inhabitants of the lands and towns where a Chinggisid was killed – such towns along with the entire population were subjected to total destruction and slaughter.[27]

It is no coincidence that after the battle at Kolomna, chroniclers started reporting cases of indiscriminate slaughter when recording the devastation of Russian cities by the Tatars. The first such case took place during the capture of Moscow – the closest city to Kolomna of Vladimir-Suzdal – since its residents also took part in the ill-fated Kolomna battle. After taking Moscow (circa 20 January 1238), the Tatars killed the governor (*voivoda*) and captured the prince, 'and the people were killed, from the elder to the infant.'[28]

Punishment also befell Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich, who, according to Rashid al-Din, was not looking for a chance to give the Mongols a decisive battle (as stated by some Russian chroniclers) but, on the contrary, tried to hide from them inside deep forests: 'The emir of that province, Yeke-Yurgu (Yuri Vsevolodovich), fled into a forest; he too was captured and put to death.'[29] This conclusion is indirectly confirmed by the Russian chronicle, which states that Yuri, hiding in a safe place, did not expect the Mongols to appear and was caught by surprise.[30] Another chronicle reports that Yuri's beheaded body was found on the site of the battle and buried, while his head was found and put in the coffin later.[31]

John Fennell suggested that Yuri could have been killed by his own people who had betrayed him.[32] It is important to bear in mind, however, that decapitation

was a common form of punishment widely practiced by the Mongols with regard to hostile foreign rulers. Around the same time, the sons of the last ruler of the Khwarazmian Empire, Duke Henry the Pious of Silesia and Rus' Prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov were executed in the same way.[33] After the execution of Yuri Vsevolodovich, the Mongols evidently considered their mission in northeast Rus' accomplished and soon withdrew their troops back to the steppe.

Based on the reports of Russian chronicles, only one town can be positively identified as having shown resistance to the Mongols – Vladimir-on-Klyazma. After its fall (7 February 1238), any organized resistance in the northeast of Rus' had practically ceased. The invaders split into relatively small detachments and, within a short time, captured and plundered several other towns of the Vladimir-Suzdal principality. It looks as though the chroniclers of Vladimir and Novgorod merely listed the major towns of Suzdalia without having any idea as to which, if any, of them was in fact attacked, sacked or even by-passed by the Tatars.[34]

At the same time, residents of the frontier towns of the neighbouring Novgorod and Chernigov lands put up a fierce resistance. The sources record information about the stout resistance of the residents of Torzhok, which eventually was taken after a two-week siege (5 March 1238), and about the heroic seven-week resistance of the residents of Kozel'sk.[35]

The stubborn resistance of the residents of Kozel'sk to the main forces of the Mongols, led by Batu and Sübedei, seemed to have impressed the Mongols and was reflected in sources from the Mongolian tradition of historical writing. According to Rashid al-Din, Batu did not have sufficient forces to capture Kozel'sk and required considerable reinforcements: 'In passing, Batu came to the town of Kosel-Iske (Kozel'sk). He laid siege to it for 2 months but was unable to capture it. Then Qadan and Büri arrived and they took it in three days.'[36] This episode was presumably also recorded in the official biography of Sübedei, included in *Yuan Shi*.[37]

In 1237–1238, the Mongols did not seek to conquer other political centres of north Rus', in particular Novgorod. The raid undertaken by one of the Mongol detachments in the direction of Novgorod, which occurred after the capture of Torzhok, was apparently a reconnaissance mission.[38]

MONGOLS AND RUS' PRINCES (1239)

The spring of 1239 saw the beginning of the Mongol conquest of south Rus'. The scanty and contradictory accounts of the Russian chronicles make it impossible to get a complete and reliable picture of the events. It is clear, however, that the consequences of the Mongol invasion for south Rus' were more devastating than for the northeast.[39]

The first southern Rus' town to be taken by storm and burned down, under unknown circumstances, was Pereyaslavl-Yuzhniy (3 March 1239). The Novgorod chronicles of the first half of the fifteenth century provide some information about the defeat of the Russian troops near Chernigov, the capture of the city after a brutal assault (October 18, 1239), and subsequent reconciliation between the Rus' princes and the Mongols.[40] The source of this account is undoubtedly the South Russian version of *The Tale of Batu's Invasion*, reflected also in the *Hypatian (Galician-Volhynian) Chronicle*. In the latter, however, the text related to the description of

the assault on and the capture of Chernigov, probably due to the confusion with the sheets and oversight by a later scribe, was divided into separate parts and attributed to different events.[41]

Describing the storming of Chernigov by the Tatars, the chronicler speaks of stone-throwing machines, which destroyed the city walls and thus determined the outcome of the battle. Contemporaries seemed to be stunned by their use. The scribe characterizes the event as something unprecedented and almost unbelievable: stones launched by the terrible machines were too heavy to be lifted even by four strong men, and those huge stones were able to cover a distance that was one and a half times farther than the range of an arrow shot from a usual bow.

The Mongols were armed with heavy trebuchets capable of releasing projectiles weighing 100 kg at a distance of 275 metres or more.[42] The heavy lever trebuchets, similar to those used during the assault on Chernigov, were up to 8 m high and weighed 5 tons; about 50 to 250 soldiers were required to bring these machines into action.[43] The regular use of heavy trebuchets and combat incendiary agents by the Mongols during their assaults on Rus' towns was one of the factors that ensured their success. Most fortifications and houses in Russian cities were built of wood, which made them particularly vulnerable to Mongolian incendiary bombs. The Rus' people did not have the ability to effectively confront these weapons and had to seek reconciliation with the Mongols, perceiving them as a superior force.

The account from the Novgorod chronicles of the first half of the fifteenth century about the Mongol conquest of Chernigov, which we have discussed above, ends with a record about reconciliation between the invaders and three Rus' princes – Mstislav Glebovich of Chernigov, Vladimir Rurikovich of Smolensk and Kiev, and Daniil Romanovich of Halych-Volhynia: 'From there they came to Kiev in peace and reconciled with Mstislav, Vladimir and Daniil.'

The widespread opinion often found in academic works that the information about a peaceful agreement between the Rus' princes and the Mongols in 1239 was, in fact, in reference to the 1234–1235 feud between the princes should be considered erroneous.[44] The conditions of peace proposed by the Mongols to the princes of south Rus' were obviously similar to the conditions previously proposed to the Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal princes. In any case, during the Mongol invasion, Daniil of Halych also tried to avoid military confrontation with the invaders, just like Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal did several years before that.

The Hypatian Chronicle also contains information about peace negotiations between the Mongols and the Kiev Prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich after the fall of Chernigov:

> Möngke Khan came to look at the city of Kiev. He stood on the other side of the Dnieper, near the Hillfort on the Sand; when he saw the city, he was surprised at its beauty and size; he sent his ambassadors to Mikhail and the townspeople; he wanted to beguile them, but they refused to listen to him.

Mikhail had to flee from Kiev soon afterwards.[45]

When explaining the reasons for Mikhail's flight, some chroniclers report that he ordered Möngke's envoys to be murdered. Historians have repeatedly suggested that the assassination of Mongolian envoys should have been the main reason for the

murder of Mikhail himself a few years later.[46] However, a thorough analysis of the sources shows that the assassination of the envoys is first mentioned in the Moscow chronicles of the second half of the fifteenth century and that the information was taken from the *Life of Mikhail Chernigovskiy*, a document which glorified him as a martyr for the faith. Early sources do not contain such information.[47]

If Mikhail Vsevolodovich did not order the murder of the Mongolian envoys, then what could have been the reason for his flight from Kiev? The plans of the Mongols in the autumn of 1239 hardly included taking Kiev by storm. The peaceful nature of Möngke's mission is confirmed by the words in the chronicle stating that he left his army on the opposite side of the Dnieper at the Hillfort on the Sand.

Therefore, Mikhail's flight from Kiev could have been caused by political rather than military reasons. One such reason could have been an alliance of the Mongols with Vladimir Rurikovich and Daniil Romanovich – the main rivals of Mikhail Vsevolodovich in his struggle for Kiev, a fact that became known to Mikhail during his negotiations with Möngke. After the capture of Chernigov, the Mongols apparently decided to give Kiev to one of their new allies, Vladimir Rurikovich, and after his sudden death, to Daniil Romanovich, who in turn handed Kiev over to his commander (captain of a thousand) Dmitri.

Mikhail Vsevolodovich, who fled to Hungary and then to Poland, attempted to join the forces of Duke Henry the Pious and fight the Mongols in the Battle of Legnica (9 April 1241). Mikhail's attempt to offer armed resistance to the Mongols cost him his life: he was executed by the order of Batu in September 1246.[48]

THE CONQUEST OF KIEV AND SOUTH RUS' (1240)

It took the Mongols only a few weeks to capture the main political centres of south Rus' – Kiev, Halych and Volodymyr Volynskyi. The absence of any prolonged resistance can be explained by the fact that at the time of the invasion the strongest south Rus' princes, Daniil of Halych and Mikhail of Chernigov, had already fled abroad, taking their families with them. Nevertheless, some towns, above all Kiev, mounted armed resistance to the Mongols.

The description of the siege and storm of Kiev by the troops of Batu, found in the *Galician-Volhynian Chronicle*, was most probably taken from the account of an eyewitness who was close to the commander Dmitri and thus emphasized his role in the events. Afterwards, this account, just like other chronicle records related to the Mongol invasion, underwent a certain literary adaptation and polishing.[49] However, the story of the fall of Kiev has not lost its value as a source of reliable historical evidence. The information contained in it – the use of heavy trebuchets and encirclement of the city with a wooden wall (protecting the attackers and their siege technology from enemy assaults and preventing the latter from escaping the encirclement) – corresponds with other sources on the history of the Mongol conquests, including the assaults on such Rus' towns as Ryazan, Vladimir, Torzhok and Kozel'sk.

The account from the chronicle about the capture of Kiev contains a list of Tatar commanders who gathered under the walls of the Rus' capital, written down in accordance with the oral information provided by a Tatar captive named Tovrul; this list mentions, among other names, Güyük and Möngke.[50] According to Rashid al-Din, both of them went to Mongolia after the spring of 1240, being recalled

there by Ögödei Qa'an.[51] For this reason, some researchers believe that Güyük and Möngke could not have taken part in the siege of Kiev, which began in the autumn of the same year.[52]

In *The Secret History of the Mongols*, however, we find the text of Güyük's report regarding his glorious victories in the west, from which it follows that he, along with other princes, took part in the capture of Kiev and other Rus' towns: 'Batu, Büri, Güyük, Möngke and several other princes . . . ravaged and brought under submission . . . Mankerman Kiwa (Kiev) and other cities . . . and returned home.'[53] The possibility of Güyük and Möngke's participation in the capture of Kiev is also confirmed by the *Yuan Shi*. Here we find the exact date of 'the imperial decree to Güyük to withdraw troops for rest and replenishment,' namely, the winter of the twelfth month of the twelfth year of Ögödei's government (December 1240). In addition, it also follows from the same source that in the spring of 1240 Güyük sent a report to Ögödei from the march and did not personally come to Qaraqorum.[54]

Güyük and Möngke were obviously recalled from the army of Batu after the capture of Kiev and, therefore, both princes must have taken part in the siege and assault led by him. This circumstance adds credibility to the information found in the Russian chronicle about the assault on Kiev by the Mongols.

The *Hypatian* and *Novgorod First Chronicles* do not contain any definite information that would allow us to determine the exact date when Kiev was captured. Among all the sources that preserved the early accounts from the chronicles concerning the Mongol invasion, only the *Laurentian Chronicle* provides an indication of the date when Kiev was conquered: 'This misfortune happened on the day of St. Nicholas before the Nativity of the Lord.'[55] St. Nicholas Day, observed on December 6, was indicated as the date of the fall of Kiev in the chronicles that in some way used the *Laurentian Chronicle* or, more precisely, the information from the Rostov chronicles of the third quarter of the thirteenth century.[56]

A different chronology can be found in the chronicles dating back to the Pskov Codex compiled at the turn of the 1460s-1470s, which records the day when the siege began, the time of its total duration and the day when Kiev was captured: 'The Tatars came to Kiev on 5 September and stood for 10 weeks and 4 days, and only captured it on 19 November, on Monday.'[57] At the same time, the *Chronica Majora* of Matthew Paris (middle of the thirteenth century) contains a letter from a certain Hungarian bishop to an unnamed Parisian bishop (possibly Guillaume III of Overno). The author of the message writes:

> I am replying to you about the Tartars, that they came to the very border of Hungary in five day crossings and approached the river called *Deinphir*, which they could not cross in the summer. And wanting to wait for the winter, they sent forward a few scouts to Rus'.[58]

Another version of this document is found in the Annals of Waverley Abbey.[59]

Most researchers date the letter of the Hungarian bishop as 1239–1240 and positively identify the river *Deinphir* with the Dnieper.[60] Unable to cross the water-abundant river immediately, the Mongols postponed the crossing until the onset of winter frosts when a strong ice cover would be formed on the river. In the meantime,

they left for the east. Similarly, the next year, while already in Hungary, the Mongols had to wait for winter frosts in order to cross the ice of the Danube.

The story from the *Galician-Volhynian Chronicle* about the siege of Kiev by the Mongols contains one remarkable detail. When Batu and his troops encircled the city, a terrible noise arose, and the besieged residents could not hear each other because of the constant rattle of cart wheels, the roar of the many camels and the neighing of horses.[61] This means that the Mongols arrived to Kiev with a multitude of livestock and their portable dwellings mounted on carts, household goods and families. In addition, the army of Batu had heavy battering rams and trebuchets, which enabled them to destroy the walls of Kiev in just a few days.

It would be reasonable to assume that such an army could have been taken across the Dnieper only after winter frosts started and a strong ice cover formed on the river. Taking into account the climatic features of the Middle Dnieper region, it is conceivable that the Mongols were unable to establish an ice crossing over the Dnieper towards Kiev until mid-November. All these details confirm the date for the capture of Kiev provided by the *Laurentian Chronicle*, namely 6 December.

According to Rashid al-Din, after capturing Kiev, the Mongol troops split into *tümens* and, using raid tactics, conquered *all the towns of Uladmur (Avladimür)*, meeting resistance only at the town of *Uch-Oghul Uladmur*, which withstood a three-day siege. Phonetically, *Uladmur/Avladimür* corresponds to the Russian princely name *Vladimir*. However, having failed to find a suitable candidate among the Rus' princes at the time of the Mongol invasion, the translators of Rashid al-Din decided that the proper name *Uladmur* referred to the town of Volodymyr Volynskyi and extended to other towns of Volhynia.[62]

In the case of such interpretation, however, we will have to look for a town called *Uchoghul* among the Volhyn settlements, with the name having not even a vague phonetic correspondence to any old Rus' place-names known today. In addition, as it has been observed many times before, '*uch oghul*' in Turkic languages literally means 'three sons,' but it does not seem possible to find any historical foundation for a Rus' geographic name with this meaning.

It was characteristic of Rashid al-Din and his Turkic-language source to pay attention not only to the names of the lands and towns conquered by the Mongols, but also to the personal names of the defeated rulers, which were used as geographic landmarks. This tendency can be seen, for example, in the descriptions related to the conquest of the Rus' Principality of Vladimir-Suzdal: in just five days the Mongols captured 'the city of Makar (probably Moscow – *A.M.*) and killed the prince of [this] city, named Avlaitimur (probably Vladimir – *A.M.*)'; or 'the city of Pereyaslavl (?), the native region of Vezislav (probably Vsevolod – *A.M.*), they altogether took in five days.' It is noteworthy that in his account of the capture by the Mongols of Vladimir-on-Klyazma, the capital of northeast Rus', Rashid al-Din does not at all mention the name of the town and confines himself to indicating just the name of the prince: 'Laying siege to the town of Yurgi the Great, they took it in eight days.'[63]

It is not surprising, therefore, that when describing the conquest of south Rus', Rashid al-Din and his Turkish-language source cite the name of the Rus' prince associated with the *towns of Vladimir* captured by the Mongols and *the town of Vladimir's three sons*. At the beginning of the Mongol invasion of south Rus', Vladimir Rurikovich still remained the legitimate Prince of Kiev. He had reigned in Kiev, though not continuously,

Map 9.1 The Mongol Empire 1230–1240
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

for more than ten years. The capture of Kiev by Mikhail Vsevolodovich in 1238 was regarded in Rus' as illegal: Mikhail is not mentioned in the list of Kiev princes placed at the beginning of the *Hypatian Chronicle*. The *Pskov Chronicles*, when recording the death of Vladimir Rurikovich (as 1239), name him the Prince of Kiev.[64]

Vladimir Rurikovich was perceived as the legitimate Prince of Kiev by the Mongols as well, since, as we have seen, in the autumn of 1239, they concluded a peace treaty with him, as well as with Daniil Romanovich and Mstislav Glebovich, after which Mikhail Vsevolodovich had to leave Kiev. The fate of Vladimir Rurikovich after that is not quite clear. For some reason, he had to leave Kiev at the end of 1239 and soon died. Perhaps the prince died in Smolensk, defending his hometown from the attack of the Lithuanians.

Thus, reporting on the capture of *all the towns of Vladimir* after their conquest of Kiev, the Mongolian source, as we believe, means the towns under the rule of Vladimir Rurikovich or, more precisely, his sons. One of them we see on the pages of the *Galician-Volhynian Chronicle*. Subsequent to the information about the return of Daniil Romanovich to Volhyn after the departure of the Mongols, we read: 'Rostislav Vladimirovich came to Daniil in Kholm.'[65]

The 'three sons of Vladimir' mentioned by Rashid al-Din and his Turkic-language source are the only princes of south Rus' who mounted some resistance to the invaders. For three days they defended their town, the name of which did not seem to interest the Mongols at all. This was possibly the town of Kolodyazhin, mentioned in the *Galician-Volhynian Chronicle*; to capture this town, Batu had to use a wall-breaking machine (just like he did during his assault on Kiev).[66]

CONQUEST OF VOLHYN AND GALICIA (1240)

Daniil Romanovich, Prince of Volhyn and Galicia, did not wait for the beginning of the enemy invasion but fled to Hungary and then to Poland; he went back to Volhyn only after receiving the news about the departure of the Mongols from Rus'. This probably explains why the chronicler of Prince Daniil Romanovich gives only a brief and somewhat passing description of the unprecedented invasion by the steppe people, concentrating all his attention on how the prince and his family succeeded in escaping the dangers.[67]

When Daniil and Vasil'ko Romanovich returned to Volhyn, which had been devastated by the Mongols, the first town on their way was Berestie. The chronicler says: 'Daniil and his brother came to Berestie and could not go out into the field because of the stench from the many dead bodies.'[68] It is interesting to note that those 'many dead bodies' were found not in the town of Berestie itself, as might have been expected, but somewhere in its vicinity. The town itself did not just stand undestroyed but, as far as we can judge, did not suffer any significant damage.[69]

To give a clearer picture of the tragic events that occurred outside the walls of Berestie, we should look at some well-known facts from the history of the Mongol conquests in Central Asia and the Middle East, which help to illustrate the regularly used methods of subjugating cities and dealing with the conquered population. When a town mounted any, even if minor, resistance before surrendering to the Mongols, its disarmed citizens were taken outside the town walls and killed. Such a fate, for instance, befell the citizens of Balkh, Fanakat (Banakat), Nasa and Baghdad.[70]

Even if the town surrendered to the Mongols without any resistance, its inhabitants had to go out into the field without weapons and humbly accept their fate. In such cases, however, there was no mass slaughter; the settlements were plundered, while young male inhabitants were taken captive and sent to serve in the Mongol army, and more precisely, in the auxiliary troops (the *hashar*), which were used to perform the most dangerous tasks, for instance, storming the towns and fortresses.[71]

We can see that before storming fortified towns, the Mongols offered their inhabitants the opportunity to surrender and leave the town unarmed as a sign of obedience. In such cases, no promises or guarantees of security were respected: the subjugated population was often fated to either be killed or taken captive. Only if the city surrendered without any resistance could its inhabitants save their lives and freedom. The towns that were taken without a fight were subjected to intensive plunder, but, as a rule, they managed to avoid large-scale destruction.

In light of the facts cited above, the slaughter of the inhabitants of Berestie by the Mongols outside the city walls suggests that at the beginning of the siege the citizens mounted some resistance but then were forced to submit to the invaders and, unarmed, went out into the field where they were killed. The fact that the bodies of the victims remained unburied for several months – probably until April 1241, when the princes could return from Poland after the departure of the Tatars – suggests that all this time there was no one to bury them: the inhabitants of Berestie were either killed or taken to the *hashar*.

It is reasonable to assume that the Mongols captured other cities of the Volhyn land, including Volodymyr, under similar circumstances. Like Berestie, the capital city of Volhyn became almost completely deserted. When Prince Daniil arrived there after the departure of the Tatars, 'not a single living person remained in Volodymyr.' This time, however, the prince found the unburied bodies of the dead citizens not in the field outside the city but in the city churches: 'the church of the Holy Virgin was filled with corpses; other churches were full of corpses and dead bodies.'[72] This tragic picture, as well as the information from the chronicler that Volodymyr was 'taken with a spear,' apparently supports the idea that the Mongols stormed and captured the city. Archaeological evidence seems to confirm this conclusion.

It appears that Volodymyr Volynskyi is the only place where more or less obvious traces of resistance to the invaders have been found. In the 1930s, a mass grave with a multitude of skeletons, lying in disorder, with broken skulls, severed limbs and arrowheads in their spines, was accidentally found during excavation works on the market square near the Kiev Gates; weapons damaged in battle were also found there.[73] It is highly probable that these finds represent material evidence of the assault on Volodymyr by the Mongols in December 1240. However, the circumstances under which the evidence was found make precise dating impossible.

At various times, human skulls with large iron nails hammered into the crown of the head and temporal bones were found in the territory of Volodymyr. In the academic literature we find widespread belief that these skulls appeared as a result of mass executions by the Mongols of the defenders of Volodymyr Volynskyi.[74] However, a more plausible explanation of the origin of the 'Volhyn skulls' was suggested a while ago. Piercing the skull of the deceased with a nail or an iron spike is a well-known custom for dealing with ghouls and the undead, especially widespread among the Ukrainian population and in particular in the Volhyn and Carpathian regions. Some new evidence on the origin of the 'Volhyn skulls' as resulting from the

ancient custom of dealing with the undead by the local population has recently been presented. The nature of the damage to the skulls clearly indicates that it was caused after the deaths of their owners.[75]

The suspicious silence about the fall of Halych in the Old Russian chronicles and the absence of any mention of such conquest in Mongolian sources makes us think that the capture of the town was an unremarkable event, which provided no grounds for recording the heroism of its defenders or the valour of the Mongolian generals.

Apparently, the capture of Halych by the Mongols, like in the case of other south-west Rus' towns, led to the loss of a significant part of its population, who were either killed or taken to the *hashar*. Later we see these Rus' captives taken from Volhyn and Galicia in the vanguard of Mongolian troops during their military operations in Poland and Hungary. According to Jan Długosz, for instance, the Rus' units marched across the Polish lands in front of the Mongolian troops, showing the way to the invaders: 'Their movement was guided and their way was shown to them by some Ruthenians, who are very hostile to the Poles.'[76] Archdeacon Thomas of Split reports that a Ruthenian defector warned the Hungarians before the decisive battle with the Mongols on the Sajó River that the enemy was planning a surprise night attack (11 April 1241).[77]

NOTES

1 See also Maiorov 2016b, 473–499.
2 Nasawi 1996, 213; Nesawi, 286.
3 Allsen 1987, 11–17; Buell 1993, 17–18; Gabriel 2004, 89; May 2007, 128.
4 Yurchenko 2003, 385–400.
5 *KFTR*, 220–221, 223.
6 Fennell 1980, 18–31.
7 Gippius 1997, 14, 34–35.
8 N1L, 62.
9 Yamaguchi 2003, 1–11; Tsyb 2009, 217–222.
10 Pow 2017, 31–51. For objections, see Timokhin and Tishin 2018, 596–617.
11 LL, 446.
12 Rudakov 2009, 33.
13 N1L, 61; LL, 445–446.
14 Jackson 2010, 31–54.
15 For more detailed arguments, see Sabitov 2010, 55–73.
16 Dörrie 1956, 177–178.
17 *EMC*, 136–141, 158.
18 N1L, 74.
19 Carpine 1989, 285.
20 Shkoliar 1980, 190, 339; Ganster 2009, 133.
21 de Hartog 1996, 32–33; Khrustalev 2008, 85–146.
22 LL, 468.
23 Rudakov 2009, 73.
24 N1L, 75.
25 N1L, 75; LL, 460, 515–516; IL, 779.
26 RDB, 59; RDT, 327; Rashid al-Din 1960, 38–39.
27 See, e.g., *HWC*, 132–133, 174–178; Rashid al-Din 1952, 219; RDT, 368; see also Yurchenko 2010, 68–72; Gießauf 2007–2008, 89–90; Jackson 2017, 158.
28 LL, 461.

29 RDB, 60; RDT, 327; Rashid al-Din 1960, 39.
30 IL, 779.
31 LL, 467.
32 Fennell 1983, 80–81.
33 Maiorov 2017, 254–256; see also Amitai 2011, 89–91.
34 Fennell 1983, 80.
35 N1L, 76; IL, 780–781; see also Dimnik 2003, 345–346.
36 RDB, 60; RDB, 327.
37 Pow 2018, 63–64.
38 Ianin 1982, 146–158.
39 Gorskii 2004, 199–201.
40 S1L, 300–301; NKL, 115; N4L, 222–223; see also Dimnik 2003, 349–353.
41 Maiorov 2012.
42 Allsen 2002, 265–267.
43 Kirpichnikov 1976, 75; see also Roldbaatar 2007, 233–239.
44 Dimnik 1979, 395–396, 401; Maiorov 2009, 323–324.
45 IL, 782.
46 de Hartog 1996, 34; Yurchenko 1997, 123–125; Dimnik 2003, 353, 372.
47 Gorskii 2006, 138–154.
48 Maiorov 2017, 237–256.
49 Tolochko 2014, 101–118.
50 IL, 784–785.
51 RDB, 61; Rashid al-Din 1960, 40.
52 Kargalov 1967, 117; Staviskii 1991, 193; Tolochko 2014, 103.
53 *SHM*, §274; De Rachewiltz 2006, 960, 989, 1009; Anonymous 1941, 194, 314, 513.
54 Abramowski 1976, 134, 148; *Yuánshǐ* 2009, 175–176.
55 LL, 470.
56 Maiorov 2016a, 702–714.
57 LA, 51; P3L, 81.
58 CM, 75.
59 AMW, 325.
60 Bezzola 1975, 54; Klopprogge 1993, 163; Gießauf 2006, 153.
61 IL, 784.
62 RDB, 69; RDT, 331; Rashid al-Din 1960, 45.
63 RDB, 59; RDT, 327; Rashid al-Din 1960, 39.
64 Maiorov 2015a, 169–181.
65 IL, 788–789.
66 IL, 786.
67 Maiorov 2015b, 11–24.
68 IL, 788.
69 Lysenko 2007, 28.
70 *HWC*, 130–131; RDT, I, 243, 497; Rashid al-Din 1952, 201, 218; Rashid al-Din 1946, 44; Nasawi 1996, 91–92; Nesawi, 87–88; see also Jackson 2017, 158–159; Krämer 2011, 97–114.
71 *HWC*, 88–90, 98–100; RDT, 243, 245–247; Rashid al-Din 1952, 200, 204–205; see also Jackson 2017, 78, 113, 156–157, 173, 176.
72 IL, 788.
73 Terskyi 2010, 46, 96.
74 Kargalov 1967, 127; Khrustalev 2008, 189.
75 Mazur 2010, 302–317.
76 Długosz 1975, 13; Długosz 2009, 13.
77 *HBSS*, 262–263; Splitskii 1997, 107.

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CHAPTER TEN

THE MONGOL INVASIONS OF EUROPE

Stephen Pow

The Mongol invasions of Europe, and the larger set of Mongol-European interactions, comprise a field in which opinions differ even on fundamental issues that shape an overarching picture of events. Why did the Latin West avoid conquest by the Mongol Empire when nearby Kievan Rus' and the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum submitted? Did the Mongols plan on conquering Europe, and why did they withdraw from it in 1242? Is it more accurate to discuss one *Mongol invasion* of Europe followed by small raids, or to refer to a series of *Mongol invasions*? Often discussions focus only on the large-scale invasion of East-Central Europe in 1241–42, which ended with Batu's forces abruptly withdrawing to the Pontic Steppe – a decision regularly viewed as a response to news of the death of Ögödei Qa'an in Mongolia. As this can impart a somewhat distorted perspective on the duration and scope of Mongol-European relations, the following will provide a broader, long-term perspective. First, an effort will be made to understand Mongol intentions and what they knew about Europe before they invaded; the latest archaeological finds in Hungary will be used to shape a fuller picture of its brief Mongol occupation; the recent debates about the cause of the Mongol withdrawal from Europe will be briefly discussed; finally, the oft-neglected ultimatums and invasions which followed will be discussed along with European responses.

It remains the opinion of many historians that the danger passed with Batu's withdrawal in the spring of 1242. Western Europe providentially escaped the conquest suffered by other regions owing to the qa'an's demise the preceding winter, which plunged the Mongol Empire into political chaos and conflict for years.[1] That tidy version of events for historical overviews and textbooks,[2] while basically adhering to the interpretation found in some primary sources, oversimplifies the situation. It stems largely from reports produced by friars in the wake of John of Plano Carpini's mission as a papal emissary to Güyük Qa'an's court in Mongolia in 1246. Güyük was the deceased qa'an's eldest son and successor. Carpini stated that Ögödei Qa'an's untimely death was the only reason the Mongols had withdrawn from Europe and had not yet returned, although he warned that they were actively

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preparing to invade again in three or four years' time. Another contemporary friar, C. de Bridia, simultaneously gave a more optimistic assessment of the threat, writing that Batu was returning to Güyük Qa'an's territory and there was "great discord" between them, owing to which "the Christians [Europe] may have a respite from the Tartars for many years."[3]

Thus, we cannot ignore the crucial event of the death of Ögödei Qa'an on 11 December 1241. After the invasion of Europe, the tensions between the rival princes, Batu and Güyük, had indeed brought the Mongol Empire to the verge of civil war.[4] For historians, the real possibility that war would inevitably break out between Güyük and Batu would have been a good reason for the latter to cease campaigning in Hungary, return to the Volga, and closely observe developments in Mongolia.[5] This was especially true once Güyük succeeded his father as qa'an in 1246. However, Batu's campaign did not mark an end to the Mongol threat to Europe. It was the largest, most destructive, and most consequential inroad into Europe, but a steady stream of threats and ultimatums followed from Mongol qa'ans to European rulers. These included Güyük Qa'an's demands in 1246–47 for the pope and all European potentates to come to Mongolia and offer their submission or face annihilation.[6] Threats were eventually followed by real attacks; a major invasion of Lithuania and Poland took place in 1258–59. In the mid-1280s, the Golden Horde launched large-scale invasions of the Balkans, Hungary, and Poland in quick succession. By the late thirteenth century, Mongol rulers had a good deal of direct control over various Balkan powers, having carved out an imperium on European soil. One could argue that the 1241–42 invasion marked the *beginning* of Europe's Mongol danger rather than the end.

PRELIMINARY MOVES, PRECONCEPTIONS, AND FIRST IMPRESSIONS

After four years of the Mongols conquering territory west of the Volga, the old capital of the Rus', Kiev, fell in December 1240. For the commander of the entire campaign, Batu, and his veteran strategic advisor, Sübedei, the road to Europe lay open. There were still several subordinate princes under Batu's command, but at this point in the campaign, two senior Chinggisid princes, Güyük and Möngke, departed for Mongolia on the orders of the qa'an. Both in turn would later become supreme khan and, as the eldest sons of Ögödei and Tolui respectively, their absence must have been felt among the Mongol troops – even though Batu and Güyük had parted from each other on hostile terms after a feast. Güyük had hurled insults and departed after becoming enraged by Batu's display of preeminence among the princes by drinking first. A message which Batu sent back to Ögödei Qa'an in Mongolia after this altercation, surviving in the *Secret History*, reflects his great uncertainty about continuing their campaign of conquest: "We were wondering whether we had been successful."[7] Likewise, European sources report that the Mongols were greatly apprehensive before invading Hungary, and their shamans first employed divination. A "demon that inhabited an idol" told Batu that he would be victorious, and so he gave the order to proceed westward.[8] His and his army's nervousness could in part reflect diminished morale caused by the departure of two major princes and their personal contingents.

What did the Mongols know about Europe at this point, and what were they expecting to encounter that could have made them apprehensive? From their first encounters, the peoples of the northwest (i.e. west of the Volga) were perceived by the Mongol high command as staunch adversaries. I have argued that Jebe Noyan, a very important military leader under Chinggis Khan, died at the hands of the Qipchaq-Russian forces shortly before the Battle of the Kalka in 1223. Though the Mongols won the engagement decisively, they quickly returned eastward to Mongolia, getting mauled by the Volga Bulghars on their way back. Thus, they perceived that the conquest of the northwest would be extremely difficult. When they were planning their return invasion in 1235, Chaghadai advised Ögödei that all Mongols should send their eldest sons to take part so that the army would be larger than ever before, and Yelü Chucai, a chief advisor of Chinggis and Ögödei, discussed but ultimately turned down a strategic proposal the same year for sending masses of Chinese troops on the western campaign.[9]

Excellent studies by Peter Jackson, Gian Andri Bezzola, and Felicitas Schmieder have explored European perceptions of the Mongols, from initial hopes in 1220 that an Eastern Christian "King David" was coming as an ally against the Muslims, to apocalyptic fears and outrage during and after the first invasion of Europe.[10] Much less has been written about the Mongol notions and preconceptions of Europe. Though the relative paucity of sources makes this a challenge, it is an important endeavor, not least because this might help explain how Mongol-European relations unfolded.

It is evident that the Mongols gained information from Europe's people during the 1241 invasion. For example, they took local townspeople in a pass through the Carpathians and used them as guides across Transylvania, Hungary's easternmost region. As they advanced into enemy territory, it was a standard tactic for the Mongols to detain and interrogate local people to discover the lay of the land and enemy positions. Certain words found in the Chinese (originally Mongolian) biographies of Sübedei probably came from Hungarian informants; the Danube is called "Tuna" (Duna in Hungarian), King Béla IV is referred to by a term resembling his royal title, Király, and his subjects are called the Mazhaer (馬札兒) tribe, which is quite a good transliteration of Magyar.[11]

More mysterious is the issue of how the Mongols gained so much intelligence about Europe *before* they invaded. A Mongol ultimatum from Ögödei Qa'an addressed to Béla IV was carried back from Russian territory by a Hungarian friar, Julian, in 1238. It read, "*I know* that you are a wealthy and powerful king, that you have many soldiers under you, and alone you rule a great kingdom."[12] How did the khan know this so early? Of course, there is the possibility that information was received from merchants, spies, and figures in Mongol employ like the Englishman who was reportedly captured during an attack on Austria in 1241.[13] There is evidence that the Mongols also indirectly got information on Europe from Arabic geographical literature. A passage in the *Secret History*, composed in Mongolian for the Chinggisid dynasty in the 1250s or 1260s, contains a line in which Chaghadai advised his brother, Ögödei Qa'an, in preparation for this invasion: "The enemy people beyond consists of many states, and there, at the end *of the world*, they are hard people. They are people who, when they become angry, would rather die by their own swords. I am told they have sharp swords."[14] Mysteriously, this has a

resemblance to a brief passage on the "land of the Franks" found in the geographical work of al-Qazwini, composed c. 1262–63 with a later recension dating to 1276. It touches the same points – the Franks' territory is a broad land, full of cruel, valiant, and perfidious people who do not think of flight in battle, preferring death. Moreover, the Franks have sharper swords than those of India.[15]

The reason that Qazwini's geographical material on the Franks, a term broadly used at the time for Europeans, also appears in a Mongolian source is mysterious.[16] The statements in Qazwini's report originate in much earlier Islamic geographical reports from the tenth century and a lost account of the Crusaders in the Levant likely made in the twelfth century. His account must have had no direct influence on the *Secret History* or vice versa. Similar statements we see could be mere literary *topoi* about the northwestern corner of the world's inhabitants, but we might trust Chaghadai's recorded statement that he received the account from informants, perhaps local literati in his territories who could have consulted what fragmentary geographical material on Europe they had. So, in preparation for their invasion, the Mongols sought information on northwestern people and heard about "the Franks" – described as huge numbers of fanatical, suicidal warriors with really sharp swords inhabiting a vast territory! Whether it was accurate, this sort of testimony could have contributed to the pre-invasion apprehension of Batu and his forces.[17]

THE MAJOR INVASION

Sources from Mongol courts note their forces were divided along five routes as they advanced on Hungary in the first months of 1241. The northern "right" group under Orda (Batu's elder brother) and Baidar (a Chaghadaid prince) moved swiftly through Poland, which at the time was fragmented into five principalities. They sacked Lublin and Sandomir in February. If we believe Polish chroniclers, Mongol forces were ambushed, suffering an initial defeat at Tursko or on the northeastern border. Afterwards, Mongol forces regrouped and swiftly won a number of victories as they proceeded westward, defeating Duke Boleslaw V's army at Chmielnik on 18 March. Krakow was burned on 31 March, and the duke became a refugee in Bohemia as the commoners fled into the forests. In Silesia, the wealthiest and most westerly duchy, the Mongols besieged but failed to take Wrocław, something which was attributed to a celestial prodigy which terrified the Mongols into retreating.[18] Further west, the high duke of Poland, Henry II, managed to assemble a coalition army at Liegnitz comprising his own contingents, local miners, and some elite units of Templars and Teutonic Knights. On 9 April 1241, the two opposing forces fought a decisive and hard-fought battle; the Mongols personally told a Polish friar a few years later that they were on the point of flight when suddenly Henry II's army collapsed.[19] Subsequently, the Mongol army made a few half-hearted advances on Bohemia and then passed through Moravia very rapidly in late April or May, only laying waste to the countryside and not besieging any fortified towns.[20] They reached Hungary shortly afterwards.

When Orda and Baidar were still advancing through Poland, the other princely contingents had simultaneously moved into Hungary. The main force under Batu and Shiban (both Jochids), along with Sübedei, moved through the Verecke Pass in Hungary's northeast. Forces under Qadan (an Ögödeid) and Büri (a Chaghadaid)

passed through the Borgo Pass and launched an invasion of eastern Transylvania's Saxon centers. Böchek (a Toluid) led the assault southward through Vlach territory (later Moldavia and Wallachia) and entered Hungary, probably through the Vöröstorony (Turnu Roşu) Pass.[21] Since Mongol sources consistently mention "five routes" of entry by Mongol forces into Hungary, it is possible that Büri and Qadan's units entered the Carpathians via separate routes. Interestingly, the advances of Mongol armies might reflect a planned distribution of appanages. Representatives of all four filial branches of the Chinggisid family invaded from different directions in a way that could have led to the tidy division of Hungary's territory. If not coincidental, there was a component of planned wealth distribution as well; Qadan and Büri's attack fell on the silver mining center, Böchek had taken the salt production and trade routes, while the Jochid princes, Batu and Shiban, appear to have moved into the pastures of the Great Hungarian Plain.

A major consequence of the Mongol strategy was that Batu, Shiban, and Sübedei might have faced the Hungarian royal army at the decisive Battle of Muhi on 11 April 1241 without the assistance of other contingents. It has regularly been imagined that Batu and the whole Mongol army moved up to Pest, provoked Béla IV into pursuit, and then retreated as a body to their chosen site at the Sajó River to do battle. However, a close comparison of the most detailed European account with Asian sources suggests that Batu remained in northeastern Hungary after breaking into the Carpathian Basin before the battle. The Mongol practice of sending ahead vanguard forces is well attested in contemporary sources, some of which record that Batu sent ahead his brother Shiban with 10,000 men. Under Sübedei, who devised the scheme, they managed to "lure" the Hungarians to a chosen site.[22] Interestingly, the Asian sources testify to intense anxiety felt amongst the Mongol troops before the engagement; Batu ascended a hill to pray and lament to Tengri in conscious imitation of Chinggis Khan's habit before his greatest military undertakings. Nonetheless, the Mongols won the battle by crossing the Sajó in the darkness of night and surrounding the Hungarian camp at dawn. This led to a panicky retreat with the Hungarian king barely escaping along with his brother, Coloman, who died a few months later from his wounds. In one fell swoop, the ability of the Hungarians to provide unified resistance was shattered. King Béla fled to Zagreb in Croatia, which was part of his kingdom, and then to an island on the Dalmatian coast when Qadan crossed the Danube and renewed his pursuit in early 1242. From the Mongol perspective, it appeared Béla had boarded a ship and put to sea, abandoning his kingdom.[23]

In the year between the king's defeat at Muhi and the Mongol withdrawal, the inhabitants of Hungary were on their own, responsible for organizing local defenses. Many improvised earthworks of concentric circles built around churches have been found in the Great Hungarian Plain, often accompanied by traces of a last stand against the Mongols.[24] These earthwork forts were evidently not effective, but they were the only option for many rural communities. The exact numbers of casualties will never be known, but the distribution of abandoned villages, archaeological traces of destruction, human remains showing signs of mass killing, and buried coin hoards dated to the invasion all point to the devastation being highly concentrated on the Great Hungarian Plain. The area east of the Danube River which the Mongols directly occupied for most of the year-long invasion suffered most heavily. This accords with the textual sources which mention the Mongols were prevented by

Hungarian defenders from crossing the Danube until the severe winter of 1241–42 caused the river to freeze over. Advancing over the ice, the Mongols reached western Hungary, where resistance was increasingly staunch, and we read of citadels like Esztergom, fortified cities, and monasteries vigorously holding out against Mongol attacks.[25] The onslaught did not last long, with the Mongols suddenly and mysteriously withdrawing, making their way to Bulgaria and perhaps considering an attack on Constantinople that never materialized. They gradually meandered their way to the northern Caucasus, where they wintered in 1242–43, reaching the Volga River and their assigned territories in 1243 or 1244, which suggests they were not compelled to return in any great haste.[26]

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL IN 1242

A "single, satisfying explanation" for the sudden withdrawal of the Mongols from the Kingdom of Hungary in 1242 is still a desideratum in the historiography, but several theories have been offered to explain it.[27] The long-established theory that the Mongols withdrew from Europe on receiving news that the qa'an died, requiring them to return to Mongolia to elect a new khan, has had the widest support among historians (including Halperin, Fletcher, Buell, Fennell, Engel, et al.). Yet the Persian official and historian Rashid al-Din denied that they knew the qa'an was dead when they left the Kingdom of Hungary, nor did Batu's forces return directly to Mongolia.[28] Another problem is that primary sources which describe the duration of journeys from Mongolia to the Golden Horde or Europe do not support the argument that any messenger could reach Hungary in fewer than four months. Since Ögödei died on 11 December 1241 and Thomas of Split claimed the Mongols withdrew eastward at the end of March, it is unlikely that Batu knew the qa'an was dead when the withdrawal order was given. On the other hand, it is plausible that they could have known he was very ill, since Ögödei was an alcoholic whose health was deteriorating in his last years. This situation was not a well-kept secret.[29]

Historian of Inner Asia Denis Sinor questioned the traditional explanation decades ago, observing that Batu and other leaders did not return to Mongolia to elect a khan. He posited that Europe had insufficient grasslands for nomadic occupation. The consideration of environmental factors was novel, but it lacks much primary source support; the king of Hungary stated after the invasion that his country was ideally suited for the Mongols and their herds.[30] Ecological explanations re-emerged recently with Ulf Büntgen and Nicola Di Cosmo's environmental hypothesis, which used paleoclimatic data to observe a sudden cold, wet period in Hungary in early 1242 and posited that the Mongols retreated owing to these weather conditions creating a food crisis and limiting their cavalry's mobility. Problems emerge with both explanations. Sinor's theory appears to underestimate the carrying capacity of the Great Hungarian Plain, judging by later medieval records of herd sizes there. The main obstacle to accepting the newer theory is that the textual evidence used to support the negative impact of the weather is almost wholly connected to a 1242 famine, but sources across Eurasia demonstrate Mongol armies intentionally triggered famines during invasions.[31]

Peter Jackson considered the possibility that the Mongols intended a punitive raid against Hungary in 1241 with no intentions for permanent occupation, suggesting

that the simplest explanation was that the campaign was intended to chastise its ruler. Timothy May has offered that conquest was intended in the long run but has drawn attention to the fact that a regular feature of Mongol conquests was that they occurred gradually and were characterized by "tsunami" cycles of invasion and withdrawal, which broke down the enemy's ability and desire to resist.[32] I agree with the argument that when they withdrew, the Mongols certainly planned to return. Furthermore, we cannot discount the problem of fortresses, which were a major factor with which to reckon before effective gunpowder weapons emerged. It is hard to ignore the vast range of source materials across the whole of Eurasia that describe the Mongols struggling most with fortifications. Thomas of Split emphasized that the Mongols were the most skilled nation in warfare "especially on open ground," yet he noted in a short timespan many examples of Mongols being foiled by fortifications in Dalmatia.[33] In addition to the problem of the fortresses, the Mongols could have been deterred by concerns about coordinated attacks from states in the unconquered western part of Europe. Shamans possibly influenced the Chinggisid princes to order a withdrawal; they played a role in the decision to invade Hungary, and according to William of Rubruck in the early 1250s, it was shamans alone whose orders prevented a return to Europe in force.[34]

Likely employing a more cautious approach owing to political instability within their empire in the aftermath of 1242, the Mongols attempted to gain the voluntary submission of Europe's leaders through ultimatums and false offers of alliance – something which Peter Jackson demonstrates was essential to their successful conquest of other regions during the thirteenth century. They did not conquer solely by means of military force. Frequently, they resorted to negotiated settlements. In cases where they lacked major military advantages, they often opted for a less-than-total subjugation by allowing the native rulers to retain a greater deal of autonomy. Employing a divide-and-conquer strategy, the usage of flattery and promises was not uncommon, and at least at first, many of the Mongols' subjects entered into pacts with them as would-be allies.[35]

AFTERMATH, REFORMS, AND LATER INVASIONS

If the reasons for the withdrawal are mysterious, one thing was considered certain in its aftermath: Béla IV, the Hungarians, and many others across the whole of Europe expected the Mongols to return imminently. There was no prevailing sense that the threat had passed. In 1248, Béla wrote a letter to Pope Innocent IV in which he explained that the Mongols were still demanding his submission; informants had told him that they planned to invade Europe in the near future. As such, the king and his leading nobles decided to undertake a series of major fortification reforms. He turned to the Knights Hospitaller to fortify the parts of Transylvania as far as the Vöröstorony (Turnu Roşu) Pass and to construct other fortifications along the Danube because his own people lacked sufficient building knowledge.[36] In a short time, he turned the river, or at least the narrow northern part near the Danube Bend, into a highly fortified zone, walling the new hilltop town of Buda and renovating the rugged castle of Visegrád. These reforms had a sense of urgency after a documented Mongol raid or advance in 1246–48 triggered fears that the Mongols had returned to Hungary.[37]

Castle building was undoubtedly a reaction to the Mongol invasion and a measure to resist future attacks. Béla IV lamented his kingdom's inadequate fortifications in a message to the pope after Batu's withdrawal.[38] However, such building reforms were carried out in the wider region beyond Hungary. Charter evidence reveals castle building reforms were taking place in Poland during the second half of the 1200s, allowing for the rapid construction of castles by the nobility, rather than remaining the prerogative of the ruler.[39] Daniel and Vasilko, the co-rulers of Galicia-Volhynia, likewise engaged in building improved fortifications in the years following the Mongol arrival. The Rus' chronicles record that Daniel of Galicia lamented that his lack of adequate fortresses had made him unable to repel the Mongols.[40] It is no accident that the Kamyenyets Tower in today's Belarus dates from the 1270s and is one of the earliest brick towers in the region. Polish towns started having their walls rebuilt in brick in the same period – for example, Poznan received its brick walls in 1275.[41]

In 1259, the Golden Horde launched a serious invasion of Poland. This episode followed the Mongols stamping out resistance in Galicia-Volhynia in 1257–58 and devastating Lithuania in 1258 sufficiently enough to make the Lithuanian duke, Mindaugas, convert to Christianity for a time in hopes of receiving help. The Mongols even came to blows with the Teutonic Knights and inflicted heavy losses on them.[42] The following year, Berke, the successor of Batu, sent an embassy to Paris demanding the French monarch's surrender and threatening invasion of France. Simultaneously, he pressured Béla IV to enter into a marriage alliance with the Mongols and join in a campaign against his Latin neighbours, essentially by offering his kingdom as a base for the invaders and sharing plunder with them.[43] This campaign had a wider scope than Poland and could have developed into a more serious and sustained assault on Christendom than even the first invasion. However, drastic developments diverted Berke's attention away from Europe. In 1259, Möngke Qa'an died in distant Sichuan and his brothers, Qubilai and Ariq Böke, went to war for his throne almost immediately. In the western part of the Mongol Empire, the Jochid *ulus* under Berke went to war with the recently founded Ilkhanate, which was established in the Middle East by the Toluid prince Hülegü. As the former empire devolved into several enormous, mutually hostile realms, Europe was granted a reprieve, especially as Berke and Hülegü inflicted huge casualties on each other in pitched battles over the first half of the 1260s.

The last period in which the Golden Horde posed an existential danger to the kingdoms of East-Central Europe was in the 1280s. Charters and Persian sources agree that the Mongols were still putting considerable military pressure on Hungary at the time. In 1285, two preeminent Horde princes, Töle Buqa and Noqai, launched a major invasion of Hungary that pushed as far as Pest before coming to ruin. Besides concerted Hungarian attacks, the weather played havoc on Mongol forces. Noqai returned home by moving eastward across the Carpathians without major setbacks, but Töle Buqa's army was surrounded and trapped in the mountains. Even Baybars al-Mansuri, a chronicler in the Islamic world, had heard of the calamity: "Nogai took his troops and left Töle Buqa. He reached his winter quarters safe and sound. Töle Buqa, on the other hand, went through shelterless deserts and wild steppes as he lost the main road. He and his troops experienced extreme difficulties and calamities; the larger part of his army died of cold and weakness. Just a few of them

survived."[44] European chronicles likewise describe how the invaders, returning with plunder and captives, were pursued by Transylvanian troops who suddenly sallied from their fortresses upon hearing that the Mongols were suffering from famine and disease. Fleeing into the forests and mountains, a huge number of the invaders died. Shortly afterwards, the Mongol princes made another drive into Poland and besieged Krakow unsuccessfully, its castle now fortified in stone.[45] Despite some setbacks, the Golden Horde did subjugate several states and played a powerful political role in the Balkans during the 1280s and into the 1300s. Even the emergence of Romanian principalities appears to be tied to the Golden Horde's activity in the region. During this period, the Golden Horde's rulers behaved very much as regional potentates rather than loyal subjects of the Mongol Empire – the only legitimate power on Earth – and the qa'an in Mongolia. For instance, Noqai made an alliance with the Byzantines, accepted their gifts gladly, cooperated in their foreign policy at certain points, and married a daughter of Emperor Michael VIII.[46] This sort of behavior, characteristic of a major regional power, signaled a transition. Noqai and other rulers in the Golden Horde had a continuing interest in carving out an imperium that extended in several directions, including Europe. Such policies and activities reflected their personal goals, and even those of their allies, rather than grandiose plans of world rulership.

CONCLUSIONS

We can see that the unified Mongol Empire, with its program of world conquest, was aiming to subjugate Europe in the 1240s. With the breakup of the western half of the Mongol Empire in 1260 into the mutually hostile Ilkhanate and Golden Horde, European powers came to distinguish different Mongol powers and the types of relationships they could cultivate with them. Likewise, Mongol khanates came to distinguish the various states in Europe and pursue different types of relationships with them, so that the Golden Horde cultivated trade with Italian merchants and the Ilkhanate reached out to France for an alliance in the Holy Land. In Eastern Europe, however, the Golden Horde remained a threatening power, playing an active role in regional power struggles before Lithuania's rapid expansion toward the Black Sea created a buffer zone in the late 1300s.

Public interest in the 1241–42 invasion largely stems from the potential consequences of a Mongol conquest of Europe. Some authors argue that a Mongol conquest of Europe would have prevented the social and scientific developments of the Renaissance. Their viewpoint was a commonplace of Mongol historians in past decades of scholarship.[47] With our present era of scholarship on the Middle Ages shifting to an increasingly global perspective, historians are less willing to make such pronouncements since they can easily be interpreted as a sort of charter myth – that is, Europe's salvation matters because its special destiny was to eventually bring forth the Renaissance. Nevertheless, historians give rise to another problem when they argue that the Mongols had no intention to conquer Europe. First, overwhelming evidence shows that they did intend a conquest. Secondly, such a viewpoint smacks of European exceptionalism, essentially implying that the Mongols were conquering the world in the thirteenth century but not Europe. If the Mongols were conquering the world, why would they see Europe as a special case for exemption? Likewise, a

tendency in the literature to discount *a priori* any possibility that human resistance played a role in Europe's *escape* from Mongol subjugation amounts to the creation of another charter myth, which holds that every force except the human agency of its inhabitants intervened to drive away the Mongols during this unique and exceptional historical episode. Through no merit of its own, we are told to believe, Europe was *saved*. Still, the wide range of sources invites alternative explanations, and the conclusion advanced here is that Europe's size and defensive capacity amounted to a deterrent even in 1241–42, when Batu waged a campaign that was very successful in many regards.

NOTES

1 Churchill 1956, 9. Though not primarily remembered as a historian, Winston Churchill undoubtedly influenced many readers in the twentieth century by advancing this view in his popular works.
2 Coffin and Stacey 2005, 414. The authors of an important textbook perpetuate a commonplace when they state, "Mongol conquests continued in Persia, the Middle East, and China, but after 1241 the Mongols never resumed their attacks on Europe."
3 *TMM*, 45; *TR*, 82–83.
4 Rashid al-Din's chronicle reveals that Batu and Güyük were approaching each other with their respective troops when Güyük abruptly died in 1248. RDT, 354–355.
5 Jackson 2005, 72–73.
6 *TMM*, 85–86; Richard 1965, 113–117.
7 The translator, Igor De Rachewiltz, suggested that this statement meant Batu wondered when it would be appropriate to end the westward advance. *SHM*, § 275.
8 Richard 1965, 77.
9 The *Yuan Shi* refers to this larger campaign as a "western campaign" (四征). Pow 2017, 15–16; *SHM*, § 270; *YS*, 3460.
10 Jackson 2005, 59; Bezzola 1974; Schmieder 1994.
11 *EMC*, 199; Olbricht and Pinks 1980, 183; Pow and Liao 2018, 62–67.
12 Jackson 2005, 60.
13 Giles 1889, 470–473.
14 *SHM*, § 270.
15 Lewis 1987, 123.
16 Richard 1965. 52.
17 Pow 2020, 69–76.
18 RDB, 70; Dlugosz 1823, 267, 271–272.
19 TR, 80–82.
20 Somer 2018, 240.
21 RDB, 70.
22 Pow and Laszlovszky 2019; *HBSS*, 260–261; *HWC*, 270–271; Pow and Liao 2018, 63–65.
23 RDB. 71.
24 Rosta 2018, 186–192.
25 Laszlovszky et al. 2018, 424–426; Pow 2019a, 315–316.
26 RDB, 71–72.
27 Rogers 1996, 3.
28 RDT, 332.
29 RDB, 65, 71.
30 Sinor 1972, 182; Göckenjan and Sweeney 1985, 309.

31 Büntgen and Di Cosmo 2016; Pinke et al. 2017, 3; Pow 2019a, 312–314.
32 Jackson 2005, 74; May 2015, 35.
33 *HBSS*, 283.
34 *TMM*, 197; Pow 2012, 78; Pow 2020, 244–246.
35 Jackson 2006, 11–15.
36 Pow 2019b, 246–247.
37 Pow 2019b, 245, n. 6.
38 Göckenjan and Sweeney 1985, 308–309.
39 Piekosiński 1886, 85–86.
40 Perfecky 1973, 57.
41 Kajzer and Salm 1999, 119.
42 Perfecky 1973, 76–77; Jackson 2005, 123.
43 Theiner 1859, 239–241, 264–265; Jackson 2005, 123–124.
44 Tizengauzen 1884, 106.
45 Gombos 1938, 1959; Pow 2020, 283–286; Jackson 2005, 204–205.
46 Vásáry 2005, 70–71, 86–90; Failler and Laurent 1984, 446–449.
47 Parker and Tetlock 2007, 381; Saunders 1971, 187.

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EMC, See List of Abbreviations.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF IRAN

Beatrice Forbes Manz

Rulers of the Mongolian Plateau had a strong interest in the Turkestan corridor linking China to the Middle East. At the turn of the thirteenth century much of Turkestan was held by the Qara Khitai dynasty, but heavy taxation had estranged many of its vassal states. Another threat to the Qara Khitai came from the territorial ambitions of rising rulers to the east and west: Chinggis Khan in Mongolia and the Khwarazmshah 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad in Khwarazm. Over the next years, most western regions of the Qara Khitai came under the Khwarazmshah's control, often voluntarily, and the eastern vassals submitted to the Mongols. In 1207–08, Chinggis Khan sent Jebe and Sübedei on an expedition further west, where apparently they clashed with the Khwarazmshah.[1] In 1218, the Mongols took over the center of the Qara Khitai realm around Balasaghun in Semirechie, bringing Chinggis Khan and the Khwarazmshah face to face. Chinggis Khan sent an embassy proposing trade relations, which the Khwarazmshah agreed to, but when the caravan reached Otrar on the Syr Darya, the Khwarazmshah's governor killed the merchants and seized their goods. Instead of reprimanding his governor, the Khwarazmshah killed the envoy Chinggis Khan sent to protest. This was the justification for the Mongol expedition against the eastern Islamic regions, the largely Iranian regions of Mawarannahr and what is now Afghanistan.

The Mongol conquest of Iran occurred in three stages, each under a different khan. The expedition of 1219–24, led by Chinggis Khan himself, concentrated on Mawarannahr, Khwarazm, and eastern Iran (now Afghanistan), with an exploratory expedition through Iran and the Caucasus. The second major invasion, sent by Ögödei in 1230, swept through Iran in pursuit of the remains of the Khwarazmian dynasty, also conquering Transcaucasia and eastern Anatolia. At this time, many cities and rulers submitted voluntarily, and bloodshed was more limited. After Möngke came to the throne in 1251, he sent his brothers to establish Toluid control over the major regions of the Mongol Empire: Hülegü arrived in Iran in 1256.

The methodology of the campaigns in the Middle East was similar to Mongol practice elsewhere. While the army often began with a sweep through the countryside

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and minor towns, the emphasis lay on the taking of cities and fortresses. It is clear that the Mongols gained advance knowledge of regions they attacked from scouts and also had a good general understanding of what cities had to offer. On the conquest of a city, the population was usually taken out, and two groups were separated out for use: young men who could serve as soldiers, and artisans – especially those working in textiles and armaments – who were placed in Mongol workshops. While the population was outside, the city was looted. The Mongols used violence selectively, grading their punishment according to the level of resistance they encountered. A city which submitted voluntarily was taxed and given a Mongol overseer (known variously as *daruqachi, basqaq*, or *shahna*), who governed alongside a local official. Such cities were expected to provide goods, money, and usually manpower to the Mongol army. When only the garrison resisted, the population was spared (more or less), but the soldiers were killed, the city was looted, and the walls were often destroyed. If the civilian population resisted, punishment extended to them as well, the severity depending on how long they fought and the number of Mongol casualties. The most spectacular punishment, including general massacres and razing of buildings, was reserved for the cities which rebelled against the Mongols after an initial submission. In most cases, the Mongols attempted to protect members of the religious classes.

The levies of soldiers that the Mongols collected from conquered cities and regions provided an important source of manpower; this was one reason why Chinggis Khan was able to undertake the conquest of eastern Iran while at the same time sending a large army to China. Locally recruited soldiers also helped to make up for the casualties the Mongols suffered, which were considerable.[2] While the military levies were at first used as disposable manpower, within about a year they began to fight alongside the Mongol soldiers as part of the army.[3] The Mongol armies also welcomed troops defecting from defeated rulers and local commanders eager to join the winning side.

Regions conquered by the Mongols had different experiences in the level of violence and destruction they suffered. The reaction of the population to the Mongol presence played an important part here, since the amount of violence the Mongols inflicted depended on the amount of resistance offered. Moreover, Mongol armies often divided into small contingents and became part of existing power struggles. The Mongol conquest therefore was a political process as well as a military one.

THE CONQUEST OF MAWARANNAHR

In 1219, Chinggis Khan gathered his army on the Irtysh River and set out for Mawarannahr. Among his commanders were several rulers from the sedentary and semi-sedentary regions of Turkestan who had voluntarily submitted and married Chinggis Khan's daughters; these men led their own troops. Barchuq, the *idiqut* of the Uighurs, was the most important, with a contingent of possibly 18,000 soldiers; Signak Tegin of Almaliq and Arslan Khan of Qayaliq, who was reported as leading 6,000 men, brought largely Muslim armies; Chinese siege engineers were also present. From the beginning, therefore, this was a mixed army, containing both nomad and sedentary soldiers.[4]

Chinggis Khan's army arrived at Otrar in late autumn 1219. Leaving his sons Chaghadai and Ögödei to invest the city, Chinggis headed towards Bukhara with Tolui. Jochi was sent against the towns of the lower Syr Darya, and several thousand soldiers headed against Khujand and Fanakat. After conquering several smaller settlements and collecting additional manpower, Chinggis and Tolui arrived before Bukhara in February or March 1220. The taking of Bukhara is vividly described by the Persian historian 'Ala' al-Din Juwayni, in one of the great set pieces which have formed our image of the Mongol conquest. As Juwayni describes it, the city population submitted after brief resistance, and the Mongols entered the city, where Chinggis Khan proceeded to the mosque, making it a place of revelry, with Qur'an stands used as mangers for the horses. He mounted the pulpit and declared himself the scourge of God. Since the garrison and population within the citadel continued to fight, the Mongols set the town on fire and pushed Bukharans and local levies against the wall of the citadel, filling up the moat with their bodies. Once the citadel was conquered, the garrison soldiers were all killed, while levies of soldiers and craftsmen were taken from the population.[5] It is not clear how much credence we should give to this account, particularly to the scene in the mosque. Juwayni was a bureaucrat serving the Mongols, and the image of Chinggis Khan as an agent of God was useful for the legitimation of Mongol rule.[6] Scholars have generally accepted the account of the conquest itself, allowing for exaggeration.

Having taken Bukhara, the army headed against Samarqand, which it reached probably in March. Chaghadai and Ögödei had taken and destroyed Otrar and now joined Chinggis, bringing more levies.[7] Samarqand was exceptionally well-fortified, and the Khwarazmshah had left a large garrison there. Nonetheless, after four days of resistance the city population let in the Mongol army, and the citadel held out for only three more days. Juwayni states that the city judge, along with several notables and a significant number of inhabitants, was given protection; the garrison was again killed; and the rest of the city population was treated in the usual way.[8] Chinggis then again divided his army, sending his commanders Jebe and Sübedei to pursue the Khwarazmshah. With them went Toquchar, who was married to a junior daughter of Chinggis Khan. Crossing the Amu Darya in late spring, they pursued the Khwarazmshah through Khurasan and Mazandaran. He sought refuge on an island in the Caspian, where he died, probably in October 1220.[9] Jebe and Sübedei continued west through the Caucasus and returned to Mawarannahr north of the Caspian. The commanders of the expedition had been ordered not to wreak destruction in Khurasan, and with some exceptions they accepted the submission of cities, gathered supplies, and moved through without much violence. Chinggis Khan remained in Mawarannahr and rested his army over the summer in the mountains south of Samarqand.

In the meantime, Jochi and his army campaigned on the lower Syr Darya, where they subjugated Sighnaq and Jand; another army conquered Khujand. However, in the summer Jochi suffered a setback when the earlier governor of Khujand made his way to Khwarazm, gathered an army, and retook the town of Yangikent.[10] In the autumn of 1220, Chinggis took the city of Tirmidh and then spent the winter on the upper Wakhsh River. At this point, the conquest of Mawarannahr appears to have been complete.

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF KHURASAN

It was probably Khurasan that suffered most severely under the Mongol conquest. The exceptional destruction there has been explained as an example of the "tsunami strategy" of the Mongol conquest: borderlands were devastated and left in confusion in preparation for later conquest.[11] Another cause for the violence in Khurasan was the reaction of its population to the arrival of the Mongols. The Khurasanians offered exceptional resistance, and several cities rebelled after an initial submission – some more than once. At the same time, a large number of Khurasanian troops joined the Mongol army voluntarily. Furthermore, not all the violence against Iranians in Khurasan was perpetrated by the Mongols; local powers also attacked each other during the conquest. To understand why this happened, we must examine both the province's recent past and how its population experienced the Mongol onslaught.

At the time of the Mongol conquest, Khurasan was deeply polarized and accustomed to frequent military action involving not only the larger regional states, but also city governors, local rulers (*maliks*), and *iqta* holders, many of them in hereditary positions.[12] In the second half of the 12th century Seljuk rule in Khurasan had become fragmented, and starting in the 1170s a new power, the Ghurid dynasty from the mountains east of Herat, expanded through much of the region. They were challenged by the Khwarazmshahs, who were interested in annexing the territories along their southern border. Both dynasties suffered from internal dissention, often played out in Khurasan. After the death of the Ghurid sultan Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad in 1206, the Khwarazmshahs took advantage of the succession struggle to take over Khurasan and the regions to the south, starting with Balkh in 1206 and annexing Ghazna in 1215, only four years before the arrival of the Mongols.[13] Thus, many cities in the region had changed hands numerous times over the 40 years preceding the Mongol invasion. Local commanders and their troops had fought for different overlords and with or against their neighbors, sometimes on orders from above and sometimes for their own advantage. The arrival of the Mongols offered both threat and opportunity.

To people coping with rapid changes of dynasty, the crucial issue was which side would win. This was not an easy question for the Khurasanians to answer. Refugees from the Mongol onslaught arrived with tales of terror, and the Khwarazmshah 'Ala al-Din Muhammad, as he fled through the region, had advised his governors to submit. On the other hand, several of the Khwarazmshah's sons remained active, and one of them, Jalal al-Din Mangubirni, continued campaigning in southern Khurasan, where he scored several victories against Mongol armies. A number of Khwarazmian commanders remained in the region with their troops. The Mongols often divided their armies into small divisions, which were sometimes defeated by local powers. In the first years of the Mongol conquest, it was clear to the Khurasanians that the Mongols were a terrifying force, but it was not obvious that they would succeed in conquering the region.

As Jebe, Sübedei, and Toquchar moved through Khurasan in the spring and summer of 1220, the major cities they approached – Marw, Nishapur, and Herat – initially submitted and were spared. Smaller cities and towns were spared if they submitted and punished if they resisted, but the army quickly moved on. When the Mongols were no longer present, city populations lost some of their fear. We are best

informed about northwestern Khurasan. In Marw, an anti-Mongol party almost immediately took over, bolstered by the arrival of a troop of Turkmen soldiers from the Khwarazmian army and the return of a former governor, Mujir al-Mulk, who took leadership of the anti-Mongol faction. The nearby city of Sarakhs remained loyal to the Mongols.[14] The people of Nishapur had been ordered to provide provisions and to destroy their walls, but after a short period they also turned against the Mongols, encouraged by the openly rebellious people of Tus.[15]

Over the next year, the Mongols appeared to have mixed success. In the autumn of 1220, Chinggis Khan dispatched an army to Khurasan under his son-in-law Toquchar, who arrived before Nishapur in November and met with stiff opposition. On the third day of the siege, he was killed by an arrow shot from the ramparts, at which his army left Nishapur and took their revenge instead on smaller towns, with massacres at Nuqan and Sabzawar. The people of Nishapur apparently understood the army's departure as a victory and remained in open revolt, seizing all Mongols who came by.[16] Over that winter, Khwarazmian officials began to restore Khwarazm, and several of the Khwarazmshah's sons, including Jalal al-Din Mangubirni, went there to reassemble their troops. Jalal al-Din soon left for Khurasan, meeting a Mongol force on the way, from which he managed to escape; the same force then defeated and killed his brothers as they retreated before a larger Mongol army.[17] However, at about the same time, when Marw was attacked by a Mongol division, the population defeated it and paraded their captives in triumph through the city. They also undertook several military expeditions against pro-Mongol Sarakhs. After this, local animosities resurfaced, and the anti-Mongol party in Marw began to fall apart; the Turkmen troops abandoned Mujir al-Mulk, left the city, and besieged it. When they failed to take it, they pillaged the countryside.[18]

The winter and spring of 1220–21 brought new Mongol aggression but with apparently varying success. The Khwarazmian princes having abandoned Urgench, Jochi, Chaghadai, and Ögödei besieged it. The city mounted a desperate defense, killing many Mongol soldiers and holding out probably until April 1221, when it suffered a particularly severe punishment, with a general massacre of the population and flooding of the town destroying many buildings, though this may have been by accident.[19] In late winter 1221, Chinggis Khan and Tolui crossed the Oxus into Khurasan; Balkh submitted and was spared.[20] However Chinggis Khan then remained stuck by the fortress of Taliqan in northern Khurasan, which held out for several months. Meanwhile, Tolui advanced into Khurasan to restore control, with an army containing large numbers of Iranian soldiers. The military levies taken from conquered cities were now more fully incorporated, and in addition both Khwarazmian commanders and local troops had voluntarily joined the army; more did so as Tolui proceeded through the region.[21] Tolui arrived before Marw in February 1221, defeated the Turkmen troops, and took it after a siege of about eight days. The city was subjected to a general massacre, and Juwayni reports that the people of Sarakhs who had joined Tolui's army participated actively, seeking revenge for the death of their judge, earlier killed by the people of Marw. Tolui then appointed a Mongol overseer (*shahna*), along with an Iranian governor. A few days later, after some of the population had reassembled, another Mongol contingent came by and killed most of them.[22]

From Marw, Tolui proceeded to Nishapur, which also suffered exemplary punishment. An attempt at submission by the city judge (*qadi*) was refused, and the Mongols took the city against the resistance of the population, who fought not only on the walls, but also in the streets. The survivors were driven into the plain, and a total massacre was ordered in revenge for the death of the prominent commander, Chinggis Khan's son-in-law Toquchar, whose widow oversaw some of the killing. Tolui then left for Herat, leaving an emir with 400 Iranians to kill off any survivors who appeared.[23] On Tolui's approach the governor of Herat, Amin Malik, departed for Sistan; the garrison commander held out, but after a week he was killed and the population submitted. The head of the weavers presented costly presents to Tolui, and the city suffered relatively mild punishment. As in Marw, Tolui appointed a Mongol and a Persian governor, who began to restore agriculture.[24]

Although Tolui's army succeeded in its punitive mission, Jalal al-Din Mangubirni was gathering troops and heading towards his appanage in Ghazna. While Chinggis Khan and the main army were still at Taliqan, the governor of Ghazna attacked a Mongol force of several thousand and defeated it. A little later Jalal al-Din defeated another Mongol army; Chinggis sent a larger force against him under his trusted commander Shigi Qutuqu, and Jalal al-Din was again victorious, destroying a large part of Shigi Qutuqu's army. Despite the punishment Khurasanian cities had received, the news of Jalal al-Din's victories raised expectations that he might prevail against the Mongols and brought a rash of new uprisings in the fall of 1221. Several cities in western Khurasan rebelled, including Marw, Sarakhs, Nisa, and Balkh.

The first uprising was in Sarakhs, led by an enemy of the judge who had submitted to the Mongols, and it was put down by the Iranian governor of Marw. However, while he was away the anti-Mongol faction in Marw instigated a rebellion. This was suppressed, but when a large Khwarazmian army arrived and invested the town, a number of inhabitants went over to the Khwarazmians and they took the city. The people of Marw spent the next six months attacking neighboring Mongol forces. A Mongol detachment arrived, conquered the city, and massacred the inhabitants, but after they left, more refugees flooded in and the city again rebelled, now under an anti-Mongol commander from Nisa. This movement was put down by another Mongol contingent, containing significant numbers of Khalaj – tribal Turk – and Afghan (Pashtun) forces, who participated in yet another massacre.[25]

Herat also rebelled in 1221, and here too the impetus came from outside. The governors Tolui had placed in the city – Mongol and Iranian – had decided to arm the population, planning to win favor by adding Herati soldiers to the Mongolian forces. The nearby fortress of Kalyun had successfully withstood two Mongol sieges, and its rulers feared that the military of Herat would be used against them. They therefore smuggled people into the city and staged a rebellion against the Mongols, killing both of the governors. In December 1221, a Mongol army took Herat with large-scale destruction and a general massacre, then attacked Kalyun and killed its commander with his troops.[26] By now Taliqan had fallen, and Chinggis Khan gathered his forces for concerted action. In November of 1221, the Mongol army succeeded in defeating Jalal al-Din and pushed him and his army across the Indus, then spent several months pacifying the region. After this, the cities of Khurasan appear to have remained quiescent for a while, though it required another year for the Mongols to take the fortresses.

In Khurasan, the Mongols had entered a charged political field in which ongoing conflicts influenced the population's reaction to the new conquerors. Cities were divided into factions, and neighboring towns and fortresses were often inimical. Political actors were used to switching sides as necessity or opportunity suggested. The slow pace of the Mongol conquest in its two first years and the division of the army into small forces which could be defeated led many people to believe that they could be repulsed. At the same time Khwarazmian commanders and troops remained active, posing a threat in themselves. Thus, the arrival of the Mongols brought about a surge of violence in which Mongolian, Iranian, and Khwarazmian soldiers were all active participants.

In the fall of 1222 Chinggis Khan recrossed the Amu Darya with the main army, and early in 1223, he headed back towards Mongolia. Mawarannahr became fully part of the Mongol Empire with Samarqand and Bukhara placed under the Khitan Yelü Ahai, who began to restore the region. He imported Chinese, Tangut, and Khitan agriculturalists to offset the loss of manpower; the population of Samarqand had reportedly been reduced to one-fourth of its earlier number, partly due to repeated levies of soldiers.[27] Khurasan was left with Mongol city officials but without a central administration. Jalal al-Din Mangubirni remained several years south of the Amu Darya River trying to carve out a kingdom for himself, then left for Iran, probably in the spring of 1224. Gathering forces in Kerman and Fars, he spent some time in Isfahan, where he gained support, and afterwards headed for Azerbaijan. Tabriz submitted without a struggle on 25 July, 1225. Jalal al-Din could now be considered the ruler of western Iran, along with Isfahan. His campaigns ranged over Georgia, the northern Jazira, and central Iran, and he attempted, unsuccessfully, to win territory in western Anatolia. In the meantime two of his lieutenants remained near Nishapur. In 1227, Chinggis sent an army against Jalal al-Din under Chin Temür, governor of Khwarazm, with little result. Jalal al-Din clashed with Mongol troops several times, most notably outside Isfahan in August 1228, where he won a victory over the Mongol force with the help of the militias of Isfahan.[28]

THE EXPEDITION SENT BY ÖGÖDEI

After Ögödei became Qa'an in 1229, he created branch secretariats in the settled regions of northern China and Turkestan, including Mawarannahr. The secretariats were controlled by the Qa'an, but revenues were shared among the four Chinggisid lines, each of which appointed an agent to represent its interests. Ögödei also enlarged the empire and in 1230 sent a large body of *tamma* troops to Iran under the leadership of Chormaqan, accompanied by Chin Temür. Another army of *tamma* troops under Dayir Noyan was sent to guard Khurasan.[29] The first objective was to defeat Jalal al-Din, but the creation of a third branch secretariat was presumably another goal. The army crossed Khurasan and Mazandaran quickly and captured Rayy. The leaders of southern Iran sent envoys requesting confirmation of their titles, and most northern Iranian cities likewise submitted. Jalal al-Din had wintered in the Mughan steppe and now retreated towards Diyar Bakr, but as the Mongol army approached, he fled into the mountains and was killed by a party of Kurds in August 1231. With the death of Jalal al-Din, Azerbaijan submitted without significant resistance; this region, along with the winter pastures of the Mughan steppe, became Chormaqan's base.[30]

The Mongols were now the preeminent power from Azerbaijan through Khurasan. They centered themselves in regions which contained pastures, fertile land, and trading cities: Azerbaijan, western Khurasan around Tus and Radkan, and to a lesser extent the region of Qunduz, where Dayir Noyan was stationed with his *tamma* troops. The Qunduz region was less rich in urban and agricultural resources than the other Mongol centers but had ample pasture and a strategic location controlling the route to Ghazna and India. Officially, Chormaqan seems to have held responsibility for the whole of the Mongol Middle East, but he limited his activities to central Iran and the regions to the west and north. Isfahan was the hardest city to subdue. However, in 1235–36 the Mongol army was called in by the Shafi'i faction of the city, locked in a bitter contest with the Hanafis. As the Mongol army gathered around the city, the two factions were in open battle. Although the Shafi'is had been promised safety, the Mongols killed many of them, along with the Hanafis, and devastated the city.[31] This punishment may have been due to Isfahan's long resistance.

Over the next few years, Chormaqan began to harass the cities of Iraq, threatening Baghdad; the caliph al-Mustansir called for help but received little aid and was defeated in 1238. However, most of Chormaqan's energy was focused on northwestern Iran and the Caucasus, and by 1239 he had subjugated both Armenia and Georgia, despite significant resistance. A portion of the Georgian kingdom remained as a vassal state under Queen Rusudan.[32] Chormaqan undertook no major actions against the territories of the Seljukid Sultanate of Rum in Anatolia, despite its excellent pastures, and in 1240–41 the Seljuk forces successfully besieged the city of 'Amid in the Diyar Bakr region, from which they obtained a peace treaty. In 639/1241–42, when Chormaqan was struck with paralysis, his second-in-command Baiju took charge of the army and attacked the Rum Sultanate, accompanied by Armenian and Georgian forces. The Sultan Ghiyath al-Din gathered a large army in 1243 and engaged the Mongols at Köse Dagh; he suffered a decisive defeat, and the Mongols seized Sivas, Kayseri, Konya, and Ankara. The Rum Sultanate became a vassal of the Mongols, with a Mongol official assigned to it. Trebizond also became a subject territory.[33] At about this time Mongol armies began to make incursions into northern Syria, securing submission and tribute from Aleppo, Hims, and Damascus. Baghdad, however, remained in the hands of the Caliph.

EARLY MONGOL ADMINISTRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Our principal source on the early Mongol administration of Iran is Juwayni, whose family served the Mongol governors. He provides extensive coverage of administrative power struggles and abuses in tax collection, a subject also well-covered in Armenian sources. However, we are left with little reliable information on either the structures of the administration or the types of taxation levied. This problem may be due to the *ad hoc* nature of the early Mongol administration. The Mongol Empire was a radically new phenomenon, based on a combination of imperial and local traditions from the steppe, China, and the Middle East. In the early period, institutions were subject to change and to local interpretation. From the beginning a Mongol official, called *basqaq* or *daruqachi* (usually *shahna* in Islamic sources), was appointed to the larger conquered cities, governing in tandem with a local official;

this has been shown, for instance, in Marw and Herat. Subjugated cities had to provide supplies, labor, and levies of soldiers for the Mongol army. Regional rulers who accepted Mongol suzerainty were likewise subject to tribute and expected to participate in military campaigns. A more articulated administration began under Ögödei. We know that in the mid-1230s a census was ordered for taxation.[34] Thus, from this time at least there was presumably some regular taxation; given the importance of Iranian bureaucrats in the administration, this may have included traditional taxes such as the *kharaj*.

Restoration of agriculture had begun during the reign of Chinggis Khan and accelerated under Ögödei. The Mongol governor Körgüz undertook the restoration of Tus, where the Mongols centered their administration; he built administrative buildings and laid out parks, while officials and *maliks* restored canals, mansions, and the bazaar. Ögödei also created the *yam*, a system of stations with horses and accommodation for official travelers.

The overall organization of the Middle East is not fully explained and may not have been explicitly laid out. In some cases, the central court seems to have deliberately created overlapping jurisdictions, putting up with friction and inefficiency in order to prevent the creation of secure power bases in distant provinces. Within the Islamic lands the uncertain nature of the overall governorship led to constant struggles. The contest was not only among the Mongol officials but also within the local leadership, who often involved regional Mongol personnel and the central court in their quarrels. One of the striking aspects of early Mongol administration is the direct relationship between the court at Qaraqorum and even minor regional *maliks* in secondary cities and regions. By travelling to Qaraqorum, *maliks* had the chance not only of securing their own positions but also of expanding their holdings. For the court at Qaraqorum, contacts with local powers probably helped to limit the independence of regional Mongol officials.

Chormaqan and Dayir Noyan had both been sent to the Islamic lands in 1230, each with a *tamma* army: Chormaqan to conquer the western areas and Dayir to garrison the eastern ones. It appears that Chormaqan had primary authority over the central Islamic lands; in any case, he soon deputized the commander Chin Temür, who had accompanied him, to take charge of Khurasan, which was again in turmoil. This is where the first troubles arose. It was not only resistance to Mongol rule – and continuing support of the Khwarazmshahs – that caused problems, but almost equally dissention among the Mongol leadership, whose chain of command appears to have been unclear. The first disagreement appeared not long after the death of Jalal al-Din Mangubirni, two of whose agents remained active in Khurasan, one of them, Qaracha, in the Nishapur region. According to Juwayni, Ögödei ordered Dayir Noyan to lead his army against Qaracha and punish the Khurasanians for their unruliness; arriving in the Nishapur region, Dayir found that Chin Temür had already sent an army and defeated Qaracha. Dayir pursued Qaracha to Sistan, where he had taken over the capital city of Zeranj. After a siege of two years, Dayir conquered Zeranj and sent envoys to Chin Temür, claiming that the governorship of Khurasan was his by order of the Qa'an.[35] It is not clear whether this claim was legitimate.[36] In any case, Chin Temür refused to accept it, claiming to be protecting the population from undeserved punishment by Dayir.

When Chormaqan ordered Chin Temür to join him in the west, Chin Temür ignored the order and turned directly to Ögödei, sending two regional rulers under his jurisdiction to curry favor at court. One of these was Baha' al-Din of Suluk, north of Isfarayn, who had submitted to Chin Temür specifically on condition that he be sent to the Qa'an's court. The other local ruler was the Mongol ally Nusrat al-Din of Kabud-Jama in Mazandaran. The arrival of these men greatly pleased Ögödei and won Chin Temür the governorship he sought. Both Baha' al-Din and Nusrat al-Din were likewise richly rewarded with additional territories.[37] One should note here that Chin Temür's family continued to be associated with the local powers of Mazandaran after this. Dayir Noyan patronized the Ghurid *malik* Rukn al-Din Kart, who controlled the Khaysar fortress east of Herat and had been granted a patent by Chinggis Khan.[38]

Chin Temür died around 1235–36, not long after the victorious return of his emissaries and the creation of a new provincial administration. He was replaced as governor by Nosal, an aged and apparently ineffectual man. New dissentions now arose, with Chin Temür's Uyghur agent Körgüz pitted against Nosal and Chin Temür's young son Edigü Temür, promoted to the governorship. This struggle presents a useful illustration of the power dynamics of the time. The two parties disputing power were not defined by rank or by ethnicity; both Körgüz's and Edigü Temür's factions contained local *maliks*, Iranian bureaucrats, and high-ranking figures at Ögödei's court. Early in Nosal's administration two *maliks* of western Khurasan, one of them again Baha' al-Din of Suluk and the other Mahmud Shah of Sabzawar, visited Ögödei's court to resolve a dispute with other parties unnamed. Baha' al-Din returned with the message that Körgüz should come to Ögödei's court with these two *maliks* and "some of the leading men of Khurasan" (*HWC,* I, 492–494) to report on matters in Khurasan. In Juwayni's account, the question debated at court appears to have been the rivalry between Körgüz and Nosal. Ögödei was encouraged by members of his entourage, notably his powerful servitor Chinqai, to favor Körgüz on the grounds that he was preferred by the great men of Khurasan. Others, including another powerful figure, Danishmand Hajji, favored settling the governorship on Edigü Temür. The decision was to give Körgüz provisional control over taxation and the census to see how he performed. He returned to Khurasan and began to assert his power at Nosal's expense.[39]

Nosal now allied with Edigü Temür against Körgüz, backed by people whom Juwayni refers to as "short-sighted foolish Mazandaranis."[40] Bureaucrats were involved as well; it is clear that the Juwayni family was aligned with Körgüz, while their enemy, the vizier Sharaf al-Din Khwarazmi, worked with the faction of Edigü Temür. After his successful return, Körgüz's enemies continued to attack him and sent an envoy to Ögödei's court with complaints; these were welcomed and used there by people wishing to discredit Chinqai, and several functionaries were sent off to Khurasan to investigate. Seeing this as a good sign, Edigü Temür's party took sticks and beat the *malik*s, *bitikchi*s (scribes), and ministers out of Körgüz's house into their own encampment. However, Ögödei then issued orders that all parties come to the central court for a decision. This was good news for Körgüz, who now forced the staff out of Edigü Temür's quarters back into his own. At court, Körgüz won Ögödei to his side and in 1239 returned triumphant as recognized governor, while Edigü Temür and his allies were punished.[41]

After Ögödei's death, however, Sharaf al-Din Khwarazmi, allied with the *malik* Mahmud Shah, succeeded in having Körgüz arrested; a number of his functionaries and local protégés were also seized. In 641/1243–44, Ögödei's widow Töregene appointed Arghun Aqa as governor.[42] Within Arghun's administration, Sharaf al-Din Khwarazmi again gained influence; he in turn rewarded his ally Mahmud Shah by appointing him to collect the taxes of Isfarayn and other territories under the control of Mahmud Shah's old enemy (and Körgüz's supporter) Malik Nizam al-Din.[43] What we see here then is contests for power at several levels; rivalry among *maliks* in Khurasan, enmities within the *diwan*, a struggle over the governorship in Khurasan, and finally the contest between Chinqai and others for power in the central court. Each struggle involved people at all levels, and the Iranians – both *maliks* and bureaucrats – played a significant role. The wishes of the "great men of Khurasan" were taken into consideration at Ögödei's court in deciding the governorship, and it is also clear that the personnel working closely with the governor included *maliks* along with scribes and other functionaries.

Another area of conflict was the relationship between the governorship, centered primarily in Khurasan, and the military forces under Chormaqan, and later Baiju, in the west. Chin Temür's appointment as governor had marked a diminution of the power granted originally to Chormaqan, who remained active but may have had primarily military power from this time on. When Körgüz became governor in 1239, he sent his son to Iraq, Arran, and Azerbaijan to reform tax collection. Chormaqan and his commanders resisted the new regime but without success. The *noyan*s and emirs who had been collecting tax and not handing it on now reportedly had to give up their gains.[44] While Körgüz seems to have remained in Khurasan, Arghun, when he became governor in 641/1243–44, almost immediately set out for the west, once more to bring an end to exploitation by Mongol commanders. By this time Baiju was the leading commander.[45] Despite Arghun's energetic action on taxes, it is clear that irregularities and extortion continued, and only a few years later Juwayni again states that Arghun was working to right the wrongs of extortionate tax collectors.

After Möngke came to the throne in 1251, there was another census and a new tax system introduced into the Islamic lands, consistent with those levied elsewhere: the *tamgha*, a tax on trade; the *qubchur*, designating both a tax on livestock for nomads and a poll tax on settled populations; and the *qalan*, which included both the traditional *kharaj* and the corvée. Arghun at first chose to introduce the *qubchur* (the poll tax) not as a graduated tax, higher for the rich than the poor, but as a flat sum for all. However, it caused so much hardship that he soon had to change it to a graduated tax. Taxation was now more regular, but the population seems to have found it even more onerous, judging at least from the Armenian sources.[46] Arghun had clear jurisdiction over the whole of the Mongol Middle East, but, like Körgüz, he found himself under attack and was constantly traveling to and from Qaraqorum to counter the machinations against him. Through astute management, he managed to preserve both his life and a high position through the arrival of Hülegü to his death in 1275.[47]

Under Ögödei, Iran became a third branch secretariat administered not only through governors appointed by the Qa'an, but also through agents of the four Chinggisid houses.[48] The secretariat added another layer of political rivalry, since each Chinggisid house used its agents to push for greater income and influence.

The situation was particularly difficult during the interregnums between Ögödei and Güyük from 1241 to 1246 and between Güyük and Möngke from 1248 to 1251, when strong central power was absent. The most successful contestant was Batu, of the Jochid *ulus*, who had considerable influence throughout Iran.[49] The history of Herat provides a good example of the way politics worked in the branch secretariat. As I mentioned above, during the original conquest the people of the nearby Kalyun fortress had engineered a rebellion in Herat, leading to severe punishment. During Ögödei's reign, the Mongol *shahna* in Herat collaborated with the Iranian official 'Izz al-Din – originally head of the weavers – to restore the city. However, learning about this, a native of Kalyun, Majd al-Din Kaliyuni, saw an opportunity to gain power in the region. He traveled with a few horsemen to the court of Batu, who granted him writs of authority *(paiza or gerege)* and sent him to Körgüz, who, always in need of allies, sent him to Herat.[50] Within a few months, Majd al-Din had gained power over the city and paid his debts by consistently favoring the Mongol parties who had backed him, slighting the agents of all other Mongol houses. However, Majd al-Din soon made enemies within the city; he was murdered and in 642/1244–45 his son, who succeeded him, was likewise killed.[51] The absence of leadership in Herat provided an opportunity for the *tümen* commander Dayir Noyan to promote his own protégé, the Ghurid Shams al-Din Muhammad Kart who, following his uncle Rukn al-Din of Khaysar, had been in Dayir's service for some time. On the accession of Möngke in 1251, Shams al-Din traveled to Qaraqorum and received a patent for the region, which his descendants ruled through the Mongol period and beyond.

What we see in early Mongol Iran then is a struggle for power in which Iranian local rulers and regional Mongol functionaries are equally involved, and it is sometimes unclear which struggle produced the other. It is useful to remember that local Iranian forces had been fighting alongside – or within – the Mongol army almost from the beginning of Chinggis Khan's conquest. The royal Mongol courts staffed with Iranian bureaucrats have long been considered the center of acculturation, but much cooperation and cultural influence undoubtedly occurred through provincial politics and military alliances. It is probably for this reason that conversion to Islam within the Mongol army preceded the conversion of Ilkhanid monarchs; it was already well underway before the accession of Tegüder Ahmad (1282–84), the first Ilkhan to adopt Islam.[52] By that time Mongol soldiers and administrators had been in the region for 60 years, interacting with Iranians at many levels.

HÜLEGÜ'S CAMPAIGN

Like Ögödei, Möngke (1251–59) secured his power by expanding the realm; in this case he was also solidifying the power of the Toluid house by sending his brothers to campaign in China and Iran. Hülegü went west with two primary objectives: to take Baghdad from the Abbasid Caliph and to overthrow the Nizari Isma'ilis, who continued to harass the population from fortified strongholds. There is disagreement among scholars about whether or not Möngke also intended to create a new and separate realm in Iran under Hülegü.[53] Until this time the Isma'ilis had not suffered from Mongol attacks, since they had submitted to the Mongols shortly after Chinggis Khan's arrival. However, after the death of their common enemy, the

Khwarazmshah, relations between the Isma'ilis and the Mongols had cooled and seem to have become inimical with the Isma'ili assassination of one of Chormaqan's officers, probably sometime after 1243.[54]

Hülegü led a large army assembled from Toluid regiments, reportedly with two men from every *tümen*, in addition to armies led by Chinggisid princes from various houses and soldiers from the Onggirat and Oirat tribes, which had married into the dynasty and campaigned under their own commanders.[55] Elaborate preparations were made for the campaign, with pasture lands cleared and prepared and provisions secured years in advance. The progress was leisurely; Hülegü set out from Mongolia in October 1253 and crossed the Amu Darya in January 1256. His advance guard under Ket Buqa was dispatched earlier and began campaigning against Isma'ili strongholds in Quhistan well before Hülegü's arrival.[56]

The grand master of the Isma'ilis, Rukn al-Din Khurshah, now attempted to come to terms with the Mongols, sending various members of his family to Hülegü, though not dismantling his fortresses. The Mongol army besieged him at his stronghold in Maymundiz and he was forced to submit, after which he joined the Mongol army and sent out contingents to reduce other fortresses. Alamut and Lammasar, however, held out, and the Mongols took them by force. After this, Khurshah was no longer of use and was put to death, along with numerous other Isma'ilis. The defeat of the Isma'ilis was useful not only for reasons of increased security, but also because it won good will among much of the population. From Alamut, the philosopher and astronomer Nasir al-Din Tusi was attached to Hülegü's court, along with at least some of the library and astronomical instruments.

The other objective was the overthrow of the Abbasid caliphate. Hülegü attempted to negotiate a surrender, but the Caliph refused all overtures, perhaps because of conflicting advice from his highly factionalized advisors. When asked to contribute troops to the Mongol army, he refused. Therefore, Hülegü gathered a huge army, including Baiju's forces, along with Georgian and Armenian allies, and attacked the city on 29 January, 1258. We have unusually detailed information on this conquest, including accounts from people who witnessed it. Baghdad resisted and was taken by force with considerable violence. Although there was a large-scale massacre it was carefully controlled, as we learn from the testimony of the musician 'Abd al-Mu'min al-Urmawi. Al-Urmawi reported that he had saved his neighborhood by meeting the Mongol commander – probably Baiju – at the gate of the quarter, inviting him to stay at his house, and offering to give him anything he desired. He provided lavish entertainment on silken carpets with the best food, wine, and singing girls, sending out people from the neighborhood to gather precious gifts to present every day. In this way his neighborhood was spared destruction, and he himself was taken to Hülegü's court, where he subsequently enjoyed gainful employment.[57] Several other groups were also protected; Christians were largely spared, as were Shi'is from Kufa and Hilla; the same could be said of a group of merchants who had earlier contacted the Mongols, and some high officials. The Mongols sent guards to ensure that these groups were not attacked.[58] The protection given to specific groups in Baghdad recalls the conquest of Samarqand, in which the judge, several notables, and a significant number of inhabitants were shielded.[59] It is likely that similar arrangements were made in other cities as well. Once the conquest was over, Hülegü swiftly moved to restore the city, then on 20 February left for Azerbaijan,

where he spent over a year and began to build the astronomical observatory at which Nasir al-Din Tusi would work.

In September 1259, Hülegü set out for Syria, once again sending Ket Buqa ahead with the advance guard. Syria and Egypt probably appeared an easy target, since they had been in turmoil for the last decade. In addition, a number of local rulers were already vassals of the Mongols. The Ayyubid dynasty had lost power in Egypt, and the Mamluk Qutuz had only recently begun his rise within a complex power struggle. Syria was contested among Ayyubid princes and a variety of other people. The Ayyubid al-Nasir al-Din Yusuf, a vassal of the Mongols, had gained control of much of northern Syria, including Aleppo, Damascus, and Hims, but was unable to extend his rule into Palestine and Egypt.[60] When Hülegü arrived in Iraq, however, al-Nasir behaved rather like the Caliph, changing his attitude in reaction to conflicting advice, sending envoys instead of attending on Hülegü in person, and finally adopting a defiant attitude.[61]

Hülegü's army in Syria included the soldiers of the Armenian king Het'um and his Crusader son-in-law, Bohemund VI of Antioch. It was joined likewise by some princes who had lost their patrimonies to Nasir al-Din.[62] The first major target was Aleppo, which the army attacked on 18 January, 1260, and took a week later, subjecting it to looting and massacre. At this time Nasir al-Din was in Damascus but did not come to the defense of Aleppo. Not long after this, Hülegü departed for Azerbaijan, leaving Ket Buqa behind with an army of probably 10,000–12,000. Hülegü's departure is usually explained as a reaction to the news of Möngke's death and a desire to be ready for a political struggle. Other motives may have contributed: doubt that Syria had the resources to support a large army and worry about the security of the border with the increasingly hostile Jochid *ulus*.[63] Ket Buqa continued the campaign in Syria, at first with considerable success. Both Damascus and Hama quickly sent envoys to offer submission. Part of the army undertook a sweep through Palestine, where it gathered booty and annihilated the rear guard of Nasir al-Din's army. Ket Buqa himself captured and destroyed Baalbek and 'Ajlun.[64]

What changed the equation in Syria was the leadership of the Mamluk Sultan Qutuz. Although he had been a rising power for some time, Qutuz did not formally claim full power until November 1259, two months after Hülegü's departure for Syria. At that time, he was still threatened by other ambitious powers, most notably the Bahri Mamluks. However, during the campaign in Syria, Qutuz's forces were enlarged by numerous groups fleeing from the Mongols, and he was joined by the powerful Bahri Mamluk Baybars, who had left Egypt to serve the Ayyubid princes but now returned. Hülegü sent an embassy to demand submission; Qutuz had the envoy killed and assembled a large army to meet the Mongols. When the two armies met at 'Ayn Jalut in Palestine, on 3 September, 1260, Ket Buqa suffered a disastrous defeat and was killed in battle.[65]

In and of itself, the defeat at 'Ayn Jalut was not entirely novel; small Mongol armies had suffered defeats before, by Jalal al-Din, for instance, both at Isfahan and earlier against Shigi Qutuqu. In this case, however, the Mongols did not come back to assert their control, and the victory thus established the prestige and power of the new Mamluk Sultanate. By the time the Mongols returned to Syria about 30 years later, the Mamluks were strong enough to resist them. Syria and Egypt remained outside the Mongol realm.

NOTES

1 Buell 1992, 4–16.
2 See for example: *HWC*, I, 84–85, 118, 137. 146, 159, 175.
3 Manz 2015, 12–15.
4 Broadbridge 2018, 155–157; Jackson 2017, 90.
5 *HWC*, I, 102–107.
6 May 2018, 32–33, 50–56.
7 *HWC*, I, 85.
8 *HWC*, I, 116–122.
9 Jackson 2017, 79.
10 Bartold 1968, 432.
11 May 2016, 13–14.
12 Paul 2016, 173–210.
13 Jackson 2000, 207–235.
14 *HWC*, I, 145–146, 154–155; Manz 2015, 19.
15 *HWC*, I, 173.
16 *HWC*, I, 174–176.
17 Bartold 1968, 432.
18 *HWC*, I, 156–159.
19 Bartold 1968, 433–437.
20 Jackson 2017, 159.
21 Manz 2015, 12–13; Jackson 2017, 89–90.
22 *HWC*, I, 160–163.
23 *HWC*, I, 176–178.
24 Manz 2015, 19.
25 *HWC*, I, 164–167; Bartold 1968, 447–449.
26 Manz 2015, 19–20.
27 *HWC*, I, 122.
28 May 2012, 129–130; Durand-Guédy 2005, 599–600.
29 May 2012, 120; Jackson 2017, 82.
30 May 2012, 131–132.
31 Woods 1977, 50–51.
32 Jackson 2017, 83; May 2012, 133–137.
33 May 2016, 25–26.
34 *HWC*, I, 493.
35 *HWC*, I, 483–485.
36 See May 2012, 130, 143–145; Jackson 2017, 109.
37 *HWC*, I, 485–487.
38 Haravi 1944, 151.
39 *HWC*, I, 488–489, 492–494.
40 *HWC*, I, 495–497.
41 *HWC*, I, 494–500.
42 *HWC*, I, 501–506, 534–537.
43 *HWC*, I, 538–543.
44 *HWC*, I, 500–501.
45 *HWC*, I, 507–508.
46 Lane 1999, 466–469, 472.
47 Lane 1999, 462–463, 474, 480–482.
48 Jackson 2017, 109.
49 Jackson 2017, 120–122.

50 Haravi, 153–156.
51 Manz 2015, 20–21; Lane 2003, 154–155.
52 Pfeiffer 2006, 369–760.
53 Jackson 2017, 138–148.
54 May 2004, 232–238.
55 Hope 2016, 97–100.
56 May 2004, 235.
57 Biran 2018, 18–30.
58 Gilli-Elewy 2011, 267–268.
59 *HWC*, I, 120.
60 Irwin 1986, 26–31.
61 Amitai Preiss 1995, 19–24.
62 Amitai Preiss 1995, 19–20, 25–27.
63 Amitai Preiss 1995, 26–29.
64 Amitai Preiss 1995, 30–33.
65 Irwin 1986, 32–34; Amitai 1995, 32–45.

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HWC, See List of Abbreviations.
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CHAPTER TWELVE

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CAUCASIA

John Latham-Sprinkle

The most powerful state in the early thirteenth-century South Caucasus was undoubtedly the Kingdom of Georgia. Following its consolidation and expansion under Queen T'amar (r.1184–1213), Georgia was at the height of its power, ruled by T'amar's son, Giorgi IV Lasha (r.1213–23). All of the Georgian-speaking lands, most importantly Imeret'i to the west of the Lixi Mountains and K'art'li to the east, were united under a single monarch, a rare event for a country that had been divided between different rulers for most of its history.[1] Moreover, following Georgia's expansion during T'amar's reign, its kings were now hegemons of a larger empire. This included the northern half of the Armenian lands, including the great cities of Ani and Dvin; the Armeno-Georgian marchlands of Somxit'i, south of Tiflis; and the powerful principality of Siwnik, in the approximate area of modern Nakhichevan.[2]

However, royal attempts to centralize power during the preceding century had been largely unsuccessful, and Georgian politics was dominated by powerful noble families.[3] Most of the major offices of state were held by members of the Kurdish-Armenian Zak'arian clan (also known as Mxargrzeli in Georgian sources). Ivane Zak'arian held the rank of *atabeg* (vizier) until his death in 1227, whereupon he was succeeded by his son, Avag. The office of *amirspasalar* (constable) was held by the son of Ivane's brother Zak'are (d.1211), Shahnshe Zak'arian. Another son of Zak'are, Varam of Gag, was one of the most powerful magnates of eastern Georgia. Between them, these members of the Zak'arian clan dominated the Armenian marchlands and Georgian politics. However, other nobles, such as the brothers Shalva and Ivane, lords of Axalt'sixe in southwest Georgia, and the Orbelean family of the principality of Siwnik, looked on warily at their power.

The Georgians stood in an uneasy relationship with the Muslim principalities to the east, in the territory of modern Azerbaijan. Ibn al-Athir described a cycle of raiding, negotiation, and largely symbolic submission between these polities, which he called 'the best of enemies.'[4] While the Shirvanshahs – a long-standing Muslim dynasty (861–1538) with their capital at Shamakhi, near Baku – were consistent,

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if distant, vassals of the Georgian kings, the more southerly cities of Ganja and Baylaqan and the failing dynasty of the Ildegizids (1136–1225), based in Tabriz, stood in a more antagonistic position to the Georgians.

Meanwhile, to the north of the Great Caucasus Mountains, there was no such hegemonic state. By the early thirteenth century, the kingdoms of Alania and Sarir, which had dominated the Central North Caucasus and Daghistan during the eighth to twelfth centuries, had declined.[5] While it was still possible to form loose regional confederations, such as that which formed in Alania under the leadership of a certain Ajis to oppose the Mongol invasion of 1238–39, the main political unit appears to have been the *As*: a local village or valley community united by ties of real or imagined kinship.[6] Their settlements were frequently located on inaccessible heights and could be extremely difficult to capture, as the Mongols would discover. While the evidence is very uncertain, it seems that the western part of the North Caucasus, populated by the Adyghe or Circassians, had a similar political structure. Rashid al-Din mentions a certain Buqan, king of Circassia; however, what this title indicates is unclear.[7]

Our sources for this time period vary widely in quantity and quality. Certain elements of the Mongol invasion of the Caucasus, notably the campaigns against Armenia and Georgia in 1220–21 and 1235–36, are attested by multiple sources from different historiographical traditions. On the other hand, the campaigns in Circassia and Dagestan in 1238–40 can only be reconstructed in the broadest of outlines. The principal reason for this is the florescence of an indigenous South Caucasian historical tradition, whereas North Caucasian traditions of written history were relatively sparse both before and after this period.[8] By this point, the Armenian historical tradition was overwhelmingly dominated by ecclesiastical chronicles, although some secular chroniclers such as Step'annos Orbelean did also appear.[9] The Georgian historiographical tradition, by contrast, remained largely under royal control, which could result in overtly political distortions of the historical record.[10] Despite these biases and the general trend of presenting the Mongol invasions in apocalyptic terms, both traditions present a relatively nuanced picture of interactions with the Mongols. For example, the early fourteenth-century *Hundred Years' Chronicle*, our best Georgian source for the period, explicitly models its descriptions of the Mongol invasions after the biblical destruction of Jerusalem by the Assyrians but also frequently praises their morals and conduct.[11] This nuanced picture provides an important corrective to much of the historiography of the Mongol invasions of the Caucasus, particularly from the Soviet period, which considers these a uniquely destructive set of campaigns.[12] Our principal sources are rounded out by the Arabic and Persian historiographical traditions, of which Ibn al-Athir and Rashid al-Din's accounts are particularly important for the campaigns of 1220–23 and 1238–40 respectively. Finally, a number of other historical traditions, notably accounts of European travellers and the Chinese *Yuan Shi*, provide important information on the Mongol campaigns in the North Caucasus.

THE FIRST MONGOL INVASION OF 1220–23 AND ITS AFTERMATH

The initial Mongol invasions of the South Caucasus appear to have been proximate and accidental, a result of Sübedei and Jebe's pursuit of the Khwarazmshah

Muhammad.[13] Their force of two *tümen*, initially numbering some 20,000 men, seems to have been considerably reduced by the time it arrived in the Caucasus – the generally reliable Georgian *Hundred Years' Chronicle* describes it as numbering only 12,000 by January 1221.[14] According to Ibn al-Athir, this force's arrival in the South Caucasus appears to have been a consequence of the need to winter in pastureland following the campaigns of 1220.[15] For this purpose, the most useful area in the South Caucasus was the Mughan steppe of modern Azerbaijan, an area of grassland that would gain critical importance as a base area for later Mongol armies.

Despite the existence of multiple sources for this first Mongol campaign in the Caucasus, the course of the following events and the precise order in which they occurred is rather confused. For example, the near-contemporary Georgian *Chronicle of Giorgi Lasha* claims that the Mongols invaded Georgia twice, being defeated both times, despite most other sources claiming that it was in fact the Georgians who were defeated; and the generally reliable Armenian chronicle of Kirakos Gandzakets'i claims that the Mongol army invaded the South Caucasus from the north via the pass of Darband, not from Iran, as is recorded by practically every other source.[16] Nevertheless, with the significant exception of several near-contemporary Georgian sources, which will be addressed at the end of this section, most major sources broadly agree on the outlines of the campaign.

Around the time of the Mongols' initial move into the Mughan steppe in late 1220, they clashed with and defeated a smaller force of Georgian troops, possibly somewhere near Tiflis.[17] According to Ibn al-Athir and Rashid al-Din, this Georgian force numbered 10,000.[18] This number is broadly corroborated by the letters sent in 1223 to Pope Honorius III by Queen Rusudan (r.1223–45), sister and successor of Giorgi Lasha, and her *atabeg*, Ivane Zak'arian. These state that the Georgians suffered 6,000 casualties in an initial clash with the Mongols.[19] It appears that this clash came as a surprise to the Georgians, since they had apparently been informed that the Mongols were Christians and potential allies against the Muslim states of the region; Ivane Zak'arian's letter to Pope Honorius states that 'the Tartars, with a cross preceding them, entered our land and under the guise of the Christian religion deceived us'.[20] Following this engagement the Mongols returned to the Mughan steppe for the winter. Meanwhile, the Georgians set about raising forces for a spring campaign, making alliances with Uzbek b. Pahlawan, the Ildegizid lord of Tabriz, and al-Ashraf b. al-'Adil, lord of the principality of Khilat on Lake Van.[21]

However, the Mongols struck first. Recruiting a force of local allies under the leadership of one of Uzbek's former commanders, the mamluk Aqush, they moved out of the Mughan steppe in December 1220 or January 1221. In January 1221, Jebe and Sübedei met the main Georgian field army, which was commanded by King Giorgi Lasha. This Georgian army, somewhat implausibly placed at 90,000 men by the *Hundred Years' Chronicle*, consisted of the royal army, the forces of the Zak'arian princes Ivane and Varam of Gag, possibly other vassal contingents such as that of Hamid al-Dawla, the Lord of Manasgom, and Alan mercenaries from the North Caucasus.[22] While the precise location of this battle is disputed, it clearly took place in the Armeno-Georgian marchlands of Somxit'i, on a plain near a river – most likely the Plain of Kotman, near modern Bagratshen.[23] While it resulted in a Mongol victory, this was clearly a hard-fought engagement. Ibn al-Athir claims that the Mongol vanguard, comprising Aqush and his local allies, suffered heavy losses

at the hand of the Georgians.[24] However, it seems clear that the Mongols, coming up to support Aqush, were able to use their classic feigned retreat tactic to break the cohesion of the Georgian forces.[25] The disruption of the Georgian army may have been exacerbated by poor co-ordination between its right wing, under the command of Varam of Gag, and the left wing under Ivane Zak'arian, which failed to come to Varam's support at a crucial moment.[26] In any case, while the Mongols won the day, they retreated to Azerbaijan relatively soon afterwards due to the strength of Georgian opposition. This allowed the Georgians to claim victory in their official correspondence.[27]

Following a raid towards Mosul, Irbil, and Hamadan during the spring and summer of 1221, Jebe and Sübedei returned to the Mughan steppe around September 1221 and extorted further funds from Tabriz and the city of Ganja on the Georgian border.[28] They conquered the city of Baylaqan in October or November 1221, an event which, together with a Georgian raid in 1223 and a further Mongol capture of the city in 1235, appears to have effectively destroyed it.[29] Following this, the Mongols renewed their invasion of Georgia, advancing towards Tiflis as far as the village of Agara. However, faced with a superior Georgian force under the command of King Giorgi Lasha, the Mongols elected to retreat without offering battle.[30]

Following their withdrawal, Jebe and Sübedei brought their forces to the Emirate of Shirvan, in the north of modern Azerbaijan. They attacked and took the city of Shamakhi, the Shirvanshahs' capital, in a terrific struggle but failed to take the city of Baku, according to the geographer Abd al-Rashid al-Bakuvi (fl. 806–16/1403–14).[31] Under the guise of peace negotiations, they forced a group of emissaries from the Shirvanshah to show the Mongol army a difficult pass through the Great Caucasus Mountains, bypassing the defences of the stronghold of Darband on the Caspian coast, which subsequently submitted to the Mongols.[32]

At this point the Mongols encountered the peoples of the North Caucasus. In early 1222, after swiftly sweeping through the highland territories of the Daghistani Lakz (Lezgian) people, the Mongols were confronted by a powerful force of Alan troops, who had allied with a group of Qipchaqs, a Turkic people of the steppes to the north.[33] This Alan-Qipchaq force, under the command of Iurgii, son of the Qipchaq prince Konchak, and an Alan leader called "T'a-t'a-ha-erh" by the *Yuan Shi*, initially fought Jebe and Sübedei's army to a standstill.[34] However, the Mongols were able to split the alliance by striking a deal with the Qipchaqs, allowing them to defeat the Alans. Following this, Jebe and Sübedei's army moved into the Qipchaq Steppe to the north before encountering the Rus' princes at the Kalka River.

While undoubtedly destructive, this first Mongol invasion does not seem to have had a decisive impact on the course of events in the South Caucasus. The pattern of regular raids, intermarriage and shifting alliances between Georgia and its eastern neighbours swiftly resumed; and while the Georgian forces had been defeated, the Mongols had withdrawn from Georgia twice, allowing the Georgian court to launch a concerted propaganda campaign to claim that they had, in fact, been victorious.[35] Far more destructive to the region's political order were the indirect consequences of the Mongol invasions. While a Qipchaq incursion into Shirvan and Arran in 1222 was defeated by the Georgians, the invasions of the fugitive Khwarazmian army of Jalal al-Din, son of the Khwarazmshah, were extremely damaging.[36] Notably,



Map 12.1 The Caucasus region in the 13th century
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

following Jalal al-Din's capture of Tiflis in 1226, the eastern half of Georgia was effectively severed from royal control, and Rusudan's attempts to have her son David Narin recognized as heir were thwarted by the eastern magnates' inability to attend his coronation.[37] This was the effective start of Georgia's division into two kingdoms, a process which would accelerate once the Mongols returned in the 1230s and 1240s.

THE SECOND MONGOL INVASION OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, 1236–45

Whereas the Mongols had entered the South Caucasus in their first invasion almost by accident, their second invasion was a deliberate conquest. And whereas their first invasion had been met by a concerted and united Georgian resistance, by the late 1230s, the weakened state of the Georgian kingdom rendered such concerted opposition impossible.

The prelude to the Mongol conquest of Georgia and its Armenian vassals was the movement of the Mongol general Chormaqan, dispatched to Iran with an army of 30,000 men, into the Mughan steppes.[38] Apart from a relatively brief sojourn in Mughan in 1230 during the pursuit of Jalal al-Din, it is not clear exactly when Chormaqan set up his base camp in this area.[39] Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog and Timothy May respectively suggest that this took place in 1231 or 1233.[40] Following this, it appears that Chormaqan spent several years securing his flanks and by 1235 had reduced the cities of western Iran and conquered the Muslim cities of Ganja and Baylaqan in Arran.[41]

The exact date of the Mongol invasion of Armenia and Georgia is also not known; the general consensus is 1236, following Step'annos Orbelean and Step'annos Episkopos, although a slightly earlier date has also been suggested.[42] The Georgian kingdom, weakened by internal division and frequent wars, was unable to create a single army to resist the Mongol invasion. Contemporaries blamed this state of affairs on Queen Rusudan, although her being prevented by custom from leading the army like a king undoubtedly did not help matters.[43] In the face of the Mongol advance, Rusudan repeated her tactic from Jalal al-Din's invasion and retreated to the safety of Imeret'i, behind the Lixi Mountains, ordering Tiflis to be destroyed to deny it to the enemy.[44] The Armenian and Georgian lords of the kingdom generally retreated to their fortresses to wait out the Mongol advance.

With no Georgian field army to oppose them, the Mongol army was able to divide into several columns to besiege the various Georgian and Armenian fortresses. It appears that each column pursued a specific Armeno-Georgian magnate, fanning out into the foothills of the Armenian plateau and besieging fortresses one by one until their target was cornered. Chormaqan set up his headquarters on the banks of Lake Sevan, from where he appears to have been able to co-ordinate the various columns' activities. Chaghadai *noyan* pursued the *amirspasalar* Shahnshe Zak'arian to the city of Lori, as well as taking the fortresses of Dmanisi and Samsvilde and the city of Tiflis.[45] However, Shahnshe was able to escape Lori to the west, leaving the city's defence to his father-in-law, who was executed by the Mongols after its fall.[46] Aslan *noyan* was sent southwards into the principality of Siwnik, where the local ruler, Elikum Orbelean, submitted to the Mongols.[47] Detachments under Ghatagha *noyan*

and Jukh-Bugha *noyan* also headed south into the regions of Charek' and Khachen (modern Nagorno-Karabakh), taking Getabek, Vardanashat, and Khokanaberd.[48] Molghor *noyan* led a column from Shamkhor, which was taken in a fierce assault, into Somxit'i, the Armeno-Georgian marchland south of Tiflis. There they besieged a series of fortresses under the rule of Varam of Gag: Terunakan, Ergevank', Matsnaberd, Gardman, and Ch'arenk.[49] A final column, under the command of Itughata *noyan*, struck southeast towards Lake Sevan, besieging Avag Zak'arian, son of Ivane, in the fortress of Kayen.[50] Avag, after lengthy negotiations, submitted to Chormaqan, who offered relatively generous terms in return for forcing Avag to accompany his main force in a campaign against the cities of Ani, Kars, and Surp Mari.[51] Following Avag's submission, most of the major magnates of Armenia and Eastern Georgia also submitted to the Mongols, notably Shahnshe and Varam of Gag.[52] This would begin a new chapter in Armenian-Mongol relations, described by Dashdondog in Chapter 44 in this volume.

Reading lists of fortresses which submitted to the Mongols can sometimes feel rather abstract and give little indication of the uncertainty and fear which the advance of these unfamiliar armies undoubtedly gave the people of northern Armenia and eastern Georgia. However, we get a much better appreciation of these experiences from the first-hand account of the cleric Kirakos Gandzakets'i, who was taken prisoner by Molghor *noyan*'s column in the summer of 1236 and was forced to work as a secretary. Kirakos was present at the capture of the cave monastery of Lorut, under the rule of the influential *vardapet* (doctor of the church) Vanakan. In their time of desperation, it seems that the peasantry of the surrounding villages turned to the church, fleeing with their priests to Vanakan's monastery. Kirakos describes the Mongols besieging the Armenian refugees in the waterless cave, leading to the *vardapet* Vanakan being selected to speak to the Mongol commander, Molghor. This exchange, as recorded by Kirakos, gives us a good idea of the uncertainties the Mongols themselves faced, since Vanakan was initially questioned under the misapprehension that he was a secular lord. Once Molghor had established Vanakan's identity, the Mongols promised to protect the villagers and leave them unharmed if they left the cave monastery. One can almost feel the summer sun beating down on the Armenian plateau as Kirakos describes how 'we descended, quaking, like lambs among the wolves, frightened, terrified, thinking we were about to die, each person in his mind repeating the confession of faith in the Holy Trinity.'[53] While Vanakan, Kirakos, and a few others were forced to accompany the Mongol force, for the most part Molghor kept his word, specifically leaving overseers to ensure the villagers' safety. What is striking about this account is the effective breakdown of the secular order: the Armeno-Georgian nobility, holed up in their fortresses, effectively abdicated their responsibilities to the church, the only organization remaining to help the peasantry.

In this atmosphere of political breakdown, it is hardly surprising that the age-old Caucasian tendency towards political fission reasserted itself. In 1242, Queen Rusudan was persuaded to submit to the Mongols and supported them in their campaign against the Seljuks of Rum in 1243.[54] However, on Rusudan's death in 1245, the fracturing of Georgia took on an unstoppable momentum. Two claimants to the throne presented themselves to the Mongols: David VI Narin (Mongol for 'Little/Younger David'), Rusudan's son, and David VII Ulu ('Big/Elder David'), an

illegitimate son of Giorgi IV Lasha who had previously been an involuntary resident of the Seljuk court.[55] Initially, Güyük Khan decided that David Ulu was to be vassal king of all Georgia and was to be succeeded by David Narin.[56] It appears that this system was one the Mongols considered beneficial, since it survived an abortive rebellion in 1249 in which David Ulu's participation was rumoured.[57] However, upon Hülegü Khan's arrival in Iran, the two co-rulers resubmitted their case to this new overlord, who instead decided that David Narin and David Ulu would be co-rulers but brought both with him on his campaign against Alamut.[58] While the reason is not clear, the *Hundred Years' Chronicle* tells us that Hülegü quickly turned against David Narin.[59] David Narin, fearing that he was going to be executed, fled to Imeret'i, where he was able to successfully establish himself as an independent ruler. In 1259–60, a rebellion against Mongol tax exactions in eastern Georgia failed, with David Ulu fleeing to the court of David Narin.[60] While it seems that neither David wished each other ill, the presence of two kings at the same court made them a focus for plots; consequently, in 1262 they agreed to officially divide the treasury and the kingdom, with David Ulu able to return to Tiflis.[61] This official division of the kingdoms formalized the split of Georgia into two polities, the final act of the drama opened by the first Mongol invasion. While Georgia occasionally reunited in the following centuries, this division of Georgia into two or more kingdoms persisted until the eighteenth century.

THE SECOND INVASION OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS, 1238–40

In contrast to the South Caucasian campaign, the Mongol conquest of the North Caucasus was an offshoot of Möngke and Güyük's campaign into Bulghar and Rus'. Due to the almost complete lack of indigenous narrative historical sources, it is also far less well-documented than the campaign in the South Caucasus.

Its initial stage is a case in point. The North Caucasian campaign began in 1238 with the subjection of the Circassians of the western North Caucasus by the army of Möngke and Qada'an.[62] However, apart from the fact that the Circassian king Buqan was killed, we know nothing further of this campaign.[63]

Having been reinforced by a further Mongol army under Güyük and Büri, the following year the combined Mongol force moved into the lands of Alania, to the east of Circassia – approximately speaking, the eastern fringe of modern Krasnodar Krai, Karachai-Cherkassia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya.[64] There they faced a situation not dissimilar to that in the Georgian and Armenian lands – a lack of a central opposition figure or army to oppose them. A Dominican monk, Julian of Hungary, who visited Alania in 1236, commented that 'there are as many princes as villages, none of whom owes allegiance to another. The war there is incessant, leader against leader, village against village.'[65] While this near-anarchic situation may not have been representative of all of the Central North Caucasus, it is unsurprising that many local leaders sided with the Mongols, undoubtedly with settling old scores in mind. However, the Mongols also faced considerable resistance.

Initially, the most important prince who sided with the Mongols was a certain Arslan, who submitted to Möngke and was declared ruler of Alania.[66] However,

it seems that he was replaced by another important prince, called Hanghusi by the *Yuan Shi*, who brought a force of around 1,000 men to support the Mongol army, and in return was declared ruler of Alania and granted the title *batyr*, the Mongol version of the old Alan royal title *baqatar*.[67] Hanghusi served with the Mongol army throughout the North Caucasian campaign but was killed on his journey home. His wife, Waimasi, and then his son, Anfapu, successively replaced him as the Mongol-recognized rulers of Alania – the former, we are told, leading Hanghusi's troops into battle while wearing her deceased husband's armour.[68] In all these cases, however, it is highly debatable how far these Mongol vassals actually held any authority in Alania. Notably, according to Rashid al-Din, it seems that a confederation of Alan tribes, led by a certain Ajis, was formed to oppose the Mongol advance, culminating in Ajis' capture by Möngke's forces.[69]

The campaign against Alania seems to have climaxed in late November or early December 1239 with an extended siege of the fortress of Magas, the former capital of the Alan kings of the tenth and eleventh centuries.[70] The location of Magas has been a matter of considerable debate but most likely can be identified with the fortress of Il'ichëvsk on the southeastern border of modern Krasnodar Krai. Il'ichëvsk was a massive site, 15 kilometres across, with seven layers of stone and earth walls.[71] It is therefore unsurprising that this was a lengthy siege, lasting until late February 1240.[72] At this point, an assault by a number of small squads, led by Alan, Tangut, and other allied contingents in the Mongol army, was able to capture the walls.[73] According to Juwayni, an extensive massacre followed this assault, which appears to have marked the end of the main Mongol campaign in Alania.[74] Archaeological evidence from Il'ichëvsk bears out Juwayni's account, with evidence of one of the city's churches being burned down and an unburied child's body being found in the porch.[75]

At the same time as the campaign in Alania, it appears that a part of the Mongol army was detached to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force of Dagestan, the region to the east of Alania. The evidence for this is preserved in the village of Richa, lying approximately 30 kilometres southwest of Darband in the Agul valley. There, three Arabic inscriptions record the rebuilding of the village's fortress and mosque, which had been destroyed by the Mongols. According to these inscriptions, the Mongol force arrived on 10 or 21 *Rabī' al-Awwal* 637 (10 or 21 October 1239), and the fortress was held until the middle of *Rabī' al-Akhir* (approximately 15 November 1239).[76] L.I. Lavrov reasonably suggests that in order to reach this relatively isolated village, this Mongol force must have campaigned for a considerable amount of time in the region.[77] A further reconnaissance of the region seems to have been conducted from the south, since Baku was apparently also captured in 1239, according to Bakuvi.[78] However, the final conquest of Darband had to wait until the siege of Magas was concluded. After this had been accomplished, Möngke and Güyük dispatched a force under Buqudai to take Darband, which seems to have been successfully achieved, according to the reports of Simon of St. Quentin and William of Rubruck, the latter of whom noted when he passed through Darband in 1254 that its towers had been slighted by the Mongol army.[79]

Despite the immediate successes of Möngke and Güyük's campaign in the North Caucasus, it seems that Mongol control remained ephemeral. Apart from the numerous mentions of opposition to the Mongols' appointed rulers of Alania, the fact that the

fortress of Richa in Dagestan was rebuilt within two years of its destruction, an event commemorated by a valedictory inscription, implies that the Mongols were unable to maintain effective control of the region.[80] This is supported by the descriptions of the North Caucasus by European travellers. Both John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck described extensive Alan resistance to the Mongol armies, the former passing on chronologically implausible rumours of an Alan fortress that had resisted the Mongols for twelve years, the latter mentioning Alan raids on animal herds in the lowlands.[81] We may suggest that a process similar to that at Richa occurred all over the North Caucasian highlands: once the Mongols had departed, the destruction was repaired, and without an established state structure able to act as vassals to the Mongols, the former political structures of the region reasserted themselves.

Despite this reassertion of local political autonomy, the Mongol Empire continued to have a considerable impact on the North Caucasus. The most drastic impact appears to have been large-scale deportations to China of North Caucasian groups identified in Mongol sources as *Asud* (Alans), most likely drawn from the agricultural lowlands which were under firmer Mongol control. These appear to have begun almost immediately after the Mongol invasion, with Hanghusi's eldest son, Atachi, being brought as a hostage to Mongolia.[82] These deportations appear to have escalated during the reign of Möngke, due to the requirement for troops for campaigns against the Southern Song and Yunnan; Allsen places the number of deportees in the period 1252–75 at around 10,000.[83] Indeed, by 1309–10, Alan troops formed two divisions of the Mongol army in China, with a paper strength of 22,000 men.[84] Further deportations to the territory of the Golden Horde can also be inferred from the presence of Alans in Moldavia in the early fourteenth century, giving their name to its modern capital city, Iasi, and from the movement of a 16,000-strong group of Alans from this region into the Byzantine Empire in 1300.[85] However, it is worth noting that these deportations did not, it seems, entirely depopulate the North Caucasus. For example, a number of existing settlements were expanded under Golden Horde rule in the late thirteenth century, notably the cities of Nizhnii and Verkhnii Dzulat on the Terek River.[86] Moreover, it is still an open question how far effective Mongol control ever extended into the Caucasian highlands.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we can trace the profoundly different effects of the Mongol campaigns in the North and South Caucasus to the varying political structures of these regions. In the South Caucasus, the Mongol campaigns, together with their indirect effects in the shape of Jalal al-Din's invasions, effectively shattered the relatively centralized political structure of the Georgian kingdom. However, at a sub-royal level, the main noble dynasties of Georgia and Armenia survived and were in many cases able to expand their power under Mongol rule.[87] By contrast, in the already polycentric North Caucasus, the Mongols had tremendous difficulty constructing any lasting order out of the fragmented political landscape, and a high degree of local autonomy was swiftly reasserted. While the peoples of the North Caucasus were unable to resist the immediate Mongol advance, it seems that in the medium term their polycentric political structure proved a much more effective defence than the centralized kingdoms of the South Caucasus.

NOTES

1 Suny 1988, 3–40.
2 Bedrosian 1997, 251–252.
3 Lordkipanidze 1987, 126–127.
4 *KFTR*, 240.
5 Kuznetsov and Lebedynsky 1997, 186–188; Gadzhiev 2004, 197–198.
6 Latham-Sprinkle 2018.
7 RDT, I, 325.
8 A handful of written histories were composed in Dagestan; however, only one of these, the *Tarikh al-Daghistan* of Muhammad al-Rafi, has any potential bearing on the Mongol invasions of 1239–1240. The only written historical narrative from the Central North Caucasus, the late fourteenth- or early fifteenth-century Nuzal Inscription, has no information on the Mongol conquests. See Shikhsaidov et al. 1993, 90–105; Kuznetsov 1990, 78–79.
9 Cowe 1997, 320.
10 Eastmond 1998, 3.
11 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 317, 327.
12 Bilz-Leonhardt 2008.
13 Dashdondog 2011, 44–47.
14 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 321.
15 *KFTR*, 214.
16 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 204–205; Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 165–166.
17 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 165–166.
18 Bedrosian 1979, 95. *KFTR*, 214; RDT, I, 259.
19 Pertz and Rodenberg 1883, 179.
20 This cross carried in the Mongol ranks might have been a deliberate ruse or alternatively may have been carried by Nestorian Christian troops in Jebe and Sübedei's army. See Dashdondog 2011, 50.
21 *KFTR*, III 214.
22 For the presence of Alan mercenaries at Kotman, see *YS* chapter 120 (biography of "Ho-ssu Mai-li"), cited in Allsen 1987, 11. Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 321; Grigor Aknerts'i 2003, 3.
23 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 321, 395; Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 167; Grigor Aknerts'i 2003, 3; Vardan Arewelts'i 2007, 28.
24 *KFTR*, III, 214–215.
25 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 321.
26 See Grigor Aknerts'i 2003, 3; Vardan Arewelts'i 2007, 28; on the Battle of Garni, see Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 323; Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 188.
27 *KFTR*, 216; Pertz and Rodenberg 1883, 179.
28 *KFTR*, 216–220.
29 *KFTR*, 220, 240; Ashurbeili 1983, 186; Qazvini 1983, 53.
30 *KFTR*, 221; Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 206.
31 *KFTR*, 221–222; Ashurbeili 1983, 186–187.
32 *KFTR*, 222; RDT, 259.
33 On the date of this campaign, see Allsen 1987, 15. *KFTR*, 222.
34 *KFTR*, 222; Allsen 1987, 13–14.
35 For the resumption of local conflicts, see *KFTR*, 240–255. The evidence for a co-ordinated campaign by the Georgian court to present the first Mongol invasion as a victory comes from the letters of Queen Rusudan and Ivane Zak'arian, the *Chronicle of Giorgi Laša*, and the claim of Georgian envoys to Jalal al-Din that they had defeated the Mongols. See Pertz and Rodenberg 1883, 179; Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 205; *KFTR*, III, 258.

36 Bedrosian 1997, 256–257.
37 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 326–328.
38 May 1996, 17.
39 *HWC*, 453–454.
40 Dashdondog 2011, 55; May 1996, 36.
41 Jackson 2011; May 1996, 36–37; Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 198–199; Ashurbeili 1983, 186.
42 Step'annos Orbelean 2012, 208; Bedrosian 1997, 257–258; Suny 1988, 40; May 1996, 36–37.
43 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 256–257. Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 205; Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 323.
44 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 330–331.
45 Vardan Arewelts'i 2007, 29; Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 215–216.
46 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 215–216.
47 Step'annos Orbelean 2012, 208–209.
48 Vardan Arewelts'i 2007, 29–30; Dashdondog 2011, 57.
49 Molghor *noyan* is called 'Molar Noyin' by Armenian sources; for the reconstruction of his name, see Dashdondog 2011, 57; Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 204–205.
50 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 217–218; Vardan Arewelts'i 2007, 29.
51 Vardan Arewelts'i 2007, 29; Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 220–224.
52 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 332.
53 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 209.
54 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 323–324.
55 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 250–251; Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 327–328, 335–338, 343.
56 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 262–265; Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 346.
57 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, 267–269.
58 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 346.
59 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 347.
60 On the date of this rebellion, see Dashdondog 2011, 92.
61 Met'reveli and Jones 2014, 347–354.
62 For the date of this campaign, see Allsen 1987, 17.
63 Allsen 1987, 18 has this king's name as Tuqtar, based on RDA, 136. RDT, 325.
64 RDT, I, 325.
65 Theiner 1968, 152.
66 Arslan is called 'Aersilan' by the *YS*.
67 The title *baqatar* (brave one, hero) was originally held by Alan rulers in the ninth century but was apparently still in use as a personal name in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, judging by the Zelenchuk inscription from Karachai-Cherkassia. See Alemany 2000, 260–261, 408–410; Zgusta 1987, 60.
68 Alemany 2000, 410.
69 RDRM, II, 825.
70 Minorsky 1958, 156–157.
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72 RDT, I, 325–326; Allsen 1987, 20–21.
73 Allsen 1987, 20; Alemany 2000, 415.
74 Allsen 1987, 20; *HWC*, 269.
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78 Ashurbeili 1983, 186.

79 RDT, 326; Allsen 1987, 24.
80 Lavrov 1966, 81–82.
81 Alemany 2000, 151, 157.
82 Alemany 2000, 409–410.
83 Allsen 1987, 35–38.
84 Alemany 2000, 407.
85 Alemany 2000, 214–215; Kuznetsov and Lebedynsky 1997, 203–205.
86 Chechenov 1969, 46–48; Vinogradov and Tolovanova 1981, 151–154.
87 See Chapter 44 of this volume by Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF THE NEAR EAST

Timothy May

The Near East, here defined as the Jazira (the territory between the Tigris and Euphrates and north of Baghdad), Syria, and Anatolia, encountered the Mongols early, albeit briefly, as part of the Khwarazmian War. Yet the Mongols were not finished with the Near East. Their intrusion into the region came as a result of tying up loose ends after Jalal al-Din Khwarazmshah moved his ephemeral kingdom westward. According to Juwayni, Ögödei dispatched Chormaqan to deal with the unrest in Persia, and his victory over Jalal al-Din, as well as the effortless conquest of Iran, 'Iraq 'Ajami, Azerbaijan, the Mughan Steppe, and Arran, was aided by Jalal al-Din's behavior. Although he was a fearless leader and a great warrior, he never consolidated his position but continually attempted to expand his empire instead of preparing for the next Mongol onslaught. Perhaps of equally great importance is that Jalal al-Din's defeat dispersed his army. Many of his warriors submitted to the Mongols, but others fled to Rum and Syria, where they served as mercenaries and, when not employed, created chaos within these already turbulent regions. Thus, the destruction of Jalal al-Din served as the catalyst for the Mongols' entry into affairs of the Near East.

JAZIRA AND IRAQ

According to *The Secret History of the Mongols*, Baghdad was the original target of Chormaqan's campaign, yet he does not appear to have made it his focus.[1] Instead, he stabilized Mongol control of Azerbaijan and conquered Transcaucasia. In accordance with the Tsunami Strategy, he created a buffer zone by attacking the Jazira and even raided into Rum.[2]

During the siege of Ganja (1234–35), the Mongols captured the cities of Daquqa and Irbil, although the citadel of Irbil withstood the assault.[3] They eventually withdrew after receiving tribute, yet wherever they went, the Mongols left a wake of devastation.[4] From there, the Mongols apparently headed south and overran the northern areas of 'Iraq al-Arabi but avoided Baghdad. Naturally, Baghdad went on the defensive and sent an army against the Mongols, defeating them near Takrit at Jibal Hamrin.

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Then in 1238, the Mongols attacked the frontier of Baghdad, but the Abbasid army defeated this incursion.[5] Later in the same year, the Mongols attacked again. At Khanikin, they defeated the Abbasid army, but their intention was simply to plunder the region, including Irbil. After sating their avarice, they departed without attempting an attack on Baghdad.[6] This may have been the encounter which Dhahabi credits to an amir named Baklak, who intercepted a *tümen* of Mongols. In the initial attack, Baklak broke the Mongol ranks, but he was killed during the action. His death, and those of several amirs, caused the Baghdad army to flee, although the Mongols did not follow.[7]

The last action against the Caliphate and the Jazira during Chormaqan's command occurred at Mayyafariqin. In 1240–41, an envoy from the Mongols delivered a message to Malik al-Muzaffar Ghazi (r. 1220–47) from Ögödei. This message read, "The representative of the Lord of the sky, who walks, the King of the East and the West, who orders the princes of all the countries to enter in submission of the Khan of Khans, Ögödei, the surface of the earth."[8] Malik al-Muzaffar was to raze the walls of his strongholds, but he did not comply, and Chormaqan did not follow up on the threat. Indeed, Mayyafariqin did not fall until the arrival of Hülegü. While Chormaqan did not conquer much of the Near East, his conquest of Transcaucasia brought the Christian Armenian and Georgian princes, who provided troops for future operations in the Near East, particularly against the Caliphate and the Seljuks of Rum, over to the Mongols. Moreover, the Mongol Empire now bordered the Jazira, as well as the Ayyubids of Syria and the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum.

Meanwhile, the Mongols kept the Caliphate off balance as their forces attacked the region but without any apparent intent of conquest. Indeed, they often retreated north upon the approach of the Abbasid army, rather than engaging in combat. In the context of the Tsunami Strategy, the Mongols maintained pressure on the outlying areas but without ever committing themselves to conquest. The rulers of these border regions, on the other hand, had to maintain a constant vigil. While in some instances this may have increased their ability to defend their regions, they also witnessed first-hand the mobility of the Mongols, who often sacked a city and departed before an army could come to the aid of the beleaguered city.

In 1240 or 1241, the *tamma* stationed in Azerbaijan underwent a change in command. Perhaps paralyzed by a stroke, Chormaqan became incapacitated on one side of his body. His wife Altan Khatun and his lieutenant Baiju assumed command. Gradually, Baiju became the true commander as Altan Khatun faded into the background, perhaps due to her husband's death or simply because Baiju received confirmation of his position. Despite the shift in command, the Mongols did not cease their operations. Prior to 1240, the Mongols expressed little interest in the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. Yet after Chormaqan's death in 1240, the Mongols stationed in Transcaucasia renewed their expansion. It is notable that Baiju's tenure as *tammachi* was one of the few instances in which Mongol armies conquered and occupied territory during a period in which a *qa'an* did not reign.

During the reign of Sultan 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubad (1219–37), hostilities between the Seljuks and the Mongols did not arise beyond a few raids.[9] After Kayqubad's death, Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw (1237–45) came to the throne and assumed an

aggressive stance, with the Seljuks carrying out their own military campaigns close to Mongol territory at Amid in 1240–41.[10] In 1242, a Mongol force accompanied by contingents of Georgian and Armenian troops invaded Rum. Their forces raided up to the fortress of Zarid, thus engaging the Mongols and Seljuks in war.[11] Baiju then attacked the town of sacking it after a siege of two months.[12]

The Seljuk Sultan, Ghiyath al-Din, assembled his army, including a sizeable force of mercenaries of Byzantine and Frankish origin, in 1243.[13] The Seljuks met the Mongols at Köse Dagh, located between Karin and Erzinjan. The Mongols defeated the Seljuks as their Georgian auxiliaries routed the Seljuk right wing, but the Mongols were unable to immediately capitalize on the victory as night fell and the armies retired to their camps. Concerned that some of his amirs would join the Mongols, Ghiyath al-Din fled to Ankara. His army then dispersed as well.[14] Thus on the next day, the Mongols discovered a deserted camp. Believing it to be a trap, the Mongols proceeded cautiously. Once their scouts confirmed the Seljuks' flight, the Mongols advanced and conquered the rest of the Sultanate.[15] Sacking Sivas and razing much of the city's walls, they then seized Kayseri, Konya and Ankara.[16] Mongol forces also sacked Erzinjan after it refused to pay tribute. With the conquest of his realm, Sultan Ghiyath al-Din submitted and agreed to pay tribute in gold, horses, cattle, sheep and slaves amounting to 400,000 dinars in value.[17] The Seljuks also agreed to the installation of a *daruqachi* in Rum.[18]

In addition to subjugating the Seljuk Sultanate, the Mongols affected other powers in Anatolia. William of Rubruck noted that Trebizond was subject to the Mongols.[19] Although the Mongols initially attacked Trebizond in 1240, setting fire to the citadel, they did not conquer it. It probably submitted in 1243 or afterwards.[20] Envoys from Trebizond are not mentioned at Güyük's coronation, at least by name, but this is not unusual. As Trebizond was small and isolated, it is rarely mentioned in Latin, Arab or Persian sources. The Byzantine kingdom of Nicaea, likewise, feared invasions by Turkmen as well as Mongols, so John Vatatzes III met with Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw's envoys and made a treaty prior to Köse Dagh. He may have even been present at Köse Dagh, hoping that the Seljuks would remain a buffer with the Mongols.[21] Additionally, the Mongol invasion of Rum halted Nicaea's preparations to attack Constantinople.[22] After Köse Dagh, John Vatatzes III strengthened his frontier fortifications against a possible Mongol attack or an attack by Turkmen, no longer restrained by Seljuk authority.[23]

Bruce Lippard argues that the Mongol conquests disrupted the stability and concord between the Seljuks and Byzantines. Between the influx of Turkmen and Khwarazm soldiers fleeing the Mongols, who often only nominally accepted the rule of the Seljuks, and the appearance of Jalal al-Din, the Seljuks devoted much of their energy to quelling rebellions and the ephemeral kingdom created by Jalal al-Din. After the death of Jalal al-Din, the Seljuks attempted to take advantage of the power vacuum in the Diyar Bakr region, rather than show concern for the Mongol forces. Then in 1243, the defeat at Köse Dagh undermined Seljuk authority and their ability to control the Turkmen. For the Mongols, Anatolia had less strategic importance than Mughan, so they paid less attention to controlling it, primarily using the Sultanate for additional pasture and tribute payments.[24]

Baiju did not confine his activities to Rum, however. After the defeat of the Seljuks, the Frankish states in the Levant began to contact the Mongols. Matthew

Paris recorded that in 1244 the Mongols sent a letter to Antioch demanding its surrender. The conditions for submission included that the walls of the castles be razed, all of the revenues of the principality be collected in gold and silver, and finally, three thousand virgins be sent as tribute.[25] Prince Bohemund V (r. 1233–51) refused. His audacity at refusing Mongol overtures escaped reprisal, as apparently Yasa'ur (fl. 1240–50), the Mongol commander active in the area, lacked sufficient men and horses at the time. Many of the horses died in Syria due to the heat. Still, prior to his demands at Antioch, Yasa'ur's forces, which were part of Baiju's *tamma*, pillaged a considerable amount of territory, including Mayyafariqin, Amid, Mardin, Edessa (modern Şanlıurfa) and Harran. A similar attack on Aleppo failed due to the extreme heat and dryness of ground, which affected the horses. The Mongols raided Malatya and collected tribute before attempting to coerce Antioch into submission.[26] Although Antioch and Aleppo escaped Mongol attack, several of the other cities accepted the presence of *daruqachi*s, perhaps in an effort to avoid further raids.[27]

With the ascension of Güyük as *qa'an*, he dispatched Eljigidei to replace Baiju as the *tammachin* in the Middle East. Eljigidei assumed command around 1248, after envoys from King Louis IX of France reached Baiju's camp. Eljigidei was interested in obtaining an alliance with the Christians and sent Mongol envoys to King Louis while he was on Cyprus. When King Louis' envoys reached the capital of the Mongols, Andrew of Longjumeau discovered that the political climate had changed with Güyük's death in 1248. The regent and widow of Güyük, Oghul-Qaimish (fl. 1246–49), chose to interpret Andrew's mission as one of submission rather than alliance. King Louis' biographer, Jean de Joinville, recorded the king's reaction: "Et sachez que le roi se repentit fort d'y avoir envoyé."[28] This ended the attempts at an alliance for the time being. Eljigidei was also removed before he could attempt any other negotiations. In 1251 he was arrested in the purge of Ögödeids that followed the Toluid Revolution.[29]

The Seljuks, or rather Turkmen nomads, although ostensibly vassals, still raided nearby territories, including the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia. In an effort to escape from the pressure of the Turks, Cilicia submitted to the Mongols in 1244. The king of Cilicia, Hethum I (r. 1226–70), recognized the wisdom of voluntary submission to the Mongols before they overran Cilicia. In return for his voluntary submission, the Mongols restored some of his territories and fortresses that had been lost to the Seljuks. On his part, Hethum became one of the Mongols' most dependable vassals. In 1247, Hethum sent his brother, the Constable Smbat (fl. 1250–76), to Güyük in Qaraqorum. In 1250, Smbat returned bearing an accord that confirmed Hethum on his throne. Prince Bohemund VI of Antioch (r. 1251–75), who was also Hethum's son-in-law, submitted to the Mongols at this time, along with a number of Muslim princes from Syria and the Jazira.[30]

Despite the lack of grand conquests, Mongol activities in Syria and Cilicia during this period accomplished much. Their victory at Köse Dagh laid the foundation not only for the acquisition of Rum, but also for the submission of Cilicia, which facilitated Antioch's submission as well, only a few years after Bohemund's father had rejected Mongol demands. Additionally, the raids in northern Syria and the Jazira demonstrated the reach of the Mongols. Their military activities only probed into Northern Syria as the limited forces of Baiju's *tamma* maintained control of

Rum and Transcaucasia. Yet the *tamma* did engage in other raids, but to the south and southeast of Baiju's camp.

Prior to attacking the Seljuks, the Mongols probed the Jazira and threatened the Abbasid Caliphate. During 1241–42, Baiju advanced against Baghdad. At Irbil, he laid siege and successfully captured the city, although the citadel continued its resistance. An army sent by Caliph al-Mustansir-bi'llah (r. 1226–42) broke the siege, with the Mongols departing before their arrival. As a future safeguard, the Caliph ordered all citizens to learn archery and repaired the moat and walls. The Caliph also had catapults built for the defense of Baghdad.[31]

These precautions, however, did not deter the Mongols from venturing into the region, as Baiju led another attack on Irbil. The arrival of a Caliphal army, however, once again prevented a prolonged siege. Abandoning Irbil, Baiju then raided Daquqa, midway between Irbil and Baghdad. Here, another Caliphal force allegedly engaged the Mongols at Jibal al-Hamrin, the westernmost of the Zagros Mountains, and defeated them.[32]

Caliph Mustansir proved to be an ardent foe of the Mongols. Thus, it is not surprising that after his death on 2 December 1242, the Mongols increased their efforts against the Abbasid Caliphate. In 1245, Mongols attacked the Abbasid Caliphate, intending to march on Baghdad. Abbasid forces, however, intercepted them once again at Daquqa and defeated them.[33]

Despite the Caliph's success at fending off Mongol raids, prior to Güyük the status of the Abbasids remained unclear. According to John Plano de Carpini, the armies under the *tammachin* Chormaqan and Baiju forced the Caliph to pay tribute:

> The same army attacked the territory of the Caliph of Baghdad, which it also subdued. Every day they pay them as tribute four hundred besants, in addition to brocades and other gifts. Every year the Tartars send envoys telling the Caliph to come to them, and every year he sends magnificent presents with the tribute, begging them to release him from this obligation. The Emperor accepts the presents, nevertheless he sends for him to come.[34]

His account does not mention Güyük's threatening letter to the Caliph, although he simply may not have been aware of it. Nor does he mention that the Abbasids had thwarted earlier Mongol raids in the region. Baghdad may have simply decided that it was better to send tribute than continually defend against Mongol attacks.

During the reign of Güyük (1246–48), it appeared that Baghdad might ultimately be conquered. The new *qa'an* sent a threatening letter to the Caliph Mustasim (r. 1242–58) demanding his submission after he refused to send the proper tribute. Undoubtedly, this letter was in the same tone as the letter that was sent to Pope Innocent IV.[35]

Yet Güyük's threats did not materialize into new conquests in the Near East. Two factors played into this. The first was that Eljigidei replaced Baiju as the *tammachi* in the region. As such, he also assumed responsibility for governing Georgia, Rum, Syria, Diyar Bakr and Cilicia.[36] His appointment, however, appears to have been politically motivated rather than due to Baiju's performance, as Güyük sent Eljigidei to prevent the Jochids from bolstering their claims in the Transcaucasia region.[37] This did not necessarily preclude Eljigidei from carrying out conquests. Indeed, Güyük,

like his father before him, ordered armies to march against those who had not yet submitted. For the Middle East,

> he dispatched Eljigitei (sic) and a large army. And he commanded that from every prince two men out of every ten should join Eljigetei, that all the men in that region should mount horse with him, that two out of every ten Taziks should go along and that they should begin by attacking the Heretics. And that he himself should follow after.[38]

Güyük never did. Indeed, it appears that Eljigidei never assembled his army as Güyük commanded, either. The specific command to gather two out of every ten "Taziks" indicates he should gather troops from the Mongols' Iranian vassals. There is no indication that this occurred. Furthermore, Eljigidei made no hostile moves against any foe in the Middle East. Thus, the Near East had a respite, as with Güyük's death in 1248, military campaigns did not resume.

Eljigidei remained as the regional *tammachi*. The regency of Oghul Qaimish (1248–50) marked one of the few stages in the Mongol Empire in which their armies appeared at a complete standstill, including in the Near East. In spite of their skirmishes with Baghdad during the period of Baiju's command and his army's successes in Northern Syria and Rum, these were not used as a building block for further conquests. Despite the rhetoric of the sources that claim Abbasid victories and frequent Mongol retreats, these Mongol forays seem more like probes than campaigns of conquest. They served the purpose of testing Abbasid defenses and responses, while also terrorizing the populations of the Jazira, often inducing them to pay tribute rather than risk attack.

HÜLEGÜ AND THE NEAR EAST

With the Toluid Revolution, the Mongols were once again on the march. Möngke Qa'an dispatched his younger brother Hülegü to subdue those rulers who had failed to offer their submission at his coronation: the Isma'ilis, the Abbasid Caliphate and the Ayyubids of Syria. Hülegü's efforts in the Middle East differed from previous Mongol operations in the region. The primary catalyst for this change was manpower. Whereas the Mongols had been limited by simply using the Mughan *tamma* for their operations in the region, Hülegü, a Chinggisid prince, crossed the Amu Darya with an imperial army of conquest that dwarfed existing Mongol forces in the region and allowed him the option of simply overwhelming his opponents with numbers, if traditional tactics and strategy failed. As discussed by Beatrice Forbes Manz in Chapter 11, the Mongols eradicated the Isma'ilis in 1256 and then the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258. The rapid fall of both, but most particularly the Abbasid Caliphate, sent shockwaves across the region. Yet the acquisition of new territory was not the only change that occurred.

The Seljuk Sultanate of Rum's status as a client state of the Mongol Empire also changed with the arrival of Hülegü in the Middle East. Accompanied by a large army and as the new overlord of the southwestern portion of the Mongol Empire, Hülegü positioned himself in the traditional headquarters of the *tammachi*, the Mughan Steppe. Thus, with Hülegü's arrival, Baiju, restored as the *tammachi*, had

little choice but to seek pasture elsewhere. The most logical location, based on its pasture, was Rum.[39]

As Rum was now a part of the Mongol Empire, he requested winter pastures from Sultan ʿIzz al-Din in August 1256. ʿIzz al-Din, however, viewed the arrival of Hülegü as a diminishment of Baiju's power and influence and rendered little assistance.[40] Baiju quickly corrected this impression by defeating the Seljuks in battle at Aqsaray.[41]

After the battle of Aqsaray (14 October 1256), Baiju remained in Rum, pasturing the herds of his armies. He also spent four months at the Byzantine frontiers. He camped at either Paphlagonia or near Ilgin, 50 kilometers west of Aksehir. Besütei, Baiju's uncle, advanced deep into Turkmen territory to Denizli in November 1256.[42]

Despite his diminished power, ʿIzz al-Din still challenged the Mongols. According to Bar Hebraeus, ʿIzz al-Din attempted to assemble a new army and find allies against Baiju. Again, Baiju's response was swift and decisive. Baiju's forces spread out in April 1257 into Galatia and Cappadocia, wreaking destruction upon ʿIzz al-Din's domains. Furthermore, Baiju gave the captured forts to Rukn al-Din, ʿIzz al-Din's younger brother and rival. At Malatya, whose ruler was allied to ʿIzz al-Din, Baiju forced the city to swear fealty to Rukn al-Din as well. Thus, Rukn al-Din gained control of a significant portion of the eastern Seljuk territories. Baiju then left Rum to join Hülegü against Baghdad.[43]

After the sack of Baghdad, Hülegü retired to Azerbaijan and received his vassals, including the Seljuks. As a ramification of ʿIzz al-Din's disrespect for the Mongol military, Hülegü divided Rum between the two brothers, with Rukn al-Din receiving the territory from Kayseri to Armenia to be ruled from his capital at Sivas. Meanwhile, ʿIzz al-Din received Aqsaray to the coast and ruled from Konya,[44] thus settling Anatolian affairs for the time being.

After the Mongols sent detachments to quell a rebellion in Georgia, the invasion of Syria began.[45] Before entering Syria, the Mongols along with contingents from Cilicia and Antioch marched on Harran, Akhlat and Edessa, which submitted with little resistance.[46] The Mongols also dealt with a recalcitrant vassal in Mayyafariqin in 1258-59. Previously Malik al-Kamil Muhammad, Mayyafariqin's ruler, had killed a Mongol envoy and driven out the *daruqachin* in his region, possibly in retaliation for Mongol raids in 1252–53 or from fear that Hülegü suspected him of plotting rebellion. With the fall of Baghdad, al-Kamil attempted an alliance with Damascus, but it faltered. Soon a Mongol force commanded by Yoshmut arrived to besiege the city, which was starved into submission.[47]

Meanwhile, the Ayyubid governor of Aleppo, al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, rejected terms of surrender. The siege commenced on 19 January 1260. After six days of concentrated fire by twenty mangonels, the Mongols broke through at the Bab al-Iraq sector. Then the city was turned over to the soldiers for five days of pillaging, and the Mongols razed the walls of the city.[48] A month after the initial slaughter, the citadel surrendered. Bar Hebraeus wrote: "And there took place in Aleppo a slaughter like unto that of Baghdad only more terrible."[49]

Hülegü then crossed the Euphrates River to return to the Mughan Steppe, as Syria lacked the resources to support his main army, although he left a *tümen* commanded by Ket Buqa. Hülegü's route took him to Mardin after the lord of the city failed to appear when summoned. The city surrendered after a siege.[50]

Meanwhile the army in Syria, commanded by Ket Buqa, targeted Damascus, which was ruled by the Ayyubid al-Nasir Yusuf (r. 1236–60). He had been in correspondence with the Mongols since 1250 and even nominally submitted to them before Hülegü arrived in the Middle East. He sent his son in 1258 to negotiate with the Mongols, but as Hülegü approached his territory, it was clear that they would not settle for anything less than complete submission from Syria. Until this point, the Mongols had been pleased with tribute.[51]

The Mongols triumphantly advanced throughout Syria after the fall of Aleppo. One by one, the greater cities of Syria submitted. The slaughter at Baghdad and Aleppo convinced them of the futility of resisting. Most of the original rulers remained in place with Mongol officials present. The Ayyubid princes were reduced to client status.[52] When the news of Aleppo's destruction reached al-Nasir at Damascus at the end of January 1260, the prince was stunned. Although al-Nasir had gathered a sizeable force, his advisors recommended that he retreat to Gaza and join forces with the Mamluks of Egypt.[53] He agreed and took only token measures for the defense of Damascus.

Al-Nasir left his *wazir*, al-Zayn al-Hafizi, in charge of the city, and he promptly surrendered it when the Mongols approached.[54] In March 1260, Ket Buqa entered Damascus accompanied by King Hethum, Prince Bohemund VI of Antioch and the Ayyubid prince al-Sa'id of Banyas. Three Persian *daruqachin* accompanied Ket Buqa, but al-Zayn al-Hafizi stayed as an advisor.[55] Almost immediately after setting up the new administration, the Mongol troops rode out into the countryside to reduce the other local towns and strongpoints. Ket Buqa also sent a contingent in pursuit of al-Nasir. This contingent caught al-Nasir's rear guard outside Nablus, where they annihilated the Ayyubid forces. Al-Nasir surrendered to the Mongols.

While the Mongols subdued the region, the Damascenes revolted in a vain effort at independence. Ket Buqa returned immediately and laid siege to the citadel. He ordered his siege weapons to fire without interruption upon the fortress. Once the Mongols breached the walls, the rebellion was quickly squashed.[56]

With the defeat of the Ayyubids at Nablus, the Mongols took control of the city and established de facto control over Palestine, with the exception of the thin strip of territory along the coast controlled by the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The Kingdom was too weak to take advantage of the Ayyubids' misfortunes. The Mongols also controlled most of the area around Mount Lebanon, including the Biqa' Valley, which served as Ket Buqa's headquarters as it provided the pasture his troops needed.

The Mongols meanwhile created a rudimentary administration to control their newly acquired territories. While Ket Buqa stationed himself in the Biqa' Valley, Baidar Noyan occupied Gaza, positioning himself between the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Egypt. The prince of Homs, Malik al-Ashraf Musa, who had petitioned Hülegü after al-Nasir Yusuf dispossessed him of territory, served as the viceroy of Syria on the Mongols' behalf, although Maqrizi referred to Ket Buqa and Baidar as the governors of Aleppo and Damascus, respectively.[57] Considering where their armies were stationed, neither Baidar nor Ket Buqa should be considered governors. As both were positioned on the western frontiers of the Mongol Syrian holdings, they were probably *tammachin*. From his base in the Biqa' Valley, Ket Buqa could defend against the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which stretched to Beirut, and impose his will over the

northern territories. Baidar, meanwhile, could do the same to the southern borders of Jerusalem and also guard against the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt. The power and influence of Ashraf are questionable, and he may have been simply a vassal, but he may have also served as a *daruqachi* or perhaps a *jarquchi*. The Mongols did place *daruqachin* in cities, as demonstrated in Damascus.

Ket Buqa personally received al-Nasir's surrender at the siege of 'Ajlun. The terms of surrender were generous, guaranteeing al-Nasir's safety, although the Mongol general did use the prince's presence to capture a few remaining fortresses, including 'Ajlun. Al-Nasir was then sent with his brother al-Zahir to Hülegü in Tabriz.[58] When al-Nasir was presented to Hülegü, the Mongol prince promised to restore Syria to him after Egypt was conquered. He also awarded the Syrian prince with a generous stipend. The day that Hülegü restored al-Nasir to Damascus, accompanied by three hundred horsemen, was also when the battle of 'Ayn Jalut was fought.

In 1257, the Mongols also sent envoys to the Franks in Palestine requesting that they submit.[59] On the surface it seemed that it was in the best interest of the Franks to join the Mongols. They would reap benefits from such an alliance. Even though they would pay tribute, they would still possess their lands, which would have undoubtedly increased.

The opportunity to submit to the Mongols ended rather quickly, however, as Julian of Sidon raided the Biqa' Valley and ambushed a patrol of Mongols. One of the Mongols who was killed happened to be a nephew of Ket Buqa. In retaliation, Ket Buqa attacked Sidon, sacking the town. Ket Buqa burned much of the city and destroyed part of the walls; only the sea castle escaped damage.[60] Later in the year, John II (r. 1254–64) of Beirut and a contingent of Templars raided into Galilee. The Mongols destroyed this force and captured John, whom they ransomed.[61] The countermeasures taken against Julian of Sidon demonstrated the power of the Mongols. The Franks could not hope to resist a concentrated Mongol attack without the arrival of a crusading army from Europe.

After the failed raids, the Mongols gave the Franks good reason to be concerned about their presence. The Mongols had shown that they were perfectly willing to protect their conquests, no matter how unstable they were at the time. In the absence of any central authority in Palestine, they were the de facto rulers. The Mongols could meet any threat the crusaders launched, as demonstrated during the Frankish incursions. Meanwhile the Franks lacked the means to do the same to the Mongols. Besides retaliatory actions, Ket Buqa did initiate two operations in Palestine. The first was at Safad, which was Frankish. Secondly, he stationed troops at Gaza, to keep an eye on Egypt and to prevent the Mamluks from entering Palestine. He also razed many of the Muslim fortresses to the ground.[62] The objectives of the Mongols in Palestine were manifold: 1) spreading panic among the Franks; 2) providing pillaging opportunities for the Mongol troops; 3) serving as a vanguard for Hülegü's army; 4) collecting intelligence about the Franks; 5) and finally, keeping the Franks on the defensive and unable to threaten Mongol patrols.[63]

Although the Franks intruded into Mongol-controlled territory, of greater concern was the nascent Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt. When the envoys from the Mongols demanded Egypt submit or face destruction, Sultan Qutuz responded by executing them – a clear declaration of war.[64] Qutuz chose his time perfectly and struck after Hülegü had withdrawn to Azerbaijan with the majority of the army. Meanwhile,

Map 13.1 The Mongol Empire 1250–1260
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

Ket Buqa had to secure Syria with a little more than a *tümen*. This was sufficient to ensure order through the function of the *tamma*, providing that no other destabilizing factors entered the country. Qutuz had other plans.

The Mamluk invasion of Syria began at Gaza, where the Mamluks defeated Baidar's force.[65] Afterward, Qutuz successfully negotiated with the Franks of Acre to obtain safe passage through their territory. The coming struggle for control over Syria took place at 'Ayn Jalut in the Jezreel Valley on 3 September 1260. This well-analyzed battle ended with a Mamluk victory over the Mongols, effectively ending the Mongols' control of Syria, although they made several attempts to recover it.[66]

Immediately after 'Ayn Jalut, the Mongols attempted to reestablish their supremacy in Syria. In December 1260, a large force of Mongols entered the region near Aleppo. The Aleppan amirs were not willing to face the Mongols alone and thus retreated south.[67] The Mongols pursued the Aleppan army to Hims, where the army of Aleppo joined the armies of Hama and Hims. Battle was joined on 11 December 1260, with the Muslims emerging victorious even though the Mongols numbered around six thousand, while the Syrian army reportedly numbered less than fifteen hundred.[68] This battle was extremely significant, as local forces, not the elite Mamluks of Egypt, had defeated a larger Mongol army. Reuven Amitai-Preiss suggests that this would not have been possible without the earlier victory at 'Ayn Jalut, as it is doubtful if the Syrian amirs would have dared to face the Mongols without the previous victory discrediting Mongol invincibility.[69]

CONCLUSION

The campaigns in the Middle East during the reign of Möngke marked a substantial divergence in the operational strategies of the Mongols. Whereas they had previously operated on a broad and far-ranging front, the armies under Hülegü's command adopted a different strategy: over-whelming force. Against their main targets, the Assassins (the Nizari Isma'ili Shi'i sect), the Caliphate and Ayyubid Syria, the Mongols attacked their enemies one at a time and with overwhelming superiority. In Rum and the Jazira, the Mongols encountered some rebellions, which they quelled handily.

During the conquest of Syria, the main force destroyed a politically and militarily important target, Aleppo, decimating it before any attempt at relief could be made. Most of the remaining cities decided that resistance was futile and submission was preferable to destruction. The only thing which the Syrian campaign lacked was a field battle. Traditionally the Mongols first defeated any armies in the field, leaving forces behind to lay siege to cities. The field army of the enemy was attacked until destroyed. Once it was defeated, the Mongols could then reduce the main fortresses at their leisure without fear of relief armies or their lines of communication being cut. As the field army battle never happened in Syria, the conquest was made easier.

The death of Möngke and the subsequent civil wars altered the course of the history of the Mongol Empire. It is uncertain what the Mongols' intentions towards the Latin states or Egypt were; however, considering their other operations to eliminate those who had not submitted, it is likely that Hülegü would have invaded the "rebellious" Mamluk Sultanate, had circumstances been different.

NOTES

1 *SHM* §260.
2 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 211; Al-Hadid 1963, 81. See May 2015 and 2016 for more on the Tsunami Strategy.
3 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 233; *KFT*, 501; Bar Hebraeus, 402.
4 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 232.
5 Bar Hebraeus, 404.
6 Bar Hebraeus, 404.
7 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 236; Al-Hadid 1963, 81.
8 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 242.
9 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 233; al-Hadid 1963, 81; Bar Hebraeus, 405; al-Nuwayri 1975, 348.
10 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 242.
11 Bar Hebraeus, 406.
12 Grigor 1949, 307; Brosset 1849, 518.
13 Grigor 1949, 309; Bar Hebraeus, 407–409; *TN*, 313; *TNR*, 162.
14 Ibn Bibi 1975, 205; Grigor 1949, 309.
15 Bar Hebraeus, 407–409; Al-Dhahabi 1979, 243; *TN*, 313; *TNR*, 162–163; Grigor 1949, 309.
16 Bar Hebraeus, 407–409; Al-Dhahabi 1979, 246; Grigor 1949, 309; Al-Hadid 1963, 82; Ibn Bibi 1975, 205–206.
17 Ibn Bibi 1975, 205–206; Bar Hebraeus, 407–409; Dhahabi, 246; Cahen 1969, 691–692.
18 Grigor 1949, 309.
19 Rubruc 1929, 167; *TMM*, 91; Rubruck 1990, 65.
20 Lippard 1983, 179; Miller 1969, 23–24.
21 Lippard 1983, 176.
22 Fine 1987, 134.
23 Lippard 1983, 177.
24 Lippard 1983, 163; Cahen 1969, 691–692.
25 Paris 1968, vol. II, 31.
26 Bar Hebraeus, 409; *RDK*, 577; RDT, 398.
27 *TNR*, 1265.
28 Joinville 1960, 236.
29 Juwayni 1937, 50; *HWC*, 583.
30 Paris 1968, vol. II, 165.
31 *RDK*, 575–576; RDT, 397.
32 *RDK*, 575–576; RDT, 397; Al-Hadid 1963, 82–83.
33 Bar Hebraeus, 410; Al-Dhahabi 1979, 250.
34 *TMM*, 32; Plano Carpini 1929, 75–76.
35 Bar Hebraeus, 411; *RDK*, 570; RDT, 394.
36 Bar Hebraeus, 411; Juwayni 1912, 212; *HWC*, 257; *RDK*, 570; RDT, 394.
37 Umari, 15–16.
38 *HWC*, 256; Juwayni 1912, 212; *TNR*, 1150–1151; *RDK*, 570; RDT, 394.
39 Bar Hebraeus, 424–425; Juwayni 1937, 93; *HWC*, 608–609.
40 Bar Hebraeus, 424–425.
41 Bar Hebraeus, 424–425; al-Nuwayri 1975, 349–350; Cahen 1968, 276.
42 Lippard 1983, 23.
43 Bar Hebraeus, 426; al-Dhahabi 1979, 264.
44 Bar Hebraeus, 434–435.
45 Juwayni 1937, 261–262; *HWC*, 525; al-Nuwayri 1975, 385.
46 Bar Hebraeus, 435; Maqrizi 1845, 88; *RDK*, 719; RDT, 502.

47 Nuwayri 1975, 383; Bar Hebraeus, 434; al-Dhahabi 1979, 261, 264; Grigor 1949, 335; *TNR*, 1266–1268; *RDK*, 725–726; RDT, 507–508.
48 *RDK*, 719–723; *RDT*, 502–503; al-Nuwayri 1975, 386; Maqrizi 1956, 422–423; Maqrizi 1845, 90; Abu Shamah 1947, 203; Grigor 1949, 349.
49 Bar Hebraeus, 436.
50 Bar Hebraeus, 437; *RDK*, 724–726; RDT, 507–508.
51 Al-Dhahabi 1979, 265, 267.
52 Maqrizi 1845, 96; Humphreys 1977, 351.
53 Maqrizi 1956, 421–422; Maqrizi 1845, 92, 94.
54 Maqrizi 1956, 424; Maqrizi 1845, 97; Abu Shamah 1947, 203–204.
55 *RDK*, 720; *RDT*, 503; al-Nuwayri 1975, 389–390; Humphreys 1977, 353.
56 Abu Shamah 1947, 204; Maqrizi 1956, 424; Maqrizi 1845, 99.
57 Maqrizi 1845, 99–100; Jackson 2017, 131.
58 Baybars al Mansuri 1993, 11.
59 Paris 1968, Vol. 3, 250.
60 Hayton 1906, 174; Marshall 1992, 128.
61 Runciman 1962, 573.
62 Amitai-Preiss 1987, 239.
63 Amitai-Preiss 1987, 242.
64 *RDK*, 721–723; RDT, 504–505; Maqrizi 1956, 427–428; Maqrizi 1845, 101–102.
65 *RDK*, 722; RDT, 504–505; Maqrizi 1956, 430; Maqrizi 1845, 104.
66 Amitai-Preiss 1992, Thorau 1985; Smith 1984; Saunders 1977.
67 Amitai-Preiss 1990, 2.
68 Amitai-Preiss 1990, 3.
69 Amitai-Preiss 1990, 4.

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RDK, See List of Abbreviations.

RDT, See List of Abbreviations.

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TMM, See List of Abbreviations.

TN, See List of Abbreviations.

TNR, See List of Abbreviations.

Umari, See List of Abbreviations.

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PART III

THE MONGOL SUCCESSOR STATES

Map 14.0 The Mongol Empire circa 1300

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE JOCHID *ULUS*

Roman Hautala

The Jochid Ulus was established in 1224/5 when Chinggis Khan decided to reward his eldest son for a successful campaign (1218–22) against the eastern Qipchaqs and the Qangli and the conquest of Urgench. Jochi was awarded an appanage (the *ulus*)[1] comprising the territory west of the Irtysh River, "as far as the hoof of Tatar horse had advanced" (the territories subjugated by the previous Mongol attack, led by Jebe and Sübe'edei between 1220 and 1224). Thus, Jochi began to rule in the lands that he had conquered, but he was expected to continue territorial expansion in the west. Nevertheless, Jochid military forces were faced with the fierce resistance of the Qipchaqs in the interfluve of the Yaik River (Ural River) and the Volga, and they were able to continue the offensive only after they received support from the supreme ruler of the Mongol Empire, Ögödei Qa'an (r. 1229–41).[2] This happened later, during the reign of Jochi's son, Batu (r. 1227–56), who headed the *ulus* after the death of his father in 1227. In the spring of 1235, Ögödei Qa'an decided to mobilize the military forces of the Mongols, who were to come to Batu's aid. During the ensuing six-year military campaign (1236–42), a Mongol army led by Batu subdued the Russian principalities and western Qipchaqs who lived in the steppes between the Yaik and the Danube rivers.

As a result of twenty-five years of military conquest, the Jochid Ulus became the largest part of the Mongol Empire, with lands extending from the upper reaches of the Irtysh River to the Lower Danube, which were divided into three parts. The eastern part (often referred to as the Blue Horde, although a number of researchers question the validity of using this term) of the Ulus stretched from the Yaik River to the upper Irtysh. This part, in turn, was divided into two parts. Its eastern part stretched from the Irtysh River in the east to the Sari Su River in the west and was headed by the descendants of the eldest son of Jochi, Orda (d. 1251). Its western part, stretching from the Yaik River to the north of the Aral Sea, was governed by the descendants of the fifth son of Jochi, Shiban (d. 1266). The rulers of these regions recognized the primacy of the heirs of Jochi's second son, Batu, who preferred to nomadize in the Lower Volga region, that is, in the central and most fertile region of the Ulus. The steppes between the Volga and the Lower Danube were also subordinated to the successors of Batu and were divided into appanages that were ruled by the closest relatives of the Jochid khans. In addition to the western

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Map 14.1 The Jochid Ulus (Golden Horde)
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

steppes, the Russian principalities also submitted to the Jochid khans, although the Rus' princes retained significant autonomy within the Ulus.

The sources gave different names to this new power. Apparently, the Mongols called it *Ulus-un Jochi* (the *Ulus* of Jochi), but a number of other names are found in the sources. Just like the Latin authors, Persian and Arab sources called it by the name of the ruling khan: "Batu's house", "Berke's land", "Uzbek's empire", etc. However, the Islamic chroniclers often preferred to call it "Dasht-i-Qipchaq" (Qipchaq steppe) or simply "Qipchaq", as if pointing out that the Qipchaqs, that is, its native inhabitants, represented the bulk of the Ulus's population. Probably this was only partially true, since the Mongol conquests led to the migration of new Mongol and Turkic tribes to the conquered territories. These tribes incorporated the subordinate Qipchaqs, and therefore the Russian chronicles ceased to call the Qipchaqs by their former tribal names (Burchevichi, Toksobichi, Etebichi, Kulobichi, etc.). After the Mongol conquest, the Russian chroniclers called the Ulus's nomads by the collective name "Tatars" and preferred to call the Jochid Ulus the "Horde". By this term, the Russian authors had in mind its center of power – the camp (*ordu*) of the Jochid khan.[3]

In addition to the Jochid territories themselves, local rulers of Transcaucasia also recognized the supremacy of Batu during the period of the Mongol Empire's unity. Perhaps Chinggis Khan considered these lands subordinate to Jochi's authority when he encouraged his eldest son to continue the conquests in the west. It was more likely, however, that this region became subordinated to Batu's power only in the last years of his rule, when his status as *aqa* (that is, of the senior ruling descendant of Chinggis Khan) was not questioned after the death of Güyük Qa'an in 1248. In any case, Möngke (r. 1251–59), who became the Qa'an in 1251 thanks to Batu's military support, recognized the subordination of these lands to the Ulus. Therefore, Batu and his successors considered themselves legitimate rulers of Transcaucasia, even after the rule over this region actually passed to Möngke's brother, Hülegü, which inevitably led to a protracted conflict between two related Mongol dynasties.[4]

SEPARATION FROM THE EMPIRE AND WAR IN THE CAUCASUS

Like the rulers of other *uluses* in the Mongol Empire, the Jochids were subordinated to the *qa'an*s in Qaraqorum in the period of its unity and gained independence only after its dissolution in 1260. The grandson of Batu, Möngke-Temür (r. 1267–82), was the first Jochid ruler to call himself a *qa'an*, that is, an independent ruler, and who began to mint coins with his name and generic familial sign (*tamgha*) from the very beginning of his reign. Nevertheless, the actual separation of the Ulus occurred under his predecessor, Berke (r. 1258–66), who did not allow himself to be called a *qa'an* but pursued an independent foreign policy. In particular, Berke entered into a military conflict with the brother of the deceased Möngke, Hülegü (r. 1260–65), who founded his own *ulus* in Persia. During this conflict, Berke pursued his own goals, not caring about whether his interests coincided with the interests of Möngke's successor, Qubilai (r. 1260–94), or other Mongol rulers.

Berke initiated the war, claiming that the Ilkhan took advantage of the dissolution of the Empire in order to illegally claim the Transcaucasian region. In the summer of 1262, the Jochid prince Noqai (d. 1299) then invaded Hülegü's domain through

the Caucasus and plundered the region of Shirvan (in northern Azerbaijan). Hülegü managed to defeat the Jochids, and at the beginning of the next year (1263), his army invaded the Jochid territory in Daghistan, where it soon suffered a heavy defeat in a bloody battle on the Terek River. Two years later in 1265, Noqai again invaded Shirvan and fought the Hülegüid army on the Aksu River in Azerbaijan. At its end, both armies settled on the opposite banks of the Kura, not daring to continue the battle. The Jochid army returned home only the following year, after the sudden death of Berke.[5]

Major military action in the Caucasus dwindled, but the tension on the border of both *uluses* did not weaken over the next century. Hostilities in the Caucasus remained relevant for the Jochid rulers due to the relative parity of forces among the hostile Chinggisid *uluses*. The Jochid Ulus needed an ally to break the Ilkhanate's resistance. Therefore, Berke took the unprecedented decision to conclude a military alliance with a non-Mongol ruler against his cousin, Hülegü, showing that he put the interests of his de facto independent *ulus* above family ties within the Chinggisid dynasty. In 1262, Berke sent his first diplomatic embassy to Egypt, proposing a military alliance with the Mamluk sultan, Baybars (r. 1260–77). Baybars, who was extremely hostile to the Ilkhanate, gladly accepted Berke's proposal and sent a reciprocal embassy to the Jochid ruler to consolidate the alliance and strengthen friendly relations.

The Mamluk author ʿAbd al-Zahir (d. 1293) reproduced the report of the head of this diplomatic mission, amir Sayf al-Din Qusharbek, who did not hide his surprise that he had not met a single town between the Crimea and the Lower Volga region, but only "the plain on which there were tents and flocks of sheep".[6] In his report, Solkhat – the future capital of the Crimea – was still a village populated by the "Qipchaqs, Russians and Alans", while Sarai on the banks of the Volga was still devoid of permanent structures and consisted of portable tents. Berke received the ambassadors in a large tent and listened favorably to the sultan's message to continue the war against Hülegü in the presence of fifty local amirs. Before sending a reply message, Berke detained the ambassadors in his *ordu* for almost a month, so that they could tell him in detail about the Mamluk sultanate.

In the future, the exchange of diplomatic embassies between Cairo and the Jochid rulers took place on a regular basis and continued even after the reconciliation of the Mamluk sultanate with the Ilkhanate in 1323. Although they did not translate into a joint military campaign, these diplomatic exchanges contributed to cultural interaction and trade relations between the Jochid Ulus and Egypt.[7]

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

After the invasion of the Ilkhanid forces in 1263, the Jochid Ulus was not seriously threatened for more than a hundred years, and only feuds between the Jochid rulers disturbed its inner well-being. The Ulus suffered major internal turmoil for the first time during the last two decades of the thirteenth century because of a conflict between the Jochid khans and Prince Noqai, who ruled the western regions of the Ulus between the Dnieper and the Lower Danube and greatly strengthened his authority during the reign of Möngke-Temür Khan. With the ascension of the weak-willed Töde Möngke Khan (r. 1280–87), Noqai began to claim primacy in the Ulus's administration, but his ambitions came up against the resistance of Töle Buqa Khan (r. 1287–91). Noqai's relations with the ruling khan deteriorated sharply during a raid on Poland the following

year, during which Noqai led independent military operations and deprived Töle Buqa's troops of their due spoils. In view of the further deterioration of relations with Töle Buqa, Noqai, who did not dare to openly clash with the ruling khan, organized a palace coup that ended with the execution of Töle Buqa and the ascension of his cousin, Toqta (r. 1291–1312). Initially completely subordinated to Noqai's will, Toqta gradually united his supporters and challenged Noqai's hegemony in the seventh year of his reign. As a result of the new conflict, a bloody civil war began in the Ulus, lasting two years. In the autumn of 1297, Toqta suffered a defeat in the first battle of the Don. However, the ruling Khan did not accept defeat and assembled a new army, successfully luring to his side the tribal nobles who had supported Noqai before. In the next clash, Toqta's army outnumbered Noghai's. In 1299 Toqta attacked Noqai's territory (on the bank of the Kogalnik River, between the Dniester and the Danube) and soundly defeated Noqai, who died at the end of the battle. Thus, Toqta managed to eliminate the threat and stabilize the internal situation.[8]

THE PERIOD OF PROSPERITY

After the removal of Prince Noqai, Toqta enjoyed undivided power. However, following his death in August 1312, a fierce struggle began in the Ulus between several candidates for the throne. The nephew of the late Toqta, Uzbek (r. 1313–41), emerged victorious in this struggle and executed two dozen hostile Jochid princes after his enthronement. Despite such radical suppression of the opposition, Uzbek distrusted the surviving Jochid princes, who could challenge his authority at any convenient opportunity. In this context, Uzbek considered it appropriate to gradually remove them from the leading administrative positions and entrust the administration of the steppe appanages to representatives of the tribal nobility who did not have the right to the throne and therefore, from Uzbek Khan's point of view, did not pose a threat to his power.[9]

Thus, the local government of each *ulus* underwent significant changes. At the beginning of its existence in 1246, the papal legate John of Plano Carpini only met the Chinggisid princes on his way across the Ulus. In turn, the famous Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta (d. 1377), who visited the Ulus in 1334, mentioned only the non-Chinggisid amirs who ruled these regions as their own appanages. Local amirs enjoyed broad administrative autonomy in their appanages and established their own courts, with officials responsible for the military organization of the appanages, their taxation and jurisdiction.[10]

Uzbek's reform contributed to the internal stability of the Ulus, which experienced its heyday during his long reign. Uzbek, who converted to Islam before or during his enthronement, promoted the wide dissemination of the religion in his domain, and during his reign a number of mosques and madrassas were built in the Ulus's cities, such as Solkhat and Sudaq in Crimea, Upper and Lower Djulat in the North Caucasus, Old Orhei in modern Moldova, Urgench in modern Turkmenistan and Sauran in the south of modern Kazakhstan. Ibn Battuta praised the huge size of Sarai, the Ulus's capital, and claimed that there were thirteen mosques in the city. Although we know that Uzbek had his palace in Sarai, the khan preferred to nomadize in the steppe with his *ordu*, which resembled, according to Ibn Battuta, "a vast city on the move with its inhabitants, with mosques and bazaars in it, the smoke of the kitchens rising in the air (for they cook while on the march), and horse-drawn wagons transporting the people".[11]

Despite his personal confessional sympathies, Uzbek continued to adhere to the policy of religious tolerance, traditional for the Chinggisids, providing equally benevolent protection to Christians in his domain. The khan's protection facilitated a large influx of merchants into the urban markets of the Ulus, where Muslim merchants made profitable deals with Italian, Armenian and Jewish merchants, paying due taxes to the khan's fiscal officials. Apparently, the taxation of merchants became the main article of the khan's income at this time.

The development of trade led to a natural expansion of existing cities and the emergence of new ones. Among the 140 known cities, thirty were located in the Lower Volga region. Important and crowded urban centers were also located in Khwarazm, the Middle Volga region, the North Caucasus, all along the eastern and northern coast of the Black Sea and especially in Crimea, whose population grew significantly due to the resettlement on the peninsula of Anatolian, Central Asian, Italian and Armenian migrants. Probably, nomads continued to be a major part of the population in Uzbek's domain. However, cities became its main economic base, contributing to the prosperity of the Ulus.[12]

THE EASTERN ULUS

Despite its formal submission to Batu and his heirs, the eastern part of the Ulus was practically independent. The eastern Jochid rulers did not participate in political events in the west, and therefore the written sources contain extremely poor information about eastern events. As for Shiban's domain (which stretched from the Yaik river to the north of the Aral Sea), we know only the names of the heirs of Shiban (Bahadur, Jochi-Buqa, Badaqul, Ming-Temür, Pulad, Ibrahim and Arabshah).[13] Written sources begin to abound in information about Shiban's domain only from the third quarter of the fourteenth century, that is, when the descendants of Shiban entered the struggle for power in the Lower Volga region (as will be discussed in the following pages).

As in Shiban's domain, the population of Orda's domain (which stretched from the Irtysh River in the east to the Sari Su River in the west) consisted mainly of nomads. According to Marco Polo, in Orda's domain, there were "no towns, nor castles" and its inhabitants lived exclusively on "milk and meat of cattle". However, recent archaeological research has shown the existence of sedentary agricultural areas along such large rivers as the Syr Darya, Irtysh, Chu and Ishim. In addition, nomads traded with neighboring *uluses*. According to the same Marco Polo, the fur export of "ermines, squirrels, sables and black foxes" from southern Siberia (to Mawarannahr and China) brought great income to the local rulers.[14]

Written sources contain more references to Orda's domain (in contrast to the descendants of Shiban), since their rulers took part in political events of neighboring Mongol *uluses*. In 1252, Orda's son, Qongqiran (d. circa 1275), rendered substantial military support to Möngke Qa'an during the destruction of Möngke's rivals – the descendants of Ögödei and Chaghadai (d. 1242). Orda's grandson, Qonichi (d. circa 1299), in turn, rendered military support to Ögödei's descendant Qaidu (d. 1301 or 1303) against Qubilai Qa'an (d. 1294). He also granted asylum to the Toluid princes who rebelled against Qubilai in 1277 but were defeated two years later and were forced to flee from eastern Mongolia to Qonichi's domain. However, around 1282, Qonichi preferred to make peace with Qubilai and receive annual gifts from him.[15]

After Qonichi's death around 1299, his eldest son, Bayan, was to become his heir. However, his brother, Mumkqiya, and two other Ordaid princes, Kupalak and Kushtai, challenged his right to the throne. A long and bitter struggle began among Orda's descendants, and each of Bayan's opponents occupied Orda's throne for some time in the course of this struggle. During this conflict, Bayan tried to deprive his rivals of the material and military support that they received from the neighboring co-rulers of the Chaghadaid Ulus, Chapar (r. 1301 or 1303–7) and Du'a (d. 1307). Bayan received aid from Temür Öljeitü Qa'an (r. 1294–1307), Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 1295–1304) and Toqta Khan, who forced Chapar and Du'a to recognize Bayan as Qonichi's legitimate heir in 1304. Chapar and Du'a not only ceased to support the rebels but agreed to cease hostilities against the Yuan Empire. Thus, Bayan's diplomatic initiative influenced the entire Mongol Empire, whose rulers concluded a short-term truce with each other (the term *Pax Mongolica* was established in historiography under the influence of this event). Nevertheless, even after the loss of Chapar's and Du'a's support, pretenders to Qonichi's throne continued their struggle with Bayan, who was able to assert his authority only after Toqta Khan sent him military assistance in 1310/11.[16]

In exchange for Toqta's military support, Bayan probably recognized his direct dependence on the *ulus*'s khans, who began to interfere in the internal political developments of the eastern domain. Bayan's son, Sasi-buqa (r. 1318–21), and his grandson, Irzan (r. 1321–41), were approved at the head of the domain by the order of Uzbek Khan. When the rebellious Jochid prince Mubarak Khwaja challenged Irzan's power in 1328, Uzbek sent troops to the east led by his eldest son, Temür. After Irzan's death in 1341, the second son of Uzbek, Tinibeg, again invaded the eastern domain to establish Irzan's son, Chimtai (d. 1361), on the throne. During Chimtai's rule, the internal situation in Orda's Ulus was temporarily pacified on the eve of the upheavals that shook the unity of the whole Ulus (as discussed in the following pages).[17]

RUSSIAN PRINCIPALITIES

The Mongols subdued the Russian principalities during two major military campaigns led by Batu in 1238 and 1240. However, Batu did not appoint Chinggisid rulers in the conquered principalities, leaving them under the autonomous control of the representatives of the Rurik dynasty. In 1243–45, major Russian princes visited Batu's *ordu* in order to obtain confirmation (*jarliq)* of their office. Later, between the second half of the thirteenth and the middle of the fourteenth century, the *ordu* of the Jochid khans was most frequently visited by those princes who were claiming the title of great prince, the holder of both the throne of Vladimir-on-Klyazma and the prerogative of collecting annual tribute owed to the khan from all the minor princes. Other princes were exempted from visiting the *ordu*, although in the event of a dispute over the rule of any principality, the Russian pretenders to power went to the *ordu* to present their case to the khan.[18]

Thus, the subordination of Russian principalities was expressed in the initial need to receive approval for their appointment by a visit to the *ordu*. The payment of the annual tribute reflected the second aspect of subordination. The size of this tribute ranged from principality to principality. The Kiev region was already subject to the

census in 1245 when its population had to pay a poll tax from every male person, regardless of age. The Mongols carried out the census in the East Russian principalities and Novgorod in 1257–59, where only adult males had to pay a poll tax. The West Russian principalities escaped the Mongol census but paid tribute on the basis of a treaty concluded in the same period. The special Mongol officials (*basqaqs*) supervised the collection of tribute, but in the 1280s, this function was entrusted to the great princes and their confidants.[19]

Another form of submission was expressed in the duty to perform military service, but the Jochid khans used auxiliary Russian troops only in rare attacks in Poland and Hungary and in some campaigns in the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the Russian troops rendered extremely important support when the Jochid khan intervened in Russian affairs. This happened in 1252, when Batu supported Alexander Nevskii in his fight against his brother, Andrei, and in 1293, when Toqta rendered military support to Alexander Nevsky's son, Andrei, against his brother Dmitri.[20]

Russian church chronicles are the main written sources for the Mongol rule of Rus'. Their attitude towards Russian submission to the Jochid khans was twofold, if not paradoxical. On the one hand, Russian church authors could not reconcile themselves to the subordination of the Orthodox people to "pagan Tatar" authorities and often compared this subordination to the Babylonian captivity of God's chosen people. On the other hand, these same authors recognized Mongol domination as a *fait accompli* – accomplished by the will of God. They did not question the legitimacy of the supreme authority of the Jochid khan and invariably called him the tsar – the title previously reserved for the Byzantine emperor. Russian chroniclers continued to show respect to the khan's power even during its weakening, and they allowed themselves to question its legitimacy only in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, when the Muscovite prince Ivan III (r. 1462–1505) decided to openly rebel against Jochid domination.[21]

JANIBEG'S REIGN AND THE ULUS'S DECLINE

Uzbek's son Janibeg came to power in 1342 after the murder of his elder brother, Tinibeg (r. 1341–42), and the gradual decline of the Jochid Ulus occurred during his reign. Janibeg Khan began his reign with an unsuccessful war with the Italian colonies in his domain, the reason for which was a clash between Christian and Muslim residents in Tana (at the mouth of the Don). Janibeg, in all likelihood, found the Italians guilty in this conflict and expelled the Venetian and Genoese merchants from Tana. However, he did not stop there and decided to expel all Italians from his domain by sending troops in the next year to lay siege to the largest Genoese colony in the Ulus – Caffa, located on the south-eastern coast of Crimea. The siege of Caffa was unsuccessful, as were two subsequent attempts to take the city in 1345 and 1346. The khan's rash adventure cost him not only a temporary loss of income from the taxation of Italian trade, but also a certain decline in authority in the eyes of his subjects. In the end, Janibeg forced the Italians to make concessions and allowed the Venetians to return to Tana in 1347 on the condition of an increase in the commodity tax (which was probably his main and primary aspiration). However, the traffic of Western merchants and their investments significantly decreased as a result of uncertainty about the future intentions of the

khan, and because of the parallel disaster that affected not only the Jochid Ulus, but the entire Middle East and Europe.[22]

In 1346 the Black Death struck the whole western part of the Ulus after having already ravaged its eastern territory for several years. According to Russian, Latin and Arab sources, the loss of the local urban population amounted to hundreds of thousands of residents. Caffa did not escape the tragic fate of other Jochid cities and was struck by an epidemic at the end of the same year. After that, the plague-infected Genoese merchants brought an epidemic to Messina in Sicily in 1347, from whence it spread to Genoa and across Europe, destroying, conservatively, a third of the European population. Apparently, the loss of population in the Jochid Ulus was just as significant, and the Black Death struck the Ulus once more in 1353.[23]

Undoubtedly, the decline in trade and a sharp decrease of the urban population led to a noticeable economic decline in the Ulus. Although one should not exaggerate the catastrophic consequences of the plague, Italian and Central Asian merchants immediately returned to the Ulus at the very first news of the weakening of the epidemic, although they did so in a much smaller quantity. Despite the upheavals, Janibeg's power remained unshakable until the end of his reign, and the troubles that followed his death were the logical consequence of his father's reforms. Like Uzbek Khan, Janibeg continued to confer the prerogatives of administration on the tribal nobility by granting its representatives entire appanages to rule autonomously. Over time, the strengthened amirs began to be burdened by the authoritarian power of the khan, and each of them was ready to take advantage of the first chance presented in order to elevate his protégé to the Jochid throne. Thus, the reform of Uzbek Khan, aimed at centralizing the power of the khan, ultimately led to its weakening, which immediately affected the internal situation in the Ulus.

TIME OF TROUBLES

The short-term conquest of Azerbaijan in 1356 was probably the only achievement of Janibeg Khan, who took advantage of the death of the local puppet khan to defeat and execute the de facto ruler of Azerbaijan, an amir named Malik Ashraf. However, the Jochid occupation forces led by Janibeg Khan's eldest son, Berdibeg (d. 1359), left Azerbaijan in the following year after the Khan's death in order to take part in the power struggle in the Ulus. After coming to power in 1357, Berdibeg Khan immediately executed twelve of his closest relatives, and after his sudden death two years later the Jochid throne was deprived of a legitimate heir. There were a certain number of Batu's descendants in the Ulus, but their rights to the throne could be challenged by any other competitor who received more weighty support from the amirs, each of whom, in turn, used the split in the Ulus to strengthen his power. As a consequence, a long and bloody internecine war, which lasted for twenty years, began in the Ulus. During this struggle, the throne in Sarai was alternately occupied by more than twenty khans, whose names can only be identified on the basis of numismatic material because of their frequent change and the brevity of their rule.[24]

The first clashes between the Tatar amirs and their puppet khans began in 1360 in the center of the Ulus. The Lower Volga region split into several warring regions.

Soon the descendants of Shiban and Togha-Temür (respectively, of the fifth and youngest sons of Jochi), who ruled in the eastern part of the Ulus, joined the struggle for the throne in Sarai. The situation was also complicated by the sharp increase in the influence of the Kiyat tribe in the western part of the Ulus. Their chief representative, amir Mamai, who by 1362 controlled Crimea and the steppes to the east of the Dnieper, moved with his troops to the Lower Volga region and put one of Batu's descendants named Abdullah on the throne in Sarai. However, in the same year, Mamai was forced to leave the Lower Volga region and return to the west, as he was concerned about the invasion of the great Lithuanian prince Algirdas (r. 1345–77) in the Kiev region. Abdullah was immediately expelled from Sarai by his rivals. Later, Mamai made several more attempts to conquer Sarai but each time lost control of the capital of the Ulus.[25]

By 1370, Mamai established firm control over the western part of the Ulus, despite his inability to gain a foothold in the Lower Volga region. However, from that moment his influence began to weaken because of a new threat from the east. A descendant of Togha-Temür, Urus Khan, brought almost the entire eastern part of the Ulus under his control and began an offensive to the west. In 1374, Urus Khan conquered Sarai, but the following year he was forced to leave the Volga region because his relative, Toqtamish (d. 1406), who received military support from Tamerlane (1336–1405), tried to take advantage of his absence to declare himself head of his domain. Urus Khan returned to the east and successfully repulsed several joint attacks of Toqtamish and Tamerlane, but after his death in 1377, Toqtamish subordinated the former domain of Urus Khan.[26]

For their part, the princes of eastern Rus' took advantage of the prolonged civil strife in the Lower Volga region and decided to secede from the Ulus. In 1374, the Russian princes, led by the Muscovite Prince Dmitri Ivanovich (r. 1363–89), gathered for a congress in Pereyaslavl (in the modern Yaroslavl region) and concluded an agreement on mutual assistance in the struggle against amir Mamai and ceasing tribute payments to him. Occupied at this time with the struggle against Urus Khan in the Lower Volga region, Mamai was able to invade Rus' only in 1378. However, his troops suffered a heavy defeat in the battle of the Vozha River (in the modern Ryazan region). Nevertheless, Mamai did not accept this defeat, and again invaded Rus' but suffered a crushing defeat on the Kulikovo field (between the rivers Oka and Don) on 8 September 1380. In turn, Toqtamish, who seized Sarai by the end of 1378, took advantage of the victory of the Russian princes by defeating the remnants of Mamai's military forces in a clash on the Kalka River, north of the Sea of Azov, at the end of 1380. Thus, Toqtamish became the unchallenged ruler of the Jochid Ulus.[27]

TEMPORARY UNIFICATION OF THE ULUS AND THE INVASION OF TAMERLANE

Twenty years of turmoil in the Jochid Ulus was an obvious consequence of the tribal nobility's rise to power as they used puppet khans to strengthen their power. However, the tribal amirs did not seek to split the Ulus into independent khanates, and their efforts were for the most part aimed at capturing Sarai in order to establish their puppet khan at the head of the reunited Ulus. Most of the

Ulus's subjects, tired of the disruptive internal conflicts, were ready to submit to the ruler who guaranteed internal order by uniting the entire Ulus under a solid centralized power.

Toqtamish Khan, who proclaimed an official program for the restoration of the Ulus's greatness and paid special attention to both stimulating domestic and foreign trade and regulating monetary circulation and taxation, fully met these demands. Toqtamish's need for financial means to stabilize the economic situation inevitably led to a conflict with the Moscow principality, whose ruler, Prince Dmitri Ivanovich, inspired by the military triumph over Mamai, refused to pay tribute to the new khan. In 1382, Toqtamish's troops unexpectedly appeared in his principality and burned Moscow, as well as a number of other cities belonging to Prince Dmitri. After this defeat, the Muscovite prince renewed the payment of tribute, which regularly went to the treasury of Toqtamish throughout his reign.[28]

Thus, Toqtamish had absolute power and worked to maintain the united Ulus. However, he had the misfortune to rule at the same time as Tamerlane's conquests, and, more importantly, Toqtamish considered it his duty to hinder Tamerlane's expansion in the territory of the former Ilkhanate. Upon learning that Tamerlane had defeated the ruler of Tabriz (1385), Ahmad Jalayir (r. 1382–1410), Toqtamish sent his troops to Transcaucasia. They thoroughly plundered Ahmad's territory, including his capital, Tabriz. Toqtamish evidently wanted to show that any attempt by Tamerlane to gain a foothold in Transcaucasia would be met by a Jochid invasion. The following year, Tamerlane's army, engaged in the devastation of Georgia, was attacked by Toqtamish's troops. However, the clash at Derbend resulted in the defeat of the Jochid forces. After this victory, Tamerlane hastened to conclude a peace with Toqtamish, hoping that the Jochid khan would no longer hinder his expansion in the Middle East. Toqtamish in turn, pretending to accept the terms of peace, decided to strike at the central regions of Tamerlane's empire.[29]

In 1387, Toqtamish's army invaded Mawarannahr through the modern southern Kazakhstan and, after having pillaged Tashkent and Qarshi, began the siege of Bukhara and Samarqand. Tamerlane, who was at that time engaged in military operations in Iran, hastily led his army to the aid of the capital of his empire and defeated Toqtamish's troops near Samarqand. Toqtamish's attempt to invade Tamerlane's domain the following year was just as unsuccessful. Toqtamish's repeated attacks assured Tamerlane that he could not continue the conquests of the Middle East without destroying the military might of the Jochid Ulus.[30]

After lengthy preparations, in 1391 Tamerlane raided deep into Toqtamish's territory through the steppes of modern central and western Kazakhstan and destroyed Toqtamish's army in a bloody battle on the River Kondurcha (in the east of the modern Samara region). However, Toqtamish managed to regroup after Tamerlane's return to Mawarannahr. The Jochid khan even managed to conclude a military alliance with the Ottoman and Mamluk sultans to conduct joint military operations against Tamerlane. In turn, Tamerlane, risking a simultaneous attack from the west and north from three powerful enemies, was forced again to attack the main initiator of this alliance. In 1395, Tamerlane crossed the Caucasus and defeated Toqtamish in a bloody three-day battle waged on the banks of the Terek. After that, Tamerlane invaded the Jochid Ulus and stayed in its territory for almost a year, engaged in the systematic devastation of its main cities.[31]

THE PERIOD OF AMIR EDIGÜ AND ULUGH MUHAMMAD KHAN

Before leaving the Jochid Ulus in 1396, Tamerlane did everything possible to both ruin its most important regions and prevent the subsequent revival of its former military might. The devastation led to many years of famine, the outbreak of plague and, more importantly, the migration of significant nomadic populations to marginal but more secure regions of the Ulus. The main consequence of this migration process was a marked increase in the role of the Manghit tribe, whose pastures between the Yaik and Emba rivers (in modern western Kazakhstan), located at a safe distance from Timurid armies and in close proximity to the central region of the Ulus (in the Lower Volga region), were significantly replenished by large groups of migrating nomads. Due to the sharp population growth and the corresponding increase of its military potential, the Manghit tribe began a leading role in the domestic policy of the Ulus throughout the fifteenth century, and the leaders of the Manghits, in turn, occupied key administrative posts in almost all regions of the Ulus.[32]

The head of the Manghits, amir Edigü, was the primary figure during the first two decades of this period. He used Toqtamish's unpopularity after Tamerlane's invasion to elevate one of Togha-Temür's descendants, Temür Qutlugh Khan (r. 1396–99), to the head of the Ulus. For his part, after several unsuccessful attempts to regain power, Toqtamish turned for help to the Lithuanian Prince Vitautas (r. 1392–1430), promising to give him the administration of the eastern Russian principalities in the event of success. Tempted by Toqtamish's offer, Vitautas assembled a huge army, mainly consisting of Tatars and his western Russian subjects and equipped with cannons ("*pushki*") transported on carts, sent it to the conquest of Sarai. Edigü defeated this army at the Vorskla River (the left tributary of the Dnieper) on 12 August 1399.[33]

Edigü's military triumph contributed to a sharp increase in his power, reinforced by the general stabilization of the economic situation in the Ulus. Thereafter, Edigü could afford to change khans in the Ulus at his own discretion. Temür Qutlugh Khan was dismissed almost immediately after the battle of Vorskla and replaced by the more pliable Shadi-Bek Khan (r. 1399–1407). Edigü was relatively successful in suppressing any attempts to limit his authority; he only lost power during the short reigns of Temür Khan and Jalal al-Din Khan between 1411 and 1413. The Lithuanian Prince Vitautas represented a much greater threat, as he refused to direct attacks on the Jochid Ulus after the defeat on the Vorskla but willingly sheltered all Edigü's opponents. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania became the haven of Toqtamish's sons, whom Vitautas equipped to seize power in Sarai. They were regularly defeated, until one of them, Kadir-Birdi, managed to defeat the Manghit amir in a battle on the Yaik River in 1419. Edigü died while running from the battlefield, although Kadir-Birdi himself was also mortally wounded in this battle.[34]

As a result of many years of internecine struggle, which erupted after Edigü's death, Ulugh Muhammad Khan (a descendant of Togha-Temür, like his predecessors) came to power in Sarai. He managed to subordinate to his control the entire western part of the Ulus in 1427, after having received support from Edigü's son, Nawruz. Ulugh Muhammad's ascension contributed to the stabilization of the internal situation in the Ulus, and the new khan even managed to temporarily establish friendly

relations with the new Lithuanian ruler, Svitrigaila (1370–1452). However, in 1433, Ulugh Muhammad's troops rashly plundered the Kiev region, and Svitrigaila chose to support the distant relative of the khan, Sayyid-Ahmad, allowing him to establish his horde in the steppes to the west of the Dnieper. Having accumulated strength, Sayyid-Ahmad went on the offensive against Ulugh Muhammad and defeated him in 1436, which allowed Sayyid-Ahmad to occupy Crimea. A year later, amir Nawruz with his Manghits, who had always supported Ulugh Muhammad before that, unexpectedly deserted and elevated another pretender to power, Kichi Muhammad, who gave Ulugh Muhammad a final defeat.[35]

Ulugh Muhammad was the last Jochid ruler to subjugate the entire western territory of the Ulus to his power for a short period of time. His overthrow in 1437 led to the disintegration of the Ulus and the emergence of several khanates, whose rulers for some time tried to unite the Ulus under their authority but soon began to defend the independence of their domains. Ulugh Muhammad, who founded a new khanate in the far north, was the first example in this respect.

THE KAZAN KHANATE

Expelled from the steppe in 1437, Ulugh Muhammad moved to the north-west, in the Middle Volga region, where he founded a separate khanate with its capital in Kazan. However, he, in all likelihood, considered Kazan his temporary shelter and hoped to regain his throne in Sarai after having accumulated enough strength for this purpose. As a result of his activities, his son, Mahmud (r. 1445–c.1465), inherited vast areas of the Middle Volga. These territories were inhabited by the descendants of the Volga Bulghars and other Turkic peoples who migrated there in the middle of the thirteenth century and became subordinated to the local Tatar nobility. The Tatar nobility professed Islam, but a numerous pagan population also inhabited the region: the Chuvash, Mari, Udmurt and Mordovians. In addition, the power of the Kazan Khanate extended to the Vyatka land and the Great Perm (modern Kirov and Perm regions), from where the Khanate obtained expensive furs, sold at a summer fair near Kazan in a large quantity. However, control over Vyatka and Perm was challenged by the Great Principality of Moscow. Several bloody wars between Kazan and Moscow lasting one century occurred, culminating in the conquest of Kazan by the troops of Ivan the Terrible (r. 1547–84) in the autumn of 1552.[36]

THE EASTERN ULUS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

After the death of amir Edigü (1419), the eastern part of the Ulus experienced a period of continuous struggle between various contenders for power. One of them, a descendant of Shiban, Abu'l-Khayr (r. 1430–68), proclaimed himself khan in Chimgi-Tura (modern Tiumen) in 1430, and his people were known as the Uzbeks. The following year, he defeated his distant relative, Mahmud Khoja Khan, in the battle on the Tobol River, which enabled him to unite under his rule the lands of south-western Siberia. Abu'l-Khayr spent the next fifteen years in unceasing wars against his rivals, and by 1446 he was able to unite under his authority almost the entire territory of the eastern part of the Ulus, moving his capital to Sighnaq (in the

middle reaches of the Syr Darya). However, his khanate disintegrated immediately after his death in 1468.

Abu'l-Khayr's grandson, Muhammad Shibani (d. 1510), was able to hold Sighnaq, but his attempts to reunite all Abu'l-Khayr's domain were unsuccessful. During the first half of the 1480s, Muhammad Shibani directed all his energy to regular raids on Khurasan and the retention of the Syr Darya lands from the unabated expansion of the Kazakh Burunduq Khan (r. 1480–1511). Finally, in 1486, he suffered a defeat from Burunduq Khan and, having lost Sighnaq, Muhammad Shibani migrated with his tribes to the Otrar region, proceeding to the gradual conquest of Mawarannahr, which was crowned in 1501 by the capture of Samarqand and the formation of the Uzbek Empire. In turn, the eastern part of the Ulus was destined to become a Khanate of Kazakhs.[37]

THE CRIMEAN KHANATE

Like the Kazan Khanate, the Crimean Khanate appeared at the end of Ulugh Muhammad's reign. The Khanate emerged at the behest of the tribal nobility (headed by the Shirin clan) of the peninsula, who instigated an uprising in 1441 against the authority of Sayyid-Ahmad (who will be discussed in the following pages) and invited a descendant of Togha-Temür, Hajji Girey (r. 1442–66), to rule. Thus, Hajji Girey was elevated to the Crimean throne by the local nobility without the participation of the Ulus's khan. The independence of the new Khanate was emphasized by Hajji-Giray's new policy towards other Jochid rulers: the first Crimean khan refused to participate in the internal quarrels of the Jochids, perceiving his Khanate as independent of the Ulus, and instead paid all his attention to strengthening its defenses.

After Hajji Girey's death (1466), his son and heir, Mängli Girey (r. 1469–75, 1478–1515), was able to occupy the Crimean throne with the military support of the head of the Shirins, Mamaq. However, his rule was characterized by the weakness of the khan's power and permanent conflicts with the tribal nobility, which sharply escalated after the death of Mamaq in 1472. The conflict between the khan and Mamaq's brother, Eminek, prompted the latter to turn to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451–81) for help. The Sultan sent a fleet to Crimea during the summer of 1475, seized all the coastal towns and captured Mängli Girey. Although temporarily deprived of power, the Crimean khan was restored three years later. Thus, the Crimean Khanate fell into official dependence on the Ottoman Empire, retaining de facto independence in its foreign policy and successfully using the Ottoman protectorate in subsequent conflicts with the Great Horde.[38]

THE GREAT HORDE DURING THE REIGN OF KICHI MUHAMMAD

Despite the dissolution of the Ulus into several independent khanates, all of their rulers recognized the seniority of its central Khanate, called the Great (that is, the Greater) Horde in Russian sources. The Great Horde gradually lost its central territories between the Volga and the Ural Rivers, ceding them to the Manghits during the last quarter of

the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, the vast steppes to the north of the Caucasus and the Azov and Black Seas remained at the disposal of the Great Horde. The khan's power in the Great Horde was severely limited by the influence of the tribal nobility, among which the most important were the representatives of the Manghit tribe, who had to reckon with the interests of other tribes (such as the Naimans and Alchins).

Kichi Muhammad (r. 1437–59) became the first khan of the Great Horde after ascending the throne at the end of 1437. He ruled in the steppes between the Don and the Volga, but he was forced to recognize the co-rule of another descendant of Togha-Temür, Sayyid-Ahmad (r. 1437–55), who established his control over the steppes between the Don and the Dnieper. Possessing significant military potential, Sayyid Ahmad's Horde carried out an extremely aggressive policy towards its northern neighbors, namely the Grand Duchies of Lithuania and Moscow. However, it was subjected to an unexpected blow from the south, from which it could not recover. In 1453, the Crimean Khan Hajji Girey suddenly attacked Sayyid-Ahmad and inflicted a crushing defeat on him. Two years later, Hajji Girey struck again, leaving the Great Horde in tatters. The khan himself surrendered to the Lithuanians, ending his days in captivity in Kovno.[39]

AHMAD KHAN AND THE END OF THE GREAT HORDE

After Kichi Muhammad's death in 1459, the power of his son and heir, Ahmad (r. 1459–81), was weakened by a prolonged conflict with Ahmad's brother, Murtaza. The weakening of the Great Horde inspired the Moscow Prince Ivan III (1462–1505) to refuse to pay tribute, which provoked a reaction from the Tatars: in 1472, Ahmad sent his troops to the north. However, Ivan III was properly prepared for the attack, and the ruin of the small town of Aleksin on the Oka River was the Tatars' only success. After that, Ahmad's troops retreated to the steppe. Ahmad's repeated attempt to return the Great Principality to obedience had even greater consequences for the Great Horde. In 1480, the Tatar army met the Moscow forces on the banks of the Ugra (the Oka's tributary), but neither Ahmad nor Ivan III dared to initiate battle. After standing for several months in inaction in front of the enemy forces, Ahmad ordered the retreat to the Volga region, where the following year he was suddenly attacked by Ibrahim (r. 1464–95), the khan of Chimgi-Tura (modern Tiumen), who personally killed Ahmad. After these events, Moscow became officially independent of the Great Horde, and Ivan III used the title *tsar*, equal in status to the khan, in his diplomatic correspondence with foreign rulers.[40]

The last two decades of the Great Horde's existence were characterized by a marked economic deterioration caused by drought and famine in the steppe, which led to a sharp decline in the number of the Great Horde's subjects, who migrated to the more fertile steppes of the Dnieper region and Crimea. Finally, in May 1502, the Crimean Khan Mängli Girey defeated the last ruler of the Great Horde, Shaykh-Ahmad (d. 1528), at the confluence of the Sula River and the Dnieper. After this defeat, the Great Horde ceased to exist, and further attempts to unite the western regions of the Jochid Ulus under the rule of the Crimean or Astrakhan Khanate had no success.[41]

NOTES

1 On the meaning of this term, see an informative article by Jackson 1999.
2 Atwood 2017, 35–56; Trepavlov 2016b, 137–138; Jackson 1978, 209–210.
3 Gorskii 2016, 199; Sultanov 2002, 14; Izmailov 2002, 245–247.
4 Atwood 2017, 35, 54–55; Trepavlov 2016b, 143; Jackson 1978, 202–204, 209–211, 227–228.
5 Favereau 2016, 336–339; Arslanova 2009, 541–544; Jackson 1978, 208–227, 235.
6 Tizengauzen 1884, 63–64.
7 Favereau 2016, 335–348; Jackson 1978, 237–238; Zakirov 1966, 43–92.
8 Uzelac 2015, 133–136, 160–164, 233–238; Trepavlov 2010, 47–48; Mys′kov 2003, 112.
9 Lapshina 2013, 112–120; Trepavlov 2010, 33–34; Mys′kov 2003, 155–156.
10 Pochekaev 2016b, 246; Fedorov-Davydov 1973, 89–103; Safargaliev 1960, 69–70.
11 Gibb 1962, 482.
12 Kramarovskii 2016, 437; Egorov 1985, 79–141.
13 Trepavlov 2016a, 153; Ivanov 2016, 542; Sultanov 2002, 20.
14 Polo 1994, 313–314.
15 Uskenbai 2016, 209–210; Allsen 1987, 18–21; Jackson 1978, 205.
16 Uskenbai 2016, 210–212; Biran 1997, 65–66; Allsen 1987, 21–25.
17 Uskenbai 2016, 212–213; Pochekaev 2016b, 245; Allsen 1987, 25–26.
18 Gorskii 2016, 63; Khrustalev 2008, 258; Halperin 1985, 44–60.
19 Mys′kov 2003, 68; Allsen 1981, 36–45; Safargaliev 1960, 64.
20 Halperin 2016, 200; Gorskii 2016, 16, 54; Khrustalev 2008, 264.
21 Halperin 2016, 198–202; Gorskii 2016, 82–84, 181; Pochekaev 2016a, 233.
22 Ciocîltan 2012, 202–216; Di Cosmo 2005, 396, 413–415; Balard 1978, 75–76, 154.
23 Schamiloglu 2016, 679–692; Benedictow 2004, 44–54.
24 Trepavlov 2016c, 729–731; Vásáry 2009, 79–80; Mirgaleev 2003, 24–28.
25 Vásáry 2009, 80; Mirgaleev 2003, 30–37.
26 Uskenbai 2013, 184–219, 224–230; Vásáry 2009, 82.
27 Gorskii 2016, 82–95; Selivestrov 2015, 257–258, 263–266; Vásáry 2009, 80–82.
28 Gorskii 2016, 95–114; Selivestrov 2015, 267–269; Mirgaleev 2003, 63–82.
29 Vásáry 2009, 83; Mirgaleev 2003, 99–104; Roemer 1986, 51, 57–59.
30 Favereau 2016, 347; Mirgaleev 2003, 105–109.
31 Vásáry 2009, 83–84; Mirgaleev 2003, 109–135; Roemer 1986, 70–73.
32 Trepavlov 2002, 67–68, 75.
33 Reva 2016, 704–705; Safargaliev 1960, 178–180; Li͡askoronskii 1907, 96–115.
34 Reva 2016, 705–707, 733; Gorskii 2016, 121; Safargaliev 1960, 180–192.
35 Reva 2016, 716–721; Uskenbai 2013, 242; Safargaliev 1960, 195–200, 234.
36 Aksanov 2016, 50–252; Khamidullin and Bakhtin 2014, 289–339; Khudi͡akov 1923, 10–148.
37 Masliuzhenko 2016, 842–845; Nesterov 2016, 851–853; Bregel 2009, 221–228 [with concise explanation of the origin of the ethnonyms of Uzbeks and Kazakhs].
38 Gulevich 2016, 764–766; Zait͡sev 2014, 253–256; Safargaliev 1960, 261–265.
39 Gorskii 2016, 143–145; Trepavlov 2015, 240–293; Pochekaev 2012, 250–251.
40 Gorskii 2016, 151–172; Trepavlov 2015, 294–296, 305–307; Pochekaev 2012, 253, 256, 261–265, 382, 384, 387.
41 Gorskii 2016, 151–172, Trepavlov 2015, 294–296, 305–322; Pochekaev 2012, 253–277, 382–388.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE YUAN EMPIRE

Xiaolin Ma

The Yuan Empire was the direct successor of Chinggis Khan's Mongol Empire. As the nominal ruler of all the Mongols, the Yuan Emperor or Qa'an actually controlled the eastern part of the Mongol Empire, including Mongolia, Manchuria, North China, South China, Korea, Yunnan, Tibet, and a large part of Xinjiang, albeit quarrels and wars with the Chaghadaids and Ögödeids led to the instability of the northwestern frontier. From its center in North China, the Yuan Empire thrived from 1260, when Qubilai was enthroned, to 1368, when the Ming army captured Daidu. Remnants of the Yuan continued the empire on the steppe until ca. 1389.

QUBILAI'S YUAN EMPIRE

Qubilai's rise to power was a watershed moment in the history of the Mongol Empire. The politico-geographical center moved from Mongolia to the ecotone border between Inner Mongolia and North China due to the conflict surrounding his accession. After Möngke Qa'an ascended the throne in 1251, he purged a large number of political opponents and appointed his own supporters. He appointed his brother, Qubilai, to conquer Qarajang or Yunnan and to supervise the military and administration of the region south of the Gobi, i.e. Inner Mongolia and North China, which then became the heartland for Qubilai's appanage, although he continued to reside around Qaraqorum in the 1240s. This appointment gave Qubilai experience ruling agricultural regions and an understanding of Chinese culture. Qubilai became an advocate for China among the Mongol princes and laid a broad and profound political foundation in North China.

When Möngke died fighting the Song in Sichuan, his youngest brother, Ariq Böke, who stayed in Qaraqorum, became the most powerful candidate for the throne because he was supported by almost the entire steppe. The cards in Qubilai's hands were his political and military experience, the support of a few princes, and North China. In 1260, Ariq Böke and Qubilai both claimed the throne in almost the same month. Qubilai Qa'an's final victory in their four-year war relied heavily on the economy of North China.

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It is precisely because Qubilai's political center was far from Chinggis Khan's base in Mongolia that his legitimacy was challenged again and again. Despite the defeat and death of Ariq Böke, some Mongols still regarded him as the fifth Qa'an of the Mongol Empire. Thus, Qubilai Qa'an still faced challenges from all the branches of the Golden Family during his thirty-five-year reign. In Central Asia, Qaidu (1235–1301), the grandson of Ögödei Qa'an, rose to power with his outstanding military and political talents and proved to be the strongest and most persistent rival of Qubilai.[1] Qaidu held an assembly of Jochids, Chaghadaids, and Ögödeids at Talas in 1269 which agreed to the division of the Central Asian domains without consulting Qubilai. Moreover, Qaidu's alliance with the Chaghadaid Prince Du'a (d.1306) led to constant raids into Uyghuristan from the 1270s on. These raids caused Qubilai Qa'an's borders to retreat eastward as the Yuan army in Khotan and Kashgar withdrew in 1289; the Yuan abandoned Turfan in the early fourteenth century.[2]

The internal rebellions also caused severe headaches for Qubilai. In 1277, Shiregi, the youngest son of Möngke, rebelled in Mongolia. In 1287, Nayan, a descendant of Chinggis Khan's youngest brother, rebelled in Manchuria. Both of the rebellions stunned the entire empire, as they seized Chinggis Khan's ancestral lands in the upper Kerülen River. The decision to set North China as the center of the empire transformed Mongolia into a front line and battlefield. After the defeat of Ariq Böke, Qubilai Qa'an never set foot in Mongolia until his death, when he was buried in Mount Kürelgü, also the burial place of Chinggis Khan.[3]

Qubilai Qa'an transformed the institutions and ideology of the empire. According to Chinese sources, Qaidu criticized Qubilai Qa'an for "complying with Chinese ways (Hanfa 汉法)".[4] Although the Chinese sources often emphasize the dichotomy between the Mongols' original customs and Chinese ways, Qubilai Qa'an's reforms did not constitute the abandonment of the original nomadic customs. Qubilai inherited the major imperial institutions from Chinggis Khan, such as the *ordu*, "imperial encampment"; *touxia* (投下), "appanage"; *a'uruq*, "base camp"; *daruqachi*, "supervisor"; *keshig*, "imperial bodyguard"; *jarquchi*, "judge"; and *ortoq*, "the Mongol aristocracy's partnership with merchants". Like every Mongolian ruler, Qubilai regarded himself as a world conqueror, or the emperor of the world, ruling everything from sunrise to sunset.[5] His imperial decrees and official documents regularly mentioned Eternal Heaven in a standard "opening formula", which had never appeared in China before,[6] although Chinese emperors claimed to be the Sons of Heaven.

Nor can Qubilai Qa'an's transformation be defined as "sinicization". Qubilai could read and write Mongolian in Uyghur script, but he could not read or write Chinese, although he was able to understand some spoken Chinese. Qubilai even accepted the title "Patriarch of Confucianism" (儒教大宗师),[7] which indicates his poor knowledge of Chinese. The so-called Chinese ways adopted by Qubilai Qa'an often bear superficial resemblance to previous Chinese Dynastic institutions.[8] The Mongol rulers of the thirteenth century portrayed themselves as universal rulers through a number of institutional and cultural devices. Qubilai's early advisors, therefore, came from various ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds, including Mongols, Turks, Chinese, Muslims, Chinese Buddhists, Daoists, Tibetans, and Christians. Even the Chinese advisors can be divided into three major groups:

pragmatists (including statesmen, engineers, and scientists), Neo-Confucianist literati, and former Jurchen-Jin Dynasty elites. With the empire centered on the ecotone border, the Qa'an was able to identify with diverse cultures from various regions and mix them together.

Capital cities

In 1256, Prince Qubilai built Kaiping City, which was renamed Shangdu, "upper capital", in Inner Mongolia. After Qubilai Qa'an took the throne, he built Daidu or Khanbaliq (modern Beijing), which competed with the earlier capital, Qaraqorum, constructed in Mongolia in 1230. Similar to the Khitan's five capitals, Qaraqorum was a temporary residence for the Qa'an, who paraded between several camping spots across Mongolia in a year.[9] Nevertheless, the city functioned as one of the ceremonial spaces of the empire, and more importantly, as the warehouse of the Qa'an, filled with artisans. Qubilai became the first Mongol Qa'an to reside in a city, although he spent two or three months per year on parade and hunting.[10] The two-capital system was the result of the mixture of nomadic custom and sedentary civilization. The designers of Shangdu and Daidu were probably Chinese elites, especially Liu Bingzhong (刘秉忠, 1216–74), a Chinese astrologer, politician, and Buddhist. The layout of Daidu is in perfect order and much neater than Shangdu or Qaraqorum. Although the designer(s) left no document that provides us an insight into their planning,[11] it is obviously unexplainable by reference to a single culture. The odd number of the eleven gates of Daidu inspired the Chinese to imagine the shape of Nezha, a powerful deity with three heads, six arms, and two feet.[12] The vast open fields inside the two cities are designed to make nomadic camping more convenient, as Qubilai preferred to live in a tent between palaces.

Ritual spaces

Like a typical nomadic ruler, Qubilai Qa'an migrated annually from Daidu to Shangdu and back. The two capitals became the centers of imperial ceremonies and rituals. When the construction of Kaiping began, Qubilai sent his retinue to perform sacrifice to the Deity of the Ji River 济渎 in his personal appanage of Huaimeng 怀孟 in North China.[13] While the Mongols worshipped the spirits of mountains and rivers, this was the first time they had sacrificed to a Chinese river using Chinese dynastic ritual, demonstrating that Qubilai combined the construction of Kaiping with the Chinese cultural symbol of lordship. Spaces were set aside for Chinese rituals as part of the planning of Daidu. Inner Asian rituals were also practiced in or around both of the capital cities. The most magnificent rituals were those to worship Heaven and imperial ancestors, which had been performed in Mongolia before being transmitted to the suburbs of Shangdu.[14] Sino-Tibetan Buddhist and Daoist monasteries inside the two capitals also served as spaces for imperial ritual. Qubilai Qa'an ordered his Chinese advisors to work out the program and music for imperial rituals. While the ritual itself was complemented by some Mongolian elements, the assembly was followed by a traditional Mongolian banquet and entertained by Chinese, Tangut, Huihui (Muslim), and Buddhist music performances.



Map 15.1 The Yuan Empire
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd

The new name of the empire

In 1272, Qubilai introduced the term *Da Yuan* 大元, which is derived from the ancient Chinese classic *I Ching*, exclusively for his Chinese subjects to replace the former *Da Chao* 大朝, "great dynasty".[15] As evidenced by the Mongolian expression *Dai Ön kemekü Yeke Monggol Ulus*, "the Great Mongol Empire which is called Dai Ön", *Da Yuan* was transliterated in Mongolian as *Dai Ön* and used as an equivalent to the Mongolian term *Yeke Monggol Ulus*.[16] Among the Mongols, the united Mongol Empire, or *Yeke Monggol Ulus*, continued to exist in reality as well as in mentality, although it now had a different geographical extent and political structure.[17]

The unification of scripts

This process demonstrates Qubilai Qa'an's ambition. In 1269, Qubilai entrusted Phagspa (1235–80), the State Preceptor (later Imperial Preceptor), with inventing the "Mongolian new script" based on the Tibetan alphabet. The new script, best known today as the Phagspa script, was also called the "Script of the Empire" (国字) and was part of Qubilai's plan to "transliterate all languages". In this sense, Qubilai Qa'an surpassed his grandfather, Chinggis Khan, in building a unified and universal empire. Special schools opened across the Yuan Empire to teach the new script, which was used on all official occasions.[18] Due to the complicated historical background and characteristics of the language, the Phagspa script was never extensively used, but it might have left traces on Chinese phonetics, Korean characters, and Tibetan inscriptions.

Attitude towards religions

If the ideology of the Mongol Empire can be defined as "Tenggerism", the Yuan continued to tolerate other religions. Möngke Qa'an once said that Heaven is like a palm, and religions are like fingers. Qubilai's and his descendants' enthusiasm for esoteric Buddhism was rather personal. The esoteric Buddhism at court was taught by not only Tibetans, but Tanguts and Uyghurs.[19] Qubilai borrowed the institution of Imperial Preceptor from Xi Xia, or the Tangut Empire (1038–1227). Despite having a Tibetan lama as the Imperial Preceptor, Tibetan Buddhism never became the sole religion of the empire, but it did help the empire to govern Tibet. Qubilai also made use of debates between Buddhism and Daoism to weaken Quanzhen Daoism, as this sect had grabbed extraordinary political privileges and economic resources in the first half of the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, Quanzhen Daoists stayed close to the center of the Mongol court. Throughout the Yuan period, almost every new emperor appointed a new patriarch of Quanzhen.[20] All the religions including Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Christianity, and Confucianism, which was also classified by the Mongols as a kind of religion, were involved in politics, as their prayers for the imperial family were exchanged for tax exemptions.[21]

Orientation of policies

Qubilai Qa'an was a pragmatic politician who focused his attention on practical results rather than cultural values. Throughout Qubilai's reign, there appear to have been two distinct factions at court. Rather than an ethno-cultural dichotomy between

Chinese and *Semu* 色目 (mainly Central Asian Muslims), the court echoed the earlier Chinese traditional dispute between righteousness 义 and interest 利. The latter concept of governance, focusing on finance, was well-represented by politicians such as Shang Yang (商鞅, ca.395–338 B.C.) and Wang Anshi (王安石, 1021–86), and Qubilai's trusted multi-ethnic ministers such as the Central Asian Ahmad, the Chinese Wang Wentong 王文统, Lu Shirong 卢世荣, and the Uyghur/Tibetan Sangha桑哥, who took the Chinese surname Wang王.[22] Qubilai's desire for expansion and a full treasury led to pragmatists dominating the Confucianist idealist equalitarianism.

There is no doubt that the Yuan Empire regarded all the other Mongol khans as vassals. Almost every Ilkhan performed two inauguration ceremonies, one when ascending the throne and the second when accepting investiture from the great Qa'an. Abaqa (r.1265–82) succeeded his father Hülegü in 1265 and performed the second inauguration ceremony when the embassy of the great Qa'an arrived with the decree and the crown (*taj*) in 1270.[23] When Arghun took power in 1284, an envoy was sent to the Qa'an and returned with the diploma of investiture in 1286. It is clear from the Yuan correspondence with Abaqa and Arghun (r. 1284–91) that the great Qa'an conferred the Chinese seal of "assisting the empire and reassuring the people" (辅国安民之宝) on the Ilkhans. The Yuan emperor conferred the seal of "the prince's palace, stabilizing the state and governing the people" (王府定国理民之宝) upon Ghazan (r. 1295–1304), which he used on his letter to Pope Boniface VIII in 1302.[24] News from the Yuan Empire arrived in the Ilkhanate with frequent envoys such as the famous Bolad Chingsang and Isa Kelemechi.[25] Marriage also linked the Yuan and the Ilkhanate, e.g. Princess Kökechin was betrothed to Arghun, who died by the time she arrived in Persia in 1293, so that his son Ghazan married her.[26]

THE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY TURN FROM MILITARY EXPANSION TO MARITIME TRADE

The constant attempts at expansions and conquests under Qubilai Qa'an were motivated by the Mongol war machine, rather than a blueprint for a maritime empire. Yet in the early fourteenth century, the Yuan Empire stopped its expansion and sought to boost its treasury through the productivity of Southeast China and maritime trade.

The greatest military success of Qubilai was the conquest of South China from the Song Empire, which was one of the most resilient opponents the Mongols faced. The Mongol war against Song was launched in 1234. For decades, the Song successfully blocked the Mongol army with its intensive defense system combined with natural barriers and fortresses along the Yangzi River. Möngke died besieging a fortress in Sichuan, while his flanking attack via Yunnan and Annam yielded no result. Qubilai developed a plan to break through the impregnable walled city of Xiangyang that stood in the middle of the Song's defensive line. The Mongol army constructed citadels, one by one, to envelop Xiangyang, then besieged it for six years before finally seizing the city. Afterwards, it took only a short span of time for the Mongols marching from Xiangyang down the Yangzi River to gain the Song's surrender. The last resistance was destroyed in 1279. The surrendered young emperor, Zhao Xian (1271–1323), was ordered by Qubilai to reside in Tibet, where he became a talented monk.

Compared to the devastation suffered by North China and Central Asia early in the thirteenth century, the Mongol conquest did little harm to South China, where

the economic structure remained in good condition. Thus, the economy continued to prosper. The social continuity of South China under the Song-Yuan-Ming transition from the twelfth century to the fifteenth century only makes sense if we accept this fact.[27] When the Mongol army was set to cross the Yangzi River, Qubilai enjoined his marshal Bayan the Ba'arin not to indulge soldiers in killing.[28] Qubilai had learned from years of experience that to conquer a country is to dominate its land and population. If they took the land without population, who else would reside there?[29]

In order to transport the grain, provisions, and treasures from the southeast to the center of the empire, the Yuan dug and dredged various ditches to form the Great Canal, which spanned 1,800 km, linking the empire's economic center, Hangzhou, and its political center, Daidu. During the Yuan period, cities with ports along the Great Canal were thronged with embassies and merchants. Nevertheless, Qubilai was not content with the great wealth stimulated by the Great Canal. Moreover, parts of the waterway were easily silted up, so that it would prove costly to maintain it. Qubilai therefore employed two former pirates, Zhu Qing 朱清 and Zhang Xuan 张瑄, to explore maritime transportation routes from the southeast coast to North China. It was the first regular offshore transportation in China. Only the former pirates took the risk to probe the maritime routes. In ten years, they tried three different routes, one after another, and finally found the safest and most beneficial one. The empire even attempted digging a canal to cut through the Shandong peninsula in order to shorten the maritime routes, although this failed. While the Great Canal was thirty to forty percent cheaper than land transportation, the maritime route saved seventy to eighty percent. The amount of grain reaching Daidu by offshore transportation increased year by year. Those in charge made great fortunes. In 1302, Zhu and Zhang were prosecuted for corruption and bribing almost all the chancellors in the court. Although the two ended their lives in tragedy, the empire benefited from their legacy.[30] Maritime transportation created several wealthy families in Zhejiang. The Great Canal and the maritime networks also contributed to a greater integration of China. Today, China follows the Yuan model that sets the political center in Beijing and the economic heartland in southeastern China.

Koryo witnessed the invasion of the Mongols in 1218 and entered into an "alliance of brothers" to pay annual tribute to the Mongols. In order to further control Koryo, Qubilai Qa'an married his daughter to the crown prince of Koryo. Thereafter, the marriage alliance between Koryo and the Mongol Empire became a usual practice, so that all the Koryo kings had Mongolian blood in their veins and took Mongolian names. The Koryo King Wang Zhang (1275–1325, r.1308–13), Qubilai Qa'an's grandson, also named Ijil-buqa in Mongolian, stayed in the Yuan Empire for more than half of his life and reluctantly returned to Koryo. The Yuan Empire once set up a *daruqachi* in the capital of Koryo to supervise its court but soon recalled him. When Qubilai Qa'an was preparing to conquer Japan, a Mongol administrative province was established in Koryo so as to make use of the manpower and material resources of the region. Later, the officials of the province were not appointed by the Mongols. The Koryo king held the post of chancellor of the province and appointed officials by himself, thus maintaining Koryo's own institutions unchanged. The contacts between the Yuan and Koryo proved to be most intensive. So many embassies, as well as merchants and Buddhist monks from Koryo, traveled in the Yuan Empire, practical Chinese manuals such as *Lao Qida*老乞大 ("Old Khita") were produced in Koryo.[31] The term Khita/Khitai indicated China,

especially North China, during the Mongol period. The use of "Old Khita" therefore implies that the Koryo were familiar with the Chinese conventions. As attested in *Lao Qida*, spoken Chinese influenced by Mongolian grammar was a *lingua franca* among various ethnic groups in and around North China.[32]

The fact that the legitimacy of Qubilai was repeatedly challenged by his cousins ignited his desire to conquer the world to prove his military talent as the supreme Mongol ruler. The Yuan's maritime expeditions to Japan in 1274 and 1281 both failed. The Yuan's preparation in Southeastern China and Korea did not result in a strong navy. The attempts to conquer Annam (Dai Viet) and Champa (modern north and central Vietnam, respectively) in the 1280s suffered failure and heavy losses. The 1292 expedition to Java also failed. Qubilai was angry with the defeated commanders but maintained the vanity of an emperor by appointing his own candidate as the king of Annam and never recognizing its true ruler.

Although all the overseas expeditions of the Yuan Empire failed, maritime trade still expanded. This was the first time a mainland regime developed its power on the ocean. In this sense, the Yuan Empire's hegemony expanded from Inner Asia to the South Sea.

When Qubilai's successor and grandson Temür Öljeitü Qa'an (Emperor Chengzong, r.1294–1307) ascended the throne in 1294, all the overseas campaigns were canceled, but maritime trade prospered. In 1297–98, Ilkhan Ghazan's envoys sailed to the Yuan Empire and returned to Persia in 1305 with the Qa'an's gifts and decades of tax revenue collected from Hülegüids' appanage in China.

Partly out of a desire for military success, Temür Öljeitü Qa'an attempted to continue inland expansion southwestward. As early as 1283, the Yuan army captured the Kingdom of Pagan (Burma) (849–1369) but was not able to establish direct rule. In 1301 Temür Öljeitü Qa'an dispatched southeastern generals who had commanded the navy to conquer the Lanna Kingdom (northern Thailand). The expedition was canceled before departing Yuan territory due to local protests and rebellions in Yunnan. Afterwards, the military operations in the southwest focused on maintaining order.

Under the reign of Temür Öljeitü, the military activities of the Yuan Empire were greatly reduced, although a large number of elite troops continued to be stationed in the Altai Mountains and Mongolia. After Temür Öljeitü's ascension, the war between the Yuan Empire and the Ögödeids along with the Chaghadaids was concentrated around the Altai Mountains. In 1298, the Chaghadaid Khan Du'a launched a surprise attack and captured and killed Prince Körgis (Georges) of the Önggüt tribe, who also happened to be an imperial son-in-law.[33] It was a serious setback for the Yuan Empire. Temür Öljeitü Qa'an reorganized the command system and dispatched his eighteen-year-old nephew, Prince Qaishan, to the front line. In 1301, the Yuan, Qaidu, and Du'a assembled almost all of their elite military forces in the decisive battle of Mount Tekelkü near the Altai Mountains. Qaidu was mortally wounded. Du'a was injured, too, and the strength of the Ögödeids and Chaghadaids in Central Asia was greatly weakened. In 1304, the Yuan Empire and the western Khans concluded a peace treaty which finally ended the half-century war. The Silk Road was secure under the reign of Temür Öljeitü Qa'an.

MID-YUAN POLITICS

Qubilai Qa'an left a rich legacy and an equally deep crisis for the Yuan Empire. The crucial political issue facing the empire was the instability surrounding the succession

to the throne. The emperors' short reigns and lowering fertility aggravated the political in stability. In less than forty years after Qubilai's death, a total of eight emperors were enthroned. Each emperor had divergent political priorities and, whilst it would be wrong to evaluate an emperor's politics by juxtaposing Chinese culture and Mongol custom, the constant change of policy led to inconstancy.

Many disputes were rooted in the election practices inherited from the steppe. According to the nomadic tradition, every Qa'an was elected through a *quriltai*. The election could cause controversy and trouble. Qubilai Qa'an decided to nominate his own successor during his lifetime, following advice from his Chinese advisors. Jingim (1243–85) was already the crown prince during the early reign of Qubilai, who gradually handed over some important responsibilities to him. In the early 1280s, Jingim – who had been well-trained in Confucianism, religions, administration, and military tactics – with a group of elite advisors around him appeared to be the most eligible candidate for the throne. However, a crown prince often sits on thin ice in the face of a long-lived emperor. Jingim's opposition towards Qubilai's trusted chancellor, Ahmad, gave rise to the suspicion of the emperor. After all, Ahmad was assassinated in 1282 by someone who was disguised as Jingim.[34] Things worsened when the aged Qubilai received a memorial from a Chinese official advising him to retire, causing the emperor to fear a plot. Jingim soon died from fear and depression. Qubilai did not appoint another crown prince, leaving the throne open for other candidates. Afterwards, the appointment of a crown prince became only one factor in the election of a new Qa'an. The other factors included virtue, intelligence, seniority, and legitimacy. After Qubilai's death, his grandson Temür Öljeitü (r.1294–1307) claimed the throne through a competition to test eloquence, military prowess, and symbolic legitimacy because he obtained the seal of the crown prince and the oldest Chinese imperial seal. Temür Öljeitü Qa'an's army defeated the Chaghadaids and Ögödeids, but the actual influence of the Yuan Empire on the khanates was weakening. In Ilkhan Öljeitü's (r.1304–16) letter addressed to the King of France in 1305, the legend on his Chinese seal reads "truly mandated emperor pacifying ten thousand foreigners" (真命皇帝和顺万夷之宝). As the Yuan Empire never recognized an Ilkhan as a truly mandated and independent emperor, this indicates that the Ilkhan produced the seal on his own initiative and no longer considered himself a vassal of the great Qa'an. This seal continued to be used by the last Ilkhan, Abu Saʿid (r.1317–35).[35]

When Temür Öljeitü died with no male heirs, his nephews Qaishan (Emperor Wuzong) and Ayurbarwada (Emperor Renzong) seized power through coups. The two brothers agreed to ascend the throne consecutively, with one of Qaishan's sons to succeed them. Qaishan had been commanding an army on the northwest frontier and ended the half-century war between the Yuan Empire and Central Asia in 1301. His younger brother Ayurbarwada spent all his early life in China, where he had accumulated abundant political alliances. Qaishan Qa'an (r.1307–11) showed generosity to almost all factions inside and outside the Yuan territory, while establishing a new central chancellery institution to carry out new policies. Recent studies have shown that it is difficult to define Qaishan's policy as typical "Mongol". On the contrary, Qaishan turned out to be rather progressive in promoting Chinese rituals and even granted Confucius an unprecedentedly long honorific title, *Dacheng zhisheng wenxuan wang* 大成至圣文宣王 ("great accomplishment sacrosanctity King Wenxuan"). Qaishan's chancellors included Toqto 脱虎脱, a Mongol; Sambonu 三宝奴, a Uyghur; Le Shi

乐实, a Koryo; Baba 保八, a Qangli; and Mengge-Temür 忙哥帖木儿, the son of 'Isa Kelemechi. They were not members of his former military retinues but sophisticated administrators with proficient knowledge of Chinese culture.[36] Qaishan's new capital city, Zhongdu 中都 or "central capital" (modern Zhangbei, north of Hebei), was not completed before his death, which aborted all his ambitions. Qaishan's four-year reign was too short to display the effect of the new policies carried out by his chancellors, who were immediately cleansed and stigmatized by the new emperor Ayurbarwada.

As soon as Ayurbarwada (r.1311–20) took power, almost all the policies of Qaishan were eliminated. While the Yuan Empire and the Chaghadaid Khanate fell into military conflict for a decade, South China drew much attention from the court. Ayurbarwada's introduction of imperial examinations allowed more southerners to enter the government. It was substantially a political strategy, although one of the results was the increasing Confucian influence on non-Chinese peoples. In order to increase revenue, re-registration of the lands in South China was carried out in 1314, although the government soon aborted the process due to protests and revolts. Ayurbarwada violated his promise to pass power to a nephew, Qaishan's exiled son Qoshila, and made his own son Shidebala the crown prince in 1316. In order to secure the throne for the teenage Shidebala, Ayurbarwada had to rely on his mother, Empress Dowager Daghi (d.1322), and compromise with her faction. The result was that Ayurbarwada remained inactive late in his reign, which could be ascribed partly to his addiction to alcohol. The first official collection of legal statutes, *Da Yuan tongzhi* 大元通制 ("Comprehensive regulations of the great Yuan"), was compiled in Ayurbarwada's early reign, and its issue was delayed until the time of Shidebala.

When the eighteen-year-old Shidebala (Emperor Yingzong, r.1320–3) ascended the throne, power rested in the hands of his grandmother Daghi and the powerful minister Temüder. The young emperor was moody, irritable, and probably addicted to opium.[37] When Empress Dowager Daghi fell ill and died in 1322, Shidebala unscrupulously slaughtered her companions, while he also killed or exiled most of his potential rivals in the imperial family. It seems Shidebala only trusted his young bodyguard and chancellor Baiju (1298–1323). The next year Shidebala and Baiju were assassinated by his own bodyguards and ministers at Nanpo 南坡, south of Shangdu. Most of the officers of the imperial bodyguard betrayed him.[38]

Qaishan's cousin Yesün-Temür (Emperor Taiding, r.1323–28) was then the senior candidate for the throne. There is no evidence to suspect that Yesün-Temür had been involved in the assassination of Shidebala.[39] Yet as the guardian of the ancestral monuments and homeland of Chinggis Khan in upper Kerülen River, Yesün-Temür had a strong claim. After marching southwards to take power, Yesün-Temür claimed to follow all the institutions of Qubilai, and he won support from all sides during his five-year reign. Yesün-Temür's legitimacy was later denied by his nephew Toq Temür (Emperor Wenzong, r.1328–32) after Yesün-Temür's descendants lost their lives in the competition for the throne.

In 1328, Yesün-Temür's son and crown prince, nine-year-old Araghibagh, was enthroned at Shangdu. A Qipchaq general, El-Temür (d.1333), who had started his career as Qaishan's bodyguard, launched a coup in Daidu and enthroned Qaishan's second son, Toq Temür. It became the fiercest competition for the throne during the Yuan period as battles waged between Daidu and Shangdu for months. El-Temür's

Qipchaq army, which had been the elite force fighting against the Ögödeids and Chaghadaids since the late thirteenth century, captured Shangdu, killed their rivals, and secured the throne for Toq Temür.

When Toq Temür's elder brother Qoshila (Emperor Mingzong, r.1329), who had been exiled by Ayurbarwada to Central Asia, returned via Mongolia, it would be the same scene as twenty years earlier, when Qaishan and Ayurbarwada decided to take power one after the other. However, the compromise between the two brothers was not repeated. As soon as the brothers met in Inner Mongolia, Qoshila was poisoned to death and Toq Temür reclaimed the throne. The murder ignited revolts by the Mongols in Sichuan and Yunnan. El-Temür, who always stood by Toq Temür, became the first kingmaker of the Yuan Empire and controlled much of the state, leaving little room for Toq Temür to exert power. Thus Toq Temür was keen on imperial rituals and cultural projects, including compiling the administrative compendium *Jingshi dadia* 经世大典 ("Compendia for Governing the World") with the purpose of growing his support.[40] Still, Qoshila's death deeply afflicted Toq Temür, who considered his first son and crown prince Aratnadala's (d.1331) premature death as punishment for his crime and fell into the depths of despair. Toq Temür died at the age of twenty-eight after deciding to pass power to his nephew rather than his son.

Of Qoshila's two sons, the younger Irinchibal (Emperor Ningzong, r.1332) was enthroned at the age of six and died forty days later. Then the throne passed to the thirteen-year-old Toghan Temür (Emperor Shundi, r.1333–70), who had been exiled in Guangxi, the southernmost part of China. Toghan Temür ruled for more than thirty years, which is comparable to the duration of Qubilai Qa'an's reign. While Toghan Temür's intelligence brought a short-lived prosperity, his lack of diligence hastened the fall of the empire, which had been corrupted through the chaotic power transitions.

COLLAPSE OF THE YUAN EMPIRE

After the 1330s, all the Mongol khanates experienced decline or fall. During this period, the Yuan Empire paid increasing attention to its own internal political disputes. By the fourteenth century, powerful chancellors became more and more dominant in politics. While imperial princes were frequently purged, most of the powerful non-imperial families were able to keep their status despite some dying in the political turmoil. The *quriltai* electoral system allowed powerful chancellors to play an important role. The rise of the Qaishanids, for example, was backed by El-Temür, who largely dictated the choice of successors after the death of Tuq-Temür.

While there was no regular forum for a Yuan emperor to meet the officials in court, suggestions and complaints from all over the empire reached the chancellors, who orally presented briefs with proposed decisions to the emperor. Usually, the emperor's only task was to say, "Agreed". As a result, most of the political matters were actually decided by the powerful chancellors.[41] After El-Temür died, his role was assumed by Bayan the Merkit (1280–1340), who held concurrent leading posts in almost every important office. Seven years later, an adult Toghan Temür launched a coup to obtain real power.

The political, ethnic, and class contradictions within the Yuan Empire had been further intensified by Bayan when he suppressed his political rivals, stopped the imperial examinations, and squeezed the wealth of the empire. A financial crisis arose due to the fact that more than half of the national annual income was spent on the emperor's grants to nobles, extravagant life-style, and endless Buddhist offerings. Bureaucratic corruption also led to civil unrest and rebellions. In 1340, Toghan Temür appointed Toqto (1314–56) as the prime chancellor to carry out reforms, including the restoration of the imperial examination; encouragement of personnel selections; development of imperial rites; dispatch of imperial commissioners supervising local officials; a new Legal Code; the compilation of the histories of the Song, Liao, and Jin Dynasties; and so forth. While the participation of scholar-officials caused cultural prosperity, the reforms did not touch on the crucial economic issues. Toqto still suffered political pressure and constant rejection. Several years later, Toghan Temür grew tired of political matters, gave up reforms, and enjoyed himself with his harem and esoteric Buddhism. The universalism,[42] mystical charms, and approachable teachings of Buddhism always attracted the Mongols in East Asia.

The Yuan Empire was wracked by dissension between the factions of Toghan Temür's Korean Empress Ki (1315–69/70) and their son, the Crown Prince Ayushiridara (1339–78), and the newly emerging military aristocracies. Moreover, while the demise of the Yuan Empire could be viewed in the context of extreme climate and plague, the direct causes were no doubt the currency reform and the Huanghe River project.

Paper money was an advanced invention that made it convenient to accumulate wealth over the vast empire. However, the greedy rulers did not restrain themselves from issuing more notes, resulting in gradual inflation. To cope with the financial crisis, Toghan Temür issued a new version of notes and copper coins in 1350. However, since the old versions were not replaced, the unregulated issuance of new currencies did not solve the financial problems and caused further inflation.

In 1344, the Huanghe River broke its dike and changed its watercourse, swallowing a thousand square kilometers at the cost of many lives and crops. Toghan-Temür appointed the water expert Jia Lu (贾鲁 1297–1353) to regulate the watercourse of the Huanghe River in 1348–51. The engineering project cost huge sums of money (1,845,636 *ding* in total) and assembled a large number of young adults at the North Huai region to carry out the work. It is always dangerous to gather a crowd of young, poorly paid men, especially with no entertainments. Rumors about the doom of the empire spread rapidly. Potential rebellious elements, together with the poverty-stricken people, were incited by the millennialism of the White Lotus Society, a heterodox Chinese religion that spawned several independent militant factions called the Red Turban Army, due to their headwear.

The Red Turbans started as a rabble. Toqto's campaigns in 1352–54 almost annihilated the rebellion. Yet political slander led to the sudden dismissal of Toqto on the battlefield, resulting in the collapse of the Yuan army and the resurgence of the Red Turbans.

The Mongol conquerors' shallow understanding of Chinese culture was not able to provide counter measures against the inflammatory rumors.[43] Moreover, the martial skills of the Yuan troops stationed in China declined due to decades of neglect. Still, Central North China witnessed the rise of new military elites such as Chaghan-Temür,

Köke-Temür, Li Siqi, and Bolod-Temür, who became formidable adversaries of the Red Turbans. The empire could not, however, control these new warlords, thus their factional disputes were exacerbated.[44] The weakness of garrisons was exploited by a branch of Red Turbans that crossed Shanxi and then captured and burned down Shangdu in 1358.

Mongol rule created a huge gap between the rich and the poor. The poor between the Yangzi River and the Huai River became the main force behind the rebellion. After 1353, the rebellion cut off transportation on the Great Canal, depriving the empire of more than half of its income. The Yuan Empire continued its rule by relying on maritime transportation. Yet when southeastern pirates and wealthy businessmen became independent, the Yuan Empire lost its last lifeline. It was Zhu Yuanzhang (朱元璋, 1328–98) a desperate peasant from along the Huai River, who finally annihilated the Yuan Empire.

Zhu Yuanzhang became a Red Turban in 1352 and soon rose from a soldier to become a warlord, eventually annexing other rebel territories and unifying South China. In 1368, Zhu proclaimed himself emperor in Nanjing and named the new empire *Da Ming* 大明. The Red Turbans had adopted various ideological concepts, including the revival of the Han-Chinese dynastic name Song 宋 and the White Lotus Society's politico-religious concept of *Mingwang* 明王 ("Wise King"), the incarnation of Maitreya to rule the world.[45] Zhu displayed his ambition in a brand-new empire called Da Ming, which could be derived from *Mingwang* but can also be explained as a derivative from *I Ching*. In the *I Ching*, the term *Da Ming* appears in the sentence immediately after *Da Yuan*, indicating Zhu Yuanzhang's mandate to replace Qubilai's empire.[46] As the seemingly unstoppable Ming army approached Daidu, Toghan-Temür escaped in the night of September 10th, 1368, and died in Mongolia two years later. Toghan Temür's descendants and remaining forces continued the Yuan on the steppe for two decades until they were defeated by the Ming campaigns and Mongolia fell into chaos.

NOTES

1 See Biran 2013.
2 See Liu Yingsheng 2011, 180–193, 268–285.
3 Pelliot 1959, 330–363. Irinjjin 1992/93, 67–75.
4 *YS* 3073.
5 Borjigijin 2016, 75–84.
6 Liu 2007, 171–182.
7 *YS* 3073.
8 Li Zhian 2004, 110–174.
9 Atwood 2015, 293–349.
10 See Li Zhian 2018, 21–39.
11 Chen Gaohua 1982; Wei 2008; Xu 2015, 107–194; Watanabe 2017.
12 Chan 2008.
13 Sakurai 2014, 381–397.
14 Ma 2018, 226–235.
15 See Hsiao 1985, 23–40.
16 Cleaves 1949, 30, 62, 83.
17 Kim 2015, 279–305; Kim 2009, 15–42.
18 See Cai 2011; Junast and Xue 2011.

19 See Dunnell 2009, 41–78; Shen 2017.
20 See Zhang Guangbao 2015.
21 See the examples in official documents in Cai 2017.
22 Mao 2017, 99–107.
23 *RDT*, 517, 535.
24 Mostaert and Cleaves 1952, 419–506; Mostaert 1962, 85.
25 Allsen 2001, 27–28, 71–73.
26 Moule and Pelliot 1938, 19; Cleaves 1976, 181–203; Qiu 2021, Forthcoming.
27 See Li Zhian 2016, 40–60, which is a response to *SYMT*.
28 *YS* 156: 3100, 3127; Cleaves 1956, 208–209, 277.
29 *YS* 166.
30 Gao 2010, 285–324.
31 Chen Gaohua 2002, 123–130.
32 Miya 2003, 53–96; Miya 2004, 157–209.
33 For recent research on Prince Körgis based on newly found inscriptions in the Altai Mountains, see Osawa and Takahashi 2015, 257–290.
34 *YS* 4563.
35 Mostaert and Cleaves 1952, 484–485.
36 Li Mingfei 2011, 149–159; Chen Xinyuan 2018, 233–250.
37 Yao 1996, 125–147.
38 Liu Xiao 2010, 47–66.
39 Yang Na 2012, 30–38.
40 For the *Jingshi dadian*, see Lam 1992, 77–93.
41 Zhang Fan 1997, 203–217.
42 Franke 1978, 3–85.
43 Liu Haiwei 2017, 121–126.
44 See Hung 2011, 85–122.
45 Yang Ne 2017.
46 Du 2014, 52–57.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE ILKHANATE

George Lane

In 1251 Möngke Qa'an, the eldest son of Tolui Khan, became the Qa'an, the Great Khan of the Mongol Empire. The House of Tolui had to assert itself and establish a solid power base, a project to which the indomitable Sorqoqtani Beki had devoted herself since the death of her husband, Tolui Khan, in 1232. Sorqoqtani Beki (d.1252) had ensured from the outset that her sons were her priority.[1] They received training and education which enabled them to realise her ambitions for power and influence, and she often took a direct role in the choice of their tutors, in the selection of their companions, and in the early administration of their allotted lands. It is recorded that the accomplished Qazvini scholar Malik Iftikhar al-Din Muhammad was employed for the tutoring of the young Toluid princes in the decades following the initial irruption of the Mongol forces circa 1220.[2] Although there is no direct evidence that Tolui's widow ever travelled to this northern Iranian city, a tomb tower in Maragha, 400 km to the west, has been dedicated to Sorqoqtani Beki's memory, just possibly in recognition of her role in recruiting locally for the education of her sons.[3] Certainly, these princes retained a special affection for Qazvin; Mustawfi records that Hülegü, his son Abaqa, and his grandson Arghun spent 18 days as guests of the Qazvini Malik and particularly enjoyed the warming "Muslim hamam," and that their enthusiasm for Qazvin was shared by their entourages and all the other Ilkhans.[4]

When word filtered westward that the new Toluid Great Khan had been elected, that his coronation was to be held in Qaraqorum, and that all his loyal subjects would be expected to attend, excitement was extreme in the city of Qazvin. For three decades, Iran's city-states had been in turmoil. Herat – the capital of Khurasan and seat of the Karts, whose ruler, Shams al-Din, had close personal ties of friendship with both the Chinggisid leadership and the military officers with whom he had campaigned in Hindustan – welcomed the news, as did the Khitan Qutlugh Khans of Kirman and the Armenian rulers of Cilicia, both strong supporters of the Chinggisid revolution. For most, the tidings of a novel and strong leader were good news especially so since it was widely known that the Toluid *qa'an*s had connections with Iran and might bring an end to these three decades of instability. The notables of

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Qazvin, in particular, realised that Möngke's elevation as Qa'an could prove highly advantageous to Iran and especially to their city.[5] By invoking Möngke's personal connections to Qazvin, they could appeal for his help in restoring order and stability to their country and bring an end to the military governance of Baiju, a Jochid appointee, and the Isma'ili attacks which they claimed to be a perpetual threat and disruption to their lives.

The Chief Qadi of Qazvin led the Iranian delegation to Möngke's coronation, and they made a personal plea to the Great Khan to put an end to the 30 years of turmoil and anarchy which the military governor Baiju Noyan (ex.1260) had failed to suppress. The impassioned speech requested that the Great Khan Möngke "build a bridge of Justice" across the Amu Darya River and unite Iran with the Empire proper. The Qazvini delegation wanted an end to Iran's peripheral status and wanted to be incorporated fully into the Chinggisid empire, and for that reason they wanted Möngke to appoint a royal prince to come westward, restore order and stability to their country, and, in particular, end the tyranny of the Isma'ilis which threatened not only Iran but world peace. In a dramatic finale, the speaker uncovered a hidden Assassin hiding among the congregation gathered before the emperor.[6] Mustawfi, a descendant of the qadi who led that delegation, claimed that it was the Qazvinis who actually chose Hülegü, "seeing in his countenance the royal *farr*."[7]

Möngke Qa'an ordered his brother Qubilai to head east to complete the task of bringing Song China into the Mongol Empire, and he dispatched Hülegü, with what proved to be the last united *tamma* army fielded, to bring the Muslim west, from the Amu Darya to the Nile, fully into the empire, declaring with trepidation that, while chaos would be brought to an end, he hoped he "would later not have to bite my lip {regret, express distress}."[8]

Hülegü's march on the West stands in clear contrast to that of his grandfather. Whereas Chinggis Khan had unleashed his forces on the Khwarazmshah and Iran in anger and in pursuit of bloody revenge, his grandson spent many months in gentle travel, stopping for hunting, merriment, and festivities as he greeted the many delegations of well-wishers there to offer their allegiance and loyalty. After crossing the Amu Darya, he relaxed with some lion hunting and then enjoyed the elaborate welcome arranged by Iran's current governor, Arghun Aqa (d.1278). The wily Arghun Aqa shared power with the unpopular military governor Baiju Noyan (d.1260), particularly in the west, but Arghun Aqa retained the ear of the Ilkhan.[9] Hülegü arrived by invitation and as a king, neither on a war footing nor as a conqueror.[10] Before the confrontation with the Caliph in Baghdad, the only military engagement that had taken place was the assault on the Isma'ili stronghold of Alamut, high in the fastness of the Elburz mountains. For this military operation he summoned all the local rulers of Iran, and these maliks, governors, khans, princes, generals, and leaders came in droves, united behind their new Shah, Hülegü, and in their opposition to the young Rukn al-Din of Alamut.

> I [Hülegü] am setting out against the Heretics. If you send assistance in the form of troops and armaments, provisions and military supplies, I will count it as a favour and your province will have peace and security. But if you neglect to do this, as soon as I become free from my present concerns, I will deal with you and after that no excuses or apology will be acceptable.[11]

They came from Khurasan, Badghis, Georgia, Armenia, central Anatolia, Sistan, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Jibal, Iraq al-Arab, and Iraq al-'Ajam, from Kirman, Shiraz, Yazd, and Isfahan. The one leader who did not send troops or supplies was the Caliph of Baghdad. The Kurdish governor of Irbil and Mosul was not the only one who felt disquiet at these unfolding events. Coinciding with Hülegü's request for military provisions, Badr al-Din Lu'lu also received a command from the Caliph which, in contrast to the Khan's request, demanded musicians. "Look at the two requests, and weep for Islam and its people!"[12]

Alamut fell after a prolonged siege. The walls of the fortress, along with the fortifications of most of the other Isma'ili strongholds, were razed, and the Isma'ili "menace" was ended. The young Rukn al-Din had finally surrendered to Hülegü, and his life was not only spared, but he was treated with respect and even presented with a Mongol wife. He fatally squandered this mercy shown him by Hülegü by insisting on an audience with Möngke Qa'an himself, who, on hearing of Rukn al-Din's approach, reproached his brother for this blatant waste of resources and manpower and immediately ordered not only the execution of the arrogant Isma'ili imam but the rest of the Isma'ili community in Iran. Those of the community who escaped slaughter went immediately into hiding, donning the blanket of *taqiyya*[13] and the hijab of anonymity.

'Ala' al-Din 'Ata Malik Juvayni, the future Ilkhanid governor of Baghdad, brother of the future prime minister of the Ilkhanate, witnessed the conquest of the Isma'ilis and Hülegü's journey from the east. He was from a long line of Persian courtiers and advisers to power, and his father had entered Chinggisid service after his former master, Jalal al-Din Mangubirni, the last Khwarazmshah, had fled across the Indus. Juvayni, currently Hülegü's personal adviser and historian, reflected on this turn of events as he surveyed the ruins of Alamut after the surrender. He wrote that now "God's secret intent" had become clear.[14] For Juvayni and for many of Iran's Sunni establishment, the apparent annihilation of the Isma'ilis, whose presence they perceived as divine blasphemy and a spiritual insult, was proof of God's sanctioning of Hülegü's actions. Möngke's very ascension to power had heralded the triumph of Islam in many scattered outposts in the Orient, recalling the *hadith* that the Faithful should "*Seek knowledge even in China,*" which Juvayni concluded "related to this age and to those who live in the present era."[15]

> The Banner of Islam is raised higher and the candle of the Faith lit brighter; and the sun of the creed of Moḥammad casts its shadow over countries whose nostrils had not been perfumed by the scent of Islam . . . and whose soil had not been trodden save by [infidels].[16]

Juvayni's father had despaired that Uyghur rather than Persian and Arabic had become the language of the court of the age and of scholarship, but his son noted with pleasure that since the ascension of Möngke Qa'an and the arrival of Hülegü in the western climes, all had been transformed. Juvayni emphasised that though the infidel Mongol khans ruled the world, their power was executed through men like him, Persians, and Muslims. The keys to the world had been "placed ready for use in the hands of the [Mongols'] power," and he saw himself and his fellow Iranians as those hands.[17]

THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

The fall of Baghdad in 1258 has often been portrayed as one of the greatest calamities ever to have befallen the Islamic world. Hülegü has been reviled as the butcher of Baghdad, who caused the Tigris first to run red with the blood of its martyrs and then to run black with the ink from the libraries of books flung into the river. All these tales have no basis in reality and emerged as Arab-inspired propaganda against the Chinggisids and their allies, the Persians. Hülegü had arrived in Iran to restore the ancient region to its former glory, and to achieve this he needed and desired the cooperation and assistance of all its citizens. His essentially peaceful progress across the country had been marred only by his assaults on the Isma'ili strongholds, for which he had received the full support of the country's many leaders and rulers. The Caliph of Baghdad, Musta'sim, alone refused to endorse the sovereignty of Möngke Qa'an and the new Ilkhan, Hülegü. The Caliph was acting on the directions of his mendacious minister, the Dawatdar, Mujahid al-Din Aybak, while ignoring the advice of his more pragmatic Shi'i minister, Ibn al-Alqami.

Caliph Musta'sim was a victim of his bickering courtiers and the internal politics of his palace machinations, still locked in the vicious religious civil war which had been destroying the city-state for more than two years now. While the Shi'i minister Ibn al-Alqami advised a negotiated surrender, the wily and ambitious royal nephew, the Dawatdar Aybak, a Sunni, fed paranoia and venom into the body politic and convinced the deputy of God, the Caliph Musta'sim, that he could do no wrong. Aybak pleaded that these upstart, barbarian Mongols braying at his gates and the treacherous, blaspheming Shi'is undermining his government and sapping its confidence must be resisted and ignored. The envoys bearing gifts and honours which the Shi'i minister, Ibn al-Alqami, had dispatched to Hülegü's camp were intercepted and their treasures returned to the Caliph's coffers, while the letters that they carried bearing conciliatory words and urging compromise were produced before the Caliph as examples of Ibn al-Alqami's secret correspondence with the invaders and his treachery. In addition, the Caliph was also pathologically avaricious. He was a man who was reluctant to even pay his own soldiers, and he reacted with horror at this "needless" squandering of his riches.

Baghdad fell, and the death toll, capped by the execution of the Caliph and his sons, was shocking. The victorious armies were permitted to indulge in a short period of plundering and looting, though strict limitations and restrictions were enforced. Wanton destruction was not encouraged. Most of the deaths were caused by unchecked pestilence, and much of the widespread physical damage had been caused by the years of civil war and a devastating flood which had swept through the city some months before Hülegü's arrival.[18] Accounts survive of individual local notables and merchants coming to personal understandings with Chinggisid amirs, such as the musician 'Urmavi, whose musical entertainment and lavish feast saved his district from destruction and ensured him an audience with and a future in the service of the Ilkhan, Hülegü.[19] The Christian residents were spared, and Shaykh Ibn Tawus guaranteed the safety of the Shi'i community and their mosques and homes in Baghdad, as did the arrangements of certain merchants and businessmen who had dealings with the Chinggisids elsewhere.[20] Baghdad's libraries, despite the later widespread reports of their destruction, were transferred to the safe-keeping of Nasir

al-Din Tusi at his university and observatory in Maragha, along with a young novice librarian, Ibn Fuwati, who eventually succeeded Tusi as the director of the library and in fact many years later oversaw the re-establishment of Baghdad's libraries.[21]

After the execution of the Caliph, swaddled in carpets and kicked to death as befitted a royal personage, Hülegü, who had himself contracted the pestilence, ordered the end of the violence and looting and re-opened the city and its bazaars.[22] Ibn al-Alqami, the former minister, was appointed governor, which disproves those who accused him of treachery, since any suspicion that he had acted against his legitimate master, the Caliph, would have disqualified him from office and would probably have earned him a death sentence under the *yasa*. Though Hülegü had judged him favourably, saying, "[Ibn al-Alqami] is an intelligent man; he attends both to our interests and to those of his own master," he died not long after taking office. In his stead 'Ata Malik Juvayni was appointed governor of Baghdad, and his brother, Shams al-Din, became prime minister, the two forming a very powerful alliance which lasted another two decades.[23]

Hülegü was mostly well-regarded by his new subjects and the Iranian establishment. A court observer and chronicler noted that:

> We had seen Hülegü in his court enough times to see that in one day he dealt efficiently with the affairs of this province [presumably Azerbaijan] and that in every one of the provinces under his command, he governed well, in such a way that his justice was total wherever was *il* to him.[24]

During his youth, Hülegü had been nurtured like his brothers by his remarkable mother, Sorqoqtani Beki.[25] She had instilled in her sons a love of learning and a respect for scholars. Though a Christian, she had been an intimate of Sayf al-Din Bakharzi, the master of the Kubraviyya Sufi brotherhood.[26] Such love of learning and of the learned was a trait found amongst steppe leaders and manifest in the popular practice of public debates. Where other cultures glorified the thrusts of swordplay, animal taunting, or jousting on horseback, the Chinggisids relished the clash of ideas and the drama of the debate. Rashid al-Din recognised the khan's deep love of wisdom and his encouragement of debate and scholarship while admiring his court "adorned with the presence of scholars and wise men,"[27] a view endorsed by Bar Hebraeus, another intellectual giant who had personal knowledge of the king. The latter believed Hülegü "was possessed of an understanding which endeared him to wise men and 'ulema," which was a characteristic he shared with his brother, Qubilai, who "loved wise men, the 'ulema and the godly of all sects and nations."[28] Nasir al-Din Tusi, almost as soon as he was "released" from the Isma'ili stronghold Alamut, found himself as Hülegü's special adviser with enormous influence and power, a position he owed solely to his reputation for erudition and wisdom and his known deep knowledge of science.

The Ilkhanate was established by Hülegü Khan after the fall of Baghdad in 1258 with its capital originally in the market town of Maragha, approximately 150 km south of Tabriz. The term "Ilkhan" recognises Hülegü and his successors' loyalty and ties to the Qa'an, Qubilai, and acknowledges the lower status of the Ilkhans. The term *il* suggests fidelity, trust, and loyalty. The establishment of the Ilkhanate almost coincided with the short-lived civil war pitting Qubilai against his youngest

brother, Ariq Böke, which followed the death of Möngke Qa'an in 1259. Hülegü alone among the ruling princes pledged his support for his elder brother, and Qubilai in turn awarded Hülegü with his support for his enthronement as Shah of the Ilkhanate, despite counterclaims on Iran by the Jochids to the north-east. Chinggis Khan had assigned the lands to the west "where Tatar hoof had trod" to the Jochids, and the khans of the Golden Horde had interpreted this to include at the very least Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, and northern Iran, which Jebe and Sübedei had entered after the fall of the Khwarazmshah in the early 1220s. The Toluid coup was more than just a change of khans, it was a revolution. The Toluid khans embraced their sedentary subjects, and their Chinese and Persian ministers jointly ruled their multi-cultural, multi-ethnic realms rather than dominate and cow the lands and subjects that had fallen under the hooves of the Tatar armies.

The Ilkhanate can be divided into three broad periods. The first period, covering the reigns of Hülegü (d.1265) and his son Abaqa (d.1282), was marked by political stability and general prosperity as Iran benefitted from the opening of the borders and access to the markets in the East. Hülegü assumed his responsibilities as Shah of greater Iran, but it should not be forgotten that he remained an imperial prince. He retained lands throughout the empire and actively controlled his estates in Tibet, land which remained under direct Ilkhanid control until at least the reign of Arghun Ilkhan. Hülegü and his descendants continued their claims and power over their considerable holdings throughout the empire, but their ties with the Yuan Empire ensured that isolation never became a reality. The second period, marked by political and economic instability, lasted through the short reign of Abaqa's brother, Ahmad Tegüder (1282–84); the longer reign of his son, Arghun (1284–92); and the chaotic years of Gaykhatu (d.1294) and Baidu (d.1295) until the ascension of Ghazan Khan in 1295 after a short civil war. The final period, the so-called Golden Age, covered Ghazan's reign from 1295 to 1304, when Islam became once again the state religion of Iran; Ghazan's brother Öljeitü's rule from 1304 until 1316; and finally the reign of the last Ilkhan, Abu Sa'id, who ruled from 1316 until 1335, when he died without issue and the country collapsed into chaos, some would say at its economic and political height. Though war against its neighbours continued for almost its whole history, the Ilkhanate never came under existential threat, a positive reflection of the regime's political and social integrity.

THE FIRST PERIOD, 1260–82

The first period of Ilkhanid rule is often celebrated as an era of growth and prosperity, with the country healing the wounds of many decades of war and civil strife and enjoying its revival after seven centuries of disunity. The Ilkhanate defined its borders by the strife outside. After the battle of 'Ayn Jalut in 1260, the fluid southern border region with Mamluk Egypt was marked by constant warfare. Though the battle of 'Ayn Jalut was militarily insignificant, it had enormous symbolic importance, since it was seen as the first time the Mongols had suffered a complete military defeat.[29] In the north-east the Chaghadaid prince, Baraq Khan, invaded Khurasan with the backing of the ambitious Qaidu Khan (d.1301), great-grandson of Ögödei Qa'an, and even though he was decisively defeated by Abaqa after the battle of Herat in 1270, the Silk Road uniting Ilkhanid Iran and Yuan China was cut to all state traffic. Qaidu Khan's animosity was directed more at Qubilai, and

he manipulated his Chaghadaid cousin, Baraq, after the Talas *quriltai* of 1269, to launch an attack on Herat to cement his own political and military situation and hasten Baraq's inevitable fate. The growing ill-will between the cousins Hülegü and Berke (1209–66) finally erupted into warfare after Berke's conversion to Islam, his alliance with Mamluk Egypt, and his claims on Iranian Azerbaijan.

Relations between the Jochids and the Toluids had been deteriorating since the death of Batu in 1255 and the opposition of Hülegü and Qubilai to Berke's assumption of power. The spark which Berke needed to initiate hostilities was provided by the misbehaviour of the Jochid prince, Balagha, who Hülegü had wanted to return to Berke for punishment. Berke had instead returned the errant prince to his cousin to deal with as he saw fit, and since the charge was witchcraft, execution was inevitable. Two other Jochid princes, Tutar and Quli, were then also seized and met their deaths, though in more obscure circumstances. As a result of the deaths of the three Jochid princes there was an immediate exodus of troops loyal to the Jochid Ulus sent to Iran as part of the vast *tamma* army. Many fled south to the Mamluks, while others under the command of Negüder Noyan fled eastward and eventually settled in the marchlands of eastern Afghanistan, where they gained notoriety as the shadowy Qaraunas, a "mercenary" army that remained generally hostile to the Ilkhanate and often allied with their Chaghadaid or Jochid neighbours to the north and were responsible for repeated attacks on Ilkhanid targets and incursions into Khurasan and eastern Iran.[30] Abaqa finally defeated Berke's troops after a confrontation on the Kura River in modern-day Georgia, and Berke's successor, Möngke Temür, was not so keen on pursuing hostilities, so the Caucasus lapsed into an uneasy truce.

Hülegü's subordination of Baghdad reflected his treatment of other cities and provinces in his considerable domains. He was willing to make use of existing people and power structures so long as those appointees offered him *il* and full cooperation. A s*hahna, basqaq*, or *daruqachi*[31] would be appointed to work alongside the local ruler in order to oversee the administration and ensure that dues were paid and that the Ilkhan's interests were safe-guarded. The Qutlughkhanid dynasty founded by the Khitan Baraq Hajib (d.1234) ruled the southern province of Kirman. Terkan Khatun (r.1257–82), the regent, ruled with the full support of her Muslim subjects and the trust of the Ilkhans in Tabriz. The *shahna* became more her aide than an overseer. In Herat, the Karts, a Persian dynasty founded by the Chinggisid loyalist Shams al-Din (r.1245–77), retained considerable autonomy but remained loyal and supportive despite disagreements and personality clashes. The Seljuk sultans of Rum continued to rule from Konya and again retained considerable autonomy, though in their case, their Tabriz-appointed overseer, the *parvana*, was a Persian Muslim who held firm control over the administration and the finances. Despite Möngke's original stricture to eliminate the Kurds and the Lurs of Iran, Kurdish warlords such as Badr al-Din Lu'lu of Mosul and Irbil continued to administer their provinces with minimal interference from Tabriz. In Shiraz, where the local dynasty, the Salghurids, did not enjoy a warm relationship with the Ilkhans, the *shahna* played a more intrusive role, and eventually the Salghurids were replaced by more loyal rulers, the Persian Injuids (1304–57), whose name reflects their status as administrators of crown (*inju*) lands. In Yazd in central Iran, the Muzaffarid dynasty's loyal service ensured their continuation and power after the collapse of the Ilkhanate. The Ilkhans were willing to devolve power to local governors overseen by *shahnas*, and loyalty and competence were rewarded by increased autonomy.[32]

Map 16.1 The Ilkhanate (1260–1335)
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

THE SECOND PERIOD, 1282–95

Abaqa's death in 1282, following a public display of delirium and hallucinations involving black crows and terrible visitations, plunged the country into crisis as the Ilkhan's brother, the weak and unprepared Ahmad Tegüder (d.1284), assumed the throne. It was widely claimed that it was Ahmad's adoption of Islam that undermined his reign, but there is little evidence that religion as such played any role in the growing hostility to his rule. In fact, the ulema of Iran were as united in their opposition to Ahmad as were the military. The conservative ulema were initially suspicious of his claims to having embraced Islam since he had had no schooling, instruction, or guidance in the religion from any recognised religious figures, and the major Islamic influence on him seemed to have been the scandalous figure Ishan Hasan Mangli, a hashish-smoking *qalandar* who exerted a powerful influence over the new Ilkhan. While Ahmad and Mangli explored the paths of "permissiveness" (*ibahat*) and immorality (*fusuq*) in the company of *muwallah* (forsaken souls) and other undesirables, his mother, Qutui Khatun, and the amir, Asiq, attended to matters of state, and popular disapproval grew.

However, it was Ahmad's reliance on and trust in another extremely suspect figure, Shaykh Kamal-al-Din ʿAbd al-Rahman, who raised the wrath of not only the ulema but the political and military elite. Shaykh ʿAbd al-Rahman was a religiously heterodox figure who gained the confidence of Ahmad Tegüder and whom the Ilkhan entrusted to lead an embassy to Mamluk Egypt to explore the prospects of peace and fraternal relations between the two Muslim neighbours. Ahmad authorised the dispatch of this sensitive mission without consultation with or, more importantly, the authorization of either the military or his political advisers. There were deep and sensitive reasons for the enmity which had fired the conflict between the Mamluks and the Ilkhanate, and these fissures could not be bridged by the snake-like charm of the charlatan ʿAbd al-Rahman. In the event, the humiliating pleas for peace were summarily rejected and the Shaykh was imprisoned, tortured, and ended his days in a Mamluk jail. But Ahmad's greatest crime was the murder of his brother, Qongurtai, "a wise and powerful cypress," the crime which eventually assured his downfall.[33]

The military did not take well to Ahmad's insubordination, blatant disregard for their guidance and understanding of the delicate position vis-a-vis Egypt, and complete neglect for security concerns in dispatching envoys to the Mamluks, one of which contained the scientist and knowledgeable insider Qutb al-Din Shirazi.[34] Before his coronation there had been many who had supported Abaqa's son Arghun, and following the fratricide, his outrageous behaviour at court, and finally his ill-considered dispatch of these Egyptian envoys, any support for Ahmad Tegüder finally evaporated, and he was run to ground and executed in the same manner as he had murdered his brother, the breaking of his spine.

The instability that Ahmad had spawned continued into the reign of Arghun, and as the Ilkhanate settled into its borders and grew into its institutions, the longer-term rivalries began to establish themselves, particularly those between the Mongol elite, the *noyat*, and the new multi-ethnic, multicultural Ilkhanid political elite. Arghun oversaw one of the early show-downs between these groups when he charged his new Jewish prime-minister, Sa'd al-Dawla (1240–91), a loquacious Mongolian and Turkish speaker, with rooting out corruption in Baghdad. The minister performed an admirable job and deposed the leading *noyat* brothers, Buqa and Aruq, who many considered

untouchable and even a threat to the king himself. Sa'd al-Dawla's success followed him into the economic sphere, but his triumph sowed his downfall as his growing power allowed him to choose his own team and for that he used his own community and family. Under the Ilkhans, Iran's minorities had been enjoying a period of liberation and unprecedented opportunity, and even the usual rivalries between Sunnis and Shi'is and the various Sunni schools all enjoyed a respite. Sa'd al-Dawla's nepotism did not go unnoticed, so much so that people joked that the Jew had taken control of the government. "Behold . . . there is a Jew governor and a general director on the throne of the House of Abbas. Observe how Islam has been brought low."[35] The jokes fuelled a whispering campaign of satirical tracts, libellous stories, and religious hatred which slowly undermined his government's credibility and, after Arghun's death, sparked a bloody pogrom led by the amir Taghachar, whose "flashing falchion on their flesh did feed" after he enticed the minister to dinner and his own brutal death.[36]

Arghun's appointment of Sa'd al-Dawla is one of the reasons that he earned a reputation for having been anti-Muslim, a charge without any basis. In fact, Arghun was very sympathetic to Islam and the Sufi poet 'Ala al-Dawla Simnani (1261–1336) even suggests that the shah came very close to converting on at least one occasion. Indeed, the highly respected and influential Sunni theologian and religious leader 'Abdallah Baydawi dedicated his commentary on the Qur'an to the Ilkhan, Arghun, in the expectation that the work would help the king understand and communicate with his Muslim subjects. It would also have provided Baydawi a gateway into the royal court in order to deliver lectures and lessons on the orthodox message that he preached to the Muslim subjects of the Ilkhanate.[37] While other members of the old and established Simnani family were serving in the Ilkhanid bureaucracy, 'Ala al-Dawla Simnani served as Arghun's *nadim* or boon companion, charged with keeping the king company and keeping him safe while he relaxed and caroused. Arghun was loath to lose such a valued intimate, and when the young poet pleaded to leave the king's service to enter a Sufi hospice and abandon his life of indulgence and royal service, Arghun initially refused. Simnani's account of their relationship recalls their intimacy and Arghun's interest and attraction to Islam and also makes it clear that the Ilkhan harboured no ill-will towards his Muslim subjects.[38]

If Arghun does not deserve his infamy, his successor, Gaykhatu, certainly does. Gaykhatu is known for two things only, neither of which impart honour or credit. His lust for young flesh, either male or female, was insatiable, for "in his day, there was not a beauty who was not called upon to satisfy him. . . . His excesses were such that there was no sign of kingly virtue in him." He also embarked upon a reckless financial experiment in the hope of meeting his growing expenses for his costly indulgences.[39] Gaykhatu oversaw the introduction of paper money (*cha'o*) in Iran. Admittedly he was encouraged by the recently arrived envoy from Qubilai Qa'an, Bolad Aqa Chingsang (c.1240–1313), who regaled him with the success of the venture in Yuan China, where the tightly controlled currency reaped rich rewards for the court. However, Tabriz was not Khanbaliq (Daidu), and the merchants of Iran were not so adventurous as the notables of China's cities. The introduction of the *cha'o* in 1294 was a disastrous failure, and despite Gaykhatu's heavy-handed enforcement, the system was met with almost complete non-compliance. Despite the threat of the death sentence for the continued use of metal currencies, the experiment was abandoned after two months as economic chaos devastated the markets. The situation

was compounded by the appearance of *yut*, a livestock disease which depleted stocks throughout the country. The *cha'o*'s only positive legacy is that it is the first recorded incident of block printing outside of China. Marco Polo, who was in Tabriz at the time, makes no mention of the introduction of this Iranian paper currency despite his enthusiasm for the system in China. The sharp economic decline which followed Gaykhatu's financial adventure opened Iran up for revolutionary change.

THE GOLDEN AGE

It was possibly in sharp reaction to Gaykhatu that Ghazan and his adoption of Islam were so readily accepted. Baidu's brief reign was marked by violent conflict, and for the first time religion seemed to play a role. Baidu advanced the course of Christians, whereas the amir Nawruz, son of the legendary Arghun Aqa, made his decisive support conditional on Ghazan's adoption of Islam. Taghachar, Sa'd al-Dawla's killer, came to Ghazan's aid, and Baidu was soon defeated. Because of the conditional nature of Nawruz Noyan's support for Ghazan, questions have always been raised as to the sincerity of Ghazan's conversion to Islam. Such questions miss the point about Ghazan's reign. Unlike Ahmad Tegüder, Ghazan was trained in the strictures of Islam. His conversion was overseen and conducted by the leading ulema of the time. He proclaimed his commitment to Islam and made Sunni Islam the official religion of the land. But he was a pragmatist and he was a politician, and his main concern was with uniting his country and establishing himself as king of all Iran, shah of both Turk and Tajik (Turco-Mongols and Persians), commander in chief, guardian of Iran's borders, and sovereign of all his subjects. In recognition of this role he adopted the religion of the majority of his people and vowed to protect them physically and spiritually. Ghazan's adoption of Islam represented his recognition of his duty to Iran and the Iranian people and his pledge to be the king of both Turk and Tajik. Not only were most of his indigenous subjects Muslims, but growing numbers of his Turkish and Mongol troops were also Muslims. Islam spread from the grassroots, and Ghazan's conversion was a recognition of this. Hülegü led his troops into Iran in the 1250s; those men had settled, taken wives, and formed families, and by 1295, so much integration had taken place that the traditional social and racial stratification and divisions had evolved and transformed the urban landscape in particular. Pur Baha's *Mongol Ode* presents the street language of Tabriz that re-creates a society in transition but asserts the practicality of Iranian life, resisting the lure of "credit for cash."[40] In Ghazan's Tabriz, beggars were as likely to be impoverished Mongols as Persians, and the court decisions went against notable Muslims as often as against Turkic power brokers. Ethnicity did not define power. The royal family remained ethnic Mongols, but the Ilkhanid establishment seethed in ethnic, religious, family, and financial rivalries.

Ghazan's conversion to Islam should in no way be seen as a repudiation of either his Mongol heritage or his recognition of the Qa'an in Khanbaliq. Relations between the two wings of the Toluid Empire were closer economically, culturally, and politically under Ghazan than at any other time during the Ilkhanid period. The close personal relations between Ghazan's prime minister, Rashid al-Din, and the ambassador from the Yuan court, Bolad Chingsang, cemented this close union, and the Persian minister's unprecedented access to hitherto secret and highly restricted documents from the Mongol archives and courts, subsequently revealed in Rashid

al-Din's universal history, was the fruit of this friendship. In fact Rashid al-Din had ambitions to initiate a cultural fusion of Chinese intellectual achievements and Islamic wisdom, utilising such erudite giants of scientific learning and theosophy as Safi al-Din, Siwse, and Asutai, the son of Isa Kelemechi, in the same way as Harun al-Rashid oversaw the assimilation of Hellenistic and Islamic learning during the Abbasid's golden age. His friend and colleague Bolad Chingsang opened the conduit to the Hanlin academy and the Medical Bureau in Khanbaliq, enabling access to the *Great Yuan Materia Medica* and the *Mishujian* (Imperial Library Directorate).[41]

The so-called Golden Age of the Ilkhanate was named by historians reflecting wistfully on the past from a present which deprived them of so much that had been plentiful and taken for granted such a short time before. "In that time of [those Il-Khan] Kings, Iran was tranquil and free from the aggression of intruders, especially in the days of the Sultanate of Ghazan Khan, Öljeitü Khudabanda and Abu Sa'id Bahadar Khan."[42] It was an age he even compared to an earthly paradise, "admirable and luxuriantly cheerful like the Garden of Paradise, tranquil and secure like the sanctuary of the Ka'ba,"[43] a view echoed by a Jalayirid historian (c.1360), Abu Bakr al-Qutbi al-Ahari, who saw the turn of the century during Ghazan's reign as a time of peace and justice. "During that time the whole of Iran was graced by the justice of the King of Islam, who held back the oppressor's hand from (harming) the oppressed," and this prosperity continued under the rule of his brother, Öljeitü Khodabanda.[44] "The country (was) flourishing and the army well organised" but reached its apogee in the time of Abu Sa'id, "The time of his government was the best period of the domination of the Mongols."[45] In fact, the Chinggisid Empire achieved a brief period of unity during this time due in part to the efforts of Ghazan, though he did not live to witness the official though short-lived union. Öljeitü sent his ambassador, Buscarello de Ghizolfi, to the courts of Europe to boast of the renewed unity of the Chinggisid khans.[46]

GHAZAN KHAN

Shaykh Zahid Gilani (d.1301), Sufi master of Safi al-Din Ardibili (1252–1334), the eponymous founder of the Safavid dynasty, established close connections with the new Ilkhan as early as 1296 and ensured that those relations blossomed. Shaykh Sadr al-Din Ibrahim al-Hammuya officiated at Ghazan's conversion ceremony earlier still in 1295, and Ghazan observed the Ramadan fast immediately afterwards to demonstrate his commitment to Islam. As Ghazan's example as a devoted convert to Islam was taken up by his associates and military commanders, the ulema were once again welcomed into the royal courts of the Iranian kings and Mongol headdress disappeared in favour of the turban.[47]

The titles that the new king awarded himself reflected his status and confidence, and Ghazan assumed the leadership of this major western province of the Mongol Empire, which dominated the region, but also the leadership of the Islamic world, directly challenging the Mamluks, who he regarded as upstart bastards without lineage or ancestry. His own royal pedigree was indisputable, and few believed that Chinggis Khan had not been divinely ordained. As a Muslim he alone had the *farr* and the prestige to dominate the Islamic world.

Ghazan's reforms (1295–1304) were designed to make the government more accountable and to curb the power of the Mongol *noyat*. He appointed the

polymath Rashid al-Din to implement his sweeping re-structuring of the government and economy which had suffered so much over the previous decade. Taxation was regulated and its collection formalised. Weights and measures and the bazaar were all standardised and overseers appointed. Control over highways and caravanserais was tightened, and the *yam* system was severely curtailed to ensure that the widespread abuses of the past were minimised and only identifiable officials on specified government projects were allowed to make use of this institution, which had caused local people who had been charged with the *yam's* financial burden such distress. The *barat* was abolished, a system whereby high-handed officials, the powerful, or just those brazen enough and armed would issue government cheques for services or goods provided on demand, though payment was rarely realised. Subsidies were granted for the cultivation of fallow land, something unprecedented for a nomadic ruler. Forced, involuntary prostitution was prohibited, and while alcohol was allowed, public drunkenness was punishable. Citizens had the right to appeal to the courts, both the religious and the secular courts were able to give independent rulings, and their decisions often favoured native Persians over powerful Mongols. Property laws were reformed and institutions strengthened. While *shari'a* law was revived and greatly increased in its reach, the *yasa* continued to hold sway, for which Ghazan earned himself rebuke and accusations of insincerity. Tabriz and later Sultaniyya became centres of learning and enterprise.

Öljeitü's construction of Sultaniyya, a new capital between Qazvin and Tabriz started by his father, Arghun, was a particularly eloquent monument to Ilkhanid sophistication and appreciation of scholarship and learning. He built magnificent halls and audience chambers, many open to the public, who were invited to attend the seminars and scholarly debates, where doctors of medicine and of philosophy and artists and artisans, agriculturists and botanists, veterinarians and physicians would all be on hand to exchange expertise and dispense knowledge and learning. The links with Khanbaliq established by Rashid al-Din, including medicine and agriculture and botany, would have contributed to the intellectual wealth of the city. Rashid al- Din recounts in the *Tanksuq-nama* that he had translated a book on "medicines from herbs, minerals, trees, animals, fish."[48] In the same book which explores so much learning and scientific knowledge from China, he admits to his ambition of replicating the achievements of the Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid (d. 809), who oversaw the translation of so much Greek learning into Arabic.[49] The intellectual factories of Tabriz had soon absorbed the scholarly communities of Maragha, and Öljeitü had constructed his vision of cultural synthesis in Sultaniyya. Halls and chambers accommodating scholars, thinkers, and scientists were open to ordinary people to witness their discourse and exchange. The pleasures of the debate had long been cherished by the Chinggisids, and now they shared and assimilated their intellectual jousting with their Persian subjects, who had their own tradition of debates.[50]

A marked contrast with the earlier period of Ilkhanid rule was not just the revival of religion and Islam in particular, but the re-awakening of religious strife. Ghazan's assumption of the throne allowed many to vent their long-held animosities and resentments, and there followed a period of vicious reprisals against Christians, Jews, and other groups who had been enjoying a prolonged period of liberality and freedom. Though Ghazan quickly reacted against and halted this more obvious

religious bigotry, he failed to foresee the revival of the rivalry and animosity between Sunni schools, which soon revealed itself and grew as the Sunni establishment began to strengthen their traditional positions and teachings.[51] Ghazan had taken on the power of appointing qadis (Islamic judges), a position of considerable reach and influence, and his court and the courts of his successors and family members became centres of intrigue and manipulation.

The appearance of bickering and intriguing mullahs and imams filling the corridors of power was resented by the traditionalist *noyat*. The old guard, already uneasy with the emerging Mongol Iranians and Persian "Mongols," found this new assertive addition to the mix disquieting. During a staged debate, so beloved of the Chinggisids, an argument between a Hanafi cleric and ʻAbd al-Malik of Maragha, a Shafi'i and chief judge with wide jurisdiction over the ulema, descended into ill-concealed hatred, with both parties deliberately misreading their texts and misquoting the *hadith* while trading insults and threats. Öljeitü and his amirs observed this venomous exchange with increasing distaste until Qutlugh-Shah Noyan was driven to demand why the Mongols had abandoned the faith of their ancestors for this "Arab religion," which would seem to endorse marriage between a man and his daughters, mother, and sister, and which was divided into so many squabbling sects.[52] Apart from revealing a serious though not unsurprising misunderstanding of Islamic practice, this exchange also revealed the wider impact that Ghazan's conversion had had on the court. The ulema were once again an important presence, but they had returned without having solved the theological disputes that had poisoned their history over the centuries. Anti-Islamic sentiment swept through the royal courts as wholly erroneous stories of Muslim practices spread through word of mouth, reaching a peak during a particularly violent thunderstorm where Öljeitü witnessed the death from lightning of some of his fellow revellers. So shocked was the Sultan that he re-introduced shamanist practices to ward off evil spirits, and *bakhshi*s (Buddhists monks) were permitted once again at court. Öljeitü reacted to the bickering amongst the Sunni clerics and the exasperation of his Mongol commanders to this rivalry by adopting Shi'ism, which appeared to him to present a more unified and coherent face.

Abu Saʿid returned to more mainstream Sunnism under the influence of his military commander, chief of staff, and initially the real power behind the throne of the boy-king who was proclaimed king in 1316 after the death of his father, Öljeitü. Choban Noyan was a devout Muslim who established a secure power base within the Ilkhanate. He and his children held the throne in their grip, a situation which initially worked in Abu Saʿid's favour. Choban was in a position to challenge the amirs who had long resisted the rising influence of the Ilkhanid bureaucracy, whose long multi-ethnic tentacles increasingly controlled the institutions of state and the finances of the country. The tension between the state and the *noyat* reflected the divisions in the wider Mongol Empire, where the traditionalist, mainly Mongol elites resented their dwindling power and influence, especially in the Toluid lands of Yuan China and Ilkhanid Iran.[53] Rashid al-Din became a victim of those tensions, and his execution in 1318 was almost a side-show in the cascade of events, conspiracies, and baseless accusations of those early years of the boy-king's reign. However, Abu Saʿid's reluctance to prevent Rashid al-Din's murder and Choban's refusal to become involved in the contrived conflict between the two ministers, Rashid al-Din

and Taj al-Din ʿAli Shah, was a stain on both men's reputations. So too was their willingness to employ the incompetent and corrupt 'Ali Shah until his death of natural causes a few years later.

Amir Choban confronted the mutinous *noyat* and disgruntled amirs such as Qorumshi and Irenjin of the Kereit but achieved a Pyrrhic victory, which left an undercurrent of ill-feeling that Abu Saʿid was quick to exploit to his own advantage. If the amir had served the king loyally though paternalistically, the same could not be said of his sons. Choban's sons were not woven from the same moral cloth as their father. Choban's second son, Timurtash, one-time governor of Rum, had already been pardoned once for his contacts with the Mamluks, and he eventually fled to Egypt where, after alienating his hosts, he was executed (1328) on the request of the Ilkhan. Dimashq, Choban's eldest, began to take full advantage of the youth of the king and the power of his office. For Mustawfi, "in the land of Iran, he was amir and vizier; in fact, Dimashq was the shah."[54] When Dimashq was discovered dillydallying with ladies of the Ilkhan's harem, his fate was sealed, and an assassin, Khwaja Lu'lu, was dispatched to eradicate the wayward son. However, Abu Saʿid did not feel confident simply to have the errant noble executed. Thus, he first fabricated a complicated conspiracy to subvert the throne in which Dimashq was intimately implicated. The "masses" were encouraged to rally to their king's support, and it was only then that the Ilkhan moved. Abu Saʿid exploited the ill-feeling and sometime hatred murmuring beneath the surface of the *noyat* and the Ilkhanid administration, all resentful of the over-bearing presence of the Chobanid family. The Amir fled the court and sought sanctuary in Herat, where the powerful Kart[55] ruler granted him haven and then proceeded to oblige the young Shah, Abu Saʿid, and in 1327 executed Amir Choban.

One reason for the strained relations between the king and his chief of staff was the demand that Choban should bless not only the marriage of his daughter, Baghdad Khatun, to the Ilkhan but also ensure that his daughter first divorce her own husband, the influential and well-respected amir Shaykh Hasan-i-Bozorg (Big Hasan). Abu Saʿid, with a young man's blind passion, had fallen completely in love with the lady, and calling on his rights under the *yasa* to be entitled to any woman he so chose, he demanded her hand in marriage.[56]

Baghdad Khatun seems to have been a highly intelligent and coldly calculating young woman, who appreciated the potential of marriage to the Ilkhan, despite the fact that he had killed a brother and her father, exiled another brother, and also humiliated her husband for whom she continued to harbour warm feelings. She embraced marriage to Abu Saʿid and built up her own power base within the Ilkhanate, and she was regarded with respect and affection by the chroniclers of those tumultuous times. When, however, her royal husband's glances and then affections strayed and embraced the favours of her young niece, the lady Dilshad (Happy-Heart), her poisonous jealousy led her, too, astray. In collusion with her ex-husband, Hasan-i-Bozorg, she was accused of poisoning the Ilkhan Abu Saʿid, who subsequently died (1335) without issue, and with him the line of Hülegü and the Ilkhanate.

ENDGAME

Arpa Ke'ün (d.1336), a claimant to the Ilkhanid throne through the youngest Toluid brother, Ariq Böke, was an able army commander respected for his honesty, his

adherence to the law, and his belief in traditional values. What Arpa Ke'ün possessed in guileless honesty and determination to root out corruption and punish the wicked, he lacked in political and strategic cunning. He seized and executed the popular Baghdad Khatun and attacked those accused of corruption without consideration for the political repercussions. Within a short time, the support and enthusiasm with which his enthronement was greeted had evaporated, and his liberal distribution of death warrants and assassination squads ensured his own early demise. Mustawfi, no fan of the rude soldier-king, summarised his reign: "the triumph of his affairs was to be seen in the disruption of other's affairs."[37]

With Arpa Ke'ün's death in 1336, Iran collapsed into a confusion of vying claimants to the throne, including the forces grouped around Big Shaykh Hasan and the Jalayirids based in Baghdad, opposed by the Chobanid family centred in Tabriz, the Karts in Khurasan, the Muzaffarids of Shiraz and former loyal servants of the Ilkhanid regime, the Sarbadars in Nishapur, the former Ilkhanid loyalist Injuids in the south, and the Kurdish Shabankara, and along with these disparate groups a plethora of claimants to the elusive Ilkhanid throne. The one figure who does survive this very confusing and bloody period with his integrity and reputation intact is Shaykh Hasan's son, Shaykh Uways (r. 1356–74). By 1360 he had managed to take control of Tabriz, the southern Caucasus, as well as much of western Iran, and he restored some kind of stability before the advent of Timur.

One of Chinggis Khan's greatest achievements, remarkable especially in Muslim Iran, is that he became a source of legitimacy, replacing the Caliphate and religious figures in that role. In fact, it was not until the appearance of the Safavid shahs in 1501 that links to the Chinggisids were replaced by a link to the Shi'i Imam, Sadiq Ja'far. The Muslim Turco-Mongol dynasty of the Aqqoyunlu abolished the *yasa* in their final years but still sought legitimacy from their Chinggisid roots.

The Mongols never left Iran. They integrated and were absorbed. The Ilkhanate is a testament to their legacy and the multi-cultural assimilated state they inspired and created with the many peoples who joined Hülegü's original enterprise.

NOTES

1 Lane 2013.
2 Qazvini 1983, 798–799.
3 It is not known when, why, or by whom the so-called "Tomb Tower of Hülegü's Mother" was built, nor is it known when, why, or by whom the inscription and "name" of the tomb tower were added. However, Andre Godard dates it to 593/1196–97. Godard 1936, 138–143.
4 Qazvini 1983, 793.
5 Qazvini (Unpublished), 5–6.
6 Qazvini (Unpublished), 13.
7 Qazvini (Unpublished), 14.
8 Qazvini 2011, 164.
9 Lane 1999.
10 Masson Smith Jr. 2006, 111–134.
11 Lane 2018b, 50.
12 Ibn Tabataba 1947, 43.
13 Dissimilation, allowed in Shi'i theology under duress or when one's life is considered in danger.

14 *HWC*, 638; Ward 1983, III, 138–139.
15 *HWC*, 14; Ward 1983, I, 9.
16 *HWC*, 13–14; Ward 1983, I, 9.
17 *HWC*, 638, Ward 1983, III, 138–139.
18 Lane 2018b, 54.
19 Biran 2016.
20 Biran 2018.
21 Saliba 2006; Melville 1997.
22 Lane 2018b, 55 [34].
23 Atabeg Ahmad 1962, 316; Lane 2012–13.
24 Lane 2018, 48 [22].
25 Lane 2013.
26 Krawulsky 2011, 128.
27 *RDRM*, 1048.
28 Bar Hebraeus 1985, 281.
29 In fact, their first major military defeat was against the Vietnamese circa 1258; see Lane 2011.
30 Jackson 2017.
31 These terms are more or less interchangeable, being of Persian, Turkish, and Mongolian origin.
32 Lane 2003.
33 Ward 1983, II, 204; Lane 2018b.
34 Lane 2018b.
35 Bar Hebraeus 2003, 490.
36 Vassaf 1967, 247; Browne 1920, III, 35–36.
37 Baydawi, 34.
38 Lane 2003, 253; DeWeese 2014, 35–76.
39 Qazvini 1983, 349.
40 Pur Baha in Minorsky 1956, 286, line 13.
41 My thanks to Yoichi Isanhaya and his presentation in Jerusalem, November 2017 at the HUJ. Jackson 2018, 230.
42 Amuli 2014, 178.
43 Amuli 2014, 178.
44 al-Ahari 1954, 48.
45 al-Ahari 1954, 51.
46 Boyle 1968, 399.
47 Boyle 1968, 384; Vassaf 1967, 344.
48 Rashid al-Din 1972, 15; Jackson 2017, 231.
49 Rashid al-Din 1972, 7; Jackson 2017, 230.
50 Lane 2016.
51 Sawma 1928.
52 Qashani 1969, 98.
53 Hope 2016; Melville 1999.
54 Ward 1983, III, 653.
55 A powerful Persian dynasty (1245–1381) whose founder's son, Shams al-Din, had welcomed Hülegü to Iran.
56 Ward 1983, III, 648–649, 666.
57 Qazvini (unpublished), 12.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE MIDDLE EMPIRE

Michael Hope

Shortly after the death of Möngke Qa'an in 1259, an autonomous Mongol khanate emerged in Central Asia, which at various times comprised the territories of Mawarannahr (in modern Uzbekistan), the Ferghana Valley, the Helmand River (in modern Afghanistan), the Yeti Su (eastern Kazakhstan), the Qobaq Plain, and the towns of the Tarim and Turfan basins (all in East Turkistan, modern Xinjiang, PRC). This region was referred to as the 'Middle Empire' or 'Middle Mongol State' (*Dumdadu Mongol Ulus)* and was ruled by the descendants of Chinggis Khan's second and third sons, Chaghadai and Ögödei.[1] The borders and administrative structure of this khanate remained unstable and shifted along with the fortunes of its rulers in their many conflicts with the Ilkhanate, the Jochid Ulus, and the Yuan Empire until its dissolution midway through the fourteenth century.

The Middle Empire grew out of the *ulus* given to Chinggis Khan's second son, Chaghadai (d. 1242), which the Persian scholar-bureaucrat 'Ala al-Din 'Ata Malik Juvayni (d. 1283) situated in the region of Quyas and Almaliq on the Ili River, straddling the current border between China and Kazakhstan.[2] Chaghadai may have also received nominal control over Beshbaliq and Qara Qocho, insofar as the *Secret History of the Mongols* numbered the *idiqut* (*idoqudai*, i.e. the Uyghur ruler) amongst his commanders, and Juvayni later commented that Chaghadai held power over the territories between 'the land of the Uyghurs to Samarqand and Bukhara,' though this remark may reflect the situation at the time of his writing many decades later.[3] Chaghadai settled this patrimony with 8,000 soldiers, which had been granted to him during his father's lifetime. The leaders of this army were drawn from the Jalayir, Barulas (Barlas), Suldus, Sonit, and Dughlat people, whose families had served Chinggis Khan with distinction.[4] Their descendants would go on to constitute a nomadic aristocracy in the Middle Empire, based upon the hereditary transmission of offices, the command of armies, and marriage alliances with the Chinggisid dynasty.

Chaghadai supplemented these forces with soldiers and experts recruited from all over the Mongol Empire, which he used to administer his *ulus*. For example, the Daoist leader, Changchun, found a Chinese 'artificer' employed by Chaghadai in Almaliq, and Chaghadai's chief secretary (*bitikchi*) was a 'Khitay,' who was known

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simply by the title of 'Vizier.'[5] A much later traveller to Central Asia, the envoy Chang Te, reported seeing a significant number of Khitans residing in both Almaliq and Beshbaliq during his journey there in 1259. Many of these '*khitay*s' seem to have been drawn from the earlier Qara Khitai empire, as they were described wearing Muslim clothes and had therefore already spent some time living amongst the Muslim population of Central Asia.[6] But the Khitans were not the only ones recruited to help build Chaghadai's state in Central Asia. Fourteen documents discovered in Turfan, written by the Chaghadai chancellery, also indicate the presence of a large number of Uyghur officials, who served the rulers of the Middle Empire until its dissolution in the middle of the fourteenth century. The Uyghurs must have been ubiquitous at the Chaghadai court, as the Uyghur language was used for chancellery documents of the Middle Empire well into the fourteenth century.[7]

The prominence of Qara Khitai, Uyghur, and perhaps even Chinese officials in Chaghadai's court may be one reason that the Persian sources often accused him of hating the Muslims, who made up the majority of his urban subjects. Both Juvayni and Minhaj al-Din Juzjani claimed that Chaghadai forbade Muslims from performing their ablutions or even slaughtering animals, though these authors are often prone to exaggeration and fabrication. Juzjani's claim that Chaghadai encouraged Ögödei to exterminate all Muslims is an example of such hyperbole.[8] Chaghadai may have punished any contraventions of the *jasaq* (the law code attributed to Chinggis Khan) in the vicinity of his *ordu* (camp, court), but it seems that later historians writing mainly in the Ilkhanate exaggerated his anti-Islamic tendencies in order to de-legitimize his successors. Indeed, some of Chaghadai's most important ministers were drawn from the Muslim population of Ferghana and Mawarannahr. Their number included Chaghadai's chief advisor, Habash ʿAmid, a Muslim from Herat, who was counted amongst Chaghadai's most powerful officials. Khwandamir, who bases his account upon the earlier *Tarikh-i Arbaʿa Ulus-i Chingizi* (*History of the Four Chinggisid States*) of the Timurid prince, Ulugh Beg (d. 1449), also claimed that Chaghadai became a devotee of the Muslim mystic Shaykh Abu Yaʿqub al-Sakaki, an expert on stars, talismans, magic, and other divinatory methods. Abu Yaʿqub's professed knowledge of prognostication saw him become one of Chaghadai's most intimate advisors.[9] Chaghadai's court was also home to a number of native Muslim princes, who had submitted to the Mongols during Chinggis Khan's conquest and retained their offices and lands under Chaghadai's rule. Their number included the Qarluq prince Arslan Khan, who was granted the rule of Uzgand in the Ferghana Valley. Almaliq also had its own dynasty that traced its descent from a brigand named Ozar, who managed to seize control of the city shortly before Chinggis Khan arrived there in 1219. There is, moreover, epigraphic evidence for the existence of autonomous rulers in Talas, Shash (Tashkent), Khujand, Khotan, and Kashgar, all of whom pledged their loyalty to the Middle Empire.[10] The importance of these Muslim princes and officials to Chaghadai's *ordu* makes it unlikely that Chaghadai would antagonize them to the extent suggested by the Persian sources.

CHAGHADAI'S SUCCESSORS, 1242–1266

The status of the Chaghadaids declined significantly under his immediate successors, most of whom were descended from his chief wife, Yisülün Khatun. She served as

regent after Chaghadai's death, during which time she personally crowned her grandson, Qara Hülegü (r. 1242–1246 and 1251–1252), before dying some time during the reign of Töregene Khatun. Yisülün was a firm ruler who contested the power of the Jochids in Khurasan, even executing their governor, Körgüz.[11] But the Chaghadaids lost a great deal of autonomy after her death, most notably after the accession of Güyük to the imperial throne in 1246, which ushered in a number of changes throughout the empire. The most important change in Central Asia was Güyük's decision to depose Qara Hülegü in favour of his uncle, Yesü Möngke (r. 1246–1251), with whom Güyük had a warm rapport, having spent much of his youth at the Chaghadai Ulus. Yesü Möngke is described by the sources as a drunk, who delegated the administration of his patrimony to his wife, Toqashi, and his minister, Baha' al-Din Marghinani. Little is known about their government, but there were signs that they had a tense relationships with Batu, the Jochid ruler of the Qipchaq Steppe, due to their competition for control of Khurasan and Mawarannahr. Yesü Möngke (or more likely Toqashi) is reported to have dispatched a secretary named Sharaf al-Din with a *jarliq* to seize the government of Herat from Batu's appointee, Majd al-Din, perhaps hoping to capitalize on the souring relations between Batu and Güyük. Yet the *jarliq* was ignored by Majd al-Din, who sent Sharaf al-Din back to Almaliq empty-handed.[12] Yesü Möngke's meddling was compounded by his nephew, Büri, who insulted Batu whilst accompanying him on the campaign against the Qipchaq and Europe in 1236–1241. Büri reportedly drank to excess before complaining that the Jochids had received more than their fair share of land and people in the division of the empire. Büri may have also referenced rumours that cast doubt upon Jochi's parentage, which were widely circulated at the time and were initially attributed to Chaghadai.[13] In any case, Batu was infuriated by Buri's comments, and relations between the Chaghadaids and Jochids became extremely tense as a result.

The rivalry between Batu and the Chaghadaids came to a head when Güyük died in 1248 and Batu threw his support behind the candidacy of his cousin Möngke (r. 1251–1259) for the throne. Yesü Möngke refused to attend Möngke's coronation, no doubt in the hope that the Ögödeids would put forward their own candidate. The failure of the Ögödeids to nominate a prince to challenge Möngke left the Chaghadaids isolated, and when Möngke took the throne, he ordered a purge of their leadership. Ten *tümen*s (a unit of soldiers, nominally totalling 10,000) were sent to scour the land from Beshbaliq and Qaraqorum up to Qayaliq (in the Yeti Su region of eastern Kazakhstan) before sweeping down to the Syr River. The Uyghur *idiqut* and the Ögödeid princes residing between the Kimcha'ut and the Yenisei River were also purged, leaving the Toluids and Jochids in firm control of the empire.[14] William of Rubruck, who passed through Central Asia shortly afterwards, noted that the territory near Lake Balkhash had suffered the loss or evacuation of several settlements and that only nomads remained, where there had once been farms.[15] Yesü Möngke and Büri were captured during the Toluid assault and were dispatched to Batu for execution. Meanwhile, Toqashi Khatun was handed over to Qara Hülegü, whose officials are said to have beaten her to death in a sack. A great many more Chaghadaid princes were dispatched to the qa'an's court, where they could be kept under close watch.[16]

The power of the Chaghadaids had been severely diminished by Möngke, who now took responsibility for appointing their rulers. He first nominated Qara Hülegü to succeed his uncle, but when he died in 1252, Möngke confirmed his wife, Orqina Khatun, in his place. The new qa'an also wielded greater power among the agrarian communities surrounding the Chaghadai Ulus, such as Mawarannahr, Turfan, and the towns of the Tarim Basin, which were incorporated into a regional secretariat, first created by Ögödei and headed by Masʿud Beg, the son of Mahmud Yalavach. Chaghadaid princes and commanders were prevented from collecting revenues from the populations in these regions, further diminishing their power.[17] The expulsion of the Chaghadaid nomads from the towns of Mawarannahr was undoubtedly a positive development for the agricultural population and ensured the growth of both Bukhara and Samarqand. Evidence for this revival can be found in Bukhara, where Masʿud Beg was best known for his construction of a *madrasa*, known as the Masʿudiyya. The Persian bureaucrat Vassaf estimated that the *madrasa* had the capacity to hold up to 1,000 students, and Juvayni claimed that it lured the most prominent scholars of the Islamic world to teach there.[18] Another Mongol official, Rashid al-Din, reported that it housed many rare and notable books of the age.[19] Sorqoqtani Beki, the mother of Möngke and Qubilai Qa'an, also famously donated 1,000 gold *balish* for the construction of a *madrasa* in Bukhara at roughly the same time. The *madrasa*, known as the Khaniyya, was supported by the purchase of nearby villages, which were converted into an endowment (*waqf*) to pay for the upkeep of the students and their teachers. Orqina served as Masʿud's accomplice in these endeavours and provided loyal support to Möngke when he dispatched his brother Hülegü to conquer Baghdad and the Nizari-Ismaʿili fortresses of Iran in 1254.[20] In short, Möngke had effectively curtailed the independent tendencies of Chaghadai and Yisülün Khatun in Central Asia, bringing the Chaghadai Ulus firmly under control from Mongolia.

This balance of power was destabilized by the death of Möngke in 1259. His brothers Qubilai and Ariq Böke violently contested the throne until 1264, when Qubilai finally triumphed. During this time, both princes sought to assert their control of Central Asia in the hope of using its resources to advance their claim to power. Qubilai was the first to act by dispatching Abishqa, son of Büri to assume control of the Chaghadai Ulus in 1260. He was, however, intercepted and killed by the forces of Ariq Böke whilst on his journey to Almaliq. Ariq Böke responded by nominating his own candidate for the throne of the Chaghadaids. His choice fell upon Alghu, a prince who had previously served in the court of Möngke Qa'an and who had subsequently pledged his loyalty to Ariq Böke in Mongolia. Ariq Böke ordered Alghu to use his family's connections in Central Asia to extract revenues and soldiers to support the war against Qubilai in China. Alghu sped to Almaliq to fulfil this mandate and began by replacing Orqina, who travelled to Mongolia to protest the decision. Alghu then dispatched his relatives to the towns of Mawarannahr to extract the revenues he had been charged with collecting. But when Ariq Böke's officials arrived in Central Asia, they were surprised to find that Alghu had changed his loyalties. He refused to give up the supplies he had collected and murdered Ariq Böke's men before declaring his support for Qubilai.[21]

Alghu's successful recapture of his ancestral lands, in addition to the major towns of the Zarafshan Valley, saw the transformation of the Chaghadaid Ulus into the

autonomous Middle Empire, albeit that it continued to be known as the 'Chaghadai Ulus' or 'Chaghadai Khanate' in many sources. He had already received formal recognition of his position when Qubilai dispatched a *jarliq* confirming him in control of the territories between Uyghuristan (Turfan) and the Amu River in 1262.[22] Alghu further bolstered his power by marrying Orqina Khatun and appointing Masʿud Beg as his chancellor in the same year, thereby reconciling two other key political stakeholders to his rule. The rest of his reign was spent in conflict with Berke Khan of the Jochid Ulus, who contested his control of Mawarannahr. Alghu was, however, aided in this endeavour by Hülegü, who was already fighting the Jochids for control of the Caucasus. The Ilkhan dispatched his son Abaqa with an army to reinforce Alghu's position by attacking the major Jochid town of Urgench, which in turn allowed Alghu to win a decisive victory over the Jochid forces at Otrar, thereby establishing the Syr River as the border between their respective domains shortly before his death in 1266.[23]

DIVIDED RULE, 1266–1301

Following Alghu's death, the Middle Empire continued to assert its independence from the qa'an in China. First, a *quriltai* of the leading Chaghadaid commanders and princes was summoned to restore Orqina Khatun to power, alongside her son Mubarakshah, in 1266. This decision, taken without consultation with Qubilai, occurred at the same time as an Ögödeid prince named Qaidu had begun to assert control of his grandfather's former patrimony, which spanned the Tarbaghatai Range (eastern Kazakhstan), the Emil River Basin (Kazakhstan and East Turkistan), and the Altai Mountains. Qaidu had vacillated in his support for Qubilai's bid for the throne and now refused to present himself before the new qa'an, despite repeated summons.[24] Both of these factors suggest that Qubilai had little or no control over Central Asia at the outset of his reign, but he had not given up on regaining power over the region. He refused to recognize Mubarakshah's enthronement and elected to appoint his own candidate to the throne of the Middle Empire, a Chaghadaid prince named Baraq, whose father had wisely aligned himself with Möngke during the latter's dispute with Yesü Möngke.[25] It was, therefore, with Qubilai's backing that Baraq set out for Central Asia in 1266, though he initially hid this information from his relatives and simply asked permission to gather together his family's former soldiers, who had scattered in the Chaghanian region near the Amu Darya River. From there he began to steadily undermine Mubarakshah's standing amongst his commanders. He did not have to work hard. Mubarakshah, who is credited with being one of the earliest Chinggisids to convert to Islam, is described as having little interest in government, and when his mother died later in 1266, he could no longer claim the undivided support of the army. Baraq was quickly able to depose him in the same year, albeit he retained Mubarakshah in his household staff.[26]

Baraq's success did not, however, bring the anticipated benefits to Qubilai, who found him as difficult to control as Alghu. Instead of paying tribute to the qa'an, Baraq declared war on the Yuan forces in the Tarim Basin (East Turkistan), assaulting garrisons in Kashgar and Khotan.[27] This move east brought Baraq into conflict not only with Qubilai, but also with Qaidu, who no doubt feared that the Chaghadaids might attempt to absorb his nascent state in the Qobaq. Qaidu therefore obtained a defensive alliance with Möngke Temür Khan of the Jochid Ulus and, despite

suffering a defeat in their initial encounter, succeeded in beating Baraq and pushing him back to Mawarannahr. Bruised by this defeat, Baraq threatened to loot Bukhara and Samarqand to replenish his army. Qaidu sought to head off any damage to these vital economic centres by enticing Baraq to negotiate a truce at Talas in 1269.[28] Baraq reluctantly agreed to the truce, which included provision for the division of Mawarannahr's revenues; Baraq would receive two-thirds of the income from the settled population, whilst Qaidu and Möngke Temür would divide the remaining third between them. The treaty also strictly barred nomads from grazing in areas of dense population and agriculture, a condition that seems to have irked Baraq. The terms of the deal recorded in the Persian sources do not say what happened to the Chaghadaid territories around Quyas and the Ili, which seem to have passed under Qaidu's control, so it is no wonder that Baraq was reportedly reluctant to enter the agreement. Indeed, he quickly violated the terms of the truce by sending his soldiers to extort revenue from the cities of Mawarannahr. Such behaviour is understandable if we assume that Baraq had lost most of his family patrimony to Qaidu.

The shortage of pasture and revenue inevitably pushed Baraq to encroach upon the land of the Ilkhans to the west. Rashid al-Din claimed that Baraq complained angrily that the Toluids had assigned themselves vast tracts of land in China and Iran, leaving the Chaghadaids with barely anything in Central Asia.[29] He appealed to his new ally, Qaidu, to help him find fresh pastures and subjects in Khurasan, where the Chaghadaids already had commanders serving in the *tamma* army, which later came to be known by the name Qaraunas.[30] Qaidu was only too pleased to see Baraq leave Mawarannahr, and he enthusiastically supported the Chaghadaid preparations by promising several divisions of soldiers under the leadership of the princes Qipchaq and Chabat. Baraq had already dispatched Masʿud Beg as an envoy to the Ilkhan Abaqa in 665/1268, ostensibly to inquire about revenues owed to the Chaghadaids from the earlier conquest of Iran. Rashid al-Din claims that Baraq also demanded the pastures from Ghazna and Badghis up to the Sind River and, whilst Abaqa was happy to grant the tribute owing to the Chaghadaids, he firmly rebuffed Baraq's demand for pastureland.[31] But Baraq would not be put off so easily. He sent a separate message to his relative Negüder, who had joined Hülegü's conquest of Iran and had been awarded the territory around Ararat and Nakhjivan to the south of the Caucasus Mountains. Baraq secretly summoned Negüder to join his forces in a surprise attack on Abaqa's armies, planned for the year 668/1270–1271. Negüder is said to have warmed to the offer, but Abaqa received warning of his movements from the King of Georgia and managed to scramble forces to prevent the two armies from meeting.[32] There could, however, be little doubt that war with Baraq was now inevitable.

Baraq crossed the Amu Darya and invaded Khurasan in 1269–1270 whilst Abaqa was busy dealing with Negüder. The Chaghadaid armies took advantage of the Ilkhan's absence to occupy and loot most of the major cities from Shaburghan to Nishapur. Even Shams al-Din, the Kartid ruler of Herat, set out to Baraq's camp in Taliqan, albeit he quickly changed posture to a more neutral stance when he learned of Abaqa's imminent arrival. Nevertheless, Baraq's forces remained in control of Khurasan for the better part of a year, whilst Abaqa's armies marched across northern Iran to confront the invaders. Upon their arrival, the Ilkhan army forced Baraq's vanguard to withdraw from Nishapur before fighting a decisive battle on the Hari Rud, in which Baraq's forces were routed and pursued over the Amu Darya River.[33]

Baraq's defeat had been in no small part due to defections from his army. The Ögödeid princes sent by Qaidu had quarrelled with Baraq's commander, Jalayirtai, shortly after their occupation of Khurasan and had decided to abandon the army and return home. Several Chaghadaid princes were also accused of disloyalty, including Ahmad Oghul, a son of Büri, who refused to send any soldiers to the expedition. Upon his return to Mawarannahr, Baraq moved to take revenge against these dissident princes. But this hard line only succeeded in destabilizing his rule as previously loyal princes, such as Naliqo'a, a relative of Ahmad Oghul, fled to Beshbaliq (in East Turkistan).[34] Perhaps more important, Qaidu decided that Baraq had become more trouble than he was worth and marched to confront the depleted Chaghadaid *ordu* at Shash (Tashkent). Conflict was only averted by the fact that Baraq suffered a stroke and was paralyzed. This affliction, and perhaps the hope of a miraculous cure, led Baraq to convert to Islam and assume the title '*ghiyath al-din*' (succour of the faith). There are, however, few verifiable details about his new-found belief in Islam as he was killed shortly afterwards. Baraq's encampment was surrounded by Qaidu's forces, and he was poisoned by his one-time ally in 1271.[35]

The death of Baraq left little doubt that Qaidu was now the supreme ruler of the Middle Empire. Senior Chaghadaid princes proffered their submission to Qaidu and many, including the former khan Mubarakshah, complained vehemently of the supposed injustice and disorder of Baraq's rule.[36] In response, Qaidu appointed Negübey, a grandson of Chaghadai by his fourth son, Sarban, as leader of the Chaghadai Ulus, whilst retaining real power for himself. Little is known about Negübey's rule, and he was swiftly overthrown by Buqa Temür, a descendant of Büri, who had obtained Qaidu's blessing for the coup.[37] Yet neither Negübey nor Buqa Temür was capable of controlling the Chaghadaid clan, who rebelled under the joint leadership of Baraq's son Bek Temür (also Toq Temür) and the sons of Alghu, leaving Mawarannahr without effective government. Weakened by the dynastic war, the Chaghadaids became vulnerable to outside attack, and in 1272–1273 the Ilkhan Abaqa took advantage of the situation to dispatch an army to raid Nakhshab and Bukhara. Rather than defend Bukhara, the sons of Alghu attacked the city themselves in 1275, leaving the region depopulated for four years.[38]

The trouble caused by the Chaghadaid civil war, combined with Qaidu's rebellion against Qubilai, led to an exodus of scholars, traders, and spiritualists from the region. Jalal al-Din Rumi's biographer, Shams al-Din Ahmad Aflaki, noted that there was a large influx of religious leaders from Mawarannahr into Anatolia during the 1270s.[39] The Sufi shaykh Burhan al-Din al-Nasafi was similarly obliged to leave Bukhara for Iran in 1273, when the Ilkhan armies forcibly migrated the population of the town towards Khurasan.[40] As late as 1291 the future archbishop of Khanbaliq, John of Montecorvino, remarked that although the overland route via Turkistan was a much faster and safer way to travel to China, it had been closed for some time owing to the wars between Qaidu and the Chaghadaids.[41] The conflict was obviously taking a heavy toll on the economic, social, and cultural life of the Middle Empire.

The situation was somewhat stabilized in 1282 when Qaidu replaced Buqa Temür with Du'a, another son of Baraq. Du'a ruled alongside Qaidu until the latter's death in 1301, during which time he pacified the rebellious Chaghadai princes and projected their energies outward against their mutual enemies, the Toluids of the Yuan and Ilkhanate. Their early focus was upon the border with the Yuan, where Qubilai had

taken advantage of the conflict between Qaidu and the Chaghadaids to seize Turfan and the Tarim Basin.[42] Yuan rule of these territories was, however, jeopardized as early as 1285, when Du'a won a victory over the Yuan army and besieged Qara Qocho before capturing Beshbaliq in 1286. By 1289, Qaidu and Du'a had managed to take control of East Turkistan, forcing Qubilai to abandon recently constructed military colonies in Khotan and Turfan. In the same year, they managed to temporarily capture Qaraqorum before Qubilai scrambled an army to its defence and forced the invaders to withdraw further into the western steppe of Mongolia before a further setback at the hands of prince Toq Temür in 1293.[43] The conflict with the Yuan continued through a series of intermittent yet bloody battles along the border, which nevertheless saw the Middle Empire maintain its influence in the Tarim and Turfan basins until 1320, when the Chaghadaids again acknowledged Yuan superiority.

The partnership of Qaidu and Du'a also made its presence felt in the Ilkhanate, especially during the drawn-out rebellion of Nawruz Aqa (1289–1294), the provincial governor and *atabeg* of the future khan, Ghazan. When the Ilkhan army sought to end his rebellion in 1292, Nawruz appealed to Qaidu for assistance. He gave Nawruz three *tümen*s of soldiers under the command of his son, Sarban, and together they drove the Ilkhan army from the field, looting as far as Nishapur in the process. One of Ghazan's generals sought to capitalize on the presence of Qaidu's soldiers by rebelling in Mazandaran, where he briefly declared the province to be part of Qaidu's empire. Du'a's army was said to have encroached on Khurasan again in 1295 before the accession of Ghazan restored Ilkhan control of the region.[44]

Du'a and Qaidu were also active in the Qipchaq Steppe, where they destabilized the Ulus of Orda, Batu's brother and nominal subject, which bordered the Middle Empire to the north. Qaidu and Du'a actively interfered in the dynastic politics of the Ulus of Orda, providing support to a coup led by Prince Küilük, who headed an ancillary line of Orda's family, against his uncle Bayan Khan in 1299. The coup destabilized the Ulus of Orda for the first decade of the fourteenth century and deeply frustrated Toqto'a Khan of the Ulus Batu, who was obliged to divert soldiers to fend off the attack on his vassal.[45] Küilük was never able to retain power in the Ulus of Orda, but the aggressiveness of Qaidu and Du'a's campaigns against neighbouring khanates suggests a rejuvenation of the political fortunes of the Middle Empire from 1281 until 1301.

The period of Qaidu and Du'a's partnership was the apogee of the Middle Empire's history. Military success and territorial expansion were accompanied by a gradual revival of trade and commerce, pushed by a financial reform engineered by Masʿud Beg, who had been kept as vizier by Qaidu in 1271. In this capacity, Masʿud engineered one of the most dramatic currency reforms in the history of the Mongol Empire by shifting the Middle Empire from a gold- and copper-based system to a new coinage of high-value silver dirhams. The effect of this reform was felt most strongly in the 1280s, when Du'a and Qaidu opened a number of new mint sites throughout the Middle Empire in addition to building Andijan, a major city in the Ferghana Valley, which has survived until the present day.[46] Straddling the overland trade-routes between India, China, Iran, and Khwarazm, the Middle Empire profited from trade duties (*tamgha*) on goods shipped in and out of its borders. This trade was no doubt limited until the death of Qaidu (1301), when normal relations were restored with the Yuan, but the Middle Empire was still described as an important source of horses, cotton, slaves, and *tanksuq* (medicine) during his lifetime by sources as far apart as the Mamluk Sultanate and Yuan China.[47]

Map 17.1 The Middle Empire
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

THE DU'AID ASCENDANCY, 1301–1334

The death of Qaidu left Du'a in a position to seize power for himself. He achieved this goal by pitting Qaidu's successors against one another. The Ögödeids had favoured Qaidu's son Orus as his replacement, but Du'a decided to back his brother, Chapar, thereby dividing Qaidu's former supporters in a succession dispute. The Persian historian Qashani was under no illusion that Du'a was cynically manipulating Chapar for his own ends. He claims that Du'a successfully cultivated an alliance with his former enemy, the Yuan emperor Temür Öljeitü (r. 1294–1307), to outflank the Ögödeids, whilst simultaneously professing friendship with Chapar.[48] The qa'an warmed to these overtures and sealed friendship with Du'a by confirming him as ruler of the Middle Empire and deeming Qaidu's tenure a usurpation.[49] Meanwhile, the Chaghadaids fought a series of battles against Qaidu's supporters in Afghanistan and Mawarannahr, which ultimately saw Qaidu's relatives abandon the Middle Empire in 1309. Du'a died in 1307, before his family could fully enjoy the fruit of his labour, but his son and heir, Konchek (r. 1307–1308), is said to have completed the restoration of the former Chaghadaid lands on the Ili and Talas Rivers, an event described as the second founding of the Chaghadai Ulus.[50] This restoration did not, however, include the Ögödeid territories around Qobaq and the Altai, which passed into the control of the Yuan army. The death of Qaidu therefore presented a new challenge to the Chaghadaids, insofar as it brought them into direct contact with the Yuan.[51]

Managing relations with the Yuan proved to be one of the greatest challenges for the Middle Empire in the decade after Du'a's death. The volatility of their border may explain the gravitation of Du'a's descendants towards the west of their dominion during the fourteenth century. Mawarannahr was especially important to the Du'aids. Its rich pastureland in the Nakhshab and Zarafshan Valley region had sustained nomadic armies for centuries prior to the Mongol invasion in 1220, and the Du'aids likewise nomadized in these territories, where they were in an ideal location to trade and tax the towns of Bukhara, Samarqand, Tirmidh, and even Balkh.[52] Afghanistan was also an important source of manpower and revenue, with the Qaraunas occupying the territory between Kabul and Ghazna down to the Sind River. Du'a granted command of this army to his sons, Qutlugh Khwaja and Esen Buqa, who used the Qaraunas army to launch raids into the Ilkhanate and the Sultanate of Delhi. The most notable attacks came in 1300 and 1305, when the Qaraunas besieged Delhi before raiding Gujarat and returning to Ghazna laden with loot.[53] The Ilkhanate sought to intermittently seize control of the Qaraunas by sending Chaghadaid defectors to assume the leadership of the region in concert with soldiers from Iran, but these endeavours achieved very mixed results. For the most part, the Qaraunas remained loyal to the Du'aids until 1334, when they began to pursue a more independent trajectory under the leadership of their own non-Chinggisid commanders.[54]

The close relationship between the Du'aids and the urban Muslim population of Ghazna and Mawarannahr naturally brought cultural and philosophical changes to the Chaghadaid armies based in these territories. Masʿud Beg had served as the champion of the major towns of the Middle Empire, heading off any violence or extortion from the nomadic Chaghadaids until his death in 1289, after which his

sons took up his mantle.[55] But from the fourteenth century, the Chaghadaids themselves began to adopt measures to encourage urbanization. Qaidu in particular was noted for his concern for the urban community, and Esen Buqa's successor, Kebek (r. 1318–1326), had a similar interest in protecting his sedentary subjects. Kebek oversaw his own currency reform, designed to stimulate trade with the Ilkhanate and the Jochid Ulus, by creating a new silver dinar, which was worth six of the silver dirhams produced by Masʿud Beg and came to be known as the *köpek*.[56] Kebek had a reputation for justice among Muslim writers and travellers, most notably Ibn Battuta, who recounted his favour towards the *ʿulama* and the equanimity of his rulings. His summer camp in the plain of Nakhshab was ultimately transformed into a small town named Qarshi, after the Mongol word for 'palace,' and he is also credited with restoring the town of Balkh for the first time since the Chinggisid conquests.[57]

Yet the most salient sign that the Du'aid elites were growing closer to their sedentary Muslim subjects was their conversion to Islam. False rumours abounded that Kebek himself had converted to Islam, whilst his predecessor, Naliqo'a (r. 1308–1309), is also presumed to be a Muslim, since his mother was descended from the Qutlughkhanid rulers of Kirman.[58] It was, however, the conversion of Kebek's brother and eventual successor, Tarmashirin (r. 1327–1334), that drew the most attention from the ostensibly Persian and Arabic histories that documented his rule. Ibn Battuta remarked upon his devotion and humility towards the imams of his court at Nakhshab, whilst writers in the Mamluk Sultanate noted that he had removed the non-canonical taxes that had been imposed by the Mongols.[59] Tarmashirin's conversion to Islam was almost certainly the culmination of a process of Islamization which had been underway for some time amongst his soldiers and ministers, as indicated by the Arabic names adopted by several Qaraunas commanders. Indeed, Tarmashirin's most ardent supporter was the commander of Ghazna, Boroldai, who had erected mosques in his domains and was praised by Ibn Battuta for his piety.[60] Yet the spread of Islam was much faster in the west of the Middle Empire than in the east. The Persian sources claim that Tarmashirin's conversion to Islam scandalized a conservative faction in the east of his realm, which retained a strong Buddhist influence. This eastern bloc, led by Tarmashirin's nephew Buzan, accused him of abandoning the *jasaq* of Chinggis Khan in favour of the *sharīʿa* and used this as a pretext to overthrow him in 1334.

There were, however, other factors that contributed to Tarmashirin's demise, outside of his embrace of Islam. The reliance of Baraq and Du'a upon their western power base of the Qaraunas and Mawarannahr naturally left them weaker in the east of their empire, where Buzan drew most of his support. Buzan's father, Döre Temür (also Du'a Temür), who took the Chaghadai throne briefly in 1326, appears to have held a great deal of power in the east of the empire. He is noted to have corresponded with the Yuan as early as 1315 and the *King shi ta tien*, a map commissioned by the Yuan in 1331, listed the Middle Empire as the domain of *Dulai Tiemurh* (Döre Temür).[61] These references, in contrast to Döre Temür's relative anonymity in the Persian sources, may suggest that he was charged with overseeing the eastern provinces of the Middle Empire during Esen Buqa's reign (r. 1309–1318). Tarmashirin had no such connection to the east of his empire, having spent most of his early career in Ghazna with the Qaraunas.[62] Residual loyalty to the line of Döre

Temür and a disconnect between the eastern and western halves of the Chaghadai Ulus certainly would have contributed to the overthrow of Tarmashirin in 1334.

FRAGMENTATION AND DECLINE, 1334–1374

The overthrow of Tarmashirin compromised the tenuous stability that had endured since the rule of Qaidu. The lack of coins minted in Buzan's name suggests that he was unable to maintain power for long, and this is confirmed by the sources that document his fall from power.[63] The throne was subsequently held by Buzan's cousins, Bolad (r. 1334–1335) and Changshi (r. 1335–1338), who appear to have moved the administrative capital back to the Ili River and the town of Almaliq, where Latin missionaries first began to establish contacts with the Chaghadaids around 1328.[64] Changshi's contacts with the West suggest a more tolerant policy towards other religions than that of Tarmashirin. Indeed, he received a letter from Pope Benedict XII in 1338 thanking him for his hospitality towards some Franciscan missionaries in Almaliq during the previous year. A bishopric was subsequently established in Almaliq after Friar Francesco of Alessandria supposedly cured Changshi of the side-effects of a stroke.[65] The Persian sources are inevitably less approving of Changshi's tolerant attitude to other world religions, remarking that he always maintained a contingent of Buddhist monks (*bakhshi*s) at his side and sought their advice on all government business. He was even accused of redecorating the mosques of his empire with Buddhist statues.[66] The Persian sources were, perhaps, seeking to explain the political disintegration of the Middle Empire by highlighting a parallel moral and spiritual decline of its rulers.

Nevertheless, the numismatic evidence confirms that the throne of the Middle Empire was contested regularly throughout the 1330s and 1340s. Changshi was overthrown by his brother, Yesün Temür (r. 1338–1340), who is also reported to have murdered his mother in a fit of madness shortly after taking the throne.[67] Yesün Temür continued to maintain his power in the east, where the Turfan manuscripts demonstrate that his orders were carried out as far afield as Qara Qocho and Qucha, before he was overthrown in another violent coup carried out in the name of an Ögödeid prince named 'Ali Sultan in 1340.[68] The coup was highly unusual, as 'Ali Sultan was not descended of Qaidu's line and was a virtual unknown until his sudden rise to power. The use of Ögödeid princes as figureheads for subsequent uprisings against the Chaghadaids may hint that 'Ali Sultan was simply a puppet in the hands of others, though the forces behind his rise to power remain mysterious. In any case, the rapid turnover of rulers before and after him suggests that the Chinggisid dynasty had begun to lose influence in the Middle Empire.

The decline of the Du'aids coincided with the growing importance of the military aristocracy, who were descended from the commanders appointed to serve Chaghadai during Chinggis Khan's lifetime. The Timurid historians, upon whose accounts we depend, give only piecemeal information about how this group came to play a dominant role in the life of the empire. They describe how the commanders of *tümen* became increasingly disillusioned with a series of weak and oppressive khans and established their own centres of power throughout Mawarannahr. By the 1340s, these commanders had established control over small tracts of territory, where they exercised authority independently from the khans. By 1358, the Middle Empire had

been divided into a patchwork of minor amirates ruled by the Mongol aristocracy; the Barlas held Shahr-i Sabz, the Suldus took Balkh, the Jalayir ruled Khujand, the Qaraunas ruled Ghazna and Kabul, the Apardi controlled Khuttalan, the Yasa'uris held Samarqand, the Arulat were supreme in Shaburghan, and even the shahs of Badakhshan proclaimed their independence.[69] A similar process took place in the Tarim Basin, where Mirza Haydar Dughlat noted that by the fifteenth century, the powerful families, especially the Dughlat, built walled fortresses to preserve their control of urban populations and their agricultural hinterland.[70] The strong rule of the Chinggisids was gradually disappearing.

A brief but futile campaign was launched to try to reverse the centrifugal tendencies of the military commanders in the 1340s. The campaign was led by two brothers who ruled in succession, Khalil Allah (r. 1341–1343) and Qazan Sultan (r. 1343–1346). Both princes were purportedly the offspring of Yasa'ur, the son of Örüg Temür and the grandson of Buqa Temür (d. 1281). Yasa'ur had quarrelled with Kebek Khan in 1316 and had been forced to flee to Khurasan, where the Ilkhan Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316) granted him the territory of the Qaraunas around Badghis and Shaburghan. Following Öljeitü's death, Yasa'ur launched his own bid for the rule of the Ilkhanate but was heavily defeated by a vengeful Kebek in 1320. Yasa'ur's army defected to Kebek, but his sons were said to have remained behind in Khurasan, where the Kartid rulers of Herat gave them shelter.[71] It was from this base that Khalil Allah is reported to have made his bid for power in Mawarannahr, albeit the Timurid genealogy, the *Muʿizz al-Ansab*, does not record Yasa'ur having a son named Khalil. It is, perhaps, possible that one of Yasa'ur's four sons adopted an Arabic name to appeal to the Islamized troops in Mawarannahr. In any case, Khalil successfully seized the throne in 1341 and, it appears, allied himself with the increasingly influential Naqshbandi sufi order, which was in the process of forming under the charismatic leadership of Baha' al-Din Naqshband Bukhari (d. 1389).[72] More is known of Khalil's brother, Qazan Sultan (r. 1343–1346), whose name is prominent in both the genealogical treatises and the narrative histories of the later Timurid dynasty. His notoriety was based on the brutality of his rule, which was consumed by a campaign to regain power from the Chaghadaid commanders. The Timurid sources claim that Qazan launched a violent purge of his military aristocracy, killing many of his senior courtiers and leaving his subjects fearing for their lives. We are told that those who travelled to his court would settle their affairs and bid farewell to their families before departure, from fear that they would never return.[73] The situation became so intolerable that the nobility conspired together to topple Qazan in a military coup. The uprising was organized by Qazaghan, the commander of the Chaghadai Qaraunas divisions in Badghis. He banded together with the senior families of Mawarannahr to attack Qazan in 1346, a battle in which Qazaghan was defeated and lost an eye. But a harsh winter devastated Qazan's herds upon his return to Nakhshab, and Qazaghan was able to recover his forces for a successful attack on the khan, which saw Qazan killed in battle.

Muʿin al-Din Natanzi characterized Qazaghan's victory by noting that 'the sultanate became an amirate.'[74] The statement suggests that true power had passed from the Chinggisids to their military commanders, and although Qazaghan appointed an Ögödeid prince named Danishmandshah (r. 1347–1348) to the throne, he was only a figurehead, as demonstrated by the speed with which Qazaghan replaced him

for another candidate, Buyan Quli Khan, in 1348. Qazaghan was the real power behind the throne, and he managed to retain control over the other military leaders of Mawarannahr and much of Khurasan until he was murdered in 1358. His son, 'Abd Allah, was far less capable of maintaining the loyalty of the commanders, who refused to recognize his authority in the absence of real Chinggisid leadership. 'Abd Allah was himself overthrown later in 1358 after having murdered Buyan Quli Khan to pursue the latter's wife.

Yet the power of Qazaghan and the Qaraunas had never stretched to East Turkistan, where the leading families nominated a rival Chinggisid prince, Tughluq Temür, to the throne in Almaliq after the death of Qazan in 1346. Little is known about this prince, whose parentage was disputed. The *Mu'izz al-Ansab* claims that he was a grandson of Du'a through the latter's son, Imil Khwaja, whilst Mirza Haydar Dughlat, writing much later in the sixteenth century, believed that he was the son of Esen Buqa Khan. The difficulty in tracing his lineage was caused by the fact that he was born after his father's death, by which time his mother had already been remarried, leaving scope for scepticism about his royal pretensions.[75] Nevertheless, the powerful Dughlat family, which controlled the towns of the Tarim Basin, backed his candidacy and ensured its success. Shortly thereafter, Tughluq Temür converted to Islam at the hands of the Kataki sufis, who established themselves in Aksu midway through the fourteenth century. This move, alongside the supposed purge of Tughluq Temür's non-Muslim commanders, has been taken as a sign that the new khan managed to consolidate his grip on power early in his reign.[76]

By 1360 Tughluq Temür felt confident enough in his position to attempt the reunification of the Middle Empire. Seeing that Mawarannahr had fallen into the hands of non-Chinggisid amirs and that there was no effective leadership in the region, he decided to rally his armies to conquer Mawarannahr. His soldiers forded the Khujand River in the winter of the same year, before marching towards the administrative centre of Samarqand. The local commanders who had seized power in the region, most notably Bayan Suldus, Bayazid Jalayir, and Hajji Beg Barlas, decided to either submit or flee, allowing Tughluq Temür to take control of Mawarannahr without a fight. Having established his power over the turbulent Chaghadaid commanders, Tughluq Temür deputed his own soldiers to govern the region before returning east to his power base in the Ili River region. Yet it was not long before the independent-minded Chaghadaid commanders shrugged off Tughluq Temür's control, obliging him to launch a second assault on the region in 1361. The lack of any concerted leadership amongst the commanders of Mawarannahr meant that they were again forced to submit to Tughluq Temür's forces, and this time the khan left his son Ilyas Khwaja to oversee the management of the region alongside the Dughlat commander, Bugaji.

But the reunification of the Middle Empire only lasted for the duration of Tughluq Temür's reign. He died in 1363 after returning to the east of the Middle Empire, and the Chaghadaid commanders of Mawarannahr were unwilling to abdicate power to his son Ilyas Khwaja. An alliance of convenience was formed against him by two of the senior Chaghadaid commanders, Amir Timur of the Barlas family and Amir Husayn, the grandson of Qazaghan. The pair fled across the Amu Darya River early in Ilyas Khwaja's tenure but re-emerged to challenge his power and force him out of the region in 1364.[77] Timur would ultimately emerge from the instability to impose

his control over Mawarannahr before building his own empire, which incorporated many of the former territories of the earlier Mongol Empire.

Timur's new polity never imposed direct control over the east of the Middle Empire, which continued to be ruled by the descendants of Tughluq Temür well into the sixteenth century. Nor was there any sign that either side desired a reconciliation. The Chinggisid rulers of the Tarim Basin and the Ili River had grown apart from the more urbane commanders of Mawarannahr. Timur and his fellow commanders distinguished themselves from their cousins to the east, regarding themselves as more civilized and more pious than their largely nomadic neighbours. For their part, the nomads in the east of the Middle Empire identified themselves as the protectors of authentic Chinggisid tradition and law, a fact that was reflected in their self-identification as 'Moghuls' (i.e. Mongols) and their territory as 'Moghulistan.'[78] The political division between east and west, which had begun during the reign of Tarmashirin in 1334, had manifested into a cultural division by the time of Tughluq Temür's first invasion of Mawarannahr in 1360. The collapse of any sense of corporate identity ultimately put an end to the Middle Empire and saw the birth of a new Timurid phase of Central Asian history in the second half of the fourteenth century.

NOTES

1 The Mongolian successor state in Central Eurasia is also described by the Persian author Jamal al-Din al-Qarshi as '*awsat al-'aqd*' (the Central Place) and by the Latin writers of the time as '*Imperium Medium*' (Middle Empire). Several Latin writers also refer to the Middle Empire as the 'Empire of the Medes,' a misnomer for *Imperium Medium*. See Matsui 2009, 111–119.
2 *HWC*, 21.
3 *SHM* §243; *HWC*, 31. Abe Takeo has suggested that the Uyghurs retained their autonomy in the early Mongol Empire and that they were not incorporated into any of the *ulus* belonging to Chinggis Khan's sons. Thomas Allsen believes that they were subject to the qa'an. See Takeo 1954, 435–450; Allsen 1983, 249.
4 *SP* f. 128; *RDRM*, I, 606.
5 *TOA*, 120; Barthold 1958, 472.
6 Bretschneider 1888, I, 29.
7 Manz 1992, 41; Vér 2020, 182–201.
8 *HWC*, 162 & 227; *TNR*, 1108–1112.
9 Khwandamir 2001, III, 77 & 80–81.
10 Jackson 2017, 243; *HWC*, 57–58.
11 *RDRM*, I, 751; Barthold 1956, I, 118.
12 Haravi 1383/2004–2005, 164.
13 Rubruck, 145.
14 *SHM* § 254; *RDRM*, I, 709.
15 Rubruck, 147. Rubruck's account is confirmed by al-ʿUmari, who blamed the devastation of Turkistan on the initial invasion of Chinggis Khan. See Umari, 133.
16 Jackson 1978, 205; Biran 1997, 16; Barthold 1956, I, 46.
17 Buell 1979, 146; De Rachewiltz 1993, 128; Allsen 1987, 101–104.
18 Vaṣṣaf/Ayati 1346/1927, 45; *HWC*, I, 84.
19 Qarshi 2005, 236.
20 Akhmedov 1999, IV, 263; Broadbridge 2018, 244–250; De Nicola 2017.

21 Biran 1997, 19–20; Barthold 1956, I, 122–123; Jackson 2017, 148–149.
22 Jackson 1978, 234.
23 Jackson 1978, 235; Bayarsaikhan 2011, 153; Barthold 1956, I, 47.
24 Biran 1997, 21–23.
25 *SP* f. 130; Biran 1997, 24; Jackson 2017, 149.
26 Barthold 1958, 491; Biran 1997, 24; Natanzi 1336/1957–1958, 104.
27 Barthold 1958, 492.
28 Biran 1997, 25–27; Barthold 1958, 492–493.
29 *RDRM*, II, 1068.
30 On the Qaraunas see Polo 1958, 64–65; Manz 1992, 38; Aubin 1969, 65–94; Hirotoshi 1977, 162; Martinez 1986–8, 232–235. On Dayir's army see May 2020, 276–281, 286–288.
31 *RDRM*, II, 1071–1072.
32 Lane 2003, 83–88; Bayarsaikhan 2011, 168; Al-Yunini 1955, 410–411; Brosset 1849, 576–583.
33 Biran 2002, 175–220; Lane 2003, 90; Jackson 2017, 195.
34 *RDRM*, II, 1089–1095; Vaṣṣaf/Ayati 1346/1967–1968, 43.
35 *RDRM*, II, 1096; Vaṣṣaf/Ayati 1346/1967–1968, 44; Biran 2002, 200.
36 *RDRM*, II, 1096.
37 Qarshi 2005, 240; *SP* 2937, f. 130.
38 Jackson 2017, 199; Biran 1997, 57.
39 Al-Aflaki 2002, 186.
40 Nasafi 1965, 6.
41 Yule 1914, III, 49.
42 Dardess 1972–3, 141; Allsen 1983, 255–258; Biran 1997, 43; Bretschneider 1888, II, 27–31.
43 Biran 1997, 43; Jackson 2017, 195.
44 Hope 2015, 451–473; Biran 1997, 57–61.
45 Biran 1997, 65; Barthold 1956, I, 127.
46 Davidovich 1999, 405; Fedorov 2002b, 372. See also Davidovich 1972.
47 *RDRM*, II, 922; Biran 2008, 376.
48 Qashani 1969, 32–33.
49 Qashani 1969, 33.
50 Yazdi 1387, I, 214; Qashani 1969, 35–37.
51 Yingsheng 2005, 341; Jackson 2017, 219.
52 Paul 2016, 495–531.
53 Ahmad 1961, 187; Jackson 2003, 220–231.
54 *RDRM*, I, 772; Jackson 2017, 195; Aubin 1969, 85.
55 De Rachewiltz 1993, 129; *RDRM*, II, 1069; Vaṣṣaf/Ayati 1346/1967–1968, 4.
56 I have found no evidence to support the claim made by Barthold that Kebek instituted a new *tümen* system, which divided the population into units capable of supporting a division of the Mongol army. For Kebek's currency reforms, see Davidovich 1999, 406; Barthold 1956, I, 52.
57 Yazdi 1387, I, 215.
58 Biran 2009, 55; Barthold 1956, I, 131–132; Haidar Dughlat 1895, 3.
59 Biran 2002, 747; DeWeese 2007, 526; Ibn Battuta 1987, 378–379.
60 Aubin 1976, 18; Ibn Battuta 1987, 380.
61 Bretschneider 1888, II, 6 & 14.
62 Biran 2002, 743.
63 Barthold 1956, I, 135; Jackson 2017, 361.
64 Ryan 2003, 29.

65 Jackson 2005, 278; Ryan 2003, 32; Yule 1914, III, 35.
66 Biran 2002, 750; Elverskog 2010, 191.
67 Jackson 2017, 361; Barthold 1956, I, 136.
68 Kara 2003, 28; Clark 1975, 194–198.
69 Natanzi 1336/1957–1958, 204; Yazdi 1387, I, 261.
70 Haidar Dughlat 1895, 82.
71 Kazuhide 1991, 106–110; Jackson 2017, 356–357.
72 Trimingham 1971, 219.
73 Yazdi 1387, I, 249; Khwandamir 2001, III, 91; Natanzi 1336/1957–8, 113.
74 Natanzi 1336/1957–8, 113.
75 *MA* f. 51; Haidar Dughlat 1895, 5.
76 Kim 1999, 302; Jackson 2017, 358.
77 Barthold 1956, I, 138; Manz 1989, 45–60; Roemer 1986, 45.
78 See Manz 1992, 38; Barthold 1956, I, 54.

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TNR, See List of Abbreviations.
TOA, See List of Abbreviations.
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PART IV

ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE YASA

Denise Aigle

Chinggis Khan is known to have been a legislator who promulgated a code of law (*jasaq* in Mongolian, *yasa* in Persian and Arabic) of extreme severity. Yet despite extensive study of the *yasa*, several questions still remain regarding this law code. What fields did the *yasa* cover? Was the *yasa* imposed on sedentary populations under Mongol rule, especially Muslims subject to Islamic law (*shari'a*)? Was it applied uniformly across all the territories of the Mongol empire and for its entire duration? And finally, after the fall of the Mongol empire, did the *yasa* endure under later Turkic-Mongol dynasties, notably in Central Asia? Before responding to these questions, it is first necessary to clarify the terminology found in the medieval sources and provide an overview of the research on the *yasa*, which, as early as the seventeenth century, aroused the interest of scholars investigating the Mongols.

THE *YASA* IN MEDIEVAL SOURCES

The *jasaq* is mentioned on several occasions in the letters sent by the khans to foreign powers as well as in the *Secret History of the Mongols*. In this founding text of Mongol identity, the term *jasaq* is variously used to denote a sovereign's law in the exercise of his authority, a legal precedent, or a rule whose violation warranted harsh punishment. In Mongolian, the verb "*jasaqla-*" means to act according to the law, to administer, to govern;[1] the noun *jasaq* therefore concerns the rules for the administration of the state.[2] The *Secret History* differentiates between imperial decrees (i.e., *jasaq*) and custom (i.e., *yosun*, Persian *yusun*), which is mentioned twenty-two times in the text to express a way of acting or a custom.[3] The *jasaq* and the *yosun* therefore have different sources of validity. With the *jasaq*, the leader enacts the law in the exercise of his authority: "The rule of our queen Gürbesü has become harsh".[4] With the *yosun*,[5] that is, the unrecorded custom, it owed its validity to tradition: "Such is the way in which Yisügei carried off Lady Hö'elün".[6] Aside from the *Secret History*, the term *yasa* is first attested in a letter sent by Güyük (r. 1246–1248) to Pope Innocent IV in 1246. In this document, *yasa* signifies the order or decree of the Great Khan.[7]

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The most important Islamic sources on the *yasa* in Muslim lands were written by 'Ata' Malik Juvayni (d. 681/1283), the only Persian historian to have visited Mongolia, and Rashid al-Din (d. 718/1318), who drew on Ghazan Khan and Bolad Chingsang. In the second chapter of his *Tarikh-i Jahangusha*,[8] Juvayni explained how Chinggis Khan formulated laws: "In accordance and agreement with his own mind, he established a rule for every occasion and a regulation for every circumstance; while for every crime he fixed a penalty".[9] The *qawa'id* (laws) and the *yasa* mentioned by Juvayni concerned state matters: hunting and military training, the organization of the army, the postal network for official correspondence (*yam*), and the levying of taxes in the conquered territories. Unlike the Persian sources in which the word *yasa* was often associated with *yusun*, "custom", this chapter on the *yasa* did not address Mongol customs and traditions. For Juvayni, the *yasa* concerned only state affairs, although he implicitly gave it a religious connotation, stating that infractions were punished with a legal penalty or *hadd*, a term borrowed from Islamic legal vocabulary.

The Eastern Christian sources also mention the *yasa*. In his Syriac chronicle, Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286), the highest dignitary of the Jacobite Church, who drew heavily on Juvayni, detailed numerous laws promulgated by Chinggis Khan.[10] He recorded nine laws concerning the regulation of the army and appropriate conduct with an enemy, as well as several social rules; the violation of just one of these laws of military discipline was punishable by death. The rules of the *yasa* also appeared in the *History of the Tatars* by the Armenian historian Grigor Akanc'i (d. 1335), who clearly borrowed from oral sources.[11] In the second chapter, entitled "Regarding the revivification of their faith, their precepts, and of their chieftain", he enumerated six rules, writing: "These are the precepts of God which he imposed on them, and which they themselves call *yasax*".[12] The violation of these rules was followed by a merciless death.

In the Chinese sources, the term *jasaq* is only twice mentioned with *yeke* (great). In the *Yuan shi*, the official chronicle of the Yuan dynasty, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241) is said to have promulgated the "*yeke jasaq*", glossed in Chinese as "the great [law] (*ta-fa-ling*)", at the time of his enthronement at the *quriltai* in September 1229. The great *jasaq* also features in a document on the imperial family dating to 1264. Other references to the *jasaq* concern judgements relating to the interests of the state (military affairs, administration of postal relays, etc.) or serious crimes like murder.[13]

The Mongol, Persian, Syriac, Armenian, and Chinese sources are unanimous on the point that the precepts of the *yasa* concerned state affairs. These rules of a general nature related to the art of governing and diverse regulations, notably on military matters. In most cases, their contravention was sanctioned by death.

The concept of *yasa* corresponds to the term *törü* (*törä*), attested in ancient Turkish inscriptions with the signification of order, regulations, and laws.[14] The expression "great principle" (*yeke töre*) appears several times in the *Secret History* in reference to fundamental issues of governance such as regulating the mutual obligations between a master and his subject. In paragraph 220, when Chinggis Khan declares, "I shall entrust him with an important task (*yeke töre*)", this refers to the loyalty owed by Naya'a after his appointment as commander of the *tümen*.[15] The "great norm" (*yeke yosu*) also regulated the spoils of war; as the exclusive property of the khan, he alone had the right to redistribute them.[16]

According to Juvayni, the *yasa* and the edicts promulgated by Chinggis Khan were recorded on scrolls known as *yasa-nama-yi buzurg* [*Great Book of the Yasa*].[17] Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether Chinggis Khan had already set out a code of law at the time of his enthronement in 1206. Immediately after Ögödei's election in 1229, "first of all he made a *yasa* that such ordinances and commands as had previously been issued by Chingiz-Khan should be maintained . . . and protect against the evils of change, and alteration, and confusion".[18] After his subsequent investiture in 1246, Güyük "had upheld the *yasa*s of his father and had not admitted any change or alteration of his statutes".[19] The declarations of Chinggis Khan's successors thus support the idea that the Great Khan formulated a corpus of laws and decrees, although there is a lack of evidence for the existence of a written code of laws. Nevertheless, numerous regulations and decrees were put into writing at the time, as the Mongol chancellery issued documents in Uyghur script before the death of Chinggis Khan in 1227.

In the Arabic Mamluk sources, the *yasa* is often presented somewhat confusedly between law and custom. Fadl Allah 'Umari (d. 749/1349) provided a list of Chinggis Khan's *yasa* which, if contravened, were punishable by death, as well as a list of Mongol customs (*adab*).[20] However, he also included customary laws, such as the proscriptions on water use like washing clothes in rivers and the ritual slaughter of animals without draining their blood. Unknowingly, Taqi al-Din 'Abd al-'Abbas Ahmad Maqrizi (d. 845/1442) reproduced the list of Fadl Allah 'Umari, although his account of the *yasa* was somewhat contentious. As Maqrizi intended to show the anti-Islamic character of the *yasa*, he introduced the rules using terms borrowed from the Islamic legal vocabulary: for example, "Chingiz-Khan made a law (*shara'a*)", "he enacted as precept (*sharata*)", "he ordered (*alzama*)", and "he prohibited (*mana'a*)".[21] Prohibitions based on Mongol customs were thus presented as laws decreed by Chinggis Khan. The arguments of Ibn Taymiyya, who issued three anti-Mongol *fatwa* in response to Ghazan Khan's attacks on Syria, also focussed on Mongol law.[22] Due to the hostility between the Ilkhans and the Mamluk Sultan of Cairo, the majority of Mamluk sources are of a controversial nature. The other medieval sources, even those in Latin, make no confusion between the *yasa* and the *yusun*. Jean de Plan Carpin, for example, spoke of the laws and ordinances (*leges et statuta*) promulgated by Chinggis Khan, which he distinguished from Mongol customs and ancestral practices (*traditiones*).[23]

POLITICAL AND MILITARY REGULATIONS

After conquering the tribes of Inner Asia, Chinggis Khan sought to ensure the stability of this nascent empire by creating a central authority to counter the former clan structures by removing the power vested in traditional authorities. He thus attempted to eliminate "any form of solidarity that did not serve the central authority".[24] At the *quriltai* of 1206 when Chinggis Khan founded the "great Mongol state" (*yeke monggol ulus*), he gave it a supreme judicial body. Appointed as supreme judge, Shigi Quduqu[25] was tasked with overseeing all peoples of the empire:

> When protected by Eternal Heaven, I am engaged in bringing the entire people under my sway, be eyes for me to see with, ears for me to hear with. . . . Curbing

> theft, discouraging falsehood, execute those who deserve death, punish those who deserve punishment.[26]

Shigi Quduqu's function of judging crimes committed throughout the empire represented the prototype of the Mongol judicial machine, the *jarqu/yarghu*. In the Persian sources, the term *yarghu* is used to designate the court responsible for investigating – often with the use of torture – cases of deposed ministers, corrupt government officers, and other "enemies" of the state accused of violating the precepts of the *yasa*.[27]

The pursuit of conquests formed part of an ideology of submission. Jean de Plan Carpin thus wrote: "Another order is that they must subjugate the entire earth and make peace with no other nation that has not submitted to them". This is how the Franciscan traveller understood the letter sent by Güyük to Pope Innocent IV in 1246:

> You who are the great pope, with the kings, will come all together in person to render us homage and we will have you hear the orders from the *yasa*. . . . By the force of God, from the rising to the setting sun, all lands have been granted to us. . . . And if you . . . contravene our orders, we will know you to be our enemies.[28]

Many decades ago, Eric Voegelin set forth the hypothesis that these letters should be regarded not as mere diplomatic correspondence but as real "acts of law".[29] And, indeed, they were understood in this manner by Bar Hebraeus, whose Syriac chronicle mentions the injunction made to sovereigns whom the Great Khan sought to bring under his power: "If they must write to rebels . . ., they shall merely be told: if you submit yourselves, you will find peace and benevolence. But if you continue to resist . . . only God knows what will become [of] you".[30]

Many regulations in the *yasa* are of a military nature. Indeed, a disciplined army was the best means for Chinggis Khan to conquer new lands. In the *Secret History*, most of the *jasaq* are military orders relating to discipline or tactics. Paragraph 153 mentions two *jasaq* of Chinggis Khan that regulate the orders of battle and pillaging: "If we overcome the enemy, we shall not stop for booty. . . . If we are forced by the enemy to retreat, let us turn back to the point where we began the attack. Those men who do not turn back to the point where we began the attack shall be cut down!"[31] The refusal to return to combat was viewed as a betrayal of both the Great Khan and one's fellow soldiers. This act deserved the most degrading punishment – decapitation – because it entailed the spilling of blood, which, for humans, prevented the survival of ancestors and thus the transmission of clan identity.

The non-Mongol sources also mention numerous regulations on military discipline, with all infractions punishable by death. According to Jean de Plan Carpin and Juvayni, it was prohibited, under pain of death, to change military units. Bar Hebraeus stated that the commander who accepted the offender into his unit would also suffer the same fate.[32] Once again, it can be assumed that the underlying offence resulting in this punishment was betrayal: whoever was complicit was also punishable by death. 'Umari cites other rules dealing with the discipline and personal accountability of soldiers: "During an attack or retreat, if a soldier loses his pack,

bow, or quiver, whoever follows him must dismount [his horse] to help him, otherwise he is killed".[33]

This rule may be founded on the notion of *omoq*,[34] which is expressed in paragraph 190 of the *Secret History*: "If, when one is still alive, the enemy is allowed to take away one's quiver, what is the advantage of living?"[35] In Mongolian, *omoq* (pride) and *oboq* (family, clan, tribe) are etymologically linked, but they evolved separately.[36] The semantic link between the two terms may explain the signification of this *jasaq*. In Mongol society, the pride of the clan and its survival depended on its ability to defend itself or be avenged by its members. A soldier who had lost his quiver could no longer fulfil this fundamental duty, thus meaning that he had lost his honour. This explains the severe punishment imposed on the violator of this rule.

THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Chinggis Khan gave a legal framework to the newly founded Mongol state. Any act that could be a potential source of animosity between clans or individuals and that was punishable according to the pre-imperial vengeance system was henceforth regulated. Indeed, in the former tribal system, any crimes committed against a rival were viewed as legitimate revenge; they were external to the clan, and so aggression towards them could even be rewarded, as attested in the *Secret History*. Only acts that endangered the internal order of the clan were considered crimes. By contrast, in the state system established by Chinggis Khan, any offence was regarded as an attack against the imperial order.

At the *quriltai* of 1206, Chinggis Khan entrusted Shigi Qutuqu with the task of punishing theft and forbidding lying. Indeed, theft would have led to retaliation and hostility between tribes. All the sources describe the condemnation of theft, although their authors differ in terms of the punishment inflicted on the thief. Grigor Akanc'i wrote that the Mongols detested stealing so much that it was punishable by the most horrific death,[37] while Guillaume de Rubrouck stated that the death penalty was only used for sizable thefts.[38] Under Yuan rule, each stolen animal (camel, horse, ox, mule, etc.) was compensated by giving nine animals to the victim. Indeed, this penalty was a Mongol innovation in the Chinese penal system.[39] Witnessing the punishment of theft in the court of Qubilai, Marco Polo stated that the theft of horses and other valuable goods carried the death penalty.[40] In nomadic societies, livestock was a significant part of each clan's wealth and an essential component of subsistence.

The condemnation of lying may also be explained in the context of the new imperial order. In the former clan system, as attested in the *Secret History*, it was not forbidden to use deception and lying to vanquish one's external enemies. By contrast, in the new empire, any form of lying could jeopardise the order established by the Chinggisid clan, which made it a crime against the Khan.

In traditional Mongol society, murder was expiated through systems of redress, in particular the right to compensation (*haci*) for the victim's family. The term *haci* expresses the idea of judgement rather than vengeance and even carries a positive meaning: the return of dues.[41] As written by Juvayni, "In conformity with the ancient *yasa* of Chingis-Khan, according to which the blood money (*qisas*) for a Muslim is forty *balish* and for a Khitayan [Chinese] a donkey".[42] Disregarding the edifying aspect of this narrative, Juvayni here refers to the right to compensation in the steppe

society while using the Islamic term *qisas* for *haci*. Comparing Juvayni's account with the legislation enforced by the Yuan dynasty in China,[43] in cases of murder, compensation known as *shao-mai-yin*, literally "money [for] burning and burying", was accorded with the amount fixed at fifty ounces of silver (*liang*), convertible into paper money. This compensation was given by the murderer to the parents of the victim.[44] In this case, the compensation of the Mongols merged with an important custom of ancestor worship from Chinese culture.[45]

Among the Mongols, marriage represented the rule (*töre*) par excellence, since it conditioned all other social relations. Indeed, *türe*, the Buryat form of the Classical Mongolian *töre*, nowadays signifies "the institution and ritual of marriage" on the one hand and "the [mode of] government" on the other. The basic notion underlying this root relates to engendering (*türeke*): it expresses the principles of alliance and filiation and considers the reproduction of society in absolute terms.[46] All the sources, whether Christian or Islamic, mention that an adulterer is punishable by death. However, the term "adulterer" should be given the meaning accorded in Mongol society, which maintained strict exogamy. In this manner, adultery refers to what we can call "incest within the clan" that breaks the principle of exogamy, as opposed to the signification attributed by the monotheistic religions. The punishment for this crime was intended to preserve the principle of exogamy, as attested in the signification of the term *töre* and its derivative *törel*, which designates the exogamous kinship group.[47] The purpose of the marriage was to perpetuate the lineages, a duty to the ancestors. It was also a means of contracting a relationship between the families of the spouses, as in the case of Chinggis Khan. When he was nine years old, his father said: "I shall ask his maternal uncles for a girl in marriage for him".[48] In these circumstances the adulterer could be a source of disorder within the clan, but if he committed adultery with a woman from another lineage, the internal harmony of the clan was not endangered.

MONGOL CUSTOMARY LAW

The issue of whether Mongol customary law was applied to the sedentary populations of the empire has kindled much debate among scholars, who have focussed on whether *shari'a* was abolished in Muslim lands. However, this issue cannot easily be resolved, as the circumstances of Muslims living under Mongol rule differed across the empire and changed over time.

With the exception of Juvayni, the Muslim authors pointed out the incompatibilities between certain Mongol customs and the *shari'a*. Muslims were particularly struck by the prohibitions relating to water use. Al-'Umari reported that according to the old *yasa* of the Mongols, it was forbidden to bathe in water, under penalty of death.[49] To better illustrate how the Mongol customary law was in disagreement with Islamic law, al-Maqrizi mentioned that Chinggis Khan encouraged them to wear their clothes without washing them, and he banned them from saying that something was impure (*najis*), as he made no distinction between the pure and the impure.[50]

The importance of spirits in the symbolic representations of shamanism, in which "soul" and "spirit" were homologous, may explain these taboos around water. After death, the soul was believed to have another mode of existence in the form of a

spirit. Because of this belief in spirits and out of respect to them, it was forbidden to immerse oneself in rivers or wash clothing and dishes there, so as not to pollute their places of dwelling. Among the medieval Mongols, the prohibitions around water, because of the spirits residing there, were combined with another factor: the fear of attracting storms, which were perceived as a supernatural punishment for failing to fulfill one's obligations towards the spirits. Juvayni and the Latin sources clarify that these proscriptions applied in spring and summer, when humans or animals were frequently struck by lightning. These tragic deaths were interpreted as the vengeance of the spirits, and as a result, the family members of the deceased were isolated from the clan for a variable period of time. Juvayni wrote that according to the law and Mongol custom (*dar yasa va adhin-i mughul*), if a man was struck by lightning, his family was sent away from the tribe for a period of three years; in the case of an animal, the separation lasted for several months.[51]

Furthermore, Mongol customary law specified slaughtering animals without spilling blood, which sparked condemnation from Muslims, as this practice went against ritual slaughter in Islam. The *halal* method was both foreign and strange to the Mongols, because in their shamanic representations, spilled blood would not permit the symbolic survival of the animal. They believed in the necessity of conserving the breathing apparatus, considered to support the potential for life and allow the symbolic birth of a new animal.[52]

Yet the question beckons as to whether this Mongol customary law, perceived by Muslims to be the *yasa*, was actually imposed on Muslim populations. According to Anne Lambton, the Mongols in Iran did not seek "to impose upon the subject population Mongol customary law to the exclusion of shar'î law".[53] The Persian and Chinese sources nevertheless provide many examples of Muslims being prohibited from slaughtering animals in accordance with the Islamic ritual. Describing Chaghadai's realm, Juvayni mentioned that Chaghadai strictly observed the laws of Chinggis Khan: to respect the *yasa*, the Muslims of Khurasan did not dare to openly cut the throats of sheep and were forced to eat pork.[54] Hülegü was said to have reinstated the obligation for Muslims to eat Mongolian food.[55] Rashid al-Din narrated that Qubilai wanted to honour a group of Muslim merchants visiting his court by giving them food from his table. Irritated by their refusal, he apparently ordered all Muslims and the people of the book to kill animals following the Mongol custom.[56] In 1280, Qubilai issued an edict banning Chinese Muslims from slaughtering animals according to the Islamic rite. However, the rule on animal slaughter was not continuously applied.[57] Indeed, Qubilai's efforts to enforce the prohibition of *halal* slaughter were rather made "as a means to project his own Mongol identity".[58]

The manner in which Mongol law was applied in China under the Yuan dynasty may partly shed light on the situation in Muslim countries. Heng-chao Ch'en states that in penal matters, "Mongol customary law was an important source of law in China during the initial period of Mongol conquest".[59] However, he observes that penalties only applied to the Chinese when the violations concerned state affairs and that from 1280 onwards, the *yasa* was only rarely mentioned, proof that these rules were poorly adapted to the sedentary Chinese population. It can thus be assumed that similar to the situation in China, the laws relating to state interests, military discipline, and the functioning of governance structures were imposed on all subjects.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that customary law was imposed on all the subjugated populations. Juvayni recounted several anecdotes about the application of customary law in Muslim lands. He thus told of a Muslim who firmly closed all the doors of his house before slaughtering a sheep according to the Islamic ritual but was denounced by a Turk who illegally entered his house. Taken before Ögödei, the man was pardoned. Juvayni's edifying story demonstrates that the application of the *yasa* was not systematic. A distinction was seemingly made between public and private spheres for the Islamic ritual slaughter. The situation of Muslims would have varied between regions: in Khurasan, in Central Asia under Chaghadai, or in China under Qubilai, their circumstances were undoubtedly more trying than in other periods or in other regions of the empire. In reality, however, it is difficult to see how the proscription of ritual slaughter could have been enforced in areas where relatively few or no Mongol soldiers were stationed.[60]

In terms of private law, the subjugated peoples were probably often governed by local traditional rules. In the Islamic territories, even though certain Mongol customs were sometimes imposed on Muslims, the *shari'a* was seemingly never abolished by the Mongol power. If these customary laws had been enforced on a large scale throughout the Muslim lands under their rule, the Islamic sources would contain specific indications. Ibn Taymiyya, most notably, would not have hesitated to enlist this argument in his anti-Mongol *fatwa*.

THE LEGACY OF THE *YASA* IN CENTRAL ASIA

What became of the *yasa* after the fall of the Mongol Empire? This code of law remained a reference point in the broadest sense for Turkic and Mongol peoples, who, though Muslims, also upheld their customs and traditions until the end of the Turkic-Mongol dynasties, through to the Manghits.[61] The *yasa* was clearly used for political purposes by Timur. The sources employ various expressions such as "the triumphant *törä*" (*tura-i qahira*) or even the formula "in accordance with the *yasa* of Chingiz-Khan and the *törä* of his excellence, the master of favourable conjunctions" (*bi-mujib-i yasa-yi Chingiz Khani wa tura-yi haẓrat-i sahib-qiran*).[62] Indeed, Timur informed a group of his emirs that obeying the decrees of heaven (*hukm-i yarligh-i asamani*) and the law of Chinggis Khan (*tura-i Chinjiskhani*) was both obligatory and necessary.[63] According to Maria Subtelny, "the *törä* was a means for Timurids to maintain their warrior culture and Chaghatay identity as distinct from the sedentary Iranian population".[64]

In his study of the political orientations of Central Asia in the seventeenth century, Robert McChesney highlights the fact that all amirs were required to be loyal to the Mongol traditions and implicitly respect the Chinggisid law. The terms *yasa* and *yusun*, like *'urf* and *siyasa*, were still in use at the time.[65] Mahmud b. Amir Wali, who authored a historical biography in the first half of the seventeenth century, considered that customary law was the expression of temporal and spiritual authority. This points to "the organic nature of the *yasa*", as it could incorporate non-Chinggisid elements while remaining faithful to the Mongol tradition.[66]

The Manghits were the first non-Chinggisid rulers to govern Mawarannahr after the Timurids.[67] Like Timur, Muhammad Rahim (r. 1747–1759), the founder of the dynasty, married a woman of Chinggisid ancestry, but he replaced the title of *khan*

with *amir*. The final sovereign of the dynasty, Amir Sayyid ʻAlim Khan (r. 1910–1920), wrote in his memoirs that religious scholars considered him to be the representative of the Prophet and the guardian of the *shariʻa*, although he did not fail to mention the Mongol tradition (*ʻadat-i mughul*).[68]

NOTES

1 See "*zagala-*" in Lessing 1960, 1040.
2 In modern Mongolian, *zasag* means "government".
3 *SHM* §§9, 56, 96, 110, 116, 117, 139, 147, 150, 164, 177, 180, 216, 241, 244, 263, 270, 272.
4 *SHM* §189. Gürbesü was the mother of Tayan Qan of the Naiman.
5 On this term, see *TMEN*, I, n. 408.
6 *SHM* §56.
7 Pelliot 1922–23, 13–14 & 17–18.
8 Juwayni 1912, I, 16–25; *HWC*, I, 23.
9 Juwayni 1912, I, 17; *HWC*, 25.
10 Bar Hebraeus 1890, 411–412; English translation in Spuler 1972, 39–41.
11 Blake and Frye 1949, 274–276. See also 269–399.
12 Blake and Frye 1949, 291.
13 Ch'en 1979, 5–6.
14 On the term *törä*, see *TMEN*, I, n. 134, 264–267.
15 *SHM*, II, 814–815.
16 *SHM* §252, which refers to the "great norm" similarly to the "great principle" of §§208, 220; SHM, II, 919. See also Buell and Kolbas 2016, 43–64.
17 Juwayni 1912, I, 17; *HWC*, I, 25.
18 Juwayni 1912, I, 149; *HWC*, I, 189.
19 Juwayni 1912, I, 211; *HWC*, I, 256.
20 Umari, 9.
21 al-Maqrizi 1418/1998, III, 383–385.
22 Aigle 2015b, 300–301.
23 Carpini 1929, I, 40.
24 Hamayon 1980, 121.
25 Discovered as a child in a Tatar camp, Shigi Qutuqu was adopted and raised as the brother of Chinggis Khan. On his role, see Ratchnevsky 1965, 87–120.
26 *SHM* §203.
27 On the *yarghū*, see Lambton 1988, 95–96, 274–275.
28 Carpini 1929, 64.
29 Voegelin 1940–41, 412.
30 Bar Hebraeus 1890, 354.
31 *SHM* §153.
32 Bar Hebraeus 1890, 412.
33 Umari, 9.
34 On this notion, see Hamayon 1980, 122–123.
35 *SHM* §190.
36 On "*oboq*" and "*omoq*", see Lessing 1960, 611. On the etymological evolution of the term, see *TMEN*, IV, n. 572.
37 Blake and Frye 1949, 291.
38 Rubruc 1929, 2 & 186.
39 Ch'en 1979, 58–59.
40 Polo 2003, II, 35.

41 On the term *haci* and this practice, see Hamayon 1980, 110–111.
42 Juwayni 1912, I, 164; *HWC*, I, 207.
43 On law under the Yuan dynasty, see Ch'en 1979; Aubin 1991, 253–254; Aubin 2004, 119–151; Ratchnevsky 1993, 161–179.
44 Aubin 1991, 253.
45 Aubin 1991, 254; Aubin 2004, 135.
46 Hamayon 1990, 224.
47 Hamayon 1990, 760, n. 2.
48 *SHM* §61.
49 Umari, 9.
50 al-Maqrizi 1418/1998, 358.
51 Juwayni 1912, I, 162.
52 Hamayon 1990, 397.
53 Lambton 1988, 90.
54 Juwayni 1912, I, 227; *HWC*, 272.
55 Cleaves 1992, 72; Polo 2004, 99. According to the historian Grigor Akanc'i (Blake and Frye 1949, 343), Hülegü ordered Muslims to eat pork.
56 RDB, 293–294.
57 See May 2019, 158–177.
58 See May 2019, 173.
59 Ch'en 1979, xiii; see also Serruys 1957, 137–190.
60 Jackson 2017, 310.
61 Subtelny 2007, 15.
62 Ando 1992, 223, citing Khwandamir, *Nama-yi nami*; Subtelny 2007, 16.
63 al-Naṭanzi 1336sh/1957, 206.
64 Subtelny 2007, 17.
65 McChesney 1983, 35.
66 McChesney 1983, 7.
67 Manghit is the self-appellation of the Mongol and Turkic tribes that played an eminent role in the Golden Horde. On this dynasty, see Kügelgen 2013 (online).
68 Kügelgen 2002, 30, n. 136. On the *yasa* in Central Asia and Mongolia until the present day, see Aigle 2015c, 314–322.

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HWC, See List of Abbreviations.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

JARQU AND JARQUCHIN

Florence Hodous

JARQUCHIN

The institution of *jarquchi* (pl. *jarquchin*) in the Mongol Empire comprised a small but very powerful group of individuals, who shared the distinction of having been appointed as judges by the Mongol conquerors in order to arbitrate disputes and keep order in their far-flung possessions. Like the *keshig* (guard) and postal system, this institution was present throughout the Mongol Empire, even after its dissolution. Its roots were not in the administrative traditions of any of the subject peoples; rather, it has been described as one of the most 'Mongol' institutions in the empire.[1]

The *jarquchin* never assumed primary responsibility for the non-Mongol peoples of the empire, though they sometimes, especially in China, functioned as a kind of appeal court.[2] Rather, they dealt with cases among those who had access to the court – imperial princes, officials, governors of provinces, and subordinate rulers, as well as jumping into negotiations about which aspects of Mongol law should or should not be applied to the various ethnicities under Mongol rule. Rather than being judges who decided according to a rule-book, they were more like negotiators between members of the elite and ethnicities.

In the Mongol fashion, judgment in a *jarquchi* court (called *yarghu* or *jarqu*) was not about following a traditional set of laws (whether written or oral). Rather, the *jarquchi*'s skill lay in, first, gathering the various participants in a legal case and, second, allowing emotions[3] and opinions to be vented until a consensus (or majority opinion) was reached or was near. While a *jarquchi* would in fact deliver a 'judgment' at the end, this judgment was always carefully calculated to maintain such unity as was possible amongst the often warring Mongol factions.[4] Their specialty in negotiation prepared them for later encounters, and compromises, with non-Mongol ethnicities.[5]

ETHNICITY

Despite their attachment to, and sometime support of, 'Mongol' legal practices and punishments, the *jarquchin* were not necessarily Mongols. A number of them came from peoples who had submitted early to Mongol rule, whose culture was perhaps

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not too different, or who had time to mingle with the Mongols and learn their ways. In fact, in Ögödei's time, the majority of recorded *jarquchin* were not Mongols but Uyghurs and Central Asian Muslims.

Jarquchin in Ögödei's time included Shigi-Qutuqu, the foster-son of Chinggis Khan;[6] the Uyghurs Eren Temür and probably also Tang Guzhi and Bül-Qaya;[7] the Central Asian Muslim Sayyid Ajall; and the Han Chinese Shi Tianlin. In addition, Isma'il of Ghuz-Ordo (probably a Khitan or a Turk) was appointed *jarquchi* but declined.

During Möngke's time, there were more Mongol *jarquchin*, though other ethnicities were also represented. The most prominent was Menggeser, a Jalayir Mongol, who was appointed during the reign of Güyük[8] but became Möngke's assistant and right-hand man, playing a major role in the trials and executions following Möngke's rise to power in 1251. Other *jarquchin* included Qadan (not much is known about him),[9] Mahmud Yalavach (a Turkic speaker from Khwarazm),[10] Bujir (a Mongol),[11] Toghto (a Mongol),[12] Boroqan (of the Mangghut, a branch of the Mongols), and Torchi (perhaps the son of Menggeser, thus a Mongol).[13]

After the United Empire broke up, in Yuan China, the majority of *jarquchin* were Mongol, though there were still exceptions. Qaidu (not to be confused with Qaidu Khan, Chinggis Khan's great-grandson), who was the son of a Chinese father and a Mongolian mother,[14] was employed as a *jarquchi* around the year 1310. The Chinese Shi Weiliang 史惟良 was involved in assembling the materials for the legal compilation known as *Da Yuan tongzhi* while employed as a *jarquchi* in the mid-1320s.[15] In addition, Yinashili, a Tangut, was appointed at an unspecified time during the mid-14th century. Thus, Mongol ethnicity as such was not a requirement for becoming a *jarquchi*.

The only place where this diversity does not hold true is in the Ilkhanate. All of those described in the sources as '*yarghuchi*' (the Persian form of *jarghuchi*) were Mongols. On the other hand, occasionally Persians are named as '*amir yarghu*' or head of the *yarghu/jarqu* trials.[16] The great historian Rashid al-Din, a Persian descended from a Jewish family, participated as judge in one of the *yarghu*s, even judging Mongol amirs, though he was not a military man; he is not described by the title of *yarghuchi*.[17] Rashid's son Ghiyath al-Din, having studied Islamic sciences, was involved both in the administration of Islamic law and of Mongol *yarghu*s and was called *amir yarghu*.[18]

APPOINTMENT

The *jarquchin* were an elite class of official, only twenty or so being known from the Ilkhanate, and no more than forty or so being in office at the same time in the Yuan dynasty. Most were concentrated in the capital, Daidu.[19] Here we will examine how, of the thousands of military men and officials in the Mongol Empire, a few came to be appointed as *jarquchin*.

Some were appointed after recommendation by others. Talichi, a Tangut, was appointed during the reign of Qubilai on the recommendation of the branch secretariat.[20] Silbi was appointed around 1270, on the recommendation of another *duanshiguan* (*jarquchi*).[21] Tuqluq, the descendant of an illustrious Qangli family, was recommended for office by a *jarquchi* named Sechegen around 1283.[22] Nonetheless these are only a

minority, and the reason why these individuals in particular were recommended, apart from personal trust or liking by those who recommended them, is not made clear.

A majority of *jarquchin* had been members of the *keshig*, or guard, at some point in their career.[23] It has been suggested that the *keshig* was the key stepping-stone for entry into office for *jarquchin*. For example, Menggeser and Bulghai were both part of Tolui's guard and became *jarquchin* under Möngke. Arghun Aqa, a former *bitigchi* (secretary, a member of the guard) of Chinggis Khan, later carried out the duties of *jarquchi* in the Ilkhanate.[24] But this does not explain why these people were chosen from among the other *keshigten* to be *jarquchin*.

One might think that legal knowledge should have been the deciding factor. However, the originally nomadic Mongols did not distinguish between governmental and judicial responsibilities, and for them, legal knowledge could not be separated from the status required to be able to judge others and enforce one's decisions. This is seen in an anecdote from the biography of Menggeser, which contrasts this famous general, whose family had been closely connected with that of Chinggis[25], with the almost unknown figure of Hewo:

> As soon as [Menggeser] had received the order [that made him head of the *jarghuchi*s], he came out of the tent-palace, and sat on a bear[skin] rug, while his 14 subordinate officials sat around him. Menggeser said: "If the lord above has made me the head of these officials, can you all tell me, in what way should one supervise them?" All of [his listeners] were silent. Again he asked them, and Hewo of the Xia, who was sitting in a place for less senior people, approached and said: "The way of the *jarghuchi* is like cutting up a sheep when slaughtering livestock: to cut [the meat off] the shoulder without harming the ridge [of the scapula?], it requires keeping balance [i.e. impartiality] and that's all."

Here, Hewo came up with an ingenious analogy between an everyday action that was part of the Mongol lifestyle, that is, the slaughtering of a sheep, and the highly complex and abstract notion of fairness in judging. Moreover, the text further says that he "became famous."[26] Nevertheless, exactly the opposite seems to have happened: Hewo was forgotten to history, while the one appointed as *jarquchi* was Menggeser.

STATUS THROUGH CONNECTION WITH CHINGGIS KHAN

The missing factor in the appointment of *jarquchin* may in fact be a close and personal relationship with Chinggis Khan. For example, Guo Baoyu and Bujir, two early *jarquchin*, are both said to have been placed in a cow's belly by the khan in order to help cure them from serious battle wounds. Shared experiences on the battlefield formed unity and loyalty, and Chinggis' care for these warriors may have ensured their high status which later enabled them to be appointed as *jarquchin*. The biography of Bujir records that:

> Once [Bujir and his father Niu'erjie] accompanied him [Chinggis Khan] on campaign. Niuerjie was granted the title of *ba'atur* (hero/champion). [They] took part in the conquest of the *Huihui* [Uyghurs], Russia and other countries. Every

> time he fought on the battlefield, Bujir exerted effort with his body and fought with power. His body was shot with numerous arrows. [When] Taizu [Chinggis Khan] personally examined him, [he] ordered a person to take out his arrows; blood was flowing out and covered his whole body. He fell forward unconscious, and would soon have expired. Taizu ordered [someone] to take a cow, cut open its stomach, place Bujir into the cow's stomach, and soak him in the warm blood. After a while, he regained consciousness.[27]

Looking at the biographies of *jarquchin*, we find that a significant majority had a close, personal relationship with Chinggis Khan or were descendants of people who had such a close relationship with him. Some were members of Chinggis Khan's own family, such as Belgütei, Chinggis' younger brother, and Shigi Qutuqu, his adopted son.[28] During Qubilai's time there were Baiqur, a son of Chinggis' younger brother Qachi'un,[29] and Zhibi Tiemu'er, son of Köten, son of Ögödei.[30] Tübshin may have been a descendant of Kouwen Buqa, the son of Belgütei the brother of Chinggis.[31] Tian Sun (d. 1336),[32] Mailü,[33] and Anchucha[34] of the post-Qubilai period are also described as imperial princes.

Those who were not descendants of Chinggis Khan had a close relationship with him. Isma'il of Ghuz-Ordo had played an important role in the campaign against the Khwarazmian empire and was rewarded by Chinggis.[35] Sayyid Ajall's grandfather had surrendered Bukhara in 1220 at the head of a thousand horsemen, and his father had fought alongside the Mongols.[36] Eren Temür was descended from a Uyghur state minister, and his brother had helped pave the way for the submission of the Uyghurs to Chinggis.[37] Bül-Qaya participated in Chinggis Khan's western campaigns, his biography claiming that he shirked no fatigue.[38] Tang Guzhi entered the *keshig* of Chinggis, who remarked that he could manage great affairs, and was later appointed *jarghuchi* by Tolui's widow Sorqoqtani Beki.[39]

Menggeser and Bulghai were the two most powerful *jarquchin* under Möngke, though Menggeser was first appointed under Güyük. Menggeser's grandfather was someone who, like Mahmud Yalavach, had refused to abandon Temüjin during his difficult times.[40] Bulghai's forbears likewise had first served in the guard of Chinggis Khan.[41]

During the time of Qubilai, Mengsus, who had served under Chinggis, is described as becoming "closer and closer to [Qubilai]" before he was appointed.[42] Shiban, of Uyghur background, was the son of Kelbi Otchi, who had submitted to Chinggis Khan and had participated in the conquest of the Uyghurs; Shiban himself had also served in Qubilai's *keshig*.[43] Darichi, of Tangut origin, was the son of an Assisting Official of the Military Administration and dispatcher of army horses under Chinggis.[44] Silbi, a Mongol, was connected with Chinggis through his grandfather Kegürtü, who had followed the conqueror in the conquest of the Xi Xia.[45]

In the post-Qubilai period, Toghon's great-grandfather Xiaochou had impressed Chinggis Khan with his bow-making skills. Jürchedei Chagur had warned Chinggis of a plot against him. His son Nachin served Qubilai as *jarquchi*, and Nachin's son Bansal and grandson Goroghutai inherited the post.[46] Dorjibal was in fact a seventh-generation descendant of Muqali, who had been one of Chinggis Khan's most trusted generals.[47] Bodasha was the grandson of the already-mentioned Menggeser, and his son inherited his position.[48] Nangjiatai[49] may have been the son of Bayan of the

Baarin,[50] a general descended from Alagh, mentioned in the *Secret History of the Mongols*. Örüg Temür, a Mongol from the Dörbetei clan, was the great-grandson of Guiyu, who had served Chinggis Khan as a *keshig* official.[51]

Only a few *jarquchin* did not have a direct connection with Chinggis but seem to have represented, or been responsible for, various tribes. Boroqan was appointed around 1255, at sixteen years of age, to be *jarquchi* of the Mangghut. Liu Haoli, a Chinese from Kaifeng, who was good in languages, became *jarquchi* of five [Kirgiz] tribes around Yilanzhou [today around Tuva] in approximately 1270.[52] Gürgi was appointed *jarghuchi* after serving in the campaign against the Song and remained involved with the Asud tribe his whole life.

A handful of *jarquchin* with no clear link to Chinggis Khan were appointed late in the Yuan dynasty. For example, Fu Shou[53] was a Tangut who was promoted through the ranks at the palace, starting with the palace guard. In 1351, he was praised for dealing promptly with a rebellion, which might have turned dangerous for the Emperor; the next year he was promoted to *yeke jarquchi*. His appointment was due to Emperor Shundi's approval of Fu Shou's prompt response to the rebellion. This recalls earlier *jarquchin* who were given this appointment as a reward for saving Chinggis Khan's life.

In the Ilkhanate, a number of *jarquchin* were also closely connected with Chinggis Khan. For example, there is the family of Sorqan Echige, an *ötegü bo'ol* (a meritorious servitor[54]) of Chinggis Khan. Sorqan had a son named Kököchu, who in turn had three sons, one of whom was Noqai Yarghuchi, also known as Bugha Ba'urchi or Buqa Yarghuchi.[55] Noqai's son Alghu was a *jarquchi*,[56] and Alghu's son is described as one of the leaders of a *yarghu*.[57] Moreover, a certain Todai Yarghuchi was a relative of theirs.[58] That makes four (or three, if we only take those explicitly described as such) *jarquchin* in one family closely and personally connected with Chinggis Khan. Moreover, the family married into the royal dynasty, as Bulughan Khatun, Abaqa Khan's wife, was a cousin of Noqai Yarghuchi.[59]

Another *jarquchi* connected with Chinggis Khan was Nuregei Yarghuchi. He is described as an "officer and courtier" in the time of Abaqa Khan and Gaykhatu Khan. Rashid al-Din makes clear that he was a descendant of Quyildar Sechen, who had risked his life for Chinggis Khan and was highly respected by him.[60] Together with Tegene and the liege men of Qonqurtai, Nuregei Yarghuchi sat in trial on the Ilkhan Ahmad Tegüder and had him put to death.[61]

The brothers Doladay Yarghuchi and Qara Bulaghan (Yarghuchi)[62] were sons of Chaghadai Qorchi, who came to the future Ilkhanate with Chormaqan. He was a senior commander in the campaign against the Isma'ilis and was ultimately assassinated by them,[63] had status as one of the earliest to implement Mongol rule in this area, and was moreover a relative of Borghochin [Bo'orchi] Noyan, one of Chinggis Khan's closest companions.[64]

Thus, in the Ilkhanate and for most of the Yuan dynasty, the majority of *jarquchin* had a high status already before they were appointed, and this high status was derived precisely from their connection with Chinggis Khan. As a position created by Chinggis himself, it befitted only the most prestigious individuals. Chinggis' successors, in large part, continued the tradition by appointing the descendants of those close to him or who had saved him from harm.

DUTIES AND LEGACY

The responsibilities of *jarquchin* were not initially limited to legal matters. Early *jarquchin* had far wider responsibilities and can be compared to ministers (and are also sometimes named as such in the sources).[65] They fought military campaigns, collected taxes, and governed. Likewise, there was no single government office or organization to which *jarquchin* belonged; rather they served in a wide variety of government offices.

Nevertheless, they became progressively more specialized over time, as the distinction between legal and other administrative matters took hold. In the Yuan dynasty, they were institutionalized as part of an office known as *dazong zhengfu*, which though borrowing its name from a traditionally Chinese office nevertheless represented mostly Mongol concerns in the Yuan dynasty. Most but not all the *jarquchin* of the Yuan dynasty were based in this office.

This office's main language until 1295 was Mongolian,[66] which gives an indication of its character and role within the Yuan administration. In fact, it is known that it promoted 'Mongol' values and punishments and that its *jarquchin* were involved in shaping the punishments system of Yuan China.[67] Due to the traditions of Mongol governance, they were frequently in contact with officials from other, more traditionally Chinese offices and were required to negotiate with them on policy or on the judgment of individual cases.

Where the *jarquchin* had a particular influence was the adoption of military exile into the traditional Chinese five-punishments system. Military exile was known to previous Chinese dynasties, though rarely used, but for the Mongols it was typical, because as a nomadic people for whom fixed prisons were not practical, it permitted an intermediate punishment between the death penalty and beating. The most ardent promoters of this punishment during the Yuan were the *jarquchin*, who at one point became the administrators for the system, keeping records and organizing travel to the place of service.[68] Military exile came to be one level under the death penalty and was also used regularly in case of commutation of the death penalty. Moreover, this particular punishment continued, with some modifications, as part of the five-punishments system under the Ming and Qing dynasties.[69]

CONCLUSION

Jarquchin remained powerful officials, at the apex of the legal system in the Ilkhanate as in Yuan China, where they co-existed uneasily with the 'local' legal systems. It would seem that the particular prestige of this office, which meant that it was accorded only to the most highly valued and trusted associates of the khans themselves, derived from the fact that '*jarquchi*' was a title first granted by Chinggis Khan himself. Unlike other titles invented after the establishment of the individual khanates or adopted from other peoples and doled out to satisfy newly joined recruits, the title of *jarquchi* continued to signify an association with the conqueror himself.

NOTES

1 Jagchid 1980, 354; Zhao 1995, 20.
2 Liu 1996, 7.

3 See, for example, the dramatic discussions preceding this judgment: RDRM, II, 1147–8; RDT, 559.
4 For more on the *jarqu*, see Hodous 2013.
5 While the present article focuses on Yuan China and the Ilkhanate, for which sources are more plentiful, it is known that a *jarquchi* called Vazir, of Chinese origin, served Chaghadai (RDT, 379–380; Buell 1977, 148). For the Golden Horde, see Favereau 2016, 60–63.
6 Ratchnevsky 1993, 75–77.
7 For the last two, it is not clear exactly when they were appointed, but it is likely it was during Ögödei's time.
8 *YS* 124: 3054.
9 *YS* 3: 47.
10 Allsen 1993a, 122.
11 Allsen 1993a, 131–132.
12 Jagchid 1980, 269.
13 *YS* 157: 3707.
14 Xiao 1999, 759.
15 Huang 1967, *juan* 26: 集贤大学士荣禄大夫史公神道碑; Liu 1996, 13.
16 Not all who are described as presiding over '*yarghu*' trials are specifically given the title '*yarghuchi*' – the Persian equivalent of *jarauchi* – in the sources.
17 Qazvini 1999, II, 1409; Ward 1983, 526.
18 Al-Safadi 1959, IV, 329; Umari, 158; Ibn Bazzaz 1987, 88–89; Melville 1999, 32.
19 *YS* 24: 551.
20 (Presumably that of Henan / Jiangbei, where Talichi's family was based) *YS* 135: 3275; Liu 1998, 59; Jagchid 1980, 321, n. 37.
21 This was the *duanshiguan* attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs. *YS* 133: 3234.
22 *YS* 134: 3251–3252.
23 Exceptions include Liu Haoli, originally from Kaifeng, who knew Chinese and Mongolian and seems to have followed a civilian rather than military career before being appointed as *jarquchi*. Darmashiri entered office as a translator and followed a career of mainly junior, clerical roles until he became Minister of the Ministry of Punishments and then was appointed to the Constabulary Offices. He became *jarquchi* in 1366. Harghasun was appointed *jarquchi* in 1285. His identity and importance, however, were not primarily derived from his membership in the *keshig*; rather, his membership in the *keshig* was due to his family history. His great-grandfather Qixili had served Ong Khan, Chinggis' patron and ally, and had warned Chinggis of Ong Khan's plot against him.
24 Melville 2006, 138, n. 12; *Tarikhi Shahi* 1976, 156.
25 *YS* 124: 3054; *SHM* §275; Juwayni 1912, I, 58; *HWC*, 587; Yao Sui 1975, 13.
26 *YS* 124: 3055.
27 *YS* 121: 3021. For the story regarding Guo Baoyu, see *YS* 149: 3521.
28 *SHM* § 203.
29 *YS* 7: 132. Unfortunately, Baiqur has no Yuanshi biography.
30 *YS* 7: 140; 107: 2717. Zhibi Tiemu'er also has no YS biography.
31 *YS* 119: 2943.
32 *YS* 39: 833–834.
33 *YS* 26: 578, 587.
34 *Yuan Dian Zhang* 1976, 49, 处断盗贼新例.
35 *YS* 120: 2970. Though he was offered the position of *jarquchi*, he did not actually take it up.
36 Buell 1993, 467–468. Sayyid Ajall was appointed *duanshiguan* (*jarquchi*) of Yanjing district (today Beijing).

37 *YS* 124: 3049–3050.
38 *YS* 125: 3070–3071.
39 *YS* 134: 3253.
40 *YS* 124: 3054.
41 *YS* 3: 1447; Allsen 1993b, 397.
42 *YS* 124: 3059.
43 *YS* 134: 3246–3247.
44 *YS* 135: 3275.
45 *YS* 133: 3234.
46 *YS* 123: 3022, Jagchid 1980, 319–320, n. 19; see also *SHM* §120, 129, 141, 202.
47 *YS* 139: 3357.
48 *YS* 30: 677; 32: 718; 124: 3058.
49 *YS* 26: 590; 131: 3184–3186.
50 *YS* 127: 3116. Cleaves 1956, 199, 272.
51 *YS* 144: 3434.
52 *YS* 167: 3924–3925.
53 *YS* 144: 3441–3442.
54 Atwood 2013, 240–243.
55 RDT, 97, n. 2.
56 Ahri 1954, 51. Later when Abu Sa'id threw off the influences of others and became powerful, there is a similar list of high appointees, but a *jarquchi* is not mentioned (p. 56).
57 He conducted the *yarghu* of Tashtemur together with Shaikh-Hasan and Ghiyath al-Din.
58 RDT, 555.
59 RDT, 97.
60 *SHM* § 171, 175, 185; RDT, 102, 104.
61 RDT, 559.
62 RDT, 42, 555, 558; Ahri 1954, 40.
63 Kirakos Gandzakets'i 1986, ch. 25 Concerning the destruction of the city of Lorhe; ch. 29 Concerning the sending of prince Awag to the Khan in the East; ch. 32 A brief description of the T'at'ars' appearance.
64 RDT, 91. See also Gandzakets'i Kirakos ch. 61 Concerning the destruction of the city of Martyropolis and 32 A brief description of the T'at'ars' appearance.
65 See, for example, the assertion in the Spirit-Way-Inscription of Shi Tianlin that "[the position of *duanshiguan*] was like that of a minister." Xiao 1999, 758. Also, Arghun Aqa 阿裡侃 is described as a *duanshiguan* (*jarquchi*) in the *Yuanshi* but as a *sahib-divan* in Persian sources.
66 *YS* 18: 396; *Yuan Dian Zhang* 1976, 14: 227–228: 蒙古刑名立漢兒文案; Liu 1996, 11.
67 Zhao 1995, 20–22 refers to it as Mongolian *jarquchi*s in Chinese garb; Liu 1996, 6–9.
68 Zhao 1995, 21–22.
69 Bodde and Morris 1967, 88.

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HWC, See List of Abbreviations.
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CHAPTER TWENTY

DAUGHTERS, CONSORT FAMILIES AND THE MILITARY

Anne F. Broadbridge

The Chinggisid confederation was a large extended family formed by Chinggis Khan and his female kin, largely through marriage alliances between Chinggisid women and vassal rulers or military commanders. Most of the key women in the formative days of the confederation were Chinggis Khan's daughters from his senior wife, Börte, and from additional wives, but other women who played a role included his mother, Hö'elün, and his secondary wife, Ibaqa. The Chinggisid confederation occupied an intermediate military and administrative level between the two best-known of Chinggis Khan's military structures: the imperial guard and the atomized army. The confederation overlapped the army but not completely; furthermore, although it was dominated by sons-in-law, it also contained men who were not married to Chinggisids and earned their privileges without the benefits of an in-law connection. The confederation was thus a unique phenomenon in the Mongol Empire.

Chinggis Khan's atomized army arose in response to existing nomadic military customs, in which rulers from particular lineages led their subjects in raids or war. When multiple rulers and their followers cooperated, they could form a larger confederation, often supported by marriage ties, which might then attract additional rulers and their followers. But after Chinggis Khan conquered his nomadic neighbors in Mongolia between 1201 and 1206, he reorganized them into an army of 95 units of a thousand, in which the subjects belonging to a given lineage were atomized, that is, scattered among his own troops, rather than staying together. In this way, any remaining members of ruling lineages and their nomadic subjects were prevented from forming resistance to Mongol rule. Once he had atomized his army, Chinggis Khan then adopted iron discipline to keep everyone in place. The Chinggisid confederation provided an important exception to these rules.

Meanwhile and in contrast to the army, Chinggis Khan also created an imperial guard, which had reached 10,000 by 1206. Members were designated either as night or day guards and also worked as shepherds and other animal handlers, stewards and cooks, and household staff in the imperial camps of Chinggis Khan's wives. Some guardsmen were chosen to lead special military assignments, such as the imperial

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divisions of 1,000 in the army.[1] Unlike the army, the guard had little or no overlap with the Chinggisid confederation.

The most important sons-in-law (*güregen*) in the Chinggisid confederation were vassal rulers who married into the Chinggisid family. Others included military commanders who already worked for Chinggis Khan, but these were sometimes lower in status than the vassals. In general, joining the Chinggisid confederation could confer significant benefits on all parties. When a ruler married (or married his son) into the imperial family, he and his subjects were peacefully incorporated into the expanding Mongol polity, rather than suffering violent conquest. A vassal son-in-law thus kept his position as ruler (or heir), albeit now with a Chinggisid wife in position as a general manager of personnel, property and resources; a political advisor and a direct representative of the imperial family.

Militarily, sons-in-law gained particular privileges. The most prominent vassal sons-in-law commanded military units ranging between 2,000 and 5,000 men, which were larger than the army norm of 1,000.[2] Furthermore, the soldiers of sons-in-law were often drawn from the vassals' subjects, rather than being an atomized mixture of individuals, as in the standard army units. The command of these homogenous, oversized units was then inherited by their sons – usually those from the Chinggisid wife – over generations. It should be noted that some vassal sons-in-law commanded outsized units within the structure of the army, while others commanded auxiliary units that functioned outside the atomized forces. The differences seem to derive from the timing of a vassal's entry into the Chinggisid confederation: those who joined during the army reorganization (roughly 1204–09) were often incorporated into the regular ranks despite the size of the units, while sons-in-law who joined after the reorganization tended to do so as auxiliaries. Also within the army were units of the lesser sons-in-law, who were usually military commanders married to junior princesses (i.e., princesses from a mother other than Börte) and whose units were often standard in size and atomized like regular units. The army also housed the few units controlled by special servants of Chinggis Khan, whose privileges resembled those of the sons-in-law but who were not themselves married to Chinggisids (see below).

All members of the Chinggisid confederation were required to participate personally in the campaigns of conquest, which gave them opportunities to work directly for or with Chinggis Khan and acquire wealth and renown. Since the Mongol armies often used a dual command system, with two or more officers working together to lead a particular maneuver or campaign, the sons-in-law formed a special pool of high-level personnel from which Chinggis Khan could draw, in addition to his regular commanders and guardsmen. Later, sons-in-law and princesses sent their children on other campaigns like the invasions of Central Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe (1236–42) or the Iran campaign of the 1250s.

Last, but not least, sons-in-law gained important political privileges along with the military ones. Princesses and their husbands could attend quriltais to determine matters of importance within the Empire and the khanates, including succession. Consorts and princesses also gained the right to wed their offspring at the highest levels, meaning into other branches of the wife's Chinggisid family through the exchange marriage model, which encouraged wives to marry some children "back" to the offspring of their brothers. This policy helped ensure the continuation of

favored lineages in consort families for generations. The benefits of strategic marriages for the princess wives could include status, wealth, the control of potentially significant resources and even the occasional, irregular opportunity for rule as regents in their own territories. Although the children of Chinggisid princesses were never candidates to govern the Empire, they could be favored to rule the vassal territories by virtue of their mother's position. In one striking example on the Korean peninsula, a king of Koryo asked the Chinggisids in China (the Yuan dynasty) for three different princess brides to bear sons to inherit after him, even though some of his other, non-Chinggisid women had already borne sons.[3]

THE SPECIAL UNITS, THEIR COMMANDERS AND THE WIVES: SENIOR PRINCESSES

The Chinggisid confederation began with Temüjin's only sister, Temülün, and then became dominated by Börte's five daughters, or the senior princesses: Qojin, Chechiyegen, Alaqa, Temülün and Al Altan. Temülün inaugurated the confederation by wedding an important follower of her brother, Butu of the Ikires, in perhaps the 1180s. The Ikires military unit was most likely the earliest unit controlled by a consort and later became part of the army. But Temülün herself soon vanished from historical view for unknown reasons, possibly illness or complications from pregnancy. Sometime later Butu married the eldest senior princess, Qojin, who was Börte's first child. As befitted a son-in-law, Butu commanded a unit composed of Ikires subjects rather than atomized troops, which was numbered at 2,000, i.e., twice the size of a standard army unit. Thereafter the offspring of Butu and Qojin, and perhaps Butu's children with other women, intermarried with the Chinggisids in typical exchange fashion. Butu himself played important roles in Chinggis Khan's conquests. He is likely to have participated in the first campaign against the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia (1209–10) and the invasion of northern China (1211–15). He is known to have been present for the campaign in northern China led by the general Muqali (1217–23). Butu also participated in the final attack on Xi Xia in 1226–27. Qojin herself held lands in northern China, while descendants from her and Butu went on to play important roles in the Yuan military with the help of the inherited Ikires troops.[4]

Meanwhile Börte's second daughter, Princess Chechiyegen, joined the Oirat ruling family in the forested region west of Lake Baikal. The Oirats' ruler, Qutuqa Beki, had previously been allied with several of Chinggis Khan's enemies and now needed a way to build a positive relationship with Chinggis Khan. His successful strategy was to help the Mongols chase Merkit enemies through Oirat territory. He also submitted politically to Chinggis Khan, which earned him the privilege of making his children into Chinggisid consorts in 1207–08 through a constellation of weddings: Chechiyegen married one of Qutuqa Beki's sons, her niece (Jochi's daughter) married the other and Prince Tolui married Qutuqa Beki's daughter. The Oirat military unit was numbered at 4,000 and was composed of Qutuqa Beki's subjects, not atomized troops. Unlike the unit led by Butu of the Ikires, however, it functioned as an auxiliary to the main army, rather than a regular unit within it. Oirat military support to the Chinggisids remained steady: Qutuqa Beki helped the Mongols in additional campaigns in his region, while Chechiyegen and her husband later sent Oirat troops to Central Asia and Russia (1236–42) and Iran (1250s).[5] The Oirat consorts under

Chechiyegen appear to have supported the coup that elevated the Toluid usurper Möngke (r. 1251–59) in 1251. Some Oirat troops then accompanied Möngke's brother Hülegü to Iran in 1253, under the leadership of one of Chechiyegen's sons. Additional Oirat troops sided with Möngke's brother Ariq Böke (Chechiyegen's son-in-law) during the civil war of 1260–64.[6]

Most visibly of all the princesses, Chechiyegen employed the exchange marriage strategy of wedding her children back into her own family, since six of her seven children formed unions with the offspring of her brothers.[7] Thus Chechiyegen's four daughters married into the Toluid, Chaghadaid and Jochid houses as senior wives: Elchiqmish married the Toluid Ariq Böke while her sister, Güyük (not to be confused with the Great Khan), married his brother, Hülegü. Another sister, Köchü (?), wedded the Jochid prince Toqoqan and bore two sons who later ruled in Jochid territory: Möngke-Temür (r. 1267–80) and Töde-Mongke (r. 1280–87). The fourth sister, Orqina, became the wife of Qara-Hülegü, Chaghadai's grandson and heir, then ruled the Chaghadaid territory herself as an independent regent for their son for at least a decade in the 1250s-60s. Furthermore, two of Chechiyegen's three sons married Chinggisid princesses. Further vigorous policies of intermarriage continued for generations after this creation of strong links between the Oirat consorts and branches of the Chinggisid houses.

Another strategic link between the Chinggisids and their vassals was established by the marriage of Börte's third daughter, Princess Alaqa, into the Önggüt ruling family, which held a border territory for the Jin Emperors in northern China. Alaqa initially married into this house, then was widowed several times and remarried subsequent Önggüt rulers through the levirate. The exact list of her husbands is not clear, but it may include any or all of the following: the Önggüt ruler, Alaqush; his elder son, Buyan-Siban, and younger son, Boyoqa; and Alaqush's nephew, Jingüe. The weddings may have taken place in 1207, 1211, 1212 or 1225.[8] Regardless of the marital details, the Önggüt military unit enjoyed in-law privileges of size and homogeneity: it contained between 4,000 and 5,000 men, who were drawn from the Önggüt's own subjects. These functioned in the Mongol army as a regular unit, not an auxiliary.

The Önggüt were essential to Chinggis Khan's invasion of the Jin Empire (1211–15). When the Mongol armies arrived at the border region in June 1211 with Alaqa already wed (or at least promised), the Önggüt not only let them through but provided additional men to fight on the Mongol side. Later Alaqa herself helped her father's general, Muqali, in a second campaign against the Jin (1217–23). She personally hosted Muqali in her territory in 1221, and Önggüt troops formed an important consort unit within Muqali's armies in 1217 and 1222. Thereafter Önggüt units remained prominent in the Yuan forces.[9] In addition to creating a useful strategic and military connection for her parents, Alaqa became a powerful person in her own right: she eventually ruled independently as a regent for her son, controlled military troops, decided criminal cases, set policy and patronized religion extensively.[10]

Easily the most prominent and powerful of all the consort houses was that of the Qonggirat, which is no surprise given that Chinggis Khan's senior wife Börte hailed from them. Her brother, Alchi, was made commander over the Qonggirat consort unit, an oversized regular unit in the army that contained between 3,000 and 5,000 men and was, as usual, not atomized. Alchi's son Chigü, whom some scholars

think was adopted from another line of Qonggirats, commanded another special Qonggirat unit;[11] this latter may have functioned more as an auxiliary.[12] Chigü was also married to Princess Temülün, Börte's fourth daughter, while Börte's sons, princes Jochi and Chaghadai, similarly married their mother's relatives. Alchi and Chigü participated actively in both Chinggis Khan's and Muqali's campaigns against the Jin.[13] This family went on to supply sons-in-law and military commanders for generations across the empire and in the successor khanates.

In addition to the favored lineage of Börte herself, other Qonggirat military commanders became consorts by marrying junior Chinggisid princesses, which established junior Qonggirat lineages. The first among these were the commanders Toquchar and Qadai, whose wives were Chinggisids of unknown name. Both men played roles during the Jin campaign: Toquchar held Mongolia in the armies' absence, while Qadai captured key positions in China that allowed the main forces to advance. Subsequently Toquchar fought in the Western Campaign against the Khwarazmshah Empire (1218–23). Later, Qonggirat military commanders rose in the successor khanates to establish additional consort lines by marrying Chinggisid princesses in return for military service in those regions.

Börte's fifth daughter was her youngest child, Princess Al Altan, who married the Turkic Barchuq, the *idiqut* (or ruler) of the prosperous and sophisticated Uyghurs. In 1209, Barchuq responded favorably to ambassadors from Chinggis Khan and also helped the Mongols track some of their Merkit enemies, who had tried to enter his realm. These services, plus the payment of a large gift, allowed him to enter the ranks of Chinggis Khan's sons-in-law through marriage to Al Altan in 1211. Barchuq was the first of several Turkic sons-in-law hailing from the dominions of the Qara-Khitai Empire, the others being the Qarluqs Arslan Khan and Ozar (see the subsequent text). All of their territories lay to the west or southwest of Mongol lands, and all three contributed to Chinggis Khan's Western Campaign.

It should be noted that details of Al Altan and Barchuq's union have been excised or obscured in some historical sources, notably the Persian-language ones, and the princess is alleged to have either married into her grandmother Hö'elün's family (the Olqunu'uts) or been promised to the Uyghurs as late as the 1230s (when she was in her 30s, an advanced age for a first marriage) but then died before any wedding could take place. The reason for this confusion seems to have been political trouble in the 1240s, which influenced some of the histories composed thereafter.[14] The trouble began in 1241 with the death of Al Altan's brother, Ögödei Qa'an (r. 1229–41). Although the cause of death was most likely heart failure or complications from excessive alcohol consumption, Al Altan was accused of murdering him with poison. Immediately after the coronation of Ögödei's son Güyük (r. 1246–48), Al Altan was executed secretly for her "crime," and the execution was covered up. At about the same time in a further purge, the Uyghur ruler (Kesmes) was killed mysteriously and replaced with a relative (Salindi), whom the Ögödeids selected. But thereafter in 1251, when the Ögödeid house was itself overthrown by a coalition between the Jochids and Toluids, Salindi was purged by the victors, and another man from the Uyghur royal house was installed as vassal ruler. In addition to the political troubles these several executions reveal, further problems seem to have stemmed from the question of resources. It appears that Ögödei and Güyük may have increasingly and improperly encroached upon the territories, inhabitants and wealth of Uyghuristan.[15]

This could help explain the complex politics of the 1240s and the obfuscation in the histories, since the lands belonging to a vassal ruler and his imperial princess wife should not have been subject to unusual impositions.[16]

Regardless of the later troubles suffered by Princess Al Altan or the Uyghur dynasty itself, the initial military unit commanded by Barchuq resembled those of other consorts: it was significant in size (or even quite large, at 18,000 men), it was composed of Barchuq's subjects and it functioned as an auxiliary to the main army. Barchuq's influence on Chinggis Khan's military decisions may have begun as early as 1209 during his initial submission, when Chinggis Khan was planning his first campaign against the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia. The Uyghurs had important cultural, commercial and diplomatic ties with the Tanguts, thus Barchuq's decision to ally himself with the Mongols instead of with Xi Xia may have been a factor in Chinggis Khan's decision to attack. Later Barchuq participated in a punitive campaign in 1218 against the Naiman ruler Güchülüg, who had taken over Qara Khitai territory. Thereafter Barchuq joined the Western Campaign (1218–23), although it is unknown whether Princess Al Altan also went; Barchuq and his troops fought at Otrar (1219–20), Talaqan and Wakhsh (1220–21), and Nishapur (1221–2). By 1224 or 1225, he was high enough in Chinggis Khan's favor to be able to ask for and receive the return of some of the Uyghurs working for the Mongol Empire. Thereafter Barchuq and his forces participated in the Mongols' second campaign against Xi Xia (1226–27).[17] A similar Uyghur presence during the 1236–42 campaign to establish Jochid territory may be deduced from the fact that all the princesses and sons-in-law were ordered to send their sons (presumably leading troops) on it, while Uyghur troops are indeed attested as taking part in the Iran campaign of the 1250s.[18]

THE SPECIAL UNITS, THEIR COMMANDERS AND THE WIVES: JUNIOR PRINCESSES

Although the senior princesses formed the most important links in the Chinggisid confederation, junior princesses also did their part. These were Chinggis Khan's daughters from wives other than Börte or from concubines. Unfortunately, the historical sources present incomplete information about these women, to the extent that we do not know the number of the junior princesses, the identities of their mothers or, often, the princesses' own names.

The most prominent of the known junior princesses was a woman named Töre, whose mother is unidentified but who herself married Arslan Khan, the Muslim ruler of the Qarluq Turks at Qayaliq and a vassal to the Qara-Khitai. Töre's match can be seen as similar to, but lesser in status than, those of her senior half-sisters and particularly resembled the one between Princess Al Altan and the Uyghur Barchuq, Arslan Khan's neighbor. Like Barchuq, Arslan Khan submitted to Chinggis Khan and met with him in person in 1211. Also like Barchuq, Arslan Khan's troops formed an auxiliary to the main Mongol forces, which were presumably composed of his own men and had greater numbers (6,000) than a standard army unit. Arslan Khan may have participated in the punitive campaign against Güchülüg in 1218; he certainly attended the Western campaign and fought at Otrar, Talaqan and Wakhsh, along with Barchuq.

Similarly, a daughter of Jochi married Arslan Khan's Qarluq neighbor, Ozar of Almaliq. After Ozar was captured and killed by Güchülüg, his princess widow remarried his son, Signak Tegin, through the levirate.[19] Since Ozar had been a son-in-law, Chinggis Khan may have been able to use this murder as part of his *casus belli* for sending the expedition against Güchülüg, in which Signak Tekin may have fought. Signak Tekin definitely participated in the Western campaign, albeit with unnumbered forces.[20]

Other junior princesses married military commanders within the Chinggisid armies, not vassals. These were lower-status matches since the husbands in question were not rulers in their own right. The two previously mentioned matches between unnamed Chinggisids and lesser Qonggirat military commanders, Toquchar and Qadai, provide examples of these unions. Others include a match between one of Chinggis Khan's commanders of a thousand named Ashiq and a junior princess whose name has been lost, and one between a Baya'ut commander, Buqa, and a similarly unidentified junior princess. Another son-in-law and military commander in the regular armies was "Fiku," about whom little is known and whose Chinggisid wife is almost completely invisible in the sources. Furthermore, in these cases the commanders in question did not necessarily enjoy homogenized troops, even though they themselves were consorts; rather, the troops for these lesser sons-in-law may simply have been regular atomized ones. In later years after the establishment of the initial Chinggisid-consort relationships, junior princesses could also marry consort men, like two junior Chinggisids – one daughter of Chinggis Khan and one from Tolui and a lesser wife – who married Princess Chechiyegen's sons.

OTHER WOMEN

In addition to Temülün, Börte and the senior and junior princesses, two other women contributed to the initial formation of the Chinggisid confederation through their marital or family ties. These were Chinggis Khan's mother, Hö'elün, and one of his wives, the Kereit princess Ibaqa. The military unit to which Hö'elün connected was composed of the Olqunu'uts from whom she herself came, after Chinggis Khan gave her 3,000 of them to be her subjects. The military commanders in question were Hö'elün's father, Olar, followed by her brother, Taichu, both of whom married a junior daughter of Chinggis Khan in succession (through the levirate in Taichu's case). It seems likely that both commanded the Olqunu'ut fighting men that Hö'elün received, rather than atomized troops, but the sources are not entirely clear on this point, nor on the size of the Olqunu'ut military unit: the numbers range from 1,000 to 3,000. The unit seems to have been a part of the main army, not an auxiliary. In a further marital exchange with her own family, Hö'elün wedded her youngest son, Temüge, to a relative named Sandaqchin. Nevertheless, Temüge does not appear to have commanded Olqunu'ut soldiers himself. In addition, and unlike some of the other consort family units, this family did not play an especially prominent role in the conquests.[21]

The last woman to support the Chinggisid confederation at its establishment was Chinggis Khan's Kereit wife, Ibaqa, through a second marriage into the commanding family of the Uru'ut. Her story is anomalous. Although Chinggis Khan conquered most of the Kereit subjects belonging to Ong Khan and atomized them across the

Mongol forces in 1203, Ibaqa's father and Ong Khan's relative, Jaqa Gambu, instead joined Chinggis Khan as an ally with his possessions and forces intact and negotiated sensible marriages for his daughters: Ibaqa married Chinggis Khan, while her sisters, Begtütmish and Sorqoqtani, married princes Jochi and Tolui, respectively. This gave Jaqa Gambu in-law status and the right to keep his subjects. But after 1204 Jaqa Gambu seems to have turned against Chinggis Khan and was ultimately killed by the Uru'ut commander and Chinggis Khan's follower, Jürchedei. Thereafter Chinggis Khan separated from Ibaqa and remarried her to the same Jürchedei, whether in order to reward him for killing her father (surprising to modern sensibilities) or as the result of a prophetic dream. The lack of clarity stems from apparent attempts by the historical sources to obscure the cause of this unusual separation and remarriage. But in any case, Ibaqa is alleged to have retained her status as Chinggis Khan's wife even while remarried – another anomaly – and she continued to visit court regularly and meet with her sister Sorqoqtani.[22]

The unit that Jürchedei and his descendants controlled was part of the main army but retained the typical privileges for consorts: the men in it were Uru'ut, not atomized soldiers, and their number was set at 4,000, not 1,000. The Uru'ut unit participated in the campaign against the Jin Empire (1211–15) and was one of the consort units that formed the backbone of Muqali's army in 1217. Ibaqa herself ultimately relocated to northern China, and her descendants, and the Uru'ut forces, were prominent in the Yuan armies.[23]

A recapitulation of the military distribution of consort officers in the Chinggisid confederation appears thus: Many were commanders of a thousand in the army, including Butu of the Ikires; Alaqush of the Önggüt; Chigü, Alchi and Qadai of the Qonggirat; Olar and then Taichu of the Olqunu'ut; Jürchedei of the Uru'ut; and Buqa of the Baya'ut, along with a few others whose affiliations are not known (Ashiq, Fiku). Other than Ashiq, Qadai and Buqa, who married junior Chinggisids and led standard-sized units, these men commanded units that were larger than the typical thousand. Furthermore, despite the significant overlap between the confederation and the atomized units of the army, some members of the confederation functioned outside the army command as auxiliary fighting units. These were Qutuqa Beki of the Oirat, Barchuq of the Uyghurs, both Qarluqs – Altan Khan and Ozar – and Toquchar of the Qonggirat.

NON-CONSORT SPECIAL UNITS

In addition to the sons-in-law and their princess wives who formed the Chinggisid confederation, certain other units in the army were larger than the norm and contained homogenized soldiers – that is, they resembled the consort units in structure and makeup – but were not led by sons-in-law. In these cases, the leaders were most often individuals who had been hereditary servants to Chinggis Khan or his relatives, or had performed special services for him, and earned these privileges as a reward.

First among them was Muqali, known as one of Chinggis Khan's "four steeds."[24] He was not only commander-in-chief of the left wing but also became responsible for the entire campaign of 1217–23 against the Jin. Muqali was allowed to lead 3,000 Jalayirs, who served in China with him. Similarly, one or both of the Ba'arin

commanders, Qorchi or Naya'a, were permitted to lead 3,000 Ba'arin. Another, smaller, homogenous unit was the Negüs, under Narin To'oril, whose father's death for Temüjin at the Battle of Dalan-baljut in 1187 earned his son this command. Similarly, the Baya'ut steward, Önggür, was allowed to lead up to 1,000 homogenous soldiers. The Mangghut also stayed together under Quyildar Sechen, who had played a crucial role at the battle of Qalqajit Sands in 1202, died of his wounds and bequeathed his privileges to his heirs. Others leading their own people were Jebe of the Besüt and Sübedei of the Uriangqat, both important generals for Chinggis Khan and considered among his "four hounds,"[25] while Tolun the Qongqotan, son of Hö'elün's third husband, Mönglik (himself a commander), was allowed to control people he and his father had collected.[26]

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Chinggisid confederation was a unique phenomenon in the Mongol Empire. It represented an anomalous military coalition that functioned between Chinggis Khan's imperial guard and his army and overlapped significantly with the latter. The confederation evoked nomadic formations of the pre-Chinggisid days because the majority of its members were connected to the imperial house through marriage. The confederation can also be noted for its irregularities: the size of units, types of authority and even role in the army (regular troops or auxiliaries) all varied according to the specific in-law relationship, the rank of the princess wife (senior or junior) and that of her husband (ruler or mere commander), and the time of his entry into the Chinggisid enterprise. Furthermore, the confederation also included special units whose leaders were not sons-in-law but who enjoyed special personal relationships to Chinggis Khan himself and whose troops resembled the consort ones in makeup and size. All of these units and their leaders provided Chinggis Khan with a pool of officers and men that functioned outside the other units of the army and the guard and therefore could contribute to the system of dual leadership that the Mongols favored. Furthermore, the confederation provided Chinggisid women with opportunities to enjoy wealth and influence and perhaps rule as regents in important regions, even as they supported the ongoing Chinggisid imperial project.

NOTES

1 Broadbridge 2018, 103–106.
2 May 2007, 27. Most units can be understood to have reached approximately 60% of this capacity.
3 Zhao 2004, 4–6 & 22–23.
4 Broadbridge 2018, 153.
5 Broadbridge 2018, 135–136 & 142.
6 Broadbridge 2018, 247.
7 Broadbridge 2018, 241.
8 Broadbridge 2018, 140–141.
9 Broadbridge 2018, 152–155.
10 Broadbridge 2018, 149–150.
11 Atwood 2014–15, *passim*.
12 Broadbridge 2018, 117–119.

13 Broadbridge 2018, 150–152.
14 Broadbridge, Forthcoming, entire *passim*.
15 Allsen 1983, 249–253.
16 Broadbridge 2018, 187–191.
17 Broadbridge 2018, 156–160 & 162.
18 *SHM* §270; Allsen 1997, 8.
19 Broadbridge 2018, 145 & 155–156.
20 Broadbridge 2018, 157.
21 Broadbridge 2018, 112–114 & 121–122.
22 Broadbridge 2018, 77–83.
23 Broadbridge 2018, 153–154.
24 *SHM* §163, §177, §209, II, n. 591–592, 792–793. These were Muqali, Bo'orchu, Boroqul and Chila'un.
25 These were Qubilai, Jelme, Jebe and Sübedei, not to be confused with the four steeds. *SHM* §209; *SHM*, II, n. 792–793.
26 Broadbridge 2018, 125.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

MONGOL STATE FORMATION AND IMPERIAL TRANSFORMATION

Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene

This section looks at the medieval Mongolian ideas of people, state, and empire. In particular, by analyzing the medieval Mongolian terms of *ulus*, *irgen*, and *yeke ulus* in relation to sovereignty and rulership (*ulus-un ejen* or *ulus medekü* or *ulus bariqu*), the distribution of princely shares (*qubi*), the establishment of princely appanages or khanate-principalities (*ulus*), as well as the creation of "the princes who rule *ulus*" (*ulus medekün kö'üt*) and subsequent developments, the section aims to provide insights into the process of Mongol state formation and imperial transformation.

THE MAKING OF *ULUS*ES: PROPERTY AND OWNERSHIP

"To ask what an *ulus* was, to investigate how many major *ulus*es there were, to examine the emergence of *ulus*es and khanates, and to try to offer a fresh perspective" are the aims of Peter Jackson's analysis of "the making of the Mongol states" and the Mongol Empire.[1] When it comes to the making or the creation of *ulus*es, Jackson identifies the most important institutions, traditions, procedures, and stories, and Kim Hodong follows suit. Jackson authoritatively sets the interpretative framework by appealing to Juvayni's statement that "Although authority and dominion ostensibly belong to one man, namely whoever is nominated *khan*, yet in reality all the children, descendants and uncles partake of kingship and property."[2] Jackson treats the Mongol Empire "not as the possessions of the emperor or Great Khan (*qaghan, qa'an*) but as the joint property of the imperial family (*altan urugh*) as a whole, including female members," while Kim repeatedly emphasizes that "the fact that Chinggis Khan and his family members regarded the Mongol Ulus as their common property is extremely important in our understanding of the Mongol Empire."[3] Their interpretations provide the framework for understanding the constitution of the Mongol Empire and the making of *ulus*es.

Since the empire was "the joint property of the imperial family" held in "common," the imperial family governed the empire. The principle of family/kinship and property inheritance dictated that provision be made for all the descendants of

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Chinggis Khan, hence the allocation of "grants of property (*injü*) among the family of Chinggis Khan."[4] Pastoralism also dictated the allocation of specific grazing-grounds to those who received provision.[5] The two requirements led to the "distribution of troops and spoils" and "grazing grounds," which resulted in the making of *ulus*es or appanages. This was, for Jackson, the normal or "the organic" process of creating *ulus*es.[6] Sharing family property among family members thus emerges as the fundamental way of creating *ulus*es. Kim not only furnishes the scheme with Mongolian details but also provides a holistic view as he maintains, "the Mongol Empire appears to have been a single political structure ruled by a supreme ruler, but if we look into it more closely, it was in fact a conglomerate of multiple *ulus*es. The lords (*ejen*), Chinggis Khan's sons and brothers, regarded their *ulus*es as private property (*emchü*) given to them as their 'share' (*qubi*). Therefore, each *ulus* was called by the name of its lord; 'the Jochi Ulus,' 'the Chaghadai Ulus,' etc."[7]

As "an assemblage of peoples and pasturelands," *ulus*es came into existence "in the early decades of the empire" as a result of "the distribution of troops and spoils" that involved allocation of "a certain number of 'thousands' as grants of property (*injü*) among the family of Chinggis Khan."[8] For Jackson "these grants were not, of course, territorial in the strict sense."[9] Only "the requirements of a pastoral society dictated the allocation to the princes, princesses and commanders (*noyan*s) of specified grazing-grounds for the various seasons of the year."[10] Thus, the land that these "assemblage of peoples" resided on during "the various seasons" formed "grazing-grounds" or pasturelands but not territories, that is, areas under jurisdiction, hence those residing on them, including the "thousands," formed an "assemblage of people" but not politico-administrative units under political authority. Since Jackson includes commanders (*noyan*s) in his list of the allocatees of grazing grounds, "thousands" – as assemblages or peoples or troops – seem to have been identical to *ulus*es or "grants of property."

For Jackson, not only were the *ulus*es not territorial, but they were also discrete and dispersed. "In addition to pasturelands and subject peoples, members of the imperial family received shares in booty and revenues of those conquered sedentary territories – such as China, Persia and Mawarannahr – which overall were retained by the *qa'an* as part of the growing '*ulus* of the centre.'"[11] The booty came in many forms, including "craftsmen and skilled artisans," "colonies of enslaved subject peoples," distant fortresses, and "cities and their agricultural hinterlands," and princes held them all over the empire, far removed from their grazing grounds.[12] This made *ulus*es discrete and dispersed. Thus, like Möngke, who possessed territory in the Darband that was "far removed from his customary habitat," princes possessed distant cities and properties in different parts of the empire.[13] As a result,

> throughout the empire there had arisen an extremely complex pattern of rights over tribal elements, colonies of enslaved subject peoples, and grazing grounds, with perhaps the addition of nearby cities and their agricultural hinterlands with entitlement to urban commodities and revenues from further afield that enmeshed the empire.[14]

Moreover, the grazing-grounds of *ulus*es shifted following the expansion of the empire. For instance, Jochi's territory shifted westward due to the empire's expansion,

as well as the coming of age of his younger brothers.[15] Around 1218, after Jochi's successful incorporation of the Forest Peoples, Chinggis Khan gave "the area of the Irtysh River and the Altai mountains" to Jochi, and he resided on the Irtysh River.[16] However, by the end of the Khwarazm campaign (1224), Jochi's territory was on the Qipchaq steppe.

As a result, the empire emerged as "a conglomerate of multiple" discrete, dispersed, shifting *ulus*es. While the domains of Chinggis Khan's brothers formed major appanages, none of the ulus-holders commanded discernable "pre-eminence."[17] Thus, the dominant role given to Chinggis Khan's four sons was "only hindsight," and it was a hindsight of "an early date."[18] All in all, *ulus*es or appanages were princely properties of various kinds, the core of which consisted of "an assemblage of peoples and pasturelands." Yet, this situation or "these rights, transmitted by Chinggis Khan's sons and brother to their descendants, were gravely undermined by the events of the mid-to-late thirteenth century."[19]

METAMORPHOSIS OF *ULUS* TO KHANATE AND SEDENTARY FACTORS

According to Jackson, if Batu capitalized on his initial sponsorship of "Möngke's accession" and made his appanage into a khanate, then Alghu and Hülegü, "taking advantage of the civil war" between Qubilai and Ariq Böke, converted their appanages into khanates, while Qubilai, who "was regarded as a subordinate khan (*il-khan*) in China," eventually consolidated his domain into another khanate.[20] Making a khanate basically amounted to eliminating and purging other princely (property) rights in their respective *ulus*es. The khanates "represented, by and large, an administrative rationalization, a consolidation and concentration of resources in the hands of fewer princes."[21] For sure, "administrative rationalization" was the work of the sedentary bureaucracy since the "tribal" Mongols presumably lacked it.[22]

Indeed, it was the "control of agrarian and urban wealth" that allowed "the rulers of the newly emergent *ulus*es in Persia and China" to consolidate their *ulus*es into khanates.[23] In particular, "area[s] of valuable sedentary resources" allowed Hülegü, Alghu, and Qubilai not only to consolidate their rule but also to subjugate their rivals on the steppe.[24] On the contrary, "the forfeiture of income and enslaved craftsmen in areas of sedentary culture, by princes who dwelt a considerable distance away and whose claims were hardly enforceable, reveals nomadic rulers at perhaps their most vulnerable."[25]

Thus, for Jackson, it was sedentary factors such as "sedentary resources" or "the agrarian and urban wealth" and bureaucratic administration that created the khanates and decided the pre-eminence of Qubilai, Hülegü, and Alghu. Obviously, it was not "a large army" that allowed Qubilai "to make a successful bid for the imperial dignity."[26] Kim, on his part, goes on to argue that it was actually Han Chinese soldiers that crushed Ariq Böke and secured Qubilai's emperorship. In particular, Kim argues that "if we judge purely from the number of soldiers, Qubilai was inferior vis-à-vis Ariq Böke. In order to compensate for this numerical weakness, he conscripted large numbers of Han people."[27] According to Kim's logic, Möngke, who dispatched Qubilai to the south and Hülegü to the west before moving south

himself, seems to have left the majority of the Mongol army behind with Ariq Böke. For sure, if it was sedentary resources, bureaucracy, and peasants that were to decide who of the Chinggisid princes were to build khanates, no Chinggisid conquest was ever to take place.

THE FOUR CHINGGISID *ULUS*ES: A POST-HOC RATIONALIZATION

The Toluid coup and Qubilai's victory, which benefitted Batu, Alghu, and Hülegü, appear to have been rationalized as a work of Chinggis Khan's own design; the view of the four Chinggisid *ulus*es was, therefore, a post-hoc rationalization. It is Juvayni whom Jackson holds responsible for initiating this rationalization "at an early date." Jackson argues that "the details furnished by Juwaynī are misleading," and "it is only hindsight that has elevated the appanages of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons to the status of official divisions of the Mongol empire at an early date."[28]

In particular, Jackson identifies the seeds of hindsight in Juvayni's description that,

> When during the reign of Chingiz-Khan the kingdom became of vast extent he assigned to everyone his place of abode, which they call *yurt*. Thus to Otegin Noyan, his brother, and to some of his grandchildren he apportioned territory in the regions of Khitai. To his eldest son, Tushi, he [Chinggis Khan] gave the territory stretching from the regions of Qayaligh and Khorazm to the remotest parts of Saqsin and Bulghar and as far in that direction as the hoof of Tartar horse had penetrated. Chaghatai received the territory extending from the land of the Uighur to Samarqand and Bokhara, and his place of residence was in Quyas in the neighbourhood of Almaligh. The capital of Ögetei, the heir-apparent, during his father's reign was his *yurt* in the region of the Emil and the Qobaq. . . . Toli's territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto, and indeed this spot is the middle of their empire like the centre of a circle.[29]

However, if we accept Andrew Boyle's statement that Juvayni "must have renounced the idea of continuing his history" in 1260 "or soon afterwards," there seems to have been "no vantage-point that enables" Juvayni to discern Alghu, Hülegü, and Qubilai "to have pre-eminence" and to elevate their appanages as "the appanages of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons," thus elevating them "to the status of official divisions of the Mongol empire," since it was not yet known if Alghu, Hülegü, and Qubilai were to succeed and if the Mongol Empire were to dissolve.[30]

Jackson also claims that "the domains of Chinggis Khan's brothers have hitherto been left out of the reckoning, and I suggest that they should be viewed as *ulus*es until the debacle of 1287 and their absorption into Qubilai's Chinese realm."[31] Jackson again keeps Juvayni responsible for this bias and mistreatment; Jackson is unhappy with Juvayni for his having "little to say" on the brothers of Chinggis Khan, "mentioning only Temüge and other of his kin were stationed in northern China (*Khitāī*)" while he details "the enormous tracts allotted to Chinggis Khan's three elder sons."[32] Yet, Juvayni actually begins his description with a statement that "When during the reign of Chingiz-Khan the kingdom became of vast extent he

assigned to everyone his place of abode, which they call *yurt*," and continues on to say that "Thus to Otegin Noyan [Temüge], his brother, and to some of his grandchildren he apportioned territory in the regions of Khitai."[33] Only after this does Juvayni go on to the territories of Chinggis Khan's sons. In short, Juvayni treats the territories assigned to Chinggis Khan's sons as a part of this general distribution of "*yurt*" or "station (*maqām*) and grazing-ground (*yurt*)"; he does not treat them as different or distinct from the rest.[34]

It is true that Juvayni furnishes his description of the territories of Chinggis Khan's three elder sons with a few place names. However, the details seem to owe to his familiarity with the region rather than his emphasis on their importance, while his vagueness on the territories of Tolui, as well as the brothers of Chinggis Khan, seems to owe at least partially to his unfamiliarity with the region rather than any conscious de-emphasis of their significance. It is Jackson who magnifies the territories assigned to Chinggis Khan's sons as "the enormous tracts," not Juvayni. Juvayni only emphasizes the centrality of Tolui's territory to the empire.[35]

Jackson also argues that "provision had to be made for all" the descendants of Chinggis Khan, and those "conferred on Chinggis Khan's four senior sons do not represent the only grants of territory and peoples made to his family."[36] He also argues that there were "a greater number of major appanages," and those of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons had no discernable pre-eminence.[37] Yet, while the epigraph that Jackson takes from Juvayni as the true characterization of the Mongol imperial order claims that "all the children, descendants and uncles partake of kingship and property," Juvayni's description of the allocation of territories emphasizes that everyone was given a *yurt*, including Chinggis's sons.[38] Juvayni does not claim that those of Chinggis Khan's sons were "the only grants of territory and peoples," nor does he give them pre-eminence. Instead, Juvayni treats them as *yurt*s that everyone else enjoyed, too. In sum, Juvayni can be held responsible for making the arguments that Jackson himself advances but not what Jackson attributes to him. Moreover, it is not just Juvayni that Jackson holds responsible for bias in favor of Chinggis's sons; the *Secret History of the Mongols* (*SHM*) is the other major culprit.

THE EVIDENCE: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRINCELY SHARE AND RULERSHIP

Jackson builds his argument on the apparent lack of evidence that supports Juvayni's account and the abundance of evidence that speaks against it. For Jackson, "there is admittedly a single piece of textual evidence in favour of the view that the creation of an *ulus* for each of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons amounted to a division of the empire as a whole," and that evidence comes from the *SHM*. However, Jackson dismisses the evidence as an "isolated passage."[39]

According to Jackson, the identification of "the heads of the branches founded by Chinggis Khan's four sons" as "the princes who rule an *ulus*" and their separation "from those who do not" is the only evidence of the four *uluses*.[40] Yet Jackson claims that "there is also a good deal of evidence that should discourage us from reading too much into this isolated passage in the *Secret History*."[41]

However, the references to "the princes who rule an *ulus*" or "princes in charge of a domain" are not the only textual evidence. The *SHM* provides information that

suggests that "the princes who rule *ulus*" were different from "the princes who do not rule *ulus*" (*ulus ba ülü medekün kö'üt*). The creation of their *ulus*es resulted in "a division of the empire as a whole," which, along with the developments of the second half of the thirteenth century, "represented a natural progression from Chinggis Khan's own allocations of territory."[42] In fact, the evidence provided by the *SHM* allows us to advance an entirely different interpretation of the transformation of the Mongol Empire.

The *SHM*'s "*ulus medekün kö'üt*" (lit. sons who rule *ulus*) were not "the heads of the branches founded by Chinggis Khan's four sons."[43] "The princes who rule *ulus*" were Chinggis Khan's four sons – Jochi, Chaghadai, Ögödei, and Tolui. "The heads of the branches founded by Chinggis Khan's four sons" were "the eldest sons of the sons who rule *ulus*" (*ulus medekün kö'üt kö'üt-ü'en-gü yeke kö'ü*), namely Batu, Büri, Güyük, and Möngke.[44] This is neatly demonstrated by the fact that Ögödei decreed circa 1236 that "the princes who rule *ulus*" should send their "eldest sons" (*yeke kö'ü*) to the westward campaign.

The *SHM* also distinguishes "the princes who rule *ulus*" not only from "the princes who do not rule *ulus*" but also from "the princesses and the sons-in-law." Ögödei's decree orders "the princes who do not rule *ulus*, the commanders (*noyat* or lords) of ten thousands, thousands, hundreds, and tens, and many people to send their eldest sons" to the campaign.[45] The decree also orders "the princesses and the sons-in-law" to send their eldest sons as well.[46] The decree therefore embraces all of Jackson's recipients of *ulus* yet still distinguishes Jochi, Chaghadai, Ögödei, and Tolui as "the princes who rule *ulus*" from all the rest. Thus, "the princes who rule *ulus*" were clearly not identical with the others, and there was a reason for it.

In fact, what Chinggis Khan gave to his brothers and sons around 1206 did not make Jochi, Chaghadai, Ögödei, and Tolui "the princes who rule *ulus*." No *ulus* was created, and no one was made a prince of an *ulus*. What Chinggis Khan gave to his brothers and sons around 1206 was their share (*qubi*) and property (*emchü*) but not rulership (*medekü*) of *ulus* or authority to rule *ulus* (*ulus medekü*).[47] *Qubi* was a legitimate entitlement for male members of the (royal) family, their share of the family estate (patrimony), and their property (*emchü*). *Qubi* was not a reward or dessert, nor was it a "grant" (*soyurqal*).[48] The verbs used are "to apportion" (*qubilaju*) and "to give" (*ök*).[49] Chinggis Khan told Shigi-Qutuqu – the great judge – that he would apportion him the same *qubi* as his younger brothers, considering him as his "sixth younger brother," for Shigi-Qutuqu was his "adopted younger brother."[50] However, Shigi-Qutuqu declined to receive *qubi*, saying, "How can an adopted younger brother like me equaling with [your younger brothers] take a *qubi*?" *Qubi* was exclusively for family members: an adoptee was not eligible. *Qubi* was an entitlement, a right of family members to inherit their due share of the family property. Unless one was ignored or excluded from the family like Bodonchar's brothers did to him, all would receive their due share.[51] *Qubi* required neither merit nor service nor aid. A prince could own property anywhere as long as the existing legal system guaranteed it: hence, Chinggisid princes received their shares of property everywhere in the empire.

However, since Jackson construes the Chinggisid Empire through property relations, he takes the Chinggisid share of property as a *ulus* or appanage. To him the scattered properties of Chinggisid princes emerged as discrete and dispersed *ulus*es

or appanages. While the immediate effect of his framing demanded the dismissal of "the princes who rule *ulus*," the ultimate effect of this framing was a negation of rulership, Mongolian political institutions, and the culture that the *SHM* contains. In fact, if Juvayni's claim is to negate the authority and dominion of the khan, Jackson's is to negate the authority of "the princes who rule *ulus*."

It is true that Chinggisid *qubi*s, because of their scale, can be compared to European princely appanages, and many later seem to have actually become appanage-like. However, *qubi* was primarily property, a due share of the family estate. As property, princely shares seem to have never been confiscated entirely. Though Temüge Otchigin was executed for trying to seize the throne in 1246, his descendants kept his share. Even when Nayan, a descendant of Temüge Otchigin, rebelled against Qubilai in 1287, the descendants of Temüge Otchigin still ruled Ongni'ud, which they retained down to the twentieth century.[52] The institution of *qubi* therefore survived well into the modern era, and in fact, all the later Mongolian princely *khoshuu*s were princely shares which formed princely appanages.[53]

THE PRINCES WHO RULE *ULUS*

What led Chinggis Khan's four senior sons to be addressed as "the princes who rule *ulus*" was rulership, not *qubi*. The question that Chinggis Khan's consort Yesüi Khatun raised was, "Who should rule the entire *ulus* [in case Chinggis Khan departs this world]?"[54] More specifically, what Yesüi Khatun asked from Chinggis Khan was, "Who of your own four son-warriors you would name [as your successor]?"[55] The question was not about property, nor was it about who from among Jackson's "imperial family" (including Chinggis Khan's brothers) was to succeed Chinggis Khan. The question was who from among Chinggis Khan's four sons was to succeed him. The question was not asked from "the imperial family" but from the emperor himself, to designate his heir from among his sons. It was Chinggis Khan who designated his successor, and it was only him and his four sons who took part in the discussion. Only Chinggis Khan asked the opinions of his sons.[56] No one else spoke on this matter.[57]

Thus, the term "the princes who rule *ulus*" arose from the matter of rulership: who should succeed Chinggis Khan? Yet a problem was caused by a particular contingency, the circumstances that surrounded Jochi's birth, and the response was the creation of "the princes who rule *ulus*." Yesüi Khatun's question seems to have been born from this situation; if Jochi's lineage had not been disputed, the question would have probably never been asked. However, because of the established line of succession and Jochi's tenuous claim to that succession, there were profound ramifications for the Chinggisid Empire. Because of Jochi's birth, Jochi and Chaghadai had an equal claim to the throne; technically, Jochi was the eldest, yet Chaghadai could claim this honor if Jochi was illegitimate. Thus, each of them claimed to be the eldest son and rightful heir to the throne. Since they had equal claims, Chinggis Khan was to deny the throne to his eldest sons. Instead, he decided to make each of them "the princes who rule *ulus*" by creating a separate *ulus* for each. According to the *SHM*, Chinggis Khan repeatedly declared that "Jochi is the eldest of my sons."[58] Yet Chaghadai thought he was the eldest, and he had a reason to claim so.[59] Even after Kökö-Chos's meticulous expostulation and Chinggis Khan's prohibiting him from insulting Jochi

again, Chaghadai insisted that "the eldest of the sons are we two, Jochi and I."[60] Yet before Jochi uttered anything about the throne, Chaghadai relinquished his claim and proposed Ögödei for the emperorship.[61] Jochi was forced to follow Chaghadai. The nomination of Ögödei resolved the fraternal conflict. Seeing the situation, Chinggis Khan decided to make both Jochi and Chaghadai "the princes who rule *ulus*."[62]

The aim was to secure the throne for the Ögödeids and to separate Jochi and Chaghadai from each other. Moreover, the creation of *ulus*es would compensate the elder brothers for their renunciation of the throne.[63] Thus, when Jochi and Chaghadai pledged "to serve jointly" the khan (or future khan Ögödei), Chinggis Khan decreed that "Mother Earth is wide: its rivers and waters are many. Separate [and] settle [separately]! [We shall] separate you [making each of you] to rule aliens by expanding our territory (*nuntuq*)."[64] Still, Chinggis Khan sternly warned Jochi and Chaghadai to keep their word to serve the khan, and as a warning he gave each of them some of the offspring of Altan and Quchar, who lost their lives for failing to keep their identical promises to serve the khan.[65]

In designating Ögödei as his successor, Chinggis Khan settled the question of rulership over the empire. The designation of Ögödei as the future ruler also saw him designated as the head of the Chinggisid house/family. In like manner, Chinggis Khan decreed that the families of his younger brothers, Qasar, Alchidai, Otchigin, and Belgütei, should each appoint one of their own to be in charge of their respective families.[66] In this sense, one may assume that Chinggis Khan also instituted rulership in the houses of his younger brothers. This was, however, a question of family/house headship (*uruq medekü*), not "rulership of *ulus*" (*ulus medekü*). As the head of the Chinggisid house, Ögödei was identical to the heads of the families of Chinggis Khan's brothers. The princes of the families of Chinggis Khan's younger brothers appear in the *SHM* as "the left wing princes."[67]

Contrary to Juvayni's claim, the authority and dominion belonged to the khan, and it was he who decided who should do what and receive what. This was an established institution, hence what made Chinggis Khan's four senior sons distinct and different from the rest was that their father was the ruler, and they were the sons of the ruler born from his lawfully wedded first wife, hence legitimate heirs to the throne. There was an established rule of succession, and this rule had made Yesüi Khatun ask the question she asked. It also prompted Chinggis Khan to command Jochi to speak. The rule also entitled Chaghadai, not Ögödei or Tolui, to interrupt Jochi. This rule ultimately made Chinggis Khan designate Ögödei as his successor and make Jochi and Chaghadai "the princes who rule *ulus*." No one challenged Chinggis Khan's ruling; if there was a rule regarding primogeniture, or a rule allowing it, someone like Chaghadai could have challenged the decision. Ultimately, this rule also made Chinggis Khan's brothers and other sons such as Kölgen, born from junior khatuns, "the princes who do not rule *ulus*." Yet they were also princes because Chinggis Khan was the ruler. For this reason, they were distinct and different from the lords or commanders. The same applies to princesses and their husbands, imperial sons-in-law.

The decision to make Jochi and Chaghadai "rule aliens" was taken right before the Khwarazm campaign. As the Khwarazm campaign expanded the territory of the empire at the expense of alien territory, they were given their own separate *ulus*es to rule, and they were made to rule or "dominate aliens."[68] Chinggis Khan created

ulus-appanages for Jochi and Chaghadai, and they were made "the princes who rule *ulus*." "The princes who rule *ulus*" were not just princes, they were rulers of *ulus*, yet they were not the khan, the ruler of the empire. Hence, the creation of "the princes who rule *ulus*" by default made the other princes "the princes who do not rule *ulus*." Thus, there emerged a distinction among princes. The creation of "the princes who rule *ulus*" also created rulers or ruling princes alongside, but still subordinate to, the khan. Moreover, with the creation of *ulus*es, there emerged princely *ulus*es within or alongside the khan's *ulus*. This transformed the Mongol Empire into "the core/main *ulus*" (*qol-un ulus*) and princely *ulus*es. The khan of the Great Mongolian State became "the khan of the ocean/sea" or the entirety (*dalai-yin qan*).[69] Yet after the transformation of Jochi and Chaghadai into "princes who rule *ulus*" and the designation of Ögödei as the successor, only Tolui was left with no rulership of his own.

The creation of separate *ulus*es for Jochi and Chaghadai might have prompted Chinggis Khan to allocate "the region of the Emil and the Qobaq," an area next to Chaghadai's *ulus*, to Ögödei. The eldest prince was assigned the farthest territory, and this principle might have contributed to the location of Ögödei's domain. On the other hand, the custom of the youngest (*otchigin*) succeeding to the father's residence must have contributed to the location of Ögödei's residence. Since Ögödei was the successor to the throne, his domain could not be a separate *ulus* or appanage like that of Jochi and Chaghadai; it must have been within "the core/main *ulus*" or "the *ulus* of the center." The location of Ögödei's residence might therefore have been intended as a future seat of the main *ulus* as it was in the middle of the *ulus*es of Jochi and Chaghadai, to the west, and the domains of Tolui and the princes of the left wing to the east.[70]

The Toluid claim to the "core/main *ulus*" is dubious. Since the decision to create separate appanages for Jochi and Chaghadai was taken before the Khwarazm campaign, and since Ögödei was already chosen as his successor, Chinggis Khan could have created a separate appanage like those of Jochi and Chaghadai for Tolui; he did not. Tolui had no legitimate right to the throne as long as there was Ögödei. There was no abdication on the part of Tolui, hence no indemnification. Moreover, Chinggis Khan could have assigned the territory that he had given to Ögödei to Tolui, but he did not; there was no (established or institutionalized) reason to treat Tolui in this way. Instead, the institution of "hearth-prince" obliged Chinggis Khan to give Tolui his residence. Chinggis Khan therefore assigned territories to his three elder sons, distancing them from his seat in Mongolia in accordance with their seniority. Clearly, as the hearth prince, Tolui was to receive his father's residence. "The core/main *ulus*" was not, however, identical with the hearth; instead, it embraced the hearth and other princely shares, including that of Ögödei. At Chinggis Khan's death, Tolui as *otchigin* succeeded his father's place; hence, "the core/main *ulus*" seems to have come under his authority temporarily. In fact, as a regent, Tolui was only "Great Lord" (*Yäkä Noyan* or *Ulugh Noyan* or *Yeke Noyan*).[71]

However, Tolui's great lordship clearly became the source of later Toluid claims that Tolui was the successor to "the core/main *ulus*" and their heightened emphasis on the rights of the *otchigin*.[72] We do not know if Tolui himself made a claim to "the core/main *ulus*." However, later Toluids depicted Ögödei and Chaghadai as being very apprehensive of Tolui.[73] They even went so far as to claim that Ögödei was responsible for Tolui's death.[74] If, however, we trust in the *SHM*, rulership always

belonged to the eldest or senior sons, starting from Alan Qo'a's five sons. Both Dobun Mergen, and Bodonchar were excluded from the family (*urugh*), and Bodonchar was not even given his due share (*qubi*), let alone the hearth of his family.[75] At any rate, Juvayni writes in vague terms that "Tolui's territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto"; he does not demarcate Tolui's territory.[76] Nevertheless, his claim that Tolui's territory "is the middle of their empire like the centre of a circle" is in line with then-current Toluid claims to "the core *ulus*."[77]

Other evidence also shows that the domains of Jochi and Chaghadai were, indeed, autonomous princely *ulus*es. When Ögödei proposed to establish relay stations (*jamut/jamud*), Chaghadai responded to Ögödei that, "From here I shall have post stations connecting with *yours*. Also, from here I shall send messengers to Batu, and Batu shall have his post stations connected with *mine*."[78] Chaghadai and Batu were responsible for postal stations in their respective territories. Neither Ögödei nor Chaghadai sent messengers to Güyük, who inherited "the region of the Emil and the Qobaq" from Ögödei.[79] There was also no mention of sending envoys to Möngke. However, Rashid al-Din makes Ögödei, Chaghadai, Batu, and Sorqoqtani appoint their own representative "for the establishment of the *yam*s."[80] Thus, "on behalf of the Qa'an, Bitigchi Qoridai; on behalf of Chaghatai, Emälägchin Tayichi'utai; on behalf of Batu, Suqu Mulchatai; on behalf of Tolui Khan, Alchiqa went by order of Sorqaghtani Beki. These amirs went and established *tayan yam*s throughout the length and breadth of the empire."[81] However, the *SHM* only reports Ögödei Qa'an appointing Arachan and Toquchar to establish the post stations each with twenty relay-men.[82] Rashid al-Din's details seem to be a Toluid bias.

In fact, when Ögödei dispatched the "eldest sons" of "the princes who rule *ulus*" to join the westward campaign, he decreed, "Güyüg should command those from the core/main." Möngke was under Güyük's command and returned with him to Mongolia.[83] Both Güyük and Möngke belonged to "the core/main *ulus*." There was no Ögödeid *ulus*, nor was there a Toluid *ulus*; neither Ögödei nor Tolui was a "prince who rules *ulus*." Since Ögödei decreed Güyük to command those from the core, including Möngke, the arrangement and the terminology of "the core/main *ulus*" and princely *ulus*es seem to have already been in practice in Ögödei's time.

Yet when Ögödei Qa'an levied one prime wether from every sheep herd, and one three-year-old ewe from every one hundred sheep from "the entire *ulus*" as "the soup sheep" for "the khan of the ocean," the decree embraced

> the princes of the right wing, all the older and younger brothers, beginning with Chaghadai, the older brother, and Batu, and all the princes of the left wing, the older and younger brothers, beginning with Otchigin Uncle and Yegü, and the princesses and the sons-in-law of the core.[84]

Though they were the princes of the left wing, Otchigin and Yegü were not "the princes who rule *ulus*," nor were the princesses and the sons-in-law. What the decree shows, however, is that the princely *ulus*es of Jochi and Chaghadai were subject to the Great Khan's taxation just like the princesses and the sons-in-law in the main/core *ulus*. The core/main *ulus* and princely *ulus*es together formed "the ocean" (*dalai*) or "the entire ulus" (*bürin ulus*), and the khan now was "the khan of the ocean." The titles of the *dalai-yin qan* and subsequent *qa'an* clearly suggest

that the "princes who rule *ulus*" needed a proper title, and the result seems to have been *khan* and *il-khan*.

Due to the fact that Jochi and Chaghadai had equal claims to the throne and had precedence over Ögödei, Chinggis Khan gave each of them an *ulus*-appanage to indemnify the sovereignty that they relinquished in favor of Ögödei and to secure the throne for the Ögödeid house.[85] Indeed, no Jochid or Chaghadaid prince ever laid claim to the imperial throne. Hence, the original arrangement that Chinggis Khan made was never breached. Thus, it was neither Batu nor Alghu that created khanates; it was Chinggis Khan who created these khanate-principalities with their ruling princes, and the first ruling princes were Jochi and Chaghadai. Yet these princes were still subordinate to the khan or "the khan of the ocean," so their principalities were part of the empire. Hence, upon the completion of the Khwarazm campaign, the Mongol Empire was comprised of "the core/main *ulus*" and two princely *ulus*es. While "the core/main *ulus*" was under the khan's direct rule, the khan was "the khan of the ocean" (*dalai-yin qahan*), and "the ocean" or "the entire *ulus*" embraced all the three *ulus*es.[86] This formation remained intact under Möngke.

DEVOLUTION, APPROPRIATION, AND FEDERALISM

Chinggis Khan's arrangement was, however, broken by the princely house that was left with no *ulus* of its own: the Toluid house. The Toluid house was a victim of the principle of primogeniture. Because of this principle, the house was left with no rulership. As a son of the lawfully wedded first khatun, Tolui was a candidate for the throne. Yet his candidacy was to take effect only after the elimination of his elder brothers. Thus, institutionally, Tolui was born between and betwixt, and Ögödei's presence left him among the "princes who do not rule *ulus*." No doubt the Jochids played a key role in installing Möngke on the throne, as Chaghadai did in installing Ögödei. Möngke's coup made the throne an object of contest.

Qubilai's seizure of the throne resulted in the creation of Hülegü's *ulus* and, eventually, recognition of Qaidu's *ulus*, along with a critical reconfiguration of "the core/main *ulus*." As for Alghu, if Ariq-Böke installed him over Chaghadai's *ulus*, Qubilai, in order to win him over to his side, seems to have augmented his power.[87] In issuing a patent to Hülegü, Qubilai recognized Hülegü as another "prince who rules *ulus*," which resulted in the creation of another princely *ulus*. If indeed Qubilai ordered Hülegü to "take over . . . lands . . . from the banks of the Oxus to the river of Egypt," and Alghu to "command and keep the *el* and *ulus* from the Altai to the far side of the Oxus," what he did was a massive devolution of power.[88] Meantime, the Jochids, who supported Ariq-Böke, emerged virtually independent, and their independence effectively reduced Qubilai to another "prince who rules an *ulus*." Subsequently, Qaidu detached Ögödei's domain from "the core/main *ulus*" and made it into another princely *ulus*. He also effectively separated Jochi's and Chaghadai's *ulus*es from "the core/main *ulus*." What Qaidu did was an appropriation of an *ulus* and the creation of a rulership. Thus, Qubilai's seizure resulted in the creation of two more princely *ulus*es and the radical pruning of the core/main *ulus*. As a result, the core/main *ulus*, as Kim notes, emerged as the Khan's *ulus* (*ulus-i qa'an*) or "great *ulus*" (*ulus-i buzurg*).[89] By implication, the princely *ulus*es emerged as lesser *ulus*es, and their rulers as lesser rulers. The peace that was concluded in 1304 between Temür,

Toqto'a, Chapar, Du'a and Öljeitü can be seen as the formalization of this structure and Temür's formal recognition of Qaidu's *ulus*.

Thus, by the start of the fourteenth century, there were five Chinggisid *ulus*es. Yet all the *ulus*es were under the name of Yeke Monggol Ulus; none adopted a different name. The Khan's *ulus* was the core/main *ulus* and bore the name of the empire, while the princely *ulus*es were simply called by the names of their ruling princes.[90] This framework transformed the Mongol Empire into "a dynastic federation," and, as Kim argues, the empire effectively emerged as "a federal world empire."[91] The overall effect, whether voluntary or forced, was devolution of power. In fact, Chinggis Khan's creation of princely *ulus*es was also, in a way, a forced devolution. No doubt Chinggis Khan must have preferred not to create princely *ulus*es. Yet, to paraphrase David Morgan, "it is not possible to run so vast an empire as a centrally-directed polity," not just "in thirteenth-century conditions" but in any time of history, hence "some kind of devolution was inevitable."[92] Established institutions and the politics of the day shaped the way Chinggis Khan devolved power and authority.

No doubt Qubilai's "great *ulus*" and his emperorship were nothing like those of Möngke or any of his predecessors, and in this sense, Jackson's dissolution, as Morgan appositely put it, "was the end of the Mongol Empire as any kind of unitary state ruled from a central capital by a paramount emperor and his governmental machine."[93] Since "Qubilai's writ . . . did not run the length and breadth of the Mongol Empire," Qubilai's seizure can be said to have been the beginning of the dissolution of the empire.[94] However, the dissolution of the empire was a long process of devolution of powers, voluntary or forced, that involved the proliferation of *ulus*es by princes and, subsequently, by commanders or lords (*noyad*), who eventually appropriated their divisions into their own lordships or emirates.

The Mongol Empire survived for a long time. Though the main/core *ulus*, or "the great court" (*Ulugh Yurt*), of the Timurid authors lost its territory in what is now China, it continued to rule Mongolia – the original seat of the empire and the original core/main *ulus* – until 1636.[95] Though fragmentary, the Mongol Empire of the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries was a formidable power, and its territory was much larger than in 1206. The two original princely *ulus*es also lasted for a long time; while the Chaghadaid khanate saw its end at the hands of the Zünghars around 1678, Jochid rule lasted until 1783 in the form of the Crimean Khanate.[96] While Jackson has the Mongol Empire dissolve in 1260, "paradoxically, twenty years before it reached its greatest geographical extent after the definitive conquest of the Song Empire in south China," the conventional wisdom terminates the Mongol Empire in 1368.[97] Yet if 1368 is the end of the Mongol Empire, its beginning cannot be 1206; it must be 1271 or, actually, 1279, when the Song Empire came to a definitive end. If, however, there was an empire in Mongolia in 1206, it continued until 1636. Thus, the conventional wisdom effectively negates not only Jackson's Mongol Empire but also Morgan's too. This is the Sinocentric vision of history, where what is now China emerges as the proper home or stage of (imperial) history, and dominion over China makes a polity an empire.

According to Jackson, the Song Empire lost its original seat with a vast territory along with the reigning emperor in 1127; however, if the Song emperors were to hold on to the island of Yaishan, the Song Empire was to last, not to end in 1279. Even this logic does not apply to the Mongol Empire. Unlike the Song, neither the original

territory and seat of the Mongol Empire nor any Mongol emperor was captured or forced to commit suicide. Instead, the reign of the Mongolian Great Khans lasted until 1636. Thus, according to the Song logic, the Mongol Empire lasted at the least until 1636. Yet the Sinocentric view terminates the Mongol Empire in 1368.

Iran is another conquest territory. If we were to adopt the Persia-centric view, the Mongol Empire was to emerge with Hülegü's conquest and end roughly with Abu Sa'id's death in 1335. Yet the collapse of the Ilkhanate is only the end of the sub-imperial Mongol rule in that region, not the end of the Mongol Empire. Thus, only the loss of the dominion over what is now China results in the termination of the Mongol Empire. Only a Sinocentric view can justify the termination of the Mongol Empire in 1368. This only shows how fundamentally Sinocentric the conventional historical vision is. Only the elevation of what is now China as "*orbis terrarum*" or "state-space" and the reduction of Central Eurasia to "dark space," "barbarian outer darkness," or "non-state space" can sustain this vision.[98]

Yet, as Morgan emphasizes, in the Central Eurasian nomadic belt, the principal seat of the nomadic empires, Chinggisid rule lasted much longer. Both Chinggisid princes and commanders kept the Chinggisid framework for centuries.[99] The idea of the Mongol Empire and the imperial framework of the main/core *ulus* and sub-*ulus*es endured like the idea of the Roman Empire. Indeed, if there emerged another Roman, or Holy Roman, Empire after the decline of the Western Roman Empire, there also emerged another "Mongol, or Mughal, Empire" alongside the eastern Mongol Empire.[100] It can also be argued that Chinggis Khan's creation of the separate *ulus*es for his senior sons set a precedent for later princes to carve out their own appanages and khanate-principalities, which led to the proliferation of princely appanages and the practice of calling princely shares *ulus*es. In fact, the *SHM* also writes "Otchigin Uncle's *ulus*" (*otcigin-abaqa-yin ulus*).[101] Surely, none of the princes of the families of Chinggis Khan's brothers were "the princes who rule *ulus*," like Jochi and Chaghadai. Hence, "Otchigin Uncle's *ulus*" is clearly an example of the proliferation of the practice of calling princely shares *ulus*. This practice must have led to Rashid al-Din's "distressingly lax" usage of the term *ulus*.[102] Yet it also seems to have been a reflection of the proliferation of princely appanages, a general aristocratic transformation.

MAKING THE MONGOLIAN STATE

Because of his equation of princely share (*qubi*) and property (*emchü*) with *ulus*, Jackson mixes princely share and property with *ulus* and rulership (*ulus medekü*) to create a division of early *ulus*es and later khanates. Jackson is not alone on this path.[103] In fact, when Juvayni negated the authority and dominion of the khan in favor of the imperial family, he was already confusing "kingship and property." For sure, Juvayni, "who was in the service of Hülegü and his descendants," seems to have had a reason to confuse it, as it legitimized the Ilkhanids.[104] At any rate, Juvayni was rationalizing the Mongol imperial order in favor of the Ilkhanids. Yet his rationalization blurs the distinction between "the princes who rule *ulus*" and "the princes who do not rule *ulus*," that is, between rulership and ownership. Moreover, by the time of Juvayni's writing, the *ulus*es of Jochi and Chaghadai were already a reality, and Juvayni himself grew up within one of these *ulus*es. The

practice of calling princely shares *ulus* might have contributed to his rationalization too.

Yet if khanship, rulership, or political power was a matter of appearance or an illusion as Juvayni and Jackson would have us believe, there would have been no Toluid coup, no war between Ariq-Böke and Qubilai, and no need for the patents given to Hülegü and Alghu.[105] It was, however, precisely because rulership was the fundamental variable that there was the Toluid coup and there was war between Ariq-Böke and Qubilai. For the same reason, Hülegü and Alghu needed patents to make them rulers of their respective domains. In fact, when Jackson holds "the new qa'an Möngke" responsible for the drastic redistribution of the Chaghadaid and Ögödeid possessions and for putting "his younger brothers, Qubilai and Hülegü, in command of operations in China and Persia respectively," he, albeit unwittingly, argues for the power and authority of the khan and the primacy of the kingship.[106] Meanwhile, Kim abundantly demonstrates the ruler's authority in the face of Möngke, Ariq-Böke, Qubilai, and Qaidu. In fact, Chinggis Khan's allocation of shares as well as his creation of princely *ulus*es was the ultimate testament of the authority and dominion of the khan.

In fact, according to Weber, appropriation of powers of government and dominion, that is, making authority and dominion "hereditary, alienable, and capable of division by inheritance" "is a phenomenon of patrimonialism" or patrimonial state. Appropriation by the sovereign himself is the most centralized form of patrimonialism, with a sovereign's "claim to full proprietorship of the land and to the status of master over subjects treated as negotiable slaves."[107] The defining feature of patrimonial authority and patrimonial state is the hereditary rulership that transforms authority and dominion into property. The most decentralized form of patrimonialism is feudalism, where "administrative staff" appropriates "powers and rights of exercising authority" and enters into "the contract of fealty."[108] When the Chinggisid commanders appropriated their authority, they basically emerged as feudal lords and their divisions as lordships.[109]

Moreover, the medieval Mongolian *nuntuq* that Jackson treats as "grazing grounds" was a clearly demarcated area under the jurisdiction of the ruling authority and allocated by the same authority – a dominion. While the khan allocated *nuntuq* to his subjects, each thousand had its own officials called *nuntu'ucin* who demarcated and distributed the allocated *nuntuq*.[110] The territory of the Chinggisid polity as a whole was a *nuntuq*, hence Chinggis Khan decided to expand the *nuntuq* of his polity to make Jochi and Chaghadai "rule aliens."[111] While "expanding *nuntuq*" presupposes the boundedness of the *nuntuq*, making Jochi and Chaghadai "rule aliens" presupposes the expansion of the *nuntuq* at the expense of alien territories. Indeed, Jochi and Chaghadai were made to rule the conquered "alien" territories farthest from Mongolia.[112]

The larger problem that underlies Jackson's representation of Mongolian *ulus* is his association of the state with a fixed territory, bureaucracy, and sedentary civilizations. However, the primary component of Mongolian *ulus* is people and the domination of people rather than land or territory. Thus, the establishment of domination over people and the domestication of them as subjects (*irgen* or *ulus irgen*) was fundamental in the making of the Mongolian state. As such, the Mongolian *ulus* was a political community – a population administratively

organized under the rule of a monarch/khan within a given territory. The Mongolian *ulus* was conceptualized as a category of government formed by rulership.[113] In fact, according to Weber's often-quoted definition, the state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[114]

In fact, *irgen* or *ulus irgen* is a concept that demonstrates the establishment of domination over people and the domestication of them as subjects. Like *ulus*, *irgen* can also be read as people or number of individuals. However, *irgen* always indicates those under certain authority. As such, *irgen* is a term for "subject" or "subjecthood." For this reason, "the Mongol imperial doctrine reduced all the known polities/peoples into *irgen*."[115] Precisely for this reason, unlike *ulus*, *irgen* is conceptualized as a community of language, custom, and descent. For this reason, Chinggis Khan had "to expand the territory" of his polity to make Jochi and Chaghadai "rule/dominate aliens." While the Chinggisid polity expanded to become the Great Mongol State or Mongolian Great State and its ruler "the khan of the ocean/sea," Mongol *ulus* as Mongol *irgen* or Mongol people did not expand beyond the Forest People. The Mongol *ulus* (a political community) therefore emerged as one of the peoples (*irgen*) of the empire, along with other peoples or *irgen*s. All under the Mongol Empire were *irgen* or *ulus irgen*, and *irgen* was a product of political domination and domestication, a product of making the *ulus*. In fact, all the non-Mongol polities, including those beyond the Mongol dominion, were called *irgen* or subjects, even the Franks and the Hindus. They were identified as *il bulga irgen*, that is, "submissive and rebellious subjects," evidenced by Güyük Khan's seal. The Mongol imperial doctrine seems to have been to turn the whole world into its subjects.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Chinggisid polity initially formed a unitary *ulus* divided into decimal units. These were in turn organized into several *tümen*s, such as the center under Naya, the right under Bo'orchu around the Altai Mountains, and the left wing under Muqali around Qara'un Jidün.[116] There was also another *tümen* around Erdiš Qudus under Qorchi.[117] All these *tümen*s were under non-Chinggisid *noyan*s, just as all the subordinate decimal divisions (thousands, hundreds, and tens) were under non-Chinggisid commanders. Although Chinggis Khan apportioned a part of his *ulus* as shares to his family members, those were still under the decimal organization, and the commanders of the thousands were still those whom Chinggis Khan appointed. Hence, though the thousands were given to Chinggis Khan's family members as their share, they were still under the khan's authority. By the end of the Khwarazm campaign, this arrangement was replaced by the main/core *ulus* and princely *ulus*es arrangement. With Qubilai's seizure of the throne there emerged two more princely *ulus*es and two more "princes who ruled *ulus*": Hülegü and Qaidu. Moreover, with Qubilai's devolution of power, the imperial framework also transformed from a unitary form of the main/core *ulus* and princely *ulus*es into a more or less federal organization of khan's *ulus* and princely *ulus*es, or the great *ulus* and lesser *ulus*es. Eventually, the princes, irrespective of whether they were *de jure* "princes who rule *ulus*" or not, seem to have transformed into *de facto* princes who ruled *ulus*; the general effect was an aristocratic transformation.

NOTES

1 Jackson 1999, 15.
2 Jackson 1999, 12.
3 In fact, asserting that "the Mongol conquest, it is true, were regarded not as the possessions of the Qa'an but as the joint property of the entire family of Chinggis Khan," Jackson seems to have made this vision the orthodoxy (Jackson 1978, 191). Jackson 1999, 12; Kim 2019, 275–276, 282.
4 Jackson 1999, 12–13, 18.
5 Jackson 1999, 18–19.
6 Jackson 1999, 36.
7 Kim 2019, 282.
8 Jackson 1999, 18.
9 Jackson 1999, 18.
10 Jackson 1999, 18.
11 Jackson 1999, 21.
12 Jackson 1999, 28.
13 Jackson 1999, 21.
14 Jackson 1999, 28.
15 Jackson 1999, 25.
16 *SHM* §239; RDT, 359.
17 Jackson 1999, 35.
18 Jackson 1999, 35.
19 Jackson 1999, 35.
20 Jackson 1999, 28–32.
21 Jackson 1999, 31.
22 Morgan 1982.
23 Jackson 1999, 31.
24 Jackson 1999, 13, 31.
25 Jackson 1999, 31.
26 Jackson 1978, 229.
27 Kim 2019, 301.
28 Jackson 1999, 25, 36.
29 *HWC*, I, 42–43.
30 *HWC*, I, 35.
31 Jackson 1999, 36.
32 Jackson 1999, 16–17, 23.
33 *HWC*, I, 42–43.
34 Jackson 1999, 19.
35 *HWC*, I, 43.
36 Jackson 1999, 27.
37 Jackson 1999, 35.
38 Jackson 1999, 12 & 16.
39 Jackson 1999, 15.
40 Jackson 1999, 15.
41 Jackson 1999, 16.
42 Jackson 1999, 36.
43 *SHM* §270.
44 *SHM* §270.
45 *SHM* §270.
46 *SHM* §270.

47 *Emchü* (*emcü*) is the Mongolian term for property in the *SHM*. *SHM* §208.
48 *SHM* §§23, 203, 224, 242, 260.
49 *SHM* §§23, 242.
50 *SHM* §203.
51 *SHM* §23.
52 *EMME*, 362, 401.
53 Atwood 2012.
54 *SHM* §254.
55 *SHM* §254.
56 *SHM* §§254, 255.
57 See Munkh-Erdene (2018) for Chinggisid political culture.
58 *SHM* §§210, 239, 242, 254, 255.
59 *SHM* §254.
60 *SHM* §255.
61 *SHM* §255.
62 The title of "*Ulus-Idi*" or "Sovereign of the *Ulus*" that Jochi had was clearly the indication (*HWC*, I, 86; Kim 2019, 272).
63 Kim 2005, 320–326; *RDT*, 39, 408–409.
64 *SHM* §255.
65 *SHM* §255.
66 *SHM* §255.
67 *SHM* §§269, 280.
68 *SHM* §255.
69 Tumurtogoo 2006, 282.
70 *HWC*, I, 260; *RDT*, 387.
71 *RDT*, 147; *HWC*, I, 150.
72 *HWC*, II, 549.
73 *RDT*, 375; *SHM* §270.
74 *SHM* §272; *RDT*, 316.
75 *SHM* §§11, 23.
76 *HWC*, I, 43.
77 *HWC*, I, 43.
78 *SHM* §279.
79 *HWC*, I, 43.
80 *RDT*, 325.
81 *RDT*, 325.
82 *SHM* §280.
83 *SHM* §270; *RDT*, 328, 331, 360.
84 *SHM* §280.
85 *SHM* §255.
86 *SHM* §280.
87 *RDT*, 371, 376, 429.
88 *RDT*, 429.
89 Kim 2019, 299.
90 Munkh-Erdene 2011; Munkh-Erdene2018; Kim 2015; Kim2019.
91 Kim 2009, 36; Munkh-Erdene 2018, 74.
92 Morgan 2009, 430.
93 Morgan 2009, 429.
94 Morgan 2009, 429.
95 Honda 1958.
96 Morgan 2009, 435–436.

97 Morgan 2009, 429.
98 Lattimore 1951, 130, 238; Sahlins 1968, 38; Frank 1992; Scott 2009.
99 Munkh-Erdene 2016; 2018, 73–79.
100 Morgan 2009, 430.
101 *SHM* §281.
102 Jackson 1999, 16.
103 From Boris Vladimirtsov (1934) to Christopher Atwood (2012), many follow this path.
104 *HWC*, I, xx.
105 Jackson 1999, 30.
106 Jackson 1999, 13.
107 Weber 1978, 44, 232–236.
108 Weber 1978, 255–262.
109 Munkh-Erdene 2016.
110 *SHM* §279; Munkh-Erdene 2011. Chinggis Khan also granted territories (*nuntuq darqalan*) to *tümen*s as well as individuals (*SHM* §§207, 219).
111 *SHM* §255.
112 *HWC*, I, 42–43.
113 Munkh-Erdene 2011.
114 Weber 1946, 78.
115 Munkh-Erdene 2011, 224.
116 *SHM* §§205, 206, 220.
117 *SHM* §207.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE *KESHIG*

Michael Hope

The formation of the *Yeke Monggol Ulus* (Great Mongol State) saw the Mongols shift from a centrifugal power structure to a patrimonial state. Chinggis Khan achieved this transformation in no small part through the institution of the *keshig*, which served not only as his personal bodyguard and household staff, but also as the chief organ through which executive power was to be exercised. The intimacy and trust shared by the khan and his guardsmen (*keshigten*) meant that they could be counted upon to loyally perform the most sensitive jobs across the empire, including commanding the Mongol armies, serving as envoys, overseeing government bureaus, and even recording the dynastic history of the Chinggisids. Outside of the imperial family, the *keshigten* were among the most influential and powerful people in the Mongol Empire until the death of Möngke Qa'an in 1259. Thereafter, the division of the Mongol Empire into several autonomous *ulus*es and the increasing influence of Persian and Chinese bureaucrats significantly altered the function of the *keshig*, though detracting little from their potency. Indeed, the *keshigten* families outlived the Chinggisids throughout much of the Mongol Empire, and from the fourteenth century many of them established their own independent dynasties across Eurasia.

FORMATION OF THE *KESHIG*

Christopher Beckwith has noted that it was common for most Eurasian dynasties to build their power through a *comitatus*, a band of companions who swore to protect their leader to the death. Chinggis Khan was, therefore, certainly not the first Inner Asian ruler to build a personal guard, with the closest parallel being the Khitan-Liao 'head and belly guard' made up of 10,000 to 20,000 representatives of the most senior households in the empire.[1] This precedent was then copied by the warring states that succeeded the Khitan-Liao in the Mongolian Plateau and Inner Mongolia in the twelfth century. The guard (*turghaq*) of the Kereit khans was one of the more prominent examples, not only providing protection for the ruler but also serving as the khan's most trusted troops, taking up position at the heart of the Kereit army to bolster the morale of the regular soldiers.[2] Both the function and the nomenclature

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of Chinggis Khan's later guard unit seem to have been borrowed from the Kereit and their neighbours to the west, the Naiman. Yet he also imbued his guard with his unique genius, making regular modifications to the size, duties, and make-up of his *keshig*, which remained a highly supple organization, both during his lifetime and after his death.

The first steps toward constituting a guard unit were taken after Chinggis, then known as Temüjin, was appointed as the khan of the Mongols by senior members of the Qiyat lineage. As his allies vowed fealty to Chinggis, the new khan singled out some of his sworn companions (*nököd*) to serve as quiver-bearers (*qorchin*), stewards (*ba'urchin*), chamberlains (*cherbin*), sword-bearers (*üldüchin*), equerries (*aqtachin*), and managers of carts and tents (*yurtchin*).[3] This troop of household servants and guardsmen were drawn from among Chinggis Khan's earliest and most trusted supporters, whose loyalty was exemplified by their two commanders, Jelme and Bo'orchu. Jelme was a hereditary servant of Chinggis's household who had grown up beside the future khan. When Chinggis's family was abandoned by their former allies and suffered attack from the Merkit, Jelme remained loyal and even accompanied Chinggis in his subsequent flight to Mount Burqan Qaldun. Years later, when Chinggis was wounded and left for dead in a battle with his former confederate Jamuqa, Jelme stayed to nurse his wounds and even risked going behind enemy lines to find him food. Jelme's partner, Bo'orchu, was a childhood friend of Chinggis Khan. The pair had met on the steppe when Chinggis suffered the loss of his family's herd to rustlers. Whilst in pursuit of these thieves, Chinggis encountered Bo'orchu milking his father's mares. With barely more than a word, Bo'orchu provided Chinggis with a fresh horse and abandoned his work to help retrieve the herd. He was one of the few people who joined Chinggis when the latter entered the service of Ong Khan of the Kereit, and he would later go on to save Chinggis's son Ögödei when he was wounded in battle. Jelme and Bo'orchu's loyalty was beyond question, and their fellow guardsmen were cut from the same cloth.

Yet this household staff was still a relatively small proportion of Chinggis's army, and it was not until 1203, after his victory over the Kereit, that Chinggis Khan is first mentioned introducing a schedule of shifts, from which the guard unit takes its name.[4] Chinggis introduced rosters for the quiver-bearers, day-guards, stewards, door-keepers, and grooms which required *keshigten* to serve shifts lasting for three days and three nights before being replaced by the next division (*keshig*). Eighty men were appointed as night guards (*kebte'ül*), and a further 70 were recruited to serve as day-guards (*turghaq*). This allocation was intended to coincide with the organization of Chinggis's forces into decimal units of 10, 100, and 1,000 in preparation for an assault on the Naiman near the Altai Mountains. The new recruits were drawn from the children of commanders of 1,000 (*minqan*) and 100 (*ja'un*), amongst others, who were expected to serve as hostages, guaranteeing the loyalty of their parents.[5] This basic structure would remain largely unchanged for over a century.

The *keshig* underwent a dramatic expansion only three years later, when Chinggis Khan was crowned ruler of all those who dwelled in felt tents. At this point, Chinggis increased the number of *keshigten* to 10,000, following the allocation of new armies and the appointment of further commanders. The number of night guards increased to 2,000, while the number of day-guards increased to 8,000. These additional troops

were drawn predominantly from the commanders of 1,000 and 100 in the regular army, who were expected to send a son along with mounts and other equipment to be levied from their own military unit. In addition, each commander of 1,000 was to send a further 10 companions to serve with their children, whilst commanders of 100 were to send a further five. These *keshigten* were then divided into four shifts and placed under the command of elders (*ötögü*s) promoted from within the *keshig*.[6]

Chinggis simultaneously made it clear that his *keshig* was to be distinct from regular units of the Mongol army. Service in the *keshig* was a privilege for the elites of the empire, with Chinggis Khan stating that 'my guards are of higher standing than the outside commanders of a thousand; the attendants of my guards are of higher standing than the outside commanders of a hundred and ten.'[7] Service in the guard was certainly a fast track to winning senior positions in other parts of the empire. The career of Boroqul is highly instructive in this regard. He began life as a foundling, adopted by Chinggis's mother Hö'elün after the defeat of the Jürkin. He was raised in her household prior to being appointed as a *bökä'ül* (food taster), then a *ba'urchi* (steward), and then commanding one of the four guard units before finally being named the *sütüküsün* (deputy commander) of the entire Right Wing of the Mongol army. He was described by Chinggis Khan as being 'lower than a khan and higher than amirs and *qarachu* (commoners).'[8] Few guardsmen would achieve the status of Boroqul, but they were still singled out for special favour, as suggested by the fact that the majority of senior officials listed in Rashid al-Din's *Shu'ab-i Panjganah* were guardsmen at one time or another.[9]

The guards' prestige was derived from their intimacy with the khan. The night-guard, for example, were to remain in the khan's camp even when not on duty. They were to lie around him during the night to prevent any possible assassination and would only engage in battle when the khan himself took part.[10] There were few people outside the khan's family who could have boasted of such close proximity to him, and this allowed the *keshig* to play an influential role in the broader empire. This influence was most often exercised through the advice that they gave to the khan. As the *keshig* were constantly in attendance on the khan, they were often the first to voice their opinions on current events, as was the case when Chinggis Khan learned of the insubordination of the Xi Xia during his campaign against the Khwarazmshah Empire (1219–1224). He immediately received advice on how to handle the threat to his empire from Tolun Cherbi, one of the chamberlains appointed in 1203.[11] Another *cherbi*, Dödei, was on hand to give Chinggis advice on how to arrange his camp and his army during his campaign against the Naiman in 1205, and Chinggis Khan personally singled out members of his guard for 'enjoining him to do what was right' during his coronation in 1206.[12] The trust and proximity afforded to the *keshig* meant that their opinions often guided the policy of the khans.

THE *KESHIG* AT COURT

This influence stretched beyond the khan to his court as well. The *keshig* established a protective cordon extending for two bowshots around the khan's residence. Those summoned to an audience with the khan would accordingly need to dismount upon reaching this demarcation, which the Papal envoy, Giovanni di Plano Carpini describes as a palisade surrounding the royal encampment. At this point,

they would be questioned, searched, and informed of the protocol to be expected of those entering the presence of the khan. Members of the guard would then escort the guests to the khan's presence.[13] Visitors coming after dark were scrutinised more heavily and were rarely given audiences. For the most part, they were simply obliged to present their notices to the night-guards, who would then relate them to the khan.[14] The *keshig* were, therefore, quite literally gatekeepers, regulating access to the khan. This granted them the ability to manipulate the balance of power at court. Louis IX's unofficial envoy, William of Rubruck, relayed one instance in which the *keshig* sought to limit the number of people seeking to attend a small chapel located within the khan's residence because it was becoming difficult to adequately frisk and check the large crowds attending mass. A rather bellicose monk threatened to complain to Möngke if they interfered, so the *keshig* got in first and slandered him to the khan. On his next visit to the court, Möngke scolded the monk for showing a lack of humility and for seeking worldly power above spiritual salvation.[15] Rubruck himself suffered similar difficulties when a group of Muslims affiliated with the khan's 'cup-bearer' informed Möngke that Rubruck had called him an 'idolater.' Möngke was apparently willing to overlook this allegation, though Rubruck was hardly in a position to repair the damage if he had not.[16] As a new arrival at court, Rubruck had yet to build a strong rapport with members of Möngke's guard who might have challenged the rumours peddled by the cup-bearer. Indeed, both Carpini and Rubruck report that their interactions with the khan were always mediated by the khan's guards. The khan sat upon a raised dais above his guests and never spoke directly to them. Instead he would address his chamberlains and translators, who would then relay what had been said to those present.[17] The same mediation can perhaps be seen in the correspondence and decrees of the khan, which required the seal of the four *keshig* commanders in order to be validated.[18] Virtually all interactions between the khan and his subjects were moderated by the guard, and this afforded them tremendous power.

The space that the *keshig* filled between the khan and his court was undoubtedly as much for political theatre as it was for maintaining the security of the khan. In many cases, the pageantry of the guard unit pre-dated the Mongol *keshig*, but it appears to have been extended under Chinggis's immediate successors. Möngke Qa'an is known to have delegated responsibility for his court ceremonies to Menggeser Noyan, one of his *keshig* elders. This included managing the protocol for accepting tribute, memorialising the throne, and all imperial audiences.[19] The *keshig* were also expected to attend rituals associated with the ancestral cult of the Chinggisids as well as 'divinations and invocations.'[20] Moreover, the guardsmen were undoubtedly present during the coronation rituals of the Chinggisids. At first, their presence was hardly noticed, but within the space of a few decades, the *keshig* became prominent players in the *quriltai*s that nominated new khans. The coronation of Ögödei in 1229, for example, was dominated by his Chinggisid relatives, yet only three and a half decades later the same ritual in the Ilkhanate was almost entirely taken over by the *keshig* of Hülegü.[21] Following the collapse of the Mongol Empire in the fourteenth century, several Chinggisid successor states in Central Eurasia gave the families of the former guard units the role of elevating newly crowned Chinggisid princes on felt rugs as part of their coronation ritual, thereby highlighting the importance of the guard on such occasions.[22]

Records of these ceremonies and even the history of the Chinggisids were preserved by the *keshig*, which included a sizeable number of secretaries, known as *bichigchi*s. A great number of these *bichigchi*s were drawn from the Kereit, though Muslims and Khitans were also employed in the guards of Chinggis's successors.[23] Rashid al-Din observed that they would sit attentively with pens at the ready, diligently recording the *bilig*s (wisdom) uttered by the princes in their meetings. Both Ögödei and Chaghadai employed dedicated *bichigchi*, giving the impression that each prince had his own staff.[24] Rubruck also recalled that his words were recorded by *bichigchi*s, who attended not only the Mongol princes, but also the chamberlains.[25] These *bilig*s were often recited by later generations at public gatherings (*quriltai*s) to legitimate policy and to demonstrate their links to earlier Chinggisid political traditions. The *bilig*s were also likely to have served as a source for court histories, with the *Yuan shi* reporting that 'writing the annals' was among the duties given to the *keshig*.[26] Perhaps the most famous of these histories was the *Tarikh-i Mubarak* of Rashid al-Din, who served as a steward under Gaykhatu before joining the *keshig* of Ghazan. Under normal circumstances Rashid al-Din claimed that the Mongol princes would jealously guard their annals from outsiders, yet his proximity to the khan gave him access to information not disclosed to others.[27] Indeed, he relied heavily on the information provided by another guardsman, Bolad Aqa, for the early history of the Mongol Empire.

The *keshig*'s ceremonial and secretarial functions hint at the much broader role they played in running the khan's *ordo* (court). The *Yuan shi* summarises their rather extensive duties thusly: 'the duties of headgear and garments, bows and arrows, food, drink, writings and annals, vehicles and horses, tents, treasuries and depositions, medicines and herbs, and divinations and invocations; all [these duties] were held hereditarily.'[28] In addition, the *keshigten* were regularly required to perform extraordinary or one-off jobs, such as serving as envoys to foreign courts. These tasks often evolved in complexity as the empire began to grow. The management of food and drink is a case in point. This duty was assigned by Chinggis to his chamberlains Önggür and Boroqul when he first set up his household staff, saying, 'distribute food to the right and left sides. Do not let it fall short for those who stand or sit on the right side; do not let it fall short for those who are placed in a row or who are not on the left side [of the *ordo*].' Yet their mandate seems to have included not only supplying food to the khan's household but also the army, as he ordered them to 'ride off and distribute food to the multitude.'[29] Such a major task would have required the guard to involve themselves in procurement as well as the management of the treasury. This is suggested by the fact that Chinggis appointed the same chamberlain, Önggür, to receive the surrender of the Jin capital, Zhongdu, and register the contents of the city's treasury nearly 10 years later.[30] Chinggis's successors made management of the treasury an explicit part of the *keshig*'s duties in the new capital at Qaraqorum, with Möngke ordering them to 'garrison and guard the palace gates and treasuries/storehouses of Qaraqorum.'[31]

Overseeing the protection of the khan and the management of his court meant that the *keshig* had to regularly interact with other members of the Chinggisid household, most especially the khan's wives. This was, as Anne F. Broadbridge has noted, often a product of their roles intersecting. The same camps (*ordo*) that the *keshig* guarded were regularly entrusted to khatuns, and so it is not unusual that their jobs

overlapped.[32] As noted earlier, the *keshig* were expected to perform a number of seemingly menial jobs within the khan's household, which ranged from working as stewards and food tasters to disposing of left-overs at the back of the tent.[33] Others guarded the entrances to the tents of the khan's family, and the *Secret History* explicitly states that the management of the female servants of the household was one of the duties of the *keshig*, a function that no doubt fell upon the khatuns as well.[34] In some cases, this overlap meant that members of the *keshig* were directly assigned to the imperial queens. Yesün To'a *aqtachi* (the groom) is simultaneously described as the commander of 100 groomsmen under Chinggis's *keshig* whilst also belonging to the *ordo* of Chinggis's senior wife, Börte.[35] Similarly, Rashid al-Din's *Shu'ab-i Panjganah* lists Elängär Noyan as being both a *ba'urchi* (steward) in command of 100 of Chinggis's personal troops and an *evoghlan* (household servant) of Börte.[36] Whether this means that Chinggis permanently assigned these officers to guard and serve his senior wife or whether the khatuns played a supervisory role administering the functions of the *keshig* is unclear. In any case, the patrimonial nature of the early Mongol Empire makes it very difficult to disentangle the *keshig* from the other members of the khan's household.

CONTINUITY OF THE *KESHIG*

Chinggis Khan regarded his *keshig* as his own personal property, and he ordered his sons to maintain them in good condition as a keepsake after his death. It is therefore generally believed that Chinggis expected his successors to recruit their own *keshig* units when they came to the throne, albeit most other forms of personal property (*emchü*) were transmitted on a hereditary basis, so it would be curious if the *keshig* were not passed on as well.[37] Indeed, Chinggis appointed senior commanders to oversee the troops given to his sons from among his own *keshig*, so the lines between past and current guard units could often be blurred. Chinggis's first heir, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241), recruited a predominantly new *keshig* when he came to power, but he still incorporated his father's quiver-bearers into his own guard. His son and heir, Güyük (r. 1246–1247), likewise recruited half of his guard from among his father's former servitors and introduced the other half from his own household, providing a measure of continuity from one generation to the next.[38]

This continuity was also promoted through the hereditary transmission of offices within the different *keshig* units. Thomas Allsen has attributed the Mongols' fondness for the hereditary principle to the realization that skills and technical knowledge passed from generation to generation within family units.[39] In any event, both the *Yuan shi* and Rashid al-Din make it clear that both the leadership and the rank-and-file members of the guard were recruited from the families of existing members. The elders of the guard (*ötögü*) were ostensibly recruited from among the descendants of some of the earliest *keshig* captains: Boroqul, Bo'orchu, Muqali, and Chila'un.[40] This principle was begun during Chinggis's lifetime, when he appointed *keshigten* from among the children of his senior commanders, many of whom were former guardsmen themselves. The former elder Jelme, for instance, was succeeded by his son Yisun Te'e, who was placed in charge of his own division (*keshig*) of day-guards.[41] Likewise, Ögele Cherbi, a relative of Bo'orchu, was appointed over his own division of the guard. Bo'orchu's nephew, Boraldai, took his place during the

reign of Ögödei, before his son, El Temür, took his place under Qubilai.[42] Keeping these descendants as hostages ensured that their parents remained loyal once they had been promoted to positions outside of the guard. Hence, even if a new khan recruited his own guard, their members were predominantly taken from amongst the families of existing guardsmen.

Those who were not redeployed into a new guard unit maintained their former status as guardsmen and even continued to identify themselves by their job in the guard (e.g. *cherbi, ba'urchi*, etc.). In most cases, former guardsmen were employed by new khans in senior administrative and military positions. Former *keshigten* could most frequently be found serving as *jarquchi*s (judges), ruling on violations of the *jasaq* (the law attributed to Chinggis Khan) – a role their former job recording the *bilig*s and *jasaq* of the khans made them eminently qualified to perform.[43] Former *keshigten* also remained prominent in the Mongol army, where they dominated senior positions. Outside of the *keshig*, the Mongol army was divided into three divisions: the Right Wing, Left Wing, and Centre. These were then divided into smaller units, nominally numbering 10, 100, and 1,000, albeit the true strength of these divisions was often much lower. During Chinggis Khan's lifetime, the leadership of the three military wings was entrusted to three of his guardsmen; Bo'orchu was charged with command of the Right Wing up to the Altai Mountains, Muqali was given command of the Left Wing, while Naya'a was placed in charge of the Centre.[44] The commanders of 1,000 were also drawn extensively from the *keshigten* and their children, ensuring that the *keshig* played a controlling role over the Mongol army. The *keshig* unit would never participate in battle without the khan, under whose direction they would typically occupy the centre of the battle-line, but individual *keshigten* were often deputised by the khan to lead important campaigns.[45] The most senior commanders in Ögödei's army were drawn from amongst Chinggis's former guardsmen, with the campaigns launched against the remnants of the Jin Empire in northern China (1231–1235), the Khwarazmshah Empire in Iran (1231), and the invasion of the Pontic Steppe and Eastern Europe (1236–1241) being led by members of Chinggis' former guard, Sübedei and Chormaqan. Similarly, Güyük appointed an elder from his father's guard, Eljigidei, to lead a campaign against Iraq in 1246. Former guardsmen could also expect to enjoy gifts and stipends long after their khans had died. By the start of the fourteenth century, the growing number of former guardsmen drawing gifts from the qa'an's treasury accounted for more than 10% of the state's revenues and was clearly becoming burdensome.[46]

Nevertheless, the *keshig* saw its function change as the khans drew more of the conquered population into their court. During the first decades of the Mongol Empire these conquered people were often incorporated directly into the *keshig*, which continued to host hostages from the families of senior commanders and vassal rulers. The Uyghurs of Qocha, members of the Sakyapa order in Tibet, and the Koryo dynasty in the Korean Peninsula all sent their sons to serve in the khan's *keshig*, in some cases for more than one term. King Ch'ungson (r. 1298 and 1308–1313) of the Koryo completed his initial *keshig* duty in the second half of the thirteenth century before returning to assume the Koryo throne in 1298. He was soon deposed by a faction aligned with his Chinggisid wife and returned to serve in the *keshig* of Ayurbarwada (r. 1311–1320), with whom he had struck up a friendship during his initial period of service.[47]

KESHIG TENSIONS

Yet the expansion of the Mongol Empire put strains on the patrimonial style of government exemplified by the *keshig*. This tension was evident as early as the reign of Ögödei, when Yelü Chucai advocated the need for a professional bureaucracy to oversee the collection of census data and the implementation of a fixed tax. These reforms saw the creation of the Central Secretariat, then branch secretariats, which were tasked chiefly with the collection of revenues. Although the Central Secretariat assumed responsibility for revenue collection, the *keshig* managed to maintain some of its influence in the new bureau, which was staffed by a mix of former *keshigten* and a poly-ethnic class of scribes, merchants, and dependents until the rule of Qubilai.[48] Under the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) the power of the *keshig* was further diluted by the formation of the Privy Council and the Censorate as well as a new guard unit, the *wei*.[49] The *wei* unit was much larger than the *keshig* and seems to have been created partly out of Qubilai's suspicions towards the *keshig* of his brother Möngke, which had largely supported the claims of his rival Ariq Böke. The *wei* was also used to offset the power of provincial governors and commanders, whose large armies could potentially be turned inward against the khan.[50] The creation of these new bureaus and institutions saw the guard sharing a lot of its former responsibilities, but it continued to remain powerful. Members of the *keshig* were often appointed to head these new divisions of government, even those that seemed to be ostensibly Chinese, such as the Hanlin Academy, which boasted no fewer than 11 *bichigchi*s.[51] Moreover, although the new *wei* divisions significantly outnumbered the *keshigten*, they were also subordinate to the Yuan Privy Council, to which the four *keshig* elders could nominate their own representatives.[52] Throughout these changes, the *keshig* never lost their proximity to the qa'an, which allowed them to continue to influence government at the very highest level from behind the scenes.

Similar changes were seen in the Mongolian successor states in West Asia, where the Islamic *diwan* system was introduced to help administer the Ilkhanate (1258–1335). Yet here too the Ilkhan *keshigten* succeeded in retaining their influence and were regularly partnered with the ostensibly Persian *diwan* governors and accountants sent to oversee tax-collection.[53] Indeed, there was often very little distinction between the *keshig* and other branches of government, as the Ilkhans regularly granted control of both the *diwan* and the army to a court favourite, known as the *na'ib*.[54] In some cases, the head of the *diwan* (*sahib diwan*) was himself drawn from the ranks of the *keshig* and the khan's household staff, as was the case during the rule of Arghun Khan (1284–1291), Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304), and his successor Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316). The close connections between Persian and Mongol officials at the Ilkhan court meant that the *diwan* was largely assimilated into the patrimonial style of government characteristic of the early Mongol Empire.

The degree of power exercised by these commanders became extremely problematic in the second half of the thirteenth century. The hereditary principle for transmitting office in the Mongol Empire allowed the families of Chinggis Khan's *keshig* to entrench themselves at the top of the Ilkhan state in the same way that the *mamluk* contingents recruited by deceased sultans in Egypt and Syria often posed a problem to newly enthroned monarchs there.[55] The most senior officials during the reign of Abaqa – Ahmad Tegüder, Gaykhatu, and Baidu – were drawn from the

keshig (and in some cases *keshig* families) of former khans. This situation was only briefly arrested by Ghazan Khan before the same families returned to dominate the Ilkhanate up to its disintegration in 1335.[56]

The entrenchment of these non-Chinggisid commanders was also evident in the Middle Empire and the Jochid Ulus beginning in the fourteenth century. Though there are far fewer sources on the *keshig* in these two Mongol successor states, it is clear that from the second half of the fourteenth century, the Jochid Khanate and its successors in the Crimea and Volga River basin were dominated by a small clique of families, often described as *qarachu beg*s (commoner commanders), whose ceremonial functions mirrored those of the *keshig*, the most obvious parallel being that the four *qarachu beg*s counter-signed the orders decreed by the khan. Yet they also expanded these functions to include the appointment and removal of the khan as well as being active in foreign diplomacy.[57] Elsewhere, in the lands ruled by the Chaghadaids, descendants from the four commanders given to Chinggis' second son Chaghadai effectively seized control of Mawarannahr before Amir Timur, himself a descendant of a *keshig* family, set up his own dynasty in Central Eurasia.[58]

CONCLUSION

The overweening powers of the *keshig* in West Asia were a long way from what Chinggis Khan had initially intended when he built up a household staff comprised of his most trusted companions. Yet the hereditary principle ensured that the same *keshig* families continued to enjoy access to the khan and the power that this afforded, which gradually saw them assume direct political control over much of the former Mongol Empire. Qubilai's creation of a second guard force as well as a number of separate administrative bureaus ensured that the *keshig* families were never able to assume as much power in East Asia. Nevertheless, the presence of *keshigten* in many of these bureaus meant that they continued to be a potent force in the politics of the Yuan until the fall of the dynasty in 1368.

NOTES

1 Beckwith 2009, 13; *EMME*, 297. See Biran 2005, 109 for the *huwei* guard of the Qarakhitan.
2 Munkh-Erdene 2016, 646; Togan 1998, 75; *EMME*, 297.
3 *SHM* §124; Hsiao 1978, 35.
4 For the word '*keshig*' see *SHM*, I, 344; Atwood 2006, 143.
5 *SHM* §191–2; Hsiao 1978, 40–41; Atwood 2006, 151.
6 *SHM* §191; Atwood 2006, 144.
7 *SHM* §228.
8 *RDRM*, 170.
9 *SP*, f. 104–105.
10 *SHM* §229 & 233.
11 *SHM* §265.
12 *SHM* §193 & 205.
13 *TMM*, 61.
14 *SHM* §229.
15 Rubruck, 205.
16 Rubruck, 229.

17 *TMM*, 67; Rubruck, 174.
18 Atwood 2006, 146; Cleaves 1951, 511; Allsen 1986, 515.
19 Allsen 1986, 504.
20 Hsiao 1978, 37.
21 Hope 2016, 49 & 115.
22 Schamiloglu 1984, 68; Sela 2003, 38.
23 *RDRM*, 115 & 123.
24 *RDRM*, 774.
25 Rubruck, 228–229.
26 Hsiao 1978, 94.
27 Kamola 2019, 42.
28 Hsiao 1978, 94.
29 *SHM* §213.
30 *SHM* §252.
31 Allsen 1987, 504 & 513; Allsen 2019, 39.
32 Broadbridge 2018, 21 & 104.
33 *SHM* §234.
34 *SHM* §232.
35 *RDRM*, 89.
36 *RDRM*, 115.
37 *SHM* §231.
38 *EMME*, 152; Abramowski 1976, 152.
39 Allsen 2019, 43.
40 Hsiao 1978, 36; Atwood 2006, 145.
41 *SHM* §225; 154.
42 *SHM* §226; RDRM, 173 & 594.
43 *SP* 158–9; Allsen 1986, 504.
44 *SHM* §205–6 & 151; May 2007, 32.
45 *EMME*, 297.
46 Hsiao 1978, 43.
47 Choi 2018, 1112.
48 De Rachewiltz 1966, 137; Allsen 1986, 507.
49 Hsiao 1978, 34.
50 Hsiao 1978, 34.
51 Melville 2012, 142; Hsiao 1978, 40.
52 Hsiao 1978, 40; Melville 2012, 142.
53 Aigle 2006–2007, 65–78.
54 RDK, 808 & 918.
55 Melville 2012, 161.
56 Hope 2016.
57 On the *qarachu beg*s of the Crimean Khanate, see Schamiloglu 1984, 283–297; Inalcık 1979–80, 445–466; Forbes Manz 1978, 282–309; Fisher 1978, 23–29.
58 *EMME*, 298. On the continuation of *keshig* offices under the Timurids, see Manz 1989, 172.

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RDRM, See List of Abbreviations.
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SP, See List of Abbreviations.
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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

THE *JAM* SYSTEM

The Mongol institution for communication and transportation

Hosung Shim

The Mongols established an extensive postal relay system throughout their vast empire during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. During the time of the Mongol Empire, the Mongolian word *jam* denoted a fixed relay station staffed by relay station keepers (*jamuchin*) and post-horse keepers (*ula'achin*), from which official travelers were to obtain remounts, provisions, lodgings, and other necessities for their journeys.[1] With the unprecedented expansion of the Mongol Empire, the *jam* system expanded to become the largest network of communication and transportation during the pre-modern era. For more than a century this system facilitated the exchange of people, materials, information, and culture between east and west, as well as north and south, during the era of the *Pax Mongolica*.

The Mongol *jam* system impressed many foreign visitors (e.g., John of Plano Carpini, William of Rubruck, Marco Polo, Odoric of Pordenone) as well as various subject peoples in China, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Russia. For this reason, all the successor states of the Mongol Empire, such as the Ming Dynasty, Timurid Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Muscovy, which were all heavily influenced by Mongol rule, maintained similar post road systems bearing almost identical names derived from the Mongolian word *jam* (*zhan* 站 in Chinese, *yam* in Turkic and Persian, and *iam* in Russian).

THE ORIGINS OF THE *JAM* SYSTEM

Scholars have considered that the Mongolian term *jam* as well as the *jam* system originated from China. They regarded the Mongolian term as borrowed from the Chinese word *zhan* 站 or *yi* 驛, and the Mongol postal relay system was modeled on that of previous Chinese states.[2] Recent research, however, emphasizes the Central Asian aspects of the Mongol *jam* system.[3]

The term *jam* did not originate from Chinese. The Chinese character *zhan*, which previously had nothing to do with a postal relay system, was only chosen to

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transcribe the Mongolian word *jam* during the Yuan period.[4] Moreover, during the early Mongol period, Chinese texts often transcribed the term *jam* by using several different Chinese characters, all pronounced *zhan*.[5] Some scholars claim that the Chinese word *yi* was transmitted to Turkic, thereby forming the term *yam*; then the Mongols inherited the Turkic word but pronounced it in their own way (*yam* > *jam*). However, the Turkic *yam* was derived from the Mongolian *jam* because the word *yam* is first attested in Middle Turkic of the fourteenth century.[6]

The earliest cognate of the term *jam* is found in the Taghbach (*Tuoba* 拓跋) language in the form of "*γyamčın*," meaning "people who use postal relay stations in all provinces."[7] Since Taghbach was one of the Middle Serbi languages of the Serbi-Mongolic language family,[8] the Mongol postal relay system inherited its name as well as basic terminologies, such as *jam* and *jamuchin*, from the Taghbach state, namely, the Northern Wei Dynasty (386–534). The Northern Wei Dynasty was not the only steppe-based state that built and utilized a postal relay system before the Mongol Empire. The Xiongnu, Rouran, Türk, Uyghur, and Khitan-Liao Empires in the Mongolian steppe and the West Uyghur Kingdom in modern Turfan and Jimsar area maintained postal relay systems within their territories.[9] Thus, it is likely that the Mongols had numerous precedents of postal relay institutions from previous steppe states when they established their *jam* system.

THE RISE OF THE *JAM* SYSTEM: CHINGGIS KHAN AND ÖGÖDEI QA'AN

A rudimentary form of the postal relay institution was already in operation during the time of Chinggis Khan. The Daoist master Changchun 長春眞人 and the Kitan official Yelü Chucai 耶律楚材 were firsthand witnesses to this earliest version of the *jam* system, and the accounts of their travels unveil a couple of interesting aspects. First, the postal relay system was more developed in the steppe areas in and around today's Mongolia than the settled regions in North China and Central Asia. In the settled areas, there was no well-organized network of relay stations. Thus, local rulers, officials, and residents in villages and towns were to offer official travelers post-horses, accommodation, provisions, and other necessities whenever necessary.[10] Across the Mongolian steppe, nomadic campsites functioned as quasi-relay stations. Therefore, all authorized travelers could obtain remounts, lodgings, provisions, and other necessary items more easily and frequently from any nomadic encampments they came across.[11]

More importantly, the Mongols established at least two regional post roads in and around the Mongolian steppe during Chinggis Khan's time. The first one was called the "Fish Lake Post Road 魚兒濼驛路" by Changchun and ran between Fish Lake and the loop of the upper Kerülen River.[12] The Mongols built this post road to connect their main rear support base on the upper Kerülen River (today's *Avraga* site in the Khentii province, Mongolia) to Fish Lake, which functioned as the frontline command center and logistics base during the campaign against the Jin Dynasty.[13] The second post road stretched from Chinqai City down to the Irtysh and Öröngö Rivers via the Altai Mountains. The southern section of it was called the "Post Road on a Big River to the South of the Altai Mountains 金山南大河驛路" by Changchun.[14] The Mongols constructed this post road to link their military support

base in western Mongolia (Chinqai City)[15] to Central Asia during their campaign against the Khwarazmshah Sultanate. In both instances, Chinggis Khan built post roads to facilitate Mongol military expansion into China and Central Asia. In sum, the Mongols built their earliest postal relay system in and around their homeland to facilitate their military expansion.

Ögödei Qa'an substantially expanded and institutionalized the *jam* system, thereby acquiring the reputation as its founder. Ögödei augmented the *jam* system to expedite the state-building and military expansion of the Mongol Empire. The last showdown with the Jin Dynasty and the construction of the new imperial capital, Qaraqorum, both prompted Ögödei to significantly improve the *jam* system connecting Mongolia to North China.[16] As a result, three post roads were built between the two regions. The eastern, central, and western routes were later known as the *Tergen*, *Morin*, and *Narin* Post Roads respectively. The itinerary of the *Tergen* Post Road went "Dadu 大都 – Shangdu 上都 – Fish Lake – the Gobi – the upper Kerulen River – the Tuul River – Lake Ögii – Qaraqorum." The *Morin* Road passed through "Shangdu – Lilingtai 李陵臺 – north of Datong 大同 – Fengzhou 豐州 – Mt. Daqing 大青山 – Jingzhou 淨州 – Shajing 沙井 – the Gobi – the Onggi River – Qaraqorum." Lastly, the *Narin* Road spanned "Dadu – Datong – Dongsheng



Map 23.1 The Tergen, Morin, Narin Post Roads
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

東勝 – Zhongxing 中興 – Mt. Helan 賀蘭山 or Ganzhou 甘州 – Ejene 亦集乃 – the Gobi – Qaraqorum."[17]

The Mongol campaign toward the Qipchaq steppe and Russian principalities also triggered Ögödei to expand the *jam* system further west. This post road bound the territories of the Mongol Empire horizontally through the Central Eurasian steppe. The itinerary of this post road went "Mongolia – the Altai Mountains – the Irtysh and Öröngö Rivers – Qobaq – Emil – the Ala Köl valley – the Ili River – the Chu River – the Talas River – the northern banks of the Syrdarya River – the northern shore of the Aral Sea – the Ural River – the Volga River." Fixed relay stations were installed at regular intervals only in the eastern half of the empire (the Mongolian steppe and its neighboring regions) during the reign of Ögödei. To the west of the Altai Mountains, *jam*s were built on a regular basis only along the northwestern rim of today's Zhungar Basin. These stations then came to be linked with those of the Chaghadaid and Jochid appanages. Across Batu's and Chaghadai's domains *jam*s were rarely installed. Instead, nomadic encampments of the steppe as well as towns and villages of the settled region provided official travelers with necessary items and service.[18]

At this juncture, two points should be underscored. First, Ögödei did not create these post roads out of nothing. In other words, these post roads were expansions of the previous post roads or land routes. For instance, Ögödei substantially



Map 23.2 Central Asian Post Roads
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

expanded the Fish Lake Post Road of Chinggis Khan's time to form the eastern (or the *Tergen*) post road. Likewise, the post road around the Altai Range was significantly extended to cover the entire northwestern fringe of the Zhungar Basin. The central and western post roads, to be known as the *Morin* and *Narin* Post Roads respectively, were constructed on the two land routes that had been frequently used even before Chinggis Khan's time. Second, during Ögödei's reign, the steppe regions, especially in and around Mongolia, retained a far better *jam* system than the settled areas in North China, Central Asia, and the Middle East, as all the post roads were constructed to supply and feed the Mongol heartland. For this reason, during that time, all roads led to Qaraqorum.

Ögödei also institutionalized the *jam* system. During Chinggis Khan's time, the *jam* system only achieved a modest level of institutionalization and was operated on an *ad hoc* basis. Thus, whenever an envoy of a Mongol prince saw a fresh horse, he (and even his entire retinue) was entitled to exchange his own horse for it.[19] Moreover, when messengers rode in haste, they were allowed to move freely among the population, often causing great disruptions.[20] Ögödei regularized the operations of the *jam* system by introducing a government branch of households designated for running *jam*s,[21] namely the relay station household (*jamuchin* in Mongolian, *zhanhu* 站戶 in Chinese). Thus, Ögödei made envoys travel only through *jam*s run by the relay households. To maintain this system across the steppe regions, each *minggan* (the administrative-cum-military unit of one thousand) was to build and administer a *jam* within its jurisdiction in lieu of other ordinary taxation and *corvée* paid by civilian households.[22] In North China, the maintenance of stations was somewhat different. Each unit of one hundred managed a station with rice granaries and Chinese carts in it, and all necessary items for *jam*s were jointly provided by relay station households and civilian households.[23] The existence of the relay station household had been unknown before the Mongol Empire.

THE EXPANSION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE SYSTEM: MÖNGKE, QUBILAI, AND GHAZAN

The Mongol post road system considerably expanded over the course of the two massive military campaigns against South China and the Middle East during the reign of Mongke (1251–1259). Möngke dispatched his brother Qubilai with large forces to the Dali (大理) Kingdom in 1252. During the conquest of Dali, the Mongols constructed new roads along with relay stations in today's Yunnan and Guizhou provinces of China.[24] In addition, Möngke launched another campaign of enormous scale to the Middle East in 1254. He appointed his brother Hülegü as the commander-in-chief of this enterprise. Hülegü's army utilized the *jam* system from Mongolia down to Khurasan via Mawarannahr.[25] During the campaign, Hülegü and his army also considerably developed the system in Iran and Mawarannahr. As a result, Hülegü's campaign created a standard route between Mongolia and western Iran, passing through Mawarannahr, Khurasan, and Mazandaran, though fixed relay stations were not installed yet along the entire route.[26]

Möngke also institutionalized the *jam* system. For instance, he set a limit on the number of post-horses and provisions that emissaries could use en route to restrain their abuse of *jam*s. He also prohibited merchants coming to Mongolia from

using post-horses.[27] More importantly, Möngke implemented a fiscal reform that regularized the operation of *jam*s. Specifically, he imposed the *qubchiri* tax, which was fixed annually according to a taxpayer's wealth, in North China, Central Asia, and the Middle East to meet the expenses of forced levies, *jam*s, and maintenance of ambassadors.[28] By doing so, Möngke attempted to standardize the way that the empire-wide *jam* system was financed and maintained.

During Qubilai Qa'an's reign (1260–1294), the Mongol *jam* system achieved its full maturity. Qubilai not only reinforced the existing post roads but also built new ones. Over the course of the construction of Shangdu and Daidu, he significantly extended the existing post roads connecting Mongolia to North China.[29] As a result, the *Tergen*, *Morin*, and *Narin* Post Roads all became fully developed with standard names and routes during the first decade of Qubilai's reign.[30] As the importance of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhist monks increased in the Yuan court, Qubilai also built relay stations in Central Tibet in the 1260s.[31] Moreover, due to the campaigns against the Song Dynasty, Qubilai constructed several new post roads in today's Hebei, Henan, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces of China.[32]

The Yuan court constructed many relay stations for waterways in South China along with horse stations, while in North China, it abolished substantial overland relay stations in 1289 as North China's strategic importance diminished with the construction of the Grand Canal, which now connected South and North China. The Yuan court built many water relay stations along the Grand Canal in North China.[33] Qubilai also expanded the *jam* system into Manchuria. By 1283, the Yuan government had already constructed many *jam*s in this region. After the suppression of Nayan's rebellion in 1288, Qubilai further strengthened the *jam* system in Manchuria by building a substantial number of relay stations, including fifteen dog-sled stations along the Amur River.[34]

During the military conflicts with Qaidu, Qubilai built several new post roads in Central Asia, particularly after Sirigi's revolt in 1276, in which he lost the control over the post road that connected Mongolia with Central Asia via the Altai Range and the northwestern rim of the Zhungar Basin. To overcome the loss of this critical route, Qubilai constructed new *jam*s several times in Uyghuristan and along the southern hem of the Tarim Basin between 1278 and 1285.[35] Qaidu's fierce attacks on Uyghuristan in 1285 and 1286, however, seriously hampered the Yuan court from maintaining the new post road in Uyghuristan. For this reason, Qubilai further expanded the post road along the southern rim of the Tarim Basin in 1286 to secure a passage to Central Asia and to the Ilkhanate.[36] During the military rivalry with Qaidu, Qubilai reinforced post roads in southern Siberia. In 1291, he established six *jam*s from the land of the Kirgiz to that of the Oirat.[37]

Qubilai substantially enhanced the *jam* system within his jurisdiction by introducing a new institution to administer *jam*s. Before Qubilai's reign, there was no specialized governmental agency to deal with the affairs of the post road system, and local officials managed every *jam*. In 1270, Qubilai appointed "postal relay station inspectors (脫脫禾孫 *todghasun*)" in every route of the empire to oversee on-site operations of *jam*s. At the same time, he also installed the "Office of Controller-general of Postal Relay Stations (諸站都統領使司)" that governed all *todghasun*s, thereby centralizing the management and control of the post road system.[38] The Office of Controller-general of Postal Relay Stations was superseded by the Bureau

of Transmission (通政院) in 1276.[39] This specialized governmental agency assumed various tasks regarding the *jam* system, such as appointment and supervision of postal relay station masters (站官), construction of new *jam*s, reporting situations of local stations to the Central Secretariat, providing relief for impoverished *jamuchin*s, issuance of official credentials, and managing provisions.[40]

The Bureau of Transmission was quintessentially a "Mongol" institution in view of its personnel and jurisdiction. Most officials of the bureau were Mongols or *semuren* and belonged to hereditary office-holding families. Moreover, the majority of the officials of the bureau had once served as *keshig* of the qa'an in their youth.[41] Therefore, in terms of human resources, the Bureau of Transmission conspicuously preferred those of privileged ethnicity who had proven their loyalty to the qa'ans for generations. The Bureau of Transmission was to handle various affairs relevant to relay stations in the steppe and settled regions. In 1311, when Ayurbarwada Qa'an abolished the bureau and put all aspects concerning the *jam* system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War (兵部), the Grand Counselor Temüder insisted that the ministry should govern only *jam*s in China proper, and Mongol *jam*s along the *Tergen*, *Narin*, *Morin*, and other post roads should all be controlled by the Bureau of Transmission. As a result, about four months later, the Bureau of Transmission was resuscitated to manage Mongol *jam*s.[42] From this fact, it is confirmed that the Yuan court handled Mongol *jam*s separately from, and probably more carefully than, Chinese relay stations and that the Bureau of Transmission had more intimate associations with the Mongol *jam*s.[43] In 1320, the Bureau of Transmission was fully restored and dealt with both Chinese and Mongol *jam*s throughout the Yuan territories.

In the Ilkhanate, Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304) played a prominent role in the institutionalization of the *jam* system. To regularize the system, Ghazan came close to re-creating a new *jam* system by adopting various elements from the Yuan Dynasty. Before Ghazan's reform, fixed relay stations were installed mostly in major cities in the Ilkhanate. Between the cities, villages and nomadic campsites (instead of *jam*s) provided official travelers with post-horses and provisions.[44] Thus, the operation of the *jam* system in the early Ilkhanate was very similar to the Jochid and Chaghadaid Khanates. The Ilkhan *jam*s were called the "*jam*s of *tümen* (*yamha-yi tuman*),"[45] which seems to correspond with Juvaini's explanation that every two *tümen* (the biggest administrative-cum-military unit of ten thousand) had to supply one *jam*.[46] As discussed earlier, in the eastern half of the empire, either a *minggan* or a unit of one hundred (not two *tümen*s) installed and maintained a *jam*. Therefore, Juvaini's statement likely depicts the construction of the *jam* system in the western half of the Mongol Empire, not the entire empire. Since a *jam* was managed by every two *tümen* in the Jochid, Chaghadaid, and Hülegüid realms, *jam*s were not densely installed at regular intervals but only in major political and military centers in those regions.

Since the lack of well-organized networks of *jam*s caused serious problems, the first action Ghazan took for his reform was to establish new post roads for express couriers, separate from the previous *jam* system. These new post roads were meant to be used only on important state matters. To this end, *jam*s were established on major highways at three-league intervals, each with three fattened horses. Only envoys carrying a letter in the khan's handwriting and with the khan's golden seal could receive post-horses. Great amirs assumed the responsibility of managing these

*jam*s at the provincial level, whilst the central government provided the great amirs with lavish funds so that there would be no shortcoming in maintaining *jam*s.[47]

Second, Ghazan issued the amirs in the borderlands a certain number of official letters, with his own customary sign and seal on them, so that the amirs could give the letters to their envoys who, by carrying the credentials, could travel through the *jam*s.[48] When an urgent situation arose, the frontier amirs could send a letter directly to the khan through the *jam*s. Post-horse keepers (*ulaghchiyan*) could cover sixty leagues in a day and night. Ghazan also gave every frontier amir "a horseman seal (*tamgha-yi savari*)" to stamp on such letters with the superscription "from X place to Y place." Two footmen messengers (*peykan*) were posted at every *jam* to convey letters about important provincial affairs. Provincial amirs were to stamp "a footman seal (*tamgha-yi peyki*)" at the top of a letter with the same superscription. These footmen messengers could cover thirty leagues in a day and night by relay.[49]

Lastly, Ghazan strictly confined the use of the post roads to official envoys dispatched from the khan's court for governmental affairs. Any official envoys assigned to a province received funds from the treasury to cover their provisions. When the envoys arrived at their destination, they were to be fed from a designated property (*far'-i moayyan*) of the province.[50] It is worth emphasizing that all the measures Ghazan implemented to reform the Ilkhanid *jam* system had already been executed in the east during the reign of Qubilai.[51] There is little doubt that Ghazan's reform was modeled upon the Yuan *jam* system. Therefore, Ghazan's reform of the *jam* system is one of the most revealing examples indicating the active interaction between the Yuan and the Ilkhanate.[52]

CRISIS, RESUSCITATION, HEYDAY, AND DECLINE OF THE *JAM* SYSTEM

The Mongol *jam* system achieved impressively comprehensive coverage across the Eurasian continent as well as a remarkable level of institutionalization by the time of Qubilai and Ghazan. Although the *jam* system came close to its full maturity at the end of the thirteenth century, the political and military turmoil in Central Asia thwarted further development of the empire-wide system. Despite Qubilai's efforts to maintain the post roads connecting the Yuan territories with Central Asia and, ultimately, with the Ilkhanate, the *jam* system stopped working in Central Asia by 1289 due to the intensified conflict between Qaidu and the qa'an.[53]

In 1304, the Mongol *ulus*es reached the Great Rapprochement on the initiative of Temür Öljeitü Qa'an and Du'a of the Chaghadaid Khanate. With the great reconciliation between the Mongol khanates, the *jam* system resumed operation across the entire Mongol territory. The Ilkhan Öljeitü's letter to Philip the Fair of France states, "from the land of South China where the sun rises to the horizon that limits the whole Mongol realms, [all the Mongol] *ulus*es became united and connected their *jam*s together."[54] From this epistle, it is certain that all the Mongol rulers agreed to revive a unified *jam* system.

Mongolia and Central Asia were the key regions where *jam*s needed to be reconstructed. The post road in western Mongolia, which had been devastated by the battles between the forces of Qaidu and the qa'ans, recovered during the negotiation for the Great Rapprochement. As a result, the *jam* system was fully reestablished from

Daidu up to the Altai Range during the first decade of the fourteenth century.[55] The Mongols also restored the post road running between Uyghuristan and North China at about the same time. The situation regarding the *jam*s along the southern rim of the Tarim Basin remains unclear due to the paucity of relevant sources. Although it cannot be proven whether the *jam*s recovered in this area, the route linking the Hexi Corridor with Khotan was utilized after the Great Reconciliation.[56] The post road connecting Mongolia with Central Asia via the northwestern fringe of the Zhungar Basin was also restored between 1306 and 1310. Specifically, *jam*s along the route began to be reconstructed with the successful advancement of the Yuan army led by Qaishan to Central Asia. The reestablishment of the post road must have been completed by 1310 given the fact that a few princes and their entourages used this post road in that year.[57] In sum, after the Great Rapprochement, all the major post roads in Mongolia and Central Asia were fully restored.

The resuscitation of the post roads in Central Asia encouraged lively interactions between all the Mongol *ulus*es during the first half of the fourteenth century. Inter-*ulus* exchanges of envoys were especially frequent during the 1310s and the 1320s, which can be regarded as the heyday of the Mongol *jam* system.[58] From the 1330s, however, the post roads in Central Asia began to decline because of the outbreak of the Black Death, which not only devastated inhabited areas in Central Asia but also threw the political situation into chaos. The *jam* system in Central Asia did not collapse completely at that time. The post roads in Central Asia were still working, although their foundation was weakened compared to the 1320s.[59] By 1347, Central Asia witnessed widespread turmoil due to the collapse of the Chaghadaid Khanate, which eventually led to the destruction of the *jam* system in Central Asia.[60]

By the mid-fourteenth century, all other parts of the Mongol Empire were also suffering various crises, which led to the disintegration of the *jam* system. In South China, for example, numerous anti-Yuan rebellions broke out during the 1350s and the 1360s. As a result, post roads in Central and South China were frequently cut off. Yuan officials suffered hardships in communication and transportation and sometimes had no other options but to use detouring maritime routes.[61] With the collapse of the Mongol Empire by the mid-fourteenth century, the *jam* system also broke down in China, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Russia. The *jam* institution, however, left a significant legacy in the territories of its successor states across Central Eurasia during the periods that followed.

NOTES

1 *SHM* §279.
2 Regarding the Chinese etymology of the Mongol word, see Doerfer 1975, 110–118; Chen 2003, 73; Dang 2006, 28. When it comes to the Chinese origin of the *jam* system, see Olbricht and Pinks 1954, 39; Morgan 2000, 379; Morgan 2007, 93–94; Silverstein 2007, 141–143.
3 Vér 2016, 227–239.
4 Dang 2006, 28.
5 Serruys 1957, 146–148; Allsen 2010, 242.
6 Shimunek 2017, 343.
7 Shimunek 2017, 151, 342–343; Vovin 2007, 195; Allsen 2010, 241.
8 Shimunek 2017, 35, 121–168.

9 Sima 1981, 123/3173; Arakawa 1994, 6–18; Sima 1956, 6245; Minorsky 1948, 283; Vér 2016, 237–238; Wang 1990, 1314; Wittfogel and Fêng 1949, 160–168.
10 Li 1985, 1–2, 10–11, 13, 16, 22–23, 25–27.
11 Li 1985, 6–9, 24–25; Yelü 2006, 1.
12 Li 1985, 7; Hu and Xie 2009, 560. Fish Lake is today's Lake Khöl Tsagaan in Abaga Banner of Shiliin Gol League, Inner Mongolia (Shiraishi 2012, 23–38).
13 Shiraishi 2006, 85–86, 93; Shiraishi 2012, 26, 30–31.
14 Li 1985, 8–9, 23. The ruin of Chinqai City is in Sharga Sum of Gobi-Altai province, Mongolia (*EMME*, 103).
15 Oba 1982, 87.
16 *YS* 153/3610; Hu and Yao 2009a, 367–368, 378; *RDT*, 328–329.
17 Chen 2005, 4–13, Zhou 1992, 28–29; Dang 2006, 283–288. There is a possibility that the *Narin* Post Road also stretched from Zhongxing to near Hami.
18 Shim 2014, 419–427.
19 Hu and Yao 2009b, 355.
20 *SHM* §279.
21 *SHM* §279–280.
22 *SHM* §279–280; Hu and Yao 2009a, 378.
23 *SHM*, I, 378; Dang 2006, 30–36.
24 *SHM* §124.
25 *RDT*, 478–482.
26 In this regard, the travels of Körgüz, Het'um, Hülegü's army, Mas'ud Beg, and Changde to Iran are worth consulting (*HWC*, 500; Shim 2014, 409–418; Gandzakets'i 1986, 304–306; Boyle 1977, 175–189; *RDT*, 482–485, 519; Liu 1936, 1–2).
27 *RDT*, 411.
28 *HWC*, 517; Kim 2010, 5–7.
29 Chen 2005, 4–7, 10–11; Dang 2006, 286–287.
30 Chen 2005, 6; Shim 2014, 429; *Zhanchi* 1977, 2/8(1).
31 Dang 2006, 298.
32 Dang 2006, 321–322.
33 Dang 2006, 322, 327.
34 Dang 2006, 289–290, 324–325.
35 Shim 2014, 433–438.
36 Shim 2014, 438–440.
37 *Zhanchi* 1977, 4/3(1)–3(2).
38 *Zhanchi* 1977, 1/3(1?); *YS* 7/132.
39 *Zhanchi* 1977, 1/3(2).
40 Dang 2006, 77.
41 Dang 2006, 67–71.
42 *Zhanchi* 1977, 1/5(2)–6(1); 5/7(2); 6/11(2).
43 The Yuan court frequently succored *jam*s across the empire because *jamuchin*s were often impoverished, to the extent that they could no longer carry out their duties, for various reasons including natural disaster and abuse of *jam*s (Dang 2006, 147–158).
44 *RDT*, 714–718.
45 *RDRM,* II, 1451.
46 *HWC*, 33.
47 *RDT*, 716–717; *RDRM*, II, 1449–1450.
48 *RDT*, 717; *RDRM*, II, 1450.
49 *RDT*, 717; *RDRM*, II, 1450.
50 *RDT*, 717–718; *RDRM*, II, 1451.
51 Kim 2010, 16–21.

52 Kim 2010, 23.
53 Shim 2014, 440.
54 Baumann 2012, 59.
55 Shim 2014, 440–442.
56 Shim 2014, 442–444.
57 Shim 2014, 444–451.
58 Saguchi 1942, 151–214; Shim 2014, 451–454.
59 Shim 2014, 454–456.
60 Shim 2014, 457.
61 Dang 2006, 337–338.

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SECTION 2

THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

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SECTION 2 INTRODUCTION

THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Michael Hope and Timothy May

The formation of the *Yeke Monggol Ulus* is typically treated as both a political and a social revolution. Not only did Chinggis Khan unify the warring states of the Mongolian Plateau, but he also provided them with a new sense of identity and belonging, which transcended earlier loyalties of kinship and service. This point can be over-emphasised, and there was still a great deal that survived from the earlier period, not least of all the *törü* – a series of principles and customs which governed relationships between lords and servants, parents and children, and also husbands and wives.[1] As late as the fourteenth century, the Persian scholar-bureaucrat Rashid al-Din still felt obliged to list the lineages of the households that had governed Mongolia prior to Chinggis Khan's rise to power, suggesting that these old identity groups retained some residual importance. Nevertheless, the creation of an empire, the development of an administrative framework, and the institutionalization of laws, offices, and entitlements would have a profound impact upon familial, social, and political relationships. This change would have only been exaggerated by the conquest of new territories and the intercourse that followed it. The movement of people necessarily resulted in the transmission of goods and ideas, which saw the rise of new fashions, rituals, and understandings of the Mongols' place in the world. This transformation was evidenced among the Mongols as well as their subject population, who were both the agents and subjects of change under Mongol rule.

Women, who occupy important positions in the heroic historical genre of the *Secret History of the Mongols*, serve as useful barometers for social change in the Mongol Empire. The number and diversity of Chinggis Khan's wives expanded simultaneously with his political confederation, at first led by his most trusted and beloved wife, Börte, but later including women from the conquered populations.[2] His household included princesses from the Kereit royal family, who lent their prestige and nobility to the khan's house, as well as women from atomised units, such as the Tatars, whose intimacy with the khan mirrored the assimilation of their people into the Mongol union. Princesses were even taken from more distant enemies, such as the Naiman, the Jin, and the Khwarazmshah Empire, though perhaps more as

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trophies than as companions. In any case, the household of the khan was a microcosm of his new political union, and senior wives therefore had enormous potential to shape the khan's policy.

Not all imperial wives were of equal power or status. From the earliest days of the Mongol Empire, Chinggis Khan and his successors prioritised marriages with the aristocratic lineages of non-atomised peoples. These were warring states, or principalities, which held separate political and social identities to the Mongols prior to 1206 and whom Rashid al-Din describes as "Turkic tribes that have also had separate monarchies."[3] They managed to retain much of their former autonomy by submitting to Chinggis Khan and supporting his campaigns against his adversaries. Exchange marriages between the Chinggisids and these aristocratic lineages were, therefore, a way to renew personal bonds of fealty and friendship, whilst also perpetuating elite lineages at the apex of the Mongol Ulus (Anne F. Broadbridge). Of course, the strength of these alliances varied with time and depended upon the political climate. The growing importance of commanders of atomised units after the reign of Ghazan Khan (1295–1304), Özbeg Khan (1313–1341), and Qaishan Qa'an (1307–1311), to some extent, disrupted earlier patterns of marriage and resulted in the initiation of new exchange marriages with commoner (*qarachu*) families (Bruno De Nicola).[4] In some cases, even concubines and women from the conquered population appear to have challenged the traditional role of the older Mongolian families.

The autonomy and influence of these women were also subject to political and ideological shifts. Women were, for example, central to the transmission of culture, especially religion, which was a marker of identity within the Mongol Empire. The soldiers of the *tamma* armies posted in China, Iran, and the Pontic were especially prone to marriage with the conquered population, as seems to have been the case with the Qaraunas, whom the African traveller Ibn Battuta described as being of mixed Mongol and South Asian descent.[5] Marriage with local women drawn from the families of merchants, magistrates, and religious leaders would have been one avenue for the transmission of new faith, as suggested by the numerous stories which link Islamization to the imbibing of milk from Muslim wetnurses. Judith Pfeiffer commented on the seemingly apocryphal story of the unnamed wife of Baiju Noyan, the *tamma* commander of Azerbaijan, playing a role in the conversion of her husband, though we also know of several marriage ties between senior Chinggisid princes and princesses from the provincial Salghurid, Qutlughkhanid, and Seljuq dynasties, which may have played a role in the Islamization of the Ilkhan court.[6] Less information is at hand for women in the east of the Mongol Empire, though there is certainly evidence that Qubilai's wife Chabui Khatun was critical in introducing Buddhism to the Yuan court (Brian Baumann).[7] These innovations have in turn spurred debate about whether the introduction of new religions would have entailed a change to relationships between the khans and their wives. The shift away from levirate marriage towards widow chastity, evidenced in the juridical books of the Yuan during the fourteenth century, may suggest that this was the case among the common people, but the khan and his relatives were often treated as exceptions.[8] In any case, imperial wives were still among the most prominent political actors in the Ilkhanate, the Jochid Ulus, and the Yuan Empire mid-way through the fourteenth century, indicating that gender relationships were highly complex and did not always shift with religious allegiances.

Women were, of course, not the only ones affected by the changing confessional makeup of the Mongol Empire. Religion had always been an important medium for monitoring relationships between the Mongols and their subjects, as the latter were commonly grouped according to their confessional identity, and the Mongols were experts at manipulating communal tensions to advance their own interests (Na'ama O. Arom and Jesse Sloane). As we have already seen, the Mongol conquest of East Turkistan was, in no small part, facilitated by Chinggis Khan's decree that Muslims of the region could practice their religion without persecution, after they had suffered the rule of the Buddhist Qara Khitai. The Cilician Armenians were, likewise, enticed to submit to Mongol rule in part because the conquerors would negate the threat posed by the Muslim Seljuqs and because of the numerous accounts of Christian princesses and princes at the khan's *ordu* (Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog). Similar stories prompted King Louis IX to dispatch clandestine envoys to the Jochid prince Sartaq, who was reputedly a Christian. His emissary, William of Rubruck, was, however, disappointed by Sartaq, whose officers abrasively ordered the European visitors, "Do not say that our master is a Christian. He is not a Christian; he is a Mo'al [Mongol]."[9] Clearly, the Mongols identified Christianity with the conquered Russian and Transcaucasian population, and so while they were presumably all praying to the same God, the Chinggisids did not regard themselves as Christians. The same reticence is evident in Güyük Qa'an's letter to Pope Innocent IV, in which he decries the possibility that he would ever become a "trembling Nestorian Christian," despite the fact that several of his most senior officials were Nestorian Christians.[10] God had chosen Chinggis Khan and his descendants to rule, whereas the Pope and his followers had shown an inexcusable ignorance of this fact and therefore demonstrated their lack of true spiritual insight.

The separation between the Mongols and the faith-based communities of their conquered people was, however, eroded to some extent by their formal conversion to a number of world religions. Islam was the most popular and therefore the most influential religion across most of the Mongol Empire, which contributed in no small way to the spread of the faith across Eurasia during this period. The rulers of the Jochid Ulus, the Ilkhanate, and the Middle Empire all adopted Islam, while at least one of Qubilai Qa'an's grandsons, Ananda, was reported to have done so (Ishayahu Landa). The extent to which this led the Mongols to abandon their former ecumenicalism is debatable. The Mongols were only ever "tolerant" of their subjects' religions insofar as those subjects were willing to pray for the longevity and strength of Mongol rule and profess the divine mandate of the khan – whether given by the Abrahamic God or by Eternal Heaven. The Muslim Özbeg was, as such, still willing to grant Italian merchants and Orthodox churches trading rights and tax exemptions, while Ghazan Khan showed compassion to the Catholicos Mar Yahballah III after his churches had been ransacked by his over-zealous supporters.[11] Nevertheless, the absence of any coordinated campaign of persecution did not preclude small-scale opportunistic attacks from governors and commanders, eager to ingratiate themselves and build up a personal powerbase among the conquered people.

Tension did, however, often exist between the rituals and taboos of the Mongols and their conquered people, which were often heightened by the conversion of a Mongol ruler. The Muslim khans Ahmad Tegüder (Ilkhanate) and Tarmashirin (Middle Empire) were both overthrown by rebellions, with their conversion to

Islam and strict enforcement of the *shari'a* over the *jasaq* being cited as reasons (or pretexts) for opposition.[12] Much seems to have depended upon the personal approach of the ruler and those around him, as demonstrated by the example of Ögödei, who refused to punish Muslims for breaking Mongol taboos. The records of papal envoys also testify to the willingness of individual Mongol commanders to either explain or forego certain court ceremonies when they offended the sensibilities of foreign visitors, such as the insistence that they bow to the ground three times in honour of the khan or the obligation that those entering the khan's presence pass by two fires.[13] Other Mongol leaders, by contrast, appear to have deliberately forced their subjects to choose between their religious proscriptions and their loyalty to the khan, as evidenced when Abaqa Khan held out a piece of pork on a fork for his Muslim chief minister Shams al-Din Juvayni. Juvayni accepted the meat, but Abaqa turned to his companions and said that he would have used the same fork to pluck out the minister's eyes if he had refused to eat it.[14] Loyalty was always of paramount importance to the Mongols, who prioritised their own personal connection to the god-head above any affiliation with the confessional communities of their subjects.

The growing role of world religions at the various Mongol courts was, however, expressed in the material culture of the empire. The Mongols acquired spiritual capital and prestige through the patronage of foundations (such as temples, schools, and charitable endowments), individuals (like artists, musicians, craftsmen, adepts, and occultists), and special projects (poetry, historical literature, portraiture, and sacred books). Such relationships of patronage could be established by prospective benefactors or, perhaps more regularly, by those seeking a backer. The Mongols' control over people, offices, and revenues made them natural objects of attraction for all manner of supplicants, entrepreneurs, and beggars. The impression given by Juvayni was that the khan encountered many such petitioners on a daily basis, some seeking small grants to tide them over through lean months, while others had more grandiose ambitions.[15] It was incumbent upon a khan to demonstrate his largesse by granting as many requests as was practical, thereby redistributing the wealth of the empire and building relationships of obligation and fealty between the khan and his subjects. Although some of these functions were taken over by dedicated ministries during the reign of Möngke and his brother Qubilai, khans, khatuns, commanders, and office-holders also maintained their own networks with regional notables in the areas where they had been appointed.

The artists, authors, and architects who produced these works served as intermediaries, linking the Mongols to the consumers of their art. Andrew Peacock has recently demonstrated the way that Turkmen *beylik*s and Persian officials would patronise copies of texts in order to appropriate the knowledge and prestige of a particular civilization for themselves.[16] The extent to which the Mongols were engaged in a similar process was evidenced in the projects linking Chinggisid princes and princesses with artists in overt imitation of earlier Chinese dynasties at the Yuan court of the fourteenth century (Shane McCausland). Patronising juridical codebooks, adding extensions to existing shrines and devotional structures, or even building palaces according to the conventions of the conquered people were means to link the ruling dynasty with the guilds, religious leaders, and bureaucratic families who helped the Mongol Empire to function (Sheila Blair). These new edifices were not simple reproductions of static cultural models, but in many cases reflected the

interests of the patrons themselves. The depiction of the Persian kings in the Great *Shahnama* of Abu Sa'id (commonly known as the Demotte *Shahnama*) as Mongols or the preponderance of animals – especially horses – among some late Yuan artists are examples of how the experience of Mongol rule dramatically influenced the type of art being produced.[17] Further research into the material culture of the Mongol Empire is still needed, nowhere more so than in the steppe and Mongolia itself, where the physical legacy of Mongol rule is still being unearthed (Ulambayar Erdenebat, Jargalan Burentogtokh, and William Honeychurch; and Daniel C. Waugh).

Trade was critical to provide the Mongols with the necessary material to carry out their grand artistic and engineering projects. From the earliest phase of its development, the unification of the *Yeke Monggol Ulus* placed stress upon the resources and productive capacity of the Mongolian Plateau. Increased traffic across old pasture grounds in the Orkhon River Valley, the Onon River Valley, and the Sa'ari Plains, followed by the construction of the imperial capital Qaraqorum in 1238, would have concentrated more people in already crowded grazing grounds. Add to this a growing number of diplomats, missionaries, supplicants, and vassals, and the resources of the steppe would have been stretched to breaking point. Chinggis Khan compensated for these pressures by enticing traders to Mongolia to provide the food, clothing, tools, and luxury items needed to placate his followers. Juvayni explains how Chinggis and then Ögödei competed for a share of the trade from East and Central Asia by offering improved prices, which would have lured merchants away from their old markets in the south towards the emerging power in the steppe.[18] Indeed, the construction of Qaraqorum, with its separate quarters for Muslims and Chinese, may have been in part a means of providing the merchants with such a market. The amenities afforded to merchants were only grown further by later generations of Mongol rulers. Marco Polo's travelogue provides extensive detail on how Qubilai incentivised merchants to come to Daidu by giving them free accommodation in fine hostels, comfort-women in state-run brothels, and security through prohibitions on carrying weapons in the inner city.[19] Trade was a serious issue for the Mongols, who acquired a great deal of their revenue from sales tax (*tamgha*; István Vásáry and Judith Kolbas).

The unification of much of Eurasia in a single empire (the *Pax Mongolica*) opened new possibilities to foreign traders, who entered lucrative partnerships with their Mongol patrons. The extent and timeframe for this exchange has been debated widely by modern historians and must be weighed against a number of factors. The decimation caused to large swaths of Eurasia almost certainly had an impact on the volume of goods being traded, which would have only marginally been compensated for through the construction of new infrastructure (e.g. roads, caravanserais, and passports). Yet many of the core agricultural producers in southern China, India, and Egypt escaped significant damage, and old maritime hubs in the Moluccas Straits, Constantinople, and the Persian Gulf likewise seem to have expanded their footprint in the second half of the thirteenth century. Indeed, though the conquests were destructive, they did contribute to the creation of new fortunes and the expansion of some older industries. From the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries, the Mongol Empire became a focal point of the slave trade across the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Hindu Kush, among other places. The displacement and, in some cases, deliberate relocation of other populations saw the exchange of skills and

technologies, resulting in the increased production and sale of cotton in East Asia, the spread of new citrus fruit from the Middle East to China, and the sale of porcelain in West Asia.[20] These exchanges were undoubtedly disrupted to some extent by the disintegration of the unified empire after 1259 and the subsequent internecine wars between the Mongolian successor states. Nevertheless, political divisions never created unsurmountable barriers for intrepid merchants. Maritime trade provided an outlet for the Yuan and the Ilkhanate, bypassing their often hostile neighbours in the Middle Empire (Colleen C. Ho and Paul D. Buell). A steady traffic of grain and slaves from the Jochid Ulus to the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt via Anatolia also suggests that ways could be found to subvert embargoes on commerce with hostile powers.[21]

The resulting trade produced what Timothy May has described as the 'Chinggis Exchange,' in which new ideas, technologies, and goods were transmitted from one end of Eurasia to the other. Medical knowledge and *materia medica* were among the most notable fields of exchange during this period as the low average lifespan of the later rulers of the empire prompted increased interest in health and well-being (Paul D. Buell). At the time that the Yuan emperor Temür Öljeitü (r. 1294–1307) was funding a translation of a Chinese manual on pulse-medicine into Mongolian, Khudabanda Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316) was doing the same thing (into Persian) in the Ilkhanate.[22] Indeed, the Ilkhan court reputedly played host to physicians from all over Eurasia, including Indian *yogi*s, Chinese physicians, as well as Islamic experts in Galenic medicine.[23] We may imagine that these doctors collaborated and exchanged information far beyond the translations which have survived for posterity. These exchanges made the Mongol court a theatre for spirited and highly entertaining debates between advocates of different schools of thought. Such debates, which the khans deliberately staged, were most common on the subject of religion, for which we have a number of examples from the Ilkhanate during the reign of Arghun (1284–1291) and again under Öljeitü.[24]

Such collaborations were not unheard of prior to the arrival of the Mongols – the collaboration between Christians and Muslims in the kingdom of Sicily being one of the other notable near-contemporary examples. Yet the sheer scale of the Chinggisid Exchange certainly was revolutionary and, in some cases, too much of a radical departure for its subjects. In the Ilkhanate, for example, the exchange of medical texts saw knowledge of Chinese pulse-medicine spread to the Middle East, yet it was not until the seventeenth century that this expertise was widely utilised, when it was reintroduced again in the Ottoman Empire.[25] The Ilkhanate's experimentation with paper currency in 1293 likewise proved to be more disruptive than helpful to the Iranian economy. Nevertheless, the use of a token currency loosely copied from Qubilai's Yuan Empire did find imitators in South Asia, and other ideas proved to be far more durable.[26] For example, he expansion of the Mongol Empire across Eurasia led to the production of new, far more detailed maps than had ever been produced (Hyunhee Park). The Map of Integrated Regions (1402), produced in Korea from earlier Yuan models, built upon existing cartographical traditions to incorporate major cities and topography of the Middle East and Africa.[27] At the same time, knowledge of East Asia spread across the Middle East, with some of the earliest references to Korea (*Ko-lai*) appearing in the *Collected Histories* of Rashid al-Din. The anonymous author of the *Travels of Sir John Mandeville*, like other contemporaries in

Europe, fed off the European fascination with the territories of the Mongol Empire to pen his fictional travelogue throughout Asia, with extensive detail afforded to the realm of the Great Khan.[28] These revolutionary discoveries played no small part in reshaping conceptualizations of space and identity on the cusp of the modern era.

NOTES

1 Buell and Kolbas 2016, 47; Pochekaev 2016, 183; Humphrey and Hürelbaatar, 25–26; Togan 1998, 148.
2 Broadbridge 2018, Zhao 2008.
3 RDT, 61.
4 Uno 2009; Broadbridge 2016.
5 Martinez 1986–88, 231.
6 Pfeiffer 2012, 373; Lane 2003, 108–117 & 131–133.
7 Rossabi 1987, 16.
8 Birge 2017, 214.
9 Rubruck, 120.
10 *TMM*, 85.
11 Budge 1928, 221–222; Lane 2018, 3.
12 Biran 2002, 749; Amitai 2001, 35.
13 The papal envoy Ascelin refused to kneel before the Mongol commander Baiju and was instead asked how the Roman Catholics might show reverence in their own fashion. The incident might have cost Ascelin his life if not for Baiju's wife's intercession. Pow 2019; Ayalon 1971, 119–120; Aigle 2004, 994.
14 Vassaf 1968, 58–59.
15 *HWC*, 203–236.
16 Peacock 2019, 167.
17 Blair and Grabar 1980, 25; Soudavar 1996, 97; Rossabi 2015, 220.
18 *HWC*, 78 & 201–231.
19 Polo 1958, 129–131.
20 Allsen 2001, 124; Brook 2010, 206.
21 Hope 2021; Haykıran 2009, 172.
22 Lane 2006, 141; Atwood 2013, 223.
23 Lane 2006, 141.
24 Lane 2016; Amitai 2013.
25 Lane 2006, 141; Atwood 2013, 223.
26 Prasad 1936, 102; Husain 1938, 133.
27 Kauz 2013; Park 2018.
28 Rashid al-Din 1953, II, 900, 909, 911, 974; Rubruck, 203; Polo 1958, 118.

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PART V

FAMILY AND ROYAL HOUSEHOLDS

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

CONSORT FAMILIES IN THE SUCCESSOR KHANATES

Anne F. Broadbridge

Consort houses in the Mongol Empire were families with whom the Chinggisids intermarried over several generations. Typically a house was composed of multiple lineages, which ranged in status depending on the prominence of their female or male ancestors. Within houses and lineages, individual consorts were men or women who wedded Chinggisids in any generation. In all consort houses, members of different lineages seem to have cooperated with one another to varying degrees. Different houses enjoyed different levels of political influence, military and marital opportunities, and economic power.

Certain consort families dominated elite marriage politics across the Empire. One reason for this was the nomadic preference for exchange marriages, in which a man and woman from two different lineages would wed and have children. Then, when it came time for the children to marry, some would wed the offspring of their mother's siblings (i.e., their own maternal first cousins) or the offspring of their mother's other relatives (i.e., their maternal second or third cousins) in "exchange" for their mother's earlier marriage to their father.[1] Such was the case of Chinggis Khan's senior wife, Börte, who hailed from a Qonggirat lineage. Three of her nine children (Princess Temülün, Princes Jochi and Chaghadai) married the offspring of Börte's brother (Alchi) or cousin (Qata). The descendants of Jochi and Chaghadai were considered to be Chinggisids like their fathers, not Qonggirat like their mothers. Meanwhile the descendants of Temülün were Qonggirat because of Temülün's husband, but the overall high status of this lineage across the Empire derived from Temülün's position as a major Chinggisid.[2]

Another option was a sister-exchange, where grooms from two lineages "exchanged" sisters.[3] Thus Börte and Chinggis Khan married a daughter and a son, Princess Chechiyegen and Prince Tolui, to the son and daughter of Quduqa Beki, ruler of the Oirats, which meant that the grooms – the sons – "exchanged" sisters.[4] Some children from sister-exchange unions then married back into their mother's family in typical exchange pattern. After joining the Oirat ruling family, therefore, Princess Chechiyegen wedded six of her seven children to her brothers' offspring, that is, "back into" the Chinggisids.[5]

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This exchange system demonstrated an important loophole in the Mongols' strict preference for exogamous marriage. Because lineage was defined by fathers, not mothers, certain marriages were acceptable to the Mongols even though they would be considered consanguineous by modern standards. Thus Chinggis Khan and Börte could marry their son Prince Jochi to Börte's niece (Öki, her brother Alchi's daughter), even though Börte and Alchi were siblings, and therefore Jochi and Öki were first cousins. This was possible because the fathers in question (Chinggis Khan, Alchi) were not related by blood. This preference could lead to generations' worth of consanguineous marriages between first cousins. Although we now know that consanguineous marriages can increase risks for certain genetic disorders, the Chinggisids did not, and furthermore they saw these cousin marriages as desirable because they conferred social, political and economic benefits on both families.[6] Whether the biological complications that might arise from generations of consanguinity had any direct effect on Mongol history is an unresolved question.[7]

Patterns of exchange marriage in the empire began with the nine children of Chinggis Khan and Börte, the senior royals: Princess Qojin; princes Jochi, Chaghadai and Ögödei; princesses Chechiyegen, Alaqa and Temülün; Prince Tolui and Princess Al Altan. The same patterns continued with the junior royals, meaning children from Chinggis Khan's other wives and concubines. Marriages for all Chinggisids reflected the status of the mothers: children from senior wives married higher-ranking partners, while offspring from junior wives or concubines married lower-ranking ones. In any generation, some children engaged in exchange marriages with their mothers' families, while their siblings contracted strategic marriages with partners from other consort families, members of the bodyguard (*keshig*), military commanders, vassal rulers and so on.

The senior consort houses appear most frequently in the historical sources. These families included key lineages from the Qonggirat, Oirats, Ikires, Önggüds and Uyghurs, and they became "senior" when one of the five daughters of Börte and Chinggis Khan married into them. The single most influential consort house was that of the Qonggirat, which contained multiple lineages of greater and lesser status. The first lineages descended either from Börte's male kin (her brother, cousins) or from the offspring of Börte's daughter Temülün, who married Börte's nephew Chigü (possibly adopted from another Qonggirat line).[8] Additional Qonggirat lineages existed: Jochi's senior wife hailed from one, while others arose from Qonggirat military commanders in the khanates who were rewarded for noteworthy military service with the opportunity to marry their daughters to Chinggisid princes.

Perhaps the second most influential consort house was that of the Oirats, which also contained several lineages: the descendants of Princess Chechiyegen and her Oirat princely husband; the children of that same husband and women other than Chechiyegen; descendants from the husband's extended Oirat family; the offspring of Chechiyegen's niece, who married into the family at the same time; and children of the Oirat administrator Arghun Aqa. This last line intermarried with the other lineages when possible.[9]

The Önggüt consort house was also prominent. Princess Alaqa married into the Önggüt ruling family, then remarried several times within it through the levirate[10] before assuming autonomous rule as regent for her son. Similarly, Princess Qojin wedded the Ikires commander Butu, a follower of her father and widower of

her aunt Temülün, which helped elevate this Ikires lineage and its subjects. Finally, Princess Al Altan married into the Uyghur ruling house. This lineage formed another consort family, but the history of the princess and the Uyghur royals was partially obscured and falsified after political scandals, including the execution of the princess in the 1240s and a purge of Uyghur leadership in the 1250s.[11]

Junior consort houses existed alongside the senior ones and can be so called because of their origin from junior Chinggisids, i.e., those with lower-status or unfree mothers. They make infrequent appearances in the historical sources and perhaps possessed less wealth or influence. They included lineages from the Jajirats, Oghuz, Qipchaqs, Ushin, Suldus and Togolas, among others. A few junior houses were anomalous, among them the Kereits and the Alchi Tatars. These were "reconstituted" houses, that is, restored from the survivors of a partially destroyed lineage through exchange marriage with the Chinggisids. Typically, their subjects had been atomized among the Mongols. The Kereit consorts began with a senior lineage that descended from sons of the Kereit royal family (i.e., the offspring of the Kereit leaders Ong Khan and Jaqa Gambu, who were killed in 1203 and 1204 respectively). Later, junior lineages arose from Kereit officers in the Mongol armies who married Chinggisid princesses as a reward for military service. However, no Kereit consort men commanded troops composed of Kereit subject people, since those had already been redistributed across Chinggis Khan's armies. Similarly, the Alchi Tatars sprang from even fewer royals than the Kereit because Chinggis Khan brutally purged the men of their ruling family, and their male subjects, in 1202. It may have been the intervention of his two Tatar wives, both conquered in 1202, that helped the remnants survive and later make a few marriages with Chinggisids.[12] These reconstituted houses thus differed from houses that boasted a daughter of Börte as a maternal ancestor and controlled troops composed of their own subjects.

The Chinggisid family was also linked to nomadic and non-nomadic vassal houses through marriage. Such marriages could be instigated by either side and could affect policies at both the Chinggisid and the vassal courts. A Chinggisid princess could marry a vassal prince, which gave the Chinggisids a princess-agent in the vassal's court. Early examples include three of Börte's above-mentioned daughters, who wedded vassal rulers or their sons (Princesses Chechiyegen and the Oirats, Alaqa and the Önggüt, and Al Altan and the Uyghurs). At the same time, junior Chinggisid princesses made similar matches with the Qarluq rulers of Almaliq and Qayaliq.[13] These unions gave Chinggis Khan indirect control over new territories and over the military services of his sons-in-law and their armies. The princesses gained wealth, status and the opportunity to manage their husbands' flocks, possessions and people, or even rule in new lands (like the frequently-widowed Alaqa in Önggüt territory). Nomadic or semi-nomadic vassal rulers gained the privilege of commanding their own subjects as troops, not the atomized troops of Chinggis Khan's main army. Sons-in-law could enjoy military opportunities during campaigns and the privilege of marrying their children "back" into their wives' Chinggisid lineage at the top of the political hierarchy through exchange marriage. Similar marriage policies were later used actively with non-nomadic rulers, most prominently the Wang royal family of Koryo, which initiated a long-standing in-law relationship in 1269.[14] Additional, yet occasional, marriages also connected the Chinggisids with the ruling houses of the

Armenians in the 1250s and Georgia in the 1280s, Russian princes in the 1270s and 1300s, and the Mamluks of Egypt in 1320.

Marrying "out" by a Chinggisid princess was one political strategy modeled by all five of Börte's daughters. Alternatively, a daughter from a vassal house could marry a Chinggisid prince and join the Mongol court, although such wives rarely enjoyed senior status. A vassal wife might lobby at court on behalf of her family and people, depending on her savvy, skill and talent; the epitome of this was the highly influential Korean-born Empress Ki (d. after 1368), although few vassal wives matched her extraordinary achievements.[15] Vassal dynasties whose women wedded the Ilkhanids included the Artuqids of Mardin, the Salghurids of Fars, the Byzantine Palaeologus family, the Seljuks of Anatolia and the Qutlugh-Khanids of Kirman. The Palaeologus and Seljuks also married among the Jochids, while the Qutlugh-Khanids formed additional unions with the Chaghadaids.[16] At the other end of Asia, the Yuan royal family also enjoyed marital links with non-nomadic vassals, most notably the above-mentioned Wang family of Koryo.

ACTIVITIES

The intermarriage of consort houses with Chinggisid royals over generations conferred political, social and economic benefits on all parties, but the specifics varied by gender. Consort women enjoyed the greatest opportunities for wealth, status and power. After marrying a Chinggisid prince, a wife could become a royal child-bearer, which meant becoming and staying pregnant, surviving birth and producing live children. None of these could be taken for granted in the pre-modern world, since pregnancy was a potential killer of women and infants. The historical sources are populated with young, married women who suddenly vanish from view (like Chinggis Khan's sister Temülün), and death from complications of pregnancy is one possible cause. Furthermore, royal babies had to survive infancy and childhood. But if a royal child-bearer and her offspring surmounted these obstacles, she could become a full-fledged royal mother, with authority over her children's upbringing, training and eventual marriages. Some women did foster the children of others or send their own out for periods of fostering, but the extent of this practice requires further study. A senior wife's sons in particular were eligible for the throne, and her daughters could expect high-status marriages, while in general children provided a kind of human capital for their mothers, which women could use to wield significant powers.

It is likely that royal mothers had a say in the strategic marriages of their daughters and sons, especially those with the mother's own close relatives from the consort family. In the successor khanates, consort families were usually established early on when wives traveled with their Chinggisid husbands to the new territory, often accompanied by the wife's brother and a contingent of the consort family's troops. Thereafter the wife married some of her royal children to her brother's children, which established the local branch of their house. Related lineages might also arise from lesser commanders in the consort family's lineages. Over time, most royals married into these local consort houses, especially in the far Western regions, which were perhaps too distant from the Mongolian heartland for regular marriage negotiations.

In addition to roles as royal child-bearers and royal mothers, certain wives became managers of property, which meant the several, moveable camps of a royal household, each of which was administered by a wife, her staff and the royal bodyguard or, particularly in China, by designated bureaucratic offices. Additional property might include territories and their human, animal or natural resources, sometimes acquired through spoils, which khans could assign irregularly as gifts. As managers, royal wives routinely oversaw the administration of these entities' economic, financial and logistical needs to a greater or lesser degree. Like all Chinggisids, royal wives received tax monies and also engaged in long-distance trade.[17]

Wives from consort families engaged in many activities. They regularly hosted banquets and meetings. They received foreign ambassadors and engaged in correspondence, either with their husbands or alone. To use Jochid territory as an example: The Jochid queen Boraqchin joined her husband Batu Khan (r. 1242–55) to receive both Franciscan friars, John of Plano Carpini in 1245 and William of Rubruck in 1253.[18] Ten years later the next Khan, Berke (r. 1257–67), and his senior wife received Mamluk ambassadors, then handed them over to a secondary wife, Chichek, who fed them, housed them overnight and gave them robes of honor.[19] In 1280, the same Chichek, now married to Möngke-Temür (r. 1267–80), received part of an enormous load of Mamluk gifts.[20] Meanwhile Kelmish Agha, grandmother of the Jochid Toqta (r. 1290–1312), corresponded with interlocutors in the Ilkhanate and possibly Yuan China about Chinggisid politics in the 1280s.[21] Thereafter in the Ilkhanate, Princess El-Qutlugh, a daughter of the Ilkhan Abaqa, corresponded with Mamluk officials.[22]

Royal women also routinely patronized a range of religious institutions and personnel, whether of their own religion or additional ones.[23] In China, Qubilai's wife Chabui was instrumental in supporting the Tibetan Buddhist Phags-pa Lama.[24] Later both Empress Ki, the Korean wife of the Yuan Emperor Toghan-Temür (r. 1333–70), and Queen Irinjinbal, the Chinggisid wife of King Chung'suk in Korea (second r. 1332–39), patronized Buddhism extensively in Korea.[25] Meanwhile in the Jochid grasslands, the wives and daughter of Özbek Khan (r. 1313–41) received the Muslim scholar Ibn Battuta (d. 1377) and organized a religious gathering that he attended.[26] Later Taydula, senior wife of Özbek's son Janibeg Khan (r. 1342–57), corresponded with Pope Benedict XII in 1340 (1334–42) and the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan in 1357.[27] In the Ilkhanate, the queens Nuqdan and Örüg, mothers of the Ilkhans Gaykhatu and Öljeitü respectively, received a missive from Pope Nicholas IV (1288–92).[28]

As for politics: a royal wife could wield a voice in politics in general and at *quriltai*s in particular. She could advise her husband or son on personnel and policy or could set policies herself if she was a regent. Such influence frequently continued or intensified in widowhood because of the Mongol respect for seniority. That said, royal wives and widows in the Mongol system did not generally rule on their own behalf, but rather on behalf of a son.

Consort family men also enjoyed opportunities through their marital connections to the royal family. They worked as military commanders for the Chinggisids, and like other commanders, they could have a voice in politics in general and at *quriltai*s in particular. But unlike regular commanders, consort family men might enjoy the prerogative of commanding fighting men who came from among their family's own subjects, not Chinggis Khan's atomized troops. Furthermore, the consort family's

marital connections could provide men with extra opportunities for military advancement and promotion to higher positions like governor, which might include grants of land and income, although these also depended on the success of royal wives from that family. Finally, consort family men could try to put "their" prince on the throne, with attendant benefits to be expected if he attained rule.

CONSORT FAMILIES ACROSS THE KHANATES

THE JOCHIDS

The Jochid khanate was established between 1236 and 1242 and included many Russian princedoms, the Pontic Steppe and swaths of Central Asia. It is difficult to discern royal marriage patterns among the Jochids since the sources are few and tricky: The single best source is a complex and propaganda-laden history written outside Jochid territory by the minister Rashid al-Din (d. 1318) in the rival Ilkhanate. Although individual wives appear in the histories, we learn little about their families. Nevertheless, some general comments can be made.

Among the Jochids the Qonggirat consorts dominated early, perhaps because Jochi's two Qonggirat wives bore his two most important sons (of fourteen or more). The senior wife was Sorghan, a Qonggirat from one particular lineage who became mother of the eldest son, Orda, and possibly also bore a daughter.[29] Then Jochi married into his mother's lineage by wedding his first cousin, Öki, who gave birth to Batu. The career differences between these two sons are noteworthy. Since Jochi died before Chinggis Khan, it was Chinggis Khan who chose Jochi's heir: He selected Batu, the younger, but gave Orda the eastern half of Jochid territory.[30] It is worth wondering whether maternal rank affected Chinggis Khan's decision to favor Batu over his older half-brother as khan: Orda's mother, Sorghan, was the senior wife and her son should therefore have been favored, but she was not from Börte's family. Meanwhile Öki was Börte's niece and thus hailed from the single most favored consort lineage in the Empire, and it was her son who was chosen.

Orda himself married three Qonggirat women, who bore all of his sons (daughters are unrecorded). Thereafter the Qonggirat family provided Orda's sons, grandsons and great-grandsons with senior wives for generations.[31] By contrast, only one of Batu's wives is known, and she was not a Qonggirat but an Alchi Tatar, Boraqchin, mother to the heir, Sartaq. We cannot discern whether Batu also married among the Qonggirat; nor do we know much about Sartaq's wives. But Sartaq's brother, Prince Toqoqan, had a senior wife from the Oirat consort family, Köchü, one of the four daughters of Princess Chechiyegen and her Oirat husband. Although Toqoqan never ruled, Köchü's two sons did: Möngke Temür (r. 1267–80) and Töde Möngke (r. 1280–87). Nevertheless, since none of Köchü's brothers served militarily in Jochid realms, and since her male descendants married Qonggirat senior wives, not Oirats, the Oirat consort family may not have been well-established there.[32]

Other known consort families among the Jochids included the Kereit, Jajirat, Jedei Bay'ut, Oghuz, Merkit, Naiman and Suldus. The Jochids also deployed the policy of marrying princesses to Russian, Seljuk, Byzantine and Mamluk vassals. These included Princess Urbay, daughter of Berke (r. 1257–67), who married the exiled Seljuk prince 'Izz al-Din Kay Kaus perhaps in the 1250s; a Chinggisid princess who wedded prince Gleb Vasilkovich of Belozero in 1257; Princess Konchaka

(a.k.a. Agatha), who became wife to the Grand Prince Yuri Danilovich of Moscow in 1317; and Princess Tulunbay, who married the Mamluk Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad in Egypt in 1320.[33]

THE CHAGHADAIDS

The Chaghadaid khanate was in Mawarannahr and Ferghana, bordered by the Amu Darya on the southwest and Uyghuristan on the northeast. Its history has often been under-studied, in part because of the paucity of reliable material. Although the wives of Chaghadaid princes appear in works by Rashid al-Din, the Timürid-era *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, and the *Baburnama* of the Mughal Emperor Babur (d. 1530), information remains scant. The history of consort families is thus as ill-known as the rest of Chaghadaid history and can only be described preliminarily.

Depending largely on Rashid al-Din, we can posit that the familiar Qonggirat consort family dominated in Chaghadaid territory as elsewhere, at least during Chaghadai's lifetime, since he married two Qonggirat sisters in succession as senior wives. Both were his second cousins (i.e., the children of Börte's cousin); both controlled the senior wifely camp, and together they produced most of Chaghadai's sons.[34]

But the initial Qonggirat position was offset by a woman from the Oirat consort family, Orqina, another of Princess Chechiyegen's four daughters, who married Chaghadai's heir and grandson, Qara-Hülegü. Qara-Hülegü took over after Chaghadai's death in 1242, then was deposed in 1246 by the new Ögödeid Grand Khan, Güyük (r. 1246–48). At some point thereafter Qara-Hülegü and Orqina transferred their allegiance to the Toluid-Jochid alliance against the Ögödeid family, along with Orqina's mother, Princess Chechiyegen, and Orqina's three sisters, all of whom were married to either Jochids or Toluids. The coalition supplanted the Ögödeids in 1251 with a new Grand Khan, the Toluid Prince Möngke (r. 1251–59), who immediately restored Qara-Hülegü as Chaghadaid Khan. After Qara-Hülegü died en route to his territories, Orqina ruled for at least ten years with Möngke's approval. Her reign was technically a regency on behalf of her son Mubarak Shah, but she seems to have made her decisions independently for years. Together Orqina and Chaghadai's widows welcomed Möngke's brother Hülegü in 1253 as he crossed their territory to invade Iran. He was accompanied by his wife Öljei (Orqina's half-sister) and the commander for his Oirat troops, Buqa Temür (Orqina's brother).

During the civil war between the brothers Ariq Böke and Qubilai (1260–64), Orqina sided with Ariq Böke, who was the husband of her sister Elchiqmish (i.e., yet another daughter of Princess Chechiyegen). Orqina also struggled with a new candidate for Chaghadaid rule, Prince Alghu, who eventually married her with (or without) her consent. But Ariq Böke was dead by 1264, and Alghu died of illness in 1266. Orqina's son Mubarak Shah enjoyed a brief reign before being unseated and fleeing to Ilkhanid territory. During this period, Orqina herself vanished from historical view, either through death or exile – the details are unknown.[35]

After Orqina our view of Chaghadayid consort families grows dim, and we resort to collecting names. These included the Uyghurs; families of Chaghadaid commanders like the Dörben, Jalayir and Baya'ut; the Qipchaqs; and lineages of the

Dughlat and Saghrichis. The Chaghadayids also married into Muslim Turkic lineages like the Qutlugh-Khanids of Kirman and later wedded the Timurids in Mawarannahr and the rulers of Badakhshan.[36]

THE YUAN DYNASTY

In China as elsewhere, the Qonggirat consorts dominated. Their preeminence began with Börte's niece Chabui, who married Qubilai (r. 1260–94) as a secondary wife, then became the favorite through her intelligence, skills, high morals and personality. She controlled a wifely camp and bore four sons (and possibly some daughters).[37] Her sons were the only ones considered for rule. Before her demise in 1281, Chabui chose a Qonggirat relative named Nambui to take over as Qubilai's most favored wife. Then after Qubilai's death in 1294, authority moved into the hands of another Qonggirat lady, Kökechin, senior widow of the Crown Prince, who became regent until her son was enthroned as Grand Khan Temür (r. 1294–1307).[38] Thereafter the Chinggisids continued to intermarry with this favored lineage: At least seventeen imperial wives, most of whom were senior wives, came from Qonggirat lineages during the Yuan period (1260–1368), while Chinggisid princesses married Qonggirat men just as regularly.[39]

Traces of other nomadic consort houses do emerge in the Yuan context, although they ranged in status and influence. Male descendants of Princess Qojin from the Ikires house worked in the Yuan military, while the family also intermarried with other eastern Chinggisids – Möngke's senior wife was Qojin's granddaughter.[40] The Önggüt intermarried among the Toluids in general, especially the descendants of Chinggis Khan's junior son Kölgen. The Uyghurs also intermarried with eastern Chinggisids, at least until their house was purged in the 1240s and 1250s.[41] But perhaps one of the more consequential of the consorts to the Yuan was the Wang royal family of Koryo, which asked to become in-laws in the 1260s and remained so for decades through a long progression of Chinggisid brides for Koryo kings. However, it was another Koryo family, the Ki family, that produced the anomalous, wildly successful and highly influential Empress Ki, wife of the last Yuan emperor and mother of the heir.

THE ILKHANIDS

The Ilkhanate in Iran, Khurasan, Iraq and Anatolia (1256–1335) was established by Hülegü in the 1250s. Three consort houses dominated the marital scene: the Oirats, Qonggirat and Kereit. Later two newer houses arose: the Chobanids and the Jalayirs. Additional Ilkhanid consort houses included Jedei Baya'ut, Eljigin, Alchi Tatar and Suldus lineages, although information on them is limited. The Ilkhanids also wedded vassals, including the Seljuks, the Artuqids, the Palaeologus, the Qutlugh-Khanids, the Salghurids and the Georgian royals.

The Oirat consorts enjoyed a preeminent position because Hülegü's senior wife was Güyük Khatun (not to be confused with the Grand Khan of the same name), another daughter of Princess Chechiyegen. Güyük managed the senior wifely camp and gave birth to the senior prince, Jumghur, and princess, Bulughan. But after Güyük's early death in Mongolia, her assets were split: Her senior position went

to a new wife, the elderly Kereit princess Doquz, widow of Hülegü's father, who married Hülegü through the levirate; while the senior camp went to a Qonggirat wife, Qutui, who stayed in Mongolia until she brought the camp to Iran in the mid-1260s. The Oirat consort presence was then maintained by a second Oirat wife, Güyük's half-sister Öljei (a daughter of Chechiyegen's husband). Both Öljei and her half-brother Buqa-Temür, commander of the Oirat troops, accompanied Hülegü to Iran, and Öljei produced three daughters and a son. When it came time to marry, some children from both Güyük and Öljei wedded the offspring of Buqa-Temür in classic exchange fashion.

Despite their overall influence, the Oirat consorts suffered several near-misses when it came to rule. Their first prince, Jumghur, remained in Mongolia during the Iran campaign, and it was his half-brother Abaqa who took over after Hülegü's death in 1265, even though he was only the son of a junior Suldus wife (Yesünjin). Thereafter Prince Jumghur died en route to Iran. The next opportunity for a Chinggisid-Oirat prince was in 1282, when the widow Öljei proposed her son, Prince Möngke-Temür, as Ilkhan at a *quriltai* in the Caucasus, but Möngke-Temür's sudden, unexplained death in Iraq closed that door. Thereafter the Oirat consorts suffered a series of challenges in the late 1280s and 1290s: the death of Öljei, secret executions of several Oirat princes (descended from Jumghur and Möngke-Temür), the public execution of an Oirat princess for witchcraft and declining birthrates.[42] The only Chinggisid-Oirat prince ever to rule was Abu Sa'id (r. 1317–35), who hailed from one of the lesser Oirat lineages. During his reign his mother enjoyed her own camp, and his maternal uncles gained access to governorships, but their influence did not last long after his death in 1335.[43]

Unlike in all the other khanates, the Qonggirat consort family enjoyed only a short-lived ascendance in the Ilkhanate. This was under Hülegü's Qonggirat widow, Qutui, who managed the Ilkhanate's finances during the brief reign of her son, Ahmad Tegüder (r. 1282–84). This family boasted several branches, from which hailed four of Tegüder's six wives, one of them a relative of Qutui herself. However, unlike in other consort families, three of Tegüder's five daughters married Kereit military commanders, not Qonggirat, which helped propel the Kereit's later rise. Furthermore, Tegüder was the only Chinggisid-Qonggirat prince to rule in the Ilkhanate. After his downfall, only his youngest and least influential Qonggirat wife remarried. Although other Qonggirat wedded Chinggisids thereafter, few children emerged from these unions, and no Qonggirat line ever produced another likely prince.[44]

As for the Kereit: Hülegü's senior wife Doquz had no offspring, thus the senior Kereit lineage arose from the children of her brother, a commander named Saricha, who married two daughters and a son to Chinggisids. Additional Kereit lineages emerged from unions between Kereit military commanders and Chinggisid princesses, but these were junior to Saricha's descendants. Like the Qonggirat and Oirat, the Kereit consorts enjoyed a moment of ascendance. Theirs began in the 1280s at a time of declining Ilkhanid royal birthrates and was due in part to the unusual fertility of Örüg Khatun, Saricha's daughter. Although Örüg was a junior wife to the Ilkhan Arghun, she bore five children, more than any of her co-wives or Arghun's concubines. One of her sons became the Ilkhan Öljeitü (r. 1304–16). Örüg's brother was the commander Irinjin, married to a daughter of the Ilkhan

Tegüder, whose own daughter Qutlugh-Shah later wedded Öljeitü in an exchange marriage for Örüg. The Kereit lineages enjoyed wealth in the form of camps, including the one formerly controlled by Doquz (inherited by Qutlugh-Shah) and another camp for Örüg herself, access to military governorships and the ability to patronize Christians extensively. But in 1319, all the Kereit lineages cooperated to oppose the senior commander, Choban, and the Ilkhan, Abu Sa'id, with disastrous results. Most of the family was brutally purged, and the few remaining members vanished from historical view.[45]

Two later Ilkhanid consort families were the Jalayirs and the Chobanids. The Jalayirs traced their prominence to the Chinggisid-Kereit Princess Öljetei, a full sister of the Ilkhan Öljeitü, who married into a Jalayir lineage and produced a son, Shaykh-Hasan. After 1335, Shaykh-Hasan eventually established his own dynasty in Iraq, the Jalayirids, which lasted until 1410. He was sometimes called Öljete'i (i.e., from his mother, Öljetei), rather than Jalayiri (from his father's Jalayir lineage), in the historical sources.[46]

The Chobanids were the offspring of the senior commander Choban, who married three Chinggisid princesses (Sati Beg, Dolandi and Kürdüchin). But since Abu Sa'id brutally purged Choban and some of his sons in 1328, the family's subsequent revival is best linked to the political influence of Choban's daughter Baghdad Khatun, whom Abu Sa'id divorced from her husband and married himself. (Additional Chobanid influence came from Baghdad's niece Dilshad, who married Abu Sa'id some years later.) The Chobanids also experimented with puppets, including Abu Sa'id's half-sister Sati Beg (Choban's widow), then ruled independently in Azerbaijan until the 1350s.[47]

CONCLUSION

To conclude, consort houses in the Mongol Empire included those families with which the Chinggisid dynasty intermarried over generations. The prominence of these consorts was fueled in part by the system of exchange marriages, which favored the formation of unions between the same two lineages over generations. Each consort house typically included multiple lineages, whose status derived from the original marriage partners at the time of the house's entry into the ranks of consorts. This system led to the predictable dominance of key houses overall, particularly those related to Börte or her five daughters. (Lesser nomadic and non-nomadic consort families also existed, but we typically know less about their activities, with only a few exceptions.) Consort women could enjoy management of camps and the ownership of property, the possibility of royal children, the ability to patronize religions lavishly, and significant influence in politics. Consort men typically inherited command of the family's troops, as well as additional opportunities for advancement and wealth, to say nothing of the advantages of intermarrying their offspring with the Chinggisids. All these factors positioned consorts to be significant players in the politics of the successor khanates. Nevertheless, consort families were not guaranteed dominance, but rather should be seen as a newly distinct category, who still had to jockey for authority, influence, and access to resources with the better-known guardsmen, commanders, vassals, religious officials, and bureaucrats.

NOTES

1 Uno 2009, 175–182.
2 Broadbridge 2018, 117–119, 229.
3 Uno 2009, 175–182.
4 Uno 2009, 179–180; Broadbridge 2018, 115.
5 Broadbridge 2018, 241.
6 Broadbridge 2018, 227 and n. 2; Broadbridge 2016, 122.
7 Melville 2016, 318–319; Masson Smith Jr. 2000, 35–36; De Nicola 2017, 136.
8 Atwood 2014–15.
9 Landa 2017, 23; RDRM, II, 972; RDT, 476.
10 This tradition meant that a widow remarried her deceased husband's male relative, the *levir*, who could be a brother, cousin, uncle or son from a mother other than herself. Such remarriages kept widows, and the property they controlled, in the man's family. Holmgren 1986, entire.
11 Broadbridge 2021.
12 Broadbridge 2018, 85–87.
13 Broadbridge 2018, 115, 117, 119–120, 122–123, 142–143.
14 Robinson 2009, 100.
15 Robinson 2009, especially chapters 3, 7.
16 Broadbridge 2018, 254 & 265.
17 Allsen 1989, 88–89; Endicott-West 1989, 129, 132, 140–141.
18 *TMM*, 57; Rubruck, 117.
19 Mufaddal 1911, 459 & 461.
20 Nuwayri 1985–1998, XXVII, 365.
21 Broadbridge 2018, 234.
22 Brack 2011, 333 & 340–346.
23 De Nicola 2017, 182–241.
24 Rossabi 1988/2009, 16 & 41.
25 Robinson 2009, 122.
26 Ibn Battuta 1958–2000, 487–489.
27 Ryan 1998, 419; *Nikonian Chronicle*, III, 180.
28 Ryan 1998, 417–418.
29 Broadbridge 2018, 230.
30 Qu and Liu 1998; Allsen 1985 [1987], 8–10.
31 Broadbridge 2018, 232 and n. 27.
32 Broadbridge 2018, 242–243.
33 Baybars al-Mansuri1998, 126; *Nikonian* 1986, III, 34 & 101; Broadbridge 2008, 132–134.
34 Broadbridge 2018, 234.
35 De Nicola 2016, 119; Broadbridge 2018, 247–250.
36 Broadbridge 2018, 254.
37 Broadbridge 2018, 238–239.
38 Broadbridge 2018, 237–240.
39 Zhao 2008, 107–111 & 112–118.
40 Broadbridge 2018, 251.
41 Broadbridge 2018, 252–253; Broadbridge 2021.
42 Broadbridge 2018, 281.
43 Broadbridge 2018, 294–295.
44 Broadbridge 2018, 274–278.
45 Broadbridge 2018, 278–289 & 290–292; Melville 1997.
46 Broadbridge 2018, 294.
47 Gilli-Elewy 2012, 717; Melville 2016, 319–320.

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RDRM, See List of Abbreviations.
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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

ELITE WOMEN IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Bruno De Nicola

The medieval Mongols, like their contemporary Chinese, Islamic or Christian counterparts, were organized through a patriarchal and patrilineal social system. This means that men were the depositaries of political, economic and social power, while inheritance (both economic and political) was based on descent through the male line. However, in comparison with their sedentary counterparts, nomadic Mongol women were more outspoken in politics, had larger degrees of economic autonomy and were able to freely decide their religious affiliation. Public prominence and freedom to dispose of wealth can also be observed among women of the Jurchen and the Qara Khitai, who shared a common nomadic background with the Mongols.[1] This higher status enjoyed by nomadic women is present even in the mythology shared by medieval nomadic Eurasian societies. A woman named Alan Qo'a plays a pivotal role in the myth that describes the primordial origin of the Mongols, serving as a link between myth and history.[2] Consequently, the high position given to women among Inner Asian nomadic societies before the rise of Chinggis Khan helps to explain the prominent role that they occupied in the Mongol Empire. Nonetheless, as the empire grew and other societies were incorporated into the Mongol domain, some of these social practices were transformed, reinforced or abandoned in a process of acculturation that took place between conquerors and conquered people.

Original historical sources are also clearly masculine, with an overwhelming majority of them being commissioned, written and read by men. Nevertheless, these sources were not exclusively about men. Indeed, women appear constantly in the historical narratives. The presence of women in the public scene is also widely documented by travel accounts written by foreigners visiting the Mongol Empire, and biographies of prominent female individuals were included in chronicles and biographical dictionaries from China to the Islamic world.[3] The abundance of references to women in the sources seems to have captured, in writing, the prominent role that these women played at different stages in the expansion of the Mongol Empire across the large territory it occupied. Yet the peculiarity of this

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abundant information about Mongol women does not necessarily provide us with a full picture of the role of women in medieval Mongol society. Written sources remain highly elitist in their conception and interest and really tell us little about the life of women from the lower strata of the society. We know almost nothing about how, for example, the wives of soldiers lived or if marriages were arranged between the daughter of a blacksmith and the son of a shepherd in Qaraqorum, Tabriz or Daidu. While masculine bias in the sources can be methodologically minimized, we should trust that future research, using new sources and methodologies, will help to bridge the gap in our knowledge between elite and common women in the Mongol Empire.

As a field of study, gender dynamics in the Mongol Empire has grown exponentially in the last few decades, and yet there is still substantial research to be done. Scholarly interest in the study of women in the Mongol Empire in the West began in the 1970s with the appearance of two articles by Paul Ratchnevsky and Morris Rossabi, respectively.[4] Simultaneously, Shirin Bayani published the first exploration of the role of women in the Mongol Empire in a single volume.[5] Written in Persian and never translated into a European language, Bayani's work has never been fully acknowledged for its pioneering and ground-breaking role in modern Mongol historiography. The publications emerging in the 1980s have been more widely recognized in the field, starting with the chapter dedicated to women in medieval Iran by A. K. S. Lambton and different articles by Jennifer Holmgren about women in Yuan China.[6] During the following decade, a number of different studies highlighted the prominent role of women in Mongol society from different angles, but it was at the turn of the twenty-first century that more comprehensive studies began to appear.[7]

Initially, there were scholars from Chinese studies, such as Betinne Birge and George Q. Zhao, who developed the first monographs on women in Mongol China, mainly concentrating their efforts on the study of marriage, inheritance practices and political legitimacy.[8] Scholars of the Ilkhanate would soon follow, with Karin Quade-Reutter and George Lane expanding on the work done by Bayani and Lambton on the role of women in Mongol Iran.[9] They, in turn, were followed by a number of different articles from young scholars, who in the second decade of the century began to expand the study of women in Mongol society beyond their political influence and into aspects of their economic, religious and social status.[10] The proliferation of scholarly works on the topic for over 40 years has contributed to establishing gender studies as a pivotal area for the study of the Mongol Empire. The appearance of two monographic studies in recent years and the inclusion of the field in different collections about the Mongols – such as this one and others – speak for the general agreement among scholars as to the critical role that studying women occupies for a general understanding of the history of the Mongol Empire.[11]

GENDER AND POLITICS IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE

From the earliest accounts we have of the Mongols, historical narratives portray women having a prominent role in politics. The *Secret History* contains a number of depictions of women making decisions that would define the fate of the empire. Similarly, Persian historians writing in different periods of the Mongol Empire such as Juvayni, Rashid al-Din and Hamd Allah Mustawfi, to mention but a few, include

constant references to women's participation in political affairs across the empire. The visibility that Mongol women had in the public sphere was not a testimonial presence but an active institutional role. For example, women attended the royal assemblies (*quriltai*s) in which new Mongol rulers were elected and appointed by common agreement.[12] Further, they actively participated in diplomacy, with elite women playing a fundamental role in securing alliances between different Mongol factions and receiving emissaries from abroad or interacting closely with military leaders.[13] The involvement of women in politics in the Mongol Empire comprised different layers of participation. While the outspoken role of women seems to have been widespread among elites, the political influence they exercised and the recognition of their role in the empire varied depending on the individual capability of the woman, her family connections and the historical context of the empire. Depending on these variables, some Mongol khatuns were acknowledged as official rulers of the empire or a khanate, while many exercised real political power both in their households and across the empire.

Women as political actors

Mongol khans and princes had several wives and concubines. It was customary among the Mongols, in order for the man to devote time to all of them, that he would spend alternative nights in the tent of each of his main wives. When staying in the *ordo* (encampment) of one of his khatuns, the man would task his wife and her servants not only with hosting him, but with facilitating the conditions for the ruler to perform his duties. Consequently, interviews with foreign diplomats, the reception of merchants and discussions of military strategies were carried out often in the presence of wives, daughters and concubines of the khan.[14] Their presence in these meetings gave women access to crucial information on the political situation of the empire which, on occasion, could become a valuable asset for ambitious women to develop their own political agendas. In addition, their proximity to the decision-making process afforded them the possibility to intercede in front of their male relatives. The use they made of their privileged access to political information varied depending on the ability and ambition of each individual and the geopolitical circumstances in which they lived. Different anecdotes contained in the *Secret History* recall women serving as advisors to their male relatives. For example, both the mother (Höelün) and main wife (Börte) of Chinggis Khan intervened in particular moments during the early years of the empire to redirect his political decisions.[15]

When they were not at the centre of political decisions, women played a vital role in advising men. This role of advisor was not limited to pre-imperial times but was a constant feature maintained through time and across the empire. Begtütmish, wife of Jochi, might have been pivotal in encouraging Jochid princes to rebel against the Qa'an and his family during the coup organized by the Toluids against the Ögödeids in the mid-thirteenth century.[16] Similarly, Möngke Qa'an (d. 1259) recommended his brother Hülegü to "consult Doquz Khatun on all matters" before he was dispatched to conquer Iran in the early 1250s.[17] This prominent seat given to women in the political structure of the empire placed them in a strategic position that many women used to fulfil their own political agendas.

In addition to having their say in the decisions of their male relatives, women also used their access to information for their own political benefit and, on occasion, even acted as kingmakers for their male relatives. Women had a crucial role in granting legitimacy to a male ruler at the time of succession to the point that, after the death of Chinggis Khan, the identity of the mother would regulate which of the sons was elected for rule.[18] In principle, only the sons of the main wife of a deceased ruler had the right to inherit the throne of the father, giving that particular woman a pivotal role once her husband died.[19] This custom placed some women in a privileged political position to influence the election of male rulers, particularly consort women coming from outside the Chinggisid line of descent.[20] As we will see, in different periods of the empire, women plotted to promote their sons to the throne, assumed power by themselves in the name of their children and disputed with rival factions to secure the election of their descendants. Their role behind the scene as advisors, kingmakers or rulers in their own right made Mongol women crucial political actors and contributors in the construction of the empire.

The ruling khatuns

The Mongols faced a recurrent problem shared with other nomadic empires before and after them: securing a peaceful succession to the throne whenever a khan passed away. The first instance in which the empire opened a process of succession occurred immediately after the death of Chinggis Khan in 1227. According to the sources, Chinggis Khan had designated Ögödei (d. 1241) as the heir to the throne during his lifetime.[21] However, the *a priori* elective nature of the Mongol succession required that all members of the royal family gather in a *quriltai* and elect – or in this case confirm – the new ruler. Two years were needed for all the scattered Chinggisids to reunite, and during that period, a regent was needed to maintain the cohesion and the administration of an empire in constant expansion. Tolui, youngest son of Chinggis Khan, became the provisional ruler until his brother was confirmed on the throne in 1229.[22] Therefore, the first regent of the Mongol Empire was a man, a military commander and the son of the deceased ruler.

The Mongols encountered a similar situation when Ögödei died in 1241.[23] The Mongol nobility was dispersed across distant lands fighting for the expansion of the empire, commanding military campaigns in both China and Eastern Europe.[24] A new power vacuum was created until the whole ruling family could reunite and appoint a new ruler. Once again, the Mongols needed a regent, but now the empire had changed. Firstly, Mongol armies had acquired new land in China and Russia; secondly, the Mongols had begun to delegate more power to subjects (local people), many of whom advocated for their own local agendas; finally, and perhaps more importantly, a new generation of Chinggisids was ready to take over command of the empire.[25] Therefore, in a changing empire, the requisite qualities of the person chosen to fill the void were different from the previous time. Töregene Khatun (r. 1241–6), wife of Ögödei, was appointed regent "until the Khan [Güyük] was appointed by agreement" and was recognized as Empress of the empire. The ascension of this woman to the throne marks a turning point in the history of women in the Mongol Empire – a decade, between the death of Ögödei Qa'an (d. 1241) and the assumption of Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251–9), in

which women emerged as key political actors and conditioned the fate of the empire in the years to come.

There is debate on why the Mongols adopted the institution of female regency at this moment in time, with some suggesting that the ruling women of the Qara Khitai Empire of Central Asia could have inspired and set a similar precedent for the Mongols.[26] Töregene Khatun was one of Chinggis Khan's daughters-in-law, who became Ögödei's wife after the Mongols conquered her tribe, the Merkit, during the early years of the thirteenth century.[27] Contemporary sources describe her ascension as a common event and do not make any negative statement regarding the gender of the new ruler. However, at least two characteristics of Töregene's life might serve to explain why she was elected as regent over other candidates. On the one hand, although Ögödei had other wives, she was the most senior among those who managed to give her husband a son, which apparently promoted her above other female contenders.[28] On the other hand, her own personal capabilities and ambition for power played a decisive role in securing her place as ruler. She is described by Rashid al-Din, who was a fierce anti-Ögödeid writing over half a century after the events, as being of "masterful nature" in affairs of state, and by Juvayni as a "capable woman," descriptions generally resembling those found also in Chinese and Christian sources.[29] Töregene's reign was not a mere interregnum between male rulers. Rather, she confronted and persecuted internal opposition posed by amirs and dissident family members, netted a network of alliances with other Chinggisids and accumulated so much power that even "when [her son] Güyük came [back], he took no part in affairs of state, and Töregene Khatun still executed the decrees of the Empire although the khanate was settled upon her son."[30]

The political influence of women in this decade went beyond the unprecedented acknowledgment of a woman as Empress-regent of the empire. In an unparalleled move, Töregene appointed a woman, named Fatima, as her highest counsellor, who became the person responsible for executing her commands.[31] Her appointment, however, lasted only a few years until a group of rebellious amirs forced the Empress to depose Fatima after she was accused of sorcery, found guilty and ultimately executed. Töregene tried to intervene in favor of her counsellor, but opposition proved too fierce at this point, and her opponents managed to bend her will and forced her to abdicate in favor of her son Güyük in 1246. Güyük replaced his mother, but his reign lasted a mere two years, when he encountered his own demise en route allegedly to violently resolve some political disagreements with his cousin Batu.[32] The Mongol response to the new vacuum of power was, once again, to place the widow of Güyük, Oghul Qaimish, as the new regent while the family decided upon the new male ruler. Although, as we have seen, there was no tradition of female regency among the Mongols before 1241, Persian chronicles refer to the new appointment as being part of the "Mongol tradition."[33] The appointment of Oghul Qaimish received the support of the Jochids from Russia, the Chaghadaids of Central Asia and the Toluids, which granted her at least a nominal recognition as Empress. However, unlike her mother-in-law and predecessor, she did not have much real power, and although she officially managed the affairs of state, a rebellion was already underway to remove her and the Ögödeids from power at the time of her appointment.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was another woman who instigated the rebellion against Oghul Qaimish. Despite never becoming ruler, Sorqoqtani Beki, the wife

of Tolui, played a fundamental role in the political development of the empire after the death of her husband in 1229.[34] Sources depict her as Töregene's *alter ego*, who from the shadows managed to design and implement a whole strategy to shift the line of succession from the Ögödeids to the Toluids.[35] During the reign of Töregene, Sorqoqtani showed herself as a loyal subject of the Empress while opening back channels to gain the favor of Batu, eldest among the surviving grandsons of Chinggis Khan, to promote her son Möngke to the throne. Her work in the shadows paid off during the reign of Oghul Qaimish, when Sorqoqtani came out in the open to challenge the legitimacy of the Ögödeids by convincing members of the *quriltai* to have her son Möngke crowned in 1250. She was praised by Persian and Christian sources alike, who always try to link her with an idea of the empire based on light taxation of the sedentary population vis-à-vis the "extractive" model represented in the narratives by Töregene, Güyük and Oghul Qaimish.[36] Similarly, these pro-Toluid sources portray her as a righteous woman, who was able to redirect the wrong dynastic direction taken by the Ögödeids. However, this representation hides the other side of Sorqoqtani's fierce political attitudes. Immediately after succeeding in displacing Oghul Qaimish, she supervised the cruel execution of her rivals and persecuted all political opposition to clear the land for her son to rule. Like Töregene and Oghul Qaimish, she was a formidable woman in implementing her will in pursuit of her own political agenda (and that of her close relatives).

The deposition of Oghul Qaimish would close the decade of female rule in the Mongol Empire, which lasted from 1241 until 1250. Never again would a woman be recognized as Empress or rule the whole empire. However, during this period, women did not act as puppet rulers or simple grantors of legitimacy for male rulers. Rather, they acquired a status that Mongol women had never achieved before and effectively shaped the destiny of the empire by pursuing their own political, economic and religious agendas. Hence, the period of the "rule of the Khatuns" is not an interregnum but rather a decisive moment in the history of the empire, when a dynastic change was imposed and a decision was made as to what would be the economic model of the empire in the decades to come. The subsequent political fragmentation of the empire limited the possibilities for women to be candidates to a now purely nominal position of Qa'an/Empress. However, the high political status granted in Mongolian society to noble women generated new political roles for women in each of the different territories controlled by the Mongols from the mid-thirteenth century onwards.

Women's political role in a divided empire

The purges on opposing family members carried out by the Toluids after the enthronement of Möngke consolidated power in the hands of this Toluid line, leaving the western territories of the empire to their Jochid allies. In the 1250s, there was still a united empire as in the prior decade, but this time, with both Töregene and Sorqoqtani Beki dead, there were no women in the central *ordu* who have been noted in the sources as being comparably outspoken in terms of politics.[37] However, the institution of regency was opened for women in the empire with the election of Töregene, and, consequently, more ambitious women managed to promote themselves to the throne in some regions controlled by the Mongols. It appears that in

the areas with a predominant nomadic population, such as Central Asia and the Russian steppes, women were initially considered to act as regents more frequently. In the territories of the Jochid Ulus, Möngke Qa'an recognized a woman as regent in 1255. Boraqchin Khatun, wife of Sartaq son of Batu, was appointed as ruler of the Ulus in the name of her son Ulaghchi, who was underage.[38] We do not know much about her personality or if she had any ambition for power or political agenda. If she did, she seems to have been unlucky because her protégé died only a year after her appointment, and she was unable to hold on to the throne after that. She was demoted by Batu's brother Berke (d. 1266), who became Khan of the Jochid Ulus from that year onward.[39] Nonetheless, another well-known case of female regency occurred in Central Asia during the same period. Orqina Khatun (r. 1251–9), a granddaughter of Chinggis Khan, fought her male relatives to become regent of the Chaghadai Ulus in Central Asia in the name of her underage son Mubarak Shah (r. 1266).[40] She ruled for nine years in Central Asia during a period in which she assumed total control of the affairs of state and secured, through diplomacy and marriage alliances, the election of her son as khan of the Chaghadaids in the early 1260s.

When Möngke died in 1259, the new regent appointed was his youngest brother, Ariq Böke, thereby omitting women from the post and emulating the procedure carried out after the death of Chinggis Khan.[41] The division of the empire set aside territories such as Iran and China, where a greater urban population increased the presence of sedentary people in the court. Neither of these territories saw the institution of female regency continue as it did in the Golden Horde and Central Asia. Instead, those regions showed a tendency towards a patrilineal succession that encountered constant opposition and power struggles among relatives representing conflicting views on succession practices among the Ilkhans and the Yuan emperors. The reasons why there were no more women acting as rulers of the different khanates after the death of Möngke Qa'an are diverse and subject to speculation. The division of the empire conditioned women in each territory to a negotiation with local sociocultural circumstances that might have shown an opposition to accepting the rule of a woman. Further, distance between the courts and their borders receded after the division of the empire into different khanates. With smaller kingdoms, male pretenders to the throne became more available, and male candidates were less dispersed in distant lands, all of which diminished the need for women to act as regents. The only examples of women ruling in these territories occurred in the fourteenth century, when both dynasties had entered into a steady decline and were soon to collapse. In the Yuan dynasty, Empress Dowager Budashiri, widow of Emperor Toq Temür (r. 1329–32), managed to name the successor to her husband but was never appointed as Empress in her own right.[42] In the Ilkhanate, however, a woman called Sati Beg (r. 1339), widow of the last Ilkhan, Abu Saʿid (r. 1316–35), was not only named as ruler of the khanate, but coins were struck for her reign and her name was mentioned in mosques during Friday prayers.[43] However, her real power over the kingdom was very limited, and she was at the mercy of her male protector, Hasan-i Kuchak. Her reign lasted only ten months and her appointment appears to have been a desperate last attempt to find a legitimate Hülegüid descendent rather than a reestablishment of a nomadic tradition of female regency.

Even if they did not sit on the throne, or were not recognized as empresses or regents, Mongol women continued to play a pivotal role in the politics of the

divided empire. This is not the place to enumerate the multitude of moments in which women intervened in politics across the different khanates, but to mention some of them will contribute to provide a general picture of their political actions. Perhaps because the Persian historians who wrote about the Mongols were not used to the high role of Mongol women in politics, we find clearer examples of women's involvement in politics coming from the Ilkhanate. However, there is no reason to believe that similar examples did not occur in the Golden Horde and the Chaghadai khanate, for which the corpus of historical sources is far less abundant.[44] Some noble women acted as counsellors of their male relatives in crucial aspects of political life, such as the administration of justice. Doquz Khatun, wife of Hülegü, intervened in front of her husband to pardon the Seljuk Sultan Rukn al-Din (r. 1248–65) from allegations of misconduct with the Mongol governor of Anatolia.[45] Similarly, although sources provide a less benevolent portrait of her actions, Örüg Khatun appears as a fierce prosecutor of rebels during the reign of her second husband, Ilkhan Gaykhatu (r. 1291–5).[46] This intervention of women in affairs of state occasionally superseded a particular territory and was performed at a trans-regional level. The deeds of the Toluid princess Kelmish Aqa are symptomatic of this interaction. She was married to a Jochid prince of the Golden Horde but always maintained close ties with her cousins both in the Ilkhanate and in China. On the one hand, she performed pseudo-espionage by keeping constant communications with Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304) in Iran and informing him all about the affairs of the house of Jochi. On the other, she used her prestige and influence to save the life of the Yuan prince Nomoqan, son of Qubilai Qa'an, who had been imprisoned by Jochids in 1276.[47]

An example of continued female involvement in politics can be seen in the Ilkhanate during the 1280s, when two women were deeply involved in the political development of the realm. Two wives of Hülegü played a leading role during the disputes between different male candidates to the throne that shook the Ilkhanate after the death of Abaqa (r. 1265–82). One was Öljei Khatun from the Oirat people, who accompanied her husband on his trip from Mongolia to Iran. She was the mother of Möngke Temür, a son of Hülegü with real aspirations to the throne. The other was Qutui, a Qonggirat woman who came to Iran only after the Ilkhanate was established in 1260 and did everything in her power to promote her son Tegüder Ahmad (r. 1282–4) to the throne of the Ilkhanate. As marked by the Mongol tradition, an assembly was held in Iran to elect the new Ilkhan in 1282. Soon disagreements arose between both women, who were trying to place their respective sons on the throne, until news arrived of the sudden death of Möngke Temür, which, in turn, paved the way for Tegüder to be named as Ilkhan while control over the political, financial and diplomatic affairs of the realm seemed to have been assumed by his mother, Qutui.[48] However, like other women in the empire, Öljei did not remain inactive after being defeated politically by Qutui. Like Sorqoqtani Beki before her, she plotted in the shadows to promote a rebellion that ultimately had Tegüder executed together with his mother, Qutui, and promoted Arghun (r. 1284–91) to the throne of the Ilkhanate. These are only two of the influential women in Mongol Iran, but their rivalry and competition exemplify how active the political role of women remained in the post-dissolution empire even if their male counterparts did not consider them as potential rulers or regents any longer.

ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

The active role that women played in the political development of the empire can hardly be understood without considering their involvement in the economy of the empire. In order to pay soldiers under their command, secure their political position or lobby in favor of their husbands' and sons' aspirations to the throne, the khatuns needed, firstly, to have access to wealth; secondly, to be able to accumulate it; and finally, to dispose of this wealth at their convenience. The ability to perform all three actions was neither homogenous nor did it occur simultaneously across the empire. The distribution of wealth was not balanced but varied depending on the status of the individual. Some women appear to have been able to use their resources in pursuit of their political goals, while others either refrained from participating in politics or had no political aspirations. Sources are ambivalent regarding the economy of the Mongol Empire in general and of women in particular. No accounting documents, if they ever existed, have reached us, and we are left only with narrative sources that are generally unreliable in their account of economic figures. Despite numbers being imprecise, sources provide anecdotes that are good witness of the presence of women as grantors and donors of the growing wealth accumulated by Mongol elites as the empire expanded, evidencing how women participated in the economy of the empire. References to women accumulating and distributing wealth appear in numerous chronicles of the period.[49] However, the nomadic nature of the early Mongol Empire and the later incorporation of large areas of sedentary population determine what was considered wealth in the Mongol context.

The riches of the khatuns cannot be thought of in terms of money but in a more complex structure that combined cattle, luxury products and people, all articulated within the institution of the *ordo* that served as the administrative centre of a khatun's wealth.[50] These camps functioned as hubs of economic, political and religious activity among elite women in the Mongol Empire. They administered the wealth of the Mongol nobility from these centres. The accumulation of properties into these *ordo*s came through different channels. The initial way in which a woman could begin to build a personal fortune was by receiving a dowry after marriage.[51] Traditionally, this consisted of livestock, cloth, jewels, household items and servants, who were under her command until she died. However, the conquests of Chinggis Khan and the expansion of the empire put a vast amount of wealth at the disposal of the Mongols. Ever since the early days of the empire, Chinggis Khan acknowledged the right of women in his family to receive a portion of the booty of war. In this early stage, women's participation was restricted to his wife Börte and his mother, Hö'elün, and the wealth distributed consisted mainly of men and women captured during war who would serve as servants, laborers or soldiers in the appanage of these women.[52] Both booty and dowry continued to be sources of income for women throughout the Mongol Empire, but the value of the assets they received increased extensively once the spoils of war obtained by the Mongol armies from the conquest of wealthy territories of China, Central Asia and Iran was added. Further, a relevant, and often overlooked, source of income for women were the gifts given to them every time a *quriltai* was held for the election of a new ruler.[53] The tradition of *present-giving* had certainly the goal of strengthening diplomatic ties among members of the royal family and rewarding those who supported them, but it was

also a form of redistribution of wealth that allowed women access to portions of the royal treasury.

Women did not increase their properties only by being passive receivers of dowry, booty and gifts. Instead, they used these resources to increase their equities by investing their wealth in different mercantile activities. Trade played a fundamental part in the economy of the Mongol Empire. Merchants (*ortoq*s) were free to trade within the empire and obtained imperial protection to carry out their activities. Mongol women, with their expanding treasuries, played a pivotal part in the economy of the empire, developing close relationships with merchants from the early period.[54] Women from all different factions within the royal family invested in trade and had close interaction with merchants. For example, it is suggested by Persian historians that Oghul Qaimish neglected all her activities while she was a ruler "except for dealings with merchants."[55] Both Juvayni and Rashid al-Din highlight this connection as a negative trait of a woman for whom they had little sympathy. However, in other cases, the same historians praise Sorqoqtani Beki for sending a trading expedition along the Angara River in Siberia in search of silver.[56] Although some measures were introduced by Möngke to have more imperial control over trade, once the Mongols settled in different regions of Eurasia, merchants continued to interact closely with khatuns at an individual level.[57] In the Jochid Ulus, the interaction of merchants with ladies of the court is documented, while in Iran, there is much evidence of women hosting traders in their *ordo*s, where they could buy luxury products from them and form investment partnerships for mid- and long-distance trade across the empire.[58]

While trade was a common economic activity among nomads of Eurasia even before the Mongols, the expansion of the empire presented them with other economic realities and new sources of income more associated with sedentary populations. The Mongols imposed taxes on agricultural land ever since Chinggis Khan had incorporated areas of Northern China into the empire. In this early period, women such as Sorqoqtani Beki were assigned portions of cultivated land from which they extracted revenues in the form of taxes.[59] Information about this practice in Central Asia and the Jochid Ulus is limited but it has been largely documented that women of the Ilkhanate were allocated specific territories for their usufruct. During the reign of Abaqa (r. 1265–82), different khatuns such as the abovementioned Qutui and Öljei were granted districts of northwestern Iran and eastern Anatolia from where they collected taxes imposed on the sedentary population that lived in these areas.[60] Women did not gather these taxes themselves but sent servants and officials working for their *ordu*s as tax-collectors in their name, who were charged with bringing the revenues back to the ladies' camps.[61]

Through different methods (dowry, booty, gifts, trade and taxes), Mongol women accumulated considerable amounts of wealth and property. The maintenance of soldiers and officials under their own command and their investments in trading enterprises show that women had a significant degree of autonomy in the use of their riches. In fact, their influence in politics cannot be separated from the fact that these women had at their disposal important amounts of both human and capital resources. This meant that, in different parts of the empire, women's *ordu*s began to be seen by male rulers as both an important reservoir of wealth and a threat to political stability. For this reason, at the turn of the fourteenth century, Ghazan Khan

(r. 1295–1304) began, with the help of his vizier Rashid al-Din, a systematic reform of the ladies' *ordu*s in Iran with the double objective of centralizing women's patrimonies under the imperial treasury and simultaneously depriving opposing Mongol factions of the accumulated ladies' wealth.[62] Consequently, the economic status of women underwent a process of transformation that adapted to the economic situation of the empire as it expanded across Eurasia.

WOMEN AND RELIGION

Before the rise of Chinggis Khan, different religions coexisted in the Mongolian steppes. The shamanism professed by the Mongols lived side by side with Buddhism, Manichaeism and people who identified with the Eastern Christian Church. As the empire grew, the Mongols encountered other religions such as Islam and Daoism and a multitude of sects that would determine the imperial attitude towards religion. The approach taken by Mongols towards religion is complex and does not seem to follow one single pattern. It was marked, on many occasions, by political purpose, in which different sects were favored based solely on the potential benefit they could afford to the Mongol political agenda.[63] On other occasions, members of the royal family expressed genuine preference towards one particular creed, but, overall, the official policy of the empire granted religious freedom in its territory and favored the expansion of a multitude of different sects and beliefs.

Mongol women interacted with religion in different ways and surrounded themselves with a diverse religious environment. There is scarce evidence for the presence of female shamans in the early empire, but several episodes of women performing rituals of divination and sacrifices appear in the sources.[64] Christianity was widely represented by women belonging mainly to the Kereit – but also Naiman, Merkit or Önggüt – peoples, while Buddhism, and to a lesser extend Islam, were common among the religions of preference in the Mongol steppe. Despite how sources might ascribe a woman to a particular religious affiliation, this did not prevent individuals from acknowledging other religions' practices or seeking advice or comfort in a religion other than their own in times of need. Women in pre-imperial times lived in a multi-religious milieu and enjoyed complete freedom to pick the religious affiliation of their choice. After the unification of these houses under the command of Chinggis Khan, many of these women were incorporated by marriage into the Mongol royal family, bringing their religious beliefs closer to the royal house and the Mongol emperors. Their role as consorts granted women from tribes other than the Mongols the ability to acquire a privileged position through marriage and offered them a new position of power to advocate on behalf of their religion.

The relationship between women and religion, at least during the thirteenth century, was based on practice rather than dogma. In other words, women were more interested in the performative aspects of religion, engaging with ritual, healing practices and close interaction with charismatic religious personalities, than doctrinal matters. This is the impression reflected in the accounts from different sources of the period. European travellers to the Mongol courts in the thirteenth century offer some testimonies on the close interaction between Christian priests and noble Mongol women. Marco Polo includes a witness account in which an Eastern Christian priest allegedly performed a divination ritual in the tent of one

of Chinggis Khan's wives and predicted his victory over the Kereit Ong Khan in battle.[65] Whether or not it was fabricated, the anecdote does typify a scenario that may very well have been possible during the time in which Marco Polo visited the empire, when religious personalities performed rituals for the satisfaction of men and women in the court. William of Rubruck (d. 1293), who visited the court of Möngke Qa'an in the mid-1250s, cites similar examples. The Franciscan missionary visited different Christian Mongol women in the court, making constant efforts to gain their trust while competing with the local Eastern Christian priests for the attention of the khatuns.[66] On one such occasion, he was summoned to the tent of a pagan Mongol woman who was sick and was asked to intercede for her life. After reading the Gospel to her and making her prostrate in front of the cross, he gave her a drink made of holy water, and the woman recovered.[67] Despite the miracle, there is no mention in the text that the lady had abandoned her pagan beliefs or that she embraced Christianity, suggesting that there was no contradiction, in the eye of Mongol women, between professing one religion and making use of another in times of need. When the Mongols conquered and settled in regions largely populated by Muslims such as Iran, women maintained a similar syncretic approach towards religion.

Women also developed a more institutional relationship with religions. In China, for example, Chabui, wife of Qubilai Qa'an (r. 1264–94), was instrumental in spreading Tibetan Buddhism in the court of the Yuan dynasty.[68] She had close contact with the influential leader Phags-pa Lama and gained the ears of her husband to win the favor of the Qa'an towards this religion.[69] As the empire grew and the Mongols settled in the conquered territories, women became active agents in the diplomatic efforts made by European powers in establishing an alliance with the Mongols. Christian Mongol women of the Ilkhanate, for example, received letters from the Pope and welcomed foreign envoys from Christian kings to their *ordo*s. They were perceived as potential facilitators in introducing Christianity to their husbands and sons during the thirteenth century with the aim of adding the Mongols as allies in future Crusade campaigns in the Middle East.[70] Despite the benefits of this strategy being limited to Europeans, in terms of attracting the Mongols to their cause, they were based not only on the accounts collected by missionaries such as Rubruck or Carpini but on the capacity of Mongol women to show themselves as openly Christian even in Muslim lands like Iran, Central Asia and the Jochid Ulus. For example, women such as Doquz Khatun, wife of Hülegü, adapted a Mongol *ger* or tent to function as a portable church that would accompany her whenever her *ordo* migrated from one place to another.[71]

While initially the majority of Mongol women were attracted by Christianity and Buddhism, other women would eventually embrace Islam. We need to wait until the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century to see a clear engagement of Mongol women with Islam, but in the territories of Iran and the Jochid Ulus there is extensive evidence of the proximity of Mongol women with different members of Muslim communities. Religion among Mongol women was shaped by their encounter with the Muslim populations in the regions west of the Amu Darya River where they settled. Shaykhs from different Sufi factions often interacted with Mongol women. Similar to the Christian missionaries mentioned above, Sufi shaykhs tried to seize the opportunity to get closer to Mongol women in Iran, the Jochid Ulus and Anatolia.[72]

In addition, the incorporation of Muslim women from local elites into the royal family in the Ilkhanate and the Jochid Ulus might also have played a role in bringing Islam closer to the royal court.[73] The increasing number of Mongol women with Muslim names documented in this period is indicative of conversions among Mongol elites in Iran, the Jochid Ulus and Central Asia.[74] However, without narratives of such conversions explaining the moment in which a woman (or a group of them) embraced Islam, it has been theorized that women converted to Islam through a process of Islamization that involved a multitude of different situations.[75]

The economic and political power accumulated by women in the empire also allowed them to provide patronage for different religions across the empire, including their original Altaic beliefs, Chinese traditions (Daoism and Buddhism) and Abrahamic faiths (Christianity and Islam). The influential khatuns of the 1240s, Töregene and Sorqoqtani, both made their financial contribution to promote religion in their own terms. The former authorized and helped to complete the printing of the Daoist Canon, while the latter, despite being a fervent Christian, did not hesitate in donating 1,000 dinars to a Sufi shaykh in Bukhara to build a madrasa in the city.[76] Buddhism received extensive patronage in China by women in the Yuan, and in the Ilkhanate, the presence of Buddhism has been re-evaluated in recent years.[77] In Iran, Christians were the first beneficiaries of women's patronage. After the conquest of Baghdad, some Christian accounts mention that Doquz Khatun, Hülegü's wife, financed the rebuilding of churches in the city, initiating a close relationship between khatuns and Christianity that would last for the rest of the Ilkhanate in Iran.[78] However, Islam would receive the majority of patronage from Mongol Ilkhans and khatuns once the Islamization of the Mongols in the region became more apparent in the decades that followed the 1280s. Women of Turkic origin belonging to subject dynasties from southern Iran and Anatolia and those incorporated into the Ilkhanid court would be fundamental in stimulating the financial support for Islamic institutions and Muslim personalities in the Ilkhanate into the fourteenth century. During the last decades of the Ilkhanate, Mongol women would openly show their appreciation for Muslim shaykhs in Iran and Azerbaijan. They paid regular visits to religious figures in search of advice and guidance while generously requiting them in the form of economic patronage and political protection.[79]

NOTES

1 De Nicola 2017b, 53–57.
2 This idea was suggested by Allsen 1994, 330.
3 Cleaves 1979–80, 138–150; Brack 2011, 331–359.
4 Ratchnevsky 1976, 509–530; Rossabi 1979, 153–180.
5 Bayani 1974.
6 Lambton 1988, 258–296; Holmgren 1986, 127–192; Holmgren 1987, 1–37.
7 In the 1990s, several studies addressing the relevance in studying women's history in the western Mongol empire began to emerge. See, inter alia, Hambly 1998, 3–27; Melville 1999; Ryan 1998, 411–421.
8 Birge 2002; Birge 2003, 212–240; Zhao 2004, 3–26; Zhao 2008.
9 Quade-Reutter 2003; Lane 2006, 227–256.
10 Brack 2011; Gilli-Elewy 2012, 709–723; De Nicola 2013, 116–136; De Nicola 2014a, 132–156; De Nicola 2014b, 143–156; De Nicola 2016a, 79–105; Broadbridge 2016b, 121–135.

11 Broadbridge 2018; De Nicola 2017b.
12 Hodous 2012–13, 87–102.
13 De Nicola 2010, 95–112.
14 See Ibn Battuta 1962, II, 483–485.
15 De Nicola 2007–8, 37–64; De Nicola 2017b, 34–47; Broadbridge 2018, 43–72.
16 This is the case of Begtütmish, wife of Jochi and sister of Sorqoqtani Beki. Broadbridge 2018, 223.
17 RDK, 977; RDT, 479.
18 Broadbridge 2018, 102.
19 In the Ilkhanate, this rule was not always respected (i.e., the enthronement of Abaqa), but the reasons for this change and the specificities of the Ilkhanid succession still need further research.
20 On the relevance of consort women, see Broadbridge 2016, 121–135; Broadbridge 2018, chapters 8 and 9.
21 Juwayni 1912, I, 143; *HWC*, I, 182; RDK, 618–619; RDB, 18.
22 RDK 787–788; RDB, 166.
23 Shabankara'i 1363/1984, 253–254.
24 Güyük (r. 1246–8) was fighting with his cousins in Eastern Europe when his father died. See Juwayni 1912, I, 196; HWC, 240. On Güyük, see Kim 2005, 309–338.
25 I am referring here to the most relevant grandsons of Chinggis Khan who would compete for power from the 1240s onward: Güyük son of Ögödei, Batu son of Jochi and Möngke son of Tolui.
26 De Nicola 2017b, 49–57.
27 On the Merkits, see *HCGK*, 273–274; see also *SHM* §55–6, §102 and §110.
28 For example, Möge Khatun had been the wife of Chinggis Khan before passing to Ögödei by the principle of levirate after Chinggis Khan's death. She was not only senior to Töregene but also widow of the founder of the empire and the favorite of Ögödei, and yet it seems that because she had no children from the khan, she was left out of the regency.
29 RDRM, 620; RDB, 19; Juwayni 1916, II, 196; HWC, 240; Bar Hebraeus 2003, II, 410. Chinese sources refer to Töregene with the title *ta huang-hou*, meaning "Great Empress," De Rachewiltz 1981, 43.
30 Juwayni 1916, II, 200; *HWC*, 244.
31 De Nicola 2017b, 70–71.
32 Kim 2005, 328–332. Carpini suggests that Güyük's campaign to the west was to continue the conquest of Europe and not to oppose Batu. See May 2018, 130–131.
33 De Nicola 2017b, 74.
34 Rossabi 1979, 12; De Nicola 2017b, 72–73.
35 The plot is explained by De Nicola 2017b, 72–76; Broadbridge 2018, 195–224.
36 On Oghul Gaimish's rule, see May 2016, 95–100.
37 Möngke's wives were important actors in the court as observed by the Friar William of Rubruck, but they do not appear to have had the same political ambitions as their predecessors. De Nicola 2017b, 190–192.
38 Juwayni 1912, I, 223; *HWC*, 268; De Nicola 2017b, 79–80; Pelliot 1949, 39–40.
39 Spuler 1943, 382.
40 For the story of her ascension, see De Nicola 2016, 115–120.
41 May 2018, 170.
42 Zhao 2008, 77–78; Dardess 1994, 567.
43 Üçok, 116; Album 1985, 43–76.
44 Despite this, Persian historians recorded the political involvement of women in territories other than Iran, such as those controlled by Orda among the Jochids. See Broadbridge 2018, 230–231.

45 RDRM, 1023; RDT, 501. Similar episodes of political interventions of women are recorded in Mongol-dominated Anatolia. See Cahen 1988, 243; Melville 2009, I, 56.
46 RDRM, 1192; RDT, 581.
47 See Lane 2006, 244–245; Broadbridge 2018, 233–234.
48 De Nicola 2017b, 96–97.
49 De Nicola 2016, 79–105.
50 De Nicola 2013, 126–136.
51 Rossabi 1979, 155.
52 De Nicola 2017b, 142–143.
53 De Nicola 2017b, 150–151.
54 Chinggis Khan ordered princesses to send agents for trading with the Khwarazmshah in 1218. See Allsen 1989, 87–92; Endicott-West 1989, 134; Broadbridge 2018, 13.
55 Juwayni 1916, II, 219; *HWC*, 265; RDRM, 810; RDB, 186.
56 RDRM, 76–77; *HWC*, 43; Broadbridge 2018, 198–199.
57 Allsen 1989, 104–105; on the measures of Möngke, see Juwayni 1916, II, 79; *HWC*, 600; De Nicola 2017b, 148.
58 RDRM, 1507; RDT, 745; Petrushevsky 1968, 509–510. On the Golden Horde, see Favereau 2016, 45–46.
59 De Nicola 2017b, 146; Broadbridge 2018, 209.
60 RDRM, 1110; RDT, 541. On Qutui Khatun, see also RDRM, 1064–1065; RDT, 520.
61 De Nicola 2017b, 151–152.
62 De Nicola 2016, 96–99.
63 Khazanov 1994, 16, 21; Jackson 2004, 245–290.
64 De Nicola 2017b, 186–188.
65 Polo 1903, I, 242.
66 *TMM*, 165–166; Rubruck 1900, 190–195; De Nicola 2017b, 189–192.
67 The woman was Qutay Khatun, wife of Möngke. De Nicola 2017b, 191–192.
68 On Chabui, see Broadbridge 2018, 237–240.
69 Rossabi 1979, 41, 138.
70 Ryan 1998, 411–421.
71 RDRM, 963; RDT, 472.
72 De Nicola 2014, 143–156; De Nicola 2014, 132–156.
73 De Nicola 2017a, 362–363.
74 Pfeiffer 2006, 372–376.
75 DeWeese 2009, 120–134.
76 Cleaves 1960–1, 62–75; De Rachewiltz 1981, 38–63; *RDRM*, 823; *RDB*, 200; Juwayni 1937, III, 8–9; *HWC*, 552–553.
77 Vaziri 2012, 111–134; Kadoi 2009, 171–180; Prazniak 2014, 650–680.
78 See, for example, the high role achieved by Qutlughshah Khatun, daughter of the influential amir Irinjin and a confessed Christian who lived in the initial decades of the fourteenth century. See De Nicola 2017b, 215–216.
79 De Nicola 2014, 143–156; De Nicola 2017b, 195–198.

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RDB, See List of Abbreviations.
RDK, See List of Abbreviations.

RDRM, See List of Abbreviations.
RDT, See List of Abbreviations.
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PART VI

FINANCE, TRADE, AND ECONOMY

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

MONGOL MONETARY TRENDS

Judith Kolbas

Wealth creation through finance and trade was the driving force for the development of money during the Mongol Empire. Originally, currency copied prevailing systems in each conquered area that eventually became more or less integrated with steppe traditions and imperial ambitions. From the conquest of the Tangut in the early thirteenth century to the height of Mongol influence in the fourteenth century, currency displayed the changing attitudes of the Mongols to the social issues of political legitimacy, religion, and status, as well as the economic ones of tax and state structure. Coinage also announced territorial expansion, contraction, and dispersion. Examining first the early empire and then the major regions, namely the Qipchaq Steppe, Mawarannahr and Turkestan, Mongolia, and China, and concluding with Greater Iran, this review intends to highlight some of the monetary trends over that period. The Mongol Empire revolutionized money in many ways by adapting new procedures and unifying accounting methods that made its economic power as influential as its military and political systems.

With the first moves outside Mongolia into Tangut territory, Chinggis Khan's (1206–27) initial financial arrangements centered on tribute in the form of products, such as camels. Tribute became a standardized policy through most of the Mongol hegemony; i.e., the Mongols expected products, labor, and shortly money to be delivered in a timely fashion, if not yearly then sometimes quarterly or stretched to several years. Tribute coinage came from subdued regions that retained their own governments, such as Anatolia under the Seljuks. Sometimes these entities had their own monetary system with little admission of Mongol tutelage, but eventually the central government tried to incorporate them into a unified system. On the other hand, the policy of 'thanksgiving' contributions or reparations to the Mongols was simply extortion. This was a one-time forced payment of money after a successful campaign or the squelching of a rebellion. The first example is the coinage from Bukhara, in which Chinggis Khan accepted the current coin, any money was good; but in Samarqand, the authorities quickly produced money acknowledging the suzerainty of the Mongols by adding the inscription *khan-i* ('of the khan'). As a result, almost immediately after the 'thanksgiving' payment, the tribute system was installed. As Chinggis Khan moved south across the Amu Darya, both policies

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were followed. Much coinage was demanded, which copied local traditions in many ways. However, unlike the area north of the river, the army did not retain control of it. Later, after securing the other regions of Mawarannahr and northern China, the government created more regular monetary and fiscal policies. The territories became provinces, northern China being the first one, Mawarannahr the second, and Greater Iran, consisting of Khurasan, Mazandaran, and extending to Azerbaijan, the third. Other extensions of the empire, such as the Qipchaq Steppe, Iraq, and southern China, also had roles in the further development of monetary activity.

IMPERIAL POLICIES

Imperial administration quickly followed military conquest in the decades after the subjugation of the Jin in 1215–34 and Mawarannahr in the early 1220s. Governors' responsibilities included taxation policy and payment types that required a bureaucracy to remove former monies from circulation and then to produce and collect new currency. Although there was a lean staff for this re-organization, the major cities managed to make the conversions at very short notice. For example, Samarqand issued Mongol money in billon (silver mixed with copper) every year from 1220 to 1222. Moreover, Bukhara, Balkh, and Marw issued Mongol money in 1221 and 1222. Balkh was also a hub for the administration accompanying Chinggis Khan's campaign into Afghanistan and Khurasan. With the army's withdrawal from Central Asia, much of this structure lapsed until the second quriltai of Ögödei (1229–41) in 1234. Again, the new policy was put into effect. It consisted mainly of taxing trade at commercial centers, so coinage appeared all over the empire from Emil, Otrar, and Bukhara to Tus and probably even to Bulghar on the Upper Volga. The policy lasted until about 1242.

By this time in Central Asia and Greater Iran, coinage had moved from billon to consist mostly of good silver struck to reasonably precise quality standards of purity and weight. This approach was a change from previous dynasties that had often issued money in three different metals: gold, silver, and copper. The stress on silver mirrored the recent steppe practice of using a standard of account called *süke* in Mongolian, *balish* in Persian, *somo* in Slavic, and *ding* in Chinese. It was a hunk of silver in the shape of a pillow but sometimes molded into rounds, squares, and even tubular bars stamped with official insignia that weighed approximately 2000 grams. It was not, however, a form of currency in ordinary transactions, but the basis eventually on which all parts of the empire calculated the denominations of their silver money. Streamlining imperial accounts and currency to silver allowed the Mongols henceforth to experiment with weight changes without attempting to relate the value of each silver coin to other gold or copper ones. This simplification led to major improvements in monetary circulation and increases in supply. It also greatly simplified tax collection and record-keeping across a vast empire.

In addition to evaluating tax income in one medium, there was an attempt to standardize inscriptions as much as possible. Nevertheless, it was incumbent that coinage in different regions be accepted by local populations, so material, language, script, and message underwent a number of modifications. However, in the

center in Qaraqorum in 1237, a universal Mongol message appeared that had the first use of Uyghur script at the bottom stating *töre*, meaning the 'correct way', the 'legitimate manner to rule'. Another issue from the capital incorporated Chinese characters. Along with Uyghur and Arabic scripts on the *töre* type, these two styles were symbolic of the idea of universal empire. Even though later coinages also employed a variety of scripts and languages, the word *töre* was the first attempt by the Mongols to claim a higher authority from their own culture that was not matched until the Uyghur inscriptions of the Hülegüids saying 'by the power of Everlasting Heaven' at the end of the century. The word *töre* also appeared below other inscriptions from Ögödei's son, Güyük (1246–48), from Qaraqorum to the Syr Darya in Otrar. Therefore, the concept of legitimate and proper government was explicit in the late 1230s and 1240s and reappeared as a Heavenly right later in Greater Iran only. The authority of Heaven was first based on tradition and later on religion. As the theory became better articulated at the end of the thirteenth century in Iran, Tengri and Allah were both on the same coin. Another attempt at a consistent message was the phrase *al-'adil khaqan al-a'zam* ('the just, the greatest khan'), perhaps also to be interpreted as the 'rightful/legitimate ruler'. This title was derived from the western Qara Khanids (c.1000–1212) and applied to coinage in Afghanistan in 1220, becoming widespread in each region in the middle years of the thirteenth century.

Beyond the message and the metal, a major concern was the coordination and centralization of a tax system. Although Ögödei's trade policy worked well, a change took place after the success in China of registering the population. This required a census that was first completed in 1234. After an increase in the state treasury, it was expanded to Central Asia and Khurasan. This meant that the method of collecting tax changed from a group payment with tribute or assessments at bazaars to a definite number of coins from individuals or families. As a result, coinage not only came from the same urban centers, but there were also new mints and a territorial extension of sites. This poll tax affected many more people and at first was very harsh, according to Juvayni. The mints that struck coinage were collection points for the surrounding regions, the most important being the capitals of the provinces or later the *ulus*es. Although the main capitals were Tabriz for Greater Iran, Sarai for the Qipchaq Steppe, and Almaliq or Bukhara for Mawarannahr-Turkistan, minting officials did take their equipment and records to lesser towns on a regular basis. This practice ensured central control over the supply of money, especially since the officials in Mawarannahr and Greater Iran had reasonably long tenures in office. Therefore, the foundation was laid in Ögödei's reign for a centralized authority issuing coinage based on silver with a standard weight of account at about 4 grams, the *mithqal*. That weight had various physical divisions depending on time and location, but it was the reference point for calculations. It was the normal unit in the Middle East and was incorporated into the heavier *balish* system of the steppe. Centralization faltered under Güyük but was forcefully re-instated by Möngke (1251–59), who preferred a poll tax since it provided stable revenue in comparison to variable income from trade. Even so, there was still tribute from several areas. A decade after Möngke's death, the empire was breaking up into self-governing sections. Monetary activity illustrates the trajectory of political events and economic currents that are best considered region by region.

QIPCHAQ STEPPE

The Qipchaq Steppe was supplied with coinage in the earliest days of Mongol control from the Upper Volga based in and around the prosperous city of Bulghar, near modern Kazan close to the confluence of the Volga and Kama Rivers. From there, a steady supply emerged especially during Batu's reign (1227–56). The type was inspired by the coinage from Zabulistan, in modern Afghanistan, during Chinggis Khan's invasion, containing the name of a deceased caliph on one side and only the mint but no date on the other. The coins were small, thick, and made from silver. The district had at least five mints with unified inscriptions and weight control. The type changed with Möngke's accession to the throne. His *tamgha* of a double-end trident stretched horizontally and crossed by a backward S in the middle announced a new policy of central control. The *tamgha* appeared on both sides, with one side displaying his name in Arabic script and the other the mint of Bulghar. As usual, there was no date, but it was probably issued in 1252 for a poll tax. It seems, however, that after the death of Batu, the steppe was furnished with coinage from Greater Iran (the Third Province) and the corridor of centers in Mawarannahr (the Second Province), indicating that coinage was a concern of the strong central government of Möngke in Mongolia. That changed as the Jochid *ulus* developed its own system after 1272 under Möngke Temür (1267–80) in response to conflicts with the Hülegüids and the failed co-operation of the Chaghadaids and Ögödeids over control of the Second Province of Mawarannahr-Turkistan. Möngke Temür struck at only a few mints including Sarai and Khwarazm (Urgench) but followed the tradition from the earlier coinage of the Upper Volga by minimizing the inscription to the most basic information. It was Bulghar along with Crimea at modern-day Sarai Krim, the latter under the control of the general Noqai, that were the main centers. They were at opposite ends of the trading network controlled by the two branches of the Jochids. However, Möngke Temür modified the inscription slightly to proclaim that he was *al-sultan al-'adil*, not a *khan*, followed by his name, while the other side just had the mint again. This coinage is considered the first Jochid money because it identified the ruler by name, a practice that never existed on imperial coinage. Like the earlier Bulghar issues, though, often there was no date, and, in general, the calligraphy was simple and bold with little attention to stylistic niceties. This pattern continued throughout the early Jochid period that distinguished the coinage from the more sophisticated products of the Ilkhanid and Mawarannahr mints.

As steppe rulers, Möngke Temür and his Chaghadaid and Ögödeid counterparts continued a practice introduced by Ögödei, i.e., inserting a personal *tamgha* on the coin. Stamping property with a geometric symbol or *tamgha* had been and still is a mark of ownership in steppe tradition that indicated, in this case, that the money was issued by and belonged to the sovereign. Möngke Temür used the Batuid *tamgha* in the center of one side, but the practice was dropped later during Toqto'a's reign (1291–1313). After this initial but small output of Möngke Temür, coinage began in earnest later in the 1270s at Khwarazm (Urgench) on the Syr Darya. From there, mint masters were taken to Sarai on the Middle Volga, which then proceeded to produce quite regularly. Like the first issues, these mints were two distant centers of Jochid control for the Blue and White Hordes, but the sites were soon joined by Azaq, currently Azov at the mouth of the Don River; Ukek near present-day Saratov

on the Middle Volga; and Hajji Turkhan, now Astrakhan, on the Lower Volga, as well as Majar in the northern Caucasus. These other issues were sporadic and locally struck without being unified, a problem which Toqto'a addressed in a reform of 1310. For the first time, he used Uyghur script, much later than the Ilkhans, but only for his name. He kept the word *'adil* but not *sultan*. The same year, not coincidentally, also saw a massive reform in Hülegüid territory.

With Toqto'a's reform, Jochid money became standardized by weight, alloy, and inscription organized by the capital, Sarai. Massive amounts of money from Sarai soon led to the cessation of former mints and indicated that the Middle Volga had become the center of both political power and commercial activity. Officials continued to strike great quantities into the 1340s under Özbeg (1313–41), who returned to *al-sultan al-'adil* and also called himself a *khan*. On the other side of the coin was the full *shahada*, the Muslim profession of faith, which did not last, as well as the border finally having an artistic design. Then under Janibeg (1342–57), by the 1350s, another major mint, Gulistan along the Volga River, struck coinage. Janibeg continued the cartouche and the title *al-sultan al-'adil* and also put his name on some issues in Uyghur script. In his capital, Sarai, he had beautifully crafted pieces, but they had only basic information, as before, sometimes without a date. These two mints over four decades supplied the entire Jochid realm with most of its money. They were on the eastern side of the Middle Volga and seem to have been new or adjacent capitals as population outgrew former sites and political control increased. When Janibeg invaded the Ilkhanate in 1357, he also struck coins in its major cities, including all the way to Baghdad. Other smaller mints existed in Moldova and along the Syr Darya, such as at Jand. Also, a mint existed in the city of Sarachik, located on the west bank of the Yaik or Ural River, on the route between Sarai and Urgench.

These coin issues had few allusions to religion or even to a Mongol ethos: the small hint contained in the rulers' names written in Uyghur had passed. This Jochid money was stable until the 1370s when the anarchy that broke out after Janibeg's death created havoc. From 1359 to 1380, at least twenty-five khans vied for the capital of Sarai and its territory. For example, in the year 1361, silver was issued for six khans. Moreover, various territories broke away during this period and formed new polities: one being Urgench in northern Khwarazm and another the lands west of the Volga into the Caucasus. On the other hand, the White Horde kept Sarai and was nominally the lead group. It thereby denied the Blue Horde the privilege of mining its own money. Then Mubarak Khwaja (1344–74) announced his independence by striking coins briefly in 1366–68 and especially in 1373. Urus (1374–76) continued the policy from Sighnaq, probably later called Sarai al-Jadid on the Syr Darya. All used the title *khan* after declaring *al-sultan al-'adil*. The coinage consisted of both copper and silver with clear calligraphy. There was no profession of faith, but once again, the date and mint completely occupied the reverse. It was a sophisticated if short-lived coinage.

As for the Russian principalities in the north, they issued no coins from the conquest in the early thirteenth century to the third quarter of the fourteenth century. Still, they had to find a means to pay the census tax ordered by Möngke Qa'an in 1257, which was initially strongly resisted. When Moscow headed the principalities, coinage began again among the Rus'. However, many had Arabic calligraphy for the Russian ruler on one side and the Jochid khan on the other. This money circulated

throughout the principalities and was also used to remit the customs tax to Sarai. Therefore, the two staple taxes that were collected in money applied to the entire Qipchaq Steppe and the extensive Slavic holdings.

MAWARANNAHR AND TURKISTAN

When Chinggis Khan invaded the territories of the Khwarazmshah, immediate and regular payment in Mongol money came from Samarqand in 1220 and 1221, then in 1222 from Bukhara, Marw, Balkh, Badakhshan, and Samarqand again. The name of the caliph was inscribed on one side with the simple word *khan-i* above, while the Islamic *shahada* was on the other. In 1223, Balkh, Samarqand, and Bukhara struck the same kind of coin again, while Astarabad joined them with an additional citing of the caliph on the side with the s*hahada*. These issues were all billon with a wide flan. Meanwhile in 1222, Marw had forged a new inscription: keeping the *shahada* on one side, it stated *al-Khaqan al-aʿzam*/*Chingiz Khan*/*al-ʿadil* on the other. This inscription was taken to Ghazna the same year, but then Chinggis Khan's name was dropped. After that, no Qa'an's name appeared on money from imperial territory. Instead in the same year, the mints in Afghanistan issued coinage stating *al-Khaqan al-aʿzam al-ʿadil* only. Later in 1222, the inscription changed to *al-urdu al-aʿzam al-ʿadil* in Baghlan and Samarqand with a simple *Allah* on the other side to replace the caliph's name and title. After this in 1223, a variety of inscriptions emerged on this model from Samarqand, Bukhara, Bulghar, Otrar, and Kurriman. Samarqand continued to strike other coinages until 1227. The metal was billon in Herat, Talaqan, and Kurriman for the *ʿAdil* coinage of Afghanistan but gold in Samarqand, Ghazna, and Otrar for some of the other types. The *al-urdu al-aʿzam al-ʿadil* coinage continued into the 1260s in Khotan and Kucha in Turkistan. In 1226–27, Samarqand also issued a cash-like billon coin that had Chinese inscribed into Arabic to say 'money/correct/Chingiz Khan'. Obviously, these first years of activity during the life of Chinggis Khan experienced a plethora of types, but Samarqand was the main mint.

As the seat of imperial power in Mawarannahr moved during Ögödei's early reign from Samarqand to Khujand in present-day Tajikistan to Almaliq in the Ili valley, and finally to Beshbaliq much later, Mahmud Yalavach and then his son, Mas'ud, as imperial governors of the Second Province established the initial monetary structure. Yalavach laid a firm foundation but instituted several financial policies, including tribute payments and customs duties. Removing tribute, Mas'ud generally maintained both trade and poll tax regimes together that maximized revenue. He became governor under Ögödei in 1238 and continued until his death from natural causes in 1289. After him, his brother and then three of his sons followed his policies until the beginning of the fourteenth century. They kept the nomadic inclinations of the Chaghadaids and Ögödeids at bay while improving commercial, agricultural, and urban life.

Mas'ud followed the poll tax that had been instituted in China in 1234 when he issued coins in Pulad and probably Emil in 1235–36. He also issued beautifully inscribed silver from Almaliq in 1240. This type continued the new inscription of *al-ʿadil al-aʿzam* beyond the 1240s. These changing legends indicated that, first, the ruler, the *khan*, then the corporate polity, the *ordu*, no longer provided legitimacy

in and of themselves but were replaced by a simpler idea of a greater world justice leading to Mongol success. *Al-ʿadil al-aʿzam* was an extremely truncated term for legitimacy. Another problem was that the issues failed to follow Middle Eastern tradition by lacking a name; instead, they acknowledged Chaghadai and Ögödei by using both of their *tamgha*s. These coins fit the Middle Eastern standard by weighing half a *mithqal* or slightly over 2 grams. Later coinage from Almaliq in 1250 included some silver-coated copper money, but it was still at the normal size and *mithqal* weight of approximately 4 grams with the Islamic profession in a square cartouche.

These various mints had five common features: first, they generally issued silver fitting a Middle Eastern standard of weight, the *mithqal*; second, legends were always in Arabic script and language; third, they contained a sign of the Mongol ruler with a *tamgha*; fourth, they stated the creed of the 'supreme just *(khan)*' of the early Chinggisid coinage; and fifth, only the mint and date were inscribed boldly on one side. Very rarely was there any acknowledgment of Islam, a feature that continued throughout most Chaghadaid-Ögödeid coinage. In other words, Mas'ud did not completely follow Middle Eastern tradition with his inscriptions but forged a specific format catering to Mongol preferences.

Mas'ud's success was interrupted when he had to flee to Batu during the latter part of Güyük's reign, preventing coinage from being struck in the province. When Möngke reappointed Mas'ud, various inscriptions appeared, but the coinage was often simply copper. It came from Almaliq, Bukhara, and Samarqand in 1251 and 1252 and all had Möngke's *tamgha*. No imperial money ever had the khan's name[1] as Ögödei, Chaghadai, and Güyük had used a *tamgha* before. This coinage followed that pattern.

Although Mas'ud did not establish a regular mining system for the rest of Möngke's reign according to the lack of coinage, nevertheless, after Möngke's death, minting resumed from 1261 to 1264. However, because of Baraq's (1266–71) coup, mints shut down again in 1265. Financial affairs were confused further as the Ögödeids and Chaghadaids together challenged the control of the Toluids for the imperial fiscal districts of the realm. They reformed the coinage and began to issue their own independent money but still under the tutelage of Mas'ud. At first, many issues were joint emissions carrying both *tamghas*, the backward S curve of the Ögödeids and the vertical stick with two adjacent circles at the top of it for the Chaghadaids. However, names never appeared, and the money was generally small silver currency. Very little came from Baraq, the Chaghadaid, himself due to his initial defeat in 1267 by Qaidu (1264–1301), the Ögödeid. By treaty, Baraq kept Bukhara and Samarqand and seems to have forced them to cover his war expenses with a special levy in 1267 and 1268. Then the cities became silent again. On the other hand, Qaidu did strike a good deal of coinage on his own. For example, in 1265, 1267, and 1268, Emil issued beautiful silver with both the *shahada* and his *tamgha*. The Ögödeid *tamgha* also appeared on undated silver coinage from Andijan and which continued the old inscription of *al-ʿadil al-aʿzam* and stayed within the Middle Eastern standard of account at half the *mithqal*. During this period, Mas'ud experimented with different cartouches around the field, most being very artistic, showing a high quality of craftsmanship, and the purity and normal weight of each coin was excellent.

Nevertheless, the Battle of Herat in 1270 between the Chaghadaid-Ögödeids and the Toluids of Iran turned the tide for monetary development in the empire. There

was no longer a transfer of payments to different sections of *tamma* units in other *ulus*es, and rulers began to create their own policies rather than try to follow directives from the center. It forced the Jochids to begin their own coinage in 1272, Abaqa to modify his system in Greater Iran, and Mas'ud to reform his own as well. At first, by diplomacy, Mas'ud tried to keep the former system. Nevertheless, in 1272, he too began to strike money for his own region starting in Bukhara. His policy was to issue for both the customs and poll taxes. Inscriptions were simple, often listing only the mint and date on one side as before and *al-'adil* or *al-sultan* before *al-a'zam* on the other, but the design of the field was always extremely elegant. In all this, Mas'ud had to balance the needs of the cities and trade with the demands of the *ulus*es in the steppe.

After securing most of the Chaghadaid territory, Qaidu wanted money and struck again in the late 1270s. The mints included Kashgar with copper, but only in 1276, and then a spate especially in 1280 also in copper at Bukhara with his *tamgha*. Coinage also came from Samarqand, which, unusually at this time, had the Islamic profession of faith. In the next decade, there was a reform as Almaliq became the main mint. This was the period during which Qaidu and Du'a (1282–1306), the son of Baraq, issued a number of joint coinages. The legend continued to favor the *al-'adil al-a'zam* slogan on one side and stated again only the mint and date on the other with a *tamgha* above, being very conservative and simple. These issues mirrored the policy of the Jochids. There are dates for 1282, 1286, and then from 1289 to 1291. Finally, the inscriptions began to change as the full Islamic *shahada* often appeared in the field although the *tamgha*s remained. There was silver coinage from Tirmidh and Taraz and copper from Shash. Many copper issues, serving as lower denominations, had followed the silver protocol, but these did not, lacking the *shahada*. Nevertheless, the copper in particular still boasted Du'a's *tamgha*.

Under Kebek (1320–26), the Chaghadaid Khan, a reform increased the weight and modified the legend as he returned minting to Bukhara, Samarqand, Tirmidh, and Urdu Bazar. He removed the *shahada* but kept the Chaghadaid *tamgha*. It is obvious that signs of sovereignty outweighed those of religion and were constantly in flux. Islam did not provide the main source of legitimacy. The issues were all silver, but they said *dinar*, a term reserved for a gold coin of any weight but usually at a standard *mithqal* of a bit over 4 grams. The legend probably referred to weight rather than metal because the coins, indeed, reached the double *mithqal* at over 8 grams. This trend continued under Yesün Temür (1338–41) when Samarqand issued silver in 1339 at the double *mithqal* and called it a *dinar*. Nevertheless, finally under him, at least the first line of the profession of Islamic faith reappeared on a regular basis, i.e., 'There is no deity but God'. Soon Bukhara, Tirmidh, and Otrar joined Samarqand with this inscription.

Another reform occurred in mid-century, 1359. *Tamgha*s were finally removed, and *al-sultan al-a'zam* became the standard legend followed by the ruler's name. The first line of the *shahada* was condensed and relegated to perch above the mint, which retained its important position in the middle of the field. This coinage lasted from 1359 to 1363, after which Timur Leng took over the area. The full *shahada* did, however, appear in Samarqand, Astarabad, and even Badakhshan during this brief period. In the remaining Mongol territories in the east, Kashgar continued

striking silver into the next century with the full s*hahada* but following the current Timurid style.

MONGOLIA AND CHINA

In the far east of Mongolia and China, money developed from a different tradition. International and interregional exchange was based on bolts of silk that were later backed by silver. The transformation started during the Qara Khanid (609–1212) and Qara Khitai (1137–1218) periods, but it was the Jin (1115–1234) who put silver into units of weight to create an accounting system. Although this was technically not money for transactions, a silver foundation was a major development. Nevertheless, pricing and paying in silver across Eurasia was not necessarily the case until the end of the thirteenth century. One of the chief reasons that silver grew in importance as a medium of exchange was that the Chinese, especially the Song (1127–1279) in southern China, discovered and exploited more mines. Although there is a significant difference between coined and bar silver, the release of so much silver for trading had an impact on money elsewhere in the Mongol Empire. For example, in 1272, copper coins from Mawarannahr that had been coated in silver were banned. Even so, the Yuan domains still used silk as the main medium after it had been introduced by the Southern Song to back the paper currency. The export of silver occurred not only through trade but also as revenue from the Jochid appanages, in particular those in the northwest of Shanxi under Ögödei and then Henan under Qubilai (1260–94). This was part of the *qubi* system, under which the various Chinggisid princes had possessions non-contiguous to their core domains. As such, they received *qubi* or shares of revenue from those districts. These "shares" could be a town, a market, or a district in a city. Although large annual remittances to the steppe occurred, during the turbulent 1260s, the Jochid revenues were no longer itemized separately but were included in the full Yuan treasury accounts. Even though itemized differently, the taxes collected on behalf of other *ulus*es were generally handed over. This was, however, discontinued by the Jochids in 1288, one of the signs that the original Chinggisid policy of sharing property and revenue (the *qubi* system) was dissolving. Therefore, Yuan silver and early appanage tax revenues were (briefly?) sent beyond its borders, enriching other parts of the Mongol Empire.

As for actual currency, Mongolia itself struck practically no coinage: the only ones known were produced briefly during Ögödei's reign at Qaraqorum in 1237. At least two unique types existed, one with Arabic calligraphy stating mint, date, and denomination and the other with Chinese inscriptions. Both were in silver and seem to have been issued in connection with the empire-wide financial reform to conduct a census and collect local poll tax. However, as stated earlier, the inscriptions indicate an attempt to define Mongol legitimacy with the word *töre* in Uyghur script and the universality of the empire by the use of different languages and scripts. Financial control of the empire did not mean that the capital struck coinage: instead, it collected money.

As for China, there were salt cakes, strings of cowrie shells in Yunnan and southeastern Asia, copper cash, tea bricks, and even paper money backed by silk stocks. For about twenty years after the conquest of Zhongdu, north China paid a heavy tribute using the financial system of the former Jin Empire. This tribute came from a

complete group, like a city. However, since much of the population during Ögödei's campaigns fled to the countryside and mountains, revenue decreased substantially. In 1234, Yelu Chucai, the chief minister, began a census and established a definite payment that was due from each family. Another census in 1236 reached even further into new territory. Now, individuals had to find resources to pay the poll tax, thereby creating Mongol money in China. Each region still had its own type of currency that had the imprint of the financial agent responsible to the imperial court. Different currencies could be converted into an imperial standard, the *balish*; but they generally maintained the previous styles of a region, such as strings of copper cash and divisions of paper money in the populous coastal cities. There does not seem to have been a distinction between payments for the yearly census tax, and money was available for the customs due at flourishing markets.

There were a number of reforms to provide better co-ordination that occurred especially in the early years of Qubilai's reign (1260–94) and one in 1341 that changed inscriptions on paper money to include the phrase 'correct money' that had appeared much earlier on Southern Song slips. The imperial agents in charge were often from Central Asia or even farther west, such as Mahmud Yalavach after 1238 and Ahmad in mid-century; even Marco Polo served as supervisor of the salt tax in the 1290s. Ahmad was particularly important as the chief financial officer from 1262 to 1282, raising money for Qubilai's many campaigns. He employed numerous other Central Asian Muslims in the bureaucracy that antagonized the Chinese elite. Ahmad also imposed heavier taxes and increased prices on monopolies. His successor, a Chinese, continued the policies but also had to issue substantial amounts of new paper money to cover the imperial budget. These practices led to some instability in the currency. Moreover, Southern Song territories were never fully incorporated into a unified system, the south maintaining most of its pre-conquest structure. Since in the later Yuan period the silver mines were fully developed, silver was incorporated into inter-regional trade by replacing silk bolts. As a result, the Yuan silver *ding* or *balish* became convertible into the currencies of the other Mongol regions, as merchants could exchange their paper money for silver when departing Yuan territories. Moreover, this area and Greater Iran emitted the greatest amount of money in the Mongol Empire since they were the most populous and the most commercially active.

Chinese money itself, however, did have reflections in the rest of the empire, an example being the billon coinage of Samarqand in 1227 that copied the inscriptional design and transliterated words found on cash. Further, in Fars under the royal appanage of the Salghurids in 1264–65, the Chinese character for *bao*/ 寶 or "precious (as in money)" was in the center of the obverse field with the name of the local dynast.[2] There was also the attempt to introduce Chinese paper money, the *chao*, into Greater Iran in 1294, but the effort completely failed. Merchants in Tabriz simply shut their shops for eight days, and the governor of Khurasan, Ghazan, refused to accept it as well. Finally, Ghazan's reform coinage in 1298 had three characters that stated *cheng/shihi/chen*/'properly minted money' in 'Phags-pa script. Beyond these influences abroad, in China itself, the plethora of currency created a challenge to commute them into a single medium of exchange acceptable within its regions and other areas of the empire. It was only after much maneuvering that these monies of different materials could be calculated in terms of the silver *balish*.

GREATER IRAN

From Afghanistan to Anatolia and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf, the Mongols controlled an area conveniently known as Greater Iran. Part of the region was conquered by Chinggis Khan between 1220 and 1223 and immediately produced money, poor-quality silver that replicated local weight, size, and brief inscription practices. These were the *'adil* coinages, which did not give the ruler's name but just stated *khan al-'adil al-a'zam*/'the just, the greatest khan' with a caliph listed on the other side, the only nod to religion. These were struck in Herat, Talaqan, Kurriman, and Ghazna with headquarters in Balkh. As mentioned above, this type was later adopted in Central Asia but ceased in Afghanistan once Chinggis Khan left the territory. With the re-entry of troops into Khurasan during Ögödei's reign, the area began to be administered by strong governors. Thus, in 1232–33, a sizeable number of cities struck coinage, which basically held the same message and style of traditional Islamic money with the *shahada* rather than the *'adil* legend. Trying to conform, they were in gold mixed with silver, called electrum, or in billon. They had larger but thinner flans than the *'adil* money from Zabulistan, all of these traits making them quite distinct. They came from Samarqand, then Bukhara, Khujand, Otrar, Isfara'in, Nishapür, Tus, and Astarabad. These were probably a form of tribute payment. However, with the restructuring of the administration after the Tarabi Revolt in 1238 in Bukhara, these sites were divided into the Second and Third Imperial Provinces, namely Mawarannahr and Greater Iran.

A deputy governor, Körgüz, took over Khurasan and then expanded his power all the way to Azerbaijan. He carried out a census as best he could and started issuing new coinage for the poll tax in 1239–42. Although his capital was Tus, the mints were centered in the Kur-Aras River valley in Georgia and Azerbaijan, namely Ganja and Nakhjavan but also Ardabil and Tabriz. The issues dropped *al-a'zam* from the Afghan inscription to say only *qa'an al-'adil*. Thereafter, these two words alone identified coinage from the Third Province but added on the other side the *shahada*, the date, and mint. This inscription had a long life in Greater Iran, lasting with some exceptions until 1277. This first coinage from 1239 to 1242 also carried a strung bow above the inscription, a steppe symbol for Mongol power. Then a reform occurred in 1244 to produce money for a customs levy, which lasted for four years until 1248. The field changed dramatically by having in the center a mounted archer shooting backwards and the universalist proclamation in the Mongolian language, written in Arabic script, of *ulugh munqul ulush nik*/'one great Mongol state'. It was emitted at the administrative center of Ganja, then at Tiflis, Nakhjavan, and Tabriz. From this period, monetary development in Greater Iran focused on this region rather than Khurasan, especially when Tabriz became the center about 1250.

In this initial period, money came from small and large towns in the Caucasus region, but once again a reform took place, this time in order to collect only the poll tax. The coinage returned to the *shahada* on one side and the *qa'an al-'adil* inscription on the other, but in a distinctive hexagon. The policy was briefly implemented alongside the other one that had a bow above the inscription for only a couple of years after 1245. Starting in Tiflis and Tabriz, it extended across Iran to Tus. This was the first attempt to incorporate the entire province into a comprehensive fiscal and monetary structure. The policy was interrupted during the last years

of Güyük's reign (1246–48) and the interregnum, but it was re-instated vigorously under Möngke (1251–60) in 1252. The Hexagon coinage lasted for thirty years until the reform of Abaqa (1265–82) in 1275. Three years before that reform, as a result of Baraq's invasion and the consequent Battle of Herat, the court had begun to incorporate the new Hülegüid territories and to add another metal, copper.

Hülegü's (1256–65) mission was to reinforce Mongol control over Iran and only then to conquer new domains. The Third Imperial Province itself, which stretched from Khurasan to Transcaucasia, continued to issue the Hexagon coinage, but money from Hülegü's conquests had a completely different inscription and purpose. For the first time in Greater Iran, the name of the great *khan* appeared on currency along with that of Hülegü. There were no *tamgha*s. This distinction between territorial legends was significant since it meant that this money belonged to Hülegü and not to imperial coffers remitting to Qaraqorum or given to imperial forces or administrators. Instead, this money paid for Hülegü's court and campaigns. Every city that he took from Baghdad to Mosul to Damascus issued coinage. His system was based on commerce rather than population, creating more coinage than the rest of Iran except for Tabriz. These lucrative regions were the ones that Abaqa sought to integrate into the original Third Province from 1272, a province that now came under his sole control. As noted, Abaqa was not alone: this was also the time that Möngke Temür started Jochid coinage and Masʿud initiated a new round of issues in Mawarannahr. For the rest of Abaqa's reign, there were numerous changes in mint structure and weight, but his *diwan* also tried to extend power over semi-independent areas like Georgia, Yazd, and Fars.

Abaqa was initially conservative with legends including those in ʻIraq-i ʻArab. After his father's death, Abaqa maintained Hülegü's name on coinage there but removed that of Möngke, leaving only the khan's title. Keeping Hülegü's name was exceptional for Islamic coinage. These points contravened both Islamic and steppe practices. Later, he added the title *ilkhan* to himself in this region and then his successor did the same. The term *ilkhan* appeared on coinage very rarely after this before finally ending in 1319.

To return to 1275 in the former Third Province, with the *shahada* on one side of the coin, a new legend emerged on the other in the Mongolian language and script, stating 'the coinage of Abaqa in the name of khaqan' with *khaqan* at the top. Abaqa did not have a title, and the *khaqan* was not identified. With this inscription, he made a grand statement of Mongol power even as the wider empire had fractured, and the symbolism of unity was stronger than anything provided by the steppe or Mawarannahr.

Building on the progress of Abaqa, from 1285–87, Arghun (1284–91) was able to completely unify the two regions of ʻIraq-i ʻArab and ʻIraq-i ʻAjam, employing one standard inscription and weight for silver. Twenty-six mints practically simultaneously issued coinage from Marw to Tiflis. There were exceptions regarding the inscription, namely in Anatolia, Dihistan, and central Khurasan, the first governed by his brother and the last by his son. Nevertheless, Arghun followed the concept initiated by Abaqa of dividing the state into three sections, the east, center, and west; but Tabriz was in full charge of monetary policy. Importantly, the *mithqal* or weight standard of account of 4.24 grams was permanently installed and became the common standard of calculation across the Middle East because of the success

of this reform. Except for unusual exceptions, no Ilkhanid coinage ever said that the coin was a *dirham* or a *dinar*, terms that had traditionally meant a silver or gold coin at a specific weight. This omission was significant since a monetary revolution was taking place that replaced value judged by metal with the amount of actual weight.

During the next stage of Arghun's reform, subsidiary coinages were initiated. Various types seem to have been oriented to interchangeability with trading partners: in Egypt, it was with copper, and in the steppe with silver. One type, the *'Adillya* copper or 'little pieces of equal money', was issued in Shiraz in 1288 for conducting trade perhaps with Cairo, which used mostly copper money. The policy of specialized coinages was phased out shortly, but the idea lingered, apparently influencing Bukhara in 1420 to issue its own *'Adilyya* coinage. Arghun's reform stalled near the end of his brother Gaykhatu's reign (1291–95), during which time a vizier tried to issue Chinese paper currency, and progress inched forward only slightly after that. For a short period at the beginning of Ghazan Mahmud's reign (1295–1304), unusual legends in Persian appeared, in which he entitled himself *al-sultan al-Islam* to proclaim his conversion. However, he quickly returned to his Mongol roots and struck coinage with only his name in Arabic script and no title surrounded by Mongolian script and language calling on 'the power of Everlasting Heaven'. The *shahada* was on the other side with the mint and date. This inscription announced the major reform of Ghazan in 1298, in which a standard weight and legend was re-imposed across Greater Iran, this time incorporating even Anatolia. Starting in Baghdad, a total of about a hundred mints were involved. The structure now included royal mints and regional centers that issued different coin sizes and metals. It was a fully integrated system of three metals of copper, silver, and gold, but, like Arghun's reforms, it lost steam around 1300, after the initial spurt. In fact, under Öljeitü (1304–16), most minting declined substantially at first, with production coming mainly from northeastern Anatolia and the Baghdad area. The Anatolian expansion seems to have been due to a commercial treaty with the Jochids in 1304, and the strength of Baghdad suggests that it took over trading networks from Shiraz and Hormuz. In 1309, a strong revival occurred in most major cities, heralded by a new inscription that proclaimed the Shiʿi faith. Öljeitü also took the title of *sultan*, which the remaining ilkhans continued, and he adopted a throne name as well. Only Gaykhatu (1291–95) had done so before, inspired by Buddhism. Öljeitü also dropped the Mongolian inscription. The rulers after Öljeitü returned to the normal *shahada* but continued creating a flurry of elegant and complicated border designs. These later inscriptions indicate how well the ilkhans had become assimilated.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning, the Mongols borrowed types from previous dynasties but soon put their own mark on them. Starting in Mawarannahr, they dropped the name of the ruler but kept the common title *khan* and ignored any religious terms. This reflected the Mongol approach to religion and titles. That proclivity continued later in the Jochid and Chaghadaid regions, which meant that although the groups had converted to Islam, there was often no profession of faith. This

situation did not manifest itself in the Hülegüid territories, in which Christian and Islamic statements appeared. With the coinage reform of 1298 in Greater Iran, the Mongolian language and Uyghur script proclaimed instead 'by the power of Everlasting Heaven' or Tengri as the ultimate deity of the steppe to be the overarching religious force for the Mongols and their claim to legitimacy. Inscriptions suggest that Islamic sentiments were essentially supports: a second tier of heavenly approval.

In other ways, inscriptions also provide a clear view of the Mongols' perception of themselves. For example, by using the word *töre* in Uyghur script on coins from the time of Ögödei and Güyük, they claimed legitimacy from the hoary traditions of customary law in the steppe. About the same time, the statement of 'one great Mongol state' appeared in Mongolian in Arabic script on the Horseman coinage of Azerbaijan. This was a statement of universality, but later coinages also proclaimed this theme, notably by employing the various scripts used in the empire: Chinese, Uyghur, Arabic, 'Phags-pa, and even Georgian.

These were some of the outward signs of adaptation and imperial messaging, but hidden within coinage was the need and intention to streamline finances across Asia. The government managed to do this by focusing on silver as the main metal and adopting a standard unit of account, the *mithqal*, which was applied eventually to all coinage metals and was ultimately related to the steppe standard of the silver *balish*. Currency struck across the empire even as it broke into separate *ulus*es fit into integral portions of this imperial unit of account. For currency, previously different metals, like gold, had sometimes been struck to a different *mithqal* or been physically divided into portions of a particular *mithqal*. Such confusion created by so many local dynasties was eliminated when every metal was put on the same standard and the exchange value was determined by supply and demand, not by government decree. This development was most obvious with the 1298 reform of Ghazan in Greater Iran. Throughout Mongol hegemony across Asia, both silver and gold achieved a high quality, often about 90 percent purity, and adhered to strict weights. The money was definitely a reliable store of value and greatly facilitated trade and wealth creation. Thus, with their acute attention to finance and the messages coinage could disseminate, the Mongols revolutionized currency in the Middle East and Central Asia to provide a legacy that lasted until the eighteenth century.

NOTES

1 The exceptions were in the Qipchaq Steppe in 1252, Georgia at the same time as a vassal, and 'Iraq-i 'Arab in the late 1260s. The areas had Möngke's name but had not been part of the three original imperial provinces.

2 Thanks to Paul D. Buell for clarification on the term *bao*.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

MARITIME SILK ROUTE

The Mongols and the Indian Ocean

Paul D. Buell

Paralleling traffic along the Central Asian land routes of the Silk Roads for more than 2000 years has been traffic over the Indian Ocean. Pointing up its parallel nature, sometimes even the same commodities were carried. The Indian Ocean was, in fact, long a conduit of trade and cultural exchange, even before formal land routes were established. The trade only gained in intensity and body as time passed.[1]

Although there had always been some trade in the area, along the coasts at least, the key developments came in late Hellenistic times (here *circa* the 2nd century BC) with the probably accidental discovery of the patterns of the Indian monsoons and their usefulness for coasting longer distances to trade.[2] At first, this trade was conducted in stages, with traders of different nationalities involved, usually in association with one or more major entrepôts, intermediate points along the way, for loading, unloading and the exchange of goods and people. Later the practice grew of direct voyages over long distances.

As these voyages initially related to China, where the trade had begun in stages, as elsewhere, goods were mostly carried in Arabic and Persian ships. Some of these were from nearer bases, but many came all the way from the Persian Gulf or, for that matter, the Red Sea or Africa directly.[3] The Middle East emerged as a natural focus of one side of the exchanges and China, distantly at first, another.

Chinese ships became involved directly, perhaps as early as late Tang 唐 times.[4] After Song 宋 times, particularly during Mongol Yuan 元, which also had a major interior Eurasian presence and controlled many areas marginal to China (including their land Silk Roads trade), as well as the China coasts driving the ocean trade, Chinese ships carried a growing proportion of the total trade. This was in large part because of superior Chinese nautical technology, larger ships among other things, fore and after rigging, and technological breakthroughs such as the compass.[5] During the Mongol period, the existence of a Mongol state in Iran, the principal ally of Mongol China in its struggles in Central Asia, resulted in a Mongol drive into Southeast Asia[6] and further stimulated the trade. Those taking part included no less

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a personage than Marco Polo. He returned to Europe via Iran by sea and recorded what he saw on the way.[7]

So well-developed did the trade become that when the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean, they had only to seize certain critical points, including Malacca, to dominate the entire system. Their ships sailed as far as China by the early 16th century. The Dutch and English followed, but none of this was anything new by their era. Here we focus on the Mongol period when the Indian Ocean trade first assumed the form and shape that it was to have subsequently.

BECOMING A NAVAL PRESENCE

Due to the many things they lacked, from grain to textiles to metals, commerce was vitally important to the early Mongols, even when they were still confined to the steppe. Even after, commerce and consumer goods – some for conspicuous consumption, such as the best pearls, popular among the Mongol elite themselves but also important for patronage – played a major role in Mongol life, as Thomas T. Allsen makes clear in a wide-ranging study focusing on much more than the pearls in its title.[8] To control their supplies of goods, also to govern conquered regions, the various Mongol groups that became the Mongol successor khanates maintained advanced positions near the trade routes and capitals, although courts continued to live a nomadic life, except during the winter. Most relevant to us here are two of these advanced positions, the Daidu 大都 (Khanbaliq) complex in China, including the "summer" capital of Shangdu上都 and the directly linked coastal maritime zone via what became the Grand Canal, and Tabriz in Azerbaijan and its complex. Tabriz was also linked to the maritime zone, in this case both the Persian Gulf, although more tenuously via areas not even directly controlled by the Mongol government; and also the Black Sea, less tenuously, and via the Black Sea with the Italian trading republics. These two centers and also, in the case of China, a parallel complex of coastal ports are well-described in full detail by Roxann Prazniak.[9]

As Mongol power expanded, so did their commercial links. This included the development of formal associations of merchants and Mongol princes (and imperial and successor state governments), who could offer resources such as use of the *jam* to traders called *ortaq* that loom large in our sources. At first associated with land transport almost exclusively, as Mongol horizons expanded *ortoq* also took to the seas. The key events were the campaigns along the coasts of China leading to the capture of the Song capital of Hangzhou 杭州 (1276) and then the total capture of the southeastern and southern coasts, culminating in the great naval battle of Yaishan 崖山 (1279), off an island near modern Macao. There the Song navy was either destroyed or forced to surrender. Some loyalists did escape farther south to continue the struggle, or at least the Mongols were afraid that they might.

Besides the destruction of Song, the Mongol campaigns of the 1270s in China had two other major impacts. One was the fact that after 1277, Mongol China was no longer simply a northern state peripheral to the Chinese maritime zone, focused as it was on the south, but in direct contact with it. The pivotal event in this case was the capture of the great trading city of Quanzhou 泉州 in Fujian 福建, Marco Polo's Zayton, taken in 1277. Secondly, Qubilai Qa'an (r. 1260–1294) had to create his own navy to respond to the Song pretenders, the "two princes," and their supporters

who, although continuing to be based on the land, also took to the seas, where they ended up surrounded by Mongols in a great floating fort comprised of Song battleships lashed together for one final confrontation[10]

Once positioned along the coast, the Mongols not only built up their political position but their commercial as well. Cities such as Quanzhou and Canton, definitively conquered by 1279, not only continued to be commercial centers in and of themselves and much involved with the South Seas and Indian Ocean trade, but now became bases for further Mongol adventures using the new Yuan fleet and imperial resources, but also, at the same time, foundations for the largely private activities of *ortaq* merchants. Overseas they functioned side-by-side with the Chinese trading organization during the incursion into Java (1292–93), for example. The fit was, in fact, good since, particularly from Zayton, merchants involved in the long-distance trade often had strong Islamic connections. This was also apparently the case for the *ortoq* merchants as well.[11] Allsen suggests that the Mongols preferred commercial connections with Muslims in part because of their commercial networking skills.[12]

Mongol overseas adventures principally used the new fleets developed to fight the Song coupled with surrendered ships, principally Song but also ships from Korean allies. The thrust was in several directions at once, with a long-range Indian Ocean connection associated with the main offensives against Vietnam, with Champa, on the central Vietnam coast, considered the key to the Indian Ocean, and against Java. Also taking place were attacks on competing commercial centers outside the khanate (that is Yuan China) – the city of Hakata in Japan (1274 and 1281), for one example, and Van Don in Vietnam (1285 and 1288). The attack on Champa (1283) can be considered in this connection too, since it was basically a major trading center on the Vietnam coast. The ultimate destination was, of course, Java, where a local struggle had gone on to control the area in succession to the old commercial empire of Srivijaya (fl. 8th to 12th centuries).[13] This was a name applied to a succession of states controlling northwestern Java and nearby areas, and the Indian and Southeast Asian trade moving along their coasts. By Mongol times, all were long defunct, but other states had arisen to contend for control of the area and its trade, drawing Mongol interest and Mongol intervention in 1292. Eventually the rise of Majapahit after 1293 ended the conflict, but by then the trade was increasingly harder to control for anyone due to improved maritime technology and a shift more and more to direct voyages.

How contemporaries saw all this and the Mongol diplomatic thrust to the west is perhaps best seen from the great survey, a veritable itinerary, of Late Yuan trading focuses and partners by Wang Dayuan 汪大淵 (fl. 1311 to 1350), the *Daoyi shilue* 島夷誌略, "Short Monograph on the Island Barbarians." Wang, who travelled just about everywhere he could by sea and land, including up the Red Sea to Mamluk Egypt, a popular destination for Chinese traders, even into interior Africa,[14] significantly states that connections to the "nations beyond the seas" begins with the Ryukyus,[15] that is to say, from Okinawa and those other islands off Japan so involved even then with international trade. If this is true, then the Mongol effort against Hakata makes sense as an effort to bring an entire trading system under its control.

The military attacks were ultimately unsuccessful, although Hakata and Van Don were severely damaged, as was the trade based on them. But the Mongol diplomatic offensive that had gone on simultaneously ultimately proved more successful, and by

the end of the 13th century such direct assaults had been more or less abandoned. In their place were direct voyages. Java was less important in such a context (one could sail right past) and Champa, for sure, was close to China and could be dominated at least, if not controlled. Exploration to and contacts with India and beyond now became the main thrust. How all this played out is currently the focus of major work by Francesca Fiaschetti.[16]

THE ROLE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Bearing considerable light upon what happened and what, for that matter, led up to later developments is a new field of inquiry, maritime archaeology. We now have the technology not only to carry out serious excavations under water, sometimes deep under water, but we can preserve and study the artifacts produced in a sophisticated manner, just like we have studied dry-land artifacts in the past, with the added advantage that a shipwreck complex is more precise. Shipwrecks happen once in a particular circumstance, and their recovery provides a specific cross-section of information, including what a ship was carrying and when. Underwater archaeology also provides a great deal of information, not only about how the ships of the time were structured, thanks to the surviving remains of large parts of them, but even where their building materials came from.

What can be accomplished can be seen from a number of timely publications. A recent work by Kimura Jun 木村純, for example, is his *Archaeology of East Asian Shipbuilding*.[17] It generalizes in a careful way from specific wrecks described in detail and analyzed comparatively. A chapter is entitled "East Asia's Link to the South China Sea and Gulf Traders" (209–237), which explores the issue of hybridization of ship types and long-distance trade, something on-going in the China Seas and within a wider Indian Ocean region. Focusing on a somewhat later period than what we are concerned with here, but still including early material by way of comparison, is Wu Chunming's edited collection *Early Navigation in the Asia-Pacific Region, A Maritime Archaeological Perspective*.[18] In addition to general works such as Kimura's book and Wu's collection, there are a number of more specific studies now being published as well. This includes what is now an extensive archaeology of the wrecks produced by the great Kamikaze when Qubilai tried to invade Japan by sea, both his attempts ending in disaster, the last spectacularly so.[19]

What these sites and associated materials can show us is clear when we look at specific sites. Earlier than our period but yielding spectacular finds is the Belitung shipwreck[20] of an Arab ship that included Chinese goods in its cargo. The ship's cargo, 60,000 items, was mostly 9th-century pottery, including blue and white dishes,[21] the earliest known, and a variety of other pottery types known also from China but in some cases decorated with their audience in mind, including Buddhist lotus symbols, even Koranic inscriptions and pottery colors that would appeal to the Islamic world. There were also miscellaneous items such as jars, ewers and inkwells; a large gold cup and a silver flask, both decorated; resins and spices; and even ballast ingots.[22]

More recent wrecks and associated archaeology, in this case connected with Java, are the subject of an in-depth study by Mai Lin Tjoa-Bonatz in her "Sea Routes in Sumatran Waters, Indonesia: Surveys of Historic Shipwrecks in the Straits of Bangka,

Gaspar and Karimata."[23] In her paper, she surveys Indonesian shipwrecks from the 10th through the 19th centuries. She also looks at the contexts of shipwrecks, including ports and trade networks, but also Indonesia's dominant position in trade, which often was carried on coasting via Indonesian ports (during the time of Srivijaya domination, in particular), although voyages tended to become more and more long-distance and direct as time passed. Other similar regional considerations like Tjoa-Bonetz's also exist – that of Miksic based on Singapore, for example.[24]

How trade and interchanges played out in practice can be seen, to be sure, in the archaeology, mostly unpublished – we are just beginning to analyze the wealth of material available fully – but also in literary and historical sources documenting Mongol activities in places such as Malabar. Malabar was a region in southern India facing the Arabian Sea and thus strategically located. It and surrounding states were among the major targets of Qubilai Qa'an's India diplomacy. It extended towards India not only across the sea, from South China and past Java, but also from the north, via the advanced Mongol positions in Burma and Tibet. Several missions were exchanged between the Yuan 元 and the Malabar regions, most notably through the diplomatic efforts of Yuan officials on the spot in the 1270s and 1280s.[25] The goal of such missions was apparently, at one level, submission and tribute, but on another, Mongol courts also wanted trading partners and, of course, commercial intelligence.

TRADE AND DIPLOMACY

As a consequence of such efforts, also the many diplomatic exchanges between Mongol China and local powers, not just in India, the shipping of Mongol China dominated the Indian Ocean from about 1290 until around 1340. There it was also connected to Indian, Arabic and Iranian shipping, even if the Chinese continued to be the active participants of the entire system at home in China, where they and their allies held ultimate control in the key homeland maritime zone.

One important route led along India to Hormuz on the Persian Gulf, then north to Shiraz, Tabriz and Trebizond, and from there primarily into the Genoese Black Sea trade, where exotic goods from the east were sent on to Europe. Typically, Marco Polo came by land but went back by sea via Iran, where he dropped off his princess.[26] She was not the only princess involved in the area's traffic. As Bade shows, from the Javanese perspective, women were what Qubilai was looking for to begin with.[27] But intermarriages with the locals was a standard part of Mongol foreign policy to the point that Koryo Korea, thanks to all the princesses, became almost more Mongolian than Korean.

And what was carried in the trade, other than princesses? Almost everything that was carried by land was carried by sea but often in greater bulk, pottery, including porcelain, as one example. One surprise was horses, not just from Arabia to India but beyond.[28]

Also popular were medicinals, and there was a lively trade. We know this because our principal source for Arabic medicine in China, the fragments of a hospital manual from Ming Dynasty times called *Huihui yaofang* 回回藥方, "Muslim Medicinal Recipes," shows clearly that the medicinals called for in it are virtually identical to the medicines called for in the Cairo Genizah materials from Egypt, for example. Most of them came over the seas due to almost continual disruptions of the

land silk roads in Yuan and Ming times and the growing convenience of shipment by sea.[29]

Of the individual medicinals called for in the *Huihui Yaofang* (*HHYF*), pepper seems strange as the most common, but pepper (both white and black) is a most important component of Galenic medicine, as are honey and saffron. Both are very popular in the *HHYF*. Pepper was primarily from India and saffron was from various places in North Africa, also from the Middle East and India. Of the items that follow in common use, myrobalans were primarily supplied by India when the *HHYF* was written, although they do grow elsewhere, even in China and Vietnam. Its medicinal aloes came from various places, but the best were from Socotra. In fact, Socotran aloe is specified several times in the *HHYF*. Chinese spikenard, also commonly called for in the text, is, as its name implies, Chinese but here is probably just a stand-in for Indian spikenard, *Nardostachy jatamansi*. The roses grew in many places, but rose water and the other rose products used as medicinals were typically Middle Eastern. They were likely imported. The cardamoms, both the large and small varieties, were mostly from India. Long pepper, called for commonly, was mostly from India, although there is a similar plant found in Java. Grapes were grown in China, in the Inner Mongolian borderlands of the time, but wine, often called for in the *HHYF*, is typically western, as are the grape vinegars (other vinegars are called for just as vinegar and many of these may, in fact, be grape vinegar). The myrrh of the text was a well-known product of South Arabia, and dodder was another largely Middle Eastern plant, as is the text's rue. Only with ginger, also often called for, do we come to a purely Chinese medicinal but one that was grown the world over and certainly used in Arabic medicine. Clearly, the most common medicinals in the *HHYF* were Middle Eastern or Indian, and most were likely direct imports.

Just how Arabic and Western the medicinals of the *HHYF* really are can be seen from a comparison of the *HHYF* list with the most important Cairo Genizah medicinals. To be sure, the *HHYF* sample, even with a fragmentary *HHYF*, is larger and more detailed than the Genizah materials and includes kinds of material excluded by Lev and Amar as not likely to find practical use, but the results of comparisons are still striking.[30] The East and West made use of the same medical system.

So the medicinals suggest trade and exchange in a highly significant way, and trade in medicinals is extremely easy to trace since many medicinals, as suggested above, come from specific places and areas. The Indian Ocean was clearly an important conduit in Mongol times, and Mongol official policies contributed to the upswing in its world importance. The existence of a Mongol regime in Iran was a major incentive but not the only one. Pure trade considerations were also important, as Ciocîltan makes clear, with the Italian city-state of Genoa functioning as a dominant influence and running the whole show, as it were, with a presence obviously in Europe but also in Iran and at points beyond, including China and Southeast Asia. In the end a pattern was created, one that persisted until the whole system, after a Chinese attempt, was dominated by an interloper, the Portuguese, but soon also by the Dutch and the English. The Indian Ocean had become the true interface fueling a world economy, but in most respects, this began with the Mongols.

Genoa's most important source of power was that it was established in all the major areas from which the trade developed.[31] In China, this soon meant the great

maritime cities which passed under Mongol control between 1276 and 1279 during the final period of the Song 宋 conquest.

Cities taken included the Song capital of Hangzhou itself, then the ports of what is now Fujian 福建 Province, including Quanzhou, also called Zayton by foreigners including Marco Polo, later Guangzhou 廣州, that is, Canton. Guangzhou and particularly Zayton were associated with colonies of Arabo-Persian merchants and others, still maintaining Western Asian connections even if assimilated to Chinese norms in some cases. In the case of Zayton, the city was even surrendered by one of them, the famous Pu Shougeng 蒲壽庚, who later provided a large fleet to help the Mongols finish off Song.[32]

Marco Polo was an eye-witness to the subsequent development of the area and the trade that passed through it. To him, Zayton was unquestionably one of the world's great cities because of its trade and connections. He records:

> In this city is the port where all the India (Indian?) ships come, with many commodities and luxuries, with many precious stones of great worth, and with many big, good-quality pearls. To this port come all the merchants of Mangi (which totally surrounds it), consequently, such a great abundance of commodities and stones come and go through this port that it is a marvelous thing to see; and from this city and port, they go throughout the entire province of Mangi. I tell you that for each shipload of pepper going to Alexandria, or other places to be carried to Christian lands, a hundred come to this port of Zaytun, for you must know that this is one of the two ports in the world where the most merchandise comes from.[33]

Polo also describes in similar terms other Indian Ocean trading points as well as some from outside, Champa, for example, and even Japan (for him it was all one larger zone called India). Like the *Yuanshi*, he has something to say about Malabar, part of his Greater India, to distinguish it from a more diverse "India."[34] For Polo and other travelers of the times, India was thus obviously greater than the geographical reality of the simple Indian Ocean. It was a significant system and commercial and cultural way of life, unified by past development and increasingly through an energetic Mongol presence, even if long-range.

NOTES

1 For a long-term view of the traditional commerce of the Indian Ocean from a world system perspective, see, in particular, Beaujard 2005, 411–465.

2 The classic study of this period of the trade, now old, is Schoff 1912.

3 See, as an introduction, the survey by Hourani 1995. For late Greek and Roman commerce, see also Innes Miller 1969.

4 For a Tang Arab ship carrying Chinese goods, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belitung_shipwreck (accessed 7 June 2019); www.thenational.ae/uae/heritage/chinese-porcelain-discovered-in-uae-shows-700-years-of-gulf-relations-1.870641 (accessed 6 June 2019).

5 The best introduction to the history of Chinese nautical science is Needham et al. 1971. See also Lo 2012 and Deng 1999.

6 See Buell 2009, 21–29. On the Mongol campaign in Java, see Bade 2013. See also Buell 2012, 42–43, and for a history of late Chinese involvement in the Indian Ocean, see Sen 2006, 421–453.

7 On the voyage, see Cleaves 1976, 181–203. For a full Marco Polo bibliography, see Buell and Fiaschetti 2018.
8 Allsen 2019.
9 Prazniak 2019.
10 Buell 1985–6, 138–186.
11 Prazniak 2019, 199–221; Allsen 2019, 154–166.
12 Allsen 2019, 27–28 and *passim*; Prazniak 2019, *loc. cit*.
13 See Wolters 1970.
14 On geographical information of the time, see, as an introduction, Bretschneider 1967 (1888).
15 Dayuan 1981, 17. On the Ryukyus see Smits 2019; Akamine 2017; and Park 2012), 114–118. See also Park 2012, 108 and Mukai and Fiaschetti 2020 for a convenient map of the route from Quanzhou to Hormuz.
16 Fiaschetti, Forthcoming.
17 Kimura 2016.
18 Wu 2016.
19 See as a sampling: Sasaki 2015; Delgado 2008; Delgado 2010; Conlan 2001.
20 See Note 5.
21 This is not yet the classic Blue and White of Yuan 元 and Ming 明 times. Finlay 2010; Carswell 2000.
22 For the trade routes of the time and a bit later, see the map at https://easyzoom.com/imageaccess/ec482e04c2b240d4969c14156bb6836f (accessed 7 June 2019). For more maps, see also Allsen 2019.
23 Tjoa-Bonatz 2018, 79–90.
24 *E.g*., see Miksic 2013. I am grateful to Mai Lin Tjoa-Bonatz for supplying this reference.
25 See Fiaschetti, Forthcoming.
26 Ciocîltan 2012. According to Prazniak, Tabriz's Genoa connection really only began in the 14th century. See Prazniak 2019, 202f and *passim*.
27 Bade 2013.
28 See Fragner 2009; Yasuhiro 2009, 87–97; and Kauz 2009, 129–135.
29 See Buell 2019, 261–293. See also Buell 2014, 133–140. See Allsen 2019 on pearls.
30 Lev and Amar 2008; Chipman 2010; Buell 2019; Buell and Anderson 2021.
31 Cioĉiltan, *op. cit*.
32 Buell 1985–6.
33 Polo 2016, 141; Shottenhammer 2001.
34 Polo 2016, *op. cit*., 157.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

TAXATION IN THE JOCHID ULUS

István Vásáry

Taxation is one of the most complicated state functions. Behind the concepts and names of taxes, intricate social and economic processes are concealed. Terms of tributary practices and taxation have been rather loose in pre-modern societies, and the Mongol Empire is no exception to that. Springing forth from the obscure tribal world of 12th-century Inner Asia, in 1206 Chinggis Khan first united the nomadic Mongol and Turkic tribes into a nomadic realm, then in two decades created an empire which during his successors' rule developed into the largest Eurasian empire in history. From the primitive tributary practices of the nomadic realm, an ever more complicated system of state administration and taxation was formed, which encapsulated and transformed the local systems of sedentary societies. The taxation systems of two old sedentary societies were especially instrumental in the formation of the tributary practices of the nascent Mongol empire: those of Iran and China. One must therefore bear in mind that the original, rather rudimentary nomadic tributary practices evolved into a complicated and complex system of taxation through a long process, not least owing to the influence of sedentary civilizations based on agriculture. Herbert Schurmann, in his still relevant basic work on Mongolian taxation,[1] names three stages of the Mongol tributary practices. In the first period (1206–27), the bases of the would-be empire were established with the conquests of Chinggis Khan. The newly acquired territories were occasionally levied by tributes but were not systematically exploited by the new state power. The second period began with the Mongols crushing Jin power in northern China (1234) and witnessed the emergence of the various Mongol *ulus*es: Jochi's *ulus* in the west (1236–41), Hülegü's *ulus* in Iran (from 1258), the Chaghadaid Ulus in Central Asia and Mongol rule in East Asia. This period was characterized by the emergence of new, variegated forms of exploitation of agricultural populations and the appearance and infiltration of local taxes and imposts. Though having some common features, the latter may have differed essentially from place to place. The harmonization of the Mongol tributary practices with the local ones went rhapsodically and intermittently, without the strict regulations of a strong central power, so a certain confusion and chaos characterized taxation in different parts of the Mongol Empire. The imposts in Ilkhanid Iran, in the Yuan Empire, in the Chaghadaid Ulus and the Jochid Ulus

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were sometimes very different, and soon need arose to regulate this fluid state of taxation. In Ilkhanid Iran and in East Asia this process took place in the last decades of the 13th century, but in the Chaghadaid and Jochid Khanates, owing to the lack of massive sedentary civilizations and a strong state power, the consolidation of the taxation systems never took place. Consequently, taxation in Ilkhanid Iran and Mongol China has been researched systematically. H.F. Schurmann and J.M. Smith's basic works[2] rely mainly on the rich testimony of Iranian and Chinese sources. The question concerning taxation is one of the least explored parts of the Jochid Ulus's internal life, only partly because of the paucity of sources.[3] Our primary source for the taxation of the Jochid Ulus will be, as mentioned above, the *tarkhan yarlik*s written in Turkic, plus the contemporary Russian translations of the immunity charters given to the Russian Church and the Italian translations of diplomas granting tax exemption to the Venetian and the Genoese traders.[4]

CENSUSES

The practice of censuses was a revolutionary step in building the Mongol Empire; it paved the way to the formation of a sophisticated administration and taxation, so vitally important in organizing and running a state. The practice of censuses was adopted from China. No wonder the first serious census extending to the whole Mongol Empire was executed in 1257–9, during the reign of Möngke Qa'an, who drew heavily on Chinese practices in creating an imperial administration. The main aim of censuses, in addition to the always-present military recruitment, was evidently population registration. Partial censuses were conducted earlier in North China in 1235–6 during Ögödei's reign, and in 1245 in the Jochid Ulus, mainly in Russia, during Batu's reign. The first imperial census encompassing the whole Empire was accomplished only in 1257–9. We do not know the precise name of these censuses in Mongol, but most probably it was *to'a/to'o* 'number', since the contemporary Persian and Russian terms for census used *shumara* and *chislo* with the same meaning, hence they were probably translated from the Mongol. The male population was registered, but there are hints that sometimes households were also enumerated, as practiced in China.[5]

Returning now to taxation, the original Mongol taxes and services in the formative period of the empire in the 13th century can be divided into three groups: 1. taxes and obligations: *alban, ghubchi'ur* (*qubchur*); 2. maintenance of the postal relay system: *ulagha, shi'üsün* (*shüsün*), *jam*; 3. commercial duties: *tamagha*.[6]

TAXES AND OBLIGATIONS (*YASAQ QALAN*)

The nomadic Mongols in Chinggis Khan's time knew only one type of tax, and this was the *qubchur*. This was obligatory for everyone, but only from Ögödei's reign was it collected on a yearly basis, with one animal taken from every hundred. At first, the *qubchur* denoted a tax collected exclusively from the nomads,[7] but later on it was collected from every subordinate: it was under Möngke's reign that the *qubchur* emerged as a poll tax on the sedentary population.[8]

We know the history of the *qubchur* in Iran quite well from the 1300s. For Muslims it was very reminiscent of the *jizya*, a poll tax levied on *dhimmi*s, the non-Muslim

part of society. The Muslims under Mongol rule resented this tax, but in spite of this, it was not abolished in either Iran or the Jochid Ulus. It became equated with Mongol exploitation, which caused the most misery and impoverishment of the agricultural population.

Another basic Mongol obligation that often accompanied *qubchur* was *alban*. *Alban* does not surface in Persian texts; moreover, strangely enough it does not occur in the *Secret History of the Mongols* either. Its early presence and significance in the Mongol state administration and taxation, however, cannot be doubted. It often emerges in Mongol texts in the Phagspa script, and there are ample examples for its use in Mongol society, especially in the post-Yuan period. Its commonest occurrence is in the binomial expression *alban qubchur*. Schurmann lingers on whether to take it as a single or dual concept, then decides that despite its rendering with a single Chinese term as *ch'ai-fa*, the former interpretation is more probable.[9]

The second group of taxes consisted of the obligations to maintain the postal relay system: *ulagha, shi'üsün* (*shüsün*), *jam*. To secure the communication, an extended network of postal relay stations was created and continually developed from Ögödei Qa'an's reign onward.[10] Much has been written on the Mongol relay system, which enabled the Mongol Empire to effectively administer such a vast territory.[11] The post stations (Mo. *jam*, Tu. *yam*) and its officers and servants (Mo. *jamchin*, Tu. *yamchi*)[12] had to be provided with courier horses (Mo. *ulagha*, Tu. *ulagh*)[13] and rations (Mo. *shi'üsün* → *shüsün*)[14] for the state envoy.[15]

Finally, the commercial tax or sales tax was the third source of significant revenue/income for the Mongol overlords (Mo. *tamagha*, Tu. *tamgha*).[16] *Tamgha* was an Old Turkic term whose original meaning was 'sign or mark of ownership, brand (on animals)'; later it came to mean 'seal' as well. The third meaning, 'commercial tax', appeared only from the 13th century onward, probably parallel with the organization of the Mongol Empire. The Chaghatay-Persian dictionary *Sanglakh* nicely reflects all three stages of the semantic development of the word: 1. 'a sign or mark', 2. 'the implement with which they seal or mark something, or brand livestock', and 3. 'a grant of tithes or government taxes'.[17]

After this brief survey of Mongol taxes, we may try to trace to what extent they were preserved, transformed or substituted by other terms of taxation, especially by the Islamic ones. What seems to be striking is that five of the basic terms of Mongol taxation (*alban, ulagh, shüsün*, *yam*, *tamgha*), although with different frequency, occur in the documents of the Jochid realm, but *qubchur* is missing. It is especially peculiar that *alban*, which otherwise is totally missing from Juvayni's and Rashid al-Din's works, crops up in the binomial *isaq alban* (Jot 4: 37).[18] Since *qubchur* is unattested in the Jochid documents (although it is amply documented in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, Juvayni, Rashid al-Din, and the Uyghur legal documents) and *alban* occurs but once, we may rightly assume that both terms must have been substituted by other words. If we take the aforementioned *isaq alban* as our starting point, the first element, *isaq*, can be identified with Turkic *yasaq*, the original meaning of which was the Chinggisid Mongol code of law, the supreme and fundamental principle of the Mongol state (Mo. *jasagh*). In Turkic, it occurs only from the 13th century onward. Interestingly, the semantic field broadened in Turkic so that it came to also refer to the state obligations, meaning something like 'lawful taxes and obligations' in general levied on the population in the name of Mongol power. So

yasaq, the name of the Mongol law, was deposited on the commonest native Mongol tax, the *qubchur*. In this capacity it seemingly ousted Mongol *qubchur* from usage, and *yasaq* became its Turkic equivalent in the Jochid Ulus. Further examples from the documents are *yasaq qalan* (Jot 5:11–12; Jot 7); *yasaqli yarli ellär* 'the destitute people burdened with taxes' (Jot 3:23)[19] and *kündüzki yasaq, kechäki yar* 'daytime burdens of taxes and nightly misery (?)'(Jot 3:14–15).[20]

Otherwise, *yasaq* was not used independently, only together with *alban* and *qalan*, but as a general term for taxes, it frequently occurs as the second component of a phrase, the first part of which exactly specifies the tax in question, e.g. *boyunsa yasagi* 'yoke tax' (Jot 4:16). In this function of serving as a general designation for taxes, it often alternates with the Arabic terms *haqq* and *mal*. (All examples will be treated in detail later.)

Yasaq as a term of taxation entered into Russian (*iasak*) and was used widely from the 16th century onward for designating the tribute levied on the conquered peoples. (In Siberia, it was mainly the fur tribute.) The origin of the name and the tax itself are undoubtedly Turkic, but the time of the borrowing is uncertain. Most probably, the institution of *yasaq* as a tribute of the subjugated peoples was adopted from Kazan and Astrakhan after the capture of these two successor states of the Jochid Ulus. When Muscovy conquered the Kazan Khanate, Tsar Ivan IV summoned the tribute-paying subjects (*chernye lĭudi ĭasachnye*), guaranteeing their safety if they paid the *yasaq*, as they had paid it formerly to the sovereign of Kazan.[21]

Since *qubchur* was substituted with *yasaq*, and *alban* – as seen earlier – occurs once altogether, one is inclined to assume that *alban*, for the most part, must have been substituted with another term. Indeed, the general dual form in lieu of Mongol *alban qubchur* was *yasaq qalan* (Jot 5:11–12; Jot 7). The origin of *qalan* is uncertain; no plausible etymology, either Mongol or Turkic, is at hand.[22] But *qalan* frequently occurs in the Uyghur juridical documents of the 13th – 15th centuries as a general term for the taxes of the sedentary, agricultural population.[23] Payment and labor services levied on land may have been equally included in this term, but in a narrower, probably original, sense labor services were meant by it in the main. This may make it clear why *qalan* was selected as a Turkic equivalent corresponding to Mongol *alban*.[24] *Qalan* is also frequently met with in Persian texts, e.g. in one of Ghazan Khan's edicts, the tax exemption of Muslim dignitaries and ʿAlids is explained with the following phrase: 'Inasmuch as it was Genghis Khan's great edict that judges, scholars, and Alids not pay *qalan* and *qubchur* tax [*qalan va qubchur nadihand*], we have commanded that they will accordingly be exempt. Taxes and *qubchur* [*mal va qubchur*] will not be taken from them'.[25] This passage clearly shows that *qalan* and *mal* (the Islamic terminology) were equated in the terminology of a Chinggisid ruler.

But before scrutinizing the taxes of Islamic origin that were present both in Ilkhanid Iran and the Jochid Ulus, we must treat two other terms used for taxes in general in the Jochid Ulus; these are *saligh* and *chiqish*. *Saligh* is a deverbal noun formed of Turkic *sal-*, 'to throw, put, impose', hence its meaning is 'any kind of tax or obligation; impost'. It often occurs in Uyghur documents where it contracts[26] as a general term for 'tax'. In a binomial it occurs as *saligh bergü*, meaning 'taxes of all forms': *saligh bergü bolmish üchün* 'because they have become liable to pay taxes'.[27] *Saligh* (and *bergü*) must have been among the oldest terms in Turkic for taxes, and their usage continued in the Jochid documents. Consequently, its meaning has never become

specified; it could mean any tax and obligation, Mongol and Islamic taxes included. In the Jochid Ulus, it was used in an expression like *saligh musamma* (Jot 1:8; Jot 5:14; Jot 8:9; Jot 11:3) or inversely *musamma saligh* (Jot 4:38), and it also occurs as *qalan musamma saligh* (Jot 2:37–8). The word *musamma*, preceding or following *saligh*, means 'named, called, styled; denominated' in Arabic and can be translated as 'the so-called *saligh* tax' in the first two instances, and '*qalan* and the so-called *saligh* tax' in the latter one. Once *saligh* is accompanied by another general term for tax obligations, this time the Arabic *qismat*, which otherwise has several meanings, but basically it is 'distribution, division; share, lot, allotment, apportionment'. *Saligh qismat* (Jot 1:12), and separately *qismat* (Jot 2:9–10), may have referred generally to all the obligations that have been imposed on the taxable population.

Finally, in two documents the terms *chiqish* (Jot 3:15) and *chiqar chiqish* (1:7, 10) are used as general designations for all imposts. Again a Turkic term, *chiqish* is a deverbal noun from *chiq-* ('to go out'), meaning 'expenditure, revenue, profit'.[28] In certain respects, the Turkic word reflected the same semantic approach as Arabic *kharaj*, the typical land tax in Islam stemming also from the verb *kharaja* meaning 'to go out, to come out'. Since the 'Abbasid period, it served as a general term for land tax and all kinds of taxes; see, for example, Abu Yusuf's (d. 818) treatise entitled *Kitab al-Kharaj*, 'The Book on Taxation'.[29] In the Jochid documents it occurs a few times as *kharj* (Jot 2:38) and *kharj kharajat* (Jot 4:21, 44; Jot 7);[30] in the latter case the second element of the dual expression is in plural. These phrases evidently refer to the land taxes of the Islamic taxation system.

In addition to general appellations of land tax, numerous local special taxes were introduced in the agricultural areas of the Jochid Ulus, especially in the Crimea, from where we have ample evidence for the use of these taxes. Besides their names, we have nothing to go on concerning the amount or character of all of these taxes and how they were extracted from the taxable people, but most likely they were collected in kind. All these special agricultural taxes were designated indiscriminately as *yasaq*, *kharj, haqq*, *mal* or *'amal*. Except for *yasaq*, all other terms are Arabic and part of the terminology of Islamic taxation.

Let us enumerate some of them: *Ekin ḫarji* 'plough/crop tax' (Jot 1:8), *anbar haqqi* (1:8)/*ambar mali* (2:36)[31]/ *haz(i)r anbar* (Jot 4:40; Jot 6:7; Jot 7) 'granary tax',[32] *qurut 'amali* (Jot 7) and *qurut anbari* (Jot 4:40) 'curds or cheese tax',[33] *indir haqqi* (Jot 2:36) 'barn tax', *chalghi haqqi* (4:16) 'scythe tax', *qubur yasaghi* (Jot 2:37) 'water-pipe tax' (for irrigation ?) (Jot 2:37),[34] *tütün ḫarji* (Jot 5:14; Jot 7; Jot 8:9) 'chimney tax', *qap ḫarji* (4:25) '(wine)skin tax',[35] *boyunsa yasaghi* (Jot 4:16)'yoke tax', *otagh(a) haqqi* (Jot 9:16) 'tent tax', *pulquz* (?) *haqqi* (Jot 4:25) '? tax'[36] and *borla tamghasi* (Jot 2:35) 'vineyard tax'[37] (for *tamgha*, see later in this chapter).

In addition to these itemized lists of taxes, an additional special type of tax, *qolush qoltqa* (Jot 4:38; Jot 7; Jot 12:13–4), is often mentioned, which cannot be specified in more detail but whose meaning in Turkic was 'request'. Both words are deverbal derivatives of the common Turkic verb *qol(t)-* or 'to ask, request'. This tax designation perhaps could have referred to those obligatory forced 'requests or demands' which the Khan or other dignitaries demanded on a family event (birth, wedding), holiday or other special occasion.[38] In the Russian, *tarkhan yarliks zapros* is the equivalent of this term (Jor 1, Jor 2, Jor 4).

POSTAL RELAY SERVICES AND PROVISIONINGS (*ULAGH, SHÜSÜN*)

The maintenance of the postal relay system (*yam*)[39] was a basic obligation of every subject of the Mongol Empire, nomadic and sedentary populations alike. Among the obligatory provisionings the most burdensome were the following: quartering state envoys (*qonaq tüshün/tüshül*: Jot 5:13; Jot 6:8; Jot 7; Jot 8:9; Jot 10:9; Jot 11:9),[40] supplying them with riding horses (*ulagh ilmäk*: Jot 5:13; Jot 6:8; Jot 7; Jot 8:8; Jot 10:8; Jot 11:9; Jot 13:7)[41] and providing them with livestock and fodder on the pretext of their daily rations (*shüsün 'ulufa*: Jot 5:13; Jot 7; Jot 8:9; Jot 1:16; Jot 13:7).[42] Those in charge of and/or working at the post stations were called *yamchi süsünchi* (Jot 2:9–10).

While it cannot be said what type of ugly abuses these provisionings possibly brought about, in general, the people were entirely defenseless against the tax collectors of the Khan and the great lords, and there was practically no possibility for legal remedies. It is not by accident that a formula was constantly repeated in the immunity charters, which strictly forbids the use of compulsion or violence against the privileged persons. The commonest binomial used for violence and harassment was *yunchugh zahmat* (Jot 1:12; Jot 4:27; Jot 5:14–5; Jot 7; Jot 8:10, 12; Jot 9:28; Jot 10:11; Jot 11:12, 13; Jot 12:19; Jot 13:9),[43] but *küch basinch* (Jot 4:27; Jot 12:19; Jot 13:9), *küch 'avan* (Jot 7; Jot 8:12; Jot 10:11) and *zulm 'avan* (Jot 4:27) were also used.

COMMERCIAL TAXES (*TAMGHA TARTNAQ*)

Besides the taxes and provisions collected from the nomadic pastoralists and the agriculturalists, the tolls and customs collected from urban craft production and trade created considerable revenues. The general term for this kind of customs duty was Mongol *tamagha*, Turkic *tamgha*, which was introduced by the Mongols as a sales tax. The urban craftsman paid it just like the peasant who came to the bazaar to sell his goods, but it primarily afflicted the urban population and the traders. The amount paid was determined for every product.

The official who gathered this tax was called *tamghachi*. *Tamgha* and *tamghachi* (both the terms and the notions they designated) were used throughout the entire Mongol Empire.[44] The Russian words *tamozhnik* 'customs officer' and *tamozhnia* 'customs office' (both coming from *tamga* 'sales tax') testify to the enduring effect of the Jochid institutions on medieval Russia.[45]

The amount of the customs duty paid varied according to place and time. We know from the contracts signed with the Venetians that the amount of customs duties, in general, shifted between three to five percent. The name for the customs duties on trade was *commercium* (Latin), *comerclo* (Venetian Italian), Greek *κομμέρκιον*,[46] but sometimes the original word *tamgha* was preserved in the Italian text as *tamoga* (Joi 3). In 1333, Özbek Khan fixed the amount of the sales tax (*tamgha*) at three percent, which in 1347 was confirmed by Janibeg Khan (Joi 1; Joi 2; Joi 3; Joi 5), who later during the same year increased the sales tax to five percent (Joi 1), which was corroborated by Berdibeg Khan in 1358.

Almost invariably following the term *tamgha*, another tax name, *tartanaq*, also appears. The hendiadyoin *tamgha tartanaq* occurs in most of the Turkic documents (Jot 2:40–1; Jot 4:21–2, 23; Jot 5:4; Jot 7; Jot 10:3, 5). It surfaces in the Italian translations as *tartanacho* (Joi 1) and *tartanaco* (Joi 2), and in the first diploma of Janibeg Khan from 1342 the term *tamghachi tartanaqchi*[47] is translated into Latin as "comerclarijs et illis de Tartanacho" (Jol 2), but at another place it is translated as *peso* 'weight' (Joi 4). According to the testimony of the Italian translations the meaning of *tartanaq* was undoubtedly 'weight', and this gives us the clue to determine what sort of tax *tartanaq* was.

The amount of the duty paid after the weight cannot precisely be defined on the basis of the data at our disposal. We may only state that the commercial duty (*tamgha*) was *three* to *five* percent added to the cost of the merchandise. It becomes apparent from the text that the customs officer (Tatar *tamghachi*, Italian *comercler*), together with the Italian consul of the town, as state servants, commissioned assistants who weighed the merchandise and collected the taxes. These persons were called *tartanaqchi*. The amount of the duty consisted of a constant part (*tamgha*) which constituted *three* to *five* percent of the value of the merchandise and a changing quota (*tartanaq*). The amount of the latter was determined by the sort of merchandise: different sorts required different amounts of *qantar* (units of weight) to be paid. So we may conclude that in the markets and customs offices of the Jochid Ulus, different types of merchandise were weighed on balances. Seemingly, the commonest term for 'balance, scales' was *tartanaq*. So we can translate this tax as 'weighing fee', since for weighing the goods, on the basis of which the *tamgha* had to be calculated and paid, one paid a special weighing fee to the officials who did the weighing, and this fee was the *tartanaq*.[48]

From some of the immunity charters we may learn about the commercial items and merchandise from which the customs duties were levied. According to Hajji Girey Khan's immunity charter granted to a certain Hakim Yahya in 1453 (4:21–2), the following items were taxable (*tamgha tartanaq*): livestock and horses (*qara ilqi*); slaves or slave girls (*qul qaravash*); and carriages with a cargo of salt, grain and flour (*tuz arabalari, ashliq un arabalari*) (4:21–2). In another document issued by Mängli Girey Khan in 1485 honey (*bal*) and wine (*sharab*) are also mentioned (Jot 10:7). Another immunity charter of Mängli Girey Khan, granted to a certain Mahmudäk in 1468 (Jot 9:19–24), offers a unique insight into the extent of customs duties levied on different items in the early Crimean Khanate, such as textile (*qumash*), salt (*tuz*), grain (*ashliq*), horse (*at*), livestock (*sighir*), sheep (*qoy*) and fish (*baliq*). The amount of duty is specified in *aqcha* and *tanga*.[49] A detailed comparative analysis of these data will demand a thorough investigation in the future.

Among the dues related to trade, we must also mention the various customs on travel. One had to pay these to use the roads and to receive the protection offered to the traveler during that time. The fee paid for the former was the *yol haqqi* 'road toll' (Jot 2:41) or *yolluq* (Jot 10:7), for the latter the *qaravulluq* 'fee for the sentinel or guard' (Jot 2:42). It is interesting that in a later document issued by Hajji Girey Khan in 1456 in the Crimea, the same toll is called *qaraqolluq* (4:24), which displays the Ottoman form of the technical term *qaravul*, otherwise a word of Mongol origin in Turkic.[50] Similarly, to enter a town or fortified settlement one paid for the permit to enter. The dues which had to be paid to the urban gatekeepers were the *qabaqchiliq*

'gate fee' (Jot 4:23). This did not exclude the fee paid to the sentinel mentioned above (*qaraqolluq* in 4:24), which refers not only to the road patrols but also to the urban security forces. In connection with road tolls, another term, *bach*, also occurs (Jot 12:14), which is well-known in Persian from the Samanid period onward as *baj* 'tribute; toll levied by the road-patrol' and – *baj u kharaj*, 'tribute and contribution, duties, taxes',[51] which later became *rahdari* in Iran (formed of *rahdar* 'road-patrol').[52] In this meaning it is equivalent to *yol haqqi* or *yolluq* (see earlier). It is interesting to note that the name of the collectors of this toll was *bazargan darughalari* (Jot 10:7), so the market inspectors must have been in charge of collecting the road toll.

In connection with road tolls, one must not forget about the Old Russian term *myto/myt* which designated various customs duties, especially those connected with travel: they were collected at roads for carriages with cargo, at bridges for use, at boats for transport on the river and on entering a town. Although it does not occur in the contemporary *khanskie ĭarlyki* (only in Özbek Khan's yarligh, which proved to be an early 16th-century falsification),[53] it is amply registered in Old Russian documents.[54] Berezin could not find a Tatar term that could be equated with Old Russian *myt*;[55] however, I think the Tatar terms *yol haqqi*, *yolluq*; *qaravulluq/qaraqolluq*; *qabaqchiliq* and *baj* were not translated into Russian separately but summed up under the Russian generalizing term *myt*, which was a well-known term in Rus' prior to the Mongol period. In addition, there is a road toll in Russian sources, known as the *mostovshchina*[56] which was the 'bridge toll'; this time, again, we cannot find a precise equivalent in the Tatar material, although the binomial *kemächi köbrükchi* 'boatman and bridge inspector' (Jot 2:11) clearly shows that those officials must have extracted the bridge tolls and boat fees, presumably called **köbrükchilik* or **köbrük ḫarji/haqqi* and ** kemächilik* or *kemä ḫarji/haqqi*.

RUSSIAN TRIBUTE (*DAN'*, *VYKHOD*)

Next to the taxes and customs assessed in the regions under the direct authority of the Jochid Ulus, taxes originating from areas which had been subjugated also brought great sums to the Mongol khans. This was the case with the Russian Principalities that yielded to the Mongols in the 1240s, but they never became an integral part of the Jochid Ulus. In this respect, Russia's situation differed from Iran and China under Mongol rule. Both in Iran and in China, the majority of the Mongol conquerors, both military and non-military, settled within the confines of the state, and their military and administrative presence enabled a symbiosis of the conquerors and the conquered. Russia was a unique case, inasmuch as it was under indirect Mongol rule.

In the beginning the khan's officials, the *basqaq*s (the institution called *baskachestvo* in Russian),[57] collected the taxes instituted by the Mongols, and only the Russian clergy was tax-exempt. Taking censuses, collecting taxes and maintaining a line of communication with the central power were the chief tasks of these early Mongol governors, who were assigned to territorial units as well as to cities. During the first half of the 14th century, the *basqaq*s disappeared from Russia, first from the north-east and then from all the principalities, and the Russian princes themselves gathered the total sum of taxes established by the Mongols. We can look for changes in the

taxation policy of the Mongols toward the Russian principalities at the end of the 13th century when several revolts broke out due to the *basqaq*s' abuses. On more than one occasion, the tax collectors were killed, and popular uprisings flared up against the Mongol officials.[58] The Mongols, therefore, could reliably count on the Russian tribute if the princes themselves collected it through their own tax-collectors, the *danshchiki*. Thus, the Russian princes themselves assumed the *basqaq*s' responsibilities, and they now served as the agents or governors of the Tatar khan. The control over Russian affairs shifted directly to the capital of Sarai, where various *darugha*s were charged with supervising the Russian principalities, particularly in matters of finance and taxation. It stands to reason that parallel to the *darugha* of Moscow, other *darugha*s may have existed with the same authority over other subjected Russian territories, such as Tver' and Riazan'. In the 14th century, however, other Russian territorial *darugha*s must have gradually disappeared, as the responsibility of collecting and presenting the taxes from all the Russian principalities was transferred to the Grand Prince of Moscow, whose economic and political power grew year by year, so that when the Horde was politically weak, they could withhold the tribute (e.g. in 1372–82 and 1396–1408). Finally, in 1472–6 Grand Prince Ivan III of Muscovy ceased to pay the tribute to Ahmad Khan of the Great Horde, who in 1480, after a long stand on the Ugra River, retreated without any military confrontation.[59]

The Russians called the Tatar tribute by the general name *dan'* (tax, payment). One must clearly see that although the Mongols imposed their own taxation system on the conquered Russian lands (e.g. introduced new taxes such as the commercial tax, *tamgha*) the older, customary taxes, such as different duties and tolls, were also levied by the Russian princely administrations. Originally *dan'* was a term for tribute paid by the subjugated peoples; it is used in this sense in the Old Russian chronicles, e.g. in the 9th century the eastern Slavic tribes paid tribute (*dan'*) to the Norse conquerors (*variagi*) and the Khazars. Another sort of Old Russian taxation was *poshlina*, which designated all customary taxes, duties and tolls. From the second half of the 13th century *dan'* came to mean primarily the Tatar tribute, and *poshlina* was used mainly for the customary Russian duties. In the privilege charters given to the Russian clergy the general terms for taxes and obligations are given as *dan'* and *poshlina*.[60] Later, when the tribute was gathered by the Grand Prince of Moscow and sent out to Sarai, the term *vykhod* 'outgo, sending out, delivery' became more common instead of *dan'*. Thus the parallel existence of this double taxation system, i.e. the Tatar and the Russian, contributed to the increased exploitation of the Russian peasantry on the one hand and the gradual enrichment of princely treasuries. This peculiar phenomenon was called 'regressive taxation' by Roublev,[61] since the tax obligations changed in a reverse proportion: the poorer the taxpayer was, the more obligations were on his shoulders. The Russians tried to diminish or evade the yearly tribute payment by every possible means. For example, beginning from 1395 they did not pay taxes for many years as they took advantage of Tatar infighting and the destruction caused to the Jochid Ulus by Timur. On the other hand, they systematically continued the collection of tribute, even when it was not, or only partly, forwarded to the Tatar overlords. Therefore, it is not by chance that from Ivan Kalita's time (1325–40) the economic growth of Muscovy

was uninterrupted until Ivan III's reign (1444–1505). Paradoxically, though the Tatar taxation system of the Jochid Ulus was devastating and exploitative for the Russian principalities in the 13th century, from the first half of the 14th century onward it assisted the emergence of an economically stronger Muscovite Grand Principality, which by 1556 liquidated almost all the successor states of the Jochid Ulus. The Crimean Khanate (and the Kasimov Khanate, a small vassal polity within Russia) did not pose any real menace to Moscow for the ensuing centuries.

The Muscovite Grand Princes skillfully manipulated the *vykhod*, which consisted of several taxes and tolls. Customary Russian taxes (*poshliny*) and new Tatar imposts were extracted from the population. In addition to the general designations *dan'* and *poshlina*, the *tarkannye yarlyki* of the Russian Church enumerate all sorts of taxes, tolls and obligations from which the ecclesiastics were exempt: *ĭam* 'post service' (~ Tatar *yam*), *podvoda* 'horse, cart' (~ Tatar *ulagh*), *korm i pitie* 'food and drink' (~ Tatar *shüsün 'ulufa*), *zapros* 'request, demand' (~ Tatar *qolush qoltqa*), *tamga* 'commercial tax, customs duty' (~ Tatar *tamgha*), *popluzhnoe* 'plough/crop tax' (~ *ekin ḫarji*), etc. *Myt* was a duty known also in pre-Mongol times in Russia, a sort of 'communications duty' paid when entering towns with carts or crossing rivers via bridges. The exact Tatar equivalent is not known, but it must have been something like *yol haqqi*, though *myt* covered other dues such as *qabaqchiliq* and *qaravulluq/qaraqolluq* (see earlier).

The Tatar tribute was typically a negotiated sum, and the Tatars were interested only in the end result: whether they received the sum or not. It is difficult to define what the exact amount of the tribute was, because of the paucity of data (e.g. before 1389 there is no data at our disposal).[62] The most plausible estimates calculate 5,000 to 7,000 rubles per annum between 1380 and 1472, which fell as low as 1,000 rubles after 1480.[63] The Muscovite grand princes tried to increase their revenue by imposing larger sums than were needed. If the sum of the tribute could be decreased, they went on collecting the former, larger sum, and the difference went into their pockets. Hence, the Tatar tribute contributed to the rise of Moscow, so that by Ivan III's time an economically and politically strong state emerged versus a few fragmented Tatar khanates.

In the 14th and 15th centuries, the growth in the authority and the territory of the Grand Principality of Lithuania at the expense of the West Russian principalities negatively affected the Jochid Ulus since it lost some of its important tribute-paying Russian territories. At the same time, the Lithuanians and Poles continued to collect, but now for their own benefit, the tribute that had been paid up to that point to the Tatars. Podolia, for example, paid tribute to the Tatars in 1320 (the prince paid one hundred rubles yearly, the boyars fifty, and the peasants five), but in 1344 the Poles demanded more than the Horde's tribute. Following his defeat by Timur, Toqtamish Khan took refuge with Grand Prince Vitautas of Lithuania and subsequently fell increasingly under Lithuanian authority. As a result, he was forced to renounce the taxes originating from Kiev, Smolensk and other cities, which were then transferred to the Lithuanian Grand Prince. By the 1460s, the Crimean Khanate was the Tatar power that caused the most anxiety for the Lithuanians. In 1462–63, Hajji Girey Khan of the Crimea confirmed that he renounced Kiev, Smolensk and other cities and that he 'granted' them to the Grand Prince of Lithuania. However, at the start of

the 16th century, after the Great Horde had finally collapsed, Mängli Girey Khan of the Crimea once again presented his demand to the Poles and Lithuanians relating to the Tatar tribute collected from the former West Russian territories under the authority of the Golden Horde.

In sum, the Jochid Ulus acquired huge amounts of income on the basis of the tribute collected from the Russians. However, in the 14th and 15th centuries this tribute flowed in a more and more disorganized manner and in fact considerably decreased in direct proportion to the Horde's political decline and the strengthening of Russian and Polish-Lithuanian authority.

NOTES

1 Schurmann 1956, 304–307.
2 Schurmann 1956; Smith 1970.
3 Most monographs on the Jochid Ulus devote only a few pages to taxation: Hammer 1840, 216–218; Berezin 1864, 460–477; Grekov and Iakubovskii 1950, 210–211; Spuler 1965, 316–320. Schurmann's and Smith's long articles (see note 2) remain the best contributions to the theme, although they focus on the Chinese and Persian sources and thus on the Yuan and Ilkhanate.
4 In this paper I will refer to the Turkic, Russian and Italian documents under the following abbreviations ("*Jo*" means the 'Jochid Ulus', while the third letter "t", "r", "l" or "i" refers to the languages of the document as 'Turkic', 'Russian', 'Latin' and 'Italian'. Thus, Jot is the abbreviation of a Turkic-language document of the Jochid Ulus). The name of the issuer and the date of issue follow.

Turkic documents

Jot 1 Toqtamïš, 1381 (original) Grigor'ev 1844, 338–339; Berezin 1851, 13–15; Özyetgin 2000.
Jot 2 Temür Qutluġ, 1398 (copy), Berezin 1851, 3–11; Radlov 1888, 18–21.
Jot 3 Uluġ Muḥammad, 1420 (copy), Berezin 1872, 17–23.
Jot 4 Ḥājji Girey, 1453 (original), Kurat 1940, 64–67.
Jot 5 Ḥājji Girey, 1459 (original), unpublished; described in Usmanov 1979, 32.
Jot 6 Ibrāhim, 1467–1479 (copy), Mukhammedyarov – Vásáry 1987, 183–184.
Jot 7 Mengli-Girey, 1467 (original), Berezin 1872, 3–9.
Jot 8 Mengli-Girey, 1468 (draft), unpublished; described in Usmanov 1979, 33–34.
Jot 9 Mengli-Girey, 1468 (copy), Berezin 1872.
Jot 10 Mengli-Girey, 1485 (original) unpublished; described in Usmanov 1979, 35–36.
Jot 11 Muḥammad-Girey, 1502 (copy) unpublished; described in Usmanov 1979, 36.
Jot 12 Ṣāḥib-Girey 1523 (original) Mukhammedyarov – Vásáry 1987, 192–194.
Jot 13 Sadat-Girey, 1524 (original) Grigor'ev, 1844, 340–346; Berezin 1851, 18–22.

Russian translations

Jor 1 Tölek Khan to Metropolitan Mikhail, 1379.
Jor 2 Taydula, khanal spouse to the Russian princes, 1347.
Jor 3 Mengü Temir Khan to the Russian clergy, 1267.
Jor 4 Taydula, khanal spouse to Metropolitan Feognost, 1351.
Jor 5 Berdibeg Khan to Metropolitan Aleksei, 1354.
Jor 6 Taydula, khanal spouse to Metropolitan Aleksei, 1354.
The best edition of the *six* Russian 'khanskie iarlyki' is *PRP* 3, 463–491.

Latin translations

Jol 1 Özbek, 1333 Mas Latrie 1868, 583; *DVL* 1, 243–344.
Jol 2 Jānibek, 1342 Mas Latrie 1868, 584–585; *DVL* 1, 261–263.
Jol 3 Taydula khatun, 1358 *DVL* 2, 53.
Jol 4 Taydula khatun, 1358 *DVL* 2, 53–54.

Italian translations

Joi 1 Jānibek, 1347 Hammer 1840, 517–519; Mas Latrie 1868, 587; *DVL* 1, 311–313.
Joi 2 Ramadan, governor of Solqat 1356 Mas Latrie 1868, 589; *DVL* 2, 24–25.
Joi 3 Jānibek, 1347 Mas Latrie 1868, 590; *DVL* 2, 25–26.
Joi 4 Berdibeg, 1358 Hammer 1840, 519–522; Mas Latrie 1868, 593; *DVL* 2, 47–51.
Joi 5 Qutluġ-Temür, governor of of Solqat, 1358 Mas Latrie 1868, 592; *DVL* 2, 51–52.
Joi 6 Berdibeg to Qutluġ-Temür, 1358 Mas Latrie 1868, 592; *DVL* 2, 52.
Joi 7 Čerkes beg, 1380 Desimoni 1887, 162–165.
Joi 8 Ilyas beg, 1381 Desimoni 1887, 162–165.

5 Allsen 1981; cf. also Eaton 1967, 55–56. For Greater Armenia see Dashdondog 2011, 107–110.

6 For the philological questions and the occurrences of these terms in Mongol and non-Mongol sources, see in detail: *qubchur*: *TMEN* 1: 387–391 (§266); *shi'üsün*: *TMEN* 1, 62, 62–64 (§238, §239); *tamgha*: *TMEN* 2, 554–565, 565–566 (§933, §934); *ulagh*: *TMEN* 2, 102–107 (§521); *yam*: *TMEN* 4, 110–118, 118–120 (§1812, §1814). (The word *alban* is missing from *TMEN* since it does not occur in Persian texts).

7 RDT, 324, 411; RDRM, I, 664, II, 845).

8 For *qubchur* see Pelliot 1944; Grigor'ev 1976; Jackson 2016.

9 Schurmann 1956, 324.

10 'Because there was so much necessary exchange of envoys between the princes and the court on various matters, the *yam*s [relay stations] were established throughout the realm and they were called *tayan yam*s' (RDT, 324–325; RDRM, I, 665).

11 Cf. Olbricht 1954; Silverstein 2007, 143–164.

12 For *yam* see *ED* 933; for *yam* and *yamchi* see *TMEN* 4, §§1812, 1813. Both the Mongol and the Turkic words ultimately go back to Chinese *chan*, 'to stop; a stage on a journey', borrowed from the Chinese separately.

13 For *ulagh* see *ED* 136; *TMEN* 2, §521.

14 For *shi'üsün* and *shi'üsünchi* see *TMEN* 1, §§238, 239.

15 E.g. In one of Ghazan Khan's edicts judges, scholars and Alids are exempted from paying and '*Ulagh* and *süsün* [*ūlāgh va shūsūn*] will not be taken from them either. No one will stop in their houses, and envoys will not be quartered there' (RDT, III, 689; RDRM, II, 1388).

16 For *tamgha* see *ED* 504–505; *TMEN* 2, § 933.

17 Sanglakh, 161v 13, in *ED* 505.

18 Sic! The form *ïsaq* seems to be a secondary form of *yasaq*. The alteration of initial *a-*, *ï-* with *ya-*, *yï-* often occurs in Turkic. The reading *ïsaq* is corroborated by the occurrence of the word as *ysacho* in the Italian translation of a document issued by Ramaḍān, governor of Solqat, in 1356 (Joi 2).

19 For *yarlï(ġ)* 'poor, destitute, miserable' see *ED* 967. It often occurs in Jochid immunity charters in the binomial *yarlï miskin*, the second word being the Arabic equivalent (*maskin*) of *yarlï*.

20 The binomial expression *yasaq yar* occurs only on one occasion, and seemingly it is a sort of playful abstraction based on the former expression *yasaqlï yarlï ellär*, so *yar* actually did not exist in the meaning 'misery, destitution'.

21 Sreznevskii 3, 1665–1666.
22 Schurmann's hypothesis (1956, 337 ff.) that *qalan* és *alban* may derive from the same Mongol stem and have something to do with a Khitan background lacks any probability. For its detailed refutation see *TMEN* 3, 489–490.
23 For occurrences of *qalan* in the Uyghur juridical documents see *USp*. 14, 21, 22, 33, 38, 77.
24 See Raschmann 1992, 156; Matsui 2005, 72.
25 RDT, III: 689; RDRM, II, 1388.
26 See *USp*. 2, 14, 25, 30.
27 *USp*. 25, 7. For more on *saliġ* see *ED* 826.
28 For Old Turkic use of *čïqïš* see *ED* 412; for the etymological background and derivatives of the word in the Turkic languages, see Özyetgin 2004, 71–73.
29 For Abū Yūsuf's *Kitab al-Kharaj* see Cengiz Kallek, in *TDVİA* 26, 101–104.
30 Cf. Özyetgin 2004, 93.
31 Cf. Özyetgin 2004, 58.
32 For more details, see Muhamedyarov – Vásáry 1987, 188; Özyetgin 2004, 73–74.
33 It is noteworthy that the granary tax (*ḫazir anbar*) and the cheese tax (*qurut 'amalï / qurut anbarï*) occur always in pair, following a reference to agricultural activity: 1. *ḫazir anbar qurut 'amalï* (Jot 7); 2. *ekin tekin sürsä ḫazir anbar almasunlar* (Jot 6: 7–8); 3. *ekin tekin qïlsa ḫazir anbar tep qurut anbarï tep nä ersä tilämäsünlär almasunlar* (Jot 4: 40–41). – Cf. also Özyetgin 2004, 149–151.
34 Berezin (1864, 473) erroneously identified it with *qubčūr*, but for *qobur/qubur* (Mo. → Tu.) see Doerfer (*TMEN* 1, 392–393, § 268).
35 Cf. Özyetgin 2004, 142–145.
36 It occurs only in this diploma of Ḥājji Girey, clearly written as *pulquz*. Malov's conjecture (1953, 192) that it is a scribal error for *pulgur/bulgur* is not too convincing. Cf. also Özyetgin 2004, 151.
37 Cf. Özyetgin 2004, 71.
38 Cf. Muhamedyarov – Vásáry 1987, 197; Özyetgin 2004, 133–136.
39 For *yam* see n. 14 above.
40 In the hediadyoin both *qonaq* and *tüšün/tüšül* refer to official guests and state envoys. For more on *tüšün/tüšül* see Vásáry 1995, 484–485.
41 For *ulaġ* see note 15 and Özyetgin 2004, 138–141.
42 For *šüsün* see note 16 and Vásáry 1977; Özyetgin 2004, 136–138; for *'ulūfa* 'fodder, daily rations', a term of Arabic origin, see more Özyetgin 2004, 141–142.
43 For *yunčuġ see* Vásáry 1991.
44 For *tamġa* in Turkic and Mongol, see *ED* 504–505; *TMEN* 2, 554–565 (§933); Bushakov 1993; Tezdzhan 2010; Pochekaev 2014.
45 For *tamga*, *tamozhnik* and *tamozhnia* in Russian see Sreznevskii 3, 924–925; Fasmer 4, 18; Shipova 1976, 307–309. – Erroneously Vernadsky 1956.
46 The Ottoman Turkish word *gümrük* for 'customs' was borrowed from this term; see Eren 1999, 166.
47 For its occurrences as *tamġačï tartanaqčïlar* in the Turkic documents see Jot 1: 5; Jot 2: 7–8; Jot 4: 12, 13; Jot 5: 4; Jot 7.
48 For *tartanaq* in more detail see Vásáry 2007.
49 *Tanga* was a silver coin of smaller value in the Mongol period and thereafter; for more see *TMEN* 2, 587–592 (§ 946).
50 For *qaravul* in detail see *TMEN* 1, 399–403 (§ 276).
51 Steingass 1977, 136. – For *bāj* see also Celal Yeniçeri, in *TDVİA* 4, 411–413.
52 Petrushevsky 1960, 387.
53 Sokolov 1918.
54 Sreznevskii II, 219–221; *SRIa* 9, 337.

55 Berezin 1864, 476. Cf. also Spuler 1965, 336, n. 26.
56 Sreznevskii II, 177; *SRIa* 9, 276.
57 On *basqaq*s in the Mongol Empire and especially in the Jochid Ulus, there is a vast literature. For the term itself see esp. *TMEN* 2, 241–243 (§ 691); Vásáry 1976. For the role of *basqaq*s in medieval Rus' see Nasonov 1940, 16–21; Halperin 1985, 33–40; Halperin 2009, 82–87; Ostrowski 1998, 37–45; Vásáry 2015, 255–257.
58 For a discussion on these uprisings against the *basqaq*s see Zimin 1952.
59 This famous 'Stand on the Ugra river' (*stoianie na reke Ugre*) is considered customarily the end of the 'Tatar yoke' in Russian national historiography. For the debatable character of this assunption see Halperin 1985, 70–73.
60 For the Old Russian occurrences of *dan'* és *poshlina* see Sreznevskii I, 627–629; II, 1333–1335.
61 Roublev 1970b.
62 Vernadsky's conjectures (Vernadsky 1953, 228–232) in this respect are misleading, see Halperin 1985, 77–78; Halperin 147–148, nn. 6, 7.
63 Roublev 1970a; Pavlov 1958.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

OVERLAND TRADE IN THE MONGOL WORLD

Colleen C. Ho

By now, Chinggis Khan and his descendants' image as destroyers of civilization and culture has been rehabilitated by scholarship that paints a more nuanced picture of the Mongol Empire. The Mongols are still, however, seen as extractive conquerors who did not care to understand how their sedentary subjects lived. This simplistic picture fails to capture how the Mongol Empire impacted the Eurasian economy and its overland trade. While their conquests were indeed devastating in many areas, the Mongols united much of Asia, restored and expanded trade routes that had been previously disrupted, and linked new markets such as India to the lower Volga through Central Asia.[1] The Mongol Empire valued and promoted trade with political and economic policies because steady commercial revenue was imperative for further military campaigns and large projects. As a result, it invested imperial funds in trade, protected merchants, and consumed copious amounts of commodities. Venture capitalists of the medieval world, the Mongols ushered in an era of unprecedented commercial exchange across Eurasia.

The conditions that the Mongols cultivated – such as the security on roads offered by guards (*qaraqchi*) who gathered intelligence and suppressed bandits and rebels – have often been referred to as *Pax Mongolica*. Hodong Kim calls it a "fashionable" term and outlines scholarly skepticism toward the concept.[2] Unlike Virgil Ciocîltan, I do not view *Pax Mongolica* as a "single global market" because favorable conditions for trade continued after the breakdown of the empire.[3] David Abulafia also reminds us that trade was conducted in stages.[4] The idea of a Mongol "peace" is a recent invention anyway, like the term "Silk Road" or *Die Seidenstrassen* in the late nineteenth century, which David Christian defines as "the long- and middle-distance land routes by which goods, ideas, and people were exchanged between major regions of Afro-Eurasia."[5] Scholars have expanded the label to include the "grasslands" and maritime trade of the Mongol era.[6] Because neither *pax* nor a unified empire was a prerequisite for overland trade in the Mongol world, I prefer the term *Via Mongolica* to describe how the Mongols facilitated commerce by expanding and protecting roads, reducing risk, subsidizing merchants, and creating new products

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and markets.[7] In this, they took seriously Chinggis's *yasa* "that whatever merchants arrived in his territory should be granted safe conduct."[8]

Janet Abu-Lughod's systems theory and argument that Mongol control over the Chinese and Middle Eastern economic circuits linked Eurasia and Africa is still beneficial.[9] The approach pushes us to examine regional trade patterns and how they connected to imperial roads. After all, the history of the successor khanates is much longer than that of the empire. After 1259, maritime commerce through numerous non-Mongol kingdoms increased, pushing us beyond the traditional East–West axis of analysis regarding "civilizational exchanges" to include "trans-ecological exchanges," and incorporate regions like Siberia and the Indian Ocean.[10] Ultimately, the Mongols were investors and consumers who encouraged trade, leading to more intense cross-cultural exchanges across Eurasia than ever before.[11]

TRADE ROUTES AND COMMODITIES ON VIA MONGOLICA

> The road you travel from Tana to Cathay is perfectly safe, whether by day or by night, according to what the merchants say who have used it.[12]

Writing in the 1330s, the Florentine merchant Francesco Balducci Pegolotti may have never traveled to China, but he drew from earlier sources and merchants who did. According to his handbook, the journey would take between 226 and 239 days.[13] The Pegolotti route was the so-called northern Silk Road, which ran from the Black Sea around the northern tip of the Caspian Sea, through Central Asia, and skirted the Tarim Basin to Qaraqorum, and after 1266, to Daidu.[14] Niccolò and Maffeo Polo followed this itinerary on their first trip to China.[15] There was an alternative and even more northern route, from Crimea to where the Kama and Volga rivers meet in Volga Bulgharia, across Siberia to the middle Yenisei, to Qaraqorum, and on to Daidu.[16] In Western Asia during the Abbasid period, Baghdad linked the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. After 1265, Tabriz and the Persian Gulf, as well as Egypt and the Red Sea, became the busiest connections.[17] Roads joined the port cities of Constantinople, Trebizond, and Ayas (Laiazzo) to Tabriz, from where you could depart to Central Asia and Delhi. Important non-Mongol trade routes included a southern route through Egypt to India, or to East Africa via Aden, as well as the German-dominated Baltic Sea. In the post-imperial period, Muslims controlled the lucrative route between the Persian Gulf, Gujarat, Calicut and Kollam (Quilon) on the Malabar coast, Colombo on Ceylon, Ma'bar on the Coromandel coast, and Quanzhou, which was the terminus for goods from Southeast Asia.[18] This maritime route grew increasingly lucrative but could take twice as long as the overland journey because of monsoons.[19]

There were three types of commodities that traversed the Mongol Empire: high-value, low-bulk goods that were relatively cheap to transport, such as spices and drugs; textiles like silk, fur, and cotton; gems and precious stones; and bullion; less expensive but bulkier items, like grain, foodstuffs, and industrial raw materials; and humans and animals.[20] North China produced silk, porcelain, grain, spices, and rarer products like rhubarb, which was prized as medicine and classified as a spice.[21] Central Asia was noted for textiles, foodstuffs like fruit and wine, gems, horses, and

Map 29.1 Trade in the Mongol Empire in 1300.
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists.

exotic animals. Rus' and the Qipchaq lands supplied fur, horses, grain, wax, fish products, and slaves. Siberia, better known as the Land of Darkness, also supplied high-quality fur. The Middle East contributed textiles, especially *nasij*, "cloth of gold and silk," horses, pearls, and dyes, among other items.

PARTNERS IN IMPERIAL OVERLAND TRADE: POLICIES AND REFORMS

The pastoral nomads of Mongolia always depended on sedentary and agriculturalist neighbors for certain goods. Without an indigenous merchant class, the Mongols attracted and protected merchants, as the Orthodox Syriac Christian Gregory Bar Hebraeus (1226–1286) observed: "Chingiz Khân commanded and gave the word of peace concerning the merchants who come to them from every region, that the guards who patrol the highways . . . should do them no harm."[22] Merchants were present from the beginning of the Mongol conquests. For example, the Uyghur merchant Chinqai joined Chinggis as early as 1202, fought well in campaigns against the Xi Xia and Jin dynasties, and served two more generations of Qa'ans.[23] Chinggis was keen to find trading partners, and in 1217 he gave 100 (or 450) non-Mongol merchants capital "of gold or silver" from his family and *noyan*s (commanders), as well as Chinese goods like silk, and sent the caravan to Mawarannahr, "that they might proceed . . . to the Sultan's territory, engage in commerce there and so acquire strange and precious wares."[24] The governor of Otrar massacred the group of merchant-envoys and though Chinggis's original goal was to increase commerce, the Mongols' retaliation against Khwarazm was swift and brutal.

Despite its unfortunate end, the Khwarazm incident demonstrates the importance of merchants and diplomats as potential spies for the Mongols. Merchants tended to be multilingual and had well-established networks of contacts in market cities, excellent qualifications to be scouts. Serving the Mongols as agents, however, could be dangerous. In the Caucasus in 1263–1264, the Ilkhan Hülegü (r. 1256–1265) and the Jochid khan Berke (r. 1257–1266) slaughtered *ortoq*s in the other's service.[25] Other risks and costs of trade included banditry, extreme temperatures, harsh terrain, the cost of beasts of burden like horses and camels, and getting lost.[26] Nevertheless, it could be a lucrative profession because *ortoq*s "engaged in commerce and moneylending with capital supplied by the Mongol Empire's imperial treasury or the private treasuries of the empire's great aristocrats."[27] The details of *ortoq* agreements are not always clear, but in addition to subsidizing travel, khans may have covered some or all of a venture's losses as long as the *ortoq* behaved responsibly, which diminished risk.[28] Mongol patronage of *ortoq*s stemmed from the belief that the empire was the patrimony of the Chinggisids, and its financial resources were viewed as personal income.[29] Khans paid high prices for goods, the empire's burgeoning *jam* or postroad system made travel safer, and the *ortoq*s' role as tax collectors and moneylenders made many of them very rich. Commercial activities raised revenue through taxes (*tamgha*) and brought goods to the Mongols they wanted and needed.[30]

Broadly speaking, the Mongols were always eager to obtain animals, weaponry, gold, silver, gems, clothing, textiles, and specialized labor, whether through

plunder, tribute, or commerce.[31] Mongol investors supplied a mix of cash (gold, silver, *chao* -paper money in the Yuan) and goods (e.g., textiles, pelts, gems, gold and silver ingots) to *ortoq*s, who might be in several partnerships simultaneously and/or carry private investments as well. *Ortoq*s also bought and sold on credit and the royal family's over-issuing of drafts based on anticipated revenues may have caused a chaotic cycle of speculation and inflation.[32] The *ortoq* had instructions to purchase or sell goods at a selected destination.[33] They would then share profits at a predetermined ratio with the investor, who also shouldered some or all losses of capital.[34]

Imperial policies encouraged commerce because of the ever-present need for increased revenue to fund military campaigns and build infrastructure and because the Mongols consumed a tremendous volume of commodities. *Ortoq*s received *paiza* (Mong. *gerege*), or tablets of authority, which exempted them from most taxes and corveé labor, and gave them access to *jam* stations.[35] Formally organized by Ögödei, the relay stations were set up about every 45 kilometers. Those on imperial business and *ortoq*s carrying *gerege* could exchange their horses, eat a warm meal, and rest for the night at a station.[36] The system allowed merchants to estimate travel times and costs more accurately, but abuses occurred frequently and complaints about merchant misuse of the *jam* were not always addressed.[37] As the empire expanded, so did the impact of merchants on imperial policies.

The reigns of Ögödei Qa'an (r. 1229–1241), Töregene Khatun (regent 1242–1246), and Güyük Qa'an (r. 1246–1248) gave *ortoq*s privileges that made them wealthy and often hated. *Ortoq*s served the vital function of bringing goods to Ögödei's newly constructed Qaraqorum, which depended on imported foodstuffs, like grain.[38] The Qa'an attracted merchants with policies like paying 10 percent above asking price for already inflated goods.[39] Juvaini tells a story about an *ortoq* who asked for and received 1,500 *balish* in three installments but made no return on the Qa'an's investment. The *bitikchi*s (secretaries) "denounced his wastefulness and extravagancy saying, 'He wastes and devours this money in such-and-such a country,'" but Ögödei was unperturbed.[40] Allsen argues that such displays of wealth proclaimed and enhanced the Qa'an's majesty, but Morris Rossabi cautions that the repetitive examples of lending *balish* are set pieces designed to emphasize Ögödei's largesse.[41] While the Qa'an's munificence earned him praise, it also drained the imperial treasury and put pressure on the administration to raise additional revenue through taxes. In this endeavor the *ortoq*s, too, played a role.

Under Ögödei and Töregene's rule, *ortoq*s could become even richer by serving as tax collectors. Ögödei implemented the Muslim merchant 'Abd al-Rahman's tax-farming plan because it was so lucrative. Tax farmers, who were usually *ortoq*s, would bid for the privilege to collect payments in silver. Bidding wars between tax farmers led to dramatic tax increases, and since north China did not use silver as currency, *ortoq*s and moneylenders loaned the silver needed for tax payments at usurious interest rates, as high as 100 percent interest compounded annually.[42] Even though imperial decrees limited interest rates, they were difficult to enforce and northern Chinese indebtedness to merchants led to resentment against Mongol rule.

After a contentious accession to the throne, Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251–1259) instituted a series of reforms to minimize corruption and increase revenue to restart

military campaigns in western Asia and China that had stalled.[43] Möngke appointed *ortoq* supervisors, ordered *ortoq*s to pay commercial (*tamgha*) and direct (*qubchiri*) taxes, recalled *gerege* to prevent fraud, and limited merchant use of the *jam* system.[44] According to Rashid al-Din, Möngke said, "Merchants travel in order to make a profit. Why should they ride post horses?" He ordered that they should come and go on their own animals.[45] This reduced the burden on families who maintained the postal stations and limited abuse by *ortoq*s, who often demanded unauthorized goods or services.[46] Möngke also ensured that merchants and *ortoq*s were included in censuses to be taxed regularly.[47] Their itinerant ways had made it easy to evade taxes, but now they had to register and pay the *tamgha* in silver.

*Ortoq*s had a variety of backgrounds. Some were well-established merchants before working for the Mongols, but others approached Mongol royals with little experience, which Juvaini complains about: "persons noble and base had sought the protection afforded by being an *ortaq*."[48] In north China, *ortoq*s were usually Muslim Turkestanis and Uyghurs.[49] Persians, Arabs, Turks, Chinese, Indians, Armenians, Russians, Jews, Syriac Christians, Greeks, Scandinavians, and Italians also served Mongol commercial interests.[50] Multilingual merchants were valuable as commercial agents, cultural mediators, and spies.[51] Some were also effective as diplomats and envoys, such as Shams al-Din 'Umar Qazwini, a dealer of precious stones, who convinced the Sultan of Rum to submit to Ögödei Qa'an in 1236.[52] Non-*ortoq* merchants also traversed Mongol lands and received partial imperial benefits, or engaged entirely in private commerce.

POST-IMPERIAL TRADE ON VIA MONGOLICA C. 1260–C. 1300 CE

The disintegration of a united Mongol Empire after Möngke's reign did not significantly impact overland trade.[53] There were still relatively few khanates and other polities, and customs and tariffs remained reasonably low. Mongol khans continued to develop urban centers and demand commodities, luxury items, and slaves.[54] Trade revenues were particularly important to the *ulus*es of Chaghadai, Jochi, and the Ilkhanate. In comparison, the Yuan had a much larger, richer, and more varied domestic economy.[55] The period saw attempts to collect regular commercial taxes (*tamgha*) and enforce liability for *ortoq* losses.[56] Concomitant with the expansion of maritime trade was the increasing importance of foreign merchant networks and growth in private commerce. The most significant catalyst for an increase in the volume of trade on Via Mongolica was the conquest of the Song dynasty in 1279, which gave the Mongols access to well-established Song trade networks and commodities like porcelain, silk, and rice.

After defeating his brother Ariq Böke in 1263, Qubilai inherited a north China that still had not fully recovered from the Mongol conquests three decades earlier. Qubilai issued three types of currency, but the paper *chao*, backed by a silver reserve, prevailed.[57] A state-backed currency enabled merchants throughout the empire to trade with one another.[58] The court's acceptance of taxes in paper money instilled trust in the currency and freed up silver to be invested in trade.[59] By moving the capital from remote Qaraqorum to more accessible Daidu in 1266, Qubilai also made imperial funds and markets more readily available. Marco Polo noted

that "Merchants and all other men who come for business . . . come in very great numbers . . . because the city [Daidu] is such a good market."[60]

In 1268, Qubilai created the "General Administration for the Supervision of the *Ortoq*."[61] Import taxes were a modest 10 percent for fine goods, 6.5 percent for coarse goods, and the *tamgha* was assessed at a low 3⅓ percent.[62] These policies, plus the fact that the Mongols accorded merchants a higher status than Chinese dynasties, in addition to the extension of the Grand Canal to Daidu and the expansion of the *jam* system, all contributed to the revitalization of the Chinese economy. Nevertheless, ethno-religious enmity was perpetuated by the Yuan's four-class system, in which Mongols and Central Asians (*semu ren*) were elevated above the Chinese. While *ortoq*s ceased to serve as tax farmers during Qubilai's rule, they continued to charge high interest as moneylenders, perpetuating Chinese resentment.[63]

While Qubilai sought to grow commerce, trade through Central Asia became more hazardous as the war with his nephew Qaidu dragged on. The inter-khanate conflict began when most Chaghadaids and Ögödeids opposed Möngke. After his enthronement, the Qa'an punished his opponents, dissolved the Ögödeid *ulus*, and executed or exiled most Ögödeids from Central Asia.[64] The civil war between Qubilai and his brother Ariq Böke also produced Chaghadaid dynastic struggles and in 1271, Ögödei's grandson Qaidu (r. 1271–1301) was enthroned as the Ögödeid khan with the authority to appoint the head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*.[65] Qaidu refused to acknowledge Qubilai's authority and thence ensued a three-decade war that often disrupted trade, though clearly traffic did not cease as the Polos, and the East Syriac Christian Rabban Sauma and his companion Markos, passed through Central Asia in the early 1270s.[66]

The *ulus* Chaghadai (1221–1370) lay at the heart of Via Mongolica and stretched from the borders of the Uyghur lands to the Amu Darya.[67] Chinggis's campaigns here were particularly destructive; however, some areas recovered quickly. In 1253, during the notable reign of Orqina Khatun (r. 1251–1260), William of Rubruck stopped at a "large town" called Qayaliq that contained "a bazaar to which merchants resorted in large numbers."[68] Despite Qaidu's frequent clashes with challengers, there was economic growth during his reign.[69] In 1272, *jam* stations south of Tianshan were used to transport jade from Kashgar and Khotan.[70] After 1275, military conflict pushed overland trade to the southern Silk Road, from Badakhshan (northeastern Afghanistan) to Khotan (southwestern Xinjiang), and from there via Cherchen and Lop Nur to Daidu. After Qaidu and his ally Du'a captured Turfan in 1285, commerce moved from Samarqand to the Yuan capital via Almaliq, Talas, and Qara Qocho.[71] There was a road from Urgench across the Hindu Kush to Ghazna (northeastern Afghanistan) onto Delhi, which exported high-quality cotton.[72] Marco Polo noted that Badakhshan was a great source of gems and stones like rubies and lapis lazuli, as well as silver.[73] Other Central Asian exports included fruits; grains; animals like horses, camels, tigers, and leopards; furs; jade; and medicinal herbs.[74] The khanate supplied slaves to the Mamluk Sultanate via the Golden Horde and to India; Hindu slaves were also exported to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Persia.[75] While the khanate did not have a permanent capital, Almaliq seems to have been the most important city and was a major stop on the trade routes.[76]

Regardless of its antipathy toward Qubilai, the *ulus* Chaghadai desired Chinese goods, like porcelain and textiles, and connected Yuan commodities to markets in the

Golden Horde, the Ilkhanate, and northern India. While the Chaghadai and Jochid *uluses* both suffer from the perception that the Mongols devastated their economies, it is clear, especially in the Golden Horde, that khans revitalized commerce and built markets.[77] The Jochid khans' most important contribution to Eurasian trade was to connect the overland routes from Urgench through the capital Sarai to Tana (Azov), onto Sudaq and Kaffa on the Crimean coast of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and to give trading rights to foreign merchants like the Genoese.[78]

Jochid trade centered on the Black Sea, which was the terminus of local Pontic, South Russian, Anatolian, and Caucasian roads. Goods flowed primarily through the Crimean ports of the Black Sea to the mouth of the Don River.[79] From there, it was a short jaunt to the capital Sarai on the Volga River, which linked to the fish-rich Caspian Sea and connected to the fur-rich Bulghar territory and Novgorod. Having been spared destruction during the Mongols' campaigns in the late 1230s, Novgorod became wealthy as the connection between Siberia and the Baltic Sea, and facilitated commerce with Hanseatic League merchants looking for fur and wax.[80] In return, German merchants brought Flemish woolen cloth, beer and wine, salt, herring, tools, and most importantly, silver.[81] International trade went via Greek Trebizond to Persia, flowed through Constantinople and Cilician Armenia to Mamluk Egypt and the Mediterranean's thirsty market for slaves, and overland to northern India and Yuan China via Central Asia.

As elsewhere in the successor states, the Jochids attracted merchants with their generosity. Juvayni tells us that "merchants from every side brought him [Batu] all manners of wares, and he took everything and doubled the price of it several times over."[82] The Jochid khans usually echoed Möngke Temür's 1270 command to Yaroslav, Prince of Novgorod: "Give passage to foreign merchants in your domain."[83] The Orthodox Church was largely exempt from taxation and could charge tariffs on trade, so it became extraordinarily rich under Mongol rule.[84]

Attractive commercial policies drew a stream of international visitors, such as Niccolò and Maffeo Polo, who spent several years of the 1260s in Jochid territory. In the Mongol spirit of overpaying for goods, Berke (r. 1257–1266) doubled the price of jewels displayed by the Venetian merchants.[85] Berke expanded trade tremendously with two actions: a treaty in 1263 with Mamluk Sultan Baybars allowing Egyptian merchants free passage through the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits; and his 1265/1266 deal permitting Genoese merchants to establish a trading colony at Kaffa in return for tribute.[86] Their rivals the Venetians gained access to the Straits in 1277 and appointed a consul in Soldaia in 1288. The Jochids issued edicts to the Italians that regulated tariffs, outlined procedures during legal disputes, and ensured the security of foreign persons and their goods.[87]

The lucrative relationship between Jochid khans and Italian merchants assured the Mongols access to tariffs and Mediterranean markets. The Genoese imported luxury goods like textiles from Europe and the Ilkhanate, as well as alum, spices, wine, and silver.[88] Exports included honey; wax; potash; linen; raw cotton; fish products like sturgeon and caviar; grains like wheat, barley, and millet; furs and hides; and horses to India.[89] India also sought northern luxury furs, which found their way east through Central Asia to China as well. The slave trade was the most profitable and impactful commercial activity. Italian slave dealers procured slaves inland and sold them in Kaffa, Tana, and the capital Sarai. The Mongols also sold slaves to brokers

directly. Slaves, often referred to vaguely as "Tartars," could be Qipchaqs, Russians, Circassians, Georgians, Hungarians, and Mongols.[90]

Many of these slaves ended up in the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517), the enemy of the Ilkhanate (1256–1335). The Jochids often warred with their cousins to the south over perceived offenses and access to pasture, and there was limited direct trade between the two khanates. Ilkhanid commerce centered on overland trade routes to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. In Persia, as elsewhere in the Mongol khanates, merchants and *ortoq*s played both commercial and political roles, and served as tax collectors, moneylenders, and administrators.[91]

The center of commerce and politics was the main capital Tabriz.[92] Venetian merchants were documented there as early as 1263, and the Polos visited in 1271/1272.[93] Marco Polo remarked: "It's a city where merchants doing business make great profits."[94] In addition to the "Latins," who were primarily Italians, Persian and Armenian merchants were active in great numbers, as well as Jews, East Syriac (Nestorians) and West Syriac (Jacobites) Christians, and Greeks from Trebizond.[95]

Tabriz received products from the Caucasus, the European steppes and forests, from the Black Sea via the Empire of Trebizond (1204–1461) – who paid tribute to the Mongols – and goods like textiles from India via the Persian Gulf and Hormuz.[96] The route to the important Mediterranean port Ayas (Laiazzo) in Cilician Armenia went through several permanent Italian colonies in Anatolia, like Sivas (central Turkey) and Erzurum (eastern Turkey).[97] Ayas also received commodities from Egypt when restrictions against trade with the Mamluk Sultanate were lifted by Ilkhan Ahmad Tegüder in 1282/1283.[98] From Tabriz, you could reach Delhi by way of Ghazna. There is evidence that in this period Persian and Italian merchants traveled between Tabriz and Daidu through the *ulus* Chaghadai and via Quanzhou.[99]

Marco Polo, Francesco Pegolotti, and Ibn Battuta all describe Tabriz's markets in vibrant terms. Half a century after the Polos saw Tabriz, Ibn Battuta marveled, "we came to a great bazaar, called the Gházán bazaar, one of the finest bazaars I have seen the world over. . . . I passed through the jewelers' bazaar, and my eyes were dazzled by the varieties of precious stones that I beheld."[100] In addition to precious stones, one could purchase pearls, local *nasij*, and other silks; ambergris and musk; Anatolian goods like fruit (apricots, grapes, plums), cotton, and rugs; Arabian products like rosewater, frankincense, mercury, dyes like madder, cotton stuffs, coral, and horses; ivory, animals, and foodstuffs from Africa; furs, grain, horses, and slaves from the Golden Horde; alum, timber, wine, textiles, and hazelnuts from Trebizond; silks, spices, medicine, and ceramics from China; and textiles and spices from South and Southeast Asia.[101]

Like in the Yuan, Ilkhanid resentment against *ortoq*s and merchants grew steadily because of general corruption and unscrupulous moneylending practices, despite Islam's prohibition against usury. During the Ilkhan Arghun's reign (r. 1284–1291), Grand Vizier Sa'd al-Dawla forbade the *ortoq*s from demanding provisions and beasts from peasants, echoing Möngke's decrees against abuse of the *jam*.[102] Several years of drought and a horse plague in the 1290s aggravated a period of deep recession in the Ilkhanate's interregional commerce, especially with India.[103] In 1294, Gaykhatu (r. 1291–1295) made a short-lived attempt to introduce Yuan-style paper money called *chao* in Persia to replenish the treasury he had depleted.[104] The experiment went

poorly: prices rose dramatically and merchants boycotted the change because the currency was not backed by gold or silver reserves (unlike in China), which resulted in violent upheavals and a dramatic loss in tax income.[105]

After the financial crisis, Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304) reformed the currency, reduced or abolished the imposts on trade and crafts, assessed the *tamgha* at 1/20, and in theory ended the *ortoq* system.[106] In reality, merchants continued to receive capital from Mongols and their administrators. The stabilization of the Ilkhanate's finances and the papal ban on Latin trade with the Mamluk Sultanate after the loss of Acre in 1291 helped revitalize caravan trade, but merchants increasingly looked to the sea for opportunities.[107]

The most important ports were Hormuz and the island of Kish, located about 11 miles from the Persian mainland. The former remained semi-independent and conducted a brisk trade with southern India, importing "all kinds of spices, precious stones, pearls, cloths of silk and gold, elephant tusks, and much other merchandise," whilst exporting to the subcontinent "fine horses" and "corals, pearls, frankincense and other goods."[108] The rulers of Kish, the al-Tibi family, submitted to the Mongols and thus obtained Ilkhanid funds for commercial ventures.[109] In 1297–1298, Ilkhan Ghazan sent an embassy to Temür Öljeitü Qa'an (r. 1294–1307) led by Fakhr al-Din, son of lord Jamal al-Din. Supplied with Ilkhanid gold for trade and traveling free of costs and duties, the merchant-diplomat also took personal, familial, and partner funds in a sort of hybrid venture.[110] By all accounts, Fakhr al-Din had commercial success in his four years in China, but he was shipwrecked off Ma'bar on his return journey and died there in 1305, demonstrating the dangers of long-distance maritime travel.[111]

Despite the risks, the maritime route between Persian, Arabian, East African, South Indian, and Chinese ports became very profitable in the last quarter of the thirteenth century.[112] Both the Ilkhans and Yuan emperors subsidized maritime trade and the *Yuan shi* notes that "The government, providing ships and capital, [to] selected people to go abroad and trade for all kinds of goods. The government took [for itself] seven-tenths of the profit made. The traders received three-tenths."[113] Fakhr al-Din's destination was the port of Quanzhou, which Marco Polo described as "the port where all the India ships come, with many commodities and luxuries . . . this is one of the two ports in the world where the most merchandise comes from."[114] Quanzhou connected China to merchants from Southeast Asia, like Annam (north Vietnam), Champa (central Vietnam), southern Thailand, the Malay peninsula, Sumatra, and Java.[115] Marco Polo noted that Java was very wealthy and had "all the expensive spices you can find in the world," which may have motivated Qubilai to attempt to procure its submission in 1289.[116]

Qubilai was also keen to cultivate Indian markets and sent diplomatic missions to Ma'bar and Kollam, which began sending regular tributary missions to the Yuan court in the early 1280s.[117] Writing in the early thirteenth century, Zhao Ruguo, the supervisor of maritime trade in Song Quanzhou, reported that India "produces lions, sables, leopards, camels, rhinoceros, elephants, tortoise-shell, gold, copper, iron, lead and tin, gold embroidered rugs . . . Sandal-wood and other aromatic woods, sugar-cane, sugar, and all kinds of fruit," and cotton.[118] The traveler Wang Dayuan (fl. 1311–1350) remarked that Ceylon "equals the kingdom of Java in its wealth and plenty" and produced valuable gemstones like rubies and sapphires.[119]

To south India went the wares of China – primarily silk, tea, and porcelain – and products from Hind and Sind, such as spices, cotton textiles, and dyes, which were then reexported to Persia, Egypt, East Africa, Rum, and Europe.[120] The Yuan maritime bureaus were unsuccessful in trying to restrict private commerce and preventing ethnic Chinese from engaging in foreign trade.

TRADE ON VIA MONGOLICA AFTER C. 1300 CE

After c. 1300 CE, trade in Mongol lands increasingly depended on ethnically and religiously diverse merchants, such as the Italians in the Jochid Ulus and West Asian Muslims on maritime routes. Their demands influenced the manufacture of Chinese goods, especially textiles and porcelain. Near Eastern and Southeast Asian consumers pushed Chinese potters to develop bowls, dishes, and jars in new forms for export.[121] Transported primarily by sea but also overland, several varieties of Chinese porcelain have been found at sites from Java to Kilwa on the east coast of Africa.[122] Chinese commodities also shaped patterns of consumption and manufacturing across Afro-Eurasia. In Mamluk Egypt, silk weavers appropriated designs from imported Yuan textiles and potters imitated Chinese Longquan celadon.[123] In the Ilkhanate, potters drew on Yuan ornamentation.[124] Material stimuli traveled in the other direction as well; the Javanese began to produce textiles decorated with gold glue-work, imitating what was likely Persian *nasij* imported from China.[125]

The death of regulation-minded Qubilai in 1294 meant that *ortoq*s operated with limited oversight in the early fourteenth century and private commerce thrived. Qaidu's death in 1301 plunged Central Asia into another round of warfare, but in 1304, Du'a, Khan of *ulus* Chaghadai (r. 1282–1307), and Chapar, Qaidu's son, surrendered to Qubilai's grandson Temür Öljeitü Qa'an.[126] This ceasefire helped Du'a achieve his goal of reviving caravan trade.[127] In 1305, the bishop of Khanbaliq (Daidu), John of Montecorvino, wrote that the northern land route was secure once again after it "was not safe for a long time on account of the wars."[128]

The security for merchants on Via Mongolica may have been further enhanced by the Chaghadai khan Tarmashirin (r. 1331–1334), who after converting to Islam abolished duties not sanctioned by the *shari'a*. This attracted merchants from Mamluk Egypt, Syria, and the Delhi Sultanate, as well as Ibn Battuta.[129] Rebellious emirs deposed Tarmashirin but despite subsequent struggles for the throne, overland commercial systems were remarkably resilient and flexible and Almaliq continued to be an important, if sometimes dangerous, stop.[130] A Genoese merchant named Joannes or William and seven Franciscans were martyred there in 1339/40.[131] Nevertheless, the Franciscan John of Marignolli and his companions stayed in Almaliq in 1340–1341, and "built a church" and preached "freely and openly."[132]

Marignolli's destination was Khanbaliq, where he spent three years (1342–1345) as archbishop.[133] By this time, religio-ethnic conflict had impacted the social position of the primarily Muslim *ortoq*s. For example, the position of the *qadi* was abolished in Khanbaliq in 1328.[134] By contrast, the khans of the Golden Horde and Ilkhanate affirmed and even augmented foreign merchants' privileges. In 1320, the Ilkhan Abu Saʿid (r. 1316–1335) granted generous concessions to Venetian merchants, such as armed protection and exemptions from certain taxes.[135] His reign was volatile,

however, as emirs and *noyan*s jostled for power and the Mamluks sacked Ayas, the terminus of one of the principal overland routes, in 1322.[136] In 1335, the Ilkhan died without a male heir, and rebellions erupted. The chaos that ensued after Abu Saʿid's death led the Venetian Senate and the Genoese to ban trade with Tabriz at the end of 1338 and 1340/41, respectively.[137] Meanwhile, Muslim merchants had been migrating to the Mamluk Sultanate, with its attractive access to the Red Sea, causing trade through Tabriz to decline precipitously.[138]

In the Ulus Jochi, Moscow prospered as a result of receiving the right to collect tribute and taxes from other Rus' principalities in 1319, and wresting control over northern trade routes in the late 1320s.[139] Duties remained low and Pegolotti notes that in Tana, "On wine, and ox-hides, and horse-hides, the Genoese and Venetians pay four per cent, and all other people pay five per cent."[140] The relationship between the Jochid khans and Italian merchants could be volatile, however. During his war with Noqai, Toqta Khan (r. 1291–1312) sacked Genoese Kaffa in 1308 to reinforce his authority over the former Noqaid territories and to rebuke the Genoese for various perceived breaches of their agreement.[141] Toqta's nephew Özbeg Khan (r. 1312–1342) welcomed the Genoese back to Kaffa in 1313 and gave them more autonomy than they ever had, indicating that in general, conflicts arose due to real or perceived breaches of Mongol sovereignty and not because of commercial disagreements.[142] Özbeg also allowed the Venetians to establish a base at Tana in 1332 in return for land-rent and a commercial tax.[143]

Trade in the Golden Horde continued to prosper in the 1320s and 1330s.[144] When in Tana in 1332, Ibn Battuta observed that horses were "exported to India in droves of six thousand or so."[145] However, in 1343, brawls erupted between Christians and Muslims in Tana when a Venetian merchant killed a Mongol aristocrat who had assaulted him.[146] The Venetians fled to Genoese Kaffa, which was soon besieged by Janibeg (r. 1342–1357). The Jochid khans had attacked Italian entrepots before, but this siege took a historical turn when the Mongols supposedly launched plague-ridden bodies into the city. While Janibeg restored Genoese and Venetian trading rights in 1347, the Black Death disrupted trade around the Black and Mediterranean Seas, and in the Middle East.[147]

Internal and external strife plus plague meant economic depression in the 1340s, which was intensified by war between Genoa and Venice in 1350. While exports of grain and slaves remained relatively stable, the Black Sea declined in favor of routes to Alexandria and Beirut.[148] In any case, Timur/Tamerlane's rise heralded a new era in world history. His destruction of the Golden Horde commercial centers of Sarai, Astrakhan, and Tana in the last decade of the fourteenth century deflected trade north to Moscow and south to Mamluk lands.[149] In contrast to his devastation elsewhere, Timur transformed Samarqand, capital of the Ulus Chaghadai, the western portion of the defunct Chaghadaid khanate (the eastern being Moghulistan), into an architectural marvel and trade destination.[150] Meanwhile, the last Yuan Emperor, Toghan Temür (r. 1332–1370), could not resolve ethnic enmity, frequent changes in policies, and corruption. A series of natural disasters and rebellions in the 1350s led to the establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368.[151] Remnants of the Yuan reestablished themselves in Mongolia as the Northern Yuan dynasty, but intra-Mongol conflicts impacted long-distance commercial connections. Travel and trade on Via Mongolica became more dangerous.

CONCLUSION

The argument that *pax* was necessary for trade to thrive in the Mongol Empire, or that trade only succeeded during peace, is too simplistic. Trade continued during times of conflict, and indeed Qubilai's conquest of southern China resulted in an influx of commodities to Eurasian trade networks after the collapse of a united empire. While it is difficult to measure the impact of the Mongol khanates' decline on overland trade, I am certain that merchants remained resilient in their search for new investors, safer lands, and developing marketplaces. Ultimately, it was the Mongols' attitude toward mercantile activity, in addition to the security their conquests produced, that fostered trade.

The Mongols generally had consistent policies toward trade wherever they ruled. They offered generous, often inflated, prices for wares, and imposed low tariffs, customs, and taxes. They provided imperial and/or personal funds to *ortoqs*, who served in administrative and diplomatic functions, and also controversially worked as tax farmers and moneylenders. Foreign merchants were generally treated well and received privileges like exemptions from certain taxes and their own neighborhoods and religious facilities in market cities. Expanded and protected *jam* stations and roads expedited safe communication and travel. Perhaps most importantly, the Mongols loved and demanded beautiful, luxurious, and useful products. They invested in merchants, increased production of valuable commodities like textiles and porcelain, linked formerly unconnected markets, and created new opportunities for commerce. Trade flourished under Mongol rule.

NOTES

1 Martin 1978, 401.
2 Kim 2009, 16–18.
3 Ciocîltan 2012, 20; Buell 2003, 210.
4 Abulafia 1998, 336.
5 Christian 2000, 3.
6 Hansen 2017, 391; Buell and Fiaschetti 2018, 90.
7 Allsen 2019, 145.
8 *HWC*, 78.
9 Abu-Lughod 1989; Smith 2015, 236.
10 Allsen 2019, 6; Christian 2000, 7.
11 Biran 2015b, 550; Jackson 2017, 210.
12 Pegolotti 1936, 22; Yule 1914, III, 152.
13 Jackson 2018, 258.
14 Christian 2000.
15 Larner 1999, 33.
16 Allsen 2019, 148.
17 Abu-Lughod 1989, 137.
18 Biran 2015b, 551.
19 Jackson 2018, 261.
20 Jackson 2017, 212.
21 Polo 2016, 49; Foust 1992; Liu 2010, 126.
22 Enkhbold 2019, 532; Bar Hebraeus, 356.
23 *EMME*, 429.

24 *TNR*, II, 966; *HWC*, 79.
25 Jackson 2018, 260.
26 Sinor 2000, 280.
27 *EMME*, 429.
28 Allsen 1989, 117.
29 Allsen 1989, 104.
30 Allsen 1987, 159.
31 Allsen 2009, 140.
32 De Nicola 2016, 89.
33 Enkhbold 2019, 545.
34 Allsen 1989, 119.
35 Allsen 1987, 163.
36 *EMME*, 259.
37 Di Cosmo 2013, 185; Kolbas 2006, 376.
38 Allsen 1989, 96.
39 Allsen 1997a, 30.
40 *HWC*, 209–210.
41 Allsen 1989, 95; Rossabi 2018.
42 *EMME*, 368 & 417; Allsen 1989, 99.
43 Allsen 1987.
44 *EMME*, 429.
45 RDT, II, 411; RDB, 219.
46 Allsen 1987, 80.
47 Allsen 1989, 106.
48 *HWC*, 598.
49 *EMME*, 417; Liu 2008, 135.
50 Allsen 1997b, 3; Martinez 2009, 107.
51 Wing 2014, 306.
52 Jackson 2017, 91.
53 Jackson 1999a.
54 Jackson 2018, 261.
55 Martinez 2008, 133–134.
56 Enkhbold 2019, 545.
57 Rossabi 1994, 446.
58 Von Glahn 1996, 57.
59 Yasuhiro 2008, 76.
60 Polo 2016, 85.
61 Rossabi 1994, 449.
62 Chaffee 2013, 43; Rossabi 2013, 212; Schurmann 1956, 217; *EMME*, 606.
63 Endicott-West 1989, 148.
64 Biran 2009, 48; Jackson 2011.
65 Biran 2009, 50.
66 Rabban Sauma 1928; Kim 2009, 21.
67 Biran 2015a, 58.
68 Rubruck, 148.
69 Biran 1997, 98.
70 Kim 2009, 21.
71 Kim 2009, 29; Biran 1997, 104.
72 Jackson 1999b, 252; Jackson 2018, 258; Levi 2010, 566.
73 Polo 2016, 38.
74 Biran 2009, 62.

75 Biran 1997, 64; Ibn Battuta 1929, 178; Levi 2002, 283.
76 Biran 2013, 270.
77 Halperin 1985; Endicott-West 1989, 128; Langer 2012, 85.
78 Martin 2007, 158.
79 Martinez 2009, 102.
80 Martin 2007, 185; Endicott-West 1989, 128.
81 Martin 2007, 184.
82 Allsen 1989, 111; *HWC*, 267.
83 Allsen 1989, 84.
84 Martin 2007, 172; Martinez 2009, 98.
85 Polo 2016, 3.
86 Martinez 2009, 103.
87 Di Cosmo 2013, 187.
88 Jackson 2018, 278.
89 Abulafia 1998, 354; Rubruck, 64; Ostrowski 1998, 123; Levi 2010, 571.
90 Di Cosmo 2005, 398; Jackson 2018, 277.
91 Allsen 1997b, 21; Martinez 1986, 193.
92 Di Cosmo 2005, 411.
93 Paviot 1997, 74.
94 Polo 2016, 24.
95 Paviot 1997; Petech 1962; Rossabi 2010, 99; Preiser-Kapellar 2013, 257.
96 Ciocîltan 2012, 49.
97 Martinez 1992–94, 152; Paviot 1997, 72, Dashdondog 2011, 161.
98 Amitai-Preiss 2005, 208.
99 Jackson 2018, 259; Lopez 1943, 165.
100 Ibn Battuta 1929, 101–102.
101 Allsen 2001, 42; Lippard 1983, 12–13; Ibn Battuta 1929, 102; Wang 1915b, 614; Kauz 2006, 63; Ptak 1990, 70; Chakravarti 1991, 172; Bryer 1966, 3.
102 Lambton 1988, 334.
103 Hope 2016, 149; Martinez 1992–94, 158.
104 May 2018, 240.
105 RDT, III, 584; Vogel 2013, 113–115.
106 Allsen 1987, 161; *EMME*, 430; Jackson 2018, 256.
107 Martinez 2008, 152.
108 Polo 2016, 30; Wang/Ptak 2001, 49.
109 Kauz 2006, 61.
110 Allsen 2001, 49.
111 Lambton 1988, 341.
112 So 2000, 119.
113 Schurmann 1956, 231; Park 2012, 111.
114 Polo 2016, 141.
115 Liu 2010, 125; Buell and Fiaschetti 2018, 90; Jackson 2018, 266; Stargardt 2001.
116 Polo 2016, 149; Bade 2013; Rossabi 1994, 487.
117 Sen 2006a, 432; Sen 2006b, 302.
118 Zhao 1911, 111, 217.
119 Wang 1915a, 379–380.
120 Roy 2012, 42; Allsen 2001, 42.
121 Soucek 1999, 131.
122 Carswell 2000, 12.
123 Mackie 1984.
124 Haddon 2016, 151–153.

125 Gerritsen 2012, 268.
126 Hope 2019; Biran 2009, 54.
127 Biran 2015b, 551.
128 *TMM*, 226; Kim 2009, 30.
129 Jackson 1999b, 266; Ibn Battuta 1929, 172.
130 Biran 2009, 58; Allsen 2019, 152.
131 Lopez 1943, 165; Sinor 2000, 16.
132 Marignolli 1866, 321.
133 Jackson 2018, 299.
134 Chaffee 2008, 121.
135 Paviot 1997, 75.
136 *EMME*, 235–236; Jackson 2018, 271.
137 Paviot 1997, 77.
138 Jackson 2018, 271.
139 Endicott-West 1989, 128.
140 Jackson 2018, 270; Yule 1914, III, 158.
141 May 2018, 292; Martinez 2009, 95.
142 Ciocîltan 2012, 182–186.
143 Jackson 2018, 273; May 2018, 292.
144 Martinez 2008, 144.
145 Ibn Battuta 1929, 145.
146 Di Cosmo 2005, 414.
147 May 2018, 300–301.
148 Jackson 2018, 271.
149 Ciocîltan 2012, 18; Jackson 2018, 272.
150 Biran 2013, 274.
151 May 2018, 214.

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PART VII

ARCHAEOLOGY AND ART HISTORY

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CHAPTER THIRTY

THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Ulambayar Erdenebat, Jargalan Burentogtokh, and William Honeychurch

An overview of scholarship on the Mongolian Empire reveals a puzzling irony. Extensive historical research exists on far-flung regions of the empire and the relationships between Mongol overlords and their imperial subjects, but less attention has been focused on the heartland of the Mongol Empire in present-day Mongolia. The very few indigenous historical sources left by the Mongols themselves, the most notable of which is *The Secret History of the Mongols*, provide important insight to the genesis and practices of the burgeoning Mongol state within the steppe regions. However, the small number of sources, as well as the limited subject matter and social groups treated by such sources, are insufficient to shed light on the wide range of questions researchers seek to answer about this period. The paucity of direct information on local steppe communities during the time of the Mongol Empire and, in comparison, the voluminous sources of information derived from regions external to the steppe have resulted in a somewhat skewed appreciation of the Mongols and their indigenous political traditions. Key to addressing this lopsided viewpoint is deeper investigation of what Mongol overlords introduced to conquered regions from their own political traditions, culture, and the pastoral nomadic steppe context. Close attention to these problems by historians has resulted in a number of what might be called 'revisionist histories' of the Mongolian empire and the Mongol steppe heartland, and these new ideas have begun to intersect with theory generated by archaeological research from Mongolia.[1] Archaeology has its own complexities and limitations, but its one great strength is an ability to provide information on local communities and common people from regions that do not figure prominently in textual documents. In many parts of the Mongolian steppe, events that occurred 800 years ago can only be known through the work of archaeologists.

As such, the Mongol 'imperial' period (1206–1368 CE) provides an interesting example of the diverse methods by which scholars obtain information on the past and how these combined efforts can yield a more accurate account of the lifeways of the medieval Mongols. However, the archaeological record of Mongolia, much

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like the historical record, is fraught with difficulties. For example, pastoral nomadic households were mobile and chose seasonal campsites at which they may have spent a few weeks or months, leaving little in the way of material remains. Surface survey to detect these obscure sites is a painstaking field method that requires years of ground walking and careful inspection just to find medieval living areas. A more common source of archaeological information is the many medieval Mongol burials containing skeletal remains of humans and animals, as well as funerary goods. Excavations of these mortuary sites has been the primary form of fieldwork in Mongolia for the past century, and advanced analytical studies have provided evidence on diet, mobility, genetics, material culture, and social differentiation, as well as funerary practices. The difficulty in discovering and excavating the seasonal campsites of nomadic households is offset somewhat by the urban walled sites constructed during the Mongol imperial period. These impressive sites give archaeologists an idea of the importance of central places on the steppe and about industries and craft specialization, farming, and how urban centers integrated with surrounding hinterlands of mobile herders. This chapter provides an overview of these different archaeological site types and what archaeologists have learned about life in the heartland of the Mongol Empire.

PRELUDE TO EMPIRE

Even though the Mongol Empire is by far the best known of the major nomadic polities from the east Eurasian steppe, it was not the only or even the first imperial steppe state. Those who built the medieval empire followed on a political tradition of more than 1,000 years of state and empire building in Mongolia, beginning with the rise of the initial Xiongnu state during the 3rd century BCE.[2] The Xiongnu state was followed a few centuries later by the Turk and Uyghur empires (550–840), and these were followed in turn by the Khitan Empire (907–1125), which was centered in southeastern Inner Mongolia but controlled much of eastern and central Mongolia.

In historical accounts, the fall of the Khitan in 1125 and the consolidation of the Mongol state in 1206 are easily differentiated in time, but archaeologists have greater difficulty in separating these events as seen through the material record. Radiocarbon dating typically has error ranges measured in centuries, and the local areas most archaeological studies focus on were often slow to reveal major changes in political conditions at the uppermost echelons of society. Although everyday ceramic styles and metallurgical practices tend to be similar over the Khitan and Mongol periods, other sites and material types were different, including details in burial practice, city sites, imported goods, and stylistic traditions. However, it is clear from both historical and archaeological research that the Khitan political presence on the eastern and central Mongolian steppe had major implications for the subsequent Mongol state. Khitan cities were fortified urban sites interlaced with smaller walled settlements likely related to promoting a strong military presence on the steppe with emphasis on the northern regions.[3] Evidence suggestive of a political frontier along the Selenge River in northern Bulgan province comes from two archaeological survey projects in the Egiin Gol and Tarvagatai valleys (Map 30.1). Intensive ground walking in both valleys turned up only a handful of Khitan punctate-decorated pottery, while similar surveys in the Gobi region of Mongolia have recovered thousands of such Khitan



Map 30.1 A map of Mongolia showing the location of major archaeological sites mentioned in the text. (1) Egiin Gol valley, (2) Tarvagatai valley, (3) Zuun and Baruun Kherem, (4) Avraga palace, (5) Khanzat palace, (6) Qaraqorum, (7) Burqan Khaldun-Khentei Khan, (8) Tavan Tolgoi, (9) Khorig Uul, (10) Bukhyn Khoshuu, (11) Okoshki, (12) Yike Shu, (13) Tsagaan Khad
Source: © William Honeychurch

pottery pieces.[4] This evidence for some kind of boundary complements historical reports of sporadic conflict along the Khitan's northern frontier, as do archaeological remains of massive fortified walls across northeastern Mongolia and Siberia.[5] The Khitan imperial occupation of the Mongolian steppe likely had the effect of consolidating political groups, especially as the empire declined in the early 12th century.

THE EARLIEST MONGOL CENTERS

The roughly 80-year period leading up to the unification of the Mongolian steppe under Chinggis Khan was a time of power struggles and political realignments in the wake of Khitan withdrawal. A number of powerful named groups appear in the historical record during this period, including the Kereit, Merkit, Tatar, and Naiman, but archaeologists can say little about their organization and material culture. Very likely, these were not tribally organized kinship groups, as often described, but were polities made up of multiple elite factions or aristocratic 'houses' in an alliance framework, having a senior elite house filling a nominal leadership role.[6] Two points, however, are clear from the archaeological record. First, based on observations from a very small number of sites and survey areas, patterns in material culture, technologies, and landscape organization tend to show a degree of continuity from the late Turkic period through the Khitan and pre-Mongol state periods.[7] Second, given that the excavation of burials has been one of the prime methods of Mongolian

archaeologists, a wealth of preserved human bone in academic collections is now being analyzed for ancient DNA. The story genetics tells is one of local and regional populations that were not radically different over time. Although eastern genetic groups begin to make up a slightly greater proportion of local areas during the Mongol imperial period, these were basically the same populations that had already occupied the Mongolian plateau for thousands of years.[8] In other words, it seems that periods of major change were political and organizational in nature, more so than the result of new groups migrating in from elsewhere.

Given these general observations, the rise of the imperial Mongols probably involved communities that had a long history in the northeastern part of Mongolia known today as Khentii province. Archaeologists and historians both identify this area as the likely homeland of the early Mongols and an important ritual and political center in the later empire. These northeastern groups had a history of confronting Khitan attempts to dominate the region based on the discovery of two large fortified sites of the Khitan period known as Zuun Kherem and Baruun Kherem along the Kherlen (Kerülen) River in southern Khentii province (Map 30.1). Historical accounts report campaigns to subdue northeastern nomadic groups and mention two walled centers, identified with these sites, as involved in the conflict.[9] By the 12th century, these impressive centers had been abandoned, and regional political alliances made up of nomadic elites vied for influence on the steppe. Historians do not know exactly how the northeastern groups were connected to the several polities mentioned earlier, but at least one theory views northeastern elites as competing for power over the Kereit polity along with other aristocratic houses.[10] Emerging victorious from these internecine conflicts was the leader of the northeastern faction, Temujin, who would assume the title of Chinggis Khan and establish Khentii as the center of the Mongol state by 1206.

Some of the earliest archaeological evidence that this political transformation and consolidation was underway is found at an unassuming riverside site called Avargyn Balgas (or Avraga) in Khentii province (Map 30.1). In the 1990s, a collaborative Mongolian-Japanese survey project employed ground-penetrating radar to reveal stone foundation structures suggestive of the kind of architectural remains expected at an elite settlement. The Avraga site stretches along a tributary stream flowing south to the Kherlen River and occupies an area of 1,200 m by 500 m with evidence for several square mounds that had once been building platforms.[11] At the center of these building foundations, a large platform indicated the existence of a special architectural structure around which the entire settlement had been spatially organized (Figure 30.1).

Archaeologists have focused excavation in and around this structure, which was oriented and arranged with an open plaza to the south in a manner similar to historical accounts of the imperial palaces for Mongol royalty.[12] Excavations reveal that the platform was surrounded by a walled embankment and had multiple stone bases for columns as well as dressed stone foundations to support walls, which outlined a rectangular building plan. This uppermost level, of what archaeologists describe as a central palace, was strewn with fragments of imported stoneware and porcelain pottery dating to the late 13th to mid-14th century (Yuan Dynasty period) and confirmed by radiocarbon dating.

Figure 30.1 The excavated foundation stones and column bases of the central palace enclosure at the Avraga site
Source: (photo credit: B. Tsogtbaatar and N. Shiraishi).

Continued excavations below this level revealed additional archaeological layers indicating reuse and repurposing of this structure for more than a century. The lowermost level also had a square or rectangular building situated on a prepared earth and clay platform erected on natural subsoils as the very first structure of the settlement. Both radiocarbon dates and dateable coins from the Jin Dynasty place the initial construction and use period during the late 12th and early 13th century, contemporaneous with the rise of Chinggis Khan's Mongol state.[13] Whether or not this settlement marks the location of the 'great palace' of Chinggis Khan, as long suspected by Mongolian archaeologists, Avraga is clearly an example of early Mongol infrastructure and investment in the political consolidation of their steppe polity, and this hypothesis is supported by the changing role of the palace over time. Studies of the faunal remains associated with each phase of palace construction indicate a subsistence-based assemblage of sheep, cattle, and goats that would be expected of a wealthy pastoral household. A century later, during the final period of the palace complex, the faunal assemblage shifts dramatically to emphasize specific portions of cattle and especially horses known to have had ritual significance.[14] This pattern suggests a transformation in the function of the site from an early

administrative and elite center to what later became a place of ritual and ceremonial importance. If so, this evidence would coincide with historical reports of later Mongolian qa'ans making ritual offerings annually at important sites within their ancestral homeland.

To the east and west of the central platform are sectors of the Avraga site best understood as supporting areas for craft production. Here archaeologists have done much less excavation but have found evidence for a wide range of glazed and earthenware ceramics, glass, bronze coins, iron-working debris, evidence for extensive agricultural production nearby the settlement, and a wide range of animal species, including herded and wild animals. To date, workshops dedicated to bone, horn and antler fashioning, composite bow and arrow manufacture, glasswork, and iron and bronze production have all been identified.[15] Some of the most interesting finds testify to the importance of ironworking. During the Khitan period, iron was strictly controlled and even prohibited from circulation into the steppe regions, making reliable access to iron a sign of political power. The Avraga settlement not only had a robust ironworking industry, it seems to have been a central distribution point for portable iron ingots that have been found up to 200 km away and were used for the local manufacture of weapons and tools.[16]

This very early palace complex helps archaeologists link the material record to the historical record and substantiates the idea that northeastern Mongolia was indeed the political epicenter of medieval Mongol state building. Archaeologists are now discovering that Avraga was not the only palace complex in Khentii province but was an entire network of what are thought to be seasonally occupied palace sites across eastern and central Mongolia.[17] The Khanzat site, 250 km northeast of Avraga along the Kherlen River (Map 30.1), was surveyed and test excavated in 2018 and 2019 and is yet another palace complex. Khanzat has an external wall with gated entries and an internal embankment that surrounds earthen mounds similar to those at Avraga and which likely represent building platforms. A large central platform in the southern part of the site near to the river once supported the main palace and has many stone column supports, fragments of fired roof tiles, and brightly glazed floor tiles, indicating a substantial architectural investment that dates to the mid-13th century.[18] Fieldwork continues at Khanzat, but both its location on the northern bank of the Kherlen River and its probable relation to Avraga are interesting from a landscape perspective. Palace sites like these located along major rivers and their tributaries were likely seasonal campsites for the Mongol qa'ans, who retained their tradition of nomadic mobility despite having numerous walled settlements, cities, and palace sites.[19]

By the time of the Mongol Empire, this mobile tradition among the steppe elite had already been in practice for more than 1,000 years, and situating palace sites along rivers afforded natural corridors of movement for mobile royal courts traveling with huge retinues and massive wooden wagons pulled by cattle.[20] At a deeper level, this tradition reveals the pervasive role of mobility in Mongolian culture. The building of permanent settlements with infrastructure and impressive architecture was, like many practices of the medieval Mongols, part of a long-standing nomadic tradition that, taken as a whole, could be described as a new approach to urbanism itself.

THE SEAT OF AN EMPIRE: QARAQORUM AND IMPERIAL URBANISM

There is great historical speculation as to why the center of the growing Mongol Empire was moved from northeastern to central Mongolia in the Orkhon Valley (Map 30.1). The first reason was probably purely administrative: as the steppe polity grew rapidly to immense size through successful military campaigns, a more central area of administration was required.[21] However, this decision to move the seat of power, possibly made by Chinggis Khan himself, had ulterior motives that were both functional and ideological in nature. Grassland and water resources were abundant and dependable in this area, especially since the early 13th century experienced ameliorating climate conditions across the Orkhon subregion favoring precipitation and warmer temperatures.[22] Geographically, Qaraqorum's location in the upper Orkhon River valley neatly bridges the major ecological zones of northern forested steppe and southern Gobi Desert; an ecotone that also represents a midpoint between the distinct cultural regions of northwest and southeast, which is apparent from at least the Bronze Age.[23] The Orkhon River itself is one of the few north–south trending waterways, and since its headwaters intersect with the two southernmost rivers in Mongolia, the Ongi and Tuin rivers, movement along these central waterways provides access to Siberia in the north as well as southern jump-off points to Inner Mongolia in the south. As such, Qaraqorum controlled several major long-distance movement and trade corridors and therefore represented a highly functional point for exerting influence relative to the larger steppe region. In addition, the Orkhon Valley had once been the site of major Turkic political monuments and the Uyghur period capital of Ordu Baliq (8th–9th century). Constructing the Mongol capital in this location appropriated the ideological authority associated with these preceding polities. This was a prudent measure on the part of the Mongols since the vast majority of peoples in the growing Mongol Empire were of Turkic descent.[24]

Qaraqorum is located on the open steppe at the eastern base of the Khangai Mountains, from which the Orkhon River flows approximately 3.5 km west of the city. The city site itself is not terribly impressive and is dominated by the later construction of the Buddhist monastery, Erdene Zuu, atop the city's ruins during the late 16th century (Figure 30.2). The site is so unassuming that, during the 19th century, the exact location of the Mongol imperial capital was debated by scholars. Fortunately, an inscribed stele from Qaraqorum had been erected and preserved in the courtyard of the Erdene Zuu temple complex, and both its translation as well as inspection of the earthworks and broken porcelain pottery adjacent to the monastery convinced historians that Erdene Zuu had indeed been constructed on the site of the former capital.

All evidence points to 1235 as the initial period of construction for the walls and main palace, although the general area was probably utilized as a seasonal campsite for the qa'an's court prior to the formal building project.[25] The layout of the city is surrounded by a semi-rectangular, pounded-earth wall that is now much deteriorated but once may have stood as high as 5–8 m.[26] The wall encloses approximately 1.2 sq. km comprising the majority of building remains at the site, although geophysical prospection and the production of a high-resolution Digital Terrain Model clearly show extensions of the town beyond the walls, especially in

Figure 30.2 An aerial photograph of the site of Qaraqorum. The 16th-century Buddhist monastery of Erdene Zuu is surrounded by a white wall with stupas in the mid-ground, and the modern town of Kharkhorin is seen in the background. Uneven earth in the right foreground is the remnants of the Mongolian capital city
Source: (photo permission: U. Erdenebat).

the northern and eastern sectors. Some of these extensions are building foundations, but others were determined to be cemeteries in the northwest and southeast, as well as a workshop district on the eastern side.[27] Including these additional areas, the built landscape attributable to the urban center is 2 sq. km in total, slightly smaller than the city of London at 1200. Qaraqorum was arranged according to a roughly rectangular grid with north–south and east–west avenues crossing in the center of the walled space and leading to four main gateways. Historical reports describe each gateway as hosting a city market for different commodities, including locally farmed grain, sheep and goats, cattle, wagons, and horses – all suggesting a lively economic sector within the city itself.[28]

Interest in economic production, workshops, and craft manufacture at Qaraqorum led the most recent Mongolian and German excavation team to focus on the central crossroads where prior archaeologists had documented an assortment of tools and worked materials, as well as deep stratigraphic sections showing each rebuilding episode at the town center (Figure 30.3). The main north–south roadway proved to be a well-engineered paved structure with drainage channels first constructed in the

Figure 30.3 Excavated sections for the Buddhist temple complex of Qaraqorum located in the southwest sector of the walled city. Archaeologists associate this temple with an inscribed stone found at Qaraqorum describing the building of a great stupa within such a temple at 1256
Source: (photo permission: U. Erdenebat).

early 13th century and subsequently rebuilt three times, the last of which occurred during the 14th century.[29] Road margins were littered with broken ceramic roof tiles, indicating a district of roofed buildings on either side of the avenue. These were built of wooden beams and brick architecture with internal courtyards and fronted by the wooden outlines of industrial workshops. These residential and manufacturing sectors were reconstructed several times throughout the history of the capital, although their basic layout did not change radically.[30] Based on the nature of artifacts recovered in this sector, the city center had long been a primary area for artisans and craftsmen, whose work produced functional everyday items as well as exotic and precious goods likely intended for elite patrons. The documented range of manufacturing activities is impressive and includes evidence for the working of gold, silver, and bronze; blacksmithing shops for the manufacture of iron and steel tools, wagon parts, and arrowheads; fine lapidary and glasswork; bone and antler carving; and wool and textile production.[31]

Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of the ongoing fieldwork at Qaraqorum is the search for the qa'an's royal palace, described in some detail by visitors to the capital city during the 13th century. Since the 1940s, a large architectural

complex inside the southwestern wall has been interpreted as the palace sector. Recent excavations, however, provide evidence to the contrary, showing that this area represented an impressive Buddhist temple based on its architectural layout, columned hallway, and numerous clay images of the Buddha recovered within its foundations.[32] This important revision raises the pressing question of where the palace could have been situated within the walled site. Based on a hypothesis advanced by Russian historians and geographers at the end of the 19th century, archaeologists surmised that the remnants of the qa'an's palace might lie beneath the walled precinct of the Erdene Zuu monastery. The walls enclosing the temple complex are strangely irregular in layout, suggesting that they had not been constructed anew in the 16th century. With permission of the Buddhist authorities in charge of the monastery, several deep trenches were excavated below the visible walls. These revealed much older underlying brick and masonry foundations measuring up to 8 m in width. Based on several lines of evidence, including the size, composition, and stamp marks of the foundation bricks; associated pottery in the lower foundations; and direct dating using thermoluminescence techniques, these earlier walls can be dated to the 13th century and represent the strongest evidence yet for the location of the qa'an's palace.[33]

Even if archaeologists had not identified the palace sector, other remains suggest the presence of an elite court and its imperial infrastructure at Qaraqorum. Materials and practices from far-flung parts of the empire attest clearly to this and include coins and glass beads from the Islamic world, Muslim-style burials in the northwestern cemetery, and what are potentially the remains of a Nestorian Christian church.[34] Archaeologists have also recovered silks and a great deal of porcelain and stoneware from kilns in China; elephant tusks meant for carving; and on the botanical side, black pepper from Southeast Asia, walnuts from the Himalayas, and hulled and emmer wheat from western Asia or even possibly from as far as Europe.[35] Occurrence of these foreign and prestige goods, however, are rare in comparison to finds related to the staple diet of thousands of commoners who also inhabited the city and its surrounding areas. The capital was embedded within a rich pastureland with good soils and sufficient water resources to support warm-weather intensive farming. Local cultivation of millet, barley, and bread wheat is evidenced both by botanical remains and by the discovery of iron farming tools, relict field systems near the city walls, and canals and water reservoirs.[36] Likewise, the pastoral economy is well represented in every sector of the city by faunal remains of sheep/goats, cattle, and horses, with a small complement of wild animals, including steppe marmot, hare, and several indigenous fish species.[37]

From 2007 to 2011, Mongolian and German archaeologists conducted a systematic survey of the Orkhon Valley to build a better understanding of the diachronic landscape and especially the hinterland or "peri-urban" context for the Mongol capital.[38] As with most urban areas, the survey documented resource extraction from sites up to 15 km away that supported the construction and functioning of the city. Two granite quarries have been discovered with unfinished grinding stones and column bases, as well as brief inscriptions in Chinese script by at least two literate stonemasons.[39] Industrial scale kilns for firing architectural bricks, glazed tiles, and pottery were situated near the southwest wall, and two other kiln sites were discovered at distances of 3.5 and 6 km southwest of the city along the Orkhon

River. After geophysical survey and extensive excavation, the site located 6 km away from Qaraqorum proved to be a craft manufacturing settlement 24 h in size.[40]

Despite this productive capacity, historical sources report the constant arrival of caravans at the city gates loaded with staple foods and supplies for the urban population.[41] This raises the question of whether Qaraqorum was in fact a dependent center unable to feed and support what must have been a sizeable population or, to the contrary, whether an unprecedented investment in infrastructure and the large population residing in and around the city required the additional transport of resources from beyond the steppe.[42] Calculating population numbers in a mobile context is particularly challenging, but historians estimate that the Orkhon Valley may have held up to 100,000 people, while the city of Qaraqorum may have had between 18,000 and 30,000 inhabitants.[43] These figures represent a substantial range but would make the demographic size of the capital city comparable to modern-day provincial capitals in Mongolia, such as the nearby towns of Tsetserleg and Arvaikheer. This ethnographic observation is important for understanding Qaraqorum as a unique kind of urban setting in which the traditional mobility of inhabitants around the city suggests that the "urban center" was not as central as it might at first appear.

The clearest combination of archaeological and historical evidence supporting this hypothesis has been advanced by Shiraishi and Atwood, who both assess the seasonal movements of the royal court over circuits of more than 450 km within the Orkhon Valley.[44] In keeping with the pastoral nomadic tradition of moving between seasonal campsites, the qa'ans regularly moved between seasonal palaces in orbit of Qaraqorum. For example, Shiraishi presents compelling textual and material evidence for a spring palace location at the site of Doityn Balgas, approximately 56 km northwest of the capital, and a winter palace site at Shaazan Khot, 140 km to the southeast.[45] Several lines of evidence support Shiraishi's identifications. First, the mobility of the royal court is clearly attested in multiple histories, and these palace ruins were indeed contemporaneous with Qaraqorum. Second, each site has material culture consistent with an elite occupation, comprising of artifact types similar to those recovered at the capital city. Finally, the geographical and environmental locations of Doityn Balgas and Shaazan Khot represent suitable sites for respective warm- and cold-weather camps given what we know of pastoral campsite preferences. We should point out that different qa'ans practiced different forms of seasonal movement and sometimes preferred sites far beyond the Orkhon region.

Therefore, in terms of the political aspect of what makes a center central, Qaraqorum seems to have been but one location among several at which political power and authority periodically arrived and then disembarked. We can imagine the number of advisors, retainers, servants, and herds attached to the royal court moving along with the qa'an, greatly shifting community population numbers at each seasonal location. Moreover, a majority of the Qaraqorum population was likely seasonally itinerant as well, like their qa'ans, and transitioned between ger communities on the outskirts of the city and seasonal camps throughout the upper and middle Orkhon Valley.[46] Given the archaeological evidence and the current state of historical scholarship on the medieval Mongol period, we concur with Moses and Greer, Shiraishi, and Rogers that urbanism under the Mongol Empire was a unique phenomenon in which the city center was secondary to the nomadic setting that embedded it.[47] Most models of settled urbanism view the center as relatively static

through time, experiencing gradual change as the urban area develops. As we have seen in the case of Qaraqorum, both population and seats of power circulated on a seasonal basis around the urban settlement, and these frequent micro-shifts effectively dissociate centrality from any one point and instead move it to a larger spatial scale. In effect, the entire region encompassing interaction and movement becomes the operative scale for centrality, as suggested by Tkachev, who views the place name "Qaraqorum" as not just designating the city center but the entire Orkhon Valley.[48]

BURIALS AND FUNERARY PRACTICES

One testament to the breadth of the Mongol imperial presence in Eurasia is that medieval reports depicting the funeral and burial place of Chinggis Khan were composed and passed down in the historical literature of China, Iran, Italy, and France, in addition to Mongolia. The cause of death of the Great Qa'an in 1227 is debated, but having initiated an imperial lineage of rulers, his funeral was something extraordinary and unique. According to various accounts, Chinggis Khan's body was transported to a spot that he had chosen in the region of his birth, at the base of a mountain called Burqan Qaldun. The exact place was kept secret by reportedly having all attendants involved in the burial construction and ceremonies killed afterwards and the greater area around the tomb site made a forbidden zone called *Ikh Khorig*. The burial itself reportedly had no surface markings, and all disrupted soils were returned to their natural state with trees and shrubs as ground cover.[49] Based on a great deal of research, the probable location of Burqan Qaldun has been identified by scholars as a crescent shaped peak today known as Khentii Khan in northeastern Khentii province (see Map 30.1) This peak conforms geographically to the description of Chinggis Khan's sacred mountain as the place from which three major rivers – the Onan, Tuul, and Kherlen – arise. Khentii Khan Mountain has been the site of cultic worship for many centuries related to the Chinggisid lineage, and local folklore identifies the peak as the site chosen by the Great Qa'an for his burial.[50]

Mortuary research is a primary source of data used by Mongolian archaeologists. Although we have various historical reports on the funerary practices of the medieval Mongols, including aristocratic and commoner burials, the accuracy of these descriptions varies substantially. However, in the case of burial structure and inclusions provided for members of the aristocracy, some accounts have proven to be quite accurate, especially ones documenting Yuan Dynasty practices.[51] Based on a wealth of material and textual evidence, archaeologists and historians agree that burial formats marked distinctions in what was an elaborate social and political hierarchy.

To date, archaeologists have documented two basic mortuary treatments: inhumations of various kinds, most notably pit-burials, and cave or rock shelter burials. This last form is a kind of exposure burial in which the deceased individual's body is left exposed to the natural elements.

Archaeologists divide these burial types into three timeframes: a formative period (10/11th–12th centuries); a classic period during the rise of the state and empire (13th–14th centuries); and a post-classic phase, during which time practices related to Tibetan Buddhism increased (15th–17th centuries).[52] This periodization tracks a process of gradual change in both political power and burial practices from the time

of the Turk and Uyghur empires (6th–9th centuries) to that of Mongol hegemony. The reasons that burial practices change over time is a topic of much debate among archaeologists. Archaeological burial sites comprise the remains of a funerary event followed by whatever happened subsequently within that space (e.g., re-use, pillaging, desecration). Funerals tend to have layered rather than singular meanings, and these might pertain to personal and household symbolism, community ideologies, cosmology and longer-term traditions, as well as assertions of political affiliation and display. As an event that could gather dispersed nomadic households from across a region, the activities conducted at a funeral were a form of what archaeologists refer to as 'commensal politics.' Political deliberations during these times of ritual significance, ceremony, and feasting allowed steppe nomads to forge alliances and realign power relationships, making funeral events all the more momentous occasions. A case in point was the royal assemblies (*qurilta* or *quriltai*) to select a new imperial ruler upon the death of a Qa'an. By the time of Chinggis Khan's death, the actual funeral and the assembly had become separate events, but this too conforms to a 4,000-year tradition of funerary politics practiced among steppe nomads.[53]

Based on what the archaeological record preserves for us to discover, inhumation in a pit-burial was the standard Mongol imperial period practice for disposing of the dead. Since the royal burials of the Chinggisid lineage have not been found, archaeologists can only address the mortuary treatments given to secondary elites or members of aristocratic lineages and that provided to local elite and commoners of high status. The issue of identifying 'commoner' burials is problematic since it is not clear that every individual was given a mortuary treatment that archaeologists can detect. As such, it is possible that even the simplest pit-burials indicate a level of status beyond that of a common herder. In any case, the burials of aristocratic individuals (i.e., lower in status than the Chinggisid royal lineage) are clearly attested in both historical sources and by archaeology. Several such sites have been studied in Siberia, Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia, with the most comprehensive analytical results from the cemetery of Tavan Tolgoi (southeastern Mongolia, Map 30.1).

The Tavan Tolgoi cemetery is located in southern Sukhbaatar province, approximately 365 km southeast of the Avraga settlement, and has been the focus of intensive fieldwork and laboratory analysis. This site first became known through publication in 1927 of the photographs and descriptions of two life-size stone statues depicting individuals seated in folding armchairs sculpted from marble. Attired in decorated belted robes and boots in styles displaying wealth and high rank, both figures originally held goblets half raised in their now broken right hands, while their left hands still hold prayer beads (Figure 30.4). The head portions of both statues were fragmented long ago, but numerous pieces from one of them indicate a medieval brimmed hat with a top decoration and tassel displaying the status of the wearer.[54] Similar stone statues dating to the 13th and 14th centuries exist in many parts of southeastern Mongolia and north-central Inner Mongolia and due to their individualized characteristic are thought to represent actual elite individuals in the empire. Although today most are regrettably broken, they provide a great deal of information on medieval clothing styles, personal decorations, implements, and headgear.[55] Such statue stones are often situated on the southeast side of a large mounded stone feature with stone alignments and standing stelae thought to be for ritual offerings. Such attributes mark a local landscape as having ceremonial

Figure 30.4 One of a pair of marble stone sculptures of seated Mongol nobles located among the burials at the Tavan Tolgoi cemetery
Source: (photo credit: Ch. Amartuvshin).

significance for the medieval Mongol aristocracy.[56] The discovery of these two figures strongly suggests that the Tavan Tolgoi cemetery, discovered just to the south of these statue stones, may represent the burial grounds of an elite extended family within what was once their territorial jurisdiction.

Beginning in 2004, archaeologists recorded 62 burial features at Tavan Tolgoi ranging in date from the Bronze Age to the Mongol period, identified by various types of stone surface constructions. Together, these features comprise a multi-phase mortuary complex distributed over an area of 2.5 km and concentrated around three low-lying hills in a setting of open steppe grassland. Of these stone features, 40

Figure 30.5 Schematic plan of Burial 61 at Tavan Tolgoi showing a semi-ring of stones on the modern surface underlain by a burial chamber. The chamber is 3–4 m below the surface stones and contained an interred individual in a wooden coffin with a partial horse skeleton to the east, along with a wooden saddle. Note that the chamber arrangement is enlarged for detail and the meter scale pertains to the surface feature only.
Source: © William Honeychurch.

are marked by stone-built rings or semi-circular stone mounds ranging in size from 4.4 to 8.5 m and dated to the Mongol imperial period (i.e., the 'classic' period) based on the excavation and analysis of 12 of these burials.[57] As would be expected from the presence of the marble statue stones, the material culture unearthed from these burials has been impressive. Tavan Tolgoi comprises comparatively large pit graves of 1.5–3 m in depth with full or partial horse burials, often with saddles and full harness gear, positioned next to a single individual interred in a heavy plank coffin oriented to the north or northwest (Figure 30.5).

Although these burials are somewhat unusual for the Mongol period, for example, only 15% of known burials are oriented to the northwest and only 4% include

horse remains, the majority of artifacts recovered instantly alerted excavators that the individuals buried here were of special status.[58] Despite evidence of disruption, the artifact assemblage taken as a whole includes substantial numbers of exotic and luxury items, indicating great wealth. These include imported silks from China and coffin woods from Southeast Asia; belt sets made from gold, silver, and rock crystal; gold and silver personal decorations inset with gemstones, turquoise, jade, and pearls; drinking vessels of precious metal and porcelains; and gilded saddle decorations (Figure 30.6). Some burials also included objects only associated with the medieval aristocracy, such as hat decorations in gold known to indicate high



Figure 30.6 Precious artifacts, mostly personal ornaments and items indicating status, unearthed from Tavan Tolgoi burials. The artifacts shown are comprised of gold and silver, semi-precious stones, and pearls
Source: (photo permission: U. Erdenebat).

status, portable folding chairs shown in court paintings of the Mongol Ilkhanate of Persia, and seal stamps (*tamgha*) reserved for elite authorities as a means to render their approval.[59] Ancient DNA research supports the idea that at least some of the Tavan Tolgoi individuals were distantly related and likely belonged to a lineage group of high political rank.[60] However, we are skeptical of the opinion expressed in this research that Tavan Tolgoi individuals can be directly linked to Chinggis Khan.[61]

Tavan Tolgoi is the best-studied aristocratic burial site in Mongolia, but several others have been discovered recently and are currently under investigation. These include the Khorig Uul cemetery in Khovsgol province (Map 30.1), with well-preserved silk garments now being analyzed at the Smithsonian Institution, as well as the Bukhyn Khoshuu burial from Khentii province (Map 30.1).[62] This latter burial was pillaged only recently, but when archaeologists arrived to conserve what was left, they found a coffin sealed with bands of iron, a gold gilded belt set with turquoise inset, and three brocaded silk robes made with gold entwined silk that combined technologies from eastern Iran, Central Asia, and China.[63] Moving just outside the borders of Mongolia, archaeologists have excavated additional elite cemeteries, revealing interesting geographic variability in aristocratic burial practices. For example, the Okoshki cemetery in southeastern Transbaikal (Map 30.1) has 49 surface features in the form of stone rings or ovals, but the burials most similar to those at Tavan Tolgoi internally were constructed under large earthen mounds 11–14 m in size and about 1 m in height.[64] This form of Mongol elite burial has not been recorded in Mongolia but has been found in the Altai mountains of Siberia and might be considered a more northerly practice within the imperial steppe territory.[65] To the south, near the Yuan Dynasty palace of Shangdu in Inner Mongolia, the Yike Shu cemetery (Map 30.1) contained elite burials with piled stone surface features and individuals buried in coffins made of split and hollowed logs, strapped together with bands of iron and gold, and placed inside a chamber floored with bricks.[66] These geographically distributed cases demonstrate the varieties of elite mortuary practices as well as the tendency to continue some aspects of local burial traditions despite regional trends toward standardized formats.

While burials of the aristocratic elite receive close attention for their impressive construction and wealth, most people of the Mongol period did not receive such lavish treatment. As mentioned, archaeologists are not certain whether to label the most common form of Mongol-period burial as a treatment provided for commoners per se. Some evidence suggests that these burials found throughout Mongolia and Transbaikal might be those of local people of some status. Such burials are lesser versions of those found at Tavan Tolgoi and consist of a slightly mounded oval or ring-shaped stone feature made up of medium-sized local stones. Their spatial distribution varies between small clusters of two or three, ranging up to larger groups of 18–20 burials, but very large cemeteries do exist, especially in eastern Mongolia, numbering 100 or more such burials.[67] These 'local' Mongol period burials are frequently found on the south-facing slopes of hills or foothills, sometimes in the upper portions of small enclosed valleys or on the banks of erosion cuts. Below the stone coverings, most burials consist of an earthen pit as much as 1.5 m deep in which a supine individual oriented to the north or northeast

was provided with a wrapping of leather, felt, or birch bark, or a wooden plank coffin. Other individuals were simply positioned on the earthen floor of the burial chamber sometimes with stone slabs providing a siding around the perimeter of the burial chamber.[68]

In contrast to pit burial inhumations, the study of naturally mummified individuals interred in rock crevices, cave compartments, and overhangs has yielded some of the best examples of preserved material culture and sophisticated bioarchaeologcial analysis conducted to date in Mongolia. Approximately 100 individuals have been identified in these contexts situated in rocky outcrops and among mountain peaks, where the deceased was placed along with common burial goods in a coffin or sometimes on the wooden sections of a dismantled cart and left exposed to the elements (Figure 30.7). Mongolia's extremely cold and dry climate naturally freeze-dries organic materials and can, under the right conditions, produce a fully mummified individual, still clothed in preserved robes, silks, and boots.[69] One of the most complete rock shelter burials dated by radiocarbon to the classic Mongol period (14th century) comes from the Tsagaan Khad site in Ovorkhangai province of Central Mongolia (Map 30.1). A cave discovered by local herders preserved most of the body and clothing of an individual, who had placed beside him a silk strung composite bow and a full complement of fletched arrows still housed in a leather quiver. Physical anthropologists at the Smithsonian



Figure 30.7 An example of an intact rock or cave burial dating to the Mongol imperial period at the western site of Khagt in the Altai Mountains. This individual was deposited in a rock alcove in an extremely cold and dry environment which preserved skin, clothing, and footwear
Source: (photo credit: Ch. Amartuvshin).

Institution CT scanned these mummified remains to reveal the deceased individual as a 15-year-old male whose cause of death is unknown and who probably ate a mixed diet of meat and grain based on his bone chemistry.[70] Similar burials to this one date to a wide time range, from as early as the 4th and 5th centuries to the 17th century, showing once again the long-term persistence of certain mortuary traditions despite political and cultural transformation over time.

LIFE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: TWO VALLEY COMMUNITIES

Archaeology also allows us to view the lifeways of common people whose activities made up the vast majority of the archaeological record. Survey and excavation projects in the Egiin Gol- Tarvagatai valley region of Bulgan province (Map 30.1) provide a perspective on what life was like for local people and their communities. These neighboring valleys in north-central Mongolia have rich forested grasslands situated along rivers that provide dependable water ideal for both farming and herding. The valleys are connected by a series of mountain passes and have comparable present-day populations of 33 and 28 herding households, respectively. By all measures, these two areas are comparable in habitable land, waterways, and pastoral resources and constitute two equivalent centers of community occupation within the greater region. Despite being similar in resources and in contemporary household numbers, these 'twin valleys' had very different mortuary, landscape, and settlement characteristics during the Mongol imperial period.

The medieval landscape of Egiin Gol was centered on the large Bayan Gol settlement in the southeastern part of the valley, which has several radiocarbon dates ranging from the 11th through 14th centuries. The settlement is by far the largest site in the valley during this period and is associated with extensive finds of porcelain ceramics, large millstones, and a central platform mound surrounded by nine circular pieces of white granite that excavators believe once formed the foundations of a building structure.[71] Two contemporaneous Mongol period cemeteries are located to the northwest and southeast of the Bayan Gol settlement and include some of the largest and most impressive Mongol burials in the entire region. Based on excavated diameter measurements, the burials from these cemeteries are more than 1 m larger on average than Mongol burials from all other parts of the valley. Given that the neighboring Tarvagatai Valley has no such burials whatsoever, and the Egiin Gol Valley has 110 of these burials differentiated by size and location, what have been perceived as 'common' pit burials may in fact indicate a degree of local social differentiation, as suggested earlier.

In contrast to Egiin Gol, a very different kind of central place was discovered in the Tarvagatai Valley just 50 km to the northwest of the large Bayan Gol settlement and cemetery complex. Recent paleo-environmental research in Mongolia has proposed that in conjunction with the emergence of the Mongol state during the early 13th century, regional climatic conditions shifted to a higher precipitation and warmer regime favoring abundant pasture and farming.[72] Historical sources also suggest that the upper Selenge River basin where the Tarvagtai and Egiin Gol valleys are located was integrated into the early Mongol state in part due to the rich agricultural resources available in this region.[73] This historical point has been borne out

Figure 30.8 Excavations underway of a pit-house eroding out from steep banks along the Tsagaan Ereg settlement in the northern Tarvagatai Valley
Source: (photo credit: William Gardner, J. Burentogtokh).

by evidence from the Tsagaan Ereg settlement site, recently discovered by survey archaeologists in the Tarvagatai Valley (Figure 30.8).

Tsagaan Ereg is also a large settlement, but unlike the Bayan Gol complex with its central architectural mounds and cemeteries, it has several round pit-house features with wooden supports for roof coverings, hearths, and birch bark flooring. These habitations were probably semi-permanent and used as seasonal dwellings given that the exposed nature of the site would have been extremely cold during winter.[74] The settlement is next to an extensive plain with irrigation channels, and its position at the confluence of two waterways makes it a good location to support intensive farming. Radiocarbon analyses date the early occupation of these pit-houses to around 1220 and the site continued to be inhabited at least through the end of the Yuan Dynasty (late 14th century). Evidence for agricultural production includes botanical remains of wheat, barley, and millet, as well as significant amounts of wheat pollen presumably deposited from neighboring field plots. Nearby the settlement, a heavy granite threshing stone was unearthed with embedded organics that provided radiocarbon dates contemporaneous with the pit-house occupation.

Two of these pit-houses have been fully excavated, revealing a great deal of broken earthenware pottery but no evidence of imported porcelain or other luxury items, as were found at the Bayan Gol settlement in Egiin Gol. All this evidence indicates that Tsagaan Ereg was a farming settlement likely occupied by local people who split their time between raising crops and herding in the valley. Fragmented faunal remains of

sheep, goat, and cattle with evidence for cut marks and marrow processing show that the local pastoral economy was fully functioning, and local households were seasonally mobile, judging from several small Mongol medieval period campsites conforming to a clear winter-summer habitation pattern.[75] Both of the excavated pit-houses had internal hearths for warmth and cooking, but the second one also had ironworking slag and substantial areas, with burnt earth and charcoal representing the remains of a furnace for blacksmithing. Metallurgical analysis of these remains suggests that two different forms of ironworking were practiced at the settlement to produce high-quality steel. The first was standard bloomery processing, also found to be the main form of ironworking at Qaraqorum, but in this context practiced at a micro scale as would befit a part-time specialist in a local community.[76]

The second form of steel production has not yet been documented at any large urban sites but is found primarily at Khitan and Mongol-period campsites associated with herding households in eastern Mongolia. This technology is unique to the medieval Mongol steppe region and involves the use of cast iron scrap pieces obtained from broken implements and vessels originally manufactured in China during prior centuries. Cast iron is brittle and cannot be used for tools or weapons unless it is treated to reduce its carbon content. This was accomplished by Tsagaan Ereg blacksmiths, who employed a complicated micro process of heat-treating to bring cast iron fragments to near melting temperatures, thereby producing steel through the release of carbon.[77] These steel pieces could then be forged into arrowheads, knives, armor plate, or common tools, as has been documented at medieval sites in eastern Mongolia.[78] This technology is well suited to small-scale production of essential materials in the context of a mobile herding lifeway where specialized formal workshops were not available. It is a fine demonstration of the flexible technological tradition that Mongolian nomads innovated based upon their unique culture and environment.

The very different Mongol period archaeological records at Egiin Gol and Tarvagatai beg the question of what the relationship might have been between these two valleys. Clearly, the two areas had very different roles to play in the larger imperial political system. Egiin Gol might have been the center of a low-level administrative district based on the patterns observed at the Bayan Gol settlement complex. If so, it is possible that part of the administrative duties of the local elite of Egiin Gol might have been managing the productive capacity of the surrounding region, including the important center for farming and craft manufacture in the neighboring Tarvagatai Valley. Based on hypothesized sizes for administrative districts during the imperial period and given present-day household numbers, these two valleys would have comprised only 9–20% of the population included in a typical jurisdiction overseen by an elite household appointed by the qa'an.[79] In geographical terms, it would take up to 12 times the Egiin Gol-Tarvagatai region to assemble such a territory, showing once again the vast spatial extents involved in the organization of the Empire.

CONCLUSION

Study of the past is a tall order, but by thoughtfully integrating historical sources of information with archaeological data, the distant past is indeed knowable. Decades of archaeological fieldwork and analysis have allowed us to perceive the dim outlines of organization in what was the heartland of the Mongol Empire. Here we present

evidence-based scenarios of mobile qa'ans with their palaces and cities, spacious political districts administered by aristocratic houses, elite funerals as sites of political negotiations and theater, and the local communities whose ways of life transformed under a growing imperial order. In this manner, archaeology allows us to see both the large- and small-scale details of social class, local life, and the intimacies of death during a pivotal period of about two centuries. To restate a previous idea, archaeology is the only way for us to know about the Mongolian imperial period in places like Egiin Gol and the Tarvagatai Valley, whose peoples do not appear in the few historical texts of this time. Even though a great deal more work is required to test and confirm some of the ideas developed by archaeologists, Mongolian scholars working with a growing cohort of international collaborators have already presented us with important new insights into the imperial past.

NOTES

1 Sneath 2007.
2 Di Cosmo 1999.
3 Kradin et al. 2015.
4 Gardner et al., Forthcoming.
5 Shelach-Lavi et al. 2020.
6 Allsen 1994, 325.
7 Konovalov 2017.
8 Rogers 2016, 103; Lee 2009.
9 Perlee 2011, 45.
10 Munkh-Erdene 2011, 230.
11 Shiraishi 2006.
12 Shiraishi 2006, 87.
13 Shiraishi and Tsogtbaatar 2009.
14 Shiraishi 2006, 90–91.
15 Shiraishi and Tsogtbaatar 2009.
16 Tsogtbaatar et al. 2017; Park et al. 2019.
17 Rogers 2017.
18 Tsogtbaatar et al. 2019.
19 Atwood 2015.
20 Honeychurch and Amartuvshin 2007.
21 Erdenebat 2018.
22 Di Cosmo 2015.
23 Burentogtokh et al. 2019, 60.
24 Allsen 1996, 128.
25 Heidemann et al. 2006.
26 Roth and Erdenebat 2002, 30.
27 Pohl et al. 2012.
28 Rubruck 1990, 221.
29 Bemmann et al. 2010, 69–79.
30 Bemmann et al. 2010, 79–84.
31 Waugh 2010, 109.
32 Franken 2015.
33 Hüttel 2009.
34 Pohl et al. 2012; Bemmann et al. 2010, 289–304; Franken et al. 2019, 132.
35 Heussner 2012; Bemmann et al. 2010, 219–267.

36 Ahrens 2020, 157–158.
37 Bemmann et al. 2010, 251–268.
38 Ahrens 2020, 6–7.
39 Bemmann et al. 2015.
40 Ahrens 2020, 152–154.
41 RDB, 62.
42 Kiselev 1965, 180.
43 Moses and Greer 1998, 111.
44 Shiraishi 2004; Atwood 2015.
45 Shiraishi 2004, 110–114.
46 Waugh 2010, 111.
47 Moses and Greer 1998; Shiraishi 2004; Rogers 2017; cf. Bemmann et al. 2015, 112–113.
48 Tkachev 1987.
49 Perlee 1964.
50 Perlee 1964.
51 Erdenebat and Torbat 2011, 19–20.
52 Erdenebat 2009, 102.
53 Burentogtokh et al. 2019.
54 Erdenebat and Torbat 2011, 11–13.
55 Bayar 1995.
56 Erdenebat 2009, 13.
57 Ulziibayar et al. 2007; Torbat et al. 2010.
58 Erdenebat 2009, 118–121.
59 Erdenebat and Torbat 2011; Youn et al. 2007.
60 Lkhagvasuren et al. 2016.
61 L. Rogers, personal communication.
62 Bayarsaikhan 2019.
63 Baiarsaikhan 2009; Oka 2009.
64 Kharinskii et al. 2012; Bayar 1999.
65 Erdenebat 2009, 15.
66 Dong 2018, 166.
67 Batsaikhan 2003, 42; Tumen et al. 2010, 183.
68 Erdenebat 2009, 111–116.
69 Erdenebat 2009, 16–17, 124–127.
70 Ahrens et al. 2015.
71 Erdenebat et al. 1999, 74–76.
72 Di Cosmo 2015.
73 Bold 2001, 45.
74 Gardner et al., Forthcoming.
75 Gardner et al., Forthcoming.
76 Park et al., Forthcoming.
77 Park et al., Forthcoming.
78 Park et al. 2019.
79 Atwood 2014, 27.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

THE ART HISTORY AND MATERIAL CULTURE OF THE YUAN EMPIRE

Shane McCausland

Understanding Yuan art and culture is a function of our contested present. There are tensions, for example, between an international (and largely Anglophone) mode of critical enquiry, and the statist model sanctioned in Communist China. The modern nation-state of China exists in the cultural and historical wake of the Yuan and on some of its geographic footprint. The capital, Beijing, stands on the metropolis of Daidu founded in 1272 by Qubilai Qa'an; and the political super-elite occupy a compound (Zhongnanhai) that even stands on the western part of the site of Qubilai's palace city.[1] Post-Yuan, late-imperial claims to Chinese cultural exceptionalism still pertain and are woven into the party-state's sometimes rancorous claims to power and legitimacy.[2] We are becoming increasingly aware of how what has survived destruction in this ideologically inflected history has been archived and curated by it. This is, however, nothing new. Acts of iconoclasm since the fall of the Yuan in 1368 have included: the disappearance of things foreign, such as Phagspa script, the Yuan phonetic writing system; the effacement of things foreign, such as Mongol royal seals on artworks; and the wilful repositioning of Mongol-Yuan art into nativist contexts – all in the retelling of political myth.

Yuan art's troubled posterity in East Asian history saw the Mongols dubbed by the first modern art historians writing in English as philistines and a 'world scourge'.[3] The British sinologist Arthur Waley (1889–1966) characterised the Yuan as follows: "The Mongols were merely policemen. They did not influence the development of Chinese civilization any more than the officials at the gate of the British Museum [where Waley worked] influence the studies of the gentlemen who work inside".[4] Modern Chinese views scarcely differed: the writer-artist Zheng Wuchang's (1894–1952) "Chart of the Glory and Decline of Painting Genres over the Ages" shows a steep decline over the course of the Yuan in all categories except landscape, which reached an historical zenith.[5] Like Waley, Zheng had in mind the "Four Yuan Masters", four mid-to-late Yuan southern Chinese scholar-painters of landscape,

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Huang Gongwang (1269–1354), Wu Zhen (1280–1354), Ni Zan (1301–1374; Figure 31.1) and Wang Meng (c. 1308–1385), whose art was seen to visually map the social-political decay and final demise of the regime.[6] In critical scholarship, there is now a move to 'decentre' this canon of Yuan painting, which has long fetishised the art of these four scholar-landscapists.[7]

The nature of the Mongol-Yuan, with its period history as a Eurasian rather than a Chinese or East Asian polity, is poorly served by a linear history underscoring Han Chinese consanguinity – that is, in a racialised cultural history unfolding in a single timeline, Marxist or otherwise, from Chinese antiquity up to now and towards a utopian future. Yuan was socially hierarchical, like any empire ancient or modern, but also an ethnic and linguistic potpourri. Traders, warriors, intellectuals and officials moved about widely; artists, artisans and brides did too, often through tribute networks. A pre-eminent example of a non-Chinese in the art world was Qubilai's great architect and art impresario in Daidu (Beijing), Anige (1245–1306), a Nepalese who painted royal portraits and constructed dozens of religious buildings in Daidu, including its highest landmark, the White Stupa of the Miaoying Temple, still standing west of the Forbidden City (Figure 31.2).[8] Chinese-educated, non-Han artists were highly regarded, like the calligraphers Xianyu Shu (c. 1257–1302), a close friend of the great Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322);[9] Guan Yunshi (Uyghur: Xiaoyunshi Haiya; 1286–1324); and Kangli Naonao (1295–1345), a relative by marriage of the southern Chinese scholar-official artist Ren Renfa (1254–1327).[10]

This idea of positioning Yuan in China's dynastic narrative of art history is not to be entirely dismissed, however. It is refreshing to conceive of the value and agency of the Chinese past within a horizontal notion of Yuan as part of the Mongol Empire across Eurasia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For example, the habit of formal referencing to China's past art (through literary and visual allusion in the Yuan context) becomes part of the iconic index of art's social agency and part of art's 'technology of enchantment', that is, one of the ways art could command attention and govern normative behaviours.[11] Future researchers will likely want to assess the impact on longstanding Chinese and East Asian artistic modes of the Yuan empire's rapid expansion and fragmentation and through the complex interdependence of *ulus*es and their control of trade networks.

To consider, overall, the implications for art of the Yuan empire's claim to originality embodied in the dynastic name (Yuan means 'primal' or 'original') promulgated by Qubilai in 1271, we prefer this kind of synchronic or horizontal modelling, which is also in tune with current comparative approaches to understanding the social agency of art.[12]

YUAN ART: BEYOND THE SINICIZATION NARRATIVE

Yuan's status as jewel in the Mongol imperial crown has been seen to justify a Sinocentric approach to Yuan art or to validate Chinese cultural exceptionalism. In recent decades, some exhibitions – often a bellwether of intellectual trends – have promoted the Sinicization narrative: the idea that things which and people who arrive in China turn Chinese due to the innate superiority of the civilization.[13] Since about 2000, other kinds of exhibitions have shown that it is possible to conceive

otherwise and put the Mongol royals centre stage.[14] Yet, positioning the Mongols in the mainstream is still an off-beat practice.

Considering how much and how frequently new evidence has come to light since about 1900, our framework for enquiry ought to be flexible. This ever-surprising stream of material from both transmitted (in collections) and buried (like in hoards and tombs) material culture continues to make us challenge our assumptions. It was only in the mid twentieth century, for instance, that the publication of a pair of temple vases, collected by Sir Percival David (1892–1964), upended the long-held belief that blue-and-white porcelain, known in Europe as china, was a Chinese invention of the early Ming dynasty (1644–1911) (Figure 31.3).[15] Their date of 1351 clearly placed them and the ware in the mid-to-late Yuan. Yuan blue-and-white is now known in Chinese by the term 'Zhizheng ware' after Toghan Temür's reign period, 1341–1370. More recent archaeological finds point towards its origin in around the 1330s as a collaboration between Persian potters familiar with underglaze technique who relocated to Jingdezhen and local Chinese potters who worked with porcelain, all facilitated by the Mongols and their trade networks.[16] In the same vein, discoveries continue to show that Phagspa script was more used and visible than previously thought. It circulated, for example, on paper money as well as on both popular (e.g., Cizhou ware) and deluxe (e.g., Guan ['official'] and Ge ['elder brother']) ceramics, and in popular Chinese encyclopaedias, like *Shilin guangji* (*Forest of Affairs*).[17] Even in elite arts, like Chinese calligraphy, which a Sinocentric view would maintain was immune to foreign 'influence', Yuan art critics freely compared Chinese ideo-pictographic writing with modern and ancient alphabetic scripts of Central and South Asia, including Qubilai's new Phagspa, for which they readily found a place in theoretical and critical texts.[18]

Ongoing discoveries include mural-painted tombs, kiln sites and hoards, but it is also appropriate to celebrate how Yuan artworks continue to emerge within the transmitted record, including scroll paintings. like *Isles of the Blessed* (Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto),[19] *Fascination of Nature* (British Museum; Figure 31.4)[20] and *Episodes from the Career of a Yuan Official* (Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, Kansas City), the last long since misattributed within a Sinocentric order to a Chinese dynastic context.[21] We also celebrate the survival of the remarkable early Yuan stone sculptures at Feilaifeng cliffs opposite the Lingyinsi Temple west of Hangzhou (Figure 31.5), which were allegedly saved from destruction at the hands of Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) through covert intervention from within the state leadership.[22] All of this strengthens the call for revisionist remodelling of Yuan art and a shake-up of its late imperially curated canon centred on the Four Yuan Masters.

SUMPTUARY AND TRADE FRAMEWORK

Sumptuous possessions, spaces and lifestyles were governed by a sumptuary order imposed by the Mongol regime on Yuan society and its material culture, keyed to racial, social and official hierarchies. The sumptuary system is useful for conceptualising (and to a degree distinguishing between) the intrinsic and instrumental values of art in the Mongol-Yuan polity, and hence gauging Mongol attitudes to art, connoisseurs, artists and artisans in the Yuan. The principle was positivist: more was indeed more. Like other sumptuary systems, the Yuan order was based on the natural world, a

concept easily shared in the popular consciousness. Regulated ownership and display of things with intrinsic value turned rare and precious materials like gold and silver into natural symbols of power and status. So, tallies known as *gerege* (*paiza*) used by officials travelling across the Mongol Empire were made of materials ranging from wood to gold, depending on the holder's rank and privileges. European illuminated manuscripts depicting the Polos before Qubilai, for instance, typically show them receiving a gold *gerege*, reinforcing the high official status Marco Polo claims for his family in his writings, where he speaks of interactions with Yuan officialdom and his having availed of high-level state infrastructure.[23]

Enjoying high visibility in Yuan culture, official dress was coded on a scale of quality and symbolic enhancement well known through official rank badges featuring fancy birds, like pheasants and peacocks, and court headwear. This imagery not only circulated in print multiples in court publications, like the royal physician Husihui's *Yinshan zhengyao* (*A Soup for the Qan*) and popularly circulating encyclopaedias like *Forest of Affairs*, but also in auspicious paintings and other reprographic forms like ink rubbings and *kesi* silk tapestries (Figure 31.6).[24] Distinctions were also captured in detail in royal portraiture and genre paintings, such as *Qubilai Qan Hunting* attributed to Liu Guandao (active late thirteenth century), which depicts Qubilai in ermine accompanied by his second principal wife, Chabui (late thirteenth century), and a suite of Eurasian and African huntsmen and guards – diversity here representing his power.[25] Anige's *Portrait of Chabui* (National Palace Museum, Taipei) is a virtual index of the power embodied in royal dress.[26] The production of one of Chabui's *nasij* ('cloth of gold') collar hems alone highlights the extraordinary value placed on such deluxe resources, like complex gold-threaded silks.[27] These were crafted by highly skilled artisans from the eastern Iranian world in China, supported by a system involving industrial-scale coordination and movement of these material and human resources across the empire by captains of craft industries.[28]

The complex logistics of producing the *nasij*, a potent visual symbol and emblem of the Mongol polity in operation, demonstrates how the political nature of the relations between the Mongol khanates allowed for, if it did not also depend on, a mutually beneficial system of trade, diplomacy and tribute. The global brand of blue-and-white porcelain from Jingdezhen in Jiangxi Province came about in the 1330s and 1340s – certainly by 1351, as noted in Figure 31.3. The distribution of ceramic finds across inner and maritime Eurasia maps out the range and extent of the trading system controlled through Mongol networks of trade licencing, capital controls, related infrastructure and policing.[29] The tribute system centred on Daidu afforded a model for equally extensive inter- and intra-regional trade networks and not just for high-status possessions like horses and hounds or luxury consumables like wine, tea and medicine.

Sumptuary appropriation and gifting

The Yuan suffered political, economic and climatic fluctuations like any other polity, but the resilience of its economic system was tested to the breaking point by Mongol internecine rivalries, including among investors and regulators of capital. The system of 'state capture' and power consolidation via control over resources through official, religious, diplomatic and trade networks is one we might recognise

in contemporary Eurasia's crony-capitalist models. Arts and architecture, religious and secular, functioned within a wider sumptuary system keyed to the spatial and temporal world, spanning the built environment, the zoning of land use and seasonal planning controls. Chinese modular practice in architecture, for instance, meant that higher-status buildings, to be larger, had more bays and higher roofs, with more complex tier-and-bracket supporting systems and more elaborate menageries of auspicious animals along the ridge tiles to ward off fire and other disasters.[30]

An example of how this played out in terms of religious art and architecture patronage is the notorious case of the Tangut lay-monk Yang Lianzhenjia (Tib. Rinchenkyap, active 1280s), patron of Feilaifeng and deputy commissioner in the Buddhist Affairs Department posted to Hangzhou (Lin'an) shortly after Qubilai's conquest of south China in 1276–1279. To help resource his high-profile Buddhist temple rebuilding programme in and around Hangzhou, Yang Lianzhenjia successfully petitioned the court to requisition materials from former Southern Song (1127–1279) royal palaces. Reuse of scarce resources, like large timbers for pillars and roof beams, might have been expected, but not his ransacking of the Song imperial tombs outside Hangzhou, from where he extracted buried treasures in addition to defiling the corpses of the Song royals, outraging southern Chinese. One of the royal skulls was later recognised by a guest as part of a Tibetan Buddhist skull-cup during an imperial banquet in the capital. At the time, Yang relied upon his official position to protect him, and Qubilai did indeed turn a blind eye to his abuses.[31]

Seasonal hunting expeditions on extensive royal reserves, annual court and state festivals and *quriltai* political summits, all of which involved sumptuous feasting and banqueting, were prime occasions for the display of luxus material culture, for example, in that courtiers wore seasonal ranked attire for different court sessions. When qa'ans issued summons to men they wished to retain in their service, they commonly sent messengers bearing inducements, including the right robes for an audience or for court feasting once they arrived in Daidu. The second scene in the biopic tribute to a meritorious officer, *Episodes from the Career of a Yuan Official*, probably a mid- or late Yuan painting, shows the protagonist donning his court robes outside the Chongtianmen palace gate (the south entrance of the former Forbidden City, from Tian'anmen Square), having discarded his civilian mufti outside the sovereign's entry at the centre of the suite of five gates. Future research may yet show that other areas of life were subject to sumptuary-type controls, including in the use of languages like Phagspa in official contexts.

Sumptuary symbols

The Yuan was a high point of descriptive representation of flora and fauna in the arts, from painting to jade carving. The Mongolian acme of Chinese luxury was the lotus garden with water birds and fish. The actual water gardens liberally appointed across palace precincts are lost, but such scenes appear widely in some of the technically proficient and aesthetically polished artistic productions of the period, including in intricate three-dimensional small carvings in jade used as court hat finials. These scenes were also a subject specialism of painting masters of the Piling School of south China, many of which are preserved in Japan.[32] Such auspicious, aspirational imagery was also widely seen to be used in official and Mongolian interiors and

on furnishings, as in illustrations in *Forest of Affairs*.[33] In *A Soup for the Qan*, a pregnant palace woman is being shown paintings of a peacock and a carp, and jade and pearls, which are all said in the captions to be 'beneficial' for her fertility and aspirations for her progeny founded upon a desire to beget rank and status.[34]

Tombs are a useful indicator of how consumption patterns related to sumptuary frameworks rippled out into provincial art production methods. Likely made by an itinerant workshop, the murals in a 1309 tomb in Shanxi, north China, explored further later in this chapter, demonstrate how a local gentry family aspired to maintain the status of the deceased in the afterlife, echoing that enjoyed in this world, as far as their means and current status allowed. The paintings celebrate current familial rank and status, with images of horses and attentive servants set within a large domestic precinct.[35] In the applied arts, from around the 1340s, images of related fauna, such as decorative fish, peacocks and golden pheasants, became a mainstay of the decorative repertoire on blue-and-white porcelain.

The implications of Mongol sumptuary laws for Yuan art

The framework of Yuan sumptuary laws has long been held apart from the history of Chinese painting, which has typically been the lofty preserve of the scholar or literati class. However, blurring this boundary could afford new insights into Yuan art. In reality, neither the sumptuary framework nor traditional Chinese hierarchies of value were standard, stable or consistent. Value in the arts was something constantly negotiated: it fluctuated like the currency with changing policies and reigns, despite the efforts of some Chinese or sinophile cultural leaders to foreground the timelessness of cultural and political values and popular symbols. Rice and silk, symbolically China's staple food and luxury clothing, were traditional Chinese markers of value (like the modern 'gold standard'), but debates at court in Daidu over policies to counter currency inflation were troubled by how even these commodities could be benchmarked as holders of value. The Mongols highly valued technical skill and hence the skilled artisans who created and thereby supported the visual, material and architectural order of the state. But common skills of economic value were also promoted. The production of albums called *Pictures of Tilling and Weaving* illustrated the technical advances of China's rice and silk production but also explained the value of them to pastoralist Mongols while also signalling the Mongol royals' acquiescence in traditional Chinese emperor and empress roles as first farmer and first weaver, respectively.[36]

There are cases where Chinese literati expression found form and traction, or agency, through reference to the sumptuary framework. Immersed through long education in China's venerable tradition of ethical statecraft, Chinese scholar-officials seem to have accepted being valued equally, if not more, for their technical skills, as in the case of two prominent southern Chinese, whose accomplishments in equestrian painting speak clearly to the Yuan moment. Ren Renfa specialised in painting horses and was also an expert hydrographer.[37] A debonair courtier and favourite of Qubilai Qa'an, Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322) was the leading and most prolific and versatile calligrapher of his age, an economist, poet, musician, painter in multiple genres and connoisseur, as well as being husband of the most celebrated female painter of the era, Guan Daosheng (1262–1319) and a follower of the most

charismatic Chan Buddhist monk of the era, Zhongfeng Mingben (1262–1323).[38] Zhao Mengfu's painting *Equestrian* (Palace Museum, Beijing) is a portrait of an official (possibly of his brother) processing into his post mounted on a well-groomed cob.[39] Values and status are naturalistically figured in the material culture. He rides a stallion and wears a long red official robe. As to his human quality, he wears a measured expression signalling his judicial, sanguine disposition; he has experience and skill in command and control of the animal; he has the look of an unflappable leader who serves the population with integrity. Another similar work by Zhao Mengfu is entitled *Horse and Groom* (Figure 31.7).[40]

MONGOL ART PATRONAGE AND ITS ENDS

If the Mongols, *pace* Waley, were more than just policemen, then normal questions about patronage arise concerning their strategies, networks and stand-out individuals. Some questions are more straightforward, like which of the Yuan Mongol royals were notable art patrons, what art and artists did they patronise and to what strategic ends? Were they recognised at the time as collectors and connoisseurs? Other times, imperial patronage may be present but is harder to confirm without textual corroboration, e.g., at the Yonglegong Daoist temple complex, or where tribute and the allocation of state resources is concerned.

Either way, it may be helpful to conceive of Mongol art patronage in terms of a web of interconnected interests that art and material culture could embody. A Korean Buddhist *sutra* box in the British Museum, likely made to be sent as tribute to the Yuan capital, serves as an example.[41] Of a kind demanded by Chabui, the mother-of-pearl inlaid box can be seen as enforcing and enacting sumptuary laws and tribute relationships, embodying the suzerain/vassal state dynamic between Yuan and the Koryo kingdom. Presumably it arrived in Daidu filled with transcriptions (or prints) of sutras in scrolls, a creative act that ensured the cultural investment of the court, religious and intellectual elites of Korea as calligraphers and patrons, but which also accrued Buddhist merit to the various constituents, principally the Mongol overlords as recipients.

The geography and seasons of art patronage

From a Chinese perspective, Daidu functioned as the political centre of the Yuan empire. Yet, Daidu also served to exemplify and elaborate Mongol cultural hegemony. In Qubilai's reign, for example, he planned, built and developed the city from the 1260s to 1290s in an ancient Chinese grid design but sited it on the borderland between the agrarian north China plain and the steppe homeland of his nomad-pastoralist hunter-warrior confederacy and used it except in summer when the court decamped to Shangdu (Xanadu, or Upper Capital), north of the Great Wall. Here was Mongol appropriation of sedentary Chinese modes and conventions: the ancient walled city with its grid plan of waterways and wards, and pillar-and-bracket architecture (*dougong*). Spatially, temporally and culturally, Daidu both incorporated China into the Yuan and the Mongols into China. The Mongols had their tented encampments in grassy steppe-landscaped reserves in the palace grounds, hunting reserves and studs near and far, and a seasonal festival calendar, which, as noted, powered cultural and other industries in its compendious

demands for feasting robes, fine consumables and accoutrements, from Qubilai's 'Great Dushan basin' (presumably for *koumiss* at feasts) to Tantric-Buddhist skull cups for drinking wine.

The peripatetic Yuan court was both a micro- and macrocosm of the Mongol Empire and its culture networks. At court there were multiple categories of people from all over the known world involved in the arts throughout the ranks of officialdom and society, on a more or less tightly regulated basis. The more independent-minded statesmen and scholar-official artists and connoisseurs (Zhao Mengfu; Li Kan, 1245–1320; Ren Renfa; Ke Jiusi, 1290–1343) seemingly painted or appraised at their own pleasure, but on occasion produced calligraphic texts for steles or congratulatory paintings (e.g., Zhao Mengfu's *Watering Horses in Autumn Fields*).[42] Court artists, known by courtesy as 'scholar-painters', included He Cheng (1224–after 1315), Shang Qi (d. 1324) and Wang Zhenpeng (active 1280–1329).[43] Wang, along with the calligrapher-connoisseurs Feng Zizhen (1257–1327) and Zhao Yan (active c. 1300–1325), served the 'grand elder princess' Shanga Lagyi (or Sengge Ragi; Xiangge Laji, c. 1283–1331).[44] A gamut of rank-holding artists and artisans of different ethnicities, headed by the Nepalese impresario Araniko (Ch. Anige, 1245–1306) in Qubilai's time, decorated palaces, temples and tombs. The mobility of art and artists within this patronage network and their access to resources was an echo of the movement of people and things regulated through the bureaucratic system.

Cosmopolitan urban centres clearly enjoyed the benefits of intra- and inter-regional networks. Hangzhou, possibly the largest city in the world at the time and the largest in China, enjoyed a status as the former Southern Song capital and sat in China's cultural heartland. State and private Buddhist patronage were pronounced here, although only a fraction of the material culture survives, such as the Feilaifeng sculptures (Figure 31.5).[45] Major port cities included Quanzhou in the southeast (Marco Polo's Zayton), which was a littoral trade entrepot, very mixed in social, ethnic and religious terms as its extant Yuan shrines and religious sites, and archaeological finds including a magnificent late thirteenth-century stone statue of Vishnu, now in the Quanzhou Maritime Museum, show.[46]

More remote strategic and regional sites were also foci for official patronage, in the form of monuments; temples; cultural and state installations, such as the Yonglegong temple complex, and installations on the sacred peaks. A much-restored ruin, the Guanxingtai (Star-gazing Platform) state observatory built in 1276 by Guo Shoujing (1231–1316) is in a tolerably remote site near Shaolin Temple in Henan Province.[47] We may consider how patronage enhanced and enriched such sites, particularly the more strategic ones, like the imperially sponsored Cloud Terrace (Yuntai) border post at Juyongguan pass on the Great Wall, just north of Beijing/Daidu, which features Tibetan Buddhist imagery. Built in the mid-1340s, the Cloud Terrace was a massive arched platform that once bore three stupas. The interior of the arch is remarkably well preserved. Relief sculptures in stone depict the four guardian kings at each corner (Figure 31.8).[48] Between these are inscriptions in no fewer than eight South, Central and East Asian languages – invocations of protection and blessings that would accrue Tantric Buddhist karmic merit to the benefactors but which also facilitated the exercise of social and mercantile control. At another corner of the empire at Dunhuang, gateway to Central Asia, the stele of Sulaiman, Prince of Xining (d. 1351), dated 1348, follows a similar multi-lingual format.

Patrons

As to art patrons, extant visual and material culture indicates that the question should not be, exceptionally, 'Which Mongols were involved?' since most were, but rather about how their strategies differed and changed. Sometimes these patronage initiatives are made obvious, as in the case of imperial donor-portraits set within Buddhist textile-images.[49] Other events are well recorded, like Qubilai's securing as war booty the Southern Song imperial painting and calligraphy collection, which he had exhibited in the palace in Daidu in 1276. These works would become a resource at court for artists like Wang Zhenpeng and others, but we know too little about how knowledge of this art heritage subsequently rippled out into the wider Mongol Empire, pictorially or otherwise. At least we have a select list: the pick of the works of calligraphy and painting was hastily recorded on arrival by the statesman Wang Yun (1227–1304) in *Shuhua mulu* (Catalogue of Calligraphy and Painting).[50]

Despite the likelihood of cultural and intellectual exchanges between khanates having been as extensive as the systems of tribute and trade, our knowledge of how patronage operated here is patchy. Within this overarching economy, luxury was highly valued – but much research needs to be done to trace flows.[51] For instance, the early fourteenth-century Ilkhanid publications of Rashid al-Din (1247–1318) in Tabriz on medicine (*Tanksuknama*) and history (*Jami' al-Tavarikh* or Compendium of Chronicles) drew upon imagery sourced from China and elsewhere, including medical diagrams and portraits of China's past emperors.[52] Thanks to Wang Yun's 1276 catalogue, we know that the Yuan palace held – and likely provided in some form – authoritative sources for images of China's rulers, such as the *The Thirteen Emperors* (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) attributed to the early Tang (618–907) master Yan Liben (c. 600–673).[53]

The art of Zhao Mengfu and his network illustrates how tricky it is to map the complex and intersecting interests of patrons and elites. Court agendas were certainly afforded by and distributed through programmatic art initiatives (the distribution of sanctioned models of calligraphy, for example), establishing their material presence and visibility across the empire and complementing the visual presentation in the built environment of official construction and restoration projects, such as at temples and civic buildings.[54] The erection of hundreds of collaboratively produced calligraphic steles at these sites recording and commemorating these building projects shows the degree to which prominent and local litterateurs, many of whom were even presumptive Song loyalists, were engaged in such Mongol and/or officially sponsored civic projects, and probably relied on them for their living, networks and status.

Changing ends of patronage

Mongol rulers became ever more adept at instrumentalising Chinese art practices over the course of the dynasty to the extent that Shanga Lagyi became one of the most influential collectors and patrons of Chinese painting in the Yuan. As sister to two qa'ans (Qaishan and Ayurbarwada) and aunt and mother-in-law to another (Toq-Temür), she was evidently free to indulge her passion for Chinese art as she chose. Her famous 'elegant gathering' (*yaji*) of spring 1323 was a new model of a Mongolian feast in Daidu, being staged at a Buddhist temple to mark the springtime

Purification Festival. The timing was not coincidental, being almost a millennium after a foundational event in Chinese cultural history, the Orchid Pavilion Gathering held near Shaoxing in 353, at which the host, China's 'sage of calligraphy' Wang Xizhi (303–365) produced his masterpiece *Preface to the Orchid Pavilion Collection* (known only in copies). The 1323 banquet was the subject of an innovative exhibition in Taipei, which reconstructed the events of the party, including the princess's invitation to certain of her Mongol, Central Asian and Chinese guests to inscribe eulogies on famous scrolls of painting and calligraphy in her collection.[55] After the wine, she had these scrolls expressly unrolled, including the Northern Song (960–1127) calligrapher Huang Tianjian's (1045–1105) late work, *Pine Wind Pavilion Poem*.[56] This new formula for Mongol art patronage in the 1320s moved far beyond Yang Lianzhenjia's triumphalist public activities in Hangzhou, in that the princess engaged a racial mix of (male) political-cultural leaders even as she expropriated core southern Chinese culture in the Mongol north.

Such activities paved the way for later Mongol qans to aspire to elevate Chinese elite art and culture to an even higher and more central position in court and government. A most explicit mid-Yuan use of high art for political purposes was the creation by Toq-Temür (Wenzong; r. 1328–1332) of the Pavilion of the Stars of Literature (Kuizhangge), a short-lived academy or cabinet form of government which met and viewed Chinese old master artworks. One meeting is recorded in a group viewing colophon to Zhao Gan's (tenth century) masterpiece *Going Upriver in Early Snow*.[57] By the end of the Yuan, the Mongol royal males and courtiers were deeply invested in and freely appropriated Chinese elite art culture, as demonstrated by their command of the Chinese calligraphic canon and of the scroll medium as a format. The commemoration of exemplary figures in art or the honouring of meritorious dead, as in *Episodes from the Career*, for example, must be seen as an appropriate Sino-Mongol cultural response to events. But puzzles remain in the material and historiographic record: why the rapid unravelling of the Yuan polity after the 1330s, in spite of the vaunted benefits of Sinic culture to the Mongol regime? How far can multi-lingual patronage initiatives (e.g. at Cloud Terrace and the stele of Prince Sulaiman) be taken as evidence of coordinated intercultural policymaking?

RHETORICAL AND SYMBOLIC MODES OF ART

Racial, official and social hierarchies, the tribute system and sumptuary laws governed the possession and display of things with intrinsic value, like gold thread or silk garments, or commodities like rare animals. However, the Yuan economy also made innovative use of symbolic value, e.g., bills of money in the form of recycled paper, which could also state their value in words and picture it in printed images of strings of cash – and still retain that 'empty' value on trust (albeit, subject to inflation). By the same principle, pictorial images could contain the symbolic value of their contents – in ways likely also governed by the sumptuary order, which carried over into the visual order generating some of the 'enchantment' of art.

As seen in *A Soup for the Qan*, a picture of a peacock or a carp effectively was a peacock or a carp.[58] The Mongol love of consummate technical ability and sheer artistic quality certainly afforded and enhanced transparent and unmediated readings of these images as the things they represented. Sometimes the symbolism or iconography (what

a depicted form represents) could be generalised and flexible, as seen in commercial art ventures or art for official or public spaces. All over Mongol material culture, including into Western Asia, dragons, for example, represented emperors and/or merely awesome but beneficent rain-bringing beasts. Sometimes, however, figuring out iconography can be complex where history has intervened.[59] Meanwhile, the descriptive technologies and expressive modes and styles used to shape artistic form, or iconology, are equally compelling forces of visual rhetoric. We consider questions in this section about these modes, about how form and message were aligned in both promotional art, e.g., in policy, propaganda and apologia, and in expressions of resistance and dissent.

Mongol visuality

We have noted how the Mongol-influenced visuality of the Yuan embraced powerfully masculine, bold and rich topics. The forms of much of Yuan material culture is accordingly loud, confident, extrovert. The contrast with effete Southern Song aesthetics is stark. Confident Yuan aesthetics in ceramics are exemplified by the forms of northern China's kilns of mass production, such as Cizhou wares. Southern China's Longquan wares and, eventually from the 1340s, Jingdezhen's blue-and-white also purveyed large and chunky, robust designs – objects with durability and strength but also natural elegance matching their functionality. The décor matched these full-bodied, often large press-molded forms. Shallow relief was sometimes favoured to create textured surface designs, echoing the richly woven silk fabrics of luxus clothing and the relief effects in stone sculptures and fine lacquers. Other art media, like murals in large temples (e.g. Yonglegong and others transported to North American museums in the twentieth century), bear out these qualities – in the depiction of material culture (e.g. furniture and ritual objects) within these images too.

Visual sources do show limits to Mongol indulgence. A dietary manual, *A Soup for the Qan* was an attempt to persuade the Mongol royals, particularly the males, who are sometimes depicted vomiting, to curb their appetites by adopting healthier lifestyles where alcohol and rich food is concerned. It does this through a form of genre-painting flattery. Evidently, such was the wealth and power of the court that quantities of exotic tribute were flooding in from far afield. The centrality of Central Asian cuisine in the recipes for the consumables must also be realistic as well as underscoring the value of the culture of the lead author, the *semu* court physician Husihui. Through *pictures* as well as text, the manual informs its readers, giving itself authority, and warns against excessive consumption while exhorting its readers to moderate and optimise their lifestyles. Meanwhile, the fall from grace of Anige exemplifies how there were limits to artistic virtuosity. He faded away and died not long after a commissioned suite of sexually explicit Tantric Buddhist sculptures went on display and drew stinging criticism from a senior female Mongol royal.[60]

Let us consider some prime examples of Yuan court painting. Some of these works are genre scenes, like *Qubilai Qan Hunting*, which embodies and reflects imperial majesty. Others are typically in elite modes of religious art, such as the long handscroll *Isles of the Blessed* by a Daoist cleric in Qubilai's service, Puguang (active 1286–1309). Ebullient and full of moxie, it is born of observation of climatic nature, a visually compelling depiction of stormy rainclouds over raging seas around the magical islands of the immortals. Skeins of lines convey the heaving quality of

waves rolling and crashing onto shores and rocks; and above, mottled wash-patterns of lowering storm clouds are seen thunderously roiling low over the earth's surface.

A superb mid-Yuan court painting is Wang Zhenpeng's *Boya Playing the Qin* (Palace Museum, Beijing).[61] A marriage of a Confucian Chinese past and a Mongol-Yuan present, it illustrates the Mongol royal family's foray into the psychology of cultural appropriation and subject positioning – led by the princess Shanga Lagyi. Exemplifying court realism, *Boya Playing the Qin* is an intense viewing experience that almost overwhelms the senses: in particular through evocation of the sound of music and the scent of incense, evoked through the eye with sumptuous ink-outline technique. With an extraordinary economy of means, the artist manages also to conjure up the haptic qualities of figures' clothing and their corporeal presence, mapping the fall of the drapery over the surfaces of the bodies by outline depiction of seams and stitching, corporeal profile and silhouette. He uses highly modulated linear effects calibrated to expand the range and depths of visual information encoded in the outline network far beyond defining texture and mapping out space within the image. The brand of realism practised by the consummate draftsman Wang Zhenpeng some 600 years ago still comes across to the modern eye as a superlative example of how to conjure a virtual presence in figural art. The technique functions here to complement the point implied by the painting's subject, namely, that the Mongols can appreciate and would assure the posterity of Chinese culture, after the demise of the native Song (symbolized by the death of Boya's audience of one, Zhong Ziqi).

The realism in court and related art was often related to the Mongol seasonal cycle of events and festivals. A string of paintings all attributed to Wang Zhenpeng record the annual dragon-boat races of early summer.[62] Wang's painting of *Vimalakirti and the Doctrine of Non-Duality* of 1308 (Metropolitan Museum, New York) shows the encounter between the wealthy Buddhist layman Vimalakirti with the Buddha's envoy, Manjushri, but it also echoes accounts of dramatic debates at court between representatives of religions and sects.[63] Paintings like *Treaty at Bian Bridge* by Chen Jizhi (Palace Museum, Beijing), dated to 1320, celebrated complex and highly skilled cavalry exercises and their diplomatic deployment on parade, the complexity of these evolutions being matched to the finely wrought linear brush-mode employed in the painting.[64] Seasonal hunting expeditions were another way Mongol military skills, including equestrianism and mounted archery, especially the Parthian shot, were honed – and this was how Mongols were popularly imagined, e.g., in *Forest of Affairs*.

New evidence demonstrates how this concern with virtual presence realizing status and culture through iconographic symbolism crossed social and ethnic strata, to the extent that it was almost a universal. It was prevalent in northern provinces in the practice of funerary art ateliers, as seen in the tomb of a Shanxi gentry couple dated to 1309.[65] The murals on the octagonal walls of the main chamber map onto the domed architectural surface of the burial space (depicting a tiered bracketing system to support the roof) but also provide visual windows onto a suite of real exterior spaces beyond the superficial confines of the central hall/tomb walls. The suite of paintings on the octagonal walls represents the deceased flanked by their sons and a Buddhist priest, but there are also panels showing the material finery symbolic of their social status, including a pair of fine caparisoned horses, teams of attendants at work serving luxury consumables and ponds and plantings in landscaped domestic gardens. These status objects in real spaces alternate with depictions of wall scroll paintings of

Confucian filial piety scenes that actually appear to hang on the tomb walls in iconic presence. The 'exterior' spaces outside the burial chamber are brilliantly conjoined with the interior through the specific focus on the liminal connections: framed doorways with attendants shown entering to serve or looking in through windows, dissolving the pictorial surface. This configuration of framing devices therefore works against the material reality of the pictorial surfaces to enhance the virtual reality of the whole schema. The effect in this case is to enact and realise the equivalence of what is depicted for the benefit of the deceased in their afterlife.

Narrative and drama

Besides a lusty, haptic realism, another significant artistic mode in Yuan visual culture relates to the development of text–image relations seen across visual culture in painting and print, decorative arts and narrative and drama. The value Mongols placed on narrative modes and drama in visual culture should be related to the historical high tide of drama in this period. Print publishing was widely supported by the Mongols in the Yuan, especially in the mid-Yuan (around the 1320s) and within this, narrative-illustrational formats, such as *pinghua* (plain speech) books, illustrating stories and dramas, were widely disseminated. Typically, a 'landscape'-shaped illustration straddled the top third of a page, with text of the narrative appearing below. The connection between these printed images and the burgeoning global ceramic industry centred on Jingdezhen is further evidence of Mongol cultural policy, as evident from a scene depicting 'Guigu Descending from the Mountain' on a Yuan blue-and-white jar that has been traced to a *pinghua* illustration.[66] The format of such dramatic scenes on fourteenth-century blue-and-white points to such text sources, even if these cannot always be identified precisely, but the strength of this connection is underscored by the appearance of drama scenes also on biscuit- and glaze-decorated Longquan wares from Zhejiang Province too, wares that were likely distributed through the same networks as blue-and-white.

Under the Mongols, narrative aesthetics had been spreading across media, regional and class boundaries since the thirteenth century. The illustration of popular tales in this horizontal rectangular format was quite common on middle-brow ceramics produced in northern China in the Jin-early Mongol period (thirteenth century), such as Cizhou-ware pillows.[67] In future, understanding the evolution of Mongol taste in China needs to take these intermediary practices of the pre-Yuan era into account. Taking a wide view of Yuan art and culture, there is an obvious trend over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries whereby pictorial scenes, typically from literary formats like *pinghua* and popular painting, come to cover the surfaces of fine objects of material culture, demonstrating the growing status of three-dimensional art media like ceramics and lacquers, likely echoing a social redistribution of wealth and literacy. What did not follow was the elaborate poetics and intertextuality of word and image seen in scholar and court scroll art – but some text did appear.

Whether in drama illustration or more elite forms, narrative also became the mode enabling Yuan discourse through culture on a *topical* variety of social and political issues and themes, from humanism (ethics and education) to the management of human resources and talent (talent-spotting, promotion, through birth, merit and/or connections) to social justice and official corruption. Some examples will serve to

illustrate the prevalence and elaboration of these themes. Narrative modes had long been employed in China to illustrate Confucian ethics of familial service and duty, typically through a mode of admonition. (Conventionally, such Confucian filial piety scenes had long been painted on the walls of tombs in China, e.g., the 1309 tomb.) It also appears in scrolls such as a sophisticated text-and-image rendition in a handscroll painting of about 1330 in the National Palace Museum in Taiwan, entitled *Four Examples of Filial Piety* (*Si xiao tu*).[68] It features a monoscenic format employing a 'conflated narrative' mode where multiple events in time share a single pictorial scene. This painting may have been commissioned by an individual for use in seeking an official position.

A tangential auto- or biographical narrative mode enabled the elaboration of exemplary conduct in state-sponsored eulogistic and subjective lyric formats. *Episodes from the Career of a Yuan Official* is likely a mid- or late-Yuan royal commission assembled to commemorate the career achievements of a meritorious official.[69] It has a royal inscription frontispiece (reading *dugong*), penned, perhaps as crown prince, by Ayushiridara (r. 1371–1378), but certainly on Yuan palace stationery office paper.[70]

To see how text–image dynamics inflected the whole of Yuan culture, *Episodes* can be compared with a former Song royal's pictorial autobiography in the form of a historical masquerade. Zhao Cangyun's (active late thirteenth century) *Liu Chen and Ruan Zhao Entering the Tiantai Mountains* (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York) follows a pattern in elite Chinese culture in reaction to the Mongol consolidation of the Yuan by around 1300.[71] Yang Lianzhenjia's ransacking of the Song imperial tombs in the 1280s had outraged southern Chinese gentry. Their emotive reactions in art and literature were shaped through references and allusions to activities such as herb gathering (i.e. collecting the scattered human remains of the Song royals) and Wang Xizhi's Orchid Pavilion gathering of 353, which took place nearby. In this Song loyalist painting, the artist instrumentalised an ancient fairytale about two men out gathering herbs who discover a paradise world hidden in the mountains. They later return home to discover their own time long gone but are unable to find the entrance back into the paradise world, a trope for the artist's forlorn situation as a Song royal in a Mongol world. Both these biographic-type picture scrolls initiated by royals adopted the same elite picture-scroll format with captions of floating text in the scenes, but for diverging aims: to lament a lost dynasty and to eulogise a late exemplary official.

Selfhood and surface

A key development in scroll-painting culture is a new Yuan-style literary and textual framing of scroll paintings. In art history, we tend to assume the primacy of a centre-to-periphery model whereby court art agendas rippled outwards, shaping dynastic culture. In the latter half of the thirteenth century, an extended mode of narrative painting was likely already current in the picture-scroll format at court, with the text or without it, as seen in He Cheng's magisterial version of the well-known subject, *Returning Home* (Jilin Provincial Museum), painted in old age. The centre-to-periphery model is complicated, however, by the fact that some early Yuan southern Chinese elite painting also adopted this mode, albeit with more self-consciously lyric iconology. Qian Xuan (c. 1235–before 1307), reputedly the teacher of Zhao Mengfu, was a scholar-artist turned professional active in the post-conquest Hangzhou region who painted scenes in a stylized, almost

hieratic, revivalist mode.[72] In contrast with the conservative narrative-type format used by He Cheng and other Yuan court and professional painters,[73] Qian pioneered the juxtaposition of text, placing his poetic inscription adjacent to the painting but symbiotic with it within the pictorial image frame. What started in Qian's painting as a juxtaposition of text and image was quickly developed into wider use in elite painting, including in figural and nature works in scholar-official painting.[74]

The socially mixed world of art collecting in the early Yuan, with Zhao Mengfu at its centre, is vividly captured in the records of southern Chinese connoisseur and dealer Zhou Mi (1232–1298).[75] Yet, as a former Song princeling, Zhao Mengfu was savagely criticised by Song loyalists like Zheng Sixiao (1241–1318) for agreeing to serve in Qubilai's government from the later 1280s. In 1306, Zheng Sixiao offered a bitter lament on Mongol dominion in a short handscroll, *Orchid* (Osaka City Museum of Fine Arts), couched in lyrical language with allusions to China's literary classics.[76] The innovative interplay of text and image in *Orchid*, however, was strikingly similar to Zhao Mengfu's own text–image interventions – see his *Sheep and Goat* (Freer Gallery).[77] Works by other, older Song loyalists, like Gong Kai (1222–1307), offered critiques of the status quo through grotesquery, as in *Zhongshan Going on an Excursion* (Freer Gallery),[78] and more mainstream subjects, like his *Emaciated Horse* (Osaka City Museum of Fine Arts), an equine image alluded to but reframed in works like Ren Renfa's *Fat and Lean Horses* (Palace Museum, Beijing).[79] Such works relate to themes of social justice evident in the broader culture in, for example, famous Yuan dramas, like 'Snow in Midsummer', but also the luxury material culture associated with provincial literate society, such as blue-and-white, which was known as *qingbai* (pure and white).

Among these broader elite concerns with selfhood, subjects like fine horses symbolised men of talent who could excel in public service. While Mongols were generally less concerned than their Chinese subjects with the ethical dimensions of horse cultures, industries and imagery, still Chinese-educated scholar-artists knowingly shaped their horse imagery in painting through the mediating lens of a Chinese tradition of equine lore, including the role of legendary judges of horses/talent, Bole and Jiufang Gao.[80] So, Ren Renfa's *Fat and Lean Horses* (Palace Museum, Beijing), with its long artist's inscription, raised tough questions about the ethical conduct of officials – a theme also darkly mooted in images of carnivorous insects and reptiles.[81] In an obvious play towards steppe culture, Zhao Mengfu painted the animals in his figural chef d'oeuvre, *Sheep and Goat* of about 1310, for a change, in lieu of horses – thereby merging Mongol and Chinese cultures in a Yuan composite. He reworked this theme in *Watering Horses in Autumnal Suburbs* (Palace Museum, Beijing) of 1312, painted to celebrate the sinophile Ayurbarwada/Renzong's (r. 1311–1320) ascent to the throne.[82] His depiction of foals being raised on a Yuan state reserve symbolically presages the restitution under Ayurbarwada of the Chinese civil service examination system for government recruitment, a policy shift widely acclaimed by the Chinese scholar class. The inscription prominently relates the painting to Ayurbarwada's ascent, a new mode in scholar-official painting.

Critics in late-imperial China canonised the consciously constrained modes of late Yuan southern Chinese scholar-artists and the elevated groups like the Four Yuan Masters. Yet, the spectrum of Chinese scholar-painting is more colourful and shows that many practices were invested in the mid-late Yuan court and its art discourse, epitomised by the activities of Ke Jiusi and the Kuizhangge, and by the art

of Zhao Mengfu's son Yong (1289–c. 1360) and grandson Lin (active mid-late fourteenth century), who also painted horses 'in praise of government'.[83]

SUMMARY

Stepping back to see the impact of Mongol cultural interests on the *longue durée* history of art, one of the grand narratives, borrowed from European art history, is articulating the growing sophistication, over the course of China's dynastic period, in the rendering of realistic spatial recession through the command of a fully unified ground plane – that is, creating a convincing three-dimensional space in a two-dimensional image. Yuan old-master painting around 1300 was seen to provide a summation of this in the 'level-distance' (*pingyuan*) mode of spatial depth.[84] In this historical model, artists in each generation are seen to have improved technically but with little regard to the social agency of the artworks in their own time. Now, researchers need to examine the friction at the interface between said linear development and the Yuan contextual moment.

We remarked also on legibility and transparency, both salient characteristics of Yuan art and qualities geared to facilitate the apparently direct and unhindered communication – from the Yuan artwork to the observer – of the actual presence of what is represented and its symbolic or implied values. There evidently was a high symbolic value placed on easy transference and understanding, overcoming the multiplicity of Yuan society (in ethnicities, languages, cultures). The calligraphy of Zhao Mengfu, as the most influential Chinese calligrapher of the period and the one whose handwriting was widely adopted in print publishing, is, in terms of Chinese calligraphic history, highly legible and attractive to the eye, with its qualities of naturalness and fluidity, which match also his prose and rhetorical styles. This fluidity and transference was seen across shared modes of visual discourse, from symbolic images (horses, bamboo) to production techniques and qualities of luxury and status – as with the *nasij* – to text–image innovations. Arguably it enabled the substance of a synthetic Yuan culture whereby Chinese modes and images, like the orchid, insects, bamboo or horses, were engaged across the social spectrum to interrogate, praise or represent the polity.

A comprehensive understanding of the regional position of Yuan art and material culture within East Asian, Eurasian and/or global networks is a worthy aspiration. But to achieve this, at present, the demands on the individual researcher are near impossible, given the number of languages required, as well as the critical facility with multiple Eurasian art histories.[85] We can, however, approach this understanding, as essayed here, through careful disciplinary framing, through thematic exploration, including of sumptuary laws and patronage, and through sharpening analytical methods in art and material culture (especially visuality).

Formal and visual evidence is to be found all over the material record and, in our new digital age, these objects are sources of history as much as any texts, challenging the historian to enrich her capability in source criticism. The coming generations of researchers are digital natives and less inclined to see a source, by default, as a text or to regard inscribed objects merely as bearers of text. The architecture, art and material culture of the Mongol-Yuan empire are rich sources and ones that challenge us to do them justice by developing suitably dynamic modes of visual and cultural critique, as well as methodological flexibility and skill.

Figure 31.1 Ni Zan (Chinese, 1306–1374), *Woods and Valleys of Mount Yu*, dated 1372. Hanging scroll; ink and colours on paper, 94.6 x 35.9 cm.
Source: Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (1973.120.8, ex collection C. C. Wang Family, Gift of The Dillon Fund, 1973).



Figure 31.2 White Stupa (Baita) of the Miaoying Temple (Miaoyingsi), west of the Forbidden City, Beijing. Late thirteenth century.
Source: Photograph by the author, 2005.

Figure 31.3 Pair of blue-and-white altar vases ('the David vases'), dated 1351. Underglaze-decorated porcelain, h. 63.8 cm. Made at Jingdezhen, Jiangxi Province, China. Sir Percival David Foundation of Chinese Art (B613, B614), on loan to the British Museum.
Source: © Trustees of the British Museum.

Figure 31.4 Xie Chufang, *Fascination of Nature*, dated 1321. Handscroll; ink and colours on silk, 27.8 x 352.9 cm. The British Museum (1998,1112,0.1,CH).
Source: © Trustees of the British Museum.

Figure 31.5 Feilaifeng cliff sculptures, west of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province. Late thirteenth century.
Source: Photograph by the author, 2012.

Figure 31.6 Vajrabhairava mandala, featuring portraits of the patrons, the khan Tuq Temür and his elder brother (bottom left) and their wives (bottom right), about 1330–1332. Woven silk textile, kesi, 245.5 x 209 cm.
Source: Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (1992.54; Purchase, Lila Acheson Wallace Gift, 1992).

Figure 31.7 Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322), *Horse and Groom*, dated 1296. Detail of a handscroll; ink and colours on paper, 30.2 x 178.1 cm.
Source: Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (1988.135; Gift of John M. Crawford Jr., 1988).

Figure 31.8 Relief sculpture in stone of a guardian king. Detail from the interior arch of the Cloud Terrace (Yuntai) at Juyongguan Pass on the Great Wall, north of Beijing. Yuan dynasty, early to mid-1340s.
Source: Photograph by the author, 2011.

NOTES

1 Chen 2015.
2 Elliott 2009.
3 Fenollosa 1912, 2: 53.
4 Waley 1923, 237.
5 Zheng 1929, Appendices, 16.
6 Ni Zan (Chinese, 1306–1374), *Woods and Valleys of Mount Yu*, dated 1372. Hanging scroll; ink and colours on paper, 94.6 x 35.9 cm. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (1973.120.8, ex collection C. C. Wang Family, Gift of The Dillon Fund, 1973).
7 Vinograd 2009.
8 White Stupa (Baita) of Miaoying Temple (Miaoyingsi), west of the Forbidden City, Beijing. Late thirteenth century. Photograph by the author, 2005. Jing 1994.
9 See 'The Met', www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/40512 (accessed 14 September 2019).
10 See 'Princeton University Art Museum', https://artmuseum.princeton.edu/es/collections/maker/4214 (accessed 14 September 2019).
11 Gell 1998.
12 Tanner 2013.

13 Watt and Wardwell 1997; Watt and Hearn 2010.
14 Shih and Ge 2001; Frings and Müller 2005; Chen 2016.
15 Pair of blue-and-white altar vases ('the David vases'), dated 1351. Underglaze-decorated porcelain, h. 63.8 cm. Made at Jingdezhen, Jiangxi Province, China. Sir Percival David Foundation of Chinese Art (B613, B614), on loan to the British Museum. © Trustees of the British Museum. 'The British Museum', www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=3181344&partId=1 (accessed 6 April 2019).
16 Soucek 1999; Huang and Huang 2012; McCausland 2014, 209–239.
17 Chen 1333; McCausland 2014, figure 107.
18 McCausland 2014, 200ff.
19 'ROM', https://collections.rom.on.ca/objects/389459/handscroll?ctx=28f57a89-5b6a-461e-9854-af851cd01a12&idx=1 (accessed 5 April 2019).
20 Xie Chufang (active early Yuan dynasty), *Fascination of Nature*, dated 1321. Detail of a handscroll; ink and colours on silk, 27.8 x 352.9 cm. The British Museum (1998,1112,0.1,CH). © Trustees of the British Museum. 'The British Museum', www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/A_1998-1112-0-1-CH (accessed 29 July 2020).
21 'East Asian Scroll Paintings', https://scrolls.uchicago.edu/view-scroll/173 (accessed July 29 2020).
22 Mezcua López 2017.
23 'BnF', http://expositions.bnf.fr/marine/grand/fr_2810_003v.htm (accessed 14 September 2019); Frings and Müller 2005.
24 Vajrabhairava mandala, featuring portraits of the patrons, the khan Tuq Temür and his elder brother (bottom left) and their wives (bottom right), about 1330–1332. Woven silk textile, kesi, 245.5 x 209 cm. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (1992.54; Purchase, Lila Acheson Wallace Gift, 1992). Husihui 2010.
25 'National Palace Museum', https://theme.npm.edu.tw/khan/Article.aspx?sNo=03009149&lang=2 (accessed 4 June 2019).
26 Jing 1994.
27 'Metropolitan Museum' www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/64101 (accessed 4 June 2019).
28 Watt and Wardwell 1997.
29 Shih 2008; Gerritsen 2012.
30 Ledderose 2000.
31 Linrothe 2009.
32 McCausland 2014, figs 85–86.
33 McCausland 2014, figure 109.
34 McCausland 2015.
35 McCausland 2014, figs 79–83.
36 Hammers 2011.
37 'East Asian Scrolls Project', https://scrolls.uchicago.edu/view-scroll/190 (accessed 5 April 2019).
38 McCausland 2011; Lauer 2002.
39 'Digital Palace Museum', www.dpm.org.cn/collection/paint/234833.html (accessed 29 July 2020).
40 Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322), *Horse and Groom*, dated 1296. Detail of a handscroll; ink and colours on paper, 30.2 x 178.1 cm. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (1988.135; Gift of John M. Crawford Jr., 1988).
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42 For some works by these artists, visit 'East Asian Scroll Paintings', https://scrolls.uchicago.edu/search (accessed 29 July 2020).

43 For Shang Qi's *Spring Mountains*, see 'Digital Palace Museum', www.dpm.org.cn/collection/paint/230475.html (accessed 5 April 2019).
44 Fu 1990.
45 Environs of the Feilaifeng cliff sculptures, west of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, south China. Mainly late thirteenth century. Photograph by the author, 2012.
46 Purtle 2011; Lee 2009.
47 McCausland 2014, figure 50.
48 Relief sculpture in stone of a guardian king. Detail from the interior arch of the Cloud Terrace (Yuntai) at Juyongguan Pass on the Great Wall, north of Beijing. Late Yuan dynasty, early to mid-1340s. Photograph by the author, 2011.
49 Watt and Wardwell 1997.
50 Wang 1276.
51 Soucek 1999; Kadoi 2009; Liu 2016.
52 Berlekamp 2010; McCausland 2015.
53 'Chinese Text Project', https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=en&file=59409&page=75 ff; Yan Liben painting on p. 92 (accessed 6 April 2019). For the painting: 'MFA', https://collections.mfa.org/objects/29071 (accessed 4 June 2019).
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62 For an example, 'The Met', www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/40514 (accessed 28 August 2019).
63 'The Met', www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/40513 (accessed 28 August 2019).
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84 Fong 1984, figure 15; Cahill 1998.
85 See Blair and McCausland, Forthcoming.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

THE VISUAL WORLD OF THE ILKHANIDS AND CHAGHADAIDS

Sheila Blair

The Mongols valued craft, and the buildings and objects produced in West Asia during the period of Mongol rule under the Ilkhanate (1256–1335) and the Chaghadaid khanate (1227–1363) are notable for many features, including their number, quality, size, color, and interest in space and surface patterning. They are also important evidence for the development of Mongol society and the international connections of the Ilkhanids and the Chaghadaids, both eastward – particularly with their cousins, the Yuan, in East Asia – and westward with other Muslim polities and beyond into Europe. In recent decades, scholars have realized that this was not just a period of violence and destruction, as described in many texts, but also one of creativity and intercontinental connections, as attested by physical evidence.[1] Hence, there is a fast-growing literature on this material culture, and the overview here is limited to the most important, most recent, and/or most accessible references. Much of the evidence survives from the Ilkhanate, but the handful of tombs and the few objects, notably textiles that remain from the Chaghadaid khanate suggest that similar forms were produced there, albeit on a much more modest scale.

This copious material is arranged here in three sections based on media. The essay begins with architecture, arguably the most expensive and therefore the most telling of the arts. It turns next to the fittings and furnishings that decorated those spaces. A third section deals with the arts of the book, which assumed extraordinary prominence in this period, probably because of connections with China and the preeminence of calligraphy and painting there. The Mongols across Eurasia shared many features of court culture, and some of the visual documentation preserved in the Ilkhanate, notably the depictions of the Mongol court in manuscripts and on objects, offers important evidence that can be combined with objects excavated or preserved elsewhere. A fourth and final section sketches the transmission of people, goods, and ideas in this period that led to the development of "a new visual language" in West Asia.[2] This essay underscores connections with other branches of the Mongol domains as well as innovations of the period under these two lines in West Asia.

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ARCHITECTURE

When the Mongols reached West Asia, they encountered lands with a substantial repertory of established construction materials, techniques, and forms used to erect a range of building types. Fine baked brick, typically set on stone foundations, was the major medium of construction, although dressed stone was also popular for construction in northwest Iran and Anatolia. The bricks were often laid in decorative patterns, and surfaces were decorated with cut and painted stucco (plaster) and glazed tile. Standard forms included the *iwan* (a barrel-vaulted space open at one end), the dome, the squinch (an arch over the corner of a square room to support the base of a dome), and the minaret. These forms were regularly combined in predictable ways. Large communal buildings, for example, typically had a central courtyard with *iwans* on the four sides. The main façade often had a high, formal gateway known as a *pishtaq*. Minarets framed the façade or the sides of an *iwan*.

This standard vocabulary was modified in several ways during the Mongol period. Surfaces were enlivened with more color, whether painted plaster or glazed tile. Proportions changed as rooms became taller, arches more pointed, and minarets more attenuated. Interest in structure gave way to a concern for covering space, with the development of various innovative systems, such as transverse vaulting and suspended *muqarnas* ceilings with superposed tiers of niches (Figure 32.1). Individual buildings were grouped in complexes, often centered around the grave of



Figure 32.1 Muqarnas ceiling over the tomb of the Sufi shaykh ʿAbd al-Samad at Natanz, 707/1307–1308.
Source: Photo by Sheila Blair & Jonathan Bloom.

the patron or of a revered figure, such as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. The earliest complexes were arranged somewhat haphazardly, but later ones were planned more symmetrically. Many of these features served as models for later developments in the region.

A wide range of buildings are known, some extant and others mentioned in texts.[3] One of the earliest commissions by the Ilkhanids was an observatory ordered by Hülegü in 1259 on a hill 500 m north of the summer capital at Maragha in northwest Iran.[4] The large site included at least 16 different units, loosely grouped around an enormous tower (diameter 45 m) with a central corridor for the quadrant. The complex, which housed a large library, was the site where the scientist and astronomer Nasir al-Din Tusi, with the help of Chinese astronomers, prepared the *zij-i ilkhani* ("Astronomical Tables of the Ilkhanids"). The size and quality of the materials show how important astronomy and astrology were to the shamanist Mongols, who also had many observatories built in Yuan China and staffed in part by West Asian astronomers.[5]

Most residential architecture erected by the Mongols in West Asia does not survive. The Ilkhanids lived in tent cities while moving between summer pastures (*yaylaq*) in the highlands of Ujan or around Sultaniyya and winter quarters (*qishlaq*) in the warmer regions around Baghdad or on the Arran and Mughan steppes.[6] Some of their tents were mobile palaces. For example, the chronicler Rashid al-Din mentions that Arghun (r. 1284–1291) had a tent of state (*bargah*) with a thousand gold pegs and a trellis tent (*khargah*) with royal appurtenances, both especially light for travel.[7] Contemporary depictions removed from manuscripts of the author's history of the Mongols and mounted in albums bear out these textual descriptions.[8]

One Ilkhanid palace survives from the period: the summer residence now known as Takht-i Sulayman ("The Throne of Solomon"), built southeast of Lake Urmiya in Azerbaijan under Abaqa (r. 1265–1282) and Arghun.[9] Arcades punctuated with *iwan*s on the four sides surround a huge courtyard (125 × 150 m) encompassing a lake. The north *iwan*, set over the foundations of the Zoroastrian sanctuary where the Sasanian emperors (r. 224–651) had been crowned, probably served as the audience hall. Behind the west *iwan* was a transverse hall flanked by two kiosks whose octagonal shape might evoke the traditional Mongol tent, or *ger*. Their elaborate decoration, including a *muqarnas* vault and glittering multicolor tiles (Figure 32.2), suggests that the kiosks were the private quarters of the Ilkhanids. The palace illustrates how the new Mongol rulers could adapt local Iranian building traditions.

In contrast to the sparse remains of secular buildings, many religious ones survive because of their more conservative construction, the generous pious endowments that were bestowed upon them, and/or the continued reverence for them.[10] As the shamanist Mongols moved westward, they were exposed to most of the major religions practiced in Eurasia: Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, at least four types of Christianity (Nestorian, Jacobite, Armenian, and Catholic/Latin), Judaism, and several approaches to Islam (notably Sunnism, Shiʿism, and Sufism). While several Buddhist sites are known in texts,[11] the best remaining example is the unfinished complex cut in a rocky hillside southeast of Sultaniyya.[12] To judge from the ruins, including a large court with *iwan*s and two large panels decorated with striding dragons, it may well have been a Buddhist monastery and the name of the nearby village, Viar, a corruption of *vihara*, the Sanskrit term for that type of building.



Figure 32.2 Overglaze-painted (*lājvardīna*) star and cross tiles, probably from Takht-i Sulayman, 1270s.
Source: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, AC1996.115.1–4.

After the Mongol courts converted to Islam – the Ilkhanid Ghazan converted officially in 1295 and the Chaghadaid Mubarakshah (r. 1266) was likely a Muslim, but more widescale conversion took place during the fourteenth century – practice of other religions was curtailed, and most of the religious architecture that survives in the region is therefore Muslim. Most communities already had congregational mosques, so only a few new ones were needed, and they generally followed the traditional Iranian plan with a domed chamber behind one or more *iwan*s. The prototypical example from this period is the mosque erected in the 1320s at Varamin, just south of Rayy, by the local family of governors under the Ilkhanid ruler Abu Saʿid (r. 1317–1335). A freestanding rectangle (66 × 43 m), it centers on a small square

court surrounded by two-story arcades, with *iwan*s in the center of each of the four sides.[13] Refinements of the period include the monumental portal with a low dome behind it, the wider *iwan* on the side facing the *qibla* (the direction of prayer), and the majestic dome behind that *iwan*, features that create a strong longitudinal axis leading to the *qibla* and the elaborately stucco *mihrab* (prayer niche).

Not all mosques adhered to the canonical type. Some mosques, such as those at Ashtarjan (1315) and Faryumad (c. 1320), have just two *iwan*s. Only a single monumental *iwan* survives from the colossal mosque that the vizier ʿAli Shah erected at the capital Tabriz sometime between 1311 (the year he became co-vizier) and 1324 (the year he died). The *iwan* faced a courtyard and may originally have been flanked by a *madrasa* (theological school) and a *khanaqah* (hospice for Sufis). The severe winters in northwest Iran made open-air worship unfeasible at certain times of the year, and various types of hypostyle mosque erected there had no courtyard (e.g., Marand, 1330s). Smaller mosques in central Iran often consisted of a single dome chamber, as in the group built in the 1320s along the Zayanda River downstream from Isfahan at Dashti, Kaj, and Aziran. As many large congregational mosques existed by this period, patrons sometimes added individual elements to extant buildings. The most famous example is the stupendous carved plaster mihrab inserted into the winter prayer hall of the congregational mosque at Isfahan in July 1310 to mark the conversion of the sultan Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316) to Shiʿi Islam[14] (Figure 32.3).

In addition to mosques, the *iwan* plan was also standard for other types of buildings designed for communal use. Some were religious, such as madrasas and *khanaqah*s (e.g., the *khanaqah* built near the tomb of Chelebi Oghlu at Sultaniyya in 1333). Others served for trade and travel, as in the caravanserais (sometimes called *ribaṭ*) at Sarcham (1333) on the route between Qazvin and Tabriz or at Sin (1330) along the route leading north from Isfahan.

Tombs followed the two forms established in earlier periods: the tomb tower and the domed polygon. Tomb towers are usually taller and have a stellate or circular plan, an elevation in a single plane, and a pointed, often conical, roof. This form of tomb was traditionally concentrated near the Caspian littoral, and the best example from this period is the one erected at Bastam in 708/1308–1309 for Öljeitü's son Muhammad Tayfur.[15] More common was the domed polygon, a type that survives not only in the Ilkhanate but also in the Chaghadaid khanate in Central Asia and even in north-central China.[16] Many domed tombs are small square buildings, but those in some shrines are often more complex, with a domed anteroom (*ziyaratkhana*) preceding the tomb room proper (*gurkhana*), as in the two late fourteenth-century examples built at Fathabad outside Bukhara, a larger one for the Sufi *shakyh* Sayf al-Din Bakharzi (d. 1261) and a smaller one for the Chaghadaid ruler Buyan Quli Khan (r. 1338–1348).[17]

By far the largest and most complex tomb from the period is the one for sultan Öljeitü at Sultaniyya, in which a huge octagon (diameter 38 m) surmounted by a double-shelled dome opens onto a large rectangular (15 × 20 m) hall[18] (Figure 32.4). Although sadly ruined, the tomb once had sumptuous decoration in tile and plaster and displayed a sophisticated handling of surface and space with interpenetrating volumes and innovative vaulting, even in the crypt. Inscriptions and references in chronicles show that the original octagon was built between 1305 and 1313, during Öljeitü's lifetime. Then, a few years later, the structure was revamped by adding the rectangular hall and completely redecorating the interior in a new layer of cut tile and molded,

Figure 32.3 Stucco mihrab added to the winter prayer hall in the Friday Mosque at Isfahan in Safar 710/July 1310.
Source: Photo: Sheila Blair and Jonathan Bloom.

Figure 32.4 Tomb of Öljeitü at Sultaniyya, 1305–1320.
Source: Photo: Sheila Blair and Jonathan Bloom.

carved, and painted plaster. The second stage was completed only under Öljeitü sultan's son and successor Abu Saʿid in 1320. The reasons for the change remain speculative, ranging from Öljeitü's frequent religious conversions or a turnover in administration, architect, or designer to some unknown political or personal reason, but the effect converted a simple tomb into a destination able to accommodate pilgrims.

To ensure their survival, many of these tombs were incorporated into multi-part complexes with substantial funds endowed to support the charitable works carried out in them. Öljeitü's tomb, for example, was the center of a large pious foundation that included a mosque, a madrasa, a hospice for Sufis, a guesthouse, and many other buildings.[19] Five major complexes dubbed "the little cities of God" were built around the tombs of Sufi saints, both contemporary and long dead.[20] The one constructed in the opening decade of the fourteenth century for the Suhrawardi shaykh ʿAbd al-Samad at Natanz shows how closely Sufis were intertwined with the upper levels of government.[21] Underwritten by two of Öljeitü's viziers, the complex included an earlier mosque that was rebuilt, a small square tomb with a spectacular *muqarnas* dome (see Figure 32.1), a minaret, and a *khanaqah* of which only the majestic portal survives. The decoration in cut stucco and tile ranks among the finest of the period.

FITTINGS AND FURNISHINGS

Like the buildings constructed in West Asia under Mongol domination, the fittings and furnishings used in them are similarly large and colorful, and many continue

Figure 32.5 Inlaid bronze candlestick endowed to the shrine of Bayazid Bastami in 708/1307–1308.
Source: Boston Museum of Fine Arts 55.106.

traditional types and forms. The typical lighting fixture, for example, was a candlestick with a cylindrical drum and a tubular shaft for the socket. A good example is the one endowed in 708/1308–1309 to the shrine of the sufi shaykh Bayazid Bastami at Bastam[22] (Figure 32.5). Such lighting devices were often given to shrines as a meritorious act,[23] and a painting made in the 1330s to illustrate the scene of the "Bier of Alexander" from the dispersed manuscript known as the Great Mongol *Shahnama* shows four such large stands placed around the bier in a Mongol-period tomb[24] (Figure 32.6). The candlestick from Bastam is decorated solely with inscriptions and floral designs, but others had elaborate figural scenes of hunters and enthronements closely related to those in contemporary paintings.[25]

The Mongols prized precious metals, especially gold, and examples from the period include horse trappings, jewelry, pen cases, basins, and footed cups made of or inlaid with gold and silver. Several shapes or types are new. One is a handled cup used as a drinking vessel at the court. Extant examples have been found across the Mongol domains from southern Russia to China.[26] These cups were also used in the Ilkhanate, for several are depicted in enthronement scenes detached from copies of Rashid al-Din's *History of the Mongols* and now mounted in albums[27] (Figure 32.7).

Figure 32.6 "Bier of Alexander" from the Great Mongol *Shāhnāma*; probably Tabriz, 1330s.
Source: Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution, Freer Gallery of Art 1938.3.



Figure 32.7 Double-page enthronement scene, probably removed from a copy of Rashid al-Din's *History of the Mongols*, Tabriz, early fourteenth century.
Source: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Orientabteilung; Diez A fol. 70, S20 and S23. Bridgeman PFH3277575.

Women of the Mongol court seem to have carried a distinctive type of purse or bag to carry jewelry or important documents. Several such bags are depicted in manuscript illustrations or on metalwares. For example, the servant standing behind the enthroned consort carries one in the painting probably detached from Rashid al-Din's *History of the Mongols* (see Figure 32.7). One superb bag survives, now in the Courtauld Gallery in London.[28] Made of brass inlaid with gold, silver, and black material, it is one of the finest inlaid metalwares from the period and shows scenes of princely life, including horsemen, musicians, and revelers set in panels against a fretted ground. On the basis of its technique and style, it has recently been attributed to Mosul during the reign of Öljeitü and may well be the surviving example of a type more commonly made in leather. These bags in turn may have been inspired by larger traveling coffers of similar shape but different materials (lacquer over leather, bamboo, and wood with colorful metal mounts) that were a specialty of Wenzhou on the south coast of China. One such coffer decorated with auspicious animals, including circling phoenixes, for example, is attributed to 1250–1290 when the region was under the control of the Southern Song or the Yuan dynasty.[29]

While the Mongol court seems to have favored metal vessels made of or inlaid with silver and gold, other patrons at the time also used a range of ceramic bowls, plates, jars, and other vessels.[30] Both the potting and the painting are distinctive to the period. Vessels are often thicker, the style is less refined, the designs are often arranged symmetrically in geometric subdivisions, and the objects display novel motifs, such as the lotus, the phoenix, and the owl-feathered cap. Most examples survive from the Ilkhanate, as virtually no ceramics have conclusively been associated with the Chaghadaid period in Central Asia.[31]

Several types of pottery from this period are new or noteworthy. One is Sultanabad ware, so-called because a hoard of fine examples was found near the modern city of that name west of Kashan, although it is not clear where they were produced. These vessels typically display birds, animals, or figures set against a densely colored gray or greenish floral ground.[32] The style spread westward to Syria, Egypt, and southern Russia, perhaps by the migration of potters, and many examples in the Hermitage Museum were excavated in the early twentieth century at Saray Berke, the capital founded by the Golden Horde on the Volga. Another new type of pottery produced in the Ilkhanate copies celadon vessels produced in Yuan China, with a blue-green glaze covering bowls often displaying carved lotus leaves and flat dishes often displaying molded fish.[33] Chinese wares not only provided the inspiration for the shapes and colors of pottery produced further west but were also imported in significant quantities to Iran.[34] From the fourteenth century, many Chinese ceramics were shipped from the south coast of China to the Persian Gulf through the port of Hormuz, frequently with the participation of shaykhs belonging to the Kazeruniyya order.[35] These ceramics included not only large celadons but also early blue-and-white porcelains, many of them later endowed to the shrine of Shaykh Safi at Ardabil in northwestern Iran.[36]

The finest pottery produced in West Asia during the Mongol period – the wares painted over the glaze in luster or enamel that required a second firing at a low temperature to fix the decoration – was made mainly, perhaps even exclusively, at Kashan in central Iran. Dated lusterwares suggest that the market, which had collapsed in the early thirteenth century with the Mongol invasions, resumed from the 1260s with the production of vessels and especially of tiles before winding down in the 1340s,

perhaps in the face of increased imports from China.[37] The pre-Mongol type of polychrome overglaze-painted ware known as *mina'i* (enamel) or *haft-rang* (seven color) gave way in this period to the one known as *lajvardina* (from *lajvard*, the Persian word for lapis lazuli). *Lajvardina* wares have an opaque colored glaze, typically dark cobalt blue but sometimes white or turquoise, with designs in cut gold leaf outlined in red, white, and black enamel.[38] The palace at Takht-i Sulayman was decorated with stunning examples of such overglaze-painted tiles in both luster and *lajvardina*.[39] Some tiles showed dragons and phoenixes, symbols of sovereignty in China (see Figure 32.2). Others had scenes and selected verses from the Persian national epic, the *Shahnama*. The decoration thus mixes Chinese and Persian elements, and the combination of blue and gold was especially appealing to Mongol tastes.

In many ways, these shimmering wall revetments of these overglaze-painted tiles evoke the sheen of gold-brocaded silks, another art form that became prominent in this period but the one that is least likely to survive, as many textiles were literally worn to death or burned to extract the gold. The Mongols prized silk textiles woven with gold-wrapped thread, especially those in which both pattern and ground were woven in gold on a silk foundation, the so-called cloth of gold known as *nasij* in Persian, *nakh* in Arabic, and *panni tartarici* (Tartar cloths) in Italian sources.[40] To acquire luxury wares, the Mongols often forcibly transferred skilled artisans from one region to another, and this was certainly the case with textile weavers. After the submission of Herat in 1221, for example, the Mongols transferred the head of the weavers' guild and 1,000 weavers of gold brocade to Beshbaliq, the Uyghur summer capital on the northern slopes of the Tianshan northeast of Urumqi. Given the mobility of both weavers and their products, it is often difficult to assign individual silks to specific locations, although scholars are making headway in classification on the grounds of technical variations (e.g., whether the silk was wrapped around paper or animal substrate; the type of selvage, etc.), design, and motifs.

The most stunning of these silks from West Asia are panels that probably once formed the lining of a tent, of which seven pieces are now in the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha and another half panel is in the David Collection in Copenhagen[41] (Figure 32.8). On each panel, vertical rows of large medallions enclosing facing roosters alternate with pairs of smaller lobed roundels enclosing coiled dragons, all set against a background filled with vegetal scrolls and stylized peonies and lotus flowers. Slender columns on the edges provide the support for lobed arches such that when the panels are sewn together, they create the effect of an arcade. The effect is particularly magnificent as the panels combine two types of gold: gold strips woven flat and thick paper strips gilded on the outside and wrapped around a silk core. The two types reflect the light differently and bring the textile to life. The hybrid design combining eastern motifs, such as the dragon, with more Iranian ones, such as paired roosters, suggests an attribution to Central Asia or eastern Iran and illustrates the artistic language that unified much of Asia during the Mongol period.

These silk-and-gold textiles already traveled far and wide in their own time. In the "Knight's Tale," Chaucer describes the Indian king Emeritus astride a steed covered in cloth of gold and dressed in a surcoat made of cloth of Tartary.[42] One rare textile that can be firmly dated and localized by the inscription on it documents the geographical range and cultural reuse of such luxury fabrics: a compound silk bearing the name and titles of the Ilkhanid sultan Abu Sa'id.[43] A lampas twill woven of gilded

Figure 32.8 Silk and gold panel from a tent; eastern Iran or Central Asia, late thirteenth – early fourteenth century.
Source: David Collection, Copenhagen 40/1997.

silver foil spun around a silk core, the textile displays three blue/green stripes with large Arabic inscriptions bordered by bands of running animals alternating with two wider red stripes displaying a staggered pattern of large lobed medallions with floral scrolls alternating with smaller geometric diamonds and peacocks in the interstices. The large cloth (estimated to have originally measured 400 × 90 cm) was a *tiraz*, a type of textile woven since early Islamic times with the name of the ruler and distributed to his courtiers. The repeating text suggests that this silk was woven in a state factory, most likely at Abu Saʿid's capital Tabriz, after he had assumed the title of *bahadur* ("brave") in 1319 but before his death in 1335. It may have been sent west as a diplomatic gift or acquired by a trader after the death of the sultan, when its messages wishing him a long life would have rendered it useless at the Ilkhanid court. Within three decades, the uncut length of cloth reappeared in north Italy, where it was tailored for a "body suit" to envelop the corpse of the Hapsburg prince, Duke Rudolf IV, who died in Milan in 1365. Dressed in his funeral suit, his embalmed body was transported ceremonially to his capital Vienna, where he was buried in it in the ducal crypt of St. Stephen's Cathedral. It took only three decades to put the silk to use in Europe, albeit in a very different context. The Abu Saʿid silk is the best documented of such silks, but it was not the only one to travel so far: other similar silks were interred in the tomb of Cangrande della Scalla (d. 1329) in nearby Verona, and some were shipped across the Mediterranean as far as Burgos in the Iberian peninsula.[44]

Brocaded silks were also used in clothing for Mongol nobility. Many examples have been excavated recently across the khanates and are desirable collectibles on the current art market. Some fabrics were sewn into caftans or robes that typically crossed to the right in front[45] (see Figure 32.7). Some surviving robes usually attributed to Central Asia or China also have wide waists that closed with a set of tapes at the right side. The cut was shown off to full advantage when riding, as seen in an early fifteenth-century drawing of a mounted Mongol archer signed by Muhammad ibn Mahmudshah al-Khayyam and now in the Diez albums.[46]

Brocaded silks were also used for headgear, both for men's flapped hats known from Mongolia[47] and for the distinctive tall headdress known as a *bughtaq* worn by women of the Mongol courts across Eurasia. Measuring nearly 90 cm high when intact, this female headgear comprised a bark column covered by a gold cloth cut in the shape of a hat with lappets reaching the shoulders and padded with silk wadding. The hat was attached under the chin by a secondary hat with a hole in the middle through which the bark column projected. Topped with metal spires and tail feathers and decorated with pearls and gold jewelry, these hats too are regularly depicted in Mongol enthronements from Rashid al-Din's history (see Figure 32.7). Several have also appeared recently on the art market and are now in museums in Moscow and Doha.[48]

In addition to woven textiles, carpets also came to the fore as a major art form in this period. Some were flatweaves used as mats. Two depicted in illustrations from Rashid al-Din's history, one under a birthing princess and the other in a tent mosque, show a zigzag pattern.[49] One surviving flatweave in the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad has multiple niches and would have been used by rows of worshippers while prostrating in a mosque.[50]

While isolated examples or fragments of knotted carpets survive from earlier times, this is the first period when we can discuss groups of knotted carpets. They are typically assigned to Anatolia or northwest Iran and may have been made over several centuries.

The exact datings vary, but the increasing accuracy of carbon-14 testing has allowed scholars to refine their attributions.[51] One group comprises Konya carpets, so-called because some 20 were discovered in 1903 in the ʿAlaʾ al-Din Mosque there, although other fragments of this and other types, like the brocaded silks, were reportedly found in Tibet. Konya carpets typically have a large central field with staggered rows of small angular motifs and a contrasting border of large stars of pseudo-inscriptions. Another group of knotted carpets comprises the so-called animal carpets. Generally smaller than the Konya carpets and knotted in brighter primary colors, this handful of carpets displays stylized animals within octagonal or square frames. One recently acquired by the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York has a red ground with four stylized dragons, each with one leg raised (Figure 32.9). A similar animal with raised leg set inside an octagon is depicted in a scene of Zahhak enthroned from the Great Mongol *Shahnama* made in the 1330s.[52] Such carpets were in turn exported to the West, for a similar carpet displaying stylized animals, each with one raised leg, is shown in *The Marriage of the Virgin*, a Sienese painting of c. 1410 now in the collection of the National Gallery, London. The paintings, whether Ilkhanid or European, depict the carpets set under enthroned kings or holy figures, and the placement suggests that these animal carpets must have been rare and expensive at this time.

Figure 32.9 Animal carpet; northwest Iran or Anatolia, early fourteenth century. Source: New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 1990.91.

THE ARTS OF THE BOOK

Books and writing had long played a major role in the Islamic lands, undoubtedly due to the reverence for the Qurʾan as God's word delivered in Arabic to the Prophet Muhammad in the early seventh century.[53] Qurʾan codices were typically the most splendid books but also the most conservative. They were never illustrated with pictures, but over the centuries, deluxe copies were decorated with increasingly elaborate non-figural illumination, a tradition that reached great heights in this period. The city of Baghdad, despite its apocryphal "destruction" by the Mongols in 1258, remained a center of learning and book production for Qurʾans as well as illustrated manuscripts.[54] The most renowned calligrapher there at the end of the thirteenth century was Yaqut al-Mustaʿsimi.[55] An Anatolian slave of the last ʿAbbasid caliph al-Mustaʿsim billah, Yaqut trained at the caliphal palace and remained at the Mustansiriyya Madrasa in Baghdad until his death in 1298–1299. His fame later blossomed such that at least 130 manuscripts bear his name, although only a small part may actually be his hand.[56] He wrote very precise calligraphy with fine lines, elegant strokes, a perfectly controlled flow of ink, and balanced open and closed strokes, characteristics that impart rhythm and exactness to his work. He penned many popular texts, including copies of the Qurʾan, collections of prayers, poetry, and maxims in a variety of scripts, often juxtaposing different styles on the same page. Most of his manuscripts are small and seem to have been made for the market.

A handful of Qurʾan manuscripts survives with interlinear translation or commentary in Persian and/or Chaghatay Turkish.[57] Probably used in proselytizing, these manuscripts share an unusual, somewhat ungainly, hybrid script but vary in size and format and may come from various regions, from Anatolia to Central Asia. A 30-volume example with a squarish format is likely to have been produced in Anatolia, where the squarish format was popular for both manuscripts and the stands on which to place them (*rahla*).[58] A better case for a Central Asian/Chaghadaid origin can be made for a four-part rectangular manuscript with Chaghadai interlinear translation, now in the Shrine at Mashhad.[59] Dated 737/1337, it was transcribed by one Muhammad ibn Shaykh Yusuf al-Abari, known as the "Sayyid of Scripts."

A significant change occurred in the Ilkhanate during the reigns of Ghazan and his brother Öljeitü, when book production exploded, notably for the large-format 30-volume Qurʾan sets intended for the tomb complexes underwritten by the court.[60] At least five sets of such monumental 30-volume Qurʾans are known.[61] Each set has five lines of large *muhaqqaq* script per page, double pages of illumination at the beginning and end of the individual volumes, and copious illumination in gold, ultramarine, and other brilliant colors throughout. Each set was produced by several artists over a period of several years at various centers of the Ilkhanid realm, including Baghdad, Tabriz, Mosul, Hamadan, and possibly elsewhere. Most are transcribed on folios of half-*baghdadi* size, with pages measuring on the order of 50 × 35 cm. One manuscript is twice that size, with pages measuring 70 × 50 cm: a behemoth copy commissioned by Sultan Öljeitü for his tomb at Sultaniyya.[62] Not only is it larger than the others, but it is also more elaborate, with three lines of gold script outlined in black alternating with two lines of black script outlined in gold (Figure 32.10). These large 30-volume sets, all connected to the sultan or his court,



Figure 32.10 Double page from a 30-volume Qurʾan manuscript made in Baghdad and endowed to Öljeitü's tomb at Sultaniyya; 1306–1313.
Source: Museum of Turkish and Islamic Art, Istanbul. Bridgeman PFH3277575.

were intended to project the image of the Mongols as pious Muslims and to propagate the patron's faith, piety, and name.

The vizier Rashid al-Din was involved not only in the production of several of these monumental Qurʾan manuscripts but also in large-format copies of his own works, both his theological treatises and copies of his world history.[63] All the manuscripts of Rashid al-Din's works are large format, copied on fine paper in careful script with fancy illumination, specifications he laid out in the text of the endowment to his pious foundation outside Tabriz, the Rabʿ-i Rashidi. Copies of his world history stand out, as they also include illustrations. The Mongol period in West Asia saw a new emphasis on history and on placing the Mongols in that history; chronicles and annals by Persian authors multiplied, probably inspired by the Yuan Chinese tradition of diary keeping and collective histories.[64] Rashid al-Din's three-volume *Jamiʿ al-tavarikh* ("Compendium of Chronicles") is the most extensive, comprising a history of the Mongols;[65] a long second volume on the history of other Eurasian peoples, including the Chinese, the Indians, the Jews, and the Turks; and a third volume on geography that is lost.

To illustrate such diverse subjects, the painters drew upon a wide variety of pictorial sources available in these cosmopolitan centers, from Chinese motifs, such as the cloud band, to European compositions, such as the Nativity.[66] Nevertheless, the

illustrations share a house style formulated in the ateliers sponsored by the patron in the Rabʿ-i Rashidi and possibly elsewhere. Like the text, the pictures are designed to propagate the seminal role of the Mongols as world conquerors and rulers.

From this point in the early fourteenth century, illustrated books proliferated in Iran. They covered a far wider subject matter, including histories, bestiaries, fables, epics, encyclopedias, scientific works, and poetry, and they became bigger with more and more ambitious images.[67] Later chroniclers looked back at this moment as transformative. Dust Muhammad, the librarian who worked at the Safavid court in northwest Iran in the sixteenth century, wrote that during the reign of Abu Saʿid the painter "Master Ahmad Musa, who was his father's pupil, lifted the veil from the face of depiction, and the [style of] depiction that is now current was invented by him."[68]

Of all the texts illustrated in Iran from this period onward, the most popular was the *Shahnama*, the book of kings compiled by the poet Firdawsi ca. 1010 that recounts the history of Iran from the creation to the coming of Islam. Ten illustrated copies are datable to the first half of the fourteenth century. Produced in a variety of formats and styles, they were probably made in several centers for different clienteles. Three manuscripts, known appropriately as the "small *Shahnama*s," are two-volume copies, each page with some 30 lines of text set out in 6 columns.[69] Each manuscript had approximately 100 illustrations, typically rectangles occupying about one-third of the modest written surface (average area: 25 x 18 cm) and set off from the text by colored frames. The paintings, typically organized along a single ground line to fit the oblong format, are executed in strong bright colors against a gold ground. No specific patrons have been identified, but to judge from the frequent occurrences of Mongol physiognomy, hairstyles, and dress, these copies may have been made in either Tabriz or Baghdad in the early fourteenth century for a burgeoning market of well-heeled book collectors who melded Persian and Mongol traditions and wanted to set themselves within the heroic Persian past.

In layout (2 volumes with some 30 lines of text per page in 6 columns), but not in size, these "small *Shahnama*s" foreshadow the most ambitious manuscript of the period: the Great Mongol *Shahnama*.[70] Likely produced at Tabriz in the 1330s, it was dismembered by the Belgian dealer Georges Demotte in the early twentieth century such that only a handful of text and 57 illustrated folios, most of them much repaired and even remounted, survive, scattered among collections around the world. Originally, the manuscript comprised nearly 300 folios with close to 200 large illustrations, many of which occupy one-half to two-thirds of the written surface (41 x 29 cm, about 2.5 times that in the "small *Shahnama*s"). The larger spaces left for the paintings in the Great Mongol *Shahnama* allow for much more ambitious compositions. The artists (and to judge from the varied styles, there must have been several of them) expanded the pictorial space, opening up the foreground and showing figures from the back in circular compositions that create a three-dimensional space on the flat surface of the paper. The large and substantial figures display a wide range of emotions, a feature that disappears from much Persian painting in later times. In the "Bier of Alexander," for example, mourners – males at the sides and veiled females seen from behind in the front – gesticulate wildly. Some seem to howl in despair (see Figure 32.6). Alexander's mother, also seen from the back, throws herself over the office, itself covered with a cloth of gold,

while Alexander's tutor, Aristotle, sobs into his kerchief behind the bier. Whereas the "small *Shahnama*s" were apparently made for the market, the Great Mongol *Shahnama* seems to have had a deliberate program intended to connect the heroes of the epic past with the rulers of Mongol times.[71] Some stories, especially the one about Alexander, are heavily illustrated with large paintings and inventive scenes.[72] This cycle, which once had 17 images on 15 folios, is framed by scenes of Alexander's enthronement and the bereavement over his coffin. In between are six illustrations of his travels to strange lands, two illustrations of him combating ferocious supernatural beasts (a horned wolf-like monster and a dragon), and two illustrations of him defeating the King of Hind (India). The famous conqueror clearly struck a chord in the Ilkhanid court.

A PERIOD STYLE

The movement of people, goods, and ideas across Eurasia in this period of Mongol domination led to significant changes in the material and cultural world in the lands governed by the Ilkhanids and Chaghadaids. The Mongols were mobile, and so were their artists, who became increasingly specialized and celebrated in this period. Following the Mongol conquests, some craftsmen, such as textile workers, were deported unwillingly from West Asia to Mongolia and China, but in later times artists moved as well. Some accompanied the Ilkhanid camp (*ordu*). The Baghdadi chronicler Ibn al-Fuwati mentions, for example, that in 705/1305–1306 he encountered the painter and illuminator ʿAfif al-Din Muhammad ibn Mansur al-Qashi in the sultan's camp in Arran when the artist was working on the books of his master Rashid al-Din.[73] This artist may well be the same person as the Muhammad b. al-ʿAfif al-Kashi, who illuminated the copy of Rashid al-Din's theological works dated 1307–1310.[74] The book atelier was thus not a permanent installation but traveled with the court.

Other artisans moved to work on specific sites or to seek new sources of patronage. According to the Mamluk historian al-Yusufi (d. 1357), Öljeitü assembled a multireligious team of craftsmen recruited from across his domains to build the tomb at Sultaniyya, and the Mamluk historian al-Nuwayri (d. 1331) adds that once completed, Öljeitü ordered many merchants, wage earners, weavers, artisans, and others to move there from Tabriz, although they later returned to their home towns.[75] To judge from the techniques and designs, some of the tile workers who decorated Öljeitü's tomb may have worked earlier on the shrine at Natanz.[76]

Not all of these traveling artisans had court patronage. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, craftsmen belonging to a family with the epithet (*nisba*) Damghani worked in their hometown Damghan and also on several buildings in Bastam, some 85 km to the northeast.[77] After the death of Abu Saʿid, book artists emigrated from Tabriz and northwest Iran to Shiraz and the southwest where they seem to have established an independent style of book production. Metalworkers may have moved as well.

The Damghanis, a father and two sons who identify themselves in inscriptions variously as builder (*bannaʾ*), engineer (*muhandis*), and stucco worker (*jassas*), illustrate another feature of craftsmen in this period: the family business. The best example is the Kashani potters who held a monopoly over the complex production

of lusterwares. At least four families of luster potters are known. The most famous is the Abu Tahirs, whose work can be traced over four generations from the turn of the thirteenth century to the mid-fourteenth.[78] In some cases, painting too was a family profession. According to Dust Muhammad, for example, the painter Ahmad Musa was trained by his father.[79]

In addition to people, goods moved regularly across Eurasia through both official and commercial channels. Embassies from the Yuan Empire arrived at the Ilkhanid court, for example, in 1304, 1306, 1308, 1310, and 1314, bringing gifts in addition to personnel.[80] The Ilkhanids did the same: Abu Saʿid sent the large 30-volume Qurʾan set made for his father Öljeitü at Rashid al-Din's pious foundation at Hamadan to the Mamluks in Cairo as part of an embassy bearing gifts.[81] Öljeitü commissioned the enormous 30-volume Qurʾan set for his tomb in Sultaniyya from Baghdad, some 750 km to the southwest. The Abu Saʿid silk that moved from Tabriz to Milan to Vienna within a few decades shows both the speed and the extent of these transfers and the difficulties of distinguishing gifts from mercantile exchanges. There were many more.

This ready movement of people and goods encouraged the transmission of ideas. New motifs such as the dragon, the lotus, and the peony appeared in the standard visual vocabulary of West Asia[82] (see Figures 32.2 and 32.6). Many motifs like these came from East Asia, probably transmitted through the medium of textiles or other portable objects, like ceramics or even lacquerwares. Some ideas and designs also came from the West, such as the composition of the Nativity that was adapted for the scene of the birth of Muhammad in the copy of Rashid al-Din's world history.[83] Such a scene might have been known through one of the devotional objects that friars or merchants carried to the Ilkhanate.[84]

Foreign motifs in turn spurred local adaptations. For example, Chinese seals such as that of Qubilai Qa'an stamped twice on a document (*firman*) issued by the Ilkhanid Gaykhatu in 692/1293 might have inspired the popularity of angular inscriptions in square kufic.[85] This type of inscription, known before this period, becomes widespread across West Asia at this time. It occurs on many objects and buildings of the Ilkhanate, including a fourteenth-century bronze talismanic plaque and the tile bands decorating the façade of the *khanaqah* at Natanz.[86] The same style of inscription also appears on Chaghadaid buildings in Central Asia, as in the panels over the doorways to the tomb of Qutluq Aqa erected in 762/1361 in the Shah-i Zinda cemetery at Samarkand or that of Tughluq Temür (r. c. 1351–1363) built posthumously by his wife Tini Khatun at Almaliq.[87]

One result of these many exchanges, particularly among various branches of the Mongol line, was a shared court culture, manifest materially in clothing and objects. The paintings of enthroned Mongols detached from Rashid al-Din's history of the Mongols provide some of the best visual documentation for this court ceremonial (see Figure 32.7). They illustrate the objects that survive elsewhere, such as gold and silver cups with handles, silk robes that crossed to the right, and women's tall hats.

The Mongols' shared court culture imparted high status to women, who had their own encampments and appanages that they used for their own financial benefit and to pursue their own political agendas. But in West Asia, particularly in the Ilkhanate, women's economic status changed to accommodate the needs of the large sedentary population there, notably in the middle of the fourteenth century as

a consequence of the economic reforms instituted under Ghazan.[88] Paintings bear out this assessment.[89] Enthronements from early fourteenth century copies of Rashid al-Din's history of the Mongols depict khatuns as equals, seated just to the left of their husbands and turned slightly toward them (see Figure 32.7). Many women are also depicted in the Great Mongol *Shahnama* of the 1330s, but rarely as enthroned consorts and more often as onlookers or mourners (see Figure 32.6), and in later Persian paintings made for other Mongol and Turkic courts, enthronements typically reverted to the traditional composition showing the ruler alone.

Some ideas were not successfully shared across the Mongol domains. One was paper currency. Paper money, which had long been used in China, was adopted by the Mongols there under Qubilai.[90] It was introduced to the Ilkhanate under Gaykhatu in 1294, but produced commercial chaos, a boycott, and overt resistance before it was quickly abandoned.

Paper, nevertheless, transformed the visual world in the Ilkhanate. The ready availability of large sheets of fine, smooth paper encouraged book artists to make larger and more complicated paintings, thereby encouraging the emergence of the illustrated book as a major medium of artistic expression in the Persianate world. It also transformed the nature of the design process.[91] In earlier periods, artists had worked out designs directly on the surface of an object, such as a tile. By using paper for designs, artists could plan larger, more complex compositions, which were circulated and replicated in various media. Designs worked out in a court studio could be realized in different places, media, and times. For example, preliminary drawings worked out on paper in gold and colors illuminated fine Qurʾan manuscripts; in cut tile for the exterior decoration of buildings, as on the façade of the *khanaqah* at Natanz;[92] and in cut and painted plaster for interior decoration, as on the vaults of the gallery around Öljeitü's tomb at Sultaniyya.[93] Scenes of enthronements and the hunt decorated metalwares with "paintings in silver and gold."[94] Such working drawings on paper were also needed for the production of complex, patterned silks, which must have been made on draw looms.

A few drawings are preserved in albums.[95] Chroniclers record their existence as well. According to a progress report (*ʿarzadasht*) describing the activities of the Timurid design studio in the early fifteenth century, a design for a saddle by Mir Dawlatyar was then copied by Khwaja Mir Hasan, and Khwaja Mir Hasan's son Mir Shams al-Din and Master Dawlat Khwaja executed it in mother of pearl.[96] Mir Dawlatyar, a slave of the Ilkhanid sultan Abu Saʿid who had been trained by the painter Ahmad Musa, was known for his pen-and-ink drawings, and this one must have been preserved for nearly a century when it was reused in the early Timurid period.

The transmission of people, objects, and ideas in the period of Mongol rule and the execution of designs worked out on paper in different media resulted in a new style in the arts of West Asia. One feature characteristic of this new style is monumentality: the Mongols thought big.[97] Öljeitü's tomb (see Figure 32.4) dwarfs its predecessor, that of the Seljuk sultan Sanjar at Merv. Fittings for these Mongol buildings are similarly large. The candlestick endowed to the shrine at Bastam (see Figure 32.5) is the largest to survive from Iran in the Islamic period. The full-*baghdadi* sheet used for the large Qurʾan manuscripts (see Figure 32.10) approaches the limit of what an individual papermaker can lift from the mold. The larger size along with the

finer quality of the paper may indicate the introduction of new technology, a subject that would bear further investigation.

Another feature that characterizes this new style is an enhanced use of color. The Mongols loved gold, often contrasting it with blue and other colors. This combination occurs often in many of the arts produced in this period, from the shimmering silks to the glittering tiles, including the new overglaze technique of *lajvardina* developed for ceramics in Ilkhanid Iran (see Figure 32.2). The predominance of bright blue might be related to the Mongol worship of Tengri as Sky God or a response to the availability of high-quality cobalt, available from mines near Kashan and exported in this period to China.

The palette used in this period was broad. Over the course of the fourteenth century, the number of colors used for glazed tilework in Iran expanded, as dark blue, white, black (manganese), green, brown, and yellow were added to the earlier light blue, made from copper, which was readily available throughout the region.[98] Chaghadaid buildings too show an extensive use of glazed tile in several colors. Buyan Quli Khan's tomb in Bukhara, for example, is decorated on both interior and exterior with carved glazed terracotta in white, turquoise, and dark manganese that appears black.

A third feature that characterizes the arts of this period is the opening up of space. Architecturally, this is evident in the development of innovative systems of vaulting, notably the stunning *muqarnas* ceilings (see Figure 32.1) and the various forms of complex transverse vaults that allow for openings to let in light. In illustrations, painters raised the horizon and transformed the flat baseline into a series of receding planes that imply a recession of space on a flat sheet of paper. The increased ground allowed for figures to be grouped in circles (see Figure 32.6). Windows that opened outward or protruding trees suggested the natural world beyond the scene depicted in a painting, as in the enthronements from the Great Mongol *Shahnama*.[99]

Many of the arts produced in this period also show a new interest in all-over surface patterning, often with raised, pierced, or multilevel carving. In the Ilkhanate, this feature is seen most clearly in plaster, whether in designs that are cut down from surface, as with the extraordinary *mihrab* added to the congregational mosque at Isfahan (see Figure 32.3), or in other designs that are raised from the surface, as in molded and painted bosses added to the tomb at Sultaniyya. Such surface patterning can also be seen in the designs used on other portable objects, such as the decorated cartouches on the candlestick endowed to the shrine at Bastam (see Figure 32.5). Such all-over patterning of the ground may be the legacy of designs transmitted on silk textiles, especially the lampas weaves, which have two sets of warps and wefts that allow for complex patterns that make the same use of the background readily visible (see Figure 32.8).

This new style that developed in the Mongol period, with its interest in monumentality color, space, and surface patterning, set the foundations for later developments in West Asia. Architects in the Timurid period, for example, developed even more complex methods of vaulting and more complex designs in tile mosaic. Over the course of the fourteenth century, books became more unified, as artists soon began to coordinate not just calligraphy and painting but also binding. The idea of an atelier or studio to produce and disseminate books (*kitabkhana*) of the type sponsored by Rashid al-Din became the norm under the Timurids and Safavids. Perhaps the

most important development that resulted from the foundations established in the Mongol period was the establishment of a dynastic style, possible when designs worked out in a court atelier could be disseminated to artists working in various media and places. Such a dynastic style, readily visible later in the region under the Timurids, Mughals, Safavids, and Ottomans,[100] had its roots in the new visual language developed during the period of Mongol rule in West Asia, perhaps encouraged by the plethora of models and motifs available in this period of intercontinental connections.

NOTES

1 Allsen 1997; Allsen2001; Morgan 2004; Morgan2006.
2 Komaroff 2002.
3 Wilber 1955; Blair and Bloom 1994, 5–20.
4 Vardjavand 1987.
5 Allsen 2001, 160–175; Steinhardt 2015, 108–116.
6 Masuya 2002; Masuya2013.
7 O'Kane 1993, 250.
8 *TLGK*, n. 18–19 & 222; Frings and Müller 2005, n. 292 & 294; Gonnella et al. 2017.
9 Masuya 2002.
10 Blair 2002.
11 Prazniak 2014.
12 Blair 2014, 139–146.
13 Nakhaʿi 2018.
14 Blair 2015.
15 Hillenbrand 1982; Blair 1982.
16 O'Kane 2004; Blair 2019.
17 Golombek and Wilber 1988, n. 1–2; Blair 2019.
18 Blair 2014, 112–171.
19 Blair 1986a.
20 Golombek 1974.
21 Blair 1986b.
22 *TLGK*, n. 160.
23 Blair 2011b.
24 Grabar and Blair 1980, n. 39; *TLGK*, figure 153.
25 Komaroff 1994; *TLGK*, n. 162, 166.
26 *TLGK*, n. 139, 149, 155.
27 *TLGK*, n. 18–19; Frings and Müller 2005, n. 284–285, 288, 290; Gonnella et al. 2017.
28 Ward 2014.
29 Brooklyn Museum of Art 1996, 68.
30 Watson 2006.
31 No Chaghadaid objects are illustrated, for example, in the section about them in Frings and Müller 2005, 241–243.
32 *TLGK*, n. 133–134.
33 *TLGK*, n. 132.
34 Soucek 1999.
35 Kauz 2010; Lane 2018.
36 Pope 1956.
37 Watson 1985.
38 *TLGK*, n. 130–131.

39 *TLGK*, n. 83–87, 94–102.
40 Wardwell 1989; Allsen 1997; Watt and Wardwell 1997, chapter 4; *TLGK*, n. 69–71, 73–76.
41 *TLGK*, n. 73; Folsach 2013.
42 Allsen 1997, 2.
43 Ritter 2016.
44 Farmer 2017, 42–43.
45 e.g., Folsach 2013, pls. 228–230.
46 *TLGK*, n. 20.
47 Frings and Müller 2005, n. 63; Kadoi 2017, figure 9.8.
48 Ward 2014, figure 8; Kadoi 2017, figure 9.7.
49 Frings and Müller 2005, n. 294; *TLGK*, n. 31.
50 *TLGK*, n. 78.
51 Franses 2013.
52 Grabar and Blair 1980, n. 1.
53 Blair 2006.
54 Simpson 1982; Blair 2011a.
55 Ben Azzouna 2018, 37–206.
56 e.g., *TLGK*, n. 63.
57 James 1988, n. 54, 58–60; Blair 2006, 370–373.
58 James 1988, n. 59; Blair 2006, figure 9.2.
59 James 1988, n. 58.
60 Ben Azzouna 2018, 207–288.
61 James 1988, n. 39–40, 42, 45–46; *TLGK*, n. 63–65.
62 Blair 2019.
63 Ben Azzouna 2014; Ben Azzouna and Roger-Puyo 2016; Ben Azzouna 2018, 289–363; Blair 1995.
64 Morgan 2013.
65 *RDT*.
66 Blair 2017.
67 Blair 1992; Hillenbrand 2002.
68 Thackston 2001, 12.
69 Simpson 1979; *TLGK*, n. 33–35.
70 Grabar and Blair 1980; *TLGK*, n. 36–61.
71 Soudavar 1997.
72 Hillenbrand 1996.
73 Blair 1995, 62; Ben Azzouna 2018, 347–349.
74 *TLGK*, n. 5.
75 Little 1978.
76 Blair 1986b.
77 *EIr*, "Damḡani (2)."
78 Watson 1985, Appendix 1.
79 Thackston 2001, 12.
80 Allsen 2001, 35–8.
81 James 1988, n. 45; Little 2006; Ben Azzouna 2018, 262–278.
82 Rawson 1984; Kadoi 2009.
83 *TLGK*, n. 6.
84 Blair 2002, 111–117.
85 *TLGK*, n. 68.
86 *TLGK*, n. 167; Blair 1986b, pl. 73.
87 Golombek and Wilber 1988, n. 13; O'Kane 2004.

88 De Nicola 2017.
89 Blair 2019c.
90 Allsen 2001, 177–179; *TLGK*, 198.
91 Bloom 2006.
92 Blair 1986b, pl. 82.
93 Blair and Bloom 1994, figure 7.
94 Komaroff 1994.
95 Komaroff 2002, 184–194.
96 Thackston 2001, 43–47.
97 O'Kane 1996.
98 Wilber 1955, 84–85.
99 Grabar and Blair 1980, n. 1, 14, 15, 17, 28 and 52; *TLGK*, n. 39 and 46.
100 Blair and Bloom 1994.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE MATERIAL CULTURE OF THE ULUS JOCHI (GOLDEN HORDE)

Daniel C. Waugh

The history of the Mongol Empire has most commonly been told using the evidence of the often richly detailed written sources, even though more than a century of archaeological study has produced a mass of evidence about the material culture across the empire. Publications of the archaeological material often are difficult to access and, for non-experts, difficult to assess. As the best work in recent decades on the Golden Horde illustrates, though, it is essential to use both the written sources and evidence from material culture if we wish to obtain a full picture of the culture and history of the region that, at its fullest extent, encompassed a territory bounded by the Carpathians in the West, the Black Sea, North Caucasus and Khwarazm in the South, and the Kazakh steppes and Western Siberia to the East (Map 33.1).[1]

While the archaeological evidence often merely reinforces what we know from the written sources, more importantly, it offers unique material about regional culture, daily life, interethnic relations, and much else. Unlike so many of the written sources, the evidence from material culture is "unbiased," but nonetheless needs to be critiqued and may invite divergent interpretations.

THE CHALLENGES IN OBTAINING AND ASSESSING THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE

The surface remains of settlements from the era of the Golden Horde had attracted the attention of Russian administrators and scholars early in the eighteenth century, at a time when even rather substantial portions of significant buildings were still in evidence. The earliest excavations occurred when there was as yet no scientific methodology in archaeology. Such was the case, for example, with the pioneering work of Aleksandr V. Tereshchenko in 1848–1850 at Tsarevskoe on the Aktuba River (a tributary of the lower Volga). While Tereshchenko uncovered evidence of many structures and accumulated masses of artifacts (including thousands of Golden

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Figure 33.1 Dragon-handled gold belt-cup, thirteenth–early fourteenth century, found at Tsarevskoe in 1848 by A.V. Tereshchenko. Collection of the Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Inv. No. Sar-1613. After Ia.I. Smirnov, ed., Vostochnoe serebro. Atlas drevnei serebrianoi i zolotoi posudy vostochnogo proiskhozhdeniia, naidennoi preimushchestvenno v predelakh Rossiiskoi imperii. Izdanie Imperatorskoi Arkheologicheskoi Kommissii ko dniu piatidesiatiletiia eia deiatel'nosti, Sanktpeterburg, 1909, ill. 230.

Horde coins and some spectacular examples of metalwork [Figure 33.1]), he failed to record information for contextualizing the finds.

While his excavations in the early 1920s left much to be desired by modern standards, Frants V. Ballod did important survey work, documented a number of structures, and recovered many artifacts at Selitrennoe and Tsarevskoe on the Aktuba River, the sites which at least until recently were considered to be the locations of the capitals of the Golden Horde, the old and new Sarai.[2] Among Ballod's more interesting contributions was to document the water supply system at Tsarevskoe (Figure 33.2), which included a connected set of catchment basins and a network of conduits, evidence of the sophistication of the engineering which went into the planning and construction of these cities where there had previously been no settlements.[3]

His excavations of house remains revealed the *kang* system of hot-air heating ducts under the benches and anticipated the much more extensive documentation of the domestic architecture undertaken in recent archaeology (Figure 33.3).[4]

Systematic, scientifically based archaeological investigation of Golden Horde sites began only in the late 1950s. Of particular importance was the work of German F. Fedorov-Davydov, who developed some of the standard methodologies for classifying and interpreting artifacts and led many of the important, large-scale excavations. Fedorov-Davydov worked out detailed ceramic typologies for Golden



Figure 33.2 Cross-section of the catchment basins for the water supply of Tsarevskoe. After Ballod 1923b, Figure 5.



Figure 33.3 Plan showing the kan heating system in "Structure No. 2" at Selitrennoe. After: Ballod 1923b, Figure 23.

Figure 33.4 Qipchaq stone statue (commonly called a "kamennaia baba"), from the Donets region, twelfth–early thirteenth centuries.
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

Horde material and systematized a great deal of the numismatic evidence, both of which are essential for establishing chronology.[5] He classified many other types of objects, including the stone statues erected in the steppes by the Qipchaqs in the period just prior to the Mongols (Figure 33.4).

The result has been to determine much more precisely than before what Mongol rule meant for the populations they conquered. Unlike many archaeologists, Fedorov-Davydov was able to move beyond his detailed technical studies to generalization about the larger historical issues of the Golden Horde. His work on the development of its cities, while revised in some particulars by more recent studies, is still standard.

Some of the most important current research is that of Leonid F. Nedashkovskii, whose innovative work extends the study of major city sites into their hinterland.[6] By including in his purview settlements and burials in a radius of about 60 km around Ukek (next to Saratov on the Volga), Tsarevskoe, Selitrennoe (both on the Aktuba) and Sharenyi Bugor (in the Volga delta), he has been able to document the interactions of the urban centers with their surrounding regions and show statistically regional variation and change over time. His "radial" approach may not always take into account the effect of natural barriers to easy movement (e.g., in the case of Sharenyi Bugor), but the broadening of focus into wider regions is highly significant for our understanding of the relationship between sedentary centers and the surrounding, often nomadic, cultures.[7]

Where excavations have been undertaken with proper attention to detail, the work is time consuming, and, especially where seasons and funding are short, may therefore have to focus on very small areas in much larger sites. Such "sampling" often tends to concentrate on the places where there is some surface evidence of there being buried structures, but this then may bias the results toward investigation of the remains left by elites. Especially for the major cities, what is excavated may be but a small percentage of the total area. The most famous of the urban sites, Selitrennoe (assumed to have been Sarai – the, or at least one of the capitals of the Golden Horde) occupies an area of some 15 km^2, of which only some 30,000 m^2 have been excavated.[8] Even though the city of Bulghar on the middle Volga has seen extensive (and largely well published) excavation, by the beginning of the twenty-first century only about 22,000 m^2 of a total area of 3,800,00 m^2 had been excavated.[9] In the study of Volga Bulgharia, incidentally, aerial photography was used for the first time in 1973–1974 to identify potential archaeological sites, a method employed some decades earlier in the arid regions of Central Asia where possible features of interest would stand out more clearly on the ground.[10] The city of Bulghar itself has now seen what apparently is one of the first attempts to use ground-penetrating radar at Golden Horde sites to identify objects of potential interest.[11] It is likely that the application of such modern technology will substantially expand the database of archaeological material.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Identifying the ethnicity of those who left behind the remains found by archaeology can be a very problematic undertaking. The structural features of residential architecture tell us little about who may have inhabited the buildings, even though some residential complexes include, along with masonry buildings, evidence of yurts. Artifacts may or may not be revealing. A residence inhabited by a Christian might have a bronze amulet with a cross; certain kinds of jewelry have been sufficiently researched to suggest with some confidence that they were popular with a certain ethnic group.[12] Artifacts such as bronze mirrors are of some interest since they were widely appreciated across Eurasia (Figure 33.5).[13]

Many seem to have been modeled on those produced in East Asia but nonetheless can reasonably be seen as local products. In conjunction with certain other kinds of artifacts, they may point to the owners as having come from nomadic traditions. Ceramic evidence, which is more abundant, may distinguish elites from commoners but not tell us who they were.

Figure 33.5 Mirrors found in medieval steppe and settlement burials in Eastern Europe. Top: probable Polovtsian mirror. Middle and bottom: mirrors found in Volga Bulgharia, the designs imitating ones on mirrors made in China or Liao territories. Twin fish designs, associated with good fortune, were especially popular.
Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.

Burial rituals are extremely important. A great deal of emphasis in their study has focused on those that show evidence of Islamic tradition (the lack of burial inventory, bodies positioned so the face looks toward Mecca). This then distinguishes them from others that may have no Islamic features or perhaps suggest the mixing of Islamic with some non-Islamic traditions. It is more common that the non-Islamic burials contain artifacts, which can help to suggest cultural filiation. There are isolated burials scattered across the steppe, many of which have over-grave structures that



Figure 33.6 Two gravestones from fourteenth-century Bulghar, the Muslim one on the left commemorating a master goldsmith who died in 1317, the one on the right in Armenian commemorating a Christian "princess," Sarah, who died in 1321.
Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.

connect them with Central or East Asian nomadic tradition.[14] The largest numbers of burials excavated from the Golden Horde period are located in cemeteries near settlement sites. Such cemeteries may offer a cross-section of the inhabitants of an adjacent city, although it is possible that those who did not live in the city proper were buried there too. Inscriptions on tombstones naturally can reveal much: there is substantial epigraphic evidence from Muslim burials at Bulghar on the Volga; one of the striking exceptions is a tombstone inscribed in Armenian commemorating a woman buried there (Figure 33.6). This is but one bit of evidence about a significant Armenian presence in several Jochid cities.[15]

Furthermore, a number of craniological studies have been undertaken, with careful measurements at least suggesting distinctions between Europoid and Mongoloid features.[16] Such studies then have made possible the sculptural reconstruction of the individuals (the methods pioneered by M.M. Gerasimov in the 1930s and 1940s). This work has documented changes over time in the ethnic makeup of Jochid cities, where in the early decades, elite burials tended to have more Mongoloid features; later, after decades of ethnic mixing, the dominant features are Europoid. In Bulghar, the evidence from Muslim burials shows a very mixed population by the late fourteenth century, though the dominant characteristics for women are more Europoid than Mongoloid.[17] Of course, this is old methodology; one has to imagine more

could be done with osteological analysis. Certain skeletal features can tell us something about occupations (especially for those who rode a lot and who may have developed the muscles to draw a composite bow). So far, there seems to be no DNA analysis of human remains from Jochid sites.

Among the very interesting results from excavations are the studies of animal bones, whose large numbers can produce meaningful statistical comparisons and may reveal a great deal about the diet of the local population.[18] At Tsarevskoe, remains of cattle are significant, whereas at Selitrennoe remains of sheep and goats by far dominate. These data reinforce other evidence about the significance of settled agriculture and animal husbandry at the former site (which became important later than did Selitrennoe), as opposed to the pattern we might expect for a nomadic population. The Selitrennoe remains are analogous to those found at Qaraqorum in Mongolia. This does not necessarily mean that the city population there was composed of sedentarized nomads but may merely reflect the significance of the site's relationship to the nomadic *ordu* of the khan. In fact, urban populations of the Jochid cities seem to have been drawn from a wide array of nomadic and sedentary peoples, many of them forcibly relocated there.[19]

Relatively recently, archaeologists at Jochid sites have been using flotation for palynological study establishing evidence of local flora from their seeds.[20] The data reinforce what some of the contemporary descriptive accounts tell us about the products of local agriculture, where millet seems to have been the primary crop, but depending on the location, rye, wheat, and oats also were significant. We know from studies of other regions across Eurasia that grains were important in nomad diets. While it is difficult to say who exactly were the farmers, the settled populations in the Jochid Ulus clearly were engaged in significant agriculture, a fact that helps us understand why the khans promoted urban development.

CITIES AND SETTLEMENTS

In a now classic work on the historical geography of the Golden Horde, the archaeologist Vadim L. Egorov described some 110 settlement sites of various sizes and indicated another 30, mentioned in written sources but not yet located.[21] The most judicious recent reviews of the evidence agree that there surely are significant settlement sites yet to be found. A minority (and sharply criticized) view claims this greatly exaggerates the level of urbanization in the Golden Horde.[22] There is some agreement on a classification scheme by the area a settlement occupies.[23] What constitutes a city is also defined by the degree to which it has substantial archaeological strata in which a wide range of artifacts has been unearthed: the remains of significant buildings, evidence pointing to its possible political importance (e.g., with the minting of coins), and its involvement in craft production and trade.[24]

While there are several somewhat different periodizations of urban development in the Jochid Ulus, they all rest in the first instance on the numismatic evidence: the frequencies and types of excavated coins and/or the mint marks indicating where they were struck.[25] Moreover, there is a consensus that the peak of urban development occurred during the first half of the fourteenth century, interrupted by the period of political disorder in the 1360s and 1370s across much of the territory of the Golden Horde. The accession of Toqatamish in 1381 restored stability, but then

Figure 33.7 Silver coins minted in the Golden Horde.
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

his conflict with Timur (Tamerlane), ended with the latter's invasion and destruction of many of the cities in 1395.[26] Other kinds of archaeological evidence (for example, the destruction or changes in usage of buildings) coincide with what the coins reveal.

If the impact of Timur's invasion is clear enough, the earliest stages in this history are rather opaque. The often-sensational narrative accounts about the destruction inflicted by invading Mongol armies are not always confirmed by archaeological evidence.[27] Of particular interest in this regard is the fate of cities in what is now southern Kazakhstan. Otrar was one of the first targets of Chinggis Khan's invasion of Central Asia and, according to the written sources, was destroyed. Yet, both for it and neighboring Sauran, archaeology has failed to find evidence of mass destruction (perhaps mainly the citadels suffered?), and in any event there is plenty of evidence about the rapid revival of these cities in subsequent decades. While Bilar, the capital of Volga Bulgharia, never really recovered from the Mongol invasion, Bulghar did and thrived under Mongol rule down through the fourteenth century.

At Selitrennoe and Tsarevskoe, no layers of settlement can be confidently dated to the first decades of Mongol rule. The earliest minting of coins in the Jochid Ulus seems to have been at a site in Central Asia on the Syr Darya River and then at Otrar (as it recovered from the initial Mongol devastation). Coins also were issued at Bulghar, which was never the Mongol capital.[28] In all of these cases, the coinage seems to have been used primarily in the local economy. Recent finds suggest that coins were minted at Sarai as early as the 1260s (Figure 33.7).[29]

Probably the explanation for this silence regarding the earliest capital on the lower Volga is that the "capital" moved with the Khan in his annual migration up and down the river between summer and winter camps. Fedorov-Davydov has posited a parallel existence of nomadic and sedentary culture in the Horde, where the survival and development of cities reflected political decisions as well as economic considerations. In the early decades of Golden Horde history, the revenues from existing cities were sent to the Qa'an in Mongolia. Newly erected cities, where none had existed previously, could be under the direct control of the local rulers, not the imperial center. Thus, new cities were built using labor conscripted in part from the indigenous nomadic populations, such as the Qipchaqs, who were now being displaced from their traditional grazing grounds. The choice of the Aktuba for the capital, Sarai, was a logical one, given favorable vegetation and climate and access to key trade routes.

Other new cities of importance included: Ukek (Uvek) on the lower middle Volga, at a key crossing point on routes originating in the cities of the Crimea; Madzhar

(Majar), bordering the northern Caucasus in a region that became one of the important summer camps for the khans and with access to east–west trade routes; and Solkhat in the Crimea, which competed with established cities, such as Kaffa.

Controversy over the location of Sarai as the capital of the Jochid Ulus has increased in recent years since it is so difficult to match the evidence of written sources with that from archaeology. The narrative texts describe the Mongol capital but do not tell us exactly where it was.[30] The Sarai of one narrative might not necessarily be the Sarai of another (the name, after all, is a generic one). Medieval Russian chronicles tell of princes going to the Horde to see the khan, but do not say precisely where he was to be found. Medieval Italian maps confuse the matter further in their naming of cities on the Volga. Important as it is, numismatic evidence can be subject to differing interpretations. Minting of coins need not necessarily have taken place in a capital city; a number of mints were located in cities that never were the capital. We have money on which the inscriptions refer to Sarai, or Sarai al-Jadid (New Sarai), and Sarai al-Mahrus (Sarai the divinely protected), as well as coins bearing no mint location but likely also produced in the capital. While it has long been assumed that the coins of "New Sarai" were produced in a later capital (the site of Tsarevskoe), there is now an argument that all these inscriptions may refer only to a single mint location, the Selitrennoe site. Yet the absence of any evidence of occupation and coins there prior to the 1360s has raised the question of whether another site, yet little studied, at Krasnyi Yar, also on the Aktuba, might not have been the first capital established by Batu.[31] Once it arose, Selitrennoe in fact had an unbroken sequence of occupation down into the fifteenth century, unlike Tsarevskoe, which seems to have flourished mainly in the middle of the fourteenth century and then declined rather sharply beginning in the political disorders of the 1360s. Tsarevskoe never recovered from its destruction by Tamerlane, whereas Selitrennoe survived.

ARCHITECTURE

Even if planned and sponsored by the ruling Jochids, these new cities do not emulate the layout of the "classic" cities of many areas of Central Asia and the Middle East, which have a citadel, a residential and craft area (*shahristan*), and a suburban *rabad*. Otrar on the Syr Darya is an example.[32] When founded, Sarai and the other new cities lacked fortifications, presumably because Mongol rule ensured security. It was only at a later stage in their history, as the political environment deteriorated, that some of them acquired walls. In contrast, many of the cities strategically located on the periphery of Jochid territories and founded prior to the coming of the Mongols, were fortified. Examples include Bulghar (Map 33.2); Verkhnii and Nizhnii Dzhulat, in Alan territory, guarding the Terek River trade route and access through the mountains into Georgia.[33]

In the new cities of the southern steppes, the house complexes generally do not emulate the complex and extensive residential quarters found in many medieval Islamic cities, but rather developed out of an array of elite residences, around which then coalesced the residences of the ordinary population, craft districts, and the like. Both the simpler houses and the larger multiroom ones tended to be made of fired brick and had similar interior arrangements, with benches warmed by hot-air ducts,



Map 33.1 Map of Bulghar, showing the location of key remains and the line of fortifications. The Volga River is at the top. After: Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva. V. P. Semenov, ed., T. 6: Srednee i nizhnee Povolzh'e i Zavolzh'e. S.-Peterburg: Izdanie A. F. Devriena, 1901: 377.

these features typical of architecture found in areas of Central and northeast Asia and considered (in the context of the Golden Horde cities) to be "of the Mongolian type."[34] As Ballod had long ago documented, amenities included water piped into the city from the outside, available in cisterns or wells, and, as has now been discovered, in a few really large mansions, channeled into a courtyard with a basin or fountain in the middle.[35] The careful excavation of such a house in Selitrennoe, which was built toward the middle of the fourteenth century, revealed several stages of reconstruction, first with the division of larger connected rooms into smaller isolated ones,



Figure 33.8 The "palace" at Bulghar, which had small towers at the corners and apparently under-floor heating. A columned arcade ran around the courtyard. The remains as seen here in the photograph have been "restored" following excavation and protected from the elements by a modern roof.
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

then, in the 1260s–1270s, the gradual decay of the residence, with accumulations of rubbish, and, finally, the use of the remains of the abandoned house as a burial ground. With the exception of a rather modest structure at Bulghar (begun in the mid-thirteenth century, measuring 24 x 29 m, built of brick and stone, with an open central courtyard [Figure 33.8]), no convincing evidence has been found to document the existence of a royal palace in the Golden Horde.

Did one exist in Sarai as a place for ceremonial functions on the occasions when the khan was in residence in his camp near the city? One might at least hypothesize something akin to the situation in the Orkhon Valley in Mongolia, where there seems to have been a regular annual peregrination of the khan and his court, stopping at several different "palace" sites.[36]

The architecture of the major buildings clearly is analogous to structures in Islamic lands, though whether the architects had come from abroad, and if so by what routes, is a matter of conjecture. Seljuk architecture seems to have been the main inspiration, transmitted either via the Caucasus or through the Crimea.[37] This can be seen in the basic plan of mosques, baths, mausolea, and caravanserais; their architectural features, such as elaborate portals; and decorative elements. The baths, which obtained water through underground pipes, featured a hypocaust system of channeling hot air under the entire floor of the hot rooms (Figure 33.9).[38]



Figure 33.9 Baths at Bulghar; 1) Drawing of what subsequently was termed the Belaia palata (White Chamber), as seen in the expedition of Peter S. Pallas in 1768 (Source: Pallas, P.S. [1788] Puteshestvie po raznym provintsiiam Rossiiskago gosudarstva. Atlas, Sanktpeterburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk: Pl. VI); 2) mid-nineteenth-century lithograph of the then ruins of the White Chamber (Photo © Daniel C. Waugh); 3) the remains of another of the baths at Bulghar, the so-called Vostochnaia palata (Eastern Chamber) (Photo © Daniel C. Waugh); 4) a fluted stone basin that probably was in the central hall of either the "White Chamber" or another of the Bulghar baths; 5) ceramic water pipes excavated at Bulghar. Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.

Most such structures can now be studied only from the remains of foundations and bits and pieces of tiles and carved stone or stucco decorative elements. The surface outlines suggesting a buried wall led archaeologists to excavate a mosque at the settlement site of Vodianskoe on the Volga somewhat north of its confluence with the Aktuba River.[39] The town obviously was of some importance, with brick houses (some of them semi-dugouts) and metal workshops. Some of these previous structures were destroyed for the building of the mosque in the second half of the fourteenth century. Measuring 26 x 35 m, it had a substantial stone foundation, walls of baked brick, and a minaret whose roof was topped by turquoise tiles interlaced with stucco that had carved inscriptions. Carved stucco inscriptions framed the mihrab, in front of which was an area delineated by a wooden rail or screen. In the middle of that enclosure, a column obtained from some building of Late Antiquity had been erected, presumably as a Qur'an stand. Around and within the mosque there were a good many burials, mostly Muslim, though in one case with a sheep interred next to the deceased. Tamerlane's invading army destroyed Vodianskoe in 1395.

The prayer hall of the main congregational mosque at Selitrennoe measured approximately 36 x 36 m with 9 naves, the roof supported by 60 columns.[40] There was a massive portal on the north and an ablutions basin just inside the entrance. An unusual feature was a separate room on the north side, next to the portal, where some fragments of brilliant tile decoration have been found (Figure 33.10). Other finds of tile work, especially from Tsarevskoe, attest to the breadth and skill of artisans in the Jochid Ulus.[41]

The types and techniques varied, including mosaic faience, anchored on a white fritware body that imitates porcelain, and majolica, where the body might be off-white or colored clay. Some tiles have a molded surface design. Accomplished calligraphers produced the Quranic inscriptions. To a considerable degree, the styles and techniques can be traced to Iran. Technical analysis of examples from Bulghar places them closer to ones found in Khwarazm and adjoining areas than is the case for tiles found at the lower Volga sites, suggesting the possibility that the craftsmen who worked at Bulghar may have come from Urgench.[42] However, local tile production in the Golden Horde must have been the norm.

Unlike at Selitrennoe and Tsarevskoe, in other locations there is more to be said from surface remains of important buildings, which either were depicted by early visitors and/or have survived even to the present. For example, Solkhat in the Crimea preserves at least parts of mosques and a madrasa. There are a great many mausolea built in the Jochid period. Visitors to Madzhar in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries drew what in some cases seem to be quite accurate pictures of a number of them, whose features clearly are to be connected with analogous structures in Khwarazm and in Seljuk Anatolia (Figure 33.11).[43]

At least two minarets from the Jochid period survived more or less intact down into modern times, one at Verkhnii Dzhulat (destroyed in 1981) and the other, the so-called small minaret in Bulghar (its current height is 16.5 m), located next to a surviving mausoleum containing a good many anonymous elite burials (Figure 33.12).



Figure 33.10 Ceramic tiles from Golden Horde sites: 1, 3, 5, and 6) Bulghar; 2) Madzhar; 4) Tsarevskoe; 7) Selitrennoe (from the northern room of the Congregational mosque).
Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.

Bulghar in fact is the site of many important architectural remains: baths (preserved mainly in their foundations), the foundation of what is thought to have been a palace, and mausolea. Most of these structures have been thoroughly excavated, although there is some disagreement about their original appearance and the degree to which they may embody elements of earlier architectural traditions in Volga Bulgharia.[44] As we now see them, the mausolea have been altered considerably down through the centuries (Figure 33.13).


Pl. 14.
Plan, Elevation et profil, d'un Monument Sepulcral, executé, en briques, trouvé, à Mafslof Kiätt sur la rivière podkumka, près de Magas, au pied du Caucase.
Fragment, d'une inscription sepulcrale, trouvé dans une Chambre Souterraine, d'un monument sepulcral, existant à Mafslof Kiätt. Le Fragment est en bas-relief emploié sur une pierre degrasse.
Profil, hors de Terre du monument Sepulcral.
Elevation, hors de Terre, du monument Sepulcral.
Plan du Souterrain du monument Sepulcral.
Plan hors de Terre du monument Sepulcral.
Ligne de Terre Horizontale
Profil du Souterrain du monument Sepulcral.
Echelle de Six Toises.
levé sur le lieux par Alexandre Digfayo Architecte.
gravé par Huberti.

Figure 33.11 Lithographs illustrating Peter S. Pallas's description of his visit to Madzhar in 1793. While he saw still substantial architectural remains, watercolors of the site made by the Russian Mikhail M. Nekrasov in 1742 suggest that there was a lot more to be seen half a century prior to Pallas's visit. The architectural drawings and some of the other lithographs illustrating Pallas's travels rather idealize some of what he must have seen.
Source: P.S. Pallas (1799) Kupfer zu P.S. Pallas Neuen Reise in die südlichen Statthalterschaften des Russischen Reichs in den Jahren 1793 und 1794. Bd. 1. Leipzig: Gottfried Martini, 1799: Pls. 12, 13 (cropped, inset), 14.

Figure 33.12 The small minaret at Bulghar, variously dated to the thirteenth or fourteenth century. It is located next to the khan's mausoleum in an area where most of the architectural tiles have been found. The portal of the minaret is framed with interesting stone carving.
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

The most interesting structure at Bulghar is a large mosque whose distinctive architecture includes four circular bastions at the corners (Figure 33.14). It seems likely that either Caucasian or Anatolian models influenced the reconstruction in the fourteenth century whose remains are what we see today.

That said, while the planning of such major buildings seems indebted to outside influences, there certainly is evidence of accommodation to local tastes and to the necessity of finding building materials locally. Thus, in Bulghar and the Crimea, construction was in stone, rather than in fired brick, as was the case in the steppe regions. Carved stone inscriptions and decorative elements have been found at a number of the sites of religious buildings.

Figure 33.13 Mausolea in Bulghar: bottom left, the so-called Chernaia palata (Black Chamber), whose function as a mausoleum has been questioned by a few scholars and whose restoration has been criticized; bottom right and top, the Eastern Mausoleum, with a view of its burial crypt. It long served as a Christian chapel in the Russian Empire. The current roof is a modern one designed to approximate the appearance of the original pyramidal or conical masonry one, typical for many of the fourteenth-century Islamic mausolea.
Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.

The role of government in city development and the construction of many of these buildings can be reasonably hypothesized, as especially is the case with a string of caravanserais placed at regular intervals between Khwarazm and Saraichuk, just north of the Caspian Sea (Map 33.2).[45] Located at water sources, these buildings made travel directly across the deserts of the Ustiurt Plateau possible. There is substantial unity in the plans and structural features. Probably their construction took place in the first half of the fourteenth century during the apogee of the Golden Horde under Özbeg Khan. At least one of the buildings, constructed of stone with some carved decoration, has parallels to Armenian architecture of the period, when Armenian architects also were commissioned to build in Islamic polities.



Figure 33.14 The congregational mosque at Bulghar. But for the base, the minaret is modern reconstruction. The building with the pyramidal roof in the center is the Eastern Mausoleum, not part of the mosque. The insert shows the onsite drawing offering a possible reconstruction of the original appearance of the mosque at the end of the fourteenth century. At top is a piece of the original carved stone portal and a rather eroded capital for one of the columns of the prayer hall. Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.



Map 33.2 Trade Routes to Khwarazm. Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd. Source: Based on map of Emma D. Zilivinskaia.

TRADE AND MATERIAL CULTURE

As the evidence from architecture suggests, the international connections of the Jochid Ulus were very important, and there is much else in the archaeological record and the written sources to support the now well-established view regarding the importance of its international trade.[46] Whether promotion of trade was the main *raison d'être* for the establishment of the new cities and the caravanserais may be disputed – certainly there were political and other considerations as well. Even if the rare finds of gold coins should not be taken to indicate they were regularly used in commerce, dinars struck in the Delhi sultanate and a florin (from Florence) dated 1329 are reminders of Ibn Battuta's evidence that annually thousands of horses were exported to India and the Florentine Pegalotti's oft-quoted description of the route through the Jochid Ulus as the best way to China (Figures 33.15 and 33.16).

Much of the material evidence relates to the consumption patterns and tastes of the elite. Leonard Nedashkovskii's recent work incorporating the urban hinterlands reminds us, though, that domestic exchange, some of it undoubtedly in prosaic necessities, was an important part of the commerce of the Horde. As evidence from sites such as Vodianskoe suggests, substantial numbers of copper coins, whose minting peaked in the fourteenth century, is evidence of the importance of domestic commerce, even though one can assume far from all transactions required money.[47]

Figure 33.15 Gold dinars of the Delhi sultans excavated in the Golden Horde. Left to right: Muhammad Shah II Iskander al-Sani (1295–1315); Kutb al-Din Mubarak Shah (718 AH; 1318 CE); three coins of Muhammad III Shah (1325–1351), the first dated 741 AH (1340/1341).
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

Figure 33.16 Gold florin (Florence), 1329, found at Bulghar in 1863.
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

Since ceramics (most commonly in shards) survive to be excavated, there is a great deal of evidence about their manufacture and distribution.[48] Apart from architectural tiles, discussed earlier, almost every common type of ware was made in the Horde, many of the designs inspired presumably by imported items. One exception would seem to be that the refined Iranian lusterware associated with Kashan was not replicated (Figure 33.17).

Figure 33.17 Golden Horde Ceramics: 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8 Selitrennoe; 3, 4, 7, 9, and 10 Bulghar.
No. 10 is imported Iranian lusterware; the other vessels presumably were all produced in the Golden Horde.
Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh, images not in uniform scale.

Any town, and even some small settlements, might have its own workshop, where red or other colored clays (as opposed to the more refined white frit, composed of ground quartz and white clay) formed the body of both glazed and unglazed vessels.[49] In the early decades of the Horde, the ceramics craftsmen probably were conscripted from the Crimea or Caucasus, bringing their techniques and designs with them, but over time the designs were adapted to local tastes. The kilns in the larger cities undoubtedly produced certain of the more elegant and expensive wares that were traded beyond their immediate region. Perhaps the most recognizable Jochid ceramics are the dishes that might have a geometric or animal design in the center, surrounded by a distinct pattern of "droplets" and dots with splashes of turquoise and blue (Figure 33.17 #1, 7, 8, 9).

At least some of these have been found outside of the central territories of the Jochid Ulus, for example, in the Russian principalities.[50] For the period up to the middle of the fourteenth century, imports of "Eastern" ceramics into Rus' were rare, probably transmitted by Mongol administrators or individuals sent on a mission to the Horde. For brief decades starting in the middle of the fourteenth century, though, the products of the Volga kilns dominated the flow of "eastern" wares into Rus', in quantities suggesting they were objects of trade.

The manufacture and trade in glass objects in certain ways is analogous to the picture for ceramics.[51] So far, few glass workshops have been found (one at Selitrennoe, one at Bulghar), the evidence suggesting that they produced products such as multicolored bracelets, pendants, and rings that circulated widely, even amongst the nomads in the territory of the Horde (Figure 33.18).

Moreover, some of the glass production was exported, judging from finds in the Rus' principalities. While there are finds of expensive and technically sophisticated glassware, such as vessels with enameling and gold decoration, it seems likely that they were imports, probably from Iran, Central Asia, or Egypt. The chemical composition of the glass produced in the Jochid Ulus is similar to that of Central Asian workshops, leading to the hypothesis that those who made the glass in the Volga region may have come from there. Moreover, it is possible that some of the raw materials were imported.

The artistic tastes of the Jochid elite were reflected in personal accoutrements. Skilled metalworking is evident in many of the towns where excavations have uncovered many stone molds used to cast jewelry (Figure 33.19).

There are stunning gold, silver, and bejeweled objects, often lacking an archaeological context, as is the case of one of the most spectacular finds, a hoard found during construction work in Simferopol, Crimea, in the 1960s (Figure 33.20).[52]

It contains gold and silver belt plaques, decorations for a woman's headdress, accoutrements made from as far away as Italy and Egypt and both imitation and actual gold coins (including ones minted in India) to which loops have been added so they could be worn as jewelry. A Mongol *gerege* (badge of authority) issued by Kildibek Khan in 1361 suggests the collection might have belonged in the family of a Mongol administrator, but it is impossible to know exactly when and by whom the collection was put together. The hoard's filigree applique with the knot representing good fortune has many analogies in other parts of the Mongol Empire. The challenges in determining the provenance of such objects of conspicuous consumption are well illustrated by one of the gold belt cups

Figure 33.18 Glass found at Bulghar, presumably all produced in the Golden Horde. Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.

associated with the Mongol elite whose handle is in the shape of a dragon's protoma (Figure 33.21).

Several analogous cups have been found in Jochid territories. This one was found somewhere in (western?) Siberia in the early eighteenth century.[53] The dragon motif, of course, has a long history across Asia, emblematic of imperial power. The given example is stylized to the extent that it likely was created by a craftsman who was not familiar with the more precise models such as one might see on the ceramics of the Yuan or Ming period in China. The designs engraved around the rim and the lotus in the medallion of the bowl have affinities to imagery known among the Tangut and Khitans, but at some remove and likely filtered via Central Asia or the Middle East. The Turkic inscription (written in Arabic script) around the inside of the bowl indicates a date of 617 AH/1220–1221 CE). However, it is inscribed in a mirror image, suggesting that it must have been added by someone who did not know the language or script and simply calqued it from another object. Stylistic

Figure 33.19 Stone molds for making jewelry and other decorative metal objects, found at Bulghar.
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

Figure 33.20 Items from the Simferopol Hoard found in the 1960s.
Source: Photos © Daniel C. Waugh.

Figure 33.21 Gold belt cup with dragon protome and mirror image of Islamic inscription in bowl. Found near Tobol'sk in Siberia. After Ia.I. Smirnov, ed., Vostochnoe serebro. Atlas drevnei serebrianoi i zolotoi posudy vostochnogo proiskhozhdeniia, naidennoi preimushchestvenno v predelakh Rossiiskoi imperii. Izdanie Imperatorskoi Arkheologicheskoi Kommissii ko dniu piatidesiatiletiia eia deiatel'nosti, Sanktpeterburg, 1909, ill. 231, colorized by Daniel C. Waugh.

analysis in fact suggests the cup is probably of later date. The comparisons of the motifs with their presumed ultimate sources in East Asia suggests that, as with many other examples from the arts of the Mongol period, the craftsmen and artists of Central or Western Asia did not always understand (or simply did not care to reproduce precisely) the imagery in the sources for their inspiration, even if they had the opportunity to see the Chinese or other East Asian works of art.[54]

Unfortunately, the relatively poor preservation of perishable organic materials in Jochid graves limits our ability to document some aspects of its material culture. Textiles are an example, where fragmentary finds have been made at Selitrennoe



Figure 33.22 A portion of the silk head covering excavated in a late fourteenth-century female burial in Bulghar; following conservation and restoration.
Source: Photo © Daniel C. Waugh.

and several sites along the Volga.[55] A late fourteenth-century elite female burial in Bulghar contained a reasonably well-preserved head covering cum shawl, remarkable for the fact the garment was sewn using several different kinds of silk (Figure 33.22).[56] It gleamed from the use of gold thread and golden appliques. Some of the silk may have come from Egypt, some from other parts of the Mediterranean world or Central Asia and some from China. The deceased was not buried according to Muslim ritual, this in a city where Islam was well established, where there were members of the Mongol ruling elite, and also a substantial population of the indigenous Mordvinians. In short, here in a microcosm is a window into the multiethnic and multicultural nature of the Golden Horde.

It has been too easy in some ways to invoke this history and material culture in the name of ethno-nationalism. As Konstantin A. Rudenko has explained, the richness of the evidence from Bulghar and its region has encouraged ideas about Bulghar exceptionalism.[57] A good deal of the current literature on the Golden Horde treats it as a distinct "civilization," at the risk of exaggerating the distinctive features of its culture.[58] The material record, though, certainly reinforces what we have known from the written sources about the (granted, forcible) incorporation of different ethnic groups into the new Mongol-ruled polity. One can see how many features of the culture of the small ruling elite were maintained alongside a range of cultures

of indigenous nomadic and sedentary peoples and how conscription and interaction with the world beyond introduced cultural change. As one might expect, borrowings were adapted; there was substantial evolution over time and syncretism. While by no means universal, sedentarization occurred. Whether this all adds up to the creation of a new "civilization" is a subject for further discussion.

NOTES

1 The current essay focuses on material from the territories directly administered by the Jochid Ulus in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and does not attempt to deal with archaeological evidence regarding the Horde's impact on the Rus' principalities. For the Rus' territories, see Waugh 2017, 16–19. The history of earlier excavations normally is reviewed in the opening sections of any more recent work discussing the same site; see, for example, Khlebnikova 1987; Fedorov-Davydov 1994, Ch. 2; Nedashkovskii 2010, Ch. 1; Rudenko 2014, devoted entirely to the archaeology and historiography of Volga Bulgharia. For up-to-date essays summarizing and generalizing from the evidence of material culture, see *ITDV* 2009 and *ZOVMI*. The most valuable of these essays have also been listed separately in the bibliography. Excellent color illustrations of the arts of the Golden Horde may be found in *Sokrovishcha Zolotoi Ordy* 2000, *Zolotaia Orda: Istoriia i kul'tura* 2005, *Dschingis Khan* 2005, 222–240, and *Zolotaia Orda i Prichernomor'e* 2019.
2 Ballod 1923a, 1923b.
3 Savel'ev 2012.
4 Fedorov-Davydov 1984, 33–57; Fedorov-Davydov 1994, 45–67; Fedorov-Davydov 2001b, 65, 73–76, 82–84.
5 Much of Fedorov-Davydov 1966 is devoted to systematization and classification for steppe burials; Fedorov-Davydov 2001a is devoted largely to ceramics found in city sites; his 1987 article pulls together what was known at that time about coinage at Bulghar. Leonid F. Nedashkovskii's publication (2000) of the results of excavation at the city site of Ukek, on the outskirts of Saratov, emulates Fedorov-Davydov's approach in devoting Ch. 1 to the numismatic material and in Ch. 2 systematically classifying the various other artifacts.
6 Nedashkovskii 2000; Nedashkovskii 2010; Nedashkovskii2013.
7 Pigarev 2016; Pigarev 2018.
8 Zilivinskaia and Vasil'ev 2016, 654.
9 Rudenko 2014, 168.
10 Igonin and Khalikov 1976.
11 Nasyrtdinov et al. 2017.
12 Poluboiarinova 2009.
13 Fedorov-Davydov 1966, 78–84; Nedashkovskii and Rakushin 1998; Rudenko 2015.
14 Kostiukov 2009.
15 Volkov 2009.
16 Iablonskii 2009.
17 Gazimzianov 2015.
18 Iavorskaia 2007.
19 Zeleneev 2013; Bulatov 1976, 98; Maslovskii 2013a; Maslovskii 2013b; Rudenko 2013.
20 Aleshinskaya and Spiridonova 2004; Lebedeva 2004; Nedashkovskii 2009; Nedashkovskii2016a.
21 Egorov 1985.
22 Blokhin 2007; cf Zilivinskaia and Vasil'ev 2016, 650.
23 Nedashkovskii 2010, 15.
24 Zilivinskaia and Vasil'ev 2016, 651.

25 See above, n. 5.
26 Zilivinskaia and Vasil'ev 2016, 637–639.
27 Smagulov 2011, 72–77; Waugh 2017; cf., however, Baipakov 2016, 529–530, 555–556.
28 Petrov 2016, 620–621.
29 Petrov et al. 2018; Pachkalov 2007; Singatullina 1998.
30 Il'ina 2007; Izmailov and Zeleneev 2009; Zilivinskaia and Vasil'ev 2016, 645–646.
31 Pachkalov 2007; Pachkalov 2011; but cf. Pigarev 2016.
32 Baipakov 2013, 105–120.
33 Krasnov 1987; Kuznetsov 2014, 8–11; Zilivinskaia 2015, 109–113.
34 Zilivinskaia 2011, 95, 115–116.
35 Fedorov-Davydov 1994, 54–57; Fedorov-Davydov 2001b, 73–75.
36 Shiraishi 2004.
37 Zilivinskaia 2011; Zilivinskaia 2014; Zilivinskaia2016.
38 Zilivinskaia 2011, 59–91.
39 Egorov and Fedorov-Davydov 1976.
40 Zilivinskaia 2014, 24–27.
41 Noskova 1976; Noskova 2001; Izmailov and Sattarova 2009, 628–634; Fedorov-Davydov 1976, 107–133.
42 Noskova 2001, 305.
43 Zilivinskaia 2014, 120–127, 364–372.
44 See *Gorod Bolgar* 2001 for excavation details and extensive illustrations; cf. Zilivinskaia 2014; Zilivinskaia 2016.
45 Zilivinskaia 2017.
46 Boldyreva 2016; Koval' 2013; Nedashkovskii 2015, 2016b; Poluboiarinova 2013; Rudenko 2018; Seidaliev and Seidalieva 2017.
47 Egorov and Fedorov-Davydov 1976, 164–167.
48 Kramarovskii 2005, 137–147. Particular categories of ceramics have received special attention (e.g., Naumenko et al. 2017); imports are among the most frequently cited evidence regarding international trade (e.g., Koval' 2013). While his focus is on ceramics found in the Rus' principalities, not in the territories of the Golden Horde, the most ambitious technically sophisticated effort to classify "oriental" ceramics in the larger region is that by Koval' 2010. Many of them came from or via the Golden Horde and its successor states (see esp. pp. 192–198 and Plates 20–24, 26, 31–37, 57–61, 74). For a recent analysis hypothesizing a Golden Horde connection to explain how a Chinese celadon made it to Novgorod far in the north, see Rodionova and Frenkel' 2018.
49 Bulatov 1976.
50 Koval' 2010, 194–195.
51 Valiulina and Nedashkovskii 2009, 274–275; Busiatskaia 1976; Poluboiarinova 2006.
52 *Sokrovishche* 2000, 288–289.
53 Kramarovskii 2000, 161–166.
54 Kadoi 2009.
55 see, e.g., Orfinskaya et al. 2004; Orfinskaya and Lantratova 2011.
56 Fedotova et al. 2015.
57 Rudenko 2017.
58 e.g., *ITDV* 2009, 551–558; Kramarovskii 2005.

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ZOVMI, See List of Abbreviations.

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PART VIII

RELIGION

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CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

SHAMANS AT THE COURT OF THE QA'AN

Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog

Shamans profess to gain power and knowledge by entering into the benevolent and often malevolent spiritual world. The shamanistic tradition of the Mongols is centered in worshiping *Tenggeri* (heaven) with its chief deity, *Qormusta Tenggeri*.[1] Various aspects of *Tenggeri* worship are described in historical sources, particularly in *The Secret History of the Mongols*. These aspects included predicting natural calamities, like solar or lunar eclipses, and communing with spirits to penetrate into the minds traveling through space and time. They performed scapulimancy for predicting wars, overcoming causes of human and social troubles, as well as performing fire purification ceremonies.[2]

ROLE OF THE SHAMAN

John Andrew Boyle, in his article "Turkish and Mongolian Shamanism in the Middle Ages," explained the etymology and meaning of the term *shaman*, stating the Tungusic origin of the word; the Turks call their shamans *qam* and the Mongols *bö'e*.[3] According to Ch. Dalai, *qam* and its derivation as *qan* and *gan'* stand for *khan* in Mongolian, as a leader of a clan.[4]

The clan-based Mongolian society of the thirteenth century possessed a complex spiritual hierarchy, and it was common for the shamans to claim a leadership position within the major clans. This work claims that the internal strife within the golden lineage (*altan urugh*) was provoked through the assistance of shamans to eliminate one or another contestant to the throne.

A review of modern literature concerning shamanism in Mongolia reveals a more anthropological understanding of the spiritual framework of shamanistic ideas, reading and explaining the shamanistic rituals from the various traditions of modern Mongolia. I aim to view the role of shamans from a historical perspective, their manifestation in the time of the *Yeke Monggol Ulus*. Undoubtedly, shamanism in Mongolia predates the time of Chinggis Khan, as the Chinese of the Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE) feared the soothsayers of the Xiongnu Empire.[5] The major studies of

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early Mongolian shamanism by D. Bazarov, Ch. Dalai, B. Rinchen, S. Badamkhatan, Kh. Buyanbat, D. Mansan, and O. Purev, trace its origins to the Paleolithic era and to the matriarchal lineage of the Mongols.[6] Among these scholars, the Sinologist Ch. Dalai gives several terms for shamanism from Chinese sources of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, where *samao* stands for a female shaman.[7]

Many of these female shamans assumed high positions within their tribes and were called *Eduggen/Idughan*.[8] The modern name for a female shaman – *Udgan* – is derived from this term. However, during the twelfth century, the chieftain of a clan and tribe [whether female or male] was called *beki*.[9] In the *Codex Cumanicus*, a handbook of Qipchaq or Cuman language compiled in Crimea at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the term for a female shaman is rendered *qam qatun*, or lady.[10]

Persian, Latin, and Armenian sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries mentioned the shamanistic rituals as the magical practice of soothsayers or as sorcery.[11] Juvayni says that the *qam* (his term for shamanism) was a discipline of magic, art, and astrology; and the Mongols were obedient to the words of those who performed *qam*.[12] While Juvayni and others may have viewed the shamans as sorcerers, the Mongol shamans were primarily concerned with communing with Tenggeri, and it was distinct from sorcery, although for special cases, such as overcoming natural calamities and human illness, it had some elements of black magic as well.

According to William of Rubruck, there was an entire group of shamans, headed by a chief, who resided at a designated place within the qa'an's *ordu*, and a yurt for the *beki* was built in front of the qa'an's ger.[13] The influential political role of the *beki* at the Mongol court and the dual function of shamans as leaders of the clan and as ritualistic performers within the Chinggisid clan caused a complication in the process of building a united *ulus*. Although it is known that, with the help of Altan, Sacha, and Quchar, the *beki*s of Qiyat Borjigid lineage, Chinggis Khan was able to rise over the Mongol tribes in 1206,[14] but the process of unification lasted until 1209. Chinggis Khan's primary focus was to rearrange the social strata of clan-based nomadic society, in which the shamans or *beki*s were still important as chiefs. To eliminate the role of tribal leaders, he introduced a new system of military-civil society where a military unit of a thousand *irgen* (members of society) would be the foundation of the new-born *ulus*, and each member of this society, whether a noble or ordinary person, could serve as a soldier. In this system, the political, legal, and religious aspects were designed to be supportive and coherent to each other. Chinggis Khan himself chose 95 persons as military commanders of thousands, according to their merits and skills.[15] In reality, these commanders replaced most of the *beki*s in *quriltai*s and therefore in the decision-making process. From this period onward, the aristocratic strata of nomadic society was not drawn from the heads of former tribes but from the commanders (*noyans*).

This reform had the far-reaching goal of shaping the religious life of the nomads. The primary purpose of the nomads' worship was to recognize the absolute power of *Qormusta Tenggeri* or *Möngke Tenggeri* (eternal heaven). The shamans were mediators who read the signs or edicts of *Tenggeri*, which was the main qualification of the shamans' importance. In the *quriltai* of 1206, the chief shaman Teb Tenggeri, a son of Mönglik of Qongqotan lineage and a chief shaman of that time, proclaimed

Temüjin to be recognized by heaven. However, Chinggis Khan saw Teb Tenggeri, and his power to read and interpret the will of heaven, as an adversary to him and a threat to his rise as the leader of a unified state. Therefore, Chinggis Khan realized that he could invoke the idea of the absolute power of eternal heaven himself to justify his reign and thus to be recognized by others. According to *The Secret History of the Mongols*, Temüjin's affiliation to the supreme power was revealed by a blood clot in his hand at the time of his birth, the charisma shown in his face and eyes, and his success in warfare, which were supposedly decreed by heaven.[16]

The shamans surely opposed the usurpation of their office by Chinggis Khan. Although Teb Tenggri understood he was in great danger and attempted to sow discord among the members of the Chinggisid clan, Chinggis Khan allowed his brother Otchigin to solve this problem by organizing a wrestling competition, in which Teb Tenggeri's spine was broken and, thus, he was killed.[17] This act was seen as *Tenggeri*'s displeasure with Teb Tenggri.[18]

Although another shaman was appointed as *beki*, the khan prayed directly to heaven and performed divination by using scapulae on his own. *Möngke Tenggeri* or a heavenly mandate became the conventional object of worship within the *Yeke Monggol Ulus*, which did not seek to place shamanism over the other religions. People of any religion could act freely, provided that their doctrine or dogma did not contradict the state ideology. Chinggis Khan's descendants who were recognized as the "golden lineage," developed this idea in a more sophisticated form of tolerance to any religion, whether it was Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, or Daoism.

SHAMANS AND POLITICS

After the death of Chinggis Khan, however, this ideology of a heavenly mandate transformed into the worship of the khan and the khan's deeds and, once again, the shamans became powerful at the qa'an's court and the princely houses. The shamans would be seated uppermost in the noble assembly and received the offerings. Although their role as chiefs lessened, they were given greater influence behind the political scenes. Their ability to read heaven's will could still be directed against the royal household. This occurred during Ögödei's reign (1229–1241), when shamans were involved actively in the death of Tolui, the youngest son of Chinggis Khan in 1232. *The Secret History of the Mongols* claims that the youngest brother voluntarily sacrificed his life to save Ögödei from a fatal illness and drank magical water, used to wash the body of his brother. According to the shamans, the evil spirits of earth and water maligned Ögödei during his campaign in north China, and thus one of the khan's family members had to be sacrificed, namely, Tolui.[19]

Why Tolui? In my view, Tolui (1191–1232/1233) was the strongest figure among the sons of Chinggis Khan. Rashid al-Din states that Tolui had no peer in bravery, courage, strategy, and tactics.[20] From a very young age, he was involved in the battles of his father, who consulted him and called him *nökör* [liege man]; he participated in campaigns against the Jin dynasty in 1213; he took Bukhara and Samarqand with his father in 1219; was in Khurasan, Nishapur, and Merv in 1220–1221; battled against Xi Xia in 1227; and from 1227 to 1230 he was regent in lieu of his brother's appointment. After his father's death, as the youngest son, he inherited the homelands and commanded the largest and most powerful army in central Mongolia.[21] Tolui,

along with Sübedei, planned and commanded Ögödei's campaign against the Jin dynasty in 1231–1232, successfully besieging Kaifeng, the capital of Jin.

The majority of the Mongol nobles supported Tolui's right to inherit Chinggis Khan's property. Nevertheless, Ögödei was chosen as the successor of Chinggis Khan. The division of power between the two brothers provoked conflict over *irgen* (people) and land. Nevertheless, the division of *irgen* was "amicably" agreed between the two brothers, and Tolui obeyed his father's wish and supported Ögödei and remained near him, unlike the Jochids and Chaghadaids, who stayed at a distance. But traditions surrounding the transmission of power were on Tolui's side, as the youngest son. Thus, the shamans, who regained power in the qa'an's court, orchestrated the elimination of a skillful opponent of Ögödei. Thus, Tolui's death can be seen as a case of politically motivated assassination among the Chinggisids with the direct involvement of the shamans behind the scenes. Ögödei's grief over the youngest brother's death was short.

This murder was a key moment for the Toluids and occasioned bloody retribution when they rose to power against the Ögödeids. Indeed, Tolui's sons, Möngke, Qubilai, Ariq Böke, and Hülegü, shaped the destiny of the Mongol Empire.

With the rise of the Toluids, the shamans remained important in performing the common rituals for treating misfortunes, while also detecting and averting them in princely courts. Shamanism was intricately connected with the daily life of the Mongols, whether royal or common people. Yet the Toluids' religious policy was enriched by the recognition of other beliefs. Thus, the shamans were obliged to coexist with the Christian, Buddhist, and Islamic clergy. It is interesting to speculate whether Möngke Qa'an intended to win the hearts of the shamans since there is no evidence except for the witchcraft of the Muslim lady Fatima Khatun.[22] It is not known whether Möngke's purge after his enthronement included the shamans as well.

The scholarship of N. Ishjamts and Ch. Dalai indicates that Möngke's preferred faith was shamanism, which is supported by the *Yuan shi*.[23] However, it is difficult to prove that Möngke favored the shamans. He knew his father, Tolui, died because of the shamans' conspiracies. In one instance, one of Möngke's court ladies, who was Christian, became ill, and the shaman accused the lady's maid of being a witch and of conspiring to kill her. A shaman once predicted that a newborn son of Möngke would be a great khan and that he would have a long life; however, the prince died soon after this occasion. The mother of the child became furious and punished the shaman.[24] The qa'an left his court for a month to avoid the shaman's spell.[25]

One can claim that Möngke Qa'an was a Buddhist, due to a Tibetan source that states that Möngke Qa'an appointed the Buddhist Garma *bagshi* (teacher) as a state teacher.[26] In Christian sources, the Mongol qa'an was a Christian, since he dispatched his brother Hülegü to liberate Jerusalem, if we believe Hayton, the Armenian historian.[27] In 1254, Rubruck, visiting Möngke Qa'an's court, met the Christian Armenian monk who was prepared to baptize the Mongol qa'an, whose mother, Sorqoqtani, was a Nestorian Christian.[28] Therefore, it is difficult to state that Möngke was a believer in shamanism. Throughout his reign, all religions flourished. When Rubruk visited Qaraqorum, he noticed 12 Buddhist monasteries, 2 Islamic mosques, and several Christian churches.[29]

Möngke initiated religious debates between Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist clergy. Many religious scholars participated in these debates, but no shamans.[30] However, in a later period, the shamans performed calendric rituals alongside

Christian Nestorian priests and joined the Tibetan Buddhist monks in the ancestral temple worship.[31] In general, when the court of the khans was dominated by either Buddhist *bagshi*s or Muslim teachers, shamans left the court and practiced their rituals among the common people.

CONCLUSION

During the reign of successive states, whether the Yuan or Ilkhanid court, the sources speak more of Buddhists among the royal family, alongside the Christian and Muslim converts. Yet shamanism remained an important aspect of the culture and ideology of the Mongols. Shamanistic rituals were incorporated into the daily life of the Mongols, but the immediate involvement of the shamans in the political arena was curtailed for good.

NOTES

1 *Qormusta* is to be equated with *Ahura Mazda*, the chief Iranian (Zoroastrian) god.
2 Purev and Gurbadar 2006, 26. Rubruck, 240.
3 Boyle 1972, 177–193.
4 Далай 1959, 15.
5 Barfield 1989, 65.
6 Базаров 1846; Ч. Далай 1959; Ринчен 1962; Бадамхатан 1965; Буянбат 1985; Мансан 1990; Пүрэв 1998; Пүрэв 2000. For more on shamanism, see Бум-Очир 2002, 2–7.
7 Далай 1959, 5.
8 *Eduggen/Idughan* is the name of a female spirit that means *origin*.
9 *Beki* is also a title for a princess. The shift from female shamans to male shamans can be explained by the shift in labor distribution, Далай 1959, 14.
10 Boyle 1972, 179.
11 *HWC*, 59; Rubruck, 240–241; Blake and Frye 1949, 289.
12 *HWC*, 59.
13 Rubruck, 240–241.
14 *SHM* §123.
15 *SHM* §202.
16 *SHM* §62.
17 This event happened around the 1210s. *SHM* §244–245.
18 *SHM*, §246.
19 *SHM* §272.
20 RDT, 375.
21 RDT, 377–378.
22 Especially when it was revealed that the death of Köten, the brother of Güyük, was due to the witchcraft of Fatima Khatun, the confidant of Töregene Khatun, wife of Ögödei Qa'an and mother of Güyük. See Golev 2017, 132–144.
23 Ишжамц 1974, 124; Далай 2006, 257.
24 Rubruck, 243.
25 Rubruck, 244.
26 Бүгд Найрамдах Монгол Ард Улсын Түүх, УБ., ШУАХ., 1966, 271.
27 Hayton. Online. Available at www.attalus.org/armenian/hetumtoc.html (accessed 18 August 2019.
28 Rubruck, 222–223.
29 Rubruck, 221.

30 Энхчимэг 2015, 79.
31 Энхчимэг 2015, 226–235.

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HWC, See List of Abbreviations.

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RDT, See List of Abbreviations.

Rubruck, See List of Abbreviations.

SHM, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE

NESTORIAN CHRISTIANITY AMONG THE MONGOLS

Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog

Nestorian Christianity spread among the Altaic tribes, such as the Naiman, Merkit, Önggüt, Uyghurs, and Kereit, and made significant inroads among the Mongols during the eleventh century. We lack clear evidence about the introduction of Christianity to the Mongols; however, the historical sources of the thirteenth century and archaeological evidence found in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, PRC, may shed light on the influence of Nestorianism among the Mongols. It is possible to describe the features of Turco-Mongol Christianity with reference to this source material.

The term 'Nestorian' describes Syriac-speaking minorities based initially in the region of Mesopotamia, what is now Iraq and Iran. The term also stands for the religion of these people, usually referred to as the Church of the East. Among the early followers were Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds, Persians, and Arabs. Named after Nestorius, a Persian bishop of Constantinople in 428–431 CE, Nestorian Christians were called 'East Syrians' to distinguish them from 'Western Syrians' – the Monophysites or the Jacobites. The Nestorians profess the duality of Christ's nature: divine and human. They rejected a union of God and man; thus, Mary was considered the mother of a man, not God. The Church of the East has much in common with Eastern Rites and Eastern Orthodox churches.

Before discussing the spread of Nestorian Christianity among the Mongols, it is important to note the invention of a Mongol script derived from Syriac. Condemned by the other churches as heretics due to the teachings of Nestorius, many fled to Persia. From this base, the East Syrian Church began to spread across the Silk Road, reaching Sogdia in the eighth century. The Sogdians adopted the Aramaic (old Syriac) script to compose Buddhist texts, which further helped to spread Syriac writing to the Uyghurs and Mongols. The teaching of the Holy Bible by Nestorian bishops or *mar*s written in *Estrangela* letters (the oldest, classical form of the Syriac alphabet) had a far-reaching result. The script allowed the Uyghurs to form their own characters whilst still making use of the vertical writing position instead of the horizontal Semitic one. The recent linguistic studies of Ts. Shagdarsurung demonstrate that the Mongols adopted the vertical script simultaneously with the Uyghurs.[1]

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Later, the Kalmyks and Manchus adopted the Mongol script. The Syriac writing system demonstrates the influence of the Nestorian Christians in Central Asia.

Under Mongol rule, scribal activities among the Turkic Christians more or less followed the Syriac or Nestorian tradition, using Syriac or Sogdian characters to express the local languages. Such cases are found in the territory that stretches from Semirechie to Inner Mongolia and South China.

MANUSCRIPTS AND HISTORICAL COMPILATIONS

The 'conversion' of the nomads to Christianity occurred as a result of missionary activity carried out among the Turkic tribes of Maru (Merv). In fact, there were three waves of Christian conversion among the Turks. The first is mentioned in the *Khuzistan Chronicle* or the *Guidi Chronicle* (ca. 660–680). Although the source does not give the date, scholars situate this event in 644.[2] The second wave of Turkic conversions occurred in Turkistan around 781/782 and was led by the Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I (727/728–823).[3] This second wave may have laid a foundation for the later activities of the Eastern Church in Central Asia as far as China. The third conversion is recounted by Mari ibn Sulayman, the Christian Arab, in his *Kitab al-Majdal* (Book of the Tower), written in 1214, and by Bar Hebraeus in his *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum*, written in 1286. Both sources attribute the spread of Christianity among the Turks to 'Abdisho, another Metropolitan of Merv.[4]

The sources refer in general terms to the conversion of the steppe people, namely, the Kereit, to Christianity in 1007. It is believed that envoys from the Kereit tribe reached the metropolitan of Merv in the eleventh century.[5] Their purpose was to request that missionaries be dispatched to their leader. 'Merv' refers to a river, a city, and a region that served as a crossroad for communication between sedentary and nomadic people on the Silk Road. It was also a centre for the missionary enterprise of the Eastern Church.[6] From the correspondence of the metropolitan of Merv and Patriarch John IV, it is clear that the leader of the Kereit was converted to Christianity.[7] Christian traders may have been among the first to encourage the Kereit aristocracy to convert.[8] Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Metropolitans of the Church of the East dealt with commerce besides the missionary activities.[9] We can, therefore, assume that trade fostered the initial spread of Christianity among the tribe's leaders, and this is how the missionaries found their way to the Turkic people and accomplished the conversion of not only the Kereit but also the Naiman, Merkit, and Önggüt nomads.[10]

It is difficult to determine precisely where in Inner Asia the Turco-Mongolian tribes came into contact with the Nestorian missionaries. Marco Polo once stated that there were some Nestorians near Kashgar, which was well located to minister to the Turco-Mongol tribes along the route to China.[11] The narratives of Bar Hebraeus and Mari ibn Sulayman agree that a metropolitan of Merv was responsible for the conversions, but neither provide any additional information about where he might have made contact with the tribes. Therefore, we can speculate that Kashgar might have been the spot where the Turco-Mongol tribes, including the Merkit, Önggüt, Kereit, and Uyghurs, were converted.

In the eleventh century, the Merkit allied with the Kereit against the Liao dynasty. It is possible that Christianity first made inroads into the Merkit tribe due to this

alliance. But in the twelfth century, the Kereit and Önggüt were under the Naiman's influence, and it is also probable that many Naiman had embraced Nestorian Christianity by that time. There was already a considerable Nestorian population among the Mongols when Chinggis Khan united the Mongol tribes into the *Yeke Monggol Ulus*. Their number increased, particularly among the high-ranking people, like Toghril (Ong-Khan), a descendant of Marqus and Qurjakus, the *buirug*s (chiefs) of the Kereit; his brother Jaqa Gambu; the latter's daughter Sorqoqtani, who married Tolui and who became the mother of four imperial sons; Doquz Khatun, the wife of the Ilkhan Hülegü; Alaqai Beki, the daughter of Chinggis Khan; officials such as Qadaq, Chinqai, and Bulqai; and generals like Ket Buqa, Kök Ilge, and others. Nestorian princesses who married Chinggisid princes played a pivotal role in the spread of Christianity through the Mongol Empire, especially during Möngke's reign. Once Rubruck observed that Ariq Böke, the son of Tolui and Sorqoqtani, seeing the monks with the cross at the court of his brother Möngke Qa'an, asked them to give blessings.[12] The Nestorian mothers, namely, Qutui and Uruk, insisted on the baptism of the Ilkhans Tegüder (r. 1282–1284) and Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316) in their infancy. Both men were given the Christian name Nicolas, albeit both of them later converted to Islam.

In the Vatican Archives, there is a document sent by the Ilkhan Arghun to the Pope. The letter was sent along with a Mongol embassy in 1285.[13] There were four people in the embassy: two Mongols named Bogacoc and Mengilic; an Italian, Tomasso Anfonsi, from Genoa; and a Nestorian priest, 'Isa, the interpreter. 'Isa was mentioned in the letter of Arghun as a representative of Qubilai Qa'an. Rashid al-Din also mentions 'Isa, a Nestorian Christian from Qubilai's court, whose biography is included in the official dynastic history, the *Yuan shi*.[14] Upon completion of his mission from Persia to the Pope, 'Isa returned to China, being perhaps the first documented Nestorian Mongol *elchi* (envoy).

Among the historical compilations, the biographical work known as the *Story of Mar Yaballaha and of Rabban Sauma* (ca. 1318), provides first-hand information about the Önggüt Christians in Khanbaliq, Koshang, and Tangut.[15] In 1287, the Ilkhan Arghun sent an embassy to Europe with the aim of establishing an alliance with the Pope and the kings of England and France against the Mamluks. The most prominent figure of the embassy to Europe was Bar Sauma, a Nestorian bishop who travelled from Inner Asia to Persia along with his younger fellow Mar Yaballaha.

The *Story* begins with Sauma's birth and ends with Mar Yahballaha's death (Rabban Sauma dies towards the middle of the narrative). The two Önggüt monks from Christian families, Sauma and Markos, decided to become hermits and make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. After an uneasy journey across the whole of Asia from China, they arrived in Mesopotamia, and, understanding they could not continue their expedition, Markos and Sauma resumed their monastic life in local monasteries. The fame of these monks reached the Ilkhans. After the death of the *Catholicos*, the patriarch of the Eastern Church, Markos was appointed to succeed him with the name of Yahballah III. Sauma was subsequently chosen by the Ilkhan Arghun as his ambassador to Europe. The activities of Markos as Catholicos and Sauma as a Mongol *elchi* are revealed in the *Story*. One can also find the details of the Christian Church's growing influence at the Ilkhan court, the siege and slaughter of

the Christian community of Irbil, as well as the papal and European lords' audience with the Mongol envoy. The narrative ends with the death of Mar Yahballaha.

The journey of Bar Sauma and Mar Yahballaha can be compared with that of Marco Polo. Marco travelled from Venice to China in 1271–1275, whilst the two monks travelled from China to Mesopotamia around 1275–1281, following similar routes. The account of the two Önggüt monks was 'preserved, although somewhat filtered' by a Syriac author.[16] The text was written in Syriac and Arabic, and spans a number of genres, including historical and canonical writing.

Bar Sauma was born in the town of Koshang, which is most probably located on the site of Olon Süme (Inner Mongolia), mentioned by Marco Polo and Odoric of Pordenone.[17] The Önggüt were Mongolized Turkic people, though to some extent culturally Sinicized.[18] The Önggüt's Christian faith is well documented by epigraphs from the site of Olon Süme[19] and by *The Secret History of the Mongols*.[20] For example, the name of the Önggüd envoy sent to Chinggis Khan was *Yuqunan*, the Mongol rendering of the Syriac *Yohannan*.

A reference to the Önggüd can be found in the *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum*, written in Syriac by Bar Hebraeus. The passage relates an encounter between the two monks, already on their way west with the Christians of Tangut.[21]

Due to the scarcity of historical material relating to Christianity among the Mongols, we need to rely on some Syriac Mss. found in Turfan[22] and some fragments in Dunhuang[23] and Qara Qoto for more information.[24] Several of these manuscripts date back to the Mongol epoch. Mostly they are liturgical texts in Syriac (psalters, Bible lectionaries, and breviaries). However, it is worth noting that Christian literature produced in Central Asia is, in general, written in Turkic, using the Syriac script.

EPIGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

Syriac inscriptions in Mongolia

Aspects of Nestorian preaching by Sogdian teachers have survived in stone inscriptions, grave panels, and oblation idols throughout Mongolia and Inner Asia. There is, for example, information about a Nestorian officer who served the Uyghur Khan in a runic inscription written around 780 CE, found in Suujiin Davaa of the Namnan Mountain (Bulgan province, Mongolia).[25] The fame of this officer spread over a great distance. He was known as having many sons and siblings, as well as building a small fortune by keeping countless horses and animals. He gave his spiritual teacher (*mar*) land to dwell on, along with 100 people from his own folk to serve him. It is stated that he ordered his son to follow the example of his teacher.[26] The use of the respectful Syriac title of *mar* for clergy in this inscription speaks to the usage of this word by the Uyghurs.

Two Syriac inscriptions were found in Khovd province, in western Mongolia, in a place called Ulaan Tolgoi (Red Peak), which is situated approximately 20 km to the west of the administrative centre of Mönkhkhairkhan District.[27] Since there are many red peaks in Mongolia, this one was called Ulaan Tolgoi of Doloon Nuur to distinguish it from other homonymous sites. There are three inscriptions, one Chinese and two Syriac, found in the southern end of a chain of rocks. The Chinese text consists of six columns, which are now barely readable, and according to T. Osawa, it is read as 'the eighteenth day of the sixth month of the second year of the Dade era' (28 July

1298) along with the name of the person responsible for it, 'Wang Wen (li?).'[28] At the beginning of the inscription, the title of prince is given in three characters, which read as 'Prince Gaotang.' There is also a Chinese character for 'military expedition.'[29] One can assume that the inscription was made to commemorate a military action led by a prince in 1298. The mentioning of the title 'Prince of Gaotang' is especially momentous since this was the title granted to the Christian Önggüt prince George (d. 1298/1299) by the Yuan emperor Chengzong (Temür Öljeitü, r. 1294–1307). Prince George was captured in 1298 while campaigning in the northwest for his sovereign against the Ögödeid Qaidu and the Chaghadaid Du'a.[30]

The first Syriac inscription on the same rock to the right of the Chinese text has two lines of written text placed vertically and reads 'God whose dwelling place is holy. 1609 of the Greeks.'[31] A little to the right above the middle line of the inscription is a cross (16 × 8 cm). There is a traceable sign of another cross at the same height a little to the right of the centre of the first line. The date 1609 of the Greeks is 1297/1298 CE, which corresponds to the date in the Chinese text.[32] This inscription, like the Chinese one, speaks about the same military action of 1298.

The second Syriac inscription is located to the south, downhill from the other two inscriptions. A triangular rock with a height of about 5 m stands separate from the other piles of rocks nearby. The text of the Syriac inscription is written vertically within a square area of 120 cm, above which is a cross. The text is that of Psalm 125.2: 'Jerusalem, the mountains surround her; [and] the Lord surrounds his people, [henceforth and forevermore].'[33] This inscription has no date, but the style of letters is a more formal *Estrangela* script, so scholars tend to assume that it was written by another scribe or on another occasion than the first inscription.[34] It has a sacred character, and one may speculate that it was a prayer for the environment that surrounded the rock. It is possible that the site was holy for local people.

Both psalms may have been invoked to bring divine protection in war and were written in the hope of achieving a victory in battle. One can assume that a Christian army either passed by this site or encamped nearby. One thing is certain: someone with knowledge of Syriac left behind an inscription in Mongolia.

These two Syriac inscriptions in Khovd province surely contribute to our knowledge of Syriac Christianity among the Mongols and represent very rare relics of non-funerary Syriac inscriptions in Inner Asia. The other examples of rock inscriptions on the cliffs relate to the Christian monastery at Urgut in Uzbekistan and the Syro-Turkic writing in the White Pagoda near Hohhot in Inner Mongolia.

Syro-Turkic inscriptions near Hohhot

The White Pagoda is located about 20 km east of Hohhot, the provincial capital of Inner Mongolia.[35] This is a seven-storey octagonal Buddhist pagoda, standing 55.6 m high, with a winding corridor staircase inside. A large number of brush-drawn ink inscriptions, dating back from the Liao period (916–1125) to the Qing period (1636–1911), and from the latter to the present day, are written in the corridors of the pagoda in different languages: Chinese, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongolian (in Uyghur as well as Phagspa characters), and Turkic (in Syriac or Uyghur characters).[36]

Most of the Syro-Turkic inscriptions are short funerary texts, usually engraved on stones.[37] The White Pagoda has nine Syro-Turkic inscriptions written by the

Nestorian Önggüt using Turkic formula and *nishan* as signatures. The standard *nishan* was used by witnesses who signed a document.[38] The Syriac word *qaššīšā* for priest can be found in four inscriptions of the pagoda and states: *pw nyš'n mn srgys qšyš' nyng 'wl*, that is translated as 'This is my handmark, of the priest Särgis.' The formula is followed by a *nishan*. It is assumed that a Nestorian priest called Sargis placed his signature four times upon the White Pagoda.[39]

There is another Syro-Turkic text in the White Pagoda, written by another hand. This inscription comprises five different storeys and represents a short invocation: *tngry xwtwx xylswn 'myn* or 'May God make happiness! Amen!' The handwriting style differs immensely from the aforementioned inscription of the priest Sargis.

The seventh level of the Pagoda contains three rhymed inscriptions that might well have been part of a poem. Although the scholars who deciphered the text found it difficult to read, they managed to translate them:[40]

> '(This is) the word of the slave Särgis, speak!
>
> The Lord of the intellect (God?) covers (everything).
>
> Do not attach (to the world?). Everybody speaks competently. My brother (Jesus?) activates (everybody?).'
>
> 'Särgis'
>
> 'in . . . the age of the xan full
>
> . . . if girl (?) . . . thinks, ? ? skilful . . .
>
> . . . yakub (?) the priest ? ? . . .'

Two priests, Sargis and Yakub, are mentioned, though it is difficult to figure out the role of Yakub here due to the missing parts. However, it is worth noting that the same hand wrote these three verses. It is possible that the same priest, Sargis, who appeared in earlier inscriptions, is the one mentioned in the poem, due to a remarkable resemblance in the letters (q, sh).[41] It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that two people have left their imprints in the Syro-Turkic inscriptions of the White Pagoda, a certain priest, Sargis, who signed four times, along with his *nishan*, on the walls of the tower and wrote a poem on the top level of the pagoda; and an unknown visitor who wrote a short prayer or invocation three times on the fifth and sixth storeys. As for the name Sargis, it was very common among the Nestorian Christians of Central Asia and China, so it is hard to identify him with a historical person who lived with the Onguts. However, the Chinese sources record a military officer under Princess Alaqai called Sargis (Xilijisi 习里吉思).[42]

Two lines of Uyghur script written in between the Syro-Turkic inscriptions, can be read as

> *Babuday čindaā-a qoyar*
> *mörgün yabuba*

which can be translated as 'Babuday and Chindaga, two [of us], prostrated.' It is suggested that two persons named Babuday and Chindaga (White Rabbit) also wrote their names on the walls of the pagoda.[43]

Knowledge of Syriac was less common among the Nestorian Christians further east towards China. Thus, the so-called Syriac or Syro-Turkic inscriptions found in Northern China (Olon Süme-in Tor, Chifeng, Inner Mongolia)[44] and in Southern China (Yangzhou, Quanzhou) are in fact written in Turkic, using Syriac script. As Borbone suggests, the use of Syriac liturgical formulae as 'In the name of the father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost' in Syriac can be considered as an extra element to the Turkic body of texts, and that's why it does not allow to view these texts as bilingual, as is commonly suggested.[45]

Church of Mar Behnam in Iraq

The Church of Mar Behnam monastery, some 35 km southeast of Mosul, contains a marvellous Syriac inscription dating to the Ilkhanid period.[46] The text of the inscription commemorates the merciful intervention of the Ilkhan Baidu, who responded to complaints from the church and returned the rich booty and relics that were taken from the monastery by Mongol troops while ravaging the region in 1295. He also gave an extra gift from himself. The Turkic inscription in Uyghur script on the saint's tomb says: 'May the blessing of Khiḍr-Ilias dwell upon the Ilkhan, his retinue and his wives.'[47] The Arabic Khidr-Ilias corresponds either to St. George or the martyr Mar Behnam, whilst the use of Turkic in the Uyghur script might be a sign of respect to the Mongol ruler.

Gravestones, crosses

Semirech'e, the valley between the Chu (Kyrgyzstan) and Ili (Kazakhstan) rivers, is famous for its gravestones. More than 600 of them are written in Turkic languages using Syriac script. It is rare to find Syriac script being put to this use, but the text is also accompanied by a cross on gravestones, indicating that a local person was a Christian.[48] A preponderance of Nestorian Christian gravestones were found in the Ak Beshim region, where a Syriac church was discovered dating to the eighth century.[49]

Numerous stones have Greek dates, which were used in the Syriac ecclesiastical calendar, ranging from 1506 (1194/1195) to 1683 (1371/1372). The structure of the text in Syriac is simple and short. One of the inscriptions says: 'In the year 1650 – it was the year of the Hare, in Turkic *tavishkan* – this is the tomb of the student (*eskolaya*) Sargis.'[50] In the case of text in Turkic, it may be longer with detailed information about the deceased. This means that Syriac was known to Turkic-speaking Sogdian communities as only a liturgical language.[51] Words of Sogdian origin are indeed present in the inscriptions, such as 'instructors' (m. and f., *khwastanch*, a Sogdian word, ca. 12 times), 'teachers' (*malpane*, ca. 10 times), 'exegetes' (*mpashshqane*, ca. 8 times), and 'students' (*eskolaye*; ca. 42 times); all of whom were among the deceased. Ecclesiastical offices are mentioned too: e.g. 'priests' (*qashshe*, *qashshyshe*, ca. 110 times), 'visitors' (*sa'ore*; ca. 20 times).[52]

The high number of graves, 213 in total, between 1647 and 1653 or from 1335 to 1342, attracts attention. The reason for such a high mortality is given in some inscriptions, which reference the word *mawtana*, which stands for 'plague.' The outbreak of the Black Death in Central Asia was definitely one of the main causes for the disappearance of the Christian Turkic communities of Syriac tradition from Semirech'e.[53]

CONCLUSION

The historical sources of the Mongol period and archaeological evidence found in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia highlights the Nestorian influence on the Mongols. Under the Mongol Empire, Nestorian monks of Önggüt origin contributed to the diplomatic activity of the Mongols. The religious role of Nestorian khatuns in promoting Christianity among Mongols, even in an Islamic environment, may serve as a good example of their influence on political and cultural aspects of the Mongol court. With the fragmentation of the Mongol Empire into four successor states, the support of Mongol elites for Nestorian Christianity vanished. Although in the Yuan Empire, the Eastern Church existed, along with newly introduced Buddhism and Shamanism, the collapse of the Yuan saw Eastern Christianity disappear from Inner Asia. Nestorian Christianity was gradually displaced in the Chaghadaid realm and in the Jochid Ulus by Islam; in the Ilkhanate, the Church of the East enjoyed favour until Ghazan Khan (1295–1304) converted to Islam and Nestorian Christianity vanished among the Mongols.

NOTES

1 Shagdarsurung 2001, 25.
2 Guidi 1903, 28–29.
3 Labourt 1904, 43.
4 Hunter 1989, 143; Dickens 2010, 117–139.
5 Bar Hebraeus 1877, III, col. 279–282; Bar Hebraeus 1890.
6 Barthold 1984, 43.
7 Bar Hebraeus 1877, III, 279. Christopher Atwood suggests that the earliest conversion was of Onguts; Atwood 2014, 514–534.
8 Plano Carpini stated that Naiman were pagans, so conversion of tribe leaders does not mean the conversion of the whole tribe; Komroff 1989, 39.
9 Bar Hebraeus 1877, III, col. 279.
10 Hunter 1989, 140.
11 Komroff 2003, 67.
12 Komroff 1989, 169.
13 On the letter in Latin see Lupprian 1984, 77–82; the text in 244–246. For an English translation see, Moule (1930, 105–107).
14 Moule 1930, 228–233.
15 Montgomery 1927, rep. New York 1966 (partial translation); Rabban Ṣauma 1928.
16 Borbone 2005, 5.
17 Polo, *Milione*, Tuscan version, chap. 73; Di Pordenone 1990, 136–137.
18 See Pelliot 1973, 252–254, n. 27.
19 Olon Süme is the site of a walled city in Inner Mongolia. It was the main castle of the house of Alaqush Tegin Quri, the ruler of the Önggüt people, who supported Chinggis Khan in the conquest of the Mongol Empire in the thirteenth century. The castle was destroyed during the collapse of the Yuan dynasty in the fourteenth century. Koichi 2003, 59–64.
20 *SHM* §190.
21 Bar Hebraeus 1877, III, col. 451.
22 A catalogue of the collection in Berlin, *Turfanforschung*, was recently published by Hunter and Dickens 2014; see Hunter 2012a, 2012b.
23 Duan 2000, 382–389. Duan 2001, 84–93.
24 Pigoulewsky 1935/36, 3–46; Pigulevskaja 1940, 212–234; Yoshida and Chimeddorji 2008.

25 Erdenebat 2009, 34. This inscription was deciphered by G. J. Ramstedt in 1898–1912; Ramstedt 1913, 2–9.
26 Ramstedt 1913, 4–5.
27 Mongolian archaeologist D. Bayar first discovered these inscriptions in 1990; Баяр 1990, 37–40. In 2014, a Mongolian-Japanese joint expedition of Takashi Osawa, Guunii Lkhundev and Shigeo Saito investigated the site and deciphered the texts; Osawa et al. 2014, 191–201. The author of this article together with Prof. P. G. Borbone had an opportunity to visit this site in 2016.
28 Osawa et al. 2014, 193.
29 Osawa et al. 2014.
30 Osawa et al. 2014, 196; Atwood 2014, 525. Borbone 2005, 18.
31 The text is from Psalm 68.5, '*God in his holy dwelling place*.'
32 Osawa et al. 2014, 194.
33 Osawa et al. 2014, 195.
34 Osawa et al. 2014, 197.
35 This is the site of the ancient city of Fengzhou, which later became an urban centre under the Liao (916–1125) and Jin (1115–1234) dynasties. In the Yuan period, Fengzhou was a flourishing town, and it served as a capital city of the Onguts, the Turkic people among whom Nestorian Christianity was spread; Borbone 2013, 51.
36 Borbone 2013, 51.
37 Borbone 2013, 58–59.
38 Several such documents, in the Uyghur script, and almost invariably datable to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, have been found in the Turfan oasis.
39 Borbone 2013, 59.
40 Reading and interpreting the text is done by Nui Ruji, Peter Zieme & Borbone; Borbone 2013, 59.
41 Borbone 2013, 61.
42 Alaqai was Chinggis Khan's third daughter and the widow of the local Önggüt ruler. Paolillo 2006, 357–373.
43 I disagree with the reading of Peter Zieme, who translated it as 'I, Babuday, (in the month) White Rabbit, the second, prostrated' in Borbone 2013, 62.
44 On Olon Süme, see Lattimore 1934, 481–497; Koichi 2003, 59–64.
45 On knowledge of Syriac among the Christian Önggüt, see Borbone (2008, 1–17).
46 The church was destroyed on 19 March 2015 by the Islamic State (ISIS). The information on the site and inscription has been given by Prof. Borbone during his Syriac class in Ulaanbaatar in 2015.
47 Borbone, Forthcoming.
48 See Dzhumagulov 2011.
49 Kyzlazov 1959; Klein 2004, 25–47.
50 Borbone, Forthcoming.
51 Kljashtornyj 1964, 130–131.
52 Borbone, Forthcoming.
53 Biraben 1975, 48–51.

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SHM, See List of Abbreviations.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX

THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE MONGOLS

Ishayahu Landa[1]

INTRODUCTION

"[E]very light that shineth because of the darkness is exceeding marvelous and wonderful", wrote ʿAla al-Din 'Ata-Malik al-Juvayni, a leading Chinggisid Persian official in the introduction to his *Tarikh-i Jahangusha* in the mid-13th century, "[and f]or this reason the Banner of Islam is raised higher and the candle of the Faith lit brighter; and the sun of the creed of Mohammed casts its shadow over countries whose nostrils had not been perfumed by the scent of Islam."[2] While both Juvayni's family and he himself occupied respectful positions at the Chinggisid courts, 'Ata-Malik, a believing Muslim, was uneasy with the Chinggisid invasion.[3] As seen from the previous quotation, he aimed at overcoming this uneasiness with the Chinggisid occupation of much of the *Dar al-Islam* by arguing that it opened new areas for the faith through the Muslim migrations eastwards.[4] When Juvayni finished his compendium in ca. 1260, nobody could imagine the long-term consequences of the Chinggisid occupation of two-thirds of Eurasia. One of these was the dramatic dispersion of Islam across the continent, not least due to mass conversions of the Chinggisids and their nomadic subjects.[5]

The unification of the tribal and ethnic groups of Mongolia under Temüjin started around 1196 and culminated in 1206 with his proclamation as Chinggis Khan (r. 1206–1227). While we cannot exclude the possibility of an Islamic presence in the Mongolian steppes at this period, it is due to this gradual expansion of Chinggisid domination over the Eurasian Islamic societies that the time of the United Empire should be seen as a foundational phase for the subsequent conversion of most of the Chinggisid family and their nomadic armies to Islam. The first five decades of Chinggisid rule in Eurasia were characterized by two crucial interconnected phenomena. Firstly, the conquests not only brought hundreds of thousands of non-Muslim nomads to the *Dar al-Islam* but also facilitated a hardly quantifiable migration between various parts of the Eurasian continent.[6] The Muslims constituted an important part of those moving along the postal and trade roads, both on land and on sea. Some professional groups can be clearly identified

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in this context, such as merchants, religious personnel, intellectuals, bureaucrats, military and, of course, artisans and slaves.[7] Of even greater importance was that, quite early on, leading Muslim officials and scholars rose to positions of power all across the Chinggisid domains and became responsible for the formation and the functioning of the Chinggisid administration. Second, the migrations brought significant Islamic and non-Islamic populations closer. This *rapprochement* (to use Pfeiffer's term) of the two groups especially in Western and Central Asia created the necessary preconditions for the broad nomadic conversion.[8] No major "royal" conversion before the 1260s is reported. At the same time, especially starting with the early 1240s, an increasing number of conversion cases among the Chinggisid military are mentioned, especially in Iran, Iraq and Transcaucasia. Even though various contemporary sources claim that Islam spread quite extensively among the Mongols, it is not clear how predominant the "active" conversion was at this time.[9] What seems much more probable is that the Chinggisid military and the members of their households engaged in intensive social networking with the Islamic culture and the Muslim populations. Continuously exposed to Islam through the webs of professional contacts, marriages, adoptions, intellectual exchanges, friendships and patron–client symbioses, they gradually entered the civilizational abode of Islam.[10] While conversion could certainly occur among the first generation of incomers, it was more often the second and third generations which underwent this process. The United Empire thus paved the ground for later processes in the post-1259 *uluses*.

THE ILKHANATE

In the case of the Ilkhanid domains, the first seeds of the gradual conversion of the Chinggisid nomadic armies were sown during the first decades of Chinggisid control in Western Asia. While the sources do not give deeper perspectives on the daily experiences or religious environment of the broader nomadic population in the future Ilkhanid domains, they mention a small number of notable military figures, mainly participants of the first or second conquest waves, who had converted to Islam during the late 1230s to the 1250s.[11] The very fact, however, that the sources mention those cases explicitly seems to indirectly indicate that conversion to Islam remained an exception during this period. As the case of Arghun Aqa (d. 1275), an important Oirat governor of Western Asia since the early 1240s, exemplifies, the decades that preceded the establishment of the Ilkhanate witnessed a massive acculturation of the Chinggisid military and administration into the Islamicate environment of Western Asia, even though those processes mainly occurred without the factual conversion to Islam.[12] When Hülegü's armies invaded Western Asia on Möngke Qa'an's behalf in the mid-1250s, the nomadic newcomers not only met with local populations of Islamic and non-Islamic backgrounds but also a number of Chinggisid soldiers and bureaucrats who had already undergone a process of cultural rapprochement during the preceding decades.

The establishment of Ilkhanid rule under Hülegü (r. 1260–1265) did not immediately *visibly* increase the speed of the Chinggisid conversion. In fact, one of the few indicators of the growing influence of Islam is the prevalence of certain culturally

and religiously specific personal names in the larger population throughout a certain period of time. Following Bulliet's and Woods' quantitative analysis of the onomastic information preserved in the biographical dictionaries and similar literature for the early Islamic and Timurid contexts, Judith Pfeiffer studied the percentage of "Perso-Muslim" names in the list of commanders ascribed to each of the Ilkhans in the *Shuʿab-i panjganah*, the famous biographical compendium by Rashid al-Din.[13] In her research, Pfeiffer suggested the slow but steady increase of such names' percentage among the top commanders of the first four Ilkhans (Hülegü, Abaqa [r. 1265–1282], Ahmad Tegüder [r. 1282–1284] and Arghun [1284–1291]), reaching its peak of 13% under Arghun. Pfeiffer also noticed a sudden jump in the numbers, up to 30.4% (i.e. 14 out of 46) under the fifth Ilkhan, Gaykhatu [r. 1291–1295], a phenomenon she ascribed to the preferential relations of the third Ilkhan Ahmad Tegüder with Sufi circles. Pfeiffer explained the rise of personalities with "Perso-Muslim" names after Ahmad, especially under Gaykhatu, with reference to Ahmad's Islamic activities.[14] However, the onomastic data is hardly representative in such a short period of time as in the current study.[15] On the one hand, while in some cases the conversion to Islam clearly led to the change of a personal name, in some other cases the personalities otherwise known to have had strong linkages to Islam (even though there is often no information on official conversion) kept their former names. Thus, Chinggis Khan's maternal grandson Togha Temür, an Qonggirat, who continuously appears in the sources since the mid-1250s as "Musa Güregen", i.e. by the name given to him by a certain Islamic teacher after his conversion to Islam, stands for the first category.[16] At the same time, the Great Amir Baytmish Aqa (Baytmish Qushchi, "the falconer"), presumably of Qipchaq origin, who is known to have established a *waqf*, a pious Islamic foundation, close to Ardabil in eastern Transcaucasia in the late 13th century, falls into the second.[17] Further on, Pfeiffer mentioned (but did not further investigate) that, based on the *Shuʿab-i panjganah*, the number of Ghazan's commanders with "Perso-Muslim" names was lower than that of Gaykhatu's, namely, 21% only, 4 out of 19.[18] In fact, the *Shuʿab-i panjganah* is not fully representative in Ghazan's regard. While the *Muʿizz al-ansab* counts 70 commanders of Ghazan, it lists only ca. 20% (14) with potentially "Perso-Muslim" names.[19] As mentioned, however, Ghazan's rise to power is clearly connected with the dispersion of Islam among the Chinggisid military towards the mid-1290s. Thus, with regard to the first generation (and, possibly, even the second), names are a rather unreliable source as indicators of religious affiliation.

Another approach is to pay attention to the changes visible on the top layers of the ruling Chinggisid family concerning its relations with Islam. It is tempting to depict a linear development of the Hülegüid-Islamic rapprochement. Indeed, the first Ilkhans were either clearly non-Muslim or at least reluctant towards the Muslim faith. The first Ilkhan, Hülegü, was buried with human sacrifices.[20] Even though the sources do not mention such explicitly steppe-rooted shamanistic features in the following decades, few of the Ilkhanid Chinggisids are known to have converted to Islam before Ghazan's rule. In addition to Shamanism, Syriac Christianity and Buddhism are two main religious identification and belief systems that were widespread among the ruling circles before 1295.[21] The conversion of Tegüder Ilkhan (originally raised by his mother as a Christian) to Islam at some point before his ascension to the throne in 1282, as well as the role of his Islamic beliefs in his

deposition and execution in 1284 have already been discussed.[22] Generally, Islamic beliefs do not seem to have been widely entrenched among the top layers of the Chinggisid family and the supreme commanders until the late 1280s. The religious and cultural change in question might have been more relevant for the lower, less well-documented, levels of the Ilkhanid military, the ones that held special relevance for Ghazan during his fight for power against Baidu (r. 1295). Since Ghazan, Islam became the dominant religion of each of the following Ilkhans, even though researchers have suggested that political motivations outplayed personal convictions in the case of Ghazan and up to some degree, Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316).[23] Ghazan's conversion and the following restrictions and countermeasures against the non-Islamic traditions and rituals in the Ilkhanid domains on the verge of the 14th century spurred further Islamization across the Ilkhanid domains.[24] It is hard to know how many non-Muslims remained among the Ilkhanid Mongol and Turkic population towards the Ilkhanid collapse in the mid-1330s, as the sources remain silent on this issue.[25] Close analysis of the Ilkhanid political ideology, tangible through textual data and material culture (primarily architecture, epigraphic, numismatic) attests to the leading role that Chinggisid ideology and pre-Islamic Iranian mythology played in the self-perception and self-representation of the Ilkhans well into the 14th century, even if strongly complemented with Islamic elements.[26] Thus, the Islamization of the Chinggisid rulers in Western Asia did not mean the abandonment of the pre-conversion ideological foundations, but rather a rapprochement with the new cultural setting. Nevertheless, in the long-durée-perspective, Islam won. The infiltration of the Islamic faith and identity markers became so widespread among the lower levels of the nomadic populations, especially during the second half of the Ilkhanid period, that the collapse of the latter in 1336 saw massive purges of the Ilkhanid elites[27] and the almost complete disappearance of the Chinggisid principle in most of the Ilkhanid domains except, notably, the Jalayirid areas.[28]

While the general course of Ilkhanid Islamization is more or less clear, the landmarks on its way are less easy to detect. Putting aside the question of the broader mass conversion of the Chinggisid military, one can try to identify the major agents behind the conversion process. The Sufi circles have often been considered central. Indeed, multiple sources mention close relations between the Ilkhans, even those clearly non-Muslims, and Sufi teachers.[29] The role of Shaykh Sadr al-Din Ibrahim al-Hammuya (1246–1322), one of the important Kubraviyya teachers, in Ghazan's conversion, is one good example.[30] Interestingly, it appears that the major Sufi supporters and clients of the non-Muslim Chinggisid elites belonged to a more systemic and orthodox branch, even though the travelling dervishes and various non-systemic religious teachers of the "antinomian" type (possibly closer in behaviour and clothes to the shamanistic spiritual leaders) appear to have gained influence after Ghazan's conversion.[31] Thus, while the interest in and respect to religious teachers of various kinds characterized the Chinggisid rulers from the very beginning of their expansion,[32] it appears that the claim that the Mongols were fascinated by the Sufis due to their similarity to the shamans[33] does not hold true in most cases.[34] As stressed by Jackson, Chinggisid "religious tolerance" was more *Realpolitik*.[35] It is plausible that the multiple patronage networks established by the Ilkhans and their courtiers with Sufi *tariqas* from Khurasan to Asia Minor since the beginning of Hülegüid rule reflected the practical approach of the Ilkhans to governing and

communicating with the relevant Islamic circles and populations rather than a religious inclination.[36]

Two other interconnected factors appear to have been of importance for the gradual rapprochement of the Ilkhanid family and their elites with Islam. First, the Sufi activity itself would not have been effective enough if not supported by the multiple personal networks of the newcomers for a longer period of time before Ghazan's conversion. The personal networks in question could be of various types: friendship and courtly relations, patron–client relations of various types, mentioned already, or those based on matrimonial ties.[37] The role of the nomadic women who converted to Islam as well as those of Muslim background that entered the nomadic households should not be underestimated.[38] This seems to be of special importance as, unlike the rulings concerning Muslim males, who were allowed to marry non-Muslim women, the *shari'a* clearly forbids Muslim women to be married to non-Muslim men.[39] Second, time itself played a role in the conversion process. The longer the Chinggisids and their nomadic subjects stayed in Western Asia, the higher was their exposure to the Islamic environment, the tighter became the personal and patronage linkages established between them and the local population and the more children of originally nomadic families were born in the new environment.

Until recently, research into the Ilkhanid conversion has concentrated primarily on the top layers of the Ilkhanid society, first on the Chinggisid "royal" conversions and, since the late 1990s, among the highest echelons of the Mongol military, not least due to the scarcity of sources concerning the Islamization of the lower levels of the nomadic population.[40] The question of what occurred beyond the visible layers of the Ilkhanid society remains. Based on a comparison to cases from the other *ulus*es, one could assume that the lower strata of the Mongol military had also become significantly exposed to Islam (with or without "active" conversion) towards Ghazan's enthronement to support his claim to the khan's seat. However, as shown by the case of Türaqai Güregen's armies on the Iraqi–Anatolian border in the late 1290s, it would be wrong to assume that this was the case for the majority of the nomadic armies.[41] The expulsion of the Buddhist monks from the Ilkhanate after Ghazan's enthronement and the destruction of the Christian churches in the first two years of his reign, conducted under Nawruz's guidance, mentioned earlier, might have played a role in the conversion processes after 1295, but it was probably through the generally increasing domination of the Islamic faith, strengthened by intermarriages and the activity of the travelling dervishes among the newer generations that the process was completed during the first half of the 14th century. It is, however, important to note that the Mongol conversion to Islam did not mean the disappearance of Chinggisid nomadic identities.[42]

THE JOCHID *ULUS*

The Islamization of the *ulus*es was crucial not only for the dramatic expansion of the religion across the Eurasian Steppe belt but also for the post-14th-century ethnogenesis of Central Asia and the later Russian Empire. Thus, specifically in the Jochid case, two parallel processes are intertwined in the ethnic and religious history of the *ulus* – that of the Turkification of the Mongol newcomers from Inner Asia to the *Dasht-i Qipchaq* on the one hand[43] and the gradual infiltration of Islam into the

ulus' nomadic population on the other.[44] Islam had been present in the territories of the future Jochid *ulus*, be it along the Volga, in the territories of Volga Bulgharia or across the *Dasht-i Qipchaq* up to the Northern Black Sea, long before the Chinggisid invasion.[45] Nevertheless, it was through the unification of all the areas from Eastern Siberia up to Crimea and the continuous spread of Islam across the Jochid ruling and military circles that it became the dominant religious unifying factor of these areas. Different from all other Chinggisid domains, the Jochid *ulus* had its first Islamic ruler, Berke (r. 1257–1266), Jochi's third son, very early. It is difficult to pinpoint the time of Berke's conversion (or the depth of his beliefs), even though it seems that his rapprochement with Islam started quite early, maybe in his youth.[46] Since his enthronement, Berke clearly positioned himself as a Muslim, being arguably the first Chinggisid ruler to have appropriated the title "padshah-i Islam".[47] Sincere or not, his Islamic self-representation helped strengthen his position in Mongol Eurasia vis-à-vis his Chinggisid relatives. Starting with the early 1260s, Berke encouraged close Jochid–Mamluk diplomatic and trade relations, aimed primarily against the Ilkhans.[48] Nevertheless, although two of Berke's brothers, as well as some other members of Berke's family and his commanders, also accepted Islam,[49] it did not become a leading religious characteristic of the *ulus* or of the ruling family. It took 50 more years, until Özbeg Khan's conversion, for Islam to become widespread in the *ulus*, which was still not completely converted after his death.

Nevertheless, even if judged by the number of allegedly Islamic rulers or converts from the Chinggisid family of the pre-Özbeg period, the Islamic influence on the top layers of the Jochid family were clearly visible during the second half of the 13th century.[50] Noqai (d. 1299), a Jochid prince and *de facto* autonomous ruler of the *ulus*' westernmost domains close to the Black Sea, is well known, not least due to his alleged conversion to Islam, which he claimed in his direct communication with the Mamluk Sultan Baybars (r. 1260–1277) in August 1270.[51] Similar to the Ilkhanate, allegiance to the Islamic faith did not (necessarily) mean the break with the convert's previous identity framework, especially in the case of the Chinggisid nobility. Thus, according to an Ilkhanid source, Noqai sent a Buddhist relic (*sharil*) to Ilkhan Arghun in 1288, while a Franciscan missionary in Crimea claimed Noqai's wife had been christened a Roman Catholic a year before.[52] A ruler's transition from non-Islamic to Islamic faith cannot always be clearly defined. A puzzling example is the Jochid khan Toqto'a (r. 1291–1312), the last khan before Islam became the *ulus*' official religion under his nephew Özbeg. Toqto'a's religious affiliation is debated in sources and research (varying from shamanism to Buddhism and/or even Christianity).[53] Nevertheless, a limited number of sources, both written and numismatic, recently led to the thesis that Toqto'a may have converted to Islam in his later years.[54] Petrov and Uskenbay based this assumption on coins minted in Ukek in 706 CE, and in Sarai al-Mahrusa, a capital minting location, since 710 CE with the *laqab* "sultan al-ʿazam ghiyath al-dunya" as well as al-Mufaddal's (sole, as far as I am aware) claim that Toqto'a converted to Islam.[55] Other mints of Toqto'a's time are known to have kept the traditional legends ("*khan al-ʿadil*" etc.).[56] If this thesis holds true, it would shed new light on the co-existence of various legitimacy modi of the Jochid ruling house in the last years before the *ulus*' conversion.

Özbeg's coup d'état after Toqto'a's death adds an additional dimension to his conversion narrative. Özbeg (similar to Ghazan) came to power mainly due to the

support of a certain "Islamized" faction among the Chinggisid family and military.[57] While this group is less visible from the sources, the new khan's anti-Buddhist, and possibly anti-shamanistic, measures arguably indirectly indicate ideological confrontations between his supporters and other religious and political groups of influence.[58] The sources also speak of Özbeg's demands to impose Islam on a number of members of the Jochid family; even this may have been a masquerade for the new khan's policy to stabilize his rule against other lineages of the clan.[59] It is not completely clear whether Özbeg converted before his enthronement, as earlier historical narratives claim, or afterwards, as later ones suggest, explicitly emphasizing the role of his Ṣufi teachers and their miracle working.[60] While the sources evaluate the degree of state Islamization during Özbeg's period differently, especially when compared with the (allegedly) more intolerant rule of his son Janibeg (r. 1242–1357), Özbeg's conversion can be seen as a crucial point in turning the Jochid *ulus* (at least its Right [west] Wing) into a predominantly Islamic political entity.[61] Similar to the Ilkhanid case, however, the state conversion to Islam did not mean a break with the Chinggisid legitimacy framework. After Batu's lineage came to an end with Berdibeg's death in 1359 and the beginning of the Jochid Great Crisis (ca. 1359–ca. 1380), it was the Chinggisid, much less the Islamic identity of the aspirants to the khan's throne in Sarai, that really mattered.[62]

The previous information relates mainly to the Jochid Right Wing, i.e., the areas around the Lower Volga basin and those stretching from the Volga westwards, towards the Don and Dnieper. Unfortunately, the information on the Left (east) Wing is so scarce that any conclusion is hard to draw, even though Allsen suggested that the Islamic influences among the ruling (Ordaid) family can be observed from the rule of Irzan, Sasi Buqa's son (r. 1320–1345), thus quite late.[63] The information on the Right Wing also includes multiple records and observations on the increasing Islamic architectural activities in multiple urban settings dating from the mid-13th century at the earliest. In addition to the increasing appearance of "usual" Islamic architectural elements, such as mosques, madrasas and *zaviya*s, the increase in Islamic-styled necropolises ascribed to the Jochid elite located near the major urban complexes along the Volga has been noted – a process that took place throughout most of the Mongol period in Eurasia.[64] The broader question, namely, that of the Islamization of the nomadic masses, is, however, left open for both Jochid wings.

THE CHAGHADAIDS

The Chaghadaid domains were long seen as the most anti-Islamic of the Chinggisid polities. Referring to an idea of nomadic "conservatism", scholars based their assumptions partly on the very late conversion of the prominent members of the Chaghadaid family – way into the first half of the 14th century in the western part of the *ulus* and towards the early 1350s in its eastern domains at the earliest. Additionally, proponents of this thesis recalled the anti-Islamic sentiments of significant parts of the Chaghadaid family and military recorded well into the 14th century.[65] Recent research has differentiated this picture.[66] The Chaghadaid domains can, despite a substantial lack of sources, be considered the best "laboratory" case for the complexity of nomadic–Islamic interactions in Mongol Eurasia.[67] The specific location of the Chaghadaid dominion, stretching from Eastern Iran to eastern

Central Asia, and the *ulus*' geographic, economic, cultural and demographic diversity means that no singular clear pattern of these interactions can be singled out. The *ulus* included both old sedentary centres of high Islamic culture, especially in the core of its western part, as well as broad steppe areas, especially in its east and south, where the growing influence of Islam towards the 13th century is negligible, with the exception of specific urban locations. Moreover, it is precisely through its location on the crossroads of the major transcontinental trade routes (that often significantly preceded Mongol Eurasia) as well as its being "squeezed" between the other Chinggisid domains that the Chaghadaid areas were in a state of permanent transition, be it in the political, demographic or ideological sense.[68] This dynamism appears to have been the main constant in its history.

It is always alluring to approach the Islamization of premodern political entities through the prosopography of their ruling strata. Similar to Ghazan's and Özbeg's conversions, Chaghadaid history allows us to identify one ruler, Tarmashirin, son of Du'a (r. 1331–1334), whose reign and personal conversion prior to his enthronement are credited with spurring the conversion of the *ulus*' western part to Islam.[69] The strong pro-Islamic tendencies of Tarmashirin's politics seem to have strengthened the antinomy of his non-Islamic subjects and partly explain his deposition.[70] Tarmashirin was, however, not the first of the Chaghadaid family to have developed close relations with Islam. While it is usually mentioned that Mubarakshah (r. 1266) was the first of the Chaghadaids to have converted, one should not forget that Mubarakshah's mother, Orghina Khatun, was said to have developed an inclination to Muslims and their faith.[71] Mubarakshah's successor, Baraq (r. 1266–1271), Chaghadai's great-grandson, primarily known for his unfortunate participation in the Battle of Herat (22 July 1270), is said to have converted to Islam shortly before his death.[72] Nevertheless, neither his nor his predecessor's conversion seem to have played any role in the overall Chaghadaid Islamization.[73] The following decades before Tarmashirin's enthronement witnessed several other Islamic rulers, such as Naliqo'a (r. 1308–1309), Büri b. Chaghadai's grandson, whose mother originated from Kirman and possibly influenced his faith,[74] or contenders to the throne, such as a certain Yasa'ur, Naliqo'a's great-nephew.[75] Notably, the onomastic analysis yields few results in the Chaghadaid case, as only in rare instances do the genealogical compendia offer information on name changes after conversions or of Islamic names in a family for more than one generation.

Only from the early 1340s can we witness a continuing succession of Islamic rulers on the Chaghadaid throne.[76] Since the Chaghadaid split of 1347, the western part of the *khanate*, the so-called Ulus Chaghadai, went through a phase of political instability, aggravated by factional conflicts and the lack of one political centre.[77] This period ended with Temür's rise to power in 1370. While Islamic identity became one of the leading components of Timurid legitimacy, and the Chinggisid principle remained intact, the Chaghadaid family itself basically lost its political relevance in the west (and even the Timurid puppet khans originated mainly from the Ögödeid family).[78] It seems plausible that much of the *ulus*' nomadic military underwent a gradual conversion to Islam towards this point (i.e. the second half of the 14th century), even though some tribal lineages appear to have been particularly influenced by Islam already in Tarmashirin's time.[79] It is possible that the mass conversions among the Chaghadaid military helped the Islamic rulers consolidate and keep

power in Mawarannahr since the mid-14th century, but a quantitative and qualitative assessment of these processes remains difficult.

The eastern parts of the Chaghadaid domains, *Moghulistan*, seem to have been much less influenced by Islam until the mid-14th century at least. During the course of the Chaghadaid split, Du'a's alleged grandson, Tughluq Temür (r. 1347–1363), was enthroned by the eastern commanders in Aqsu, a location in today's northwestern Xinjiang, possibly as a reaction to the Qaraunas overthrowing Qazan, the last Chaghadaid khan.[80] At some point during his rule Tughluq Temür is known to have converted to Islam.[81] While it is assumed that the new ruler took this step to strengthen his legitimacy vis-à-vis the already existing Islamic base among his military, the much later *Tarikh-i Rashidi* (1546) claims that no fewer than 120,000 of his followers converted with him.[82] The same author stresses, however, that "most of the tribes of the Moghuls", thus the majority of the nomadic population of the eastern Chaghadaid domains, came to Islam at a much later point, during the reign of Muhammad son of Khizr Khwaja (r. 1408–1415).[83] The Buddhist presence in Turfan was completely eliminated only in the 1430s.[84] This and the attempt of Namun, a Chinggisid in-law, to enthrone a Chaghadaid khan with clearly no Islamic connotation through Ming mediation in 1380 strengthens the assumption that the eastern parts of the Chaghadaid *ulus* (in both its nomadic and sedentary areas) remained mainly non-Islamic throughout most of the 14th century.[85]

Islamic and non-Islamic features, traditions, and legitimacy seem to have co-existed among the Chaghadaids during a much longer period than in the other khanates. Recent scholarship shows that the Islamic governmental and religious elites had already become an indivisible part of the *ulus* during the United Empire.[86] The first conversions to Islam among the Chaghadaid family occurred in the 13th century, yet, unlike the other *ulus*es, the converts exerted much less influence on the khanate as a whole. Similarly, the first conversions took place among the Chaghadaid military relatively early.[87] While it remains unclear how broadly Islam spread among the Chaghadaid military *before* Tarmashirin's conversion, it appears that it was more intensive than in the western Chaghadaid domains than in their eastern locations.[88] While the Sufi circles are known (or said) to have exerted significant influences on a number of leading Chaghadaid personalities, nothing similar to the Ilkhanid-Sufi patronage networks in Tabriz or Anatolia seems to have existed in the major Chaghadaid urban centres at least until Tarmashirin's time.[89] While the discussion of this peculiarity lies beyond the limits of this overview, one should stress the importance of the *ulus*' geographic characteristics. Neither the Ilkhanate nor the Jochids had a direct connection to the eastern trade routes leading to Mongolia and China, so the Chaghadaid domains can be seen as some sort of transitory zone between China and Iran, both in the geographical and the cultural sense.[90] In addition to their control of the urban centres along the trans-Eurasian trade routes (especially Bukhara, Samarqand and southern Khwarazm), the Chaghadaids also had a direct connection to China and Mongolia, their eastern domains being much closer to Daidu and the Orkhon Valley than to Tabriz, Sarai and Damascus. The Buddhist pilgrimage networks, closely dependent on the postal road system linking the eastern Chaghadaid domains with Chinese Dunhuang and Gansu, for example, continued long after Buddhism disappeared in the western khanates.[91]

MONGOL EASTERN EURASIA

While neither the Ögödeid *ulus* nor the Yuan were significantly influenced by Islam, much less converted to it, one should keep in mind another significant development related to Chinggisid Eurasia, i.e., the massive influx of Muslims to Inner and East Asia during the 13th and the first half of the 14th centuries.[92] While the first important Muslim migrations to the Chinese territory occurred under the Tang,[93] it was Chinggisid control over Eastern Eurasia that had a considerable impact on the formation of the Islamic communities (or strengthening of the already extant ones) and the spread of Islam from today's Xinjiang to the southern shores of China. Different from the other Chinggisid *ulus*es, Eastern Eurasia was not characterized by a sizable Islamic population until the Mongol domination in most of its parts.[94]

Compared with the three western khanates, neither the Yuan nor the areas under Qaidu's domination (incorporated mostly into the Qa'an's domains in the early 14th century) underwent systemic Islamization on the administrative or cultural levels. It would, nevertheless, be wrong to ignore the Muslim presence in the territory of both *ulus*es. More is known about the Qubilaid domains. Scholarship has underlined the extensive employment of the "Semu"[95] (up to a high degree Islamic) intellectual elite in the Yuan governmental bureaus and administrative hierarchies throughout the Yuan period – a phenomenon that started with the leading role of the Islamic governors of Central and West Asian origin in the administration of North China in the first half of the 13th century.[96] Despite some limited and short-term instances of discrimination against Muslims (such as the prohibition of Islamic slaughter under Qubilai in 1280), all in all the Qubilaids were positively oriented towards their Muslim subjects so long as they remained loyal.[97] This favourable attitude also reflected the significant dispersion of the newly arrived Islamic communities and their settlement across most of the Yuan domains. Being forcefully brought to China or coming voluntarily (e.g. as merchants, both via land and sea routes),[98] the Muslims entrenched themselves in the urban centres of the Yuan, building mosques and establishing communities from Gansu and today's Inner Mongolia to the southern and south-eastern coast of Fujian and Guangzhou.[99] The Islamic presence was particularly visible in the south-western areas, in Sichuan and Yunnan, both located on the important trade routes leading to South and South-East Asia, primarily Myanmar, Annam, and India.[100]

While the Islamicate cultures went through some sort of renaissance in China under the Chinggisids, the religious activity of the newcomers rarely led to massive conversions to Islam – be it of the local non-nomadic populations or the Chinggisid family and their armies. One interesting case is Yunnan, under the control of Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din (1211–1279), a Qubilaid governor of Bukharan origin, since 1274.[101] Yunnan provides an example of the long-term Islamization of the originally mostly non-Han population.[102] As a rule, while the Islamic communities were dispersed almost everywhere in China, it was only in the north-western areas, primarily along the Hexi corridor, particularly in Gansu province, that the impact of Islam both on the Han population and on the Chinggisid nomadic population became tangible.[103] Since the first aspect reflects more of a long-term development, it is the second development that should be touched upon.[104] Most of the nomads in Mongol Eastern Eurasia remained untouched by Islam, as the Church of the East

and Tibetan Buddhism were widespread among the Chinggisid military under the Yuan.[105] While the Yuan armies incorporated a number of Islamic military units,[106] it remains unclear how intensive the communication networks between the Muslims troops and other parts of the military (comparable to western khanates) were in the Yuan case. Similarly, not much is known about the members of the Golden Lineage who converted to Islam. One remarkable exception is Ananda, Qubilai's grandson, who is known to have been fostered, still as a little boy, by a Muslim "Semu" family.[107] Manggala, Ananda's father, who controlled most of north-western and western China, had a significant number of Muslims in his domains, including the members of his own personal guard.[108] While Manggala himself is not known to have converted to Islam, his son Ananda did so at some point.[109] During the factional war after Temür Öljeitü's death in 1307, Ananda failed to gain power and was executed the same year.[110] It remains disputable how broadly Ananda's conversion influenced the standing of Islam in Anxi. A Persian source recalls that a "hundred fifty thousand" converts followed the prince into the new faith, more plausible would be something like a few thousand.[111] No similar case is known from the Yuan. As Islam was not a leading identity marker of the Yuan elite and ruling family, it is only in the vicinities with a high number of Islamic communities, such as Gansu and Yunnan, that one may expect more long-term traces of the conversion of the Chinggisid troops to Islam.

Turning to the (original) Ögödeid *ulus*, the shortage of sources become even graver.[112] The Islamic communities constituted a significant part of the urban population of the original Ögödeid appanage. Qayaliq, Qaidu's personal appanage since 1252, is a good example.[113] Qaidu's expansion westwards, towards the Ferghana Valley, significantly increased the number of Muslims under his control. Qaidu's army, however, seems to have been predominantly of tribal Mongol and Turkic origin.[114] Little can be said about the religious composition of its ranks. Some indications of Christian troops (e.g. of the Bekrin tribe) exist, but it is plausible to assume that, similar to Qaidu himself, most of his troops were shamanistic.[115] Following Qaidu's expansion westwards, a number of Muslims probably entered his service as auxiliary troops.[116] Similarly, the expansion westwards brought Qaidu and the Ögödeids into close contact with the Central Asian, predominantly Muslim, urban intellectual and governmental elites.[117] Nevertheless, the direct Islamic influence on the Ögödeids under Qaidu or their military appears negligible. As far as I am aware, almost no Ögödeid conversions to Islam under Qaidu are known, and no Islamic conversions among his military have been recorded.[118] Be it due to the short lifespan of the independent Ögödeid *ulus*, the lack of significant contacts between the Chinggisid military and administrative elites and the urban Islamic population or the still shallow entrenchment of the missionary Sufi networks in Qaidu's domains, the Ögödeids under Qaidu remained tolerant of the multiplicity of religions in their territory and never went through systemic Islamization.[119]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Contrary to the sources' tendency to picture the Islamization process in a clear-cut linear fashion, Islam remained but one of the major identity markers appropriated by the Chinggisid families and their nomadic military, even after the conversion

of most of the Chinggisid entities. Thus, the Chinggisid principle itself remained basically intact across Eurasia as long as the Chinggisid political structures existed, even though this changed from location to location, starting with the crisis-decades of the mid-14th century. Similarly, tribal identities remained of crucial importance both for the Chinggisids and their military. This can clearly be seen from our sources, and not less important, from the "retribalization"[120] processes visible across Eurasia during the Chinggisid Crisis. While it remains an open question to what degree the ethnic entities behind the tribal labels (Jalayirids, Oirats, Barlas) of the mid-14th century emerged from the entities with the same names of the early 13th century, it seems quite clear that Islam did not replace the already extant identity markers.

Islam spread only slowly and gradually among the Chinggisid family and the Mongol populations in general. It took presumably more than 150 years for the conversion of the majority of the Chinggisids and their military to Islam. Islamization probably was not fully completed in any of the Chinggisid and ex-Chinggisid domains (the Yuan case being different anyway) up until the early 15th century at least. In this regard, the almost exclusive attention paid by the sources to the major cases of Chinggisid conversion is unfortunate, as it decisively diverts our attention from the broader social reality. But what role did these "royal" converts play in the general development of the conversion processes? It appears that in all three major case studies (the Ilkhanate, the Jochids and the Chaghadaids) the conversion of the rulers could be instrumental for a top-down *institutional* Islamization of the khanates. However, it remains without doubt that in none of the *ulus*es did those conversions play the *decisive* role in turning most of the non-Islamic nomadic population to Islam. On the one hand, the conversions of the rulers were in the first place mostly motivated by the increasing Islamization of their own nomadic military – and in this case, the conversion was more a result of political considerations regarding legitimacy or power acquisition than personal conviction. On the other hand, other vectors of the conversion appear to have been of major importance for the continuous, generation-long conversion of the Mongols to Islam: both the geographical expansion of the Islamic missionary networks and charismatic teachers as well as the "domestic" rapprochement of the nomads with the Islamic environment (e.g. through friendship or marriage).

As shown, Islam caught on in the Chinggisid successor states at different speeds and with various effects, the Ilkhanate standing for the (comparatively) quickest penetration of Islam, the Yuan remaining non-Islamic until its collapse in 1368. Nevertheless, as stressed in the beginning, the Chinggisid unification of most of Eurasia led to the significant expansion of Islam across the continent, within the empire and beyond its limits. While the migrations of the Islamic populations were crucial for this phenomenon in East Asia, the conversion of the Mongol nomadic masses to Islam everywhere outside China, Mongolia and Manchuria appears pivotal for the decisive conversion of the Eurasian Steppe and the deeper infiltration of Islam in western Asia and the Caucasus. Though originally unintended by the architects of the Chinggisid empire, this phenomenon is one of the major legacies of Mongol Eurasia. Therefore, at least in this regard, the period of Chinggisid rule could be counted as a formative phase of the early modern history of most of the continent.

NOTES

1 This research was made possible by the German Research Foundation (DFG project no. 429873935).
2 *HWC*, 13.
3 A clear indication of this is that al-Juvayni avoids mentioning the fall of Baghdad and the violent death of the last Abbasid caliph al-Mustaʿsim bi-'llah.
4 Lane 2015, 183–186.
5 Note that, for the sources, "conversion" often means the change of practice rather than of religious affiliation (see Jackson 2017, 329–332). Note Eaton's criticism of the term "conversion" as wrongly assuming "a sudden and total change" (Eaton 2017, 389).
6 Note Allsen 2015.
7 Allsen 1997.
8 Pfeiffer 2006.
9 cf. Jackson 2017, 337–338.
10 Landa 2018a, 90–99.
11 Two such examples are Körgüz, an Uyghur governor (*basqaq*) of Khurasan under Ögödei Qa'an (*HWC*, 505), and Baiju, the Chinggisid governor in Asia Minor in the late United Empire (Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 42).
12 Lane 1999; Landa 2018a.
13 Bulliet 1970, Bulliet 1979; Woods 1990; Pfeiffer 2006, 373–374.
14 Pfeiffer 2006, 374, 383–388.
15 See Biran 2002a, 750 for a similar claim in the case of the Chaghadaid conversion.
16 RDRM, II, 971; Pfeiffer 2006, 372–373.
17 Pfeiffer 2006, 377–378. On the clarification of Baytmish's origin, see Landa 2019, 164–165.
18 Pfeiffer 2006, 374. For the original source, see *SP*, fl. 148b.
19 *MA*, fl. 74a–75a.
20 Wassaf 2010, 101 [text], 97 [transl.]. For a discussion of the Steppe burial rituals, see Barthold 1921, 68.
21 On Syriac Christianity, see, e.g., Bundy 1996, 42–48; Ryan 1998; on Buddhism, see Elverskog 2010, 136–162; Praznyak 2014; Yoeli-Tlalim 2011, 9–12.
22 Amitai 2001.
23 Amitai 1996; Pfeiffer 1999; Pfeiffer 2014, 154–155.
24 e.g. Amitai 1999, 41; Borbone 2017, 116–117, 120, cf. Borbone 2021, 359–360.
25 Note, however, that some *qams*, i.e., shamans, were active in the Ilkhanate during Öljeitü's rule.
26 Amitai 2021; Brack 2018; Blair 1983; Whaley 2003.
27 Landa 2016b, 170–171 on the Oyirad example.
28 Wing 2016, 74–100. For the "Chinggisid principle", see Miyawaki 1992.
29 Amitai 1999; Pfeiffer 2006.
30 Melville 1990.
31 Amitai 1999, 39–42.
32 See Atwood 2004; Jackson 2005; Jackson 2017, 350–351.
33 Köprülü 1929; Fletcher 1986, 44.
34 Amitai 1999, 38.
35 Jackson 2005, 277–278.
36 Pfeiffer 2006, 376–388.
37 Lane 2015, 192–194; Yang 2019, 398–399.
38 De Nicola 2017; Brack 2011.
39 Friedmann 2003, 162–163.
40 e.g. Melville 1990; Amitai 1996; Amitai 2001.

41 Landa 2016b, 157–163; Landa 2017.
42 Paul 2011; Landa 2016b, 173–177; Landa 2017, 1199–1206.
43 Jackson 2017, 394–395; Amitai 1997, 316.
44 For a long-term-perspective, see Bregel 1991, 60–61.
45 Golden 1992, 253–258, 269, 281; Zimonyi 1990, 89–157.
46 Jackson 2017, 352–353; *TNR*, II, 1283–1284. For more on Berke's conversion, see Vásáry 1990; DeWeese 1994, 84–85.
47 Petrov and Uskenbay 2010, 24–26; Kramarovsky 2012, 132–134 vs. Goncharov 2011.
48 Favereau 2017; May 2018, 310–311; Broadbridge 2008, 50–58.
49 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 82; Jackson 2017, 348.
50 One could also name Berke's great-nephew Töde Möngke (Jackson 2017, 353). Also recall al-Mufaḍḍal's claim that Toqto'a converted, recently supported by Russian and Kazakh scholars based on numismatic data (see later in this chapter).
51 Broadbridge 2008, 59–60.
52 RDRM, II, 1163–1164; Jackson 2017, 353.
53 Petrov and Uskenbay 2013, 279–281; Jackson 2017, 353–354.
54 Petrov and Uskenbay 2010; Petrov and Uskenbay 2013.
55 al-Mufaḍḍal 2017, 441; Petrov and Uskenbay 2013, 308–314.
56 Petrov and Uskenbay 2010, 42–46; Petrov and Uskenbay 2013, 317–322.
57 DeWeese 2009, 127–128.
58 DeWeese 1994, 113; Jackson 2017, 354.
59 Jackson 2017, 354.
60 DeWeese 2009, 127–128.
61 But note Hautala 2018, 73–76, who calls for a more differentiated approach to the immediate effects of Özbek's Islamizing policies.
62 For more on the Chinggisid Crisis, see Morgan 2009; Safargaliev 1960; Spuler 1965, 109–136. Note, however, the exceptional case of the Nangudaids, the local ruling family of Qonggirat origin (Landa 2018b, 219–224).
63 Allsen 1985, 32.
64 Jackson 2017, 355; Garustovich 2011.
65 DeWeese 2009, 128–129.
66 DeWeese 2009; Biran 2002a; Biran2007–8; Biran2009; and Jackson 2019.
67 DeWeese 2009, 128.
68 Biran 2009, 66.
69 Biran 2002a.
70 Biran 2002a, 748–750.
71 Jackson 2017, 355; Landa 2016a, 179, fn. 91.
72 Biran 2015, 43; Biran 2002b.
73 None of Mubarak Shah's children, mentioned both in the *SP* (fl. 120b) and the *MA* (fl. 36b-37a) appear under a Muslim (or potentially "Perso-Muslim") name. Such names appear only in the generation of his grandsons.
74 Barthold 1943, 59–60. On the different ruling years of Naliqo'a, note *MA*, fl. 31a.
75 Biran 2002a, 750; Jackson 2017, 356.
76 Jackson 2017, 356.
77 Biran 2009, 58–59; Jackson 2018, 92.
78 Manz 1998; Jackson 2017, 384–386.
79 Woods 1990, 12.
80 Biran 2009, 59–60; Jackson 2018, 99–100; Kenzheakhmet 2013, 133, fn. 9.
81 DeWeese 2009, 132.
82 Haidar 2012, 6. Note that Haidar 1973, 15 gives wrongly 160,000.
83 Haidar 2012, 21.

84 Elverskog 2010, 203.
85 Kim 1999.
86 Biran 2009, 63–65.
87 Biran 2002a, 750–751.
88 Biran 2002a, 751.
89 Biran 2009, 65–66.
90 Frank 1992, 67–69.
91 Matsui 2008.
92 Rossabi 1981.
93 Park 2012, 20–55; George 2015.
94 Allsen 2015, 143, also 151, fn. 136.
95 "Semu ren" (色目人, lit. "people with colored eyes"), is a general term used in the Yuan administration for the broader social group of the Western and Central Asians in the Yuan domains (Haw 2013–14; Brose 2013, also Lee 2016, 107 and see a critical perspective on the term in Funada 2004).
96 Rossabi 1981, 207ff for a general discussion of Muslims at the early Qubilaid court; as well as Yang 2019, 399–408 on the astronomers and Allsen 2002, 269–272 on the transfer of military specialists and technologies.
97 Cleaves 1992.
98 Allsen 2015.
99 Lane 2018; Chaffee 2006; Chaffee 2008; Mukai 2016.
100 Sen 2006; Forbes 1986a, 174–175; Forbes 1986b, 386–387.
101 *YS* 125, 3064. For the Yuan conquest activities in the Southeast (Yunnan and Annam), see Fiaschetti 2017.
102 Rossabi 1981, 287–291.
103 On these areas, see Dunnell 2014; Shurany 2018; Landa 2021, 224–227.
104 Dillon 1999, 21–22.
105 We hear more of the "Sinicization" of the Eastern Central Asian population in the territory of today's Kyrgizstan (Ili Valley) as a by-product of the Han resettlement. Allsen 2015, 130–131.
106 Farquhar 1990, 259 [§48.19], 265 [§48.32].
107 Dunnell 2014, 191–194.
108 Shurany 2018, 1171–1172, 1178–1180.
109 Dunnell 2014, 189–190; Shurany 2018, 1182.
110 *YS* 22, 478.
111 Dunnell 2014, 190.
112 The major study remains Biran 1997.
113 Biran 1997, 19. Also Biran 2009, 51.
114 Biran 1997, 81–83.
115 Biran 1997, 92–93.
116 Biran 1997, 84.
117 Biran 2013, 265–269.
118 This does not mean that such conversions did not happen.
119 Biran 1997, 94–95; Zhou 2017, 193–195; Haidar 2012, 21; Geng 1984, 12; Brose 2000, 111.
120 Togan 1998, 13; Landa 2017, 1203, esp. fn. 81.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN

DAOISM IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Jesse Sloane

DAOISM IN RELIGIOUS TERMS

In the Mongol world, Daoism encompassed a set of practices, beliefs, and institutions centered on the manipulation of natural forces. These forces were mediated or embodied by a pantheon of hundreds of deities inhabiting various heavens, the earth, and the human body. Many Daoist techniques targeted the practitioner's own body with the goal of attaining health, a long life, and even immortality – though not necessarily in one's earthly body.[1] One did not need to be a religious professional to learn and practice these techniques of self-cultivation. The chief requirements were time, the necessary knowledge (ideally gained through training from a teacher possessing secret techniques), and perhaps money to procure the rare ingredients used in some medical formulae.

In speaking of Daoism as a 'religion', we refer to the fact that in addition to the circulation of these ideas and practices, Chinese society contained professional Daoist clergy who practiced rites in dedicated ritual buildings. While Daoist priests were expected to be accomplished in self-cultivation, they provided a broader range of religious services, such as aiding the transmigration of the souls of the deceased, healing the living, and protecting communities from natural disaster, with exorcism rites in particular often employed to resolve worldly difficulties. Priests might be identified with a school or sect; in some, such as the Heavenly Master sect (*Tianshidao*) prominent in southern China, priesthood was inherited from father to son. Generally, though, each local priest was effectively autonomous and not overseen by any ecclesiastical hierarchy.[2]

In the centuries preceding the Mongol conquests, the creators and leaders of Daoist sects were concentrated in southern China, although Daoist priests, temples, and adherents could be found in the north as well. Almost everywhere they existed, Daoist clergy and abbeys were outnumbered many times over by their Buddhist counterparts but enjoyed enough social and cultural importance that educated elites conventionally referred to Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism as the 'Three Teachings', comparable and complementary. As in all periods of East Asian history, the overwhelming majority of people did not define themselves as an adherent of

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one particular religion but instead drew on beliefs and practices from all of the Three Teachings as well as popular religious traditions, which, in some cases, might overlap with elements of the three.[3] In the five centuries before the creation of the Mongol Empire, some imperial courts had occasionally given special recognition to certain Daoist priests and deities, favoring them over their Buddhist counterparts. Except for brief episodes, however, the officially sanctioned Daoist teachings were not widely promoted, and the clergy was not granted political power.[4] By the time of the Mongol conquests, some Daoist self-cultivation techniques and metaphysical concepts had spread from China throughout East Asia, becoming combined with existing traditions wherever they reached.[5] In Koryo, a small number of Daoist rites and buildings were operated by and for the state, probably in emulation of their patronage by the Song imperial court, but they lacked followers among the broader population.[6]

THE MONGOL ENCOUNTER WITH DAOISM

The founding and growth of several new Daoist sects had been a major religious trend in northern China during the half-century preceding the Mongol conquests. The creation of the Jurchen empire in the 1120s had separated the northern population from the centers of the main Daoist sects, which, located as they were in the south, remained under the control of the hostile Song state. By the end of the twelfth century, several new Daoist sects in Jin territory attracted large followings, with the Quanzhen (Completing Authenticity) sect being the most successful.[7] Quanzhen was founded by Wang Zhe (called Wang Chongyang, 1113–1170), a member of the literati in 1159.[8] Three decades later, his chief disciples fashioned the sect into a network with a coherent origin story, clearly defined lineage of patriarchs, and closely knit network of adherents spread throughout the Jin empire.[9] While Daoist metaphysics, pantheons, institutions, and indeed clergy had long overlapped with other traditions,[10] Quanzhen was even more syncretic. The sect used Confucian and Buddhist concepts and texts in teaching its lay followers, and for its clerics prescribed a monastic regimen borrowing extensively from Chan Buddhism.[11] Its leaders gained a reputation for rigorous cultivation through demonstrations of ascetic devotion, walling themselves in isolation for months or years at a time, or exposing their bodies to the harshness of the elements in public places where their austerities could advertise the sincerity of the movement.[12] Through purification of the body and mind, Quanzhen priests were believed to gain not only health and longevity but also the powers to predict the future, heal the sick, resurrect the dead, summon mirages, and manipulate the weather.[13] In the late 1180s, two high Quanzhen clergy were hosted personally by the Jurchen emperor, but the sect was still seen as enough of an upstart that in the 1190s it was banned until gaining official recognition in 1197.[14] Although Quanzhen probably represented less than half the Daoist clergy in northern China and numbered far fewer than Buddhist monks, they exhibited exceptional organizational cohesion between localities and so enjoyed significant authority and influence in society.[15]

During his invasion of the Jin, Chinggis Khan was told by his subordinates of the social importance of the Quanzhen clergy and the mastery of healing and longevity practices attained by its current patriarch, Qiu Chuji (1148–1227).[16] A group

of senior Quanzhen clerics, including Qiu, was consequently summoned to the khan's presence, resulting in the farthest documented movement of Daoist clergy and ideas across the Mongol Empire. The clerics embarked in 1220, escorted by Mongol soldiers; they met Chinggis Khan at his camp in modern Afghanistan in spring 1222 and returned to northern China in 1223.[17] A chronicle authored by one of the clerics in the group described their travel through Turkistan, southern Siberia, and the Central Asian territories formerly governed by the empires of Qara-Khitai and Khwarazm. Although the Quanzhen clerics noted with interest the practices of Manicheans and Muslims in the areas traversed on their journey westward, in contrast to their zeal in recruiting followers in northern China they recorded no attempts to attract support in regions where Daoism had no preexisting following.[18] The furthest recorded geographic extent of the clerics' missionary activity was a community of several thousand artisans from northern China who the Mongols had relocated to southern Siberia and among whom the Quanzhen leaders had to confront hostility toward their sect.[19]

After reaching the khan's camp, Qiu Chuji delivered a series of lectures to Chinggis Khan summarizing Quanzhen Daoist cosmology, metaphysics, and physiology; the history of the sect; and advice for rulership.[20] Qiu did not modify the content of the message to fulfill his listener's expectations, but rather urged a set of self-cultivation methods and moral precepts similar to those espoused by Quanzhen leaders on other occasions, including their advice to Jurchen emperors in the 1180s–1190s.[21] Qiu's admonishments against vigorous exertion, sexual activity, and the taking of life were not the 'medicine for longevity' that Chinggis had requested of him and conflicted with the figure of martial hero and august patriarch expected of a Mongol leader. Even so, the khan showed neither disappointment nor displeasure at the criticism of his habits; his responses assured the delegation that he understood, respected, and to some degree accepted their views. The Daoist delegation's recollection of Temüjin as gracious, encouraging, and open-minded thus complements the more common image of him as a stern and merciless commander, adding nuance that may help explain his popularity as a leader.

DAOISM IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Evidence suggests that the Quanzhen account of a positive reception from the khan was accurate, with even authors, such as Yelü Chucai, who were critical of the sect observing that they subsequently enjoyed favor from the Mongol rulers. Their privileges included nominal authority over all Daoist and Buddhist institutions and clergy in former Jin territory, exemptions for their followers from government exactions, and free use of the post system's resources in their travels.[22] Epigraphy from the decades following the Mongol conquest of the Jurchen empire shows a spread of Quanzhen abbeys northward into areas where evidence of earlier Daoist sites is rare or absent.[23] As their organizational and economic resources increased and their political support grew, between 1237 and 1244 Quanzhen leaders compiled and printed the largest Daoist canon ever produced up to that time, comprising 7,000 chapters.[24] Undertaken in southern Shanxi, then the center of the printing industry in northern China, the project received support from at least two members of the Chinggisid ruling family. A stele dated 1240 contains

the text of an edict (*bichig*) from Töregene Khatun, then in the role of Ögödei's consort, placing a Chinese local official in charge of managing the carving of the printing blocks for the Daoist canon and constructing buildings necessary for the work; it also prohibited interference by anyone, including other officials. To publicize the order, a Daoist priest reproduced the full text of the edict in Chinese script on the stele. He also appended fragmented and poorly written phrases from the Mongolian text, apparently intending that the visual presence of the script on the stone marker would improve its effectiveness in protecting the project.[25] In ca. 1240–1241, Köden, the second son of Ögödei, who had been granted territory in Shanxi, issued further edicts authorizing nearby administrative districts to establish offices for the carving of printing blocks and reproduction of the printed canon; he also conferred an honorific title on the priest who had initiated the project.[26] These shows of patronage for Daoist canon projects and the religious professionals who led them demonstrated continuity with the role taken by Jurchen imperial relatives, who had patronized the compilation and printing of Daoist canons by Quanzhen clerics in the 1180s–1190s.[27]

The canon printing marked the high point of Daoist support from the Mongol rulers, and a counterreaction followed. Critics charged that Quanzhen clerics abused the privileges they had received from the Mongol rulers and their representatives; Chan monks' material grievances concerned Quanzhen efforts to seize Buddhist monasteries and attract their adherents, but what prompted action from the Mongol state were complaints, joined by Tibetan clergy, that texts and images printed by Quanzhen clergy denigrated Buddhism.[28] The offending publications featured the centuries-old claim that Buddhism had been founded when the Daoist sage Laozi journeyed west to 'transform the barbarians'; the Quanzhen version may have drawn parallels to Qiu Chuji's journey to preach to Chinggis Khan and thus insulted the Mongols as well.[29] Under Möngke and Qubilai, a series of debates were held between representatives of the Quanzhen Daoist and Chan Buddhist orders, with the Mongol arbitrators declaring Buddhist victory each time.[30] After the final debate in 1281, the Yuan court ordered the abolition of the Quanzhen order and the burning of its newly printed Daoist canon, although inscriptions from the time suggest that Quanzhen activity was unaffected outside Daidu.[31] The court's position softened over the following decades, however. After the execution of Sengge (or Sangha, d. 1291), one of several Tibetan officials who had been particularly forceful in urging the destruction of the canon, Daoist texts without anti-Buddhist content were freed from prescription.[32] Throughout these vicissitudes and particularly during the violent early decades of the Mongol takeover, the size, transregional character, and political privileges of Quanzhen institutions and organizational structure helped them provide support to inhabitants in former Jin territory during the violent disruption of the Mongol takeover, complementing a similar role played by Buddhist institutions.[33] Over time, the Mongol rulers came again to offer formal gestures of support for the sect, and under Qaishan its rehabilitation was made official, with new posthumous honorific titles granted to thirty founding figures of the Quanzhen movement in 1310. The move came only after edicts from Qaishan conferring new titles on Confucius in 1307 (see chapter 38 in this volume) and generations of Heavenly Masters of the eponymous southern sect of Daoism in 1308, suggesting that the court's focus was not so much a favoring of Quanzhen

as a willingness to include it among the groups recognized as respectable forms of elite religion.[34]

Daoism in southern China reflected the Mongols' less disruptive conquest of that region compared to the north, with the commercial economy continuing its growth and local religious institutions receiving minimal interference.[35] One ongoing trend in that region that reached its culmination in the Mongol epoch was the founding of the Zhongxiao Jingming Dao sect. During the centuries before the Mongol conquest, the cult and teachings of the Daoist priest Xu Xun (or Xu Sun, 239–272), which focused on the value of filial piety (*xiao*), had grown in popularity.[36] The tradition had retrenched in the south after the fall of northern China to the Jurchens, with new leaders adding an emphasis on political loyalty (*zhong*). Their activity culminated under Mongol rule with the founding in 1297 of a new sect called Zhongxiao Jingming Dao. The sect remained prominent for three centuries thereafter, featuring in popular literature despite being respected by scholar-officials.[37] It produced the first 'ledgers of merits and demerits', guides enabling practitioners to quantify their spiritual cultivation according to the number and type of virtuous and sinful acts performed and which reflected the actuarial mindset accompanying the commercialization of southern Chinese society.[38]

As a Quanzhen leader observed, Daoist adherents had previously been few in northern China, so the activity and popularity of new sects there under Mongol rule was a new development in East Asian religious history.[39] The Mongol conquest also made possible the spread of Quanzhen institutions from former Jin to Song territory.[40] Followers of the sect figured prominently in the Mongol Empire in East Asia; one of many in the service of the Great Ulus was Zhao Liangbi (1217–1286), a Jurchen patron of Quanzhen who served as Qubilai's ambassador to Koryo and Japan.[41] Where Mongol control extended into areas where Daoist institutions and clergy were already prevalent, some elites of Muslim background, beginning with Jafar Khoja (traditionally 1110–1227), became involved with Daoism in the course of engaging with Chinese elite society more broadly.[42] Newcomers to the region, such as Ja'far, encountered Daoism in the company of other advisers and commanders like the Khitan brothers Yelü Ahai and Yelü Tuhua, whose engagement with Quanzhen leaders provided examples for how a layperson with political power utilized the services of Daoist clergy, interacted with them as fellow elites, and granted them patronage.[43] Involvement of officials in the Mongol service with Daoism could range from associating socially with Daoist clergy and listening to their predictions, as Ja'far did, to, by the fourteenth century, devoting considerable attention to the production of Daoist elixirs. Writing in the late fourteenth century, the poet Wang Feng described a man identified by the name 'Lamadang', who had served as a Censor in the Yuan administration but then became a Quanzhen priest, perhaps after the expulsion of the Mongol rulers from Daidu in 1368.[44] Generally speaking, the documented instances of Daoist adherence among groups from regions (primarily Muslim) where Daoism had previously been absent suggests that it was treated as one aspect of participation in Chinese civil elite society. Its prevalence among these immigrant groups mirrored the patterns seen in Chinese civil elites as a whole. Daoist adherence appears to have been less prevalent among Tibetans, whose political service to the Mongol government was often tied to rank in a specifically Buddhist institutional structure.

Daoist ideas and institutions appear not to have been spread further through the Mongol world, and at most we can only speculate as to relevant factors. As noted at the start of this chapter, Daoist beliefs and practices were quite complex, requiring the participation of dedicated professional ritual masters, and their teachings often centered on proposing particular ways of organizing elements already accepted in Chinese society, whether metaphysical concepts or popular deities. Although Quanzhen clerics pursued adherents in former Jin territory, their appeal presupposed regard for Confucian and Chan Buddhist practices, institutions, and discourses as well. Records of Daoist priests' interactions with other groups show that they could be readily interpreted as thaumaturges, offering prognostication and prescriptions for longevity that could be evaluated and even accepted without deeper curiosity into the underlying cosmology, theology, or institutions. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, moreover, Daoist priests of any order did not display an impulse to spread their clergy or institutions in areas where Daoism was unknown. At most, Mongol rulers and their officials were treated as patrons or lay adherents who could benefit existing institutions. As a whole, the geographic spread of Daoist practices was a parallel but separate process to the spread of other practices, ideas, and linguistic elements from Sinophone regions southward through the frontier regions into Southeast Asia more broadly.[45] In East Asia, Daoist texts were kept in the original orthography, even if their oral interpretation was different in varying Sinoliterate contexts, such as the Korean peninsula and Japanese archipelago. This lack of missionary zeal was common in East Asian religious culture of the time. As most people outside the clergy did not identify as the exclusive adherent of any one religious group,[46] the stakes in seeking adherents were lower than for Abrahamic traditions demanding an exclusive religious affiliation.

NOTES

1 For an overview of the Daoism, see Schipper 1993, 32–43 and 160–182.
2 Goossaert 2001, 118.
3 Teiser 1996, 18–22.
4 Weinstein 1973, 265–266; Cahill 1980, 23–44; Strickmann 1978, 331–353; Davis 2001, 34–38; Chao 2006, 332–357.
5 On the transmission of Daoism in Japan, see *Ajia Yugaku* 2005, vol. 73; Richey 2015.
6 Huang 2017, 80–87.
7 For the sects, see Zhan 1989, 2–26; Goossaert 1997, 10–20.
8 Marsone 2001, 97–101.
9 Goossaert 2001, 115.
10 See, for example, Demiéville 1986, 809–819; Stein 1979, 53–81; Davis 2001, 115–170.
11 Kubo 1992, 11–15.
12 Goossaert 1997, 122–126; Goossaert 2001, 123–127, 134.
13 Eskildsen 2004, 123–137 and 173–183.
14 Goossaert 1997, 35–37.
15 Goossaert 2001, 128–134.
16 Yelü 1967, 87; de Rachewiltz 1962a, 25.
17 Li 1972. The annotated English translation has many inaccuracies and omits nearly all the poems through which the Quanzhen leaders instructed their devotees: *TOA*.
18 Li 1972, 48 and 85–57.

19 The account offers only vague descriptions of 'slander' encountered there, with far more detail given to the divine intervention by which it was overcome. Li 1972, 100–101.
20 A portion of Qiu's lectures is transcribed by Yelü 2004, 25–29. On its authorship, see Yao 1996, 214–215.
21 On Quanzhen lectures to the Jin monarchs, see Eskildsen 2004, 16; Hachiya 1998, 92–94 and 217.
22 de Rachewiltz 1962b, 198.
23 See, for example, the 1236 'Lüezuo Yunfeng Zhenren Kang gong mubeiming', in *Manshu kinseki shiko* 1936, vol. 1, 143–146.
24 Chia 2011, 177.
25 Cleaves 1960–1, 63–66 and 74.
26 Wang 2014, 16–17.
27 Chia 2011, 175.
28 Fang 2001, 704–705; Yelü 1967, 95–104; Kubo 1977, 323–324.
29 Chia 2011, 179–180.
30 Kubo 1977, 324–326.
31 Goossaert 2001, 117.
32 Chia 2011, 182.
33 Wang 2018, 70–117, 271–274.
34 Miya 2006, 273; Kubo 1977, 331–332.
35 Smith 2003, 6–9.
36 Shek 2004, 142–144.
37 Shek 2004, 150–155.
38 Brokaw 1991, 3–4, 26, 229–232.
39 Li 1972, 108.
40 See, for example, the 1282 inscription by Zhao Daoyuan, 'Fenzhen daoyuan ji', in Wang 2005, 237–238; also Li 2015, 219.
41 On Zhao's diplomatic role, see Su 1996, 226–227; on his Quanzhen activity see Yamamoto 2004, 62–64.
42 *YS* 2961.
43 On Daoist patronage by Tuhua, Ahai, and Tuhua's sons, see Li 1972, 17–18; Yao 1996, 213; Biran 2015, 163.
44 For several examples of Daoist interest and practice among these newly arrived groups under Mongol rule, see Chen 2005, 34–39.
45 See Kleeman 2002, 30–34.
46 For representative examples, see McDermott 2015, 194–215.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT

CONFUCIANISM IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Jesse Sloane

CONFUCIANISM IN RELIGIOUS TERMS

'Confucianism' can be thought of as a set of ideas and practices emphasizing the importance of proper actions in accordance with social roles. The Chinese term for proper actions (*li*) is conventionally translated as 'ritual' but in the widest possible sense, from everyday social behavior to elaborate sacrifices where food offerings were presented to unseen spirits. Good governance depended on emulating the legendary sovereigns of antiquity, whose era was considered a prosperous time of stable rule.[1] In East Asia at the time of the Mongol conquests, ritual offerings and other Confucian ceremonies were among the essential duties of state officials, from county magistrates up to the sovereign. These state rites were valued partly as examples to those they ruled, encouraging each person to the proper performance of social roles, but also for their resonance with cosmic laws, which helped ensure favorable weather and avert natural calamity. The spirits that received state offerings were tied to the sacred geography outlined in the Confucian classical texts and included the deities of heaven, earth, soil, grain, as well as sacred mountains, rivers, and seas.[2]

Another category of sacrifices in the Confucian tradition concerned offerings to the spirits of Confucius, his disciples and intellectual successors. These figures were considered *shengren*, a term connoting a more-than-human excellence closer to 'saint' than the standard English translation 'sage'. At the time of the Mongol conquests, rites to Confucius and his successors were performed in a grand shrine complex in his home county of Qufu (in modern Shandong province) as well as in smaller shrines, private academies, and government schools throughout East Asia. The cult of Confucius was not believed to bring tangible rewards and lacked the ancient pedigree of rites to nature deities. State patronage of the cult had nonetheless grown from the eighth century onward and was viewed as an important affirmation of Confucian teachings by honoring their transmitters.[3]

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At the time of the Mongol conquests, Confucian rites were part of the court ceremonies not only of the two contenders for regional primacy, the Jurchen Jin and nativist 'Chinese' Song, but had also been adopted in Koryo, Japan, and the Tangut Xia kingdom.[4] All of these governments continued to sponsor Buddhist and, especially in the Jin and Song, Daoist and popular religious rites at both central and local levels. At the same time, it was normal for most people – even civil elites aspiring to government office – to participate in multiple religious traditions. When two Confucian scholars in the Jin insisted that Buddhist funeral rites not be performed for them after their deaths, their attitude was viewed as so anomalous as to be recorded in a compilation of 'tales of the strange'.[5] Even so, Confucian rites were the only category for which performance of particular rituals at the proper times was considered absolutely indispensable for a state to fulfill its function, and Confucian classical texts were featured in the examinations serving as the main route of entry to civil service in the Jin and Song.[6] In consequence, some modern scholars use the term 'Confucians' to denote all people in East Asia pursuing or aspiring to a role in the prevailing forms of civil government or favoring those institutional structures. Because members of this group normally participated in multiple religious traditions, however, the terms 'civil elites' or 'literati' are favored here.[7] Similarly, although some scholars refer to the accustomed structures of East Asian civil government as 'Confucian' when contrasting them with other forms of government in the Mongol world, this chapter deals specifically with practices, ideas, and institutions that modern scholarship conventionally addresses under the analytical category of 'religion'.

SACRED GEOGRAPHY AND LEGITIMATE RULE

Confucian sacred geography was bound to particular locations and geographic features in and around the area referred to as the 'Central Territories' (*Zhongguo*), comprising the North China Plain and adjacent region. Although in modern usage the term *Zhongguo* is used to denote the People's Republic of China and all areas under its control, at the time of the Mongol Empire it referred to a far more limited space where the societies that produced the Confucian classics a millennium and a half earlier had carried out their ritual and political activities. This sacredness could not be generalized to mountains and rivers in general, and in principle could not be transported to allow rites of the same importance in new regions, although in practice governments in Korea, Japan, and even southern China granted special significance to certain local geographic features. This same framework applied to governments: metaphysically, the human realm could contain only one supreme government, whose ruler held the position of 'emperor'; a line of 'legitimate succession' (*zhengtong*) had begun with the first mythic ruler and ran through one ruling family on earth at any one time, with rare exceptions for periods of extreme political fragmentation. To be viewed as the heir to legitimate succession, a ruling house needed to gain control of the Central Territories, and its patriarch had to claim the title of emperor explicitly. Recognition of these circumstances then needed to be enforced on a critical mass of elite writers of Confucian official history, many of whom were normally employed in government bureaus dedicated to current and past official records. A new ruling house could gain this recognition even if it had arrived from

outside the Confucian geographic, linguistic, and social sphere; publicly identified itself in terms of an alien origin; and officially maintained other non-Confucian state rites.

The Mongols extended their power into East Asia at a time when incorporation of ruling dynasties from newly arrived nomadic groups into the 'legitimate succession' framework had become a familiar exercise for Confucian thinkers. In the early eleventh century, the Khitan state had established parallel 'Northern' and 'Southern' administrations to govern the affairs of its nomadic and sedentary populations, respectively; they conducted Confucian rites while maintaining other state rituals.[8] The Khitan rulers had transformed their steppe confederation into a stable state and gained political supremacy in the region, compelling the Song court to recognize the Khitan sovereign as an emperor senior to their own and forcing Koryo to recognize them as the supreme legitimate power for most of the eleventh century.[9] A more significant challenge to conventional understanding had been posed when the Jurchens established a state firmly occupying the 'Central Territories' from the late 1120s onward. Confucian thinkers across the region engaged in intense theoretical discussions over how the control of *Zhongguo* by a ruling house claiming an alien origin and identity should be understood in cosmological terms. One center of these discussions was the Jin court itself, where from 1194 to 1202 – culminating only a decade before the Mongols arrived in force – a series of debates sought to determine which of the Five Phases (metal, wood, water, fire, and earth) was associated with their own state by drawing on Confucian cosmology and parallels with the mythical rulers of antiquity described in the Confucian classics.[10] The proceedings of the debates were moderated by the emperor and recorded in detail, providing a precedent for loyal subjects of a ruling house proudly asserting its nomadic heritage to articulate their state's legitimacy in Confucian terms.

NEO-CONFUCIANISM

The shock of the Jurchen takeover of the Central Territories, as well as the willingness of many former Song officials and elites to enter Jurchen service, convinced many Confucian thinkers in the portion of the Song surviving in the south that nothing less than a thorough reform of morality could effect the substantive change needed to revitalize society and strengthen their own state.[11] The influential scholar-official Chen Liang (1143–1194) argued that even orthodox Confucian ritual and culture would lose its legitimating power outside the geographic setting of the Central Territories.[12] As Chen explained in a series of memorials to the Song emperor, the *zhengqi* – 'standard' or 'correct' energy – of the earth was concentrated in the Central Territories. The Song would inevitably wither away if it remained confined to the southern regions it still controlled, regardless of the rituals and cultural practices the state and its subjects maintained.[13] This sense of crisis stimulated the growth of Neo-Confucianism, at the time often called the 'Learning of the Way' (*Daoxue*). The movement spread through the Southern Song, aided by strong personal networks, the growing industry of private printing, and a network of academies founded by its most influential thinker and author, Zhu Xi (1130–1200).[14] Neo-Confucianism insisted on the vigorous application of Confucian morality in both individual life and politics, drawing urgency from the perceived failure

of the technocratic approach to governance in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and from the erosion of traditional family norms by the Song's flourishing market economy. The movement grounded this reinvigorated morality on a metaphysics by which the 'psychophysical stuff' (*qi*) that composed and motivated all things in the world should be shaped and channeled by proper 'principle' (*li*). Correct 'principle', embodied in the actions of the *shengren* of the past, could be understood through careful study of canonical Confucian texts, observation of the natural world, and self-cultivation.[15] While Neo-Confucianism spread quickly in Southern Song society, its adherents' relationship with the Song court, bureaucracy, and mainstream elite culture was often mutually critical; this tension peaked with a state ban on Zhu Xi's teachings from 1195 to 1202, although after his death they received increasing recognition from the Song court.[16]

As a response to Jurchen control of the Confucian heartland and dissatisfaction with their own government, Song Neo-Confucians advanced the concept of the *daotong*, a unitary line of legitimate succession to the Way of the ancient mythic rulers and Confucius by new generations of exemplary Confucian practitioners who need not hold roles in government.[17] In Zhu Xi's formulation, the *daotong* lineage was one of righteous orthodoxy based on the concept of *zhengtong*, the legitimate succession of dynasties, but independent of political events.[18] For those among Confucian thinkers who clung to a rejection of the legitimacy of self-identified 'alien' ruling houses, this doctrine of 'legitimate succession of the Way' lessened the degree of adjustment needed to accept Mongol rule by arguing that the identity of the family controlling the Central Territories was not of paramount importance. Whether one joined Mongol government or avoided serving it, in other words, Confucian worldviews provided a way to understand and value one's role in the Mongol Empire.

THE MONGOLS AND CONFUCIAN RITUAL

The Mongol rulers were initially reluctant to recognize the value of Confucian practices. Because Confucian ritual roles were tied to social positions, their proponents could not promise that through their own actions they could accomplish the practical intercession of cosmic forces on the Mongol rulers' behalf, as might the clergy of other traditions.[19] Consequently, although authority regarding Confucian rites lay with East Asian civil elites, this group did not receive *darqan* tax-exempt status until 1237, later than Daoist and Buddhist clergy.[20] Confucian scholars firmly believed that their classical rites brought tangible benefits to the realm, yet they could not perform the most important offerings in place of the sovereign. Consequently, the literati in northern China – who were also the local authorities on civil administration – repeatedly urged Mongol rulers to adopt them.

The main shrine complex to Confucius, in his ancestral home of Qufu, had been burned during the Mongol invasion of the area in 1214.[21] The Yan family, who had been granted the hereditary title of myriarch by Ögödei in the early 1220s, had established their headquarters at Dongping, a short distance northwest of Qufu, and governed the area.[22] The Yan family sponsored the long process of rebuilding the elaborate shrine complex, gaining a decree from Ögödei in 1236 that formally ordered the reconstruction.[23] In 1233, Ögödei summoned the most senior living

descendant of Confucius, Kong Yuancuo (1181–ca. 1251) to an audience with him, and in response to Kong's urging issued a decree in 1238 ordering that the ritual and musical implements and personnel from the Jurchen court, which had been scattered after the Mongol destruction of the capital, be collected and put back into use.[24] These musicians and ritual officiants were assembled not at the Mongol capital at Qaraqorum, but rather at Dongping, and thus for a time not only offerings to Confucius but also the Confucian state rites were performed at the shrine complex in Qufu.[25] After assuming the title of *qa'an* in 1260 and consolidating his court at the Great Capital, in 1261 Qubilai had the formal *shidian* seasonal rites performed at court for the first time since the fall of the Jurchens, issuing a decree ordering the rites to be incorporated into the Mongol state's ritual calendar.[26] Mongol rule also brought the practice of Confucian offerings and the study of the Confucian canon by groups who had not engaged in either before, particularly Uyghur and Central and Western Asian families who settled in the Yuan Ulus and joined the civil elite alongside Tanguts and the descendants of Song and Jin subjects.[27]

The Yuan court's patronage of Confucian ritual went beyond mere restoration of previous institutions and practices, as rulers, imperial relatives, and officials introduced a series of innovations following Qubilai's death. Immediately after succeeding to the throne in 1307, Qaishan (r. 1307–1311) issued an edict further augmenting the noble title conferred on Confucius that determined the ritual honors due to his spirit.[28] Earlier dynastic courts in China had set a precedent of conferring posthumous honorary titles on Confucius,[29] yet the promulgation of Qaishan's decree was distinguished from previous instances by a deliberate inclusion of multiple ethnic constituencies. Although the edict was drafted by the prominent Chinese scholar Yan Fu (1236–1312), officials who led the call to elevate Confucius's status appear to have had Mongol, Uyghur, and Khitan backgrounds.[30] This edict was sent to every administrative center under Yuan control and over 50 stelae inscribed with its text are extant in various locations in China today.[31] On imperial order, an imposing stele announcing the edict was placed in the Shrine to Confucius in Qufu, using Phags'pa script for a phonetic gloss on the inscription's Chinese text to demonstrate the intended universality of the announcement.[32] This stele's presentation of the cult of Confucius as relevant to the varied constituencies of the Great Yuan Ulus was borne out in practice: other epigraphic evidence testifies that Yuan subjects from a range of backgrounds either visited Qufu to pay their respects or participated in restoration projects there.[33]

From that point onward, the mode of patronage of Confucian ritual practiced by the Mongol court diverged still further from preceding models. Most striking was the greater role of women, who had historically been excluded from participation in all ceremonies in Confucian shrines.[34] Most active of these was the princess Sengge Ragi (ca. 1284–1331), a younger sister of Qaishan whose appanage included Qufu. In 1308, she sponsored sacrifices at Qufu in honor of Confucius's new title, presided over by a Chinese official who acted in the explicit capacity of her personal representative and was received by descendants of Confucius and his chief disciples.[35] As Qaishan had done, Sengge Ragi presented the *tailao* 'large animal' sacrifices, the traditional offering of sovereigns at Qufu.[36] In 1327, now in the status of older sister to the new ruler Yesün Temür (r. 1324–1328), Sengge

Ragi dispatched representatives, including a Chinese civil official and the local *daruqachi*, to offer liquor and incense at the Qufu shrine on her behalf.[37] On this occasion, her representatives erected a stele memorializing the rites and praising Sengge Ragi's distinguished family and her virtue in supporting the sacrifices; at 2.55 meters, it towered over even Qaishan's imperial edict stele. In 1334, Sengge Ragi's daughter Buddhashri (1305–1340) offered sacrifices at Qufu in the position of Supreme Empress Dowager.[38] The occasion was commemorated in a lengthy stele, which, although badly weathered, appears to record a series of events in which a group of officials traveled to Qufu on Buddhashri's instructions to offer sacrifices and meet members of the same distinguished families as Sengge Ragi's representatives. Under the precedent of previous dynasties, including the Jurchens, the dispatching of personal representatives to offer sacrifices at Qufu had been a prerogative strictly limited to the (male) sovereign. The early fourteenth-century sacrifices by relatives of the Yuan rulers marked the first time women had taken this role, and indeed it would not be repeated after the Mongols lost control of the region later in the century.

THE MONGOL IMPACT ON NEO-CONFUCIANISM

Neo-Confucian texts had reached northern China before the Mongol conquests, yet Confucian learning in the Jin and neighboring Koryo still focused on poetry and conservative commentaries on the classical canon rather than Neo-Confucianism's elaborate metaphysical, social, and political programs.[39] The Mongol conquest of the Song in the late 1270s integrated into the empire the personal networks and academic institutions that gave Neo-Confucianism its social presence in southern China. In consequence, by the end of the thirteenth century, it became dominant in northern China as well. To the movement's popularity among civil elites, the Mongol court added stronger state support than it had ever before received. When after decades of lobbying by literati the civil service examination system was finally restored under Ayurbarwada (r. 1311–1320) in 1315, the examination curriculum focused on testing candidates' mastery of Neo-Confucian thought,[40] a feature that government examinations in China retained until 1905.[41] The Mongol court also ordered that Zhu Xi and other leading Neo-Confucian thinkers be added to the figures honored in the Shrine to Confucius; this ritual change has persisted in Confucian ritual to the present day.[42] The patronage Neo-Confucianism enjoyed from the Great Yuan Ulus appears to have contributed to its spread throughout East Asia and later adoption as official ideology by other regimes. Scholar-officials from Koryo staying in Daidu in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries brought Neo-Confucian texts and ideas back to the Korean peninsula, where they spread among educated elites and became the state ideology of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910).[43] Neo-Confucianism first gained patronage by the imperial court in Japan at the same time but became firmly associated with state authority there only after 1605, when Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), who drew on continuing Neo-Confucian developments in China and Korea, was made retainer to the first Tokugawa *shogun*.[44] The incorporation of East Asia into the Mongol world thus led to the transformation of Neo-Confucianism from a popular intellectual movement based in local academies in southeast China to an ideology shared by states across the region.[45]

NOTES

1 Von Glahn 2004, 37–38.
2 Chen and Chen 2015, 150–161.
3 Huang 2009, 540–547; Wilson 2002, 50–53 & 72–84.
4 Song 1977, vols. 8, 26 and 31–32; McMullen 1996, 52–61; Paramore 2016, 709–712; Dunnell 1996, 24–25.
5 Haowen 1986, 23.
6 Iiyama 2005, 22–26; Chaffee 1995, 30–37.
7 For the distinguishing role of these civil elites immediately preceding and under the Mongol Empire, see Hymes 1986, 1–11 and 124–135; Makino 1987, 529–553; Gerritsen 2007, 47–112.
8 *LS*, 3; Marsone 2011, 97–176.
9 Tao 1988, 10–24 and 34–49; Rogers 1958, 194.
10 Chan 1984, 80; *Da Jin deyun*, 22b.
11 Liu 1995, 44.
12 Chen 1204, 1a.
13 Tillman 1982, 102.
14 Liu 1973, 491–499. On the centrality of academies, see Hymes 1989, 439–440.
15 Chan 1987, 45–46; Bol 2008, 153–168.
16 Liu 1973, 500–502.
17 On this concept, see Bol 1992, 28–30 and 338.
18 See, respectively, Bol 1992, 368, n. 123; Soffel and Tillman 2012, 93–94.
19 Atwood 2004, 255.
20 Atwood 2004, 249–250.
21 Chen 1989, 11b–3a.
22 Zhao 2004, 104–106.
23 *YS* 34.
24 Ke 1989, 425.
25 Yao 1969, 192–193.
26 Ke 1989, 410.
27 Chen 2005, 8–9; Brose 2005, 396–435; Brose 2002, 267–289; De Bary 1981, 152–153.
28 Yan, 'Jiafeng Kongzi zhi', in Su 1334, 1a.
29 Wilson 2002, 50–51.
30 Zhao 2009, 78–80.
31 Sugiyama 2002, 220–225.
32 For a rubbing of the stele and analysis of its layout, see Miya 2006, 271–272.
33 E.g., 'Mubalaji ye linmiao jijie' (1323), 'Duo'erzhi yemiao jie' (1336), 'Nishan shuyuan bei' (1339), in Luo 2001, 268, 289, and 296–300.
34 Flath 2016, 140–142.
35 G. Xu, 'Huangmei Dazhang gongzhu ji Kongmiao bei', in Luo 2001, 256.
36 Sima Qian 1975–1981, 1945–1946.
37 H. Zhang, 'Huangjie dazhang gongzhu jiang xiang bei', in Luo 2001, 270–271.
38 Q. Zhang, '[Xuanzhao] Huang taihou si Lu Queli miao zhi bei', in Luo 2001, 284–285.
39 On northern Confucianism, see Makino 1987, 529–530; Bol 1987, 466–468; on Jin awareness of Neo-Confucianism, see Tillman 1995, 72–83; Miura 2003, 47–51.
40 De Bary 1981, 53–60; Bol 1997, 46–47.
41 Elman 2000, xx, 37–41, 594–605.
42 Huang 2010, 224–225.
43 Chung 1995, 5–14; Deuchler 1992, 16–27.
44 Nosco 1984, 5–14; Boot 1982, 279–301.
45 Dardess 2003, 129–130.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE

BUDDHISM IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Brian Baumann

The conversion of the Mongols to Buddhism marks a turning point in world history. Patronizing Buddhism to a degree no nation ever approached, the Mongols brought Buddhism to its apogee as a world religion, connecting their empire with Buddhist centers over an area that stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Black Sea. In so doing, their predilection for Tibetan-rite tradition over the Chinese sects favored by their predecessors changed the face of Buddhism to the countenance it bears today. The assimilation of Buddhism occurred since the onset of their campaign for world dominion beginning with the investiture of Chinggis Khan in 1206, but the Mongols did not convert to Buddhism until after Qubilai Qa'an's (b. 1215, r. 1260–1294) reign. Once effected, conversion did not happen overnight. Just as in the case of their turn to Marxism-Leninism centuries later, the Mongols converted to Buddhism before actually having assimilated its doctrine. Conversion took a generation, with Mongols first rendering the dharma in their own language and then inculcating their children. Despite their conversion, Mongols did not forswear their traditional cult of heaven and went forward venerating the two very different religions as nominally coequal until the coming of modernity.

At the Mongol Empire's founding under Chinggis Khan (1162–1227) in 1206, the Mongols were not unfamiliar with Buddhism. Khitan Buddhists, such as Yelü Ahai and Yelü Tuhua, were prominent members of their grand confederation, which included not only Buddhists but also Christians, Muslims, Confucianists, Daoists, and peoples of other religious affiliations as well.[1] Buddhism flourished in a semicircle of nations on their periphery: the Uyghurs of Qocho, the Tangut of Xi Xia, the Khitans of Qara Khitai, and the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234). Not far beyond was Buddhist Tibet. Chinggis Khan had relations of varying degrees with all of these nations and kept Buddhist scribes in his administration.

Chinggis Khan was not Buddhist. For the men of the royal family, submitting to a foreign discipline, Buddhism or otherwise, was proscribed as tantamount to forfeiture of sovereignty. Mongols saw foreign religions as they saw themselves – as nations to be dealt with. For a khan to assume a foreign religion implied submission

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to the religion's head. The sole deference of Mongols was to the blue sky (*tengri*), that is, the vault of heaven whence sovereigns create the sensible world through signs that engender spatial and temporal order on earth.[2] For intercession between heaven and earth, the Mongols adhered to the pronouncements of priests and priestesses whose function was to determine the auspices of rule and sanctify those auspices through sacred ritual. Within decades of the empire's founding, however, the status of Buddhism surpassed that of every other priestly order – including the Mongols' very own. Initially, this change of status was something of a matter of happenstance resulting from the subjugation of the Buddhist nations at their periphery. With Toluid supremacy after 1251, however, it became a matter of predilection for the Buddhist *dharma*.

Mongol assimilation of Buddhism was not a simple matter of individual lords exercising personal preference for religion. It constituted one aspect of a greater geopolitical modus operandi. Bent on conquering the known world, dividing its spoils amongst themselves, and keeping everything in it in the family, the Mongols patronized religions as a means to achieving peaceable order. Patronage was contingent upon services rendered. In exchange for financial support, military protection, and special tax-exempt status, the Mongols charged priestly orders with praying to heaven (the sky above) and offering blessings. In practical terms, this meant that in return for patronage they expected religious orders to work to secure Mongol prosperity and support among the populace. Services rendered were manifold. In addition to sacred ritual and teaching, priestly orders carried out a variety of profane functions. In the case of Buddhism, these included government administration, calendar reckoning, divination, medicine, business, commerce, banking, manufacturing, construction, and agriculture. The Mongols patronized religious orders generally, but not all to the same degree. Some religions were more capable than others at rendering certain services. It is in this context of competition that Buddhism gained preeminence over other priestly orders – and then Tibetan Buddhism over other forms of Buddhism. Traditional wisdom held that of religions, Confucianism was superior for ruling the state, Buddhism, the mind. By the time of the Mongol Empire, however, intellectuals had come to esteem Buddhist statecraft.

The 1209 submission of the Uyghur aristocracy brought the Mongol Empire its first infusion of Buddhist influence. Since 1204, Uyghur scribes had been serving Chinggis Khan as his secretarial corps, and this presumably brought some Buddhist influence. The submission of the Uyghur aristocracy brought Buddhism not only patronage but also power and privilege, for now the population of Uyghur Buddhists belonged to the aristocracy. William of Rubruck reports that during his journey in the 1250s the Mongols privileged Uyghur Buddhism over every other Buddhist sect. He notes too that Uyghur Buddhist prelates carried the title *toyin*.[3] The term comes to Mongolian from Chinese *dao ren* 道人 via Old Turkic. Eventually, it came to mean 'lama' in general, but during the imperial era referred specifically to a monk of noble birth.

Having begun to campaign in the Tangut Xi Xia realm from 1205, by 1207 Chinggis Khan was exacting tribute from Tibet and giving audience to delegations of Tibetan monks.[4] With Tangut submission in 1210, Tangut Buddhists entered Mongol service. Chinese Buddhism, as patronized by the Jurchen, came with the campaign against North China that began in 1211 and culminated with the taking

of the Jurchen capital, Zhongdu (present-day Beijing), in 1215. During this period, as part of establishing Mongol rule in North China, Chinggis Khan summoned the leading Buddhist clergy and enjoined them to assemble a cohort of leading monks to see to the continuity of Buddhist practice under Mongol auspices. In return for praying to heaven for Mongol success, or in other words, working under Mongol auspices, they would continue to receive tax-exempt status. At this time, two eminent Buddhist personages entered Chinggis Khan's service and joined the Mongol fold, the Chan Buddhist monk Haiyun (1202–1257) and the lay-Buddhist Khitan polymath Yelü Chucai (1189–1243).

Haiyun was still in his teens when first he met Chinggis Khan in 1214.[5] The brilliant young disciple of Dhyana master Zhongguan (d. 1220) spent the remainder of his life in Mongol service, living for extended periods among the Mongol royal family who esteemed his teaching. In the 1240s, to study political science, a youthful Qubilai had Haiyun assemble a college of eminent Buddhist and Confucian sages who instilled in Qubilai faith in Buddhism as the vehicle most capable of engendering a pacific world. When his first son was born in 1243, Qubilai gave Haiyun the honor of naming him. The name Haiyun gave was Jingim (Ch. Zhenjin 真金 'True Gold'). Qubilai's younger brother, Hülegü (1218–1265) studied under Haiyun at Qaraqorum and sought Haiyun's blessing before setting out on the campaign that established the Ilkhanate (1256–1335). After Qubilai founded the Yuan dynasty, he further honored Haiyun with the erection of the Haiyun Pagoda of Qingshou Temple in Daidu (present-day Beijing).[6]

When the Mongols took Zhongdu in 1215, the Khitan nobleman, Yelü Chucai (1189–1243), forewent his allegiance to the Jurchen and entered the service of Chinggis Khan. Adept in astronomy, literature, music, and medicine, Chucai knew the Three Teachings – Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism – but favored Chan Buddhism. Chinggis Khan made the eminent polymath a member of his retinue and endowed him with oracular power, that is, with authority to speak for the government. On his Western Campaign (1218–1225), Chinggis Khan kept Chucai in his imperial entourage as a chief secretary. Chucai handled various matters, including calendar reckoning, making omens, and healing the sick. At one point, Chinggis Khan charged Chucai to procure the presence of a Daoist Master, Changchun Qiu Chuji (1148–1227), head of the Quanzhendao School. Chucai saw to inviting the Daoist sage and his travel arrangements from China to Chinggis Khan's camp in the Hindu Kush, north of Kabul where he arrived in 1222. Chinggis Khan had summoned him, wishing to learn the secret of longevity and, upon meeting the Master, was so impressed with the Daoist's teaching that he granted Daoists special tax-exempt status and asked them to pray to heaven and offer benedictions. In the aftermath, Changchun's followers at the Quanzhendao School took advantage of their privilege by appropriating Buddhist holdings. The ensuing conflict between Buddhists and Daoists lasted decades and led to a series of debates to determine which religion was the truer.[7]

Through the reigns of Ögödei (r. 1229–1241) and his eldest son, Güyük (r. 1246–1248), Mongol patronage of Buddhism expanded significantly, and the legacy of Mongolian Buddhism began. This change of status was due to no special intention of the Mongols but happened merely through appropriation of the institutions of conquered Buddhist nations. The Mongol world remained, by and large, traditional

and continued to rely heavily on its indigenous priestly order. John of Plano Carpini's 1240s travelogue shows the Mongol *töre* 'state' still in the hands of *böge* priests.[8] Buddhists' power largely was limited to Buddhist affairs. At Haiyun's request, in 1229 Ögödei gave tax-exempt status to Chan Buddhist monks. Now when the Mongols sacked a city, they spared Buddhists. When the Mongols took the Jin capital at Kaifeng in 1233, the Mongol commander, Sübedei, requested permission to exact a massacre of the city, but Yelü Chucai interceded to save the population from wanton slaughter and helped refugees resettle to the north. In this war-torn era, as an alternative to military service and corvée labor, men began pledging to Buddhist monasteries and other dispensation-granting institutions in great numbers. By 1237, Yelü Chucai recognized that the number of priests, Buddhist and Daoist both, had grown too large to care for and imposed an examination in knowledge of scripture to screen Buddhist and Daoist priests. Those proficient received a certificate of adherence to their vows and had to promise to dwell in monasteries.[9] An additional boon to the Buddhist *sangha* occurred in 1235 with the construction of Qaraqorum. In fulfilling his promise to his father to build the city, Ögödei constructed a series of palaces, pavilions, and temples and began construction on a great pavilion, pagoda, and temple complex that Möngke would bring to completion in 1256. By the 1250s, the small city was home to twelve monasteries housing monks of the various Buddhist nations and Daoists.[10]

Late in life, Ögödei made an inroad into assimilating Tibetan Buddhism when, in 1239, he assigned his second son, Köten (1206–1247 or 1251), an appanage over the Tangut realm bordering Tibet.[11] In 1240, Köten sent a Tangut general, Dor-ta Darqan, with an army to subjugate central Tibet and secure a worthy teacher, a lama-preceptor. After ransacking several monasteries, Dor-ta Darqan found his man, headmaster of the Sakya Order, Sakya pandita Kungga gyaltsan (Sa skya pandita Kun dga' rgyal mtsan, 1182–1251).[12] Sakya Pandita (or Sa Pa) was one of the great scholars of his time and came to be considered the founder of Mongolian Buddhism. By summoning the eminent sage to his court at Liangzhou (modern Wuwei), Köten was bent on patronizing Tibetan Buddhism whether Tibetans wanted him to or not. After dallying until 1244, Sakya Pandita set out for the Mongolian prince's camp, stopping off along the way to give teachings. Traveling in the company of two nephews, Pakpa Lodrö gyeltsen ('Phags pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan, 1235–1280, 'Phags pa, for short) and Chakna Dorje (Phyag na rdo rje, 1239–1267), he arrived at court only in 1246.[13] By that time, Köten had returned to Mongolia to participate in the 1246 *quriltai* that would elect Ögödei's successor.[14] Köten went to Qaraqorum seeking the qa'anship for himself. When the honor went to his older brother, Güyük, instead, Köten returned to Liangzhou in 1247 to find Sakya Pandita and his two nephews, Phagspa and Chagna, waiting.[15]

At this time, Sakya Pandita and Köten sowed a relationship that would blossom into Mongolian Buddhism as we know it. According to Buddhist hagiography, Sakya Pandita cured Köten of an illness, initiated him in the *Hevajra tantra*, an esoteric ritual with a sexual aspect, and the two together established a certain *Yön cho* (*yon mchod*) patron–priest relationship. A contraction of *yöndak* (yon bdag) and *chö ne* (mchod gnas), in this relationship a Lord of Alms or alms-giver, *yöndak* (yon-bdag, Mong. *öglige eǰen*) agrees to provide material support, military and financial, to a *chö ne* (*mchod gnas*) 'object of veneration' (Mong. *sitügen*), his priest who sees to

the temporal needs of his patron and his patron's people. In rhetoric, it is the priest who holds ultimate authority. When worldly matters are at issue, patron and priest have seats of equal height. In religious matters, the monk sits higher.[16] This bond is designed to pull the state into an ultimately catholic Buddhist world. Buddhist histories refer to Köten's initiation as the Mongols' conversion to Buddhism. Modern scholarship often refers to Köten as the first Mongol Khan to convert to Buddhism. The reality is different. Köten's submission to Sakya Pandita was nominal. He remained a Mongol first. In real politics, the patron–priest relationship subordinated Sakya Pandita as Köten's subject and ultimately the subject of Güyük Kh'an. Around this time, Güyük granted Haiyun authority over all Buddhist monks in the empire – except the Uyghur aristocracy, and so, nominally at least, the patron–priest relationship further subordinated Sakya Pandita under the Chinese Chan Buddhist prelate as well.[17] Most importantly, from Köten's perspective, establishing a patron–priest relationship with Sakya Pandita secured the submission of the Tibetan Buddhist World. At some point, Köten made Sakya Pandita a viceroy of the Mongol Empire with temporal power over Tibet. Sakya Pandita sent a letter to the Tibetan lords calling upon them to submit to the Mongols and pay tribute, which they did.[18]

Although some sources indicated that Köten and Sakya Pandita both died in 1251, we must keep in mind the uncertainty of Köten's death. Regardless, Sakya Pandita died in 1251.[19] Nonetheless, the relationship established by them between Tibetan Buddhism and the Mongols lived on. Möngke gave Köten's appanage to his younger brother, Qubilai.[20] In 1253, Qubilai took Sakya Pandita's nephew, the young Phagspa lama, into his retinue. Though his junior by several years, Qubilai made Phagspa his guru. In 1258, Qubilai and his wife, Chabui, underwent initiation in the rites of the *Hevajra tantra*, and Qubilai and Phagspa reestablished the patron–priest relationship.[21] In time, their enactment of this bond became the foundation for future church and state relations throughout the dynastic era and a precedent cited by China for its claim to sovereignty over Tibet in modern times.[22]

During the reign of Möngke Qa'an (b. 1209, r. 1251–1259) the Mongols promoted Buddhism over other foreign religions, such as Christianity, Daoism, and Islam, and made Tibetan Buddhism preeminent among Buddhist traditions (apart from Uyghur Buddhism). Upon his investiture in 1251, Möngke initially confirmed Haiyun's appointment as head of Buddhist affairs. By as early as 1252, however, Möngke replaced Haiyun with a Kashmiri monk of Tibetan-rite Buddhism, Namo, as head of Buddhist monks at the *ordu*.[23] In doing so, Möngke bestowed upon Namo the title *Ulus-un baghsi* 'National Preceptor' (Ch. *guoshi* 國師), a title adopted from Tangut Buddhism for the governance of a Buddhist state.[24] In this moment, while the empire itself was not yet a Buddhist state, Möngke changed the face of Buddhism at the Mongol court from Chinese to Tibetan. Scholars proffer several arguments in speculation over the reason for this predilection. A weak, anachronistic argument has been made that the Mongols had an economic preference for Tibetan animal husbandry over Chinese farming. A better argument can be made for Mongol preference for Tibetan Buddhist politics of syncretism, the tradition of holding multiple disparate traditions in kind rather than imposing a single, monolithic order. A good argument can be made for the superiority of Tibetan scholasticism (as embodied by the likes of Sakya Pandita). But one argument in this vein need not be deduced. Sources show clearly that the Mongols preferred Tibetan Buddhism for its magic. Derived from

the Iranian tradition of the *magi*, Mongol tradition was a magic-based tradition, and Mongols regarded Tibetan and Kashmiri Buddhists as the best magicians in the world.

A sign of Mongol esteem for Tibetan Buddhism is their missionary work to spread the dharma even into parts of their realm where it was either foreign or had long been absent. Kashmir entered the Mongol world when the *tammachi* Sali Noyan, commander of the *tamma* stationed in Afghanistan, conquered the Buddhist kingdom in 1253. It is perhaps through this connect that when he established the Ilkhanate (1258–1335), Hülegü favored the West Tibetan Kashmiri monks of the Pakmodrupa (Phag mo gru pa) sect and made Buddhism the religion of court at the center of the Islamic world.[25] With Muslims and Buddhists traditionally at odds, the decision was radical and destined to fail – but not for lack of trying. The Ilkhanids supported monks from multiple Buddhist groups – Uyghur, Tibetan, Kashmiri, and Chinese. The Mongols sponsored these monks to translate Buddhist scripture into Persian and Arabic. In these manuscripts, translators substituted 'Buddha' with 'Allah'. The great Ilkhanid *wazir*, Rashid al-Din, used the teaching of a Kashmiri hermit monk to write a Buddhist catechism for Muslims.[26] In his *Compendium of Chronicles*, Rashid al-Din stated that before acceptance of Islam, the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina were Buddhists and that Chinggis Khan was a descendent of the tribes of Noah through Japheth.[27] The Mongols spent lavishly to build Buddhist infrastructure in the West. They restored ancient Buddhist centers Islam had left to ruin and constructed visually magnificent temples and monasteries of Tibetan architecture along all major routes in a string that joined East and West extending all the way to the Black Sea, Anatolia, and Armenia.[28] As microcosms of the universe, these monasteries became centers for education, study of Sanskrit, manufacture, agriculture, commerce, and moneylending, and were often favored over established Islamic concerns.[29]

After the Buddhist reigns of Hülegü and Abaqa, increasing fissures between Buddhism and Islam produced a rift that agents could exploit for political advantage, and the Ilkhanate's Buddhist state began to destabilize. Playing on sympathy for Islam, Hülegü's son, Tegüder (r. 1282–1284), was able to ascend to the seat of the Ilkhan by converting to Islam. He reigned as Sultan Ahmad but did not Islamicize the realm. His successor Arghun (r. 1284–1291) returned to Buddhism, but his reign ended in chaos and religious conflict ensued. In 1295, Ghazan (r. 1295–1304) converted to Islam and Islamicized the state, ordering all Mongol elites and soldiery to convert.[30]

The same political tension between Buddhism and Islam existed in the Ulus of Jochi, but there the politics played out in reverse. Berke (r. 1257–1266), son of Jochi, had converted to Islam in 1257 yet supported other religions, including Buddhism. In 1291, Toqto'a (1291–1312) used sympathy for Buddhism to overthrow the existing government and established himself as khan. Once in power, he made Uyghur Buddhism the religion of the court, but in the final years of his reign converted to Islam. After Toqto'a's death in 1312, upon seizing power from his base in Khwarazm, Özbeg Khan (r. 1313–41) purged Buddhist clerics and all who opposed the Islamization of the realm.[31]

In the eyes of the West, Mongol patronage of a certain religion signified submission to that religion. In his early writings, Dante saw Mongols as Buddhists

and then later came to see them as Muslims.[32] William of Rubruck saw Sartaq (d. 1257), son of Batu, as Christian and Möngke as Buddhist. This perception, however, was mistaken. Although they made Buddhism their court religion and promoted it above other religions, the Mongols under Möngke did not submit to Buddhism to the extent that Arab kings and European monarchs had to Islam and Christianity, respectively. By maintaining the cult of heaven (*tengri*) over all, they remained Mongols first. This distinction is clear from William of Rubruck's 1255 audience with Möngke Qa'an, wherein the mighty lord told the Franciscan that, as heaven has given different fingers to the hand, so it has given different ways to men. Heaven has granted Christians their scriptures, but Christians do not keep them. On the other hand, heaven has given the Mongols priests (or soothsayers). They do what the priests tell them to do and live in peace.[33]

Möngke may have promoted Tibetan Buddhism, but he did not go as far as to prohibit the establishment of other religions or exclude them from his patronage. Rather, Möngke tested Buddhism against competing religions by subjecting the dharma to the rigors of debate. One debate occurred in 1254, when a Buddhist interlocutor engaged with an Islamic counterpart and the Roman Catholic missionary William of Rubruck. The following year, Möngke held another debate, this to resolve the conflict that had ensued following Chinggis Khan's promotion of the Daoism of Changchun over the Buddhism of Yelü Chucai. Möngke summoned protagonists of both parties to court, the Daoist patriarch Li Zhichang and the abbot of the Buddhist Shaolin monastery in Qaraqorum, Fuyu Zhanglao. The Buddhists were declared victorious, but dissension continued. Thus, Möngke scheduled another debate for the following year, but the premature death of the Daoist interlocutor forced its postponement. Möngke then turned the matter over to Qubilai, who organized a third debate in 1258 at his newly built summer palace city, Kaiping (renamed Shangdu in 1264). Buddhists again won, but again dissension reigned. When the dispute resulted in bloodshed in 1280, Qubilai responded by sharply curtailing the prestige and influence of Daoism, a censure from which Daoism never recovered.[34]

Qubilai Qa'an came to power at a time of political fragmentation in the Mongol Empire. His brother Möngke's usurpation of power from the Ögödeids caused hard feelings among the royal family. At Möngke's death in 1259, the wealth and territory of the Mongol Empire far exceeded historical precedent. But the wealth and vastness of the empire coupled with dissension over the question of Möngke's successor created a void of vision for the future. Rather than going to the trouble of tanistry to see who would hold supreme power and carrying on with a united bid for absolute world dominion, the Chinggisids preferred to settle into their individual *ulus*es. The royal family knew that Qubilai, son of Tolui, had a vision for the future. This vision, however, they saw as too radical. They opposed Qubilai and forced him to fight for power.

In his youth, Qubilai had been a student of political science. While still in his twenties, Qubilai had Haiyun assemble a stable of the best political thinkers in the realm. They counseled him on the possibility of using Buddhism to create a world order that might endure in peace and justice indefinitely.[35] As viceroy over North China, he utilized his brain-trust of Buddhist and Confucianist sages to begin a series of experiments in good government. He founded a Pacification Commission and began to transform political administration, city planning, public welfare,

agriculture, and more. Möngke's regular administration had opposed these efforts, but, after securing power through victory in a civil war with the Toluids' youngest brother, Ariq Böke, Qubilai Qa'an was at liberty to put his vision for the future into action.[36]

At the top, order changed but little. Qubilai remained a Mongol. He never fully submitted to Buddhism, and throughout his life continued to venerate the Mongol royal family's traditional cult of heaven. He retained the Mongols' indigenous priesthood, did not prohibit the establishment of other religions and continued to support them. Rather, change came from the ground up. Through political innovation, Qubilai transformed the relationship between sovereign and subject. To effect this change, he relied extensively on Buddhist modes of statecraft. Promoting it with unheard of generosity, his reliance on Buddhist statecraft was such that Qubilai Qa'an became Buddhism's foremost patron in all of world history. Qubilai showered Buddhist monks and temples with favor, a practice followed by many of his successors. So great was his munificence, that it caused strain on the state finances. Literally tons of gold and silver. Thousands upon thousands of bolts of silk and gold-spun cloth. All to produce nothing but the finest works of art and architecture and to support the most learned of monks.[37]

In promoting Tibetan Buddhism as the state religion, Qubilai had Phagspa preside over his 1260 inauguration establishing the Yuan Zhongtong 中統 government. Thereafter, he bestowed on his guru the honorary title *Ulus-un baghsi* 'State Preceptor' (Ch. *guoshi*). In 1264, Qubilai sent both Phagspa and Chagna back to Tibet. Phagspa he put in charge of the newly established Bureau of Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs, with authority over Buddhist clergy in Tibet. Chagna he invested with secular power over Tsang or Central Tibet. After years at Sakya, where he wore Mongol dress and imposed Mongol ways, Phagspa returned to court in 1268. At this time, he carried out the important task of realigning the Buddhist calendar in keeping with the Chinese. On March 17, 1269, Phagspa introduced a newly invented quadratic alphabet based on Tibetan letters to accurately render all languages in the dynasty. For his achievement, Qubilai rewarded him with the title *Dishi* 帝師 'Imperial Preceptor'. The position, adopted in accordance with Tangut precedent, affords its bearer real temporal power, the right to speak with the authority of the emperor.[38]

Later in his life, in 1278, Phagspa composed a primer in Buddhist teaching, a guide for the pious layman titled *Shes bya rab gsal* 'Elucidation of the Knowable', for Qubilai's son, Jingim (1243–1286). Though said to have been composed at Jingim's request, it was traditional Buddhist practice to educate the heir apparent as an awakened *bodhisattva* with a formal catechism of this type, known in Tibetan as *bshad mdzod* 'treasury of explanations', a type of compendium often written for kings and princes. Unfortunately for Jingim, having been named heir apparent in 1273, he was implicated in a court intrigue calling for Qubilai to abdicate and in 1285 preceded his father in death without ever having had the chance to apply his training. The catechism itself has survived. Originally composed in Tibetan, it was then translated into Chinese and Mongolian.[39] Written in *abhidharma* tradition, the text, which opens with an invocation to Sakya Pandita, is composed in five parts. Part Three, a section devoted to the Animate World, gives the genesis of a Mongolian Buddhist world. In a genealogy proceeding from the deific sage-king Mahasammata

to the Solar Race of Kings to the kings of Tibet, the text goes on to say that 3,250 years after Buddha's Nirvana, Chinggis Khan came to rule the world.[40]

The foundation of the Mongolian Buddhist world lay in establishing Buddhist centers throughout the realm. This responsibility fell not only to the qa'an. Princes and wealthy aristocrats took it upon themselves to outlay funds for establishing Buddhist works, monasteries and temples, in their individual appanages and realms. Qubilai himself established at least three prominent Sakya Buddhist centers outside of Tibet. In 1256, while still viceroy of North China and at the same time Möngke Qa'an was completing the magnificent pagoda and great temple of Qaraqorum, Qubilai built himself a stately summer palace as a Buddhist garden paradise. Originally named Kaiping, with the establishment of the Zhiyuan government in 1264, he renamed the center Shangdu (上都) 'Upper Capital'. There, as we learn from Marco Polo, he housed a large enclave of Buddhist faithful and clergy and placed the clergy in charge of officiating civil order. This charge entailed not only establishing spatial and temporal order and regulating ritual practice but also harmonizing Buddhist tradition with the Mongolian. Marco Polo tells us that at the beginning of fall in the Mongol calendar (August 28), Buddhist chaplains officiated the traditional Mongol mare's milk aspersion ritual, formerly conducted, as William of Rubruck informs us, by the Mongols' indigenous priesthood.[41]

A second Buddhist center Qubilai established was a pilgrimage site to the earthly abode of Manjusri, the bodhisattva of wisdom, high upon a mountain terrace known as Wutai shan in present-day Shanxi Province. Qubilai's patronage revitalized the pilgrimage site, which Sui-Tang China had made prominent and the Tanguts had maintained for the entire Buddhist world. The site drew pilgrims from as far away as India, Kashmir, Korea, and even Japan. Phagspa lama is said to have made pilgrimage to the site, where he made Qubilai an emanation of Manjusri.[42] As an emanation of Manjusri, Phagspa bestowed upon Qubilai the epithet Sechen Khan 'Wise Emperor', by which he is remembered to this day.[43]

The third Buddhist center Qubilai established was his capital city, Khanbaliq or Daidu. According to the city's architectural plan, Buddhist monasteries in the four cardinal directions and at the four corners of the city made Buddhism the symbolic foundation of Qubilai's world.[44] Within the Yuan capital, Qubilai established several Buddhist centers and erected a number of Buddhist temples and monuments – most of which have been destroyed. One of these was Candan Juu 'Sandalwood Temple', home of a large Sandalwood Buddha. Legend has it that the ancient Sandalwood Buddha resides only in the presence of a righteous king and possesses the magical power to walk from one king's realm to the next. After having come to rest in the realm of Qubilai, the temple burned to the ground, around 1900, in the Boxer Rebellion.[45]

To enliven his realm with Buddhist objects of veneration, Qubilai came to rely on the Nepalese artisan master Anige (1244–1278). Anige was discovered by Phagspa, who after a search for a worthy artist, commissioned him to erect a golden stupa in Amdo (Qinghai) in honor of Qubilai's enthronement. When admirers judged Anige's achievement surpassing expectations, Phagspa presented him to Qubilai, who went on to commission Anige for other works, including temples, stupas, and Buddha sculptures in Daidu, Shangdu, and elsewhere. Anige did the metalwork decoration for the astronomical and timekeeping instruments at the Daidu Observatory as well

as for the royal family's imperial standards. He did portraiture and painted Qubilai and Chabui for the imperial temple. In 1273, Qubilai appointed Anige head of the Directorate General for the Management of Artisans.[46] A few of Anige's works survive. The famous portraits of Qubilai and Chabui now hang in the National Palace Museum in Taipei, Taiwan.[47] In Beijing stands his White Pagoda of Miaoying Temple. Also extant is an icon he made of the protector deity, Mahakala.

As the god of infinite time, the *dharmapala* Mahakala is the annihilator of all things – even time itself. Known in Chinese as Daheitian (大黑天) 'Great Black Heaven' and in Tibetan as both Nagpo Chenpo (*nag po chen po*) 'Great Black One' and Gönpo (mgon po) 'Protector', the Mongols know the deity as Yeke Qara 'the Great Black One' but especially as Gombo. Personifying ferocity and intelligence, Mahakala was the tutelary genius of the Sakya order in general and Phagspa in particular. Qubilai made Mahakala his spiritual guide or *yidam*, and Qubilai himself became the embodiment of Mahakala, the great protector of Buddhism. People venerated Mahakala as the genius of Qubilai's martial power. Mahakala became the tutelary deity of the Mongols at large. From the Mongols – who themselves had appropriated it from the Tangut – the cult of Mahakala passed to the Manchus, who, centuries later, built a temple complex to Mahakala in their capital city, Mukden.[48]

Qubilai's reliance on Buddhism was such that he placed Sakya monks in positions of authority over the affairs of the entire empire and over the peoples and institutions that had formerly held those positions and wielded their power. Many felt diminished by the Sakyapa's meteoric rise to power, priests of the Mongols' sacerdotal tradition, Daoists, Syriac-rite Christians, Chan Buddhists, Uyghur Buddhists, and Confucian scholars to name but a few. At court, tensions existed between Sakya prelates on the one hand and members of the Uyghur Buddhist aristocracy and Confucian scholars on the other. Upon proclamation of the Yuan Dynasty in December 1271, Qubilai's decision to subordinate Confucian predominance to Buddhism left the Confucian estate especially aggrieved. These tensions made court life rife with intrigue that from time to time came to a head in political violence. One such incident came in 1287 when, in order to deal with a budget shortfall, Qubilai put a Tibetan Buddhist monk, Sangha (from Tib. *sengge* 'lion', also seen as Sangke, Sang-ko, and Sengge), in charge of the finances of the entire dynasty by appointing him chancellor of the Supreme Secretariat. Sangha made some headway in the matter by introducing a new devalued currency, but his implementation of austerity measures on the one hand while enriching himself and the Buddhist establishment created opportunities for opponents to attack him. Officials denounced him in the presence of Qubilai, who had him dismissed, disgraced, and executed.[49]

Along with the Buddha and the Sangha (the Buddhist community of monks, not to be confused with the finance minister), a third element in the creation of a Buddhist state is promulgation of the dharma. In the Mongol Empire, establishing the dharma entailed translation of scripture into the languages of manifold nations. The Ilkhanate patronized translation into Arabic and Persian. The Yuan funded translation into Chinese, Tangut, Uyghur, Tibetan, and Mongolian. Mongols supported the scholars and language experts necessary to do the actual translation and explication of texts as well as the artisans requisite to print and publish it. To produce text, publishers sometimes utilized movable type but principally made use of xylography, the production

of which required skilled engravers. Numerous monasteries published texts but mass production occurred at but a few industry centers located in Daidu in the north and in the West Lake region and the cities of Suzhou and Hangzhou in the south. As the southern publishing houses were still beyond his control when Qubilai first ascended to power, the publication of Buddhist literature increased with their acquisition after the conquest of the Song dynasty (960–1279) in 1279.

Translating, explicating, and mass producing Buddhist literature for each nation in the empire took a concerted effort. The Mongols assembled a diverse stable of distinguished sages from the Buddhist nations of the realm. Included among them were scholars of Chinese, Tangut, Uyghur, and Tibetan nations. Themselves incipient as a Buddhist people, Mongol scholars contributed little to this corps. Sanskritists such as the Uyghur Karunadas (Skt. Karuṇadasa 'servant of compassion') were necessary to maintain Sanskrit as the standard medium of Buddhist expression. Because Mongols were disseminating the Vajrayana Buddhism of Tibet, the majority of scholars either were of Tibetan extraction or (as the Uyghur Karunadas) at least lettered in Tibetan Buddhist tradition. The intellectual hub for this coterie was the Sakya School, which carried on a tradition of excellence in learning established by Sakya Pandita. Exemplifying the tradition was the eminent textual scholar and translator, Buton Rinchen Drub (1290–1364), who catalogued Buddhist texts, composed an important history of Buddhism (*Chos 'byung*, 1322), and explicated the important cosmographic treatise, the *Kalacakra tantra*.[50]

During the reign of Qubilai (1260–1294), translation into Mongolian was something of an *ad hoc* phenomenon. Sonom-gara (Tib. *bsod nam* 'merit' + Skt. *kara* 'maker') translated Sakya Pandita's aphorisms, the *Subhasitaratnanidhi* (Tibetan *Lek shé* [Legs bshad] 'elegant sayings', Mongolian *Erdeni-yin sang* 'treasury of jewels'), from Tibetan into Mongolian specifically for the edification of Qubilai.[51] A mandala-treatise written by Phagspa was translated specifically for Köten's son, Jibik-Temür.[52] Around the turn of the fourteenth century, however, publishing houses began to mass produce translations of Buddhist literature.

Translation into Mongolian was spearheaded by the monk Chosgi odsir (Tib. Chos kyi 'od ser, fl. 1305–1321). Of uncertain extraction, one might deduce from biographical information and his extant works that Chosgi odsir was an Uyghur born in Tibet and trained under the Sakyapa. In addition to Uyghur, he was learned in Tibetan and Mongolian letters. Around 1305 he translated Santideva's famous didactic poem *Bodhicaryavatara* together with a verse auto-commentary (which would later be included in the Buddhist canon).[53] In 1312, by decree of Emperor Ayurbarwada (1311–1320), 1,000 copies of his translation and commentary were block-printed at the Great Temple of the White Stupa in Daidu, where they were 'distributed to the many' (*olan-a tügügülbe*).[54] Another extant translation of his is a hymn to the Sakyapa protectress Mahakali. Chosgi odsir was handsomely rewarded for his efforts and eventually set up in a monastery in Daidu as head of a circle of translators. A disciple of his, Sherab Sengge (Tib. *shes rab seng ge* 'lion of wisdom'), translated numerous important works into Mongolian. These include the *Pancaraksa*, *Golden Light Sutra*, and Chosgi odsir's Tibetan translation of the *Twelve Deeds of Buddha*.[55]

Translation has direct benefit for teaching the literate, that is to say, to the elite, but even greater indirect benefit to the entire populace. Dissemination of the dharma

brought merit to those involved in the process of its creation. Hearing scripture inculcated Buddhist teaching as well as reading it for oneself did. What is more, the very existence of scripture held benefit as a talisman, for the Buddhist world saw it as a sign of peace. Especially irenic was the publication of a Buddhist canon, the reading of which constituted a potent magical ritual for instilling peace. In promotion of comity, Yuan emperors funded the publication of canons for the peoples of the various Buddhist nations under their sway. These included a Tangut canon (*Xixia zang* 西夏藏, completed in 1302), two separate Chinese Buddhist canons, the *Puning canon* 普寧藏 (which was lost in a fire) and the *Qisha canon* 磧砂藏 (still extant), and the 1312 Tibetan canon (*bka' 'gyur*) and commentary (*bstan 'gyur*) compiled and published in manuscript form at Narthang Monastery in Tibet. The efficacy of this magic is clear in the 1340 Inscription of Arugh, Prince of Yunnan, wherein residents of Yunnan erected a stele inscription memorializing the prince's contribution of 150 pieces of silver to Kunming monastery for an annual reading of the Buddhist canon in the name of peace.[56]

In the wake of Qubilai's transformation of the Mongol Empire, succeeding generations of Mongols were born into a Buddhist world, and the Mongol conversion to Buddhism was complete. In their conversion, Mongols adopted Buddhist names, a common name being Sambuu (from Chinese *sanbao* 三寶 'the three jewels'). They gave their children over to monasteries to become monks. They couched their propaganda in the moralistic idealism Möngke Qa'an had eschewed. And we might presume that they lived their lives in accordance with Buddhist teaching as well. A telling sign of their conversion to Buddhism is the rewriting of the history of their patron, Chinggis Khan. In the *Yuan shi* (History of the Yuan Dynasty), published during the Ming dynasty around 1370, the eulogy of Chinggis Khan says that in 1266 he received a new title, Lawgiving Martial Emperor. This new title marked the recreation of the Mongol world in Chinese dynastic tradition. Then, in 1309, he received the expanded title Lawgiving Martial Emperor for whom the Dharma and Heaven Opened the Way to Good Fortune. This title marked the recreation of the Mongol world as a Chinese-Mongolian-Buddhist world. In this relationship between dharma and heaven, just as the priest held ultimate authority over the patron in the patron–priest relationship, so the dharma superseded heaven. The relationship is evident in a passage from the 1346 Buddhist Inscription of Qaraqorum. The passages states that the power of Buddhist faith creates, "the capacity of the Great Holy Man to regard the 'Four Seas' (i.e., the World) as anthills, to regard the 'Eight Limits (of the Earth)' as a pinch of soil, to put the whole universe in a bag, and to roll up the rivers and mountains as a mat."[57]

Eventually, as the power of the emperorship became more formal than real, Mongol sovereignty was subordinated to the dharma. Illustration of this subordination is the Vajrabhairava Mandala, a large silk tapestry dated ca. 1328–1329, now kept at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City. Below the mandala's central deity, the Conqueror of Death, Yamantaka, in the painting's lower-right corner, sit in prayerful supplication from right to left the emperors Toq-Temür (r. 1328–1329, 1329–1332) and Qoshila (r. 1329), and their respective wives in the same posture to the left. Such representation would have been unthinkable to Qubilai Qa'an and his predecessors. Recounting the Mongols' conversion, the *Fozu lidai tongzai* (佛祖歷代通載) of 1333 says that Chinggis Khan ruled from the North over many

nations with many languages as a king who turns a wheel of iron. Qubilai, following his brother, Möngke, on the throne of emperor and king, subjected many nations and territories and powerfully extended his frontier. He adopted the teachings of the Buddha and transformed his people in accordance with the law. Consequently, Buddhism flourished twice as much as before.

Ironically, not long after the Mongols had grown accustomed to the Buddhist world they had created that world turned against them. In May 1351, workers enlisted to rebuild the flood-damaged Grand Canal, facing economic hardship, natural disaster, and the Bubonic Plague, donned red turbans and red clothes, and rebelled. These 'Red Turbans' fought under the leadership of the White Lotus Society (Chinese *Da bai lian she* 大白蓮社), a Buddhist millennial group created to usher in apocalypse when the coming of the end is plain to see. Although by 1354 the Mongols had put down the initial rebellion, by 1355 the Yuan dynasty was in shambles. Rebellion resumed under the leadership of a former monk, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398). Having retaken the South, in 1368 Zhu drove his forces north to Daidu. On September 14, 1368, his armies forced the reigning Yuan emperor, Toghan Temür (b. 1320, r. 1333–1370), to flee. That same year, Zhu Yuanzhang founded the Ming dynasty (1369–1644) and reigned as the Hongwu emperor.[58] In the aftermath, Confucian scholars blamed the Yuan collapse on Toghan Temür's personal deficiencies, in particular for being too preoccupied with tantric sex to attend to the business of his empire. A later Mongol chronicle, the *Altan tobchi*, presents Toghan Temür as lamenting the loss of the Yuan capital, saying that he lost his poor Daidu while propagating the laws of religion, while becoming accustomed to the religion.[59]

Though the Yuan dynasty would continue to reign in the north until 1635, by the end of the fourteenth century, Mongol power had largely collapsed everywhere. Yet, despite the decline of Mongol patronage, the Buddhist establishment survived. As evidenced by their retention of the position of Imperial Preceptor, the Chinggisids continued to support Sakya Buddhism in the Northern Yuan. During the Mongol-Oirat wars of the mid-fifteenth century, Esen Khan (1407–1455) promoted Buddhism and tried to use it to establish tribute relations with the Ming.[60] The Chaghadaid Ulus, which had patronized Tibetan Buddhism since the death of the Ögödeid, Qaidu in 1301, continued to do so to varying degrees into the fifteenth century.[61]

In the wake of Mongol collapse, the world stood transformed from the aristocratic dominion imposed by Chinggis Khan and the soteriological dominion imposed by Qubilai. By the fifteenth century, vast soteriological dominions reigned supreme, Christianity in the West and North, Islam in the Center, and Buddhism in the East. When first they established their patron–priest relationship in 1258, Qubilai was forty-three years old and Phagspa but twenty-three. While Phagspa would exercise impermanence in 1280 at the age of forty-five and Qubilai became a Buddha in 1294 at age seventy-nine, the two together, Qubilai and Phagspa, are remembered as founders of a new world order. Their coming together as patron and priest established the precedent for all subsequent Tibetan-Buddhist dual regency church-and-state governments. In 1578, they were reincarnated in the bodies of Altan Khan and his guru, Sonam Gyatso, the third Dalai Lama, and thereafter, one reigning monarch and chief priest after another.

NOTES

1 Cleaves 1955, 402.
2 Baumann 2013, 234.
3 *TMM*, 139–141, *passim*.
4 Sagaster 2007, 379–381.
5 Sagaster 2007, 381.
6 *EMME*, 48, 117, 278.
7 de Rachewiltz 1962a, 1962b; *TOA*.
8 *TMM*, 8–14.
9 *EMME*, 528.
10 As reported by William of Rubruck (*TMM*, 184).
11 Petech 1990, 7. There is uncertainty regarding Köten's death. Juwayni places his death during the reign of Güyük. See *HWC*, 245; Juwayni 1912, I, 201.
12 Petech 1990, 8; Sagaster 2007, 383.
13 Sagaster 2007, 384.
14 Petech 1990, 8.
15 *EMME*, 321.
16 Hoog 1983, 4.
17 Petech 1990, 5.
18 Sagaster 2007, 385. If Köten did not die in 1247, then this occurred in 1249. If not, then it must have occurred in 1246 or 1247.
19 Sagaster 2007, 386. Again, here we are assuming that Köten lived this long.
20 Petech 1990, 10.
21 Petech 1990, 15.
22 Hoog 1983, 4.
23 *EMME*, 48.
24 Sagaster 2007, 389.
25 Sperling 1990.
26 Jahn 1956, 122.
27 Prazniak 2014, 669.
28 Prazniak 2014, 653.
29 Prazniak 2014, 661.
30 *EMME*, 50.
31 *EMME*, 50, 206–207.
32 Baumann 2015.
33 *TMM*, 91, 187–197.
34 Sagaster 2007, 389.
35 Sagaster 2007, 382–383.
36 *EMME*, 117–118, 458.
37 Sagaster 2007, 392.
38 Sagaster 2007, 391–392.
39 Kara 2016, 43.
40 Hoog 1983, 42.
41 Polo 1929, 300–327.
42 Debreczeny 2011, 1–23.
43 Charleaux 2015.
44 Steinhardt 1983, 151.
45 Franke 1978, 72–76. For a precedent to the Yuan Sandalwood Buddha in the Jurchen Jin, see Tillman and West 1995, 161. For its destruction in 1900, see Charleaux 2014, 1.
46 *EMME*, 13–14.

47 Jing 1994.
48 Berger 1995, 4, 54.
49 *EMME*, 488.
50 Kara 2005, 37–38.
51 Kara 2005, 44; see also Bosson 1969.
52 Kara 2005, 42.
53 Kara 2005, 274.
54 Cleaves 1954, 55, 86.
55 Kara 2005, 46.
56 Kara 1964; Cleaves 1965.
57 Cleaves 1952, 32.
58 *EMME*, 610.
59 Bawden 1955, 57–58.
60 Serruys 1963, 187.
61 *EMME*, 87.

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TMM, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER FORTY

JUDAISM AND THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Na'ama O. Arom

In blood and fire, the kingdom of Judaea fell to the Babylonian sword, and its people were exiled to dwell in foreign lands. Centuries later, at the time of the Mongol advance, Jewish communities were to be found in the cities and countryside across the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe, in northern and eastern Africa, and on the maritime and land-based Silk Roads – also in India and China. Throughout the Fertile Crescent, Jewish communities are described in the texts of twelfth- and thirteenth-century travelers and historians. Baghdad, Aleppo, and Damascus were among the largest settlements; other communities were to be found in Erbil, Homs, Hama, al-Bira, and more – all lay in the path of the approaching Mongol forces.[1] Scant evidence reveals Jewish communities even farther east. A written Hebrew prayer from the ninth century, discovered in Dunhuang – one of China's gateways to the northwest – is the sole evidence of the passage of at least one Jew on the road from Inner Asia into China. At the time of the Mongol conquest, a Jewish community was flourishing in Kaifeng, with an active synagogue built in 1163. Other communities existed farther to the northwest, in Ningxia, as well as in the southeastern ports of Yangzhou and Ningbo. Their members apparently came from India and Persia, and while gradually adopting several Chinese customs, held on to Jewish identity and rites.[2] This chapter will discuss several points of contact – legal, mythical and substantial – between the Mongol Empire and the Jewish communities.[3] Based on these contacts, the conclusion attempts a wider statement concerning the religious attitude of the Mongols.

A NOTE ABOUT THE SOURCES

Since they had no land to be conquered and no army to subdue, Jews are not mentioned – as far as I know – in the Mongolian-language sources. Texts written by Christian and Muslim hands provide valuable information, yet because of the complex relations between the beliefs and the followers of the three monotheistic religions, these descriptions are not bereft of myth and prejudice. The Mamluk historian

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al-Nuwayri (d. 1333), writing in Cairo, described Chinggis Khan as consulting with "one of the Jews" before his rise to power.[4] Amitai, remarking that the story has no grounds in any other source of early Mongol history, surmised that the belief that Chinggis Khan was himself a prophet – a belief that did exist, according to certain contemporary sources – might have contributed to the creation and credibility of this story.[5] The association of the Jews and the Mongols was also found in a negative sense, when al-Dhahabi (d. 1348) referred to the Ilkhanate as "*dawlat al-Yahud*", the "Jewish dynasty", as we shall see later in this chapter. Blunter was the attitude farther west. Mentions of a Mongol–Jewish connection appeared in European texts during the 1220s, when Mongol activity awakened the legend of the Christian Priest-King of the Orient, Prester John. One of his descendants, "David, king of the Indians" (*rex Indorum*), was sometimes mentioned as "David, king of the Jews" (*rex Iudaeorum*).[6] As the Mongol threat drew nearer, this connection took a darker turn, as the Mongols became the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, intending to conquer the world and subjugate Christendom; Hebrew was used for secret communication between them and the Jewish communities.[7] Vague suspicion became specific accusation during the large-scale invasion of Eastern Europe. Matthew Paris (d. 1259), writing in London, described a plot organized by "numbers of the Jews on the continent", i.e., Europe, to aid the invading army in 1241. Preparing casks full of arms, the Jews told "the Christian chiefs" that the casks were full of poisoned wine meant for the Mongols. The plot was discovered when a keen keeper of a bridge checked the contents of the casks, and Christendom was saved.[8] Menache, remarking that no other contemporary source mentions the tale, notes that it reflected the atmosphere of Europe at the time.[9] The street fights that became a massacre in the community of Frankfurt, in May 1241, a short while after the Mongol victories at Liegnitz and Mohi in April, were one result of this atmosphere.[10]

On this background, Chinese sources are blissfully refreshing, as they hardly noted Jews at all. The Chinese designation for Jews, *zhu-hu* (术忽),[11] appears to bear this meaning only from the Mongol dynasty onward.[12] Leslie surmised that prior to the Yuan era, Jews were considered a sect of the more numerous Muslims.[13] This vagueness was aided by the Jews themselves. In the earliest of the Chinese stone inscriptions erected by the community of Kaifeng, dated 1489, Judaism is described in proper Chinese terms: God is named *tian*, "Heaven"; religious piety is intermingled with respect for one's ancestors. Thus, Judaism was viewed as one of many Chinese local sects.[14] In this mosaic, Hebrew sources are few, yet the letters, tombstones, sermons and poems form a valuable addition to the colorful and incomplete picture of the contacts between the Mongol Empire and Judaism.[15]

THE *YASA* AND THE *HALAKHAH*

The legal system of Judaism, the *Halakhah* embraces personal, social and religious practices. Traditionally, it dates to Moses, who received it from God at Mount Sinai. Later generations elaborated and innovated, according to the changing circumstances.[16] Setting it against the background of the Mongol *Yasa*, traditionally ascribed to Chinggis Khan, strikes immediate difference. Although the *Halakhah* is centuries older and its written nature is much more obvious than that of the *Yasa*, there are points of common ground. Both are inclusive sets of customs and laws

belonging to nomad-based societies that later came to be applied to a sedentary nation. Both legal systems form an important factor of these peoples' identity. Now, before discussing points of contact between these two legal systems, one should ask, did the Mongols ever afford legal recognition to the Jewish communities under their rule?

This basic question can be answered by Mongol taxation. According to the order of Chinggis Khan, men of religion are exempted from paying tax. Thus wrote the Persian historian Juvayni (d. 1283): "the Jews heard of this ordinance and, not being included in this category, they became exceedingly vexed. . . . [One of them] said – 'We are not of that number. We account to nothing in either [Mongol or Muslim] worlds'."[17] Yet a Yuan edict, studied by Leslie, stated that "Nestorians, Jews and Dashiman [i.e., Danishmandan, Muslim scholars], except those in actual charge of temples and service", should pay taxes.[18] This edict, dated 1320, hints that Jews, alongside others, were misusing the tax exemption intended for religious specialists alone. Another edict, dated 1329, ordered "Buddhist and Daoist priests, Nestorians, Jews and Dashiman, who engage in trade, to be taxed according to the old regulation."[19] It is possible that during Juvayni's time, Jews were not recognized by the Mongols due to their small number, yet later they evidently were and shared the same status as other religious groups.[20] Thus, they too had faced the harsh periods during which the Mongols enforced their own customs on the entire population under their rule. The most serious clash concerned dietary laws.

"If anyone of the house of Israel . . . eats any blood, I will set my face against that person . . . and will cut that person off from the people. For the life of the flesh is in the blood."[21] The conception of the soul as residing in the blood appears in Mongol religious belief as well as Judaism,[22] yet while it led Jewish law to set up rigid regulations for slaughtering, among them the swift killing of the animal and draining as much blood as possible, Mongol custom required opening the animal's chest and stopping the heart.[23] This custom, May noted, emerged from spiritual and moral motives, as well as from the practical view of avoiding the waste.[24] Drinking animal blood, described by foreign travelers, was mentioned in the *Secret History* as well, albeit only in emergencies.[25] Jewish dietary laws, elaborated by later generations, were of vital importance in Jewish tradition. Muslim law, growing from the same root, led both Jews and Muslims to refrain from eating meat prepared by strangers. When the Mongols first rose to power, described Rashid al-Din, they enforced their custom on the entire population. Chinggis Khan's second son, Chaghadai, was particularly known for pursuing this point.[26] Thus, for certain periods – as late as the reign of Qubilai Qa'an – ritual animal slaughter was prohibited. The incidents described in the Muslim sources, of persons who were caught red handed and expected Mongol punishment, involved Muslims,[27] yet in the edicts of Qubilai Qa'an, Jews were mentioned as well.

"Muslims and Jews, no matter who kills the meat, will eat it, and cease killing sheep by their own hands." This edict was dated 1279/1280, but according to its introduction, it was Chinggis Khan who ordered it after being offended by those who refused to eat Mongolian food. In this edict, Qubilai went on to prohibit Muslims and Jews from conducting the rite of circumcision and the Muslim five daily prayers.[28] Rashid al-Din mentioned only the ritual slaughter, remarking that these prohibitions originated in Qubilai's own anger, stirred by merchants who refused to eat from his table. These laws, causing a decrease in foreign trade, were relaxed in 1287.[29]

In certain places in Europe of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Jews observed their tradition at the peril of their lives. These pogroms began during the first wave of the Crusades, in 1096, when the communities of the Rhine Valley were attacked. Many preferred to kill themselves and their families rather than obeying the demand to transgress the Jewish laws.[30] It is not known whether Qubilai's edicts were so obstinately opposed or enforced. It is important to note that while these edicts were promulgated by Qubilai, numerous Muslim officials served in the Mongol administration – in Yuan China and elsewhere – not to mention Qubilai's relative, Tegüder, who ruled the Ilkhanate as a Muslim convert (r. 1282–1284).[31] It appears that these prohibitions had no ongoing effect on the Jewish communities, even in the lands under Qubilai's direct control. Thus, the communities of Ningbo and Yangzhou, established as early as the twelfth century, continued to observe traditional dietary laws as late as the seventeenth century, and in Kaifeng until the nineteenth.[32]

While the *Yasa* and the *Halakhah* collided on the point of diet, in the field of marriage law there was somewhat more common ground. The Mongol custom of marrying an older brother's widow (the levirate) was sometimes enforced on the non-Mongol population, despite contradicting Christian, Muslim and Chinese traditions.[33] Yet a similar levirate law exists in the *Halakhah*: "When brothers reside together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the deceased shall not be married outside the family. . . . Her husband's brother shall go in to her, taking her in marriage."[34] Although marrying the widow of one's father, allowed by the Mongols, was prohibited[35] – and although the levirate as a whole was frowned upon by later rabbinical law[36] – it might still have made the Mongol custom less alien. Yet, if the legal sphere forms the basic layer of the picture, the mythical sphere adds striking colors to the contacts between Judaism and the Mongol Empire.

TRACES OF THE MONGOL ADVANCE IN THE *KABBALAH*

Often termed "Jewish mysticism", the *Kabbalah* is the search for the understanding of God and creation, whose elements are beyond the grasp of the intellect. Although nonrational in nature, it is based on deep learning of the traditional texts and combines gematria, astrology, philosophy and occasionally the events of the time.[37] Such an event was the Mongol advance. During the thirteenth century, as the *Kabbalah* spread from Provence to Spain, followed by Central Europe and North Africa,[38] the Mongols were making their way westward. Their advance was echoed in a description of an apocalyptic war found in *Sefer haZohar*, the most important corpus of the kabbalist texts:

> (God) has given to the Ishmaʾelites an inheritance in the Land of Israel . . . and the Edomites will gather to wage war against them. . . . At that time, one nation from the end of the world will awake . . . and (the Land) will fall into their hands . . . and then (God) shall arise on it.[39]

While Ishmaʾel and Edom represent Islam and Christianity, the third nation referred to the Mongols.[40] Another apocalyptic text, *Sefer haOt*, was written by the wanderlust kabbalist Avraham ben Shmuel Abulʿafia (d. 1291), who reached Acre ca. 1260.[41] It, too, contains a description of a war, this time between three kings. Magdiel

of the north was struck down by Qedariel of the south. These names, commented Idel, commonly referred to Islam and Christianity, and at this time to Mamluks and Crusaders. Then appeared another king, whose name was not yet known, who struck Qedariel down. That was Alfiel of the east, identified by Idel with the Mongols.[42] "He is not of our people", described Abul'afia; "God has sent him to fight on our side."[43]

R. Meshulam ben Shlomo de Pierra (fl. 1260), a poet and philosopher, and a part-time kabbalist in Girona, Spain, elaborated on this idea. In his poem, the Mongol advance no longer appears as a clash of mythical forces but as a campaign led in a well-defined area; all this, as a part of the "wanderers' redemption" – the redemption of the wandering Jewish people. "And how Bavel [Baghdad] and Aleppo were taken, and Damascus, laying cities to waste. . . . And my savior broke through the barrier mountains."[44] Here the Mongols are no strangers sent to fight on the Jewish side but are a part of the Jewish people – lost brothers returning.[45] The European fear described earlier is now reflected in the Jewish view, for Meshulam's expectations for his brothers' great victory contain no sign of an intention to subjugate Christendom.

Were these expectations justified? Let's follow the trail of the Mongols through the communities on their path.

COMMUNITIES AND INDIVIDUALS UNDER MONGOL RULE

During the harsh conquests of Baghdad and Aleppo, surmised Ashtor, Jews were one of the groups that escaped the Mongol sword. The other communities of the Fertile Crescent had either fallen or fled,[46] yet later activity indicates revival. The community of Mosul exemplified this speedy recovery. Hülegü pillaged the city in 1262, and its citizens put to the sword.[47] Yet later, in 1288, the Jewish community of Mosul was active in the inter-Jewish philosophical dispute, the Maimonidean Controversy.[48] The Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammuna (d. 1285) continued writing in Abbasid and then Mongol-ruled Baghdad.[49] Yet there were more extreme cases, where the Mongol conquest marked the community's end – or its very beginning.

In the mountainous region of central Afghanistan, between Herat and Kabul, a lonely minaret rises 60 meters high. It is located in the junction of two rivers, Hari and Jam, and in the mid-twelfth century, there stood Firuzkuh, the capital of the Ghurid Dynasty. Ghur's independence did not last long. In 1215, Firuzkuh was conquered by the Khwarazmshah. Four years later, Chinggis Khan fell upon the realm. In 1222, Firuzkuh apparently ceased to exist.[50] Centuries later, tombstones were excavated near the minaret, the remains of a cemetery that was once built on the mountainside. The Hebrew inscriptions on the stones told of a flourishing Jewish community, including teachers, clerks and envoys that dwelled in Firuzkuh between 1115 and 1215. Fischel remarked that the Mongol advance was the cause of the community's end.[51] Yet Mongol forces only invaded the area in 1219. It might therefore be the Khwarazmian conquest that put an end to this community, although it appears that the subsequent Mongol conquest and rule did nothing to revive it.

An opposite story is that of Eghegis. In 1236, the Armenian prince Elikum decided to submit to Mongol rule. This brought gradual prosperity to his land. Eghegis, in modern-day south Armenia, became its flourishing capital.[52] Excavations conducted in the present-day small village of Eghegis revealed the remains of a Jewish

cemetery – evidence of a community that was until then unknown. Amit and Stone, heading the excavations, uncovered forty tombstones, dated 1266 to 1336/1337.[53] Parallel to the rise and fall of the Ilkhanate, the dates hint at the connection between the community and Eghegis itself, to the rule of the Mongols.

Moving from the communal to the individual level, we find contacts between Mongol commanders and Jewish experts as early as 1244. Yasa'ur Noyan, leading the attack on Melitene (Malatya), contacted the physician Aaron "the Hebrew", the father of the future bishop and historian named Bar Hebraeus. After treating Yasa'ur, Aaron joined his retinue along with his family.[54] The gruesome tale brought by Grigor of Akanc, of a failed attempt of a Jewish physician to heal "Xul",[55] may also point to the presence of Jews in the retinue of the Mongol Prince Quli.[56] According to one source, Jewish physicians and astronomers accompanied Hülegü long before he reached Iran.[57] One of the astronomers, Ibn al-Da'i al-Isra'ili of Irbil, was sent in 1259 by Hülegü to the Möngke Qa'an. Later, when the observatory of Maragha was established, another Jewish astronomer, Muntajab al-Dawla Dawud al-Israʾili al-Dahistani peered through it into the stars.[58]

A peak in these contacts occurred during the rule of Hülegü's grandson, Arghun (1284–1291), whose physician and friend Saʿd al-Dawla became chief minister in 1289.[59] His nomination led to the appointment of many of his relatives as officials and governors in Tabriz, Baghdad and Diyar Bakr.[60] It is worth mentioning that his Mongol allies were appointed to strategic positions as well, in Baghdad, Shiraz and Fars. The impression of Arghun's Jewish minister cast a long shadow. The Mamluk encyclopedist al-Dhahabi wrote, under the year 689 (1290), that "in this year the calamity intensified in Iraq in Dawlat al-Yahud (sic!), at the hands of Saʿd al-Dawla al-Tabib, and people were hurt".[61]

Certain writers described the death of Arghun Khan and the fall of his chief minister as the disaster of all Jews throughout the land.[62] Yet other sources reveal that the turmoil following the Khan's death focused on the high administration, striking down Jews, Muslims and Mongols alike,[63] similar to earlier and later political changes. In Baghdad the political purge swelled into actual fighting between the city mob and the Jewish quarter; yet two years earlier, following the fall of Arghun's Mongol chief minister, Buqa, the political purge swelled to a fight between the mob of Mosul and the Christians of the city.[64]

A sharper watershed was marked by the gradual Islamization of the Ilkhans, following Ghazan Khan's conversion in 1295. Alongside the remaining Jews in the Mongol administration, convert Jews appear – the most prominent is Rashid al-Din. The change was slow but sure. In 1306, described the Persian historian Qashani, a group of eminent Jewish personalities serving at court publicly proved their conversion to Islam by openly breaking the Jewish dietary laws.[65]

CONCLUSION – A GLANCE AT THE MONGOLS' RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE

If the Mongol position toward Buddhism, Islam or Christianity may be explained by hopes for political or military gain, Judaism stands apart. As a religion, it had no cause to be tolerated or acknowledged, yet the Mongols accepted the Jewish communities as a distinct religious group and treated them equally, like any other sect.

The Mongol attitude toward different faiths may therefore derive not from indifference, for then they would not have bothered to recognize any; nor from toleration, for their own customs rated higher than any other; but from open-mindedness, that allowed them to believe in the existence of truth in every faith. This open-mindedness, mostly unheard of at the time, gave the Mongols the ability to contact, befriend, and surely make use of every idea and every person – thus forming a vital part of the power that thrust the Mongol advance forward.

NOTES

1 Ashtor 1939, 59 & 61–63.
2 The Kaifeng synagogue remained active until the gradual disintegration of the community during the nineteenth century. In 1849, it was damaged severely in a flood and abandoned shortly later. Eber 2008, 3–6.
3 For a general view of the two peoples, see Amitai 2007, 443–444; for Jewish political and Messianic views of the Mongols, see Arnon 2010, 151–156.
4 al-Nuwayri, XXVII, 302; translated by Amitai 2004, 603.
5 Amitai 2004, 605 & 698–699.
6 Menache 1996, 327–328.
7 Menache 1996, 332.
8 *CM*, 131–133; translated by Menache 1996, 338–339.
9 Menache 1996, 340–341.
10 Menache 1996, 338; Jackson 2005, 63–64.
11 Derives from the Persian *yahūd*, "a Jew". The Chinese term is represented by several different characters of a similar pronunciation. The one mentioned above was used in the *Yuan dian-zhang* (Yuan statutes), in the earliest decree, that of 1280. See Löwenthal 1947, 110; Steingass 2007, 382.
12 Löwenthal, too, brings in his study no earlier source than Yuan (Löwenthal 1947, 110). According to Leslie, mentions of "*zhu-hu*" in the History of the Jin dynasty (*Jin shi*) appear to be personal names. The official history of the Song dynasty offered no mention of Jews and the meaning of "*zhu-hu*" as appears in sources of the Tang dynasty is questionable. See: Leslie 1995, 234; Leslie 1972, 12.
13 Leslie 1972, 11.
14 Eber 2008, 5, 33–34.
15 For a detailed survey see Arom, Forthcoming.
16 Jacobs 2007, VIII, 251.
17 *HWC*, 272 & 599; quoted Leslie 1995, 238.
18 *Yuan dian zhang*. Translated in Leslie 1995, 236.
19 *YS*. Translated in Leslie 1995, 236.
20 Leslie 1995, 241.
21 Leviticus 17: 10–11. The English translation of the Bible used throughout this chapter follows the *New Revised Standard Version Bible 1989*. Online. Available www.biblegateway.com (accessed 23 January 2019).
22 *SHM*, II, 753.
23 Mintz-Geffen 2007, V, 651; RDB, 78.
24 May 2019, 151–177, n. 68 and 69. My thanks to the author for the access to this article.
25 *SHM* §151.
26 RDB, 77; Barthold & Boyle, online. Available at https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2 (accessed 23 October 2018); May 2019, n. 22 and 24.
27 May 2019, 1 & n. 21.

28 *Yuan Dian zhang*. Translated in Leslie 1995, 235. See also, abridged, in Löwenthal 1947, 110–111; and in Leslie 1972, 14. May rejected the notion that this edict originated in Qubilai's antagonism towards Islam – May 2019, n. 34–35. Jackson doubted that the prohibition went as far back as Chinggis Khan; Jackson 2004, 261–262.
29 RDB, 293–294; Leslie 1995, 239; May 2019, n. 29.
30 Mintz-Geffen 2007, 656.
31 For the Yuan, see May 2019, n. 39; for Tegüder, see Amitai 2001, 15–43.
32 Eber 2008, 4–5, 25.
33 For China, until 1276, see Leslie 1972, 13, n. 2; for China and Rus', see Jackson 2004, 260; for Islam, see May 2019, n. 28.
34 Deuteronomy 25, 5–6.
35 Leviticus 18, 16; see Schereschewsky 2007, 574.
36 Leslie 1972, 13, n. 2.
37 Scholem 2007, XI, 587.
38 Idel 1990, 4.
39 Translated by Idel 2014, 160 – based on MS *Zohar* II, fol. 32a.
40 Idel 2014, 161, 165.
41 Idel 2014, 156; 153, for 1260.
42 Idel 2014, 154–156 Abulʿafia 2001, 18–19.
43 Abulʿafia 2001, 19.
44 Ben Shlomo in Schirmann 1971, 318.
45 Schirmann 1971, 317–318.
46 Ashtor 1939, 61–63.
47 RDT, 510.
48 Ashtor 1939, 63, n. 98.
49 Amitai 2007, 444.
50 Thomas et al. 2005. Online. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20060516231503/http://antiquity.ac.uk/ProjGall/thomas/index.html (accessed 23 October 2018).
51 Fischel 1965, 152–153.
52 Amit and Stone 2002, 68–70.
53 Amit and Stone 2002, 66–67, 71; 68, n. 7.
54 Bar Hebraeus, 15–17.
55 Blake and Frye 1949, 331.
56 Son of Orda, who joined Hülegü's invasion of the Middle East – RDB, 104.
57 Ashtor 1939, 55.
58 Yang 2019, 416. I warmly thank the author for this information.
59 RDT, 572; for his close relations with the Khan, according to Vassaf, see Fischel 1968, 98. For a recent study of this controversial figure, see Brack 2019. Online. Available at https://doi.org/10.1515/islam-2019-0028. My thanks to the author for the information.
60 RDT, 572.
61 al-Dhahabi 2000, LIX, 43. I am happy to thank Dr. Amir Mazor for this information.
62 Bar-Hebraeus, 491; see also a poem brought by Vassaf, translated by Browne 1928, III, 35–36.
63 RDT, 575.
64 Bar Hebraeus, 491 for Baghdad, 482 for Mosul.
65 Brack 2019, 39.

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PART IX

SCIENCE AND EXPLORATION

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CHAPTER FORTY-ONE

ARABIC MEDICINE IN CHINA AND IN THE MONGOL WORLD

Paul D. Buell

Chinggis Khan (r. 1206–1227) created the largest land empire in history, and he and his successors not only united the old land silk routes but produced successor regimes active on water as well as on land. As time went on, in fact, trade and cultural exchange moved increasingly along the Indian Ocean routes, which gradually became the dominant East–West and West–East links and remained so, inaugurating our global era. Later, the Portuguese, then the Dutch and the English, and no longer Chinese or others working for the Mongols, based in China or Iran, became the primary maritime movers and shakers.

TRANSMISSION

Among the physical goods conveyed along both silk routes, besides obvious ones such as textiles, pottery (including, as time went on, blue-and-white porcelain), and spices, were less obvious ones, such as horses.[1] The latter moved in surprisingly large quantities, primarily by sea. Among the non-material goods were medical ideas. Associated with them were many specific medicinals, needed to put borrowed medical ideas into practice. Some of these medicinals were quite rare, often requiring complex transmissions to get them for use in China, for example.

Medical ideas and systems came from a variety of cultures the Mongols came into contact with as they created their empire. Most notable, although it was never the preferred Mongol foreign medical system, not even in Mongol China, was Chinese medicine. Although the term is used generally, Chinese medicine, then as now, was not a unity but comprised various more-or-less regional and other alternative traditions. The main thrust was herbal, generally involving complex formulae of medicinals (sometimes just foods and there was little real distinction made between food and medicine) to suit general and specific pathologies. By the 13th century, herbal medicine was increasingly associated with a theoretical system known as correspondence medicine, in which diseases, symptoms, and cures were associated with flows of *qi* 氣 in special *qi* channels. Other Chinese treatment practices paralleled

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herbal medicine, including acupuncture, not all that much like the acupuncture of today with its fine needles, largely not in use yet, and various forms of bleeding and cautery. Unlike herbal medicine, acupuncture, and to some extent bleeding and cautery, already had its theoretical system developed in the various textual traditions of the *Yellow Emperor's Inner Classic*.[2] There were also magical and spiritual practices. Chinggis Khan himself was interested in them.[3]

Also encountered by the Mongols were the various forms of Middle Eastern medicine.[4] This is discussed in more detail later as a theoretical system, but Arabic Medicine, of which there were many varieties, was practiced in Turkistan, Iran, the Arabic- and Syriac-speaking Middle East, the Turkish Middle East, Africa, and Spain, etc. Like Chinese medicine, it was humoral, but whereas Chinese medicine received its humoral ideas by diffusion from the West, or through Buddhism, the humoral ideas in Arabic Medicine were inherited directly from the previous cosmopolitan medical system of its region, Greek medicine. Besides existing in the Middle East and beyond in a rich translation literature, Greek medicine was still practiced as a living tradition in the Byzantine world and in a derived form in Europe (which also got information from the Middle East through translations of Arabic medical classics).

Also a major tradition for the Mongols in their world was Tibetan medicine. This came in many shapes and sizes, including a Tibetan variant of Indian Ayurvedic medicine. Likewise, there was a Tibetan variant of Greek Galenic medicine coming from Iran[5] and various spiritual and shamanic traditions to which the Mongols related only too well. Since Tibetans traveled to Mongol China, and even Mongol Iran, the various Tibetan medicines were most important for the Mongols, including in the official dietary medicine of the 1330 dietary manual *Yinshan Zhengyao* 飲膳正要, "Proper and Essential Things for the Emperor's food and drink," which also reflects Arabic Medicine traditions.[6]

HUIHUI YAOFANG

Ayurvedic medicine itself was not a direct interest of the Mongols but came to them perhaps indirectly, not only through the Tibetans but in the encyclopedia *Huihui yaofang* 回回藥方 (*HHYF*), "Muslim [or West Asian] Medicinal Recipes," to be discussed later. In fact, during the period, there was a reinterpretation and amalgamation going on with Ayurvedic medicine that was increasingly influential in mainstream Arabic Medicine. The phenomenon has now been studied in detail by Fabrizio Speziale.[7] Speziale has traced the interaction between Persian systems of Arabic Medicine and Ayurvedic medicine as practiced in India but through the *HHYF*, which shows similar tendencies to the texts studied by Speziale. Ayurvedic medicine reached the Mongols as well.

The Ayurvedic or Tridosa system is similar to Greek and Arabic humoral medicine, with some significant differences. One of them is that the system of humors is different. Ayurvedic medicine has three main life forces associated with wind, phlegm, and bile, compared to the blood, bile, wind, and phlegm performing a similar function in the systems of Arabic Medicine. The key to it all here is the role of wind in some *HHYF* recipes, but this could just as easily be the Chinese wind, and blood is certainly a humor there. More on this later.

In any case, the important thing is that ideas traveled in Mongol times and associated systems in the form of texts. These were no doubt physically carried from one side of Asia to the other, from East Asia to West Asia, but also the reverse.

From the East Asian side, moving to Iran was Chinese medicine and some of its ingredients, such as tea, which started out there not as a drink but as a medicine. The westward movement of Chinese medicine finds reflection in the Ilkhan encyclopedia *Tanksuq- nama-yi Ilkhani dar funun-i 'ulum-i Khitay*, "Treasure book of the Ilkhans on the Sciences and Learning of China." This text, which largely survives, although in somewhat different form than originally written, translates and interprets a great deal of information regarding Chinese medicine, including an entire Chinese treatise on pulsing, as well as loose information from such sources as the *Yellow Emperor's Inner Classic*. What is particularly interesting is evidence that the readers of the source Chinese texts may have been Uyghurs due to the forms of words used.[8]

On the East Asian side is another encyclopedia, this one in Chinese and not Persian, although with Arabic script entries mostly in that language. It is a hospital manual of a type well-known from the Middle East, from the Cairo Genizah materials,[9] for example. It is more fragmentary than the *Tanksuq*, but these fragments lucidly demonstrate that, when intact, this text embraced all of Arabic Medicine as practiced in the Mongolian world at the time and even managed to express Arabic ideas in a somewhat assimilated Chinese form, as well as other ideas from other traditions, perhaps Ayurvedic mixed in with the Arabic Medicine. There are also many purely Chinese medicinals called for, while Chinese descriptive terms and sub-systems, *qi* 氣 for example, are also used to explain Arabic pathologies.

This text is now called *HHYF*, but this is not its original title. Use of the term *Huihui* 回回 reflects Ming 明 Dynasty thinking, not the ideas of the Mongols. In its present form, it comprises the 500 or some pages left, some 15 percent, from what was once, judging from internal evidence, a 3,200-page manuscript compendium. Also judging from internal evidence, it was compiled between 1398 and 1408 but probably based upon an earlier version or versions from Mongol times.[10]

Of the original 36 chapters, 3 content chapters (*juan* 卷 12, 30, 34) survive along with the Table of Contents for the second half of the compendium. This means that we have precise details about the contents of more than half the book (20 *juan*). In fact, our knowledge of what the *HHYF* once contained extends to more than 20 *juan*. This is because the surviving *juan* contain references to sections now entirely lost. Some gaps can also be filled in through comparisons between the *HHYF* and other sources for what is more conventionally called Arabic Medicine (*Al-Tibb*). These include Ilkhanid sources, from Mongol Iran, from where much of the source material for the encyclopedia must have come, although some was Central Asian too.

Each of the three content chapters is organized around one or more disease categories, the largest being the detailed discussion of "wind" ailments, a Chinese category in focus but easily applicable to the Arabic world (or, for that matter, to medical India), with various subcategories that occupy all of *juan* 12, and "various symptoms," which occupies all of *juan* 30. By contrast, *juan* 34 is comprised of shorter discussions of wounds from metal objects, broken bones, including a highly

interesting section on head wounds and skull fractures, cauterization, scalds and burns, wounds from blows, and bites. The approach in these three chapters is overwhelmingly Arabic, and supporting the discussions presented are numerous quotations from the various Arabic medical authorities. These include, and this is unique for East Asia, Zhalinuxi 扎里奴思 (i.e., Galen[os]), but also, among others, Paul of Aegina, Hippocrates, Rufus of Ephesus, Aristotle, Alexander the Great, and, of course, the great purely Arabic authorities, such as Ibn Sina,[11] whose *Qanun fi 'l-Tibbi*, "Canon of Medicine," is clearly reflected in the texts and recipes of the *HHYF* (and, for that matter, in the *Yinshan Zhengyao*, see later in this chapter). Also well reflected in the Chinese text are the Greeks, not just Galen but particularly the Alexandrian Paul of Aegina, who was extensively translated by the Syrians and Arabs,[12] such as Hunayn b. Ishaq al-'Ibadi (808–873), noteworthy for his translations of the works of Galen and extensively quoted in the later Arabic Medicine literature, sometimes without direct identification.

The following is typical of the material in the text. The first is a medicinal compound attributed to Jalinus, Galen, and whose name is spelled out in an Arabic script entry as a small script subtext. Other such subtexts occur later in this chapter, although others are explanatory. The recipe, judging by the brief introduction, is intended to treat what are clearly stroke symptoms. The medicinals are, for the most part, the standard medicinals for Arabic Medicine, with a few exceptions, e.g., apparently the "mountain onions," and tree peony skin. Note the equivalents called for in some subtexts, mostly quite fanciful, even dangerous equivalents, such as the croton beans called for as a substitution for scammony or the Chinese *dangui* 當歸, not so dangerous, but not much like parsley in its properties. Such substitutions appear to be associated with what is apparently a later recension of the text, the one that has survived, probably done in late Ming times, when rare medicinals may not have been available any longer, thus the mundane substitutions. Figures in brackets are the page numbers in the source edition. A *qian* 錢 (3.12 g today) is one-tenth of a *liang* 兩, the Chinese ounce. The exact weight varied from period to period. The recipe here is typical of larger numbers in the *HHYF*, some even more complex, perhaps, with magic at work as well as actual treatment since compounds of so many rare medicinals are exceptional and have a force of their own just because of the rare ingredients.

The second example is a recipe for treating wounds. It uses all Arabic Medicine medicinals, with proven strengths in this area. Besides such simple recipes, the text also contains extensive instructions and hands-on and herbal medicinal treatment regarding broken and dislocated bones, even skull fractures. Such discussion shows the extensive anatomical knowledge of Arabic Medicine doctors at the time, one reason the rough-and-tumble Mongols may have found the tradition so useful. Most such discussions, including such relatively straightforward instructions on setting bones and what materials to use, are very detailed and too long to excerpt here, at least without pages of explanations.

Finally, Example 3 is one of the more exotic recipes from the *HHYF*, primarily calling for cauterization, probably using a heated needle. Such practices have now passed out of mainstream medicine but were once a part of most medicinal systems, almost universally, and continue to be applied among folk practitioners of the various medical traditions. This includes those in Chinese and Japanese medicine

using moxacautery to cure, involving the burning of an artemesia extract at carefully determined points of the skin, often on the top of acupuncture needles inserted at the chosen position.

1. [60] Jalinus Recipe ([subtext] [Ar.] Jalinus)

It treats wry obliqueness of mouth and eye and weakness disease due to a preponderance of phlegm. It cleans a turbid body (of?) thick pollution, wind, phlegm, and opens the apertures and treats very urgent discharge, hemiplegia, and head pain of brain disease. Use:

[Pr.] *Shaḥm-e ḥanẓal* [colocynth pulp] ([Subtext] [Pr.] *shaḥm-e ḥanẓal*)

Ghariqun [*Agaricus officinalis*] ([subtext] *ghariqun*)

Mountain onions [*Allium victorialis*, *A. fistulosum*, and possibly various *Veratrum* spp] ([Subtext] Roasted)

[Ar.] *Ushaq* [gum ammoniac] ([Subtext] [Ar.] *ushaq*)

[Ar.] *Saqamuniya* [scammony, *Convolvulus scamonia*] ([Subtext] This is the croton bean)

"Black" [Ar.] *harbaq* [hellebore] ([Subtext] [Ar.] *harbaq-e siah* ["black *harbaq*"])

[Ar.] *Fariqun* [*Hypericum perforatum*] ([Subtext] [Ar.] *fariqun*. Each one *liang*, six *qian*)

[Ar.] *Basbayij* [common polypody, *Polypodium vulgare*]

[Ar.] *Afithimun* [dodder, *Cuscuta epthymum*] ([Subtext] [Ar.] *afithimun*)

Benzoin

[Ar.] *Kamadaryus* [dragonfly larvae] ([Subtext] [Pr.] *kamadaryus*)[13]

[Ar.] *Farasiyun* [horehound, *Marrubium vulgare*] ([Subtext] This is steppe leek)

Tree Peony skin [*Paeonia suffruticosa* rootbark] ([Subtext] Each eight *qian*)

Myrrh

[Ar.] *Ṣaghyin* [= *ṣaghbin*, sagapenum, root of *Ferula* spp] ([Subtext] [Ar.] *ṣaghyin*)

"Long" [Ar.] *Zarawand* [*Aristolochia longa*] ([Subtext] [Ar.] *zarawarnd Tawil*)

White Pepper

Black Pepper

Long Pepper [*Piper longum*]

"Mountain" cassia [*Cinnamomum burmannii* or *C. japonicum*]

[Ar.] *Jawashir* [opopanax, resin of *Opopanix chironium*] ([Subtext] *jawashir*)

[Pr.] *Khazmiyan* [castoreum] ([Subtext] This is castoreum)

[Ar.] *FuTrasalyun*[14] [parsley] ([Subtext] This is *dangui* 當歸 [*Angelica sinensis*] Four *qian* of each medicinal)

Medicinal Aloe [*Aloe barbadensis* or *A. ferox*]

[Ar.] *Zafaran* [saffron] ([Subtext] This is the pistil of foreign safflower. Four *qian* of each medicinal)

The dry ingredients pound finely into a powder. For the soft ingredients, use water to grind. Combine with refined honey. Each time take 4 *qian* 錢. Use water in which [Ar.] *afithimun* [dodder, *Cuscuta epithymum*] has been decocted to take.

[406] 2. Recipe for metal wounds

It treats metal wounds and all kinds of wound diseases. It stops bleeding and produces flesh when the wound is then dry. Also, it stops nose bleeding, mouth pain and tongue pain. It also specially treats moist ulcers, takes pus and produces flesh. It stops various kinds of wound blood. Use:

[Ar.] *Anzarut* [sarcocol, Sarcocolla, *Astragalus sarcocolla*]

Pomegranate flower

Frankincense

Dragon's blood [palm resin] ([Subtext] Each one *liang*)

[Ar.] *Zarawand* [*Aristolochia*] ([Subtext] *zarawand*)

Myrrh ([Subtext] Each five *qian*)

Finely powder the ingredients [on the right] and paste on the ulcer.

3. [489] Discusses cauterizing for [Pr.] *nasur* [fistula] symptoms at the corner of the eye

Another name is *arbu* ("pear") symptoms. ([Subtext] There are small swellings at the corner of the eyes like hemorrhoid scars) Whenever someone has these symptoms, you can first cut off the [Pr.] *nasur* [fistula] and cause the bone to appear. Afterwards look and see if the bone is deeply eaten away. Also clean. Scrape away a little with an implement. If there is corruption, cauterize with a fine implement. When cauterizing first use [Ar.] *isfanj* [marine sponge] or cotton flowers contained in a cloth. Moisten with cold water and apply above the eye. Afterwards cauterize the bone once, or twice, or three times. Hollow out the place going right through to the nasal passage. How does one know that the hollow is open? If a person can stop the nose and the mouth with a hand [and] if *qi* [air] comes out of this place then one knows that the hollow has passed through. Afterwards take a paper and light it. First moisten with butter oil [or lard]. Afterwards moisten with [Pr.] *mardami-giyah* [mandrake] and then put a copper chloride ointment on the place. If the [490] [Pr.] *nasur* [fistula] ([Subtext] [Pr.] *nasur*) has additional root moisture, you can get rid of it [in this way]. You can also cause the hollow to be dry and clean. A day later, light a paper which has been moistened with ointment medicine. The next day place a clean cotton bulb and light.

Adding to its value, as already noted, the *HHYF* includes Arabic script entries referring to the names of medicinals, recipes, and individuals cited, and even technical terms of which there are hundreds in Arabic or Persian, showing the linguistic mix of the mainstream Arabic Medicine of the time. These and names of medicinals are also given in Chinese transcription, in some cases showing the influence of Persian syntax and perhaps an Uyghur pronunciation both of Persian and of Chinese words. The transcriptions alone provide rich evidence of a mixed cultural environment where Chinese was just one of several languages in use.

From the Table of Contents, we know that, in good Arabic tradition, the *HHYF* once included a full discussion of *materia medica*, preceded with a general overview of the various types of medicinals used. We also know the names of hundreds of simples, that is, of single medicals used to treat alone, and formularies not mentioned elsewhere in the text. Some are quite famous compounds and may be reconstructed using other sources. The late Ming edition of this text, the only one now surviving,

exists in two manuscripts, one located in Beijing and another that is extremely fragmentary, just a few pages, in a regional library (not seen).

From whence are the texts used as the basis for the encyclopedia? Iran and Central Asia for sure, but a major intermediary was a Syrian (origin) doctor 'Isa the Translator or 'Isa Kelemechi (1227–1308).[15] He was Nestorian, from a medical family who first appeared among the Mongols during the time of Güyük (r. 1246–1248) and later went on to serve Qubilai (r. 1260–1294), and his successor Temür (r. 1295–1308). In 1263, 'Isa established a specialized clinic for Arabic Medicine called *Xiyu yiyao si* 西域醫藥司, "Agency for Western Region Medicine and Medicinals," also *Jingshi yiyao yuan* 京師醫藥院, "Office for Medicine and Medicinals of the Capital," under the *Taiyi yuan* 太醫院, "Imperial Medical Office." In 1273, this office became the *Guanghui si*, 廣慧司, "Agency for Broad Compassion." Despite this official connection, the agency may have grown out of a family business.

Simultaneously with his medical functions, 'Isa also took part in the official study of the astronomy and astrology of the Western Regions in the new agency *Xiyu xingli si*, 西域星曆司, "Agency for the Astronomy of the Western Regions." He had previously fulfilled such a role under Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251–1259) when he met Prince Qubilai, later his major imperial sponsor.

A trusted confident of Qubilai, 'Isa was sent on an embassy to Mongol Iran, where he and the powerful Mongol minister Bolad noyan arrived at the end of 1285.[16] Completing their embassy, both men went back to China, but Bolad was unable to complete the journey and remained in Iran. 'Isa finally returned to China in 1288 after two years on the road thanks to disturbances in Central Asia caused by the war with Qaidu.

In view of 'Isa's role in the Arabic Medicine of Mongol China of the era, a role continued by his sons after his death, it is logical to connect him with the *HHYF*. It was probably originally compiled for the *Guanghui si*, or one of its earlier forms, even though the current edition is basically early Ming 明, with later additions. In any case, the mix of medicines in the text is precisely what one would expect for someone like 'Isa, and in addition the latter's trip to Mongol Iran would help explain directly how books and ideas moved across Central Asia to Mongol China. Quite likely, 'Isa and his family probably had their own collections of books, some heirlooms, and given 'Isa's strong medical interests, he quite likely brought more books back from Iran too, perhaps major ones including one on Arabic Medicine in the imperial library, probably not the only such book.

The medicine of the *HHYF*, although somewhat assimilated to its Chinese environment, is by and large Arabic humoral medicine based in Galenic theory (with apparently substantial Ayurvedic influence as will be shown later). Galenic theory is expressed as a system in a number of Arabic works but especially in the work of 'Ali ibn-al-'Abbas al-Majusi (fl. late 10th century).

HUMORS

Al-Majusi generalizes about illness and human physiology at four levels: the Greek elements and their extensions, generalized to embrace the entire human system; the temperaments; the four humors; and the faculties. Also important are the *pneumata*, the link between the strictly material and spiritual side of man. At their simplest

level, the elements are the traditional fire, air, water, and earth, the primary or homogenous elements. To this are opposed various secondary and even tertiary elements, which can be further grouped into terms of a more distant connection with physiology. In practice, in terms of this system, the homoeomeral organs of the body, that is, the basic organs from which all other organs of the body are composed, are also elements, as are the humors themselves, which make up the homoeomeral organs. The system is further tweaked by Al-Majusi to express nearly all aspects of basic physiology. The elements of the body are also formulated in terms of the hot, cold, wet, and dry system, a basic categorization of humoral medicine.

At the next level, the temperaments reflect the precise mix of hot, cold, wet, and dry. In humans, there are nine basic temperaments, mixtures of hot, cold, wet, and dry, one in balance and eight out of balance. The latter are comprised of four simple temperaments and four composite temperaments. But there are many more variations due to place, habits, sex, food, and so forth.

The four humors are secondary elements, that is, they exist above the level of fire, air, water, and earth, the primary elements, but are still closely connected with them. In Arabic Medicine, the humors are blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile, with each associated with an element and having properties in terms of the hot, cold, wet, dry system. Phlegm is cold and wet, for example, with some internal variations, and corresponds to the element water. Although not all can change, some humors can change into another under the right conditions, e.g., phlegm can become blood when worked on by an "innate heat." The real importance of the humors for the system is that the dominance or absence of a given humor results in illness. And when the dominance or absence becomes extreme, death can result.

The faculties are threefold: 1) natural faculties involved in conception, physical growth, and the process of nourishment; 2) animal faculties most closely associated with the process of life, in the beating of the heart, for example; and 3) psychic faculties associated with such things as reason. Each set is associated with a particular part of the body, the psychic faculties with the brain, for example. And each set of faculties is associated with a kind of *pneuma*, with the relationships involved strongly reminiscent of the complex system of *qi* 氣, a close equivalent of the Greek *pneumata* that is important in Chinese medicine but with nothing, apparently, to do with Greek ideas.

CONCLUSION

What is interesting about the *HHYF* is not only that it is clearly a work situated within the Arabic medical tradition, but also the evidence of Chinese influence at work as well, in the way that blood, e.g., *qi* circulation is visualized, even the channels of that circulation, also in the medicinals. Yet, some other systems are at work when we look closely at the way the humoral information is presented. Is the wind of the text Chinese, or is it an Ayurveda-influenced wind? Is there evidence of Ayurvedic influences in other areas as well, in the way that blood is handled as a humor in the text, for example, or in the application of phlegm and bile?[17]

In any case, Arabic Medicine as a mixed and assimilated tradition is not just evident in the *HHYF*. The *Yinshan Zhengyao*, for example, combines Ibn Sina, the *Yellow Emperor*, herbal and dietary traditions from a number of cultures, even from

the Mongols themselves and even Tibetan ideas, with gay abandon under the general editorship of a man who is quite likely a Turk, although he had at least one Tibetan predecessor. But such was the Mongol age.

NOTES

1 See Fragner 2009.
2 Unschuld 1985; Unschuld 1986.
3 See *TOA*.
4 By Arabic Medicine, I mean the then cosmopolitan medicine of Eurasia, whose literature was primarily written in Arabic. Nonetheless, so significant was the Greek component of Arabic Medicine that it could be called Greek-Arabic Medicine.
5 Martin 2011, 117–143; Buell 2011, 189–208.
6 Buell et al. 2010.
7 See Speziale 2018; Speziale 2014a, 783–796; Speziale 2014b, 524–532.
8 Matsui 2009, 33–42.
9 See the discussion of parallel texts in Lev 2013, 487–515.
10 Kong 1996 and Song 2000.
11 Ibn Sina's work is based in Hippocratic medicine as interpreted by Galen. Much also reflects the authors of the Greek herbal tradition, principally Dioscorides. Dioscorides became a major foundation for the rich botanical literature of the Arabic world (Waines 2011). On Dioscorides, see Sadek 1983.
12 Paul of Aegina was a 7th-century (c. 625–690) Alexandrian physician and medical writer most known for his great encyclopedia *Pragmateia*. See Pormann 2004; Gutas 1998.
13 This does not make sense, and the reference is possibly an error for *kamaduriyus*, medical germander, *Teucrium chamedrys*.
14 This is one of several transcriptions of the name of this medicinal. Note also *feitelachelirong* 肥忒剌撒里榮 and *jitelachelirong* 吉忒剌撒里榮.
15 On 'Isa, see Weng 1938. More recently, see also Kim 2020, 255–269.
16 On Pulad/Bolad in Iran, see Berlekamp 2015, 67–99.
17 See Buell and Anderson 2021 for complete translation and discussion of the *HHYF* and its medicine.

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CHAPTER FORTY-TWO

MAPPING AND EXPLORATION

Hyunhee Park

One of the most influential transfers of geographic knowledge in world history occurred across Afro-Eurasia during the era of the Mongol Empire, which lasted from the thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth century. Mongol rulers imposed a transcontinental peace dubbed the "Pax Mongolica" over a domain that stretched from Hungary to the Pacific, which encouraged an unprecedented flow of people, goods, and ideas across much of Afro-Eurasia.[1] The change led to the development of a network of cross-cultural contact and exchange that allowed people to disseminate information about the wider world across a larger space, in greater volume, and of better quality than ever before in world history.[2] This came first from travelers, either from the accounts they recorded or the books and maps they brought with them to their homelands, and second from geographers and other scholars through their writings and maps.[3] This growth in the scale of information exchange played a crucial role in widening world geographic knowledge in many Afro-Eurasian societies, which helped to propel the transition to the early modern era in global history.

This chapter addresses the consequences of Afro-Eurasian connections during the Mongol era in world geographic knowledge, from both connective and comparative perspectives, by focusing on three regions: China, the Islamic Middle East, and Europe. All three societies experienced significant change from their traditional worldviews, thanks to the assimilation of both world geographical knowledge and mapping techniques from other cultures. We can retrace their interconnections and make credible comparisons, thanks to the abundance of extant sources, most importantly, literature and cartography from Mongol and pre-Mongol periods. This analysis reveals that there was direct contact, influence, and exchange between China, Iran, and Europe during the Mongol age, which facilitated the production of new realistic maps of the Afro-Eurasian landmass.[4]

This unprecedented circulation of geographic knowledge and consequent long-term influence rested upon the memoirs of a multicultural group of globetrotters who traversed this giant landmass, sometimes in both directions, thanks to the loosened political barriers and boom in traffic that Mongol policies allowed. These writings include the work of both legendary authors like Marco Polo (1254–1324) and more obscure ones like the Italian missionary Odoric of Pordenone (1286–1331), the Moroccan Ibn Battuta (1304–1368), and the Chinese Wang Dayuan (1311–1350),

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whose travelogues contributed to the circulation of cross-cultural knowledge in their home societies in the fourteenth century. Moreover, their accounts verify the cosmopolitanism then flourishing in major cities of the empire, such as the Mongol capital of Khanbaliq (Daidu, modern Beijing) and the busy Chinese port city of Quanzhou. New forms of knowledge about other societies did not exert an immediate influence on the majority of people, as scholars like Jackson have pointed out in the case of Europe.[5] In time, however, as this knowledge continued to circulate, it inspired many political leaders, scholars, and merchants to seek contacts beyond their traditional cultural frontiers. This, in turn, led to the new era of unprecedentedly large, distant, and frequent global interconnection from the fifteenth century onward.

FROM A SINOCENTRIC TO HEMISPHERIC PERSPECTIVE IN EAST ASIA

People in China have historically drawn maps since ancient times for a variety of purposes – local, military, and religious.[6] Soon after the first empire appeared in 221 BCE, the Chinese began to create maps of their new realm using cartographic techniques, such as the Six Principles created by professional geographers like Pei Xiu (224–271 CE).[7] Extant maps of China proper, which include accurately drawn coastlines, date back to the tenth century CE; their cartographic techniques and accumulated information help us assume a relatively high level of content, style, scale, and accuracy in ancient Chinese mapmaking.[8] The earliest extant map of the world, titled *Map of Chinese and Non-Chinese Territories* (*Huayi tu*), engraved on a stone tablet in 1136, depicts China proper with geographic accuracy and detail yet noticeably relegates foreign place names to its margins.[9] This sidelining reflects an early Sinocentric worldview rather than a lack of geographic details or spatial sense of the wider world. As the Chinese developed contacts with people in foreign countries, including the initial expeditions to the Western Regions by Zhang Qian (d. 113 BCE), they gathered information about the countries and cultures with which they had contact – at this time, largely diplomatic or commercial – and relayed them to other Chinese through their writings. Consequently, descriptions of foreign countries are found in both official and private documents, from the early surveys of Sima Qian (145–ca. 86 BCE) to official court histories or the Song-dynasty *Description of the Foreign Lands*.[10] In general, few extant maps, including *The Map of Chinese and Non-Chinese Territories* (*Huayi tu* 華夷圖, 1136), fully acknowledge the extent of geographic knowledge, much less adequately represent it at a realistic scale on a map. One exception is a set of Buddhist maps in the Southern Song (dated 1265), which depict Central Asia and India on a scale comparable to China. This is the earliest evidence of an overt assertion of a Buddhist worldview over a Sinocentric one. The map set, however, did not exert major influence on official mapping; nonetheless, it is significant because it confirms a worldview born of ideology rather than ignorance.[11]

This practice of Sinocentered mapping did not face any serious challenges until the thirteenth century, when the larger Mongol Empire subsumed China. For the first time in its history, all of China fell under the rule of foreigners, indeed, nomads from the north whose culture the Chinese traditionally regarded as "barbarian." Of course, the early Mongols possessed their own set of geographical concepts based on the sacred beliefs and social landscapes their ancestors had developed in the Mongolian grasslands.

However, they also adapted culturally as they expanded into new conquest territories, a phenomenon enhanced by their promotion of cultural exchanges. This included the assimilation of new mapping practices and geographical perceptions of the world from conquest societies with highly developed mapping cultures, like China and Iran.[12]

Accordingly, in China, major innovation in world mapping resulted from the initiative of Mongol rulers and their foreign collaborators, even after the empire's formal division in 1260 into four khanates.[13] An important moment arose in 1286, when the Mongols asserted rule over all of China under Qubilai, the fifth qa'an. A Muslim scholar from West Asia, Jamal al-Din, then the supervisor of the qa'an's Palace Library, proposed a new mapping initiative to Qubilai. He argued that traditional Chinese "world" maps, which limited their horizons to China, did not suffice for comprehending the new empire's political boundaries and geographic position in the world. To remedy this problem, the court had to create new maps that accurately reflected the empire's realities.[14] The emperor agreed, and Jamal al-Din undertook the task, utilizing the court's amassed geographical materials, most notably, Chinese and Islamic maps and writings, in addition to sea charts and territorial globes from West Asia, to develop a new perception through Mongol imperial eyes.[15]

The court scholars under Jamal al-Din's direction, Chinese and non-Chinese alike, fulfilled their mission, producing an array of new and original works of geography and cartography. Sadly, few of these works have survived; nonetheless, what exists can help us determine what improvements to spatial knowledge and cartographic style in Chinese geography derived from contemporaneous Muslim maps depicting a large part of Afro-Eurasia. For example, the only surviving map from this era, the *Encyclopedia of Yuan Dynasty Institutions* (*Yuan Jingshi dadian*, ca. 1330), displays the four Mongol *ulus*es and Mamluk domains; among the map's 105 place names are towns not found in surviving Chinese maps of earlier periods, like Damascus, Kish, Alamut, and Isfahan. Moreover, the map displays obvious signs of influence from contemporaneous Muslim maps, including the map's orientation, which places south at the top of the chart, and its grid, which probably serves as a system for locating specific points in a two-dimensional projection of a terrestrial sphere.[16] Similar grids appear on a Song map of China called *The Tracks of Yu* (*Yiji tu*), carved on the back side of another stone-tablet map, *A Map of China and the Non-Chinese Countries*, created in 1136, on which the grids serve as a relative measure of distance, each square representing 100 *li*.[17] This suggests that, while the grid itself could be an earlier development adopted from the Song cartographers, its function as longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates for the wider world was introduced from the Islamic world. In short, the *Encyclopedia* map exemplifies the progressive deviations of Yuan-era Chinese maps from the Sinocentrism of earlier Chinese cartography.

Comparative analyses of other relevant extant materials suggest that, in addition to the scholars of various ethnicities collaborating with the Mongols, Chinese scholars outside the court also began to draw new kinds of world maps that included West Asia. Perhaps the court's new works had interested them, or they had observed maps and texts newly arrived through direct contact with scholars from West Asia.[18] The most important of such maps, drawn by Li Zemin in the fourteenth century and now lost, included western Afro-Eurasia, which made it a key source for later cartographers seeking to include West Asia, Europe, and Africa in their world maps.[19] One extant map, whose author acknowledges his reliance on Li, the *Map of Integrated Lands*

and Regions of Historical Countries and Capitals (referred to as the *Kangnido*), produced in Korea in 1402, displays place names and cartographic contours that Li drew from Islamic sources to construct his depiction of western Eurasia (see Map A in Figure 42.1).[20] The map appears to have been influential given the number of existing copies available to us today. It was not only copied several times in Korea but also transported to places like Japan, where copies survive today. Scholars have also identified styles similar to the *Kangnido* in Chinese maps, such as the *Comprehensive Map of the Great Ming Empire* (*Da Ming Hunyi tu*, ca. late fourteenth century) and



Figure 42.1 Comparison of the outlines and contents of the four world maps discussed in this chapter. Reconstruction by the author (drawn by Matilde Grimaldi). Map A: the *Kangnido* of 1402. Map B: the world map in Ibn Falallah al-'Umari's encyclopedic compendium. Map C: Sanudo-Vesconti world map. Map D: Fra Mauro map. The original maps for Map B and Map D placed the south on top and the one for Map C placed the east on top; I changed the orientations here for clarity.

Luo Hongxian's *Broad Terrestrial Map* (*Guang yutu*, 1541), which suggests not only the direct influence of the *Kangnido* but also the long-term impact of expanded geographic knowledge throughout Afro-Eurasia as a result of widespread Mongol rule, that is, until the arrival of Jesuit world maps from Europe in the seventeenth century.[21]

Signs of an increase in world geographic knowledge also appear in the many writings by East Asian travelers to Western Asia and Europe, who generally traveled there for diplomatic, religious, and commercial reasons. These include "Chinese Marco Polos" like Rabban Sauma, a Nestorian Christian monk who journeyed as far into the heart of Europe as Rome and Paris and never returned to Mongolia.[22] His case testifies to the conditions that travelers could face whenever they undertook voyages from China to the West, including Europe. Whereas Rabban Sauma traveled over land, another traveler named Yang Shu took advantage of Chinese maritime links with the Ilkhanate to travel in a state-funded ship (*guanben chuan*) to the Persian Gulf port of Hormuz.[23] Wang Dayuan (1311–1350), another Chinese voyager who traveled privately, claims in his account to have visited around 100 countries in his voyage to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean in the 1330s.[24] While some scholars doubt the veracity of his itineraries to regions like West Asia and Africa, it was not at all impossible for Chinese to travel there, thanks to the favorable travel and trade climate during the Mongol era.[25] Some of Wang Dayuan's Confucian colleagues in Quanzhou were so impressed by his detailed knowledge about the world's vastness and complexity that they abandoned the mainstream China-centric worldview for an ancient cosmographic theory of the world comprising multiple geographic centers. The example of Wang and other Chinese of the Mongol era show that some Chinese had enough awareness of the world to travel widely, to sail ships across vast seas, and to publish their observations after their return home, thus changing the standard Chinese worldview.

Chinese ports played an important role in facilitating travel across Afro-Eurasia. For example, many travelers heading west, including Wang Dayuan and Marco Polo, departed from Quanzhou, a key port city in Chinese international commerce and home to foreigners from many different countries, including Muslims from West Asia. A map of the late Yuan period titled the *Map of the World Regions* (*Guanglun jiangli tu*) reveals why, for it depicts a direct sea route leading from Quanzhou to Hormuz, a main port in the Persian Gulf that flourished as a hub for Indian Ocean trading networks from the thirteenth century onward. Inside an inset block, the map also contains a concise long-distance navigational guide that claims it took about 200 days to complete the voyage.[26] The map's focus on Quanzhou establishes its centrality to Yuan-era sea trade, while the mention of Hormuz confirms the distant range of its commercial contacts, as well as its importance to merchants from the Islamic world. Naturally, this affected perceptions in port cities, like Quanzhou. Some Chinese wrote favorably about their Muslim colleagues and their Muslim mosque, providing evidence of cross-cultural fertilization. A similar climate prevailed in China's other major port city, Guangzhou (Canton), particularly after its early fourteenth-century recovery from the Mongol invasion of the 1270s. At that time, the size of China's foreign trade doubled, as a local Yuan-era gazetteer shows.[27]

After the Ming dynasty overthrew the Yuan in the late 1300s, the new self-consciously Han court issued a "sea ban" (*haijin*) on all private sea travel and trade relations with foreign countries. Still, it could not undo the influence of the Mongol era on Chinese geographical knowledge, and its effects would be felt for some time.

One important legacy was the series of expeditions undertaken by the Ming "treasure fleets" to the western Indian Ocean under the leadership of Admiral Zheng He, a descendent of Muslim immigrants to China. Other Muslim Chinese joined the admiral's crew, including Ma Huan, who was on Zheng He's fourth voyage to Hormuz and wrote an account of his travels, which included a pilgrimage to Mecca.[28] While many Muslims fled China for Southeast Asia in the wake of the Yuan defeat, many others remained in China and developed what became the country's Hui communities.[29] These communities already had a long history in China, dating as far back as the Tang era (618–907), not long after the rise of Islamic civilization in West Asia. Their numbers were swollen by West Asian mariners and merchants belonging to shipping networks and commercial ventures from as far afield as the East African coast.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN WORLD MAPPING IN THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST

Soon after the rise and expansion of Islamic civilization in the Middle East during the seventh century, Muslim scholars in the newly formed Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258) developed an extensive set of geographical writings and world maps that newly depicted most of Afro-Eurasia. They based their works on various sources acquired as a result of Muslim political and commercial expansion. Their ambition to develop geography as an intellectual discipline dates back to the ninth-century world-mapping project of Caliph al-Maʾmun (r. 813–833). Caliph al-Maʾmun commissioned projects of physical and mathematical geography to create a world map that accurately depicted the shape of the known world. Scholars participating in the world-mapping project plotted newly collected data according to longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates, having borrowed such theoretical mapping techniques from ancient Greek and Roman scholars, in particular Ptolemy (ca. 100–170 CE).[30] The resulting final map has been lost, but surviving world maps similarly depict most of Afro-Eurasia, suggesting an extensive knowledge of the world that explains why the Abbasid maps became so influential as a prototype for most of the maps produced by later Muslim geographers, such as the earliest surviving maps attributed to geographers of the Balkhi School of the mid-tenth century.[31] In accord with Muslim convention at the time, South sits atop a map that orients along a south–north axis. Afro-Eurasia lies in the center of the map, surrounded by the "Encompassing Sea," while Mecca sits at the continental center. The Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean extend to the west and east, while Africa stretches eastward as it consumes much of the Southern Hemisphere, reducing the Indian Ocean to a narrow horizontal band of open sea space straddling the East African coast and China. Muslim geographers of later periods continued to develop world geography by incorporating new content and techniques. Notable contributions were made, such as al-Idrisi's (fl. 1154) monumental works, al-Biruni's (973–1048) sketch map, and the fourteenth-century charts incorporating longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates. Islamic world maps, like the round map of al-Kashgari (1008–1102) and the maps of the Silk Road recently discovered in the Egyptian *Book of Curiosities*, provide unique interpretations of non-Islamic territories.[32] Given the transfer of mapping knowledge from the Islamic world to China during Mongol times, one can assume that some of the geographic treatises and maps produced in China during and after the Yuan

dynasty incorporated some of the features found in these early Islamic maps, which underscores the importance of comparative study to our understanding of individual societies both during and after the Mongol period.[33]

Like China, the Islamic World experienced its most ambitious world-geographical projects under the auspices of Mongol rulers. The Ilkhanate was established in 1256 in Iran. As a part of the Mongol Empire, scholars in the Ilkhanate drew from many sources for knowledge about the wider world. For example, some ministers and diplomats from other Mongol states circulated through the empire at large bearing new materials and information that provided opportunities to Muslim scholars, eager to expand the horizons of Muslim knowledge about the world, particularly Yuan China, the Ilkhanate's closest ally.

Similar to Yuan China, the Ilkhanate's new Mongol rulers also embraced local culture to a certain degree; some even converted to Islam. After stabilizing their rule in Iran, the seventh Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 1295–1304) and his successor Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316) sponsored the first systematic chronicle of societies in the "known" world, the *Compendium of Chronicles*. The author, prime minister Rashid al-Din (1247–1318), recalled in his preface that Ghazan Khan had proposed the project, echoing the sentiment of Jamal al-Din, the contemporaneous Yuan court official and scholar mentioned earlier. He states that he and his collaborators were able to write this unprecedented grand compendium of the history of most of the known world thanks to the fact that the Mongols ruled almost "all corners of the earth," including China.[34] However spotty factually, the work's geographical content belies a shift in world perspective from an Islamic to a Mongol point of view. Moreover, the compilers drew upon a wider range of sources in various languages, obtained directly from the regions in question. For example, a significant source about China found its way to Iran thanks to Bolad Aqa, a Mongol aristocrat who served Qubilai Qa'an as an official in the Yuan court and who the khan later dispatched to the Ilkhanate as a political advisor.[35] Bolad Aqa's expertise allowed Rashid al-Din to integrate China into his history and geography of the world with considerable accuracy, thereby advancing Muslim knowledge of the world. The Yuan dynasty figured prominently as the senior khanate within the Mongol Empire, reflecting the interest of his sponsor Ghazan Khan, who actively nurtured diplomatic relations with the Yuan court. It is not clear whether his third volume of world geography, *Routes of the Realms*, was ever completed, as only the Table of Contents has survived.[36] Nevertheless, the fact that it was commissioned suggests that the author and his sponsors were interested in the topic.

New groundbreaking techniques also appeared as a result of cross-cultural exchanges.[37] For example, during this time period, grid maps began to appear, like those created by Hamd Allah Mustawfi al-Qazwini (ca. 1281–1349), which are similar to the contemporaneous Chinese grid maps mentioned earlier. He probably inherited some source materials from Rashid al-Din, although he did not incorporate much else that was novel into his geographic treatise. The introduction of grids is, however, significant because it reveals that he was incorporating knowledge both from China and about China that was circulating through Ilkhan Iran.

We can detect more exchanges of information throughout the greater Indian Ocean in accounts written by travelers who undertook unprecedentedly long-distance journeys in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These travelers took advantage of the expanded networks of both overland and overseas routes that the Pax Mongolica enabled. The

most famous Muslim traveler during the Mongol period is Ibn Battuta, who journeyed all the way from Morocco in northwestern Africa – Afro-Eurasia's westernmost region – to eastern China through the inter-Asian trade networks that included Karimi and *ortaq* merchants, as well as the Kazaruniya order of Sufis.[38] While debates have erupted over the veracity of Ibn Battuta's claim that he traveled all the way to Khanbaliq (Daidu), the Mongol capital, scholars acknowledge that he went to Quanzhou in southern China.[39] His account, written in the form of travel literature called *rihla* and structured to include episodes meant to entertain readers, includes much fanciful information, like the story of a 200-year-old man who lived in a cave in Guangzhou (Canton).[40] It also contains a great amount of reliable information about China, including popular maritime activities, the Muslims who lived there, and the newly circulating name for Guangzhou, Sin Kalan, which literally means "Great China" in Arabic (Machin in Persian), and Sin al-Sin (China of China), which also means southern China.[41] These names, which were probably also used to refer to Guangzhou, acknowledge the city's longtime status as the world's southern gateway to the Chinese empire.

The open environment created by the Mongol peace fostered connections between western and eastern Afro-Eurasia that offered Islamic geographers new opportunities for geographic exchange. For example, maps of this time use a new name for southern China, Sin al-Sin, based on contemporaneous sources (possibly Ibn Battuta), which reflects China's 1127 division into northern and southern kingdoms (see Map B in Figure 42.1).[42] The geographical treatise by Hamd Allah Mustawfi, mentioned earlier, reveals similarly novel information about China's political division into three realms – Khitay (northern China), Chin, and Machin (Greater China) – the same divisions Rashid al-Din used in his *Compendium of Chronicles*.[43] The means through which the aforementioned names were transferred remains unclear. We can, however, surmise that the information was transmitted through people who shared communication channels between western and eastern Afro-Eurasia.

We can even assume that some information was transmitted to Europe by way of European travelers transiting Eurasia in small but significant numbers after centuries of isolation. They included the Franciscan missionary Odoric of Pordenone, who called Guangzhou "Censcalan" – clearly a transliteration of the Arabic name "Sin Kalan," which he must have learned sometime in the course of his travels.[44] Thus, whatever the changes in the structure of Muslim trade networks or Sino-Islamic exchange, the establishment of the Pax Mongolica allowed people to travel Asia's reopened overland routes to reach the heart of the empire in Mongolia. This had important consequences for travelers from relatively marginal parts of Afro-Eurasia, who could now travel to more advanced societies, like China or the Islamic world, and return home with new, more reliable information. The long-term repercussions for people in peripheral Western Europe – to say nothing of the rest of the world – who could now obtain more knowledge of the East than any European had ever done, were huge.

RECONNECTED TO THE EAST: EUROPEAN TRAVELERS AND NEW MAPPING OF THE WORLD

It was the ancient Greek and Roman scholars who first mapped the Afro-Eurasian world based on scientific cartographic techniques, including longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates and geographic knowledge collected by travelers. These techniques

were later adapted by scholars in the medieval Islamic world, as seen previously, though ironically not by the people of early medieval Europe. Europe faced isolation from Asia's trade networks for several centuries after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476. During this time, Christian monks developed a unique map based on a Christian worldview that is known as a "T-in-the-O" map (henceforth "T-O map"), which would become the continent's dominant form of *mappa mundi*, or world map. The T-O structure orients the East toward the top of the map and separates the world's landmasses into the three major continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe; at the center of this world lies Jerusalem, the holiest city in Christendom. These continents are closely juxtaposed, separated only by watercourses that flow west from the Paradise in the far east – at the top of the map.[45] The Indian Ocean, Serica, and the Chinas (China), which appear in ancient Greco-Roman geography, do not appear here.

Given the evidence of skepticism about claims of a flat earth illustrated in geographic works, we could regard the T-O map as a symbolic representation of the dominant worldview in Christian Europe at the time rather than a demonstration of actual world-geographical knowledge.[46] However, during the early Middle Ages, when the T-O was the only model of the world circulating through Europe, the medieval European perception of the world could have been limited to just this. From around 1000 CE, as political encounters like the Crusades put Western Europeans in direct contact with the Islamic world and economic exchanges with the outside world increased, European geographers began to revise their Eurocentric view of the world.[47] The biggest growth in long-distance contact and exchange occurred in response to the Mongol expansion into western Eurasia in the early thirteenth century.

While most of the societies in Eurasia were subjugated by the Mongols, Western Europe was saved in 1242 by the sudden death of the Great Khan, which halted their military campaigns.[48] The Mongols never returned, but the looming Mongol threat nonetheless frightened political leaders throughout Europe, and they began to ponder ways to cope with possible future threats. The pope in Rome and the king of France each sent Franciscan friars, including John Carpini and William of Rubruck, as emissaries to Mongolia to meet with Mongol rulers and attempt diplomatic compromise.[49] After returning home, the two friars wrote about the Mongolian society they had observed. Rubruck, able to travel all the way to Qaraqorum, the Mongol capital, before advancing to China, left vivid accounts of the Mongol lifestyle, as well as accounts of Cathay (a medieval name of China – more particularly, northern China – from the Arabic word Khitay into Latin).[50] Though their accounts never reached more than a small group of educated elites, Rubruck and Carpini nonetheless introduced new information about East Asian societies to Europe, which had long-term consequences.

Marco Polo, the Venetian merchant who traveled directly to China, which he called Cathay (northern China) and Manzi (southern China), provided new information to cultivate a fresh awareness of the East among Europeans. He created a sensation and incredulity with his description of China as a wealthier and more advanced civilization than Europe.[51] As with other medieval travelers, like Ibn Battuta, fierce debates have erupted in recent years about whether he actually went to China.[52] The detailed and often considerably accurate information contained in his writings,

however, suggests that some Europeans, including Marco Polo, actually traveled to China and obtained new information there.[53] Multiple versions of Polo's account proliferated in many languages after the Venetian's death and ultimately influenced European perceptions of the world, albeit gradually.

Other Europeans also traveled to eastern Eurasia through the open networks of the Mongol period and returned to disseminate similarly important information. Friar Odoric of Pordenone was one such person. Like Ibn Battuta, who utilized the Muslim religious and commercial networks of the Indian Ocean, the Franciscan missionary took advantage of the Franciscan communities strung across Asia, which collectively functioned as an institutional network on which Franciscan itinerants like Odoric could rely.[54] This helped him reach his first landing in China, the port of Guangzhou (which he called "Censcalan"), and later to China's principal port, Quanzhou. In the course of his travels, he gathered new and reliable facts about China, such as the popularity of foot binding and cormorant fishing, which he divulged in his travelogue, written after his return to Europe.[55] His story was soon after plagiarized for an English-language book called *Mandeville's Travels*, which ironically became more widely read than even Polo.[56] Still, the effects were enduring.

Over a longer period, however, Polo's account exerted the most profound influence on European geography and mapping of the world. Medieval Europeans could not easily imagine cultures as diverse as those that existed elsewhere in Afro-Eurasia, evident in illustrations of Chinese people and cities looking decidedly European in some versions of Polo.[57] However, new geographic information began gradually to influence some cartographers to seek new information that they could incorporate into their world maps, a trend that undermined the limited geography of T-O maps.

The first world map to incorporate geographic data from Polo's account was the Catalan Atlas, made in 1375 by a Majorcan Jew named Cresques Abraham.[58] This chart's many detailed passages and vivid illustrations, such as that of a caravan crossing a Central Asian desert, suggest that Abraham not only consulted Polo's book but also probably possessed a copy. The atlas's author relied on other sources as well. For example, he placed a city called "Cincalan" on the southern coast of China. Clearly, this is Guangdong, derived from Odoric's "Censcalan," albeit in slightly altered form – a name, it should be added, that actually traces back to Islamic sources, like Ibn Battuta.

The cartographic contour of the Catalan Atlas is unique and significant because it presents the Asian continent and Indian Ocean in more realistic ways, marking a decided departure from the T-O map tradition in both content and form. In fact, new maps differing from earlier *mappa mundi* began to circulate in Europe several decades prior to the publication of the famed atlas.[59] For example, some new maps of the fourteenth century, like the Sanudo-Vesconte world map submitted to Pope John XXII in 1321 by the Venetian politician Marino Sanudo (1260–1338), portray the Afro-Eurasian world in a realistic shape that includes the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Ocean, and China, in other words, in a fashion similar to contemporaneous Islamic world maps (see Map C in Figure 42.1). While the map's cartographer Pietro Vesconte does not reveal the source of the cartographic features he drew, little doubt remains that he based them on an Islamic circular world map.[60] Although the map lacks information about Asia that could be directly linked to Polo's travelogue, contemporaneous sources had an impact on its design as well. As his treatise

to which he appended his map shows, Sanudo drew information about Asia and the Mongols from contemporaneous sources like Hayton (d. 1271), king of Little Armenia (r. 1224–1269), a vassal state of the Mongols since the 1240s, and others, whose accounts considerably reshaped the images of the Far East since the mid-thirteenth century.[61]

Geographic information introduced from abroad continued to stimulate and influence new mapping endeavors in Europe after the Mongol Empire disappeared. The mid-fifteenth century witnessed a proliferation of many different ideas about world geography represented in different kinds of world maps that coexisted and conflicted with each other. These include the revival of Ptolemy's world map and Fra Mauro's 1450 map that added details about the wider world, including Asia, based largely on information derived from Polo's account, classic information from Ptolemy's *Geography*, and other contemporary sources (see map D in Figure 42.1). The Fra Mauro map even places South at the top, in classic Islamic fashion.[62] Though mapmakers continued to use and even modify the T-O model, the new approach to mapping based on information from eyewitness travelers and cross-cultural sources led Europeans to view the world in novel ways that inevitably undermined the old form. It also inspired political leaders, scholars, and merchants to seek greater contact with the world beyond Europe, which contributed ultimately to global interconnection.[63]

CONCLUSION

Geographic knowledge and mapping techniques significantly developed across Afro-Eurasia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These developments were inspired in part by transfers of knowledge made possible by expanded contacts and travel during the Pax Mongolica, which scholars have begun to see as an initial stage in the history of globalization. Extant sources are limited, however, when examined from a comparative perspective, they testify to a large-scale circulation of people, goods, and knowledge – including geographical – that affected Afro-Eurasian cultures for a short but significant period in a way that explains the growth in cartographical expertise. The eastward and westward transfers of Islamic geographical knowledge and their consequent cross-cultural influence in Chinese and European societies offer an important example of the Mongol impact on rapid transfers of information and knowledge across Eurasia. Although the Islamic impact on Chinese geography has been better documented to date, the Islamic world may have exerted an even greater impact on their western neighbors.

However much this new knowledge affected some people, traditional ways of seeing the world remained widespread in each society. Occasionally, as shown in the travel accounts of Rubruck, Polo, Mandeville, and Ibn Battuta, new information and traditions, including myth/legend became mixed up, causing confusion: for example, Rubruck discusses the legendary Christian Kingdom of Prester John, while Ibn Battuta talks about Gog and Magog in China. In China, imaginary places, such as countries of women and hairy people, found from the *Classic of Mountains and Seas* (*Shanhaijing*), also continued to find their way into geographic works and maps well into the early modern period.[64]

Nonetheless, the general trend toward long-term change is unmistakable in the evidence from Chinese, Islamic, and European geography and cartography. Gradually, elites in these societies began to use the practical knowledge gained through these interactions to develop new policies that impacted their people and, in the long run, global history. Interestingly, though, elites in Europe were only indirectly affected by the Mongols; they were stimulated by the knowledge transfers of the Mongol age, and they used it to project power into Afro-Eurasia and beyond. By contrast, this new knowledge seemed to exert a limited influence in China, as seen in the short-lived Zheng He expeditions. Its previously extensive networks across the Indian Ocean and into the Islamic Middle East shrank amidst the Ming dynasty's sea ban. In other words, the importance of new geographic information, which the Europeans gained during the Mongol period, is undeniable and should not be underestimated. Indeed, these maps suggest that we should reconsider the implications of the Mongol Empire for global history.

NOTES

1 Allsen 1997, 6; May 2012, 109–129, 232–256.
2 Sugiyama 2000; Sugiyama2007.
3 Park 2012, 9–15.
4 Allsen 2001; Park 2012; Park 2016c.
5 Park 2018, 100.
6 Cao 1990.
7 Wang Yong 1958, 18–24.
8 Aoyama 1963, 569–593.
9 Cao Wanru 1990, 42–44.
10 Zhao 1911; Zhao 1996; Leslie and Gardiner 1982, 254–308.
11 Park 2010, 78.
12 Buell 2015, 27; Allsen 2001.
13 Sugiyama 2004; Kim Hodong 2009.
14 Miya 2006, 517–523.
15 Kauz 2013, 159–167; Park 2012, 99–107; *YS* 48: 998–999.
16 Park 2012, 100–103; Unno 1996, 51–52.
17 Yee 1994, 124.
18 Park 2018, 1–4.
19 Fuchs 1946, 9–14.
20 Park 2018; Kenzheakhmet 2015; Kenzheakhmet2016.
21 Park 2018, 229–230.
22 Rossabi 1992.
23 Park 2012, 112–113.
24 Wang 1981, 385.
25 Ptak 2001, 40.
26 Park 2012, 107–109.
27 Chen 1986, 31; Park 2012, 113–114.
28 Ma Huan 1970, 158–176.
29 Wade 2010; Leslie 1986, 105–139.
30 Ragep 2010, 124–125.
31 Tibbetts 1992.
32 Rapoport and Savage-Smith 2018.
33 Park 2018.

34 RDT, 6.
35 Allsen 2001, 59–80, 90–91.
36 Ono 2015; RDT, 11; Allsen 2001, 103–104.
37 Bloom 2008, 83–96.
38 Ashtor 1956; Allsen 1989; Kauz 2010.
39 Dunn 1986, 260.
40 Ibn Baṭṭuṭa 2000, 897–898; Beckingham 1993; Netton 1984.
41 Ibn Baṭṭuṭa 2000, 88–89; Pelliot 1959, 275–276; Park 2012, 155.
42 Park 2012, 147–149.
43 Qazwini 1919, II, 250–254; Park 2012, 141–146.
44 Pelliot 1959, 276; Park 2019, 42.
45 Woodward 1987; Edson 2007, 9–29; Akbari 2008, 112.
46 Woodward 1987, 319.
47 Park 2016c; Jackson 2005, 10–22.
48 Jackson 2005, 123–128.
49 Rubruck, 25–47; Dawson 1980; Bressan 1997, 5–8.
50 Rubruck; Pelliot 1959, 216–229.
51 Jackson 2018, 100.
52 Wood 1995; de Rachewiltz 1997; Vogel 2012, 1–88.
53 Vogel 2012.
54 Bressan 1997, 8–9.
55 Andreose 2014.
56 Andreose 2012; Andreose 2014; Bressan 1997, 11; Mandeville 1983, 11–22.
57 e.g., see fr. 2810 in Tsukimura 2002.
58 Park 2016a; Woodward 1987, 315.
59 Llompart 2011, 3–6.
60 Park 2016c, 143–158; Schröder 2021.
61 Sanudo 2011, 370–377; O'Doherty 2013.
62 Park 2016c; Falchetta 2006; Cattaneo 2011.
63 Skelton 1958, 16–17.
64 Park 2016b.

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SECTION 3

THE MONGOLS IN WORLD HISTORY

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SECTION 3 INTRODUCTION

THE MONGOLS IN WORLD HISTORY

Timothy May and Michael Hope

The Mongol conquests and the subsequent century and a half of Chinggisid rule across Eurasia was a watershed moment in world history, separating the Global Middle Ages from the early modern period. The destruction caused by the Mongol invasions swept aside old hierarchies, identities, and taxonomies and replaced them with new, more expansive, outward-looking approaches to government, religion, and trade. Like a wildfire burning through a forest, the Mongol Empire brought unprecedented destruction, but it also played a crucial role in building the new values and institutions that emerged from the ashes; any fair appraisal of the Mongol Empire must acknowledge both aspects. The world they left behind in the fourteenth century did not completely depart from the past, and in some instances the Mongols simply accelerated trends that were already well underway before their emergence – the rising popularity of Sufism and Neo-Confucianism as well as the growth of long-distance maritime trade being two examples. Yet the Mongols did stimulate a new wave of exchanges that would transform the social, intellectual, and political map of Eurasia for centuries to come. Even today, the Mongols have left an indelible mark upon the languages, culture, and history of those they ruled.

For most people, however, the initial experience of the Mongol Empire was violent and destructive. Any resistance to Mongol rule was met with disproportionate force on a scale not often recorded in history. This violence was meted out to all members of an enemy civilization – male or female, young or old, both the powerful and the meek. The conquest of the city of Zhongxingfu in the Xi Xia Empire (Wright), which included the systematic massacre of the population and the desecration of tombs, but also the buildings and habitations of the town, was mirrored in Khurasan, Korea, and the Pontic region.[1] Entire cities seemed to be temporarily or permanently wiped off the map. The Persian historian Minhaj Juzjani sought to rationalise the great khan's behaviour through a conversation he contrived between a captured imam and Chinggis Khan. Seeing the devastation wrought by the Mongol armies in Iran, the man of God said, "A name continues to endure where there are people, but how will a name endure when the Khan's servants martyr all the people and massacre

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them, for who will remain to tell the tale?" The khan responded coldly that "I used to consider thee a sagacious and prudent man, but, from this speech of thine, it has become evident to me that thou dost not possess complete understanding, and that thy comprehension is but small."[2] The imam, like the author, had difficulty in making sense of the Mongols' grand strategy and was therefore expelled from the imperial court.

This destruction had a number of important consequences beyond the tragic loss of life and infrastructure. It resulted in widespread displacement, causing many hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of people to flee their homes in the face of the conquering armies and the heavy taxes and duties required by Mongol governors. Many of these refugees found shelter in the wilderness – mountains, deserts, and forests – before returning to rebuild, but others found new homes along the ever-shifting frontiers of the expanding Mongol Empire. In the Islamic Core Territories, this saw the spread of Persian-speaking scholars, merchants, and officials into Anatolia, Syria, and India, while in East Asia, many of the Southern Song literati migrated into Southeast Asia. Movements of similar magnitude were recorded among the Turkic-speaking people of Inner Asia, such as the Qipchaqs (Cumans), Qanglis, and Turkmen, who had opposed Mongol rule or had been driven from their pastures. They found new seasonal camps in Anatolia, northern Iran, Eastern Europe, and South Asia, leading to the gradual Turkification of much of modern-day Russia, Turkey, Iran, and India.[3]

The migration of people coincided with a shift of thinking. Those who were forced to find a new home brought new ideas with them. In Syria and Egypt, the influx of Islamic scholars and adepts contributed further to what has popularly become known as the Sunni Revival, while the spread of Persian speakers to South Asia coincided with a proliferation of Persian poetry and may have played a role in the expansion of Islam to Southeast Asia. Irrespective of whether a population chose to remain or leave, the Mongol invasion tested their beliefs in temporal institutions as well as the cosmic order of the universe. The Mongol conquest of first the Jin (1211–1234) and then the Southern Song (1254–1279) dynasties appeared to indicate that the Mandate of Heaven had, at the very least, passed to a new power. This was most likely the reason that Chinggis Khan summoned the Chinese bureaucrat and astrologer Yelu Chucai after the capture of Zhongdu in 1215 and the Daoist master Changchun in 1223.[4] As we saw in the previous section, the Mongol invasion of the Islamic and Christian worlds (both Eastern and Latin) was rationalised as a form of divine punishment, perhaps even an augury of the End of Times. Religious scholars, astrologers, and occultists alike looked to their charts and scriptures for signs to explain what was happening and in most cases concluded that a new age was on the horizon, though how long it would last was unclear.

The Mongols imposed order on the chaos engendered by their invasions. Rulers who submitted were incorporated into the imperial hierarchy, while those who resisted were purged and replaced by more amenable vassals. These subject princes then assisted the Mongols in governing their empire. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the Mongol Empire at all without the manpower and expertise provided by the conquered people. Contrary to some of the historiography of the twentieth century, the Mongols had no interest in ruling over a wasteland, and they needed willing subjects to help them exploit the wealth of their newly acquired assets. In the

Middle East, this meant that a great number of dynasties survived the initial conquest; the Seljuqs, Artuqids, Salghurids, Kartids, Qutlughkhanids, Hethoumids, and Bagratids were just some who realised that they had more to lose by fighting against the Mongols. Those in lesser positions of authority – including, but not limited to, secretaries, merchants, soldiers of fortune, accountants, translators, tutors, and minor nobles – likewise found it advantageous to throw in their lot with the new conquerors. Hence, there were a number of Korean noble families who submitted to Mongol rule well before the Koryo king Kojong did so in 1258. Perhaps the most successful of these early supplicants was Hong Pok-won, who governed parts of North Korea under the Cho dictatorship when Mongol armies first made their appearance in Korea in 1219. Hong quickly threw in his lot with the Mongols and was rewarded with continued control over his own territory but also a place at the Mongol court. Indeed, his membership of the Mongol imperial elite opened up new possibilities for Hong, who was appointed pacification commissioner over Liaodong and much of the Bohai region north of the Yalu River (Lee Kang Hahn).[5] Mongol rule could be quite lucrative for those who submitted to the *qa'an* in a timely fashion.

Confirmation of earlier office holders did not mean that life continued as normal in the conquered territories. Once under Mongol rule, the fate of a noble family or local dynasty depended on the outcome of factional struggles at the Mongol *ordu*, in which vassal princes were often embroiled. The Uyghur monarchy, for example, had been among the first to submit to the Mongols in 1210 and had participated in Chinggis Khan's campaigns against the Qara Khitai and the Khwarazmshah empire, among others. Moreover, the Uyghur *idiqut* had been granted one of Chinggis Khan's daughters in marriage, giving him the nominal status of *güregen* (royal son-in-law). Yet the close proximity of the Uyghurs to the Ögödeid appanage and their ties with Güyük Khan and his sons saw the overthrow of the *idiqut* at the hands of Möngke in 1251 and the eventual collapse of Uyghur power when East Turkistan became a theatre of conflict between the Toluids and Ögödeids in the second half of the thirteenth century (Michael C. Brose). Picking the right side could, however, result in a rise in fortunes, as was the case for the Russian princes of Moscow. The city was of middling importance prior to the arrival of the Mongols and was granted to the third son of the ruling family of Vladimir. Yet a marriage alliance with the Jochid ruling house saw its ruler, Duke Yuri Danilovich (r. 1303–1325), given the right to collect taxes on behalf of the Mongol court, thereby enriching its rulers and laying the foundation for the rise of Muscovy in the second half of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries (Alexander V. Maiorov). The early accommodation reached between followers of the Sakya-pa monastic order in Tibet and the Yuan Dynasty of Qubilai Qa'an, likewise, saw their members assist Mongol governors in the region in addition to supplying the imperial preceptors to the house of the *qa'an* (Soyoung Choi). The Mongol expansion was, therefore, pushed by a process of accommodation and appeasement, in which local magnates and potentates were assimilated into the Mongol ruling structure.

This appeasement was often voiced through reference to earlier religious and political ideology. The Mongols had, it seems, always been amenable to using the language and semiotics of the conquered people to express their authority. This was most famously evidenced in the episode, described by 'Ata Malik Juvayni, in which Chinggis Khan ascended the pulpit of the congregational mosque of Bukhara

and told the assembled population that "I am the punishment of God. If you had not committed great sins, God would not have sent a punishment like me upon you."[6] Whether the Mongols shared Islamic conceptions of sin is highly dubious, and several historians have rightly assumed that this event was entirely apocryphal.[7] Nevertheless, the description of this event, provided by a Muslim serving the Mongol Empire, shows that, at least by the middle of the thirteenth century, the Mongols were willing to express their conception of divine mandate by drawing on the more familiar language of their conquered people. The same premise may have underpinned Möngke Qa'an's comment to William of Rubruck that

> just as God gave different fingers to the hand so has He given different ways to men. . . . God has given you the Scriptures and you do not keep them; to us, on the other hand, He has given the soothsayers, and we do what they tell us, and live in peace.[8]

The "Scriptures" that Möngke was referring to were unlikely to be from the Bible, but rather a more general adherence to the will of God, which had ordained the Chinggisids as universal rulers. The empire was the product of divine intervention, albeit European Christians and Mongols may have disagreed about the nature of the divinity and His purpose for calling forth the Mongols in the first place. There were, however, also areas of overlap between the Mongols and their subjects. One area the Mongols, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and others shared a mutual interest was in astrology. The Mongols, like most people of their time, had long seen the movements of the heavens as auguries of events on earth. We, therefore, have evidence of the Mongols consulting foreign astrologers for advice in the Chinese, Russian, and Persian source material as early as the reign of Chinggis Khan (1206–1227) and his son Ögödei (1229–1241).[9] Albeit the measurements and terminology may have differed from region to region, the conclusions they arrived at were more or less the same – the Mongol conquests marked a new epoch.

The assimilation of the conquered experts into the Mongol hierarchy produced a convergence of interests, which blossomed into a greater ideological reconciliation in the second half of the thirteenth century. The compact created between the Mongol conquerors and local officials saw the proliferation of new literature, endowments, and artwork that not only sought to explain the rise of the Mongols to power but also justify their collaboration with local officials. This type of project was perhaps best exemplified by the *Blessed History* of Rashid al-Din, the Persian bureaucrat who served the Muslim Ilkhan, Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304). Stefan Kamola and Jonathan Brack have demonstrated that Rashid al-Din's historical project was linked to other works being produced in the Ilkhanate at the time and was just as much an attempt to grow the profile of the Persian official, as it was to expand the power of his master.[10] To that end, Rashid al-Din portrayed Ghazan as the fulfilment of God's secret intent. Whereas Chinggis Khan had been sent by God to rid Islam of its impurities, Ghazan would oversee its revival in an almost messianic fashion.[11] To what extent this project was initiated by Rashid al-Din or Ghazan remains an open question. Indeed, the admittedly hostile Hanbali jurist, Ibn Taymiyya was under no illusion that the Mongols had only the most superficial grasp of Islam, which led them to compare Chinggis Khan to the Prophet Muhammad and the Rashidun

caliphs.[12] As such, Ghazan's conversion did not result in him abandoning the earlier Mongolian ideology of heavenly mandate, nor the primacy of the Chinggisid dynasty – the two most essential ingredients of Mongol imperial ideology.

A similar project was simultaneously underway in the east of the Mongol Empire, where Qubilai Qa'an enlisted his Buddhist preceptor, Phagspa Lama, to expound his new imperial ideology. Not only did Phagspa write a Mirror for Princes for Qubilai's son and heir Jingim, he also authored a series of epistles, which spelled out Qubilai's qualifications to rule as a universal Buddhist sovereign. Like his Islamic contemporaries, Phags-pa drew upon familiar millenarian ideas to portray Qubilai as a *chakravartin* king, a *bodhisattva*, and a living god as the reincarnation of Manjusri.[13] As was the case in the Ilkhanate, the assimilation of Buddhist ideas into the Mongol imperial ideology did not entail the abandonment of earlier ideas or the marginalization of other alternatives. The popularity of Tibetan tantric Buddhism at the Yuan court caused tension, especially among the Mongols' Han Chinese subjects, who sought to compete for the *qa'an*'s affections by providing their own form of adulation. They were especially effulgent after Qubilai oversaw the successful reunification of China for the first time in over 300 years – evidence, if any were needed, that the Mongols retained the capacity to finesse their message to incorporate a diverse population (Morris Rossabi & Qiu Yihao).

Nevertheless, Mongol imperialism did not go unchallenged. Regimes that managed to resist the Mongols in Japan, Southeast Asia, India, and Egypt drew upon opposition to the Mongols to solidify their grasp on power. Both India and Egypt had undergone violent upheavals just prior to the arrival of Mongol forces on their frontiers, which had seen the installation of manumitted military slaves (*mamluk*s) in control of the Ayyubid and Ghurid sultanates respectively. These former slaves sought to legitimate their seizure of power by claiming the mantle of defenders of the faith. Historians writing in the mamluk empires conceived of the Islamic world being threatened by pagan enemies (the Franks, Hindus, and Khitans) as well as internal enemies (heretical Shi'is as well as backsliders), whose infidelity put the Dar al-Islam in a precarious position (Josephine van den Bent). The size of the Mongol threat made them the perfect avatar for the challenges faced by the Muslims, necessitating the rise of new rulers, chosen by God to defend the true believers.[14] Similarly, in Vietnam and Japan, the expulsion of Mongol troops was followed by the construction of historical narratives about divine intervention, which justified a concentration of power in the hands of new dynastic founders (Li Narangoa & James A. Anderson).

Of course, the clash of cultures between the Mongols and their external enemies was never as great as has been suggested by some historians. Although they were never incorporated into the Chinggisid imperium, Cairo and Delhi welcomed Mongol political refugees, slaves, and brides into their ranks. This Mongol diaspora population became a powerful faction within both sultanates, with some even rising to the highest offices of these regimes. Precisely what divided the Mongols of the Ilkhanate from those in Syria or the Gangetic Plains is, therefore, not always clear. A recent biographical study of one such defector, Qipchaq, suggests that even the Mongols themselves were not always sure where their loyalties lay.[15] Having been born in the Ilkhanate, Qipchaq was captured by the Mamluks and was raised in the household of Qalawun, before falling out with the sultan Lachin and being forced

to flee back to the Ilkhanate. Qipchaq was, therefore, a political refugee, whose migration was forced, rather than chosen, and he quickly returned to the Mamluk Sultanate at the first opportunity. Not all defectors found the difference in court culture to be so jarring, and the shared pursuits of martial and equestrian sports, falconry, and drinking meant that elites from these rival empires often had more in common than may be assumed.

In many cases, the distinction between these diaspora communities and those who remained loyal to the Chinggisids seems to have been based more upon competing political interests than upon cultural differences. This was certainly true after the conversion of the Mongols in the Ilkhanate and the Chaghadaid Khanate to Islam, thereby allowing Ghazan Khan to call on the Mamluks to surrender to him, since faith no longer precluded them from doing so.[16] Of course, Berke Khan (r. 1257–1266), the Jochid ruler of the Qipchaq Steppe, had converted to Islam well before Ghazan and had used shared faith as a means to build an alliance with Sultan Baybars against the Ilkhanate. Yet their mutual antipathy towards the Hülegüid rulers of the Ilkhanate was a much more durable foundation for friendship, as Berke's immediate successor, Möngke-Temür, was not a Muslim but still managed to retain cordial relations with the Mamluks.[17] Meanwhile, the purge of Mongol officials that took place in the Delhi Sultanate during the reign of Muhammad ibn Tughluq, appears to have been caused more by their initial reluctance to swear allegiance to him than any connection to their former Chaghadaid masters, who had already been toppled in Mawarannahr.

In any case, the notion that the Mongol Empire marked a new epoch in world history was not abandoned after the collapse of the empire, nor were the ideologies espoused by the respective Mongolian successor states following their disintegration in the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, the collapse of the pre-Mongol political order allowed for new political configurations, which combined earlier political traditions and religious symbolism with the universalism espoused by the Mongols to produce new constellations of power.

At least initially, many of these formations appeared to distance themselves, at least superficially, from the earlier Mongol regime. The Russian chronicles, which describe the rise of the Duchy of Muscovy, for example, turned the Muslim Tatars into the main adversaries of the pious Christian tsars (Don Ostrowski). The earlier collaboration between the Muscovites and the Mongols was given short shrift in the narrative of Ivan IV's successful expansion of Christendom to the Volga River and beyond.[18] In China, likewise, the early years of the Ming dynasty were characterised by ambivalence towards the bloodied, but not yet destroyed, Yuan dynasty after 1368. Toghan-Temür, the last Yuan emperor, had been forced out of Daidu, but he continued to maintain control over Mongolia, while his commanders and relatives remained in the regions of Dali, Liaodong, and Manchuria. The ongoing danger posed by the Chinggisids in East Asia prompted the Hongwu emperor to seek a break with his predecessors, exemplified by the rather rapid compilation of the Yuan dynastic history. Yet earlier Chinggisid diplomatic conventions (including the use of Persian as an imperial lingua-franca) continued to shape the Ming's interactions with its neighbours through to the reign of the Yongle emperor, and there were clear signs that the new regime aspired to rule the former territories of the Yuan, if not assume its leadership position in the former territories of the Mongol Empire (Qiu Yihao).

Of course, the connection between the Mongol Empire and its successors was often far more tangible. In fact, the descendants of Chinggis Khan continued to rule over a great deal of central Inner Asia up to the modern era. The assimilation of Islamic and Chinggisid ideology at the court of Özbeg Khan resulted in the Jochid Ulus being divided among a number of Chinggisid dynasties, many of which survived for several centuries, including the Crimean Khanate, the Shibanid Uzbek Empire, and the Kazakh Khanate. The same process saw Mongol rulers maintain control over the city-states of the Tarim Basin until the seventeenth century, when another Mongol Empire, the Zhungars, replaced them with Sufi shaykhs. In other parts of the former Mongol Empire, dynasties were formed by the families of Mongol commanders, like the Jalayirids in Iraq and Azerbaijan or, perhaps most sensationally, the Timurids of Mawarannahr (Patrick Wing & Evrim Binbaş). The popular appeal of Islamic piety, combined with the prestige of Chinggisid descent, provided these lineages with a formidable claim to rule until the nineteenth century, when a series of new, mostly European empires appeared with their own universal ideologies. Nevertheless, even in the face of this threat, the symbols of Chinggisid rule were invoked to preserve autonomy and protect old identity groups. This time the Mongol Empire was recounted, often in semi-mythical form, by bards, historians, and singers in epics like *Kartal Edigey* and in the national history building projects of the Soviet and post-Soviet era (Ippei Shimamura). Such stories have played a formative role in building and reinforcing the makeup of Eurasia to the present time.

NOTES

1 Dunnell 2010, 88.
2 *TNR*, 1040–1042.
3 Petrushevsky 1968, 483–537; Rizavi 1388/2009; Smith 1992, 665–708; Brook 2010; Sweeney 1994, 34–62.
4 de Rachewiltz 1993, 136–175; de Rachewiltz 1962, 193–194; *TOA*, 48–49.
5 Henthorn 1963, 61; Robinson 2009, 28.
6 *HWC*, 105.
7 For analysis of this quote, see Jackson 2009, 111; Atwood 2004, 254; May 2018, 32–57.
8 *TMM*, 195.
9 Baumann 2008, 94–97 & 296; Jackson 2005, 277; Elizabeth Endicott-West has drawn attention to the importance of diviners at the Yuan court; Endicott-West 1999, 224–239.
10 Brack 2016; Kamola 2019.
11 Lane 2013, 1–40; Atwood 2010, 105–108.
12 Brack 2016, 3; Calmard 1997, 281; Aigle 2007, 102 & 114.
13 Seyfort Reugg 1997, 864; Farquhar 1978, 14.
14 Amitai-Preiss 1995, 2; Broadbridge 2008, 2; Jackson 1999, 119.
15 Mazor 2020, 102–119.
16 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 334.
17 Amitai-Preiss 1995, 81–89; Broadbridge 2008, 53–60.
18 Halperin 2009, 54.

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TMM, See List of Abbreviations.

TNR, See List of Abbreviations.

TOA, See List of Abbreviations.

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PART X

THE MONGOLS IN THE EYES OF THE CONQUERED

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CHAPTER FORTY-THREE

YUAN CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MONGOLS

Morris Rossabi

An assessment of the Mongols' Chinese subjects' attitudes toward their rulers faces considerable obstacles. The vast majority of the Chinese were illiterate, and nearly all contemporary written sources reflect elite views. Inference, however, offers a means of gauging the perceptions of the non-literate population. Many peasants benefited from the Mongols' perceptions of agriculture; craftsmen were awarded a high status; and merchants, many of whom were literate, appreciated the Mongols' stimuli to both short-distance and Silk Road trade. Only after the Mongols began to reverse these policies, for reasons that will be explained, did many Chinese subjects turn against them.

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND THE MONGOLS

Merchants, in particular, benefited from Mongol rule. They did not encounter the same biased Confucian attitudes, which often portrayed merchants as parasites who profited from the exchange of goods but did not contribute anything of economic value. Various dynasties had imposed stiff taxes and sumptuary legislation on traders. On the other hand, the Mongols were not scornful of merchants and certainly valued them. Trade was profitable for the Mongol domains, which gave the merchants considerable status. Greater respect from the government and society must have influenced Chinese merchants' attitudes toward the Mongols. Naturally, they appreciated the support and perks the Mongols provided.

Chinese artisans were another group that developed a positive attitude toward the Mongols. The Chinese elite prized the objects produced, but not so much the craftsmen. Artisans allegedly worked with their hands, not their minds, as the scholar-official class did, an inaccurate perception, but it shaped elite views. The Mongols, by contrast, admired beautiful objects and fine craftsmanship, prompting them to hold artisans in high esteem. Chinggis Khan's instruction not to harm artisans when the Mongols conquered and occupied Samarqand confirms the value he and other khans accorded to such occupations.[1] Chinese and Central Asian textiles, Iranian

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illustrated manuscripts, and Russian metalwork, among other crafts, flourished under the Mongol Empire. The Mongols encouraged, supported, and patronized local crafts and elevated artisans in the social structure. The Mongol khans frequently reduced taxes and freed craftsmen of corvee labor. They also put potters, weavers, and metalworkers in touch with foreign markets for their goods.[2] Such Mongol assistance made a favorable impression on artisans, who no doubt benefited from this craft revolution. More valued than in many of the Chinese dynasties, craftsmen gained enormously from Mongol rule.

Foreign subjects and the Chinese who possessed necessary skills also enjoyed Mongol support. Agronomists, astronomers, siege engineers, and armaments makers, among others, received considerable patronage. The Mongols, who placed tremendous strains on their bodies through herding and in conflicts and wars, recruited doctors from all over their vast domains. To be sure, some of these skilled individuals were Arabs, Persians, Turks, Koreans, and Europeans. Yet the Mongols' favorable attitudes toward these occupations also spread in Chinese society. The medical profession, in particular, gained new status in China.[3] This group was comfortable with Mongol rule.

CHINESE ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MONGOLS

Chinese elite attitudes toward the thirteenth-century Mongol invaders and rulers varied. Naomi Standen's term "unbounded loyalty"[4] explains why Chinese willingly served foreign rulers, such as the Khitan, Jurchen, and Mongols in North China. In those eras, boundaries were permeable, and the concept of unified nations did not shape behavior. A group that earlier considered another as an enemy might be willing to join and assist the victorious side. Chinggis Khan and his successors relied on such changes in loyalty to recruit officials, translators, financial administrators, and scientists. Chinese who filled these positions performed valuable functions and facilitated Mongol rule over China.

On the other hand, some Chinese perceived the Mongols as barbarians who killed countless Chinese and plundered numerous cities and sites. They portrayed the invaders from the north as antithetical to Chinese civilization. The Confucian scholar-official class, which had governed China for centuries, was no longer in power and constituted a group of dissatisfied and educated men. The Mongols' initial abolition of the civil service examinations, which had been one of the cornerstones of Chinese civilization, created similar animosities. Even when the Mongols restored the examinations in 1315, they did not necessarily rely upon these tests in selection of officials. The Mongols' general indifference and occasional opposition to Confucianism exacerbated hostility toward the invaders and rulers. Many Chinese whose careers were threatened by the lack of civil service examinations had a negative view of the Mongols. The foreign rulers' veneration of the military also clashed with traditional Confucian beliefs.

Even prior to Qubilai Qa'an's accession as Emperor of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), a few Chinese had exposure to the Mongols. Chinggis Khan invited the Daoist Changchun to accompany him on his military expedition to Central Asia. The Mongol ruler had been told that the Daoists had developed ways to prolong life. In his conversations with Chinggis, Changchun denied that he had such powers

but advised the Mongol ruler to lead a healthier life by avoiding hunting. He pleaded with Chinggis not to destroy any life, which was quite ironic in light of the massive killings during the Mongol campaigns.[5] He also suggested that the khan eliminate Mongol injunctions prohibiting bathing in rivers and washing clothes. He appeared to have been appalled by what he perceived to be the Mongols' lack of hygienic practices.

Yelü Chucai, another prominent figure, also attempted to "reform" Chinggis and other Mongols. Of Khitan lineage, he had been influenced by Chinese culture and became an ardent lobbyist, promoting the use of Chinese practices and institutions during the early Mongol rule of North China. A Buddhist, he was distressed that Changchun's close relationship with Chinggis had permitted the Daoist to achieve a tax-exempt status for Daoists. Chinggis' son and successor Ögödei also favored Daoism. With such support, the Daoists then expropriated Buddhist monasteries and carried off some of their wealth.[6] Despite his disappointment over the Daoists' apparent favored position, Yelü cooperated with the Mongols because he believed that

> the success that accompanied Cinggis Qan's expedition against the state of Chin [Jin, which dominated North China] was granted by heaven. . . . Cinggis Qan had proved his right by victory, and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai considered himself free from allegiance to Chin when he took up service with him.[7]

He had convinced himself that the Mongols had proved worthy of obtaining the Mandate of Heaven to rule. To be sure, they needed to be "enlightened" in order to govern China, and it was his duty to educate Chinggis and his successors in the Confucian principles of government. He introduced ideas about institutions, taxes, and even the civil service examinations to Ögödei, who adopted some but not all of them.

Many Chinese actually assisted in defeating other dynasties in China. Shi Tianze (1202–1275) organized a Chinese army to attack the Jurchen Jin dynasty, which ruled North China in the 1220s and 1230s. Later, he participated in Möngke Qa'an's attempt to subdue the Song, which was composed of ethnic Chinese, or his own people, in 1258–1259, and he supported Qubilai Qa'an in his struggle with his younger brother Ariq Böke from 1260 to 1264. He commanded a force of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers, an indication of a positive Chinese view of the Mongols.[8] Even more telling was the military support of Zhang Rou (1190–1268) against the Southern Song dynasty during Qubilai's reign. He led several campaigns against his own people because he believed the Song had become corrupt and ineffective. The Mongols, on the other hand, appeared to be effective, powerful, and willing to abide by Chinese institutions.[9]

Qubilai Qa'an was the ruler who attracted numerous Chinese. It was no accident that many Chinese had a favorable view of Qubilai. His mother, Sorqoqtani Beki, had received an appanage in North China and had ensured that Qubilai learn to speak Chinese. Qubilai's ability to communicate allowed him to seek advice and assistance from Chinese and to ingratiate himself with them. The advisers, in turn, appreciated his openness to advice and his efforts to create a governmental system that the Chinese found familiar. Similarly, his openness to Chinese culture won the support of many in the Chinese elite.[10]

Like Yelü Chucai, the Chinese advisers perceived themselves as having a civilizing mission. They thought they would truly Sinicize Qubilai and believed that he and other Mongols were receptive to changes in attitudes and beliefs. Qubilai would often accept their policy recommendations. It is important to note, however, that he selected from the recommendations submitted from his advisers. As critical, the Chinese sources would also be partial to Chinese actors, would often attribute successful policies to Chinese officials, and would downplay Qubilai's role. They would, in short, offer more credit to Chinese officials than they merited.

A typical example of such attributions relates to Yao Shu (1203–1280), one of Qubilai's earliest advisers. Möngke Qa'an, Qubilai's older brother, had commanded him to subdue the mostly non-Chinese population in the Dali Kingdom in the modern province of Yunnan. The Chinese sources assert that Yao was instrumental in Qubilai's success and in preventing a major conflagration in Dali. He allegedly persuaded Qubilai to send envoys to the Dali King, persuading him to accept Mongol overlordship. The sources praise Yao for averting bloodshed. This apparently misleading version ignores the Mongol practice of "orders of submission." Chinggis and his successors, including Qubilai, had repeatedly dispatched envoys with offers to avoid damage or killings if foreigners submitted. Qubilai therefore modeled his policy regarding Dali on that of his Mongol predecessors and did not require Yao's recommendation.[11]

Yao continued to be a counselor to Qubilai throughout his life. He provided Qubilai with an assistant well-versed with Confucianism and the ways it would translate into a stable and harmonious society. One product of this attempt was a set of instructions for Qubilai, based on Confucian principles. These moral injunctions, which included such sentiments as affection for the family, benevolence toward the people, and devotion to learning, appear to be bromides, with limited practical application, but Yao subsequently transmitted a group of more pragmatic injunctions for Qubilai's domain in North China. He advocated proper ways of recruiting officials, reduction of taxes, fostering agriculture, restoration of functional ministries to implement policies, and promotion of education.[12]

It is hard to believe that Qubilai needed to be told that he was required to perform these tasks. Here again, Chinese sources portray a Chinese, Yao Shu, as the civilizer of the Mongol Qubilai Qa'an. The one proposal Yao transmitted and that Qubilai had probably not considered was the founding of *tuntian*, military farms, especially on strategic borders. Soldiers would farm the land and supply themselves, reducing government expenditures. By adopting this institution, Qubilai acquired combat forces that were self-sufficient.

The Chinese sources also credit Yao with saving Qubilai's life and career. Before Qubilai became the qa'an and the emperor of China in 1260, his success in governing his territory in North China had generated considerable hostility toward him at court. In fact, Möngke had dispatched two supervisors to investigate government operations in Qubilai's territory. They discovered that local officials had apparently retained tax revenues designated for the court. They executed the officials and thereby posed a political threat to Qubilai. Yao advised Qubilai to travel, with his family, to the court to demonstrate his allegiance to his older brother.[13] Impressed by his brother's gesture, Möngke did not punish him but instead offered him greater responsibility to resolve political difficulties. Would Qubilai have needed advice to

reassure his brother of his loyalty? This condescending attitude toward the Mongols shaped Chinese attitudes toward their former steppe neighbors and their current rulers.

Hao Jing (1223–1275), another Confucian scholar, was even willing to risk his life to serve the Mongols. Qubilai had recruited him in 1256 and had commanded him to accompany the Mongol troops on their invasion of South China in 1259. Möngke Qa'an's death ended the campaign against the Song, but Hao Jing would shortly be given another significant assignment. He had allegedly impressed Qubilai with a sixteen-point memorandum that described the proper methods for ruling. These recommendations consisted of generalizations about governance and then more specific suggestions. The fundamental recommendations consisted of a plea for the establishment of a government with assistance from scholars and officials. In short, they instructed the qa'an to avoid monopolizing authority, be honest, punish the guilty, and reward the meritorious.[14] Mongol rulers since Chinggis Khan were aware of the need for a government in the territories they had conquered and for recruitment of officials who would help administer their vast domains. They also saw the utility in establishing a set of regulations (such as Chinggis's *Jasaq*) that would outline proper behavior, with honors and gifts for those who deserved them.

Hao's specific recommendations were crucial, although the Qa'an himself may have also conceived of these policies. The first was establishment of a capital city in North China to replace Qaraqorum in Mongolia, which remained distant from the center of Qubilai's domain and required considerable supplies that had to be transported from distant locations. The second was naming one of Qubilai's sons as his successor to ensure the dynasty's foundation. Another was promotion of the economy through the wider use of paper money and the reduction of taxes on ordinary people. These recommendations were valuable because they offered new and important information for Qubilai, who had never used paper money and had never devised a regular system of taxation. The Mongol system of succession centered on election by the Mongol leaders in a *quriltai* (or meeting). Hao proposed a stabler approach through the Chinese system of imperial designation.

Guo Shoujing (1231–1316) was a favorite of Qubilai's because he offered practical advice. Counselors who sought to "enlighten" Qubilai about Confucian principles scarcely gained his attention. Guo, a scientist, presented Qubilai with specific projects that benefited China. At their first meeting, Guo provided Qubilai with suggestions for improvements in waterways and irrigation works. Later, he helped devise a new and more accurate calendar and built a number of astronomical instruments, which allowed him to chart the motions of the moon and the times of sunrise and sunset. Qubilai trusted him and provided him with equipment, resources, and time for his projects. Guo certainly had a positive attitude toward Qubilai and the Mongols.[15]

The painter and calligrapher Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322) was an especially valuable supporter for the Yuan court. Descended from the Song imperial family, his acceptance and support of Qubilai bolstered the Mongols' legitimacy. In 1286, Qubilai appointed him to a position in the Ministry of War, where Zhao apparently had considerable free time for his artistic production. He was repeatedly promoted until he received the rank of president of the Hanlin Academy, the most important organization of scholars in the country. Several painters and scholars criticized him for shifting his loyalty to the foreign rulers of China, but he defended himself by

stating that each individual had to choose between serving the Mongols or retiring from government and that he should not be lambasted for his choice.[16] He devoted his public career to eliminating abuses in the postal station system and reducing taxes on ordinary people. Yet his prime interest was painting, and even here he tried to accommodate the Mongols. He depicted horses, sheep, and goats, among other subjects, which appealed to the traditionally pastoral Mongols. He remained loyal to the Yuan court, despite critiques from other Chinese scholars.

Other painters followed his lead in serving the Mongols. Qubilai appointed Li Kan (1245–1310), a painter of bamboo, as the minister of personnel; Gao Kegong (1248–1310) served in the Ministry of Works and eventually became the minister of justice; and Ren Renfa (1254–1327) a painter of horses, worked in a water-conservation bureau.[17]

Why were these Chinese willing to serve the Mongols? Some were ambitious and sought appointment in government offices, while others may have had no other sources of revenue. Still others prized the Yuan for finally unifying China after four centuries of division. The Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) had lost part of North China to the Khitans and much of the northwest to the Tanguts, and the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) did not control the Chinese territory north of the Yangzi River. By 1279, the Mongols had brought China under one government, a matter of great pride for patriotic Chinese. Some Chinese, with valuable skills, were thus more willing to collaborate with and serve the Mongols.

CHINESE OPPOSITION TO THE MONGOLS

Yet other Chinese adamantly refused to deal with the Mongols. They viewed the Mongols as barbarians who subverted the basic features of Confucian civilization – morality, focus on the family, and rule by scholar-official civilians. Military rulership was abhorrent to many Chinese Confucians. They therefore believed that they could not participate in public life under Mongol rule. Public service under those circumstances appeared to them a betrayal of their loyalty to Chinese culture. Future generations might regard them as traitors if they accepted positions at the Yuan court.

One group, known as the *yinyi*, or recluses, withdrew from public service and rejected government employment. A few led hedonistic lives, but most sought solace in other solutions. Some joined Buddhist or Daoist monasteries or became lay leaders in the two religions and lived a meditative existence. They painted or wrote poems or essays, and a few among the Daoists became involved with scientific or magical pursuits. Others became retired scholars and dabbled in the arts and were "less cut off from the normal pattern of life in society than the Buddhist or Taoist [Daoist]."[18]

Leftover subjects (*yimin*) were another category of recluses. They were figures who had political differences with the Mongols. Their political allegiances remained with the Song dynasty. Most could not and did not express their discontent with Mongol rule for fear of punishments, but they would never serve the Mongols. Even when the Yuan court offered them prestigious positions in government, they flatly rejected such entreaties. Chinese in the creative arts used their works covertly to criticize the foreign rulers. Painters had sophisticated means of showing their disdain and disapproval for the Mongols. The painter Zheng Sixiao (1241–1318)

despised the Mongols and rejected any cooperation with them. His paintings reveal his distaste for "foreign barbarians." Known for his depictions of the Chinese orchid, Zheng "was asked why he depicted it without earth around its roots, he replied that the earth had been stolen by the barbarians."[19] The artist Gong Kai (1222–after 1304) painted a lean and emaciated horse that may have symbolized the Song dynasty that the Mongols had conquered.[20] By using their dramas, some Chinese playwrights made subtle and indirect critiques of the Mongols. Since the Yuan was a golden age for theater, such critiques influenced the perceptions of many Chinese toward the Mongols.

Wen Tianxiang (1236–1283) was perhaps the most famous dissenter who scorned and rejected employment with the Mongols. A scholar-official without an illustrious family background, Wen placed first in the civil service examinations of 1252, four years before Qubilai's accession to power. According to the Song dynastic history, as a staunch and honest official, he proposed the dismissal and execution of a prominent eunuch, which led to his expulsion or withdrawal from government service on several occasions. He reappeared in 1275, right as Mongol invaders approached the Song capital of Linan (or modern Hangzhou). He raised an army but found himself at odds with other Song commanders. Several tried to kill him, but he managed to escape and reached Fuzhou, where the Song emperor had fled. In 1279, a Chinese commander captured Wen and sent him to Qubilai's court in Daidu. He remained imprisoned at court for three years, and Qubilai considered releasing him, but his Chinese officials dissuaded him. In an interview, Wen stated that if Qubilai allowed him to return to his birthplace "as a Taoist, in the future, in an unofficial capacity, I could give some counsel."[21] Otherwise, he could not serve Qubilai. Officials persuaded Qubilai that he should abide by Wen's wishes to be executed if the emperor chose not to release him. At the execution grounds, Wen said, "Death is merely death; what else is there to say?"[22]

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CHINESE REACTIONS TO THE MONGOLS

Wen was a Chinese from the south, and North China and South China appear, in general, to have had different perceptions of the Mongols due to historical and geographical reasons. The Khitans, who ruled in Inner Mongolia and parts of North China, and the Tanguts, who governed much of Northwest China, had signed treaties and made agreements with the Northern Song dynasty in the eleventh century, which prevented clashes and regulated trade and tribute. The Jurchens had ruled North China for more than a century before the Mongol invasions, and many Chinese had collaborated with the Jurchens to develop a government.[23] They found that the Jurchens established a system that scarcely deviated from those of the traditional Chinese dynasties. The scholar-official class survived, the Chinese offered the Jurchen dynasty skilled administrators, and the economy maintained its equilibrium. North China thus accommodated foreign rule and did not perceive Mongol control as extraordinarily negative.

South China had remained independent until the Mongol invasions of 1279. Foreigners had not conquered the South, even during the so-called Ten Kingdoms period from 907 to 960. This tenth-century era also witnessed a vibrant economy

in the south, with maritime trade along the southeast coast providing considerable wealth. Refugees from the north to the more fertile south fostered land reclamation, irrigation networks, and greater agricultural production. Market towns flourished because of increased production of crops. Regional trade grew, and cultural life benefited from developments in Buddhist and Confucian thought and in the arts.

This economic and cultural efflorescence in the south continued into the Northern Song period and became even more incandescent by the Southern Song period. The capital city of Hangzhou was the most populated city in the world. Situated on the West Lake, it had excellent housing for the elite, well-maintained canals and streets, as well as fine transport and communications. Its restaurants, teahouses, bathing establishments, and shops with an extraordinary array of goods not readily available in other parts of the world made a great impression on Marco Polo. When the Mongols approached the city, many of the residents were "prepared to die rather than flee."[24] They did not welcome the Mongols.

This resplendent culture in the south appeared to militate against Southerners valuing the Mongols or even cooperating with them. The Northern Chinese were less reluctant to accept the Mongols because they had managed to maintain their identities during the rule of the Jurchens. The Southern Chinese, who had developed a remarkable culture, were more suspicious of and condescending toward the Mongols.

CHINESE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MONGOLS

After Qubilai Qa'an's death, many Chinese began to sour on their Mongol rulers. Poor policy decisions, struggles among the Mongols, mismanagement, and financial problems not only caused the decline of the Yuan dynasty but also altered Chinese attitudes toward them. The disastrous policies included naval expeditions against Japan and Java and land-based assaults on Southeast Asian countries, which entailed considerable expenditures and offered no rewards or gains. Conflicts among the Mongols had plagued them after the first succession to the throne. As early as 1241, succession issues divided Chinggis Khan's descendants, but it was Möngke Qa'an's purge of his opponents in 1251 that revealed the rifts within the ruling elite. Struggles for power persisted throughout the Mongols' domination of China. Fratricidal strife within the Yuan weakened the Mongols and showed their vulnerability. The conflicts and the ensuing instability contributed to Chinese disaffection. Wars between the Yuan dynasty and other regions in the Mongol domains, particularly the Chaghadai Khanate in Central Asia persisted and harmed trade. Sporadic wars continued throughout Qubilai's reign and beyond. Such instability harmed Chinese merchants who engaged in long-distance commerce because the trade routes needed to pass through the Chaghadai Khanate.

Misgovernment also prevailed in the latter stages of the dynasty. Maintenance of irrigation projects on the major rivers and their tributaries faltered, leading to disastrous floods, which killed tens of thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands or perhaps even millions. Then the qa'ans appointed some foreigners as finance ministers, who frequently alienated many Chinese by excessive demands. Financial problems plagued the Yuan, partly due to expenses for such infrastructure projects as expansion of the Grand Canal or construction of the capital city. It was also

due to the expenses incurred in abortive invasions of Japan and Java and in the Yuan dynasty's wars with other Mongol leaders in Central Asia and Manchuria. Annual government stipends to the Mongol elite or princes added to the costs and burdens of the state. The ministers of finance chose to resolve these fiscal problems by adopting policies that generated more dilemmas. They imposed additional taxes on the Chinese population but not on the Mongol princes.

Chinese merchants who had earlier profited from the Mongols' favorable attitudes and policies toward commerce now faced higher taxes and other government demands. Government shortfalls of revenues also impinged upon the peasants who had benefited from Mongol support. Now the state did not have the resources to maintain such infrastructure as irrigation and flood-control projects. It was no accident that floods and changes in the course of the Huanghe River in the 1340s led to numerous deaths from flooding and the spread of infectious and parasitic diseases that ensued. The floods and the diversion of the Huanghe River divided North China from South China and prevented the transport of grain from the South to the North. The government built a channel from the South to the province of Shandong, and the construction consumed vast expenditures and relied on considerable corvee labor. Peasants who comprised the main group that served as forced laborers began to perceive the Mongols as oppressors. In sum, by the mid-fourteenth century, the Mongols had lost much of the Chinese support they had attracted when they first occupied China.

Despite the Mongols' failures, they influenced China and earned some plaudits from the Chinese. As noted earlier, the Mongols supported trade, which permitted the Chinese to have access to a wide array of Asian and Middle Eastern products. They fostered the sciences, via Iranian discoveries and techniques, in China, including cartography, astronomy, pharmacology, and medicine. The succeeding dynasty, the Ming, learned much about military strategy, armaments, and tactics from the Mongols.[25]

NOTES

1 *HWC*, 122.
2 Rossabi 2014, 214–227.
3 Hymes 1987, 9–76; Shinno 2016.
4 Standen 2006.
5 *TOA*, 115 & 117.
6 de Rachewiltz 1981, 52.
7 de Rachewiltz 1960, 208–209.
8 Hsiao 1993a, 27–45.
9 Hsiao 1993b, 46–59.
10 Rossabi 1988.
11 *YS* 59–60.
12 Chan 1980, 17–50.
13 *YS* 3075; Yao 1976, 223–225.
14 Schlegel 1968, 38–43.
15 Ho 1993, 282–299.
16 Mote 1960, 236–238.
17 Cahill 1976, 47–49 and 159–160.

18 Mote 1960, 205.
19 Cahill 1976, 17.
20 Watt 2010, 22–23.
21 Brown 1986, 161.
22 Brown 1986, 195.
23 For relations among these groups, see Rossabi 1983.
24 Gernet 1962, 247.
25 For additional details on the Mongol legacy in China, see Rossabi 2020, 25–50.

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HWC, See List of Abbreviations.
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YS, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER FORTY-FOUR

THE MONGOLS IN THE EYES OF THE ARMENIANS

Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog

The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries formed one of the richest periods in Armenian historiography, as more than ten historians and chronologists wrote their works during this period. Samuel Anets'i, Mkhit'ar Anets'i, Matheos Urhayets'i, Mkhit'ar Ayrivanets'i, Vardan Arevelts'i, Kirakos Gandzakets'i, Grigor Aknerts'i, Vahram Rabuni, Smbat Sparapet, Het'um Patmich' and Step'annos Orbelian are among those whose work has survived to the present time.

From 1220 to 1344, Greater Armenia was under Mongol control. Mongol scouting expeditions in pursuit of Muhammad Khwarazmshah (r. 1200–1220) and his son Jalal al-Din (1220–1231), witnessed the first face-to-face contact between the Armenians and Mongols. The latter viewed Greater Armenia as a strategic crossroad connecting Iran with Anatolia, and the Caucasus with the Qipchaq steppes. Thus, Greater Armenia was partitioned by the Seljuks, the Georgians and the Ayyubids. Only some of the southern territories were directly ruled by Armenians. Moreover, it was a suitable location to mount campaigns, not only into Georgia but also into Anatolia. This ambition was accomplished in 1243, bringing the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum under Mongol rule.

The Mongols issued the Armenians with a standard set of demands, made to all newly conquered peoples or lands. These demands required the local king or lord to present themselves at the Mongol court; the delivery of hostages, usually sons of the nobility; the provision of armed forces; the submission of household registers; payment of taxes; and the provision of stations (*jam*s) for the Mongol governors.

This work analyses how individual Armenian lords manipulated the Mongols to resolve personal and local disputes over land whilst also allying themselves with the Mongols to prevent Muslim incursions into Cilician Armenia.

GREATER ARMENIAN LORDS AND THE MONGOLS

During and after the destructive Mongol conquest of Transcaucasia, some Georgio-Armenian princes, recognizing the authority of the Mongols, decided to support the

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Mongol regime and thus secure their rights and lands. Kirakos Gandzakets'i (1200–1271) is very explicit about the extent of the destruction wrought by the Mongols in Greater Armenia and Georgia. He also shows great concern about the Armenian lords' actions under Mongol pressure. One of the lords' key decisions, whether voluntary or under Mongol compulsion, was to visit the court of the Mongol qa'ans. Regular visits to the court was one strategy to reinforce Mongol control over their vassal princes. In my opinion, however, many Armenian princes viewed this sojourn as an opportunity to press their own agenda at the apex of Mongol power. Some of these lords used their time in Mongolia to resolve personal or local conflicts and remove their Georgian or Armenian competitors from the political arena, an aim that perfectly suited Mongol policy.

Awag (d. 1250), the son of Iwane Zak'arian (d. 1234), was the first Caucasian noble to acquiesce to Mongol rule. The account of his submission was given by the Armenian historian Kirakos Gandzakets'i in his *History of the Armenians*.[1] This account may be viewed as a template for the future submission of other Armenian princelings to the Mongols. It is likely that Awag's treatment at the hands of the Mongols, specifically the Mongol leader Chormaqan (ca. 1218–1242), influenced the other lords' decision to submit.

The act of submission secured Awag's land.[2] His friendship with Chormaqan inoculated his lands from further Mongol aggression. In return, Awag was obliged to take his troops against the city of Ani and participate in Baiju's conquest of Anatolia.[3] After the escape of the Georgian Queen Rusudan (1223–1245) to Swanetia, Awag became the most influential figure at the Georgian royal court.[4] He was *de facto* ruler of Greater Armenia, and the Mongol administrators sent him to the qa'an in recognition of this fact. The exact date of Awag's journey to Mongolia is not known, although he paid this visit before the death of Chormaqan, presumably in 1240/1241. According to Kirakos Gandzakets'i, Awag himself was disposed to make this journey to help the situation in his country.[5] In fact, the qa'an, presumably Ögödei Qa'an (r. 1229–1241), received the prince, gave him a Mongol wife and sent him home.[6] To my knowledge, there are no records in the Armenian historical annals or church council documents about the regulation of Mongol–Armenian marriages. In view of the fact that the children of such marriages were baptized, one can conclude that these mixed marriages were accepted by the Armenian church.[7] After his return from the Mongol court, Awag was restored to his lordship over his dominion. Nevertheless, according to Kirakos Ganzakets'i, in 1245 Awag fled to Queen Rusudan due to violence from Mongol tax collectors.

The Mongols considered this action as rebellion, so Awag had to write a letter to the qa'an explaining that his action was not a revolt but that he was only escaping from disorder. A messenger called Tonqus-aqa came from Güyük Kha'an (r. 1246–1248) to Awag with guarantees of immunity. In return, Awag was obliged to convince the Georgian queen to submit voluntarily to the qa'an.[8] Queen Rusudan, however, died in 1245 before this order could be fulfilled. She voluntarily consumed poison to escape the constant Mongol pressure, but left a will entrusting her kingdom to Awag Zak'arian.[9]

Awag died in 1250.[10] His submission had a domino effect on the other lords. The Armenian princes of the Orbelian, Pṙoshian, Dop'ian, Vach'utian and Jalalian houses co-operated with Mongol administrators in order to retain their principalities, which

had been under the suzerainty of the Zak'arids during the previous century.[11] It was understood that those who accepted the new order would regain their lands from the Mongol commanders, as was the case between Elikum Orbelian and Aslan [Arslan] Noyan.[12] The good will of the Armenian lords was welcomed by the Mongols, who gave them *enchü* (*injü*) status – the qa'an's owned people – which in Orbelian's *History of the Siwnik' Province* is interpreted as *teruni*, or lord's people.[13] Although this status meant that the Mongols imposed some direct obligations on these lords, it did allow the latter, who had previously allied with the Georgian king, exemption from tax and other extraordinary exactions vis-à-vis the Mongols. Closer alliance with the Mongols also meant that the Orbelians abandoned their former obligations to the Georgian king. This was true as well for Hasan Jalal Dawla (d. 1261) of the Khachen province, the next Armenian noble to submit to the Mongols.

Amir Arghun (d. 1275), the administrator who oversaw Mongol taxation, disliked Hasan Jalal and treated him harshly. At times, Arghun even accused Hasan of corruption.[14] In 1251, to escape Amir Arghun, Hasan Jalal journeyed to the Mongol prince Sartaq of the Jochid Ulus.[15] Sartaq took Hasan Jalal to his father, Batu Khan (fl. 1205–1255), who returned to Hasan Jalal his patrimony of Ch'araberd, Akanay and Karkarn, which the Seljuks and the Georgians had previously taken from him.[16] Using his close relationship with Sartaq, he succeeded in separating Khachen from Georgia and the Zak'arid princes and assumed the title of Lord of Khachen for himself.[17]

In 1255, when Sartaq went to visit Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251–1259), Hasan Jalal joined him with his family, as is mentioned in the colophons of the Gospel (Echmiadzin, no. 232) in 1261.[18] He was granted *enchü* status by Möngke in 1255. In return, he was obliged to perform military service every year.[19] His position was secured by the marriage of his daughter to Bora Noyan, the son of Chormaqan.[20] However, his daughter's marriage could not guarantee his life. In 1261, having lost the protection of Sartaq, who died in 1257, Hasan Jalal was tortured and killed by Amir Arghun in Qazvin for failing to pay taxes.[21]

Another prince to whom Möngke Qa'an granted *enchü* status was Smbat Orbelian of the Siwnik' province, who visited Qaraqorum in 1251/1252. He went there to secure his land from Gontsa, the wife of the late Awag, who had infringed on his territory. In the narration of his journey written by Step'annos Orbelian, Smbat, in return for a valuable precious stone (a ruby) presented to the qa'an, retained the lands of Vorotan up to the boundaries of Borotna and Bghen, within which the Siwnik' court of Tat'ew was located. Besides this, he received Eghegis with the district of Vayots' Dzor, P'oghahanos, Urts, Vedi with the valley of Ererawn and many villages in Kotaik and Geghark'uni.[22]

Just before the vital shift of Mongol power from Baiju *noyan* to Hülegü Khan in Greater Armenia, Smbat Orbelian secured his dominions against the Zak'arids and the Georgian king by travelling a second time to Möngke Qa'an in 1256.[23] The independence of the Orbelian prince was reflected in the inscriptions of 1261, where he is referred to as 'King Smbat'.[24]

Smbat remained an important vassal of the Mongols in the time of the Ilkhans. He was sent by Hülegü Khan (r. 1256–1265), the first Mongol Ilkhan, to Ala Taq (Darn Dasht), to assist in building a large royal palace.[25] Smbat Orbelian cultivated the favour of Hülegü to confront a serious opponent, Sadun Arts'runi/Mankaberdeli

(d. 1284), the *atabeg*, or army commander, of Awag. Seeing that Smbat possessed strong ambition, Sadun Arts'runi decided to support Gontsa, the wife of the late Awag, who later married the Georgian King David (r. 1259–1270).[26] While Smbat was in Qaraqorum, Sadun replaced him as the guardian of Khoshak,[27] the daughter of Awag and Gontsa, according to an anonymous Georgian source of the thirteenth century, and he was consequently recognized by the Georgian court.[28] Thus, Sadun became an influential figure in the political arena. Later, Hülegü recognized and honoured Sadun after he defeated the most valiant Mongol wrestler.[29] The wrestling match at the Mongol court was perhaps equivalent to the Christian knights' jousting tournaments. Being a successful wrestler in the ring meant being a good warrior in the field. Therefore, according to another Armenian historian, Grigor Aknerts'i (1250–1335), Sadun's victory impressed the Mongols.

When Abaqa Khan (r. 1265–1282) succeeded to the Ilkhanid throne, Sadun befriended Shams al-Din Juvayni, the *sahibdivan* (executed in 1284), whom Khoshak, Sadun's protégée, married in 1269.[30] After Hülegü's death, Smbat Orbelian lost his influential role in the political life of Armenia, and Sadun became the favourite of Abaqa. Moreover, he strengthened his position as *atabeg* of Georgia.[31] The cities of Kars, Telavi and Bailaqan were separated from royal Georgian control and given to Sadun Arts'runi.[32] To re-establish the Orbelian House's authority, Smbat's brother, Tarsaich, who was called a 'valiant man' by Step'annos Orbelian (1250/1260–1304), expressed his will to be loyal to Ilkhans Abaqa and Arghun.[33]

The contacts between Armenian lords and the Mongols inoculated Greater Armenia from heavy Mongol repression. Later, obtaining support from the Ilkhans, the Armenian lords secured control of their Houses and lands.

THE CILICIAN ALLIANCE WITH THE MONGOLS

If the princes of Greater Armenia built personal relations with Mongol commanders and qa'ans, the king of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia followed a different paradigm. The Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia held a unique historical position among the Christian states of the Levant, with its ties to the kingdom of Cyprus, the principality of Antioch and its very tense diplomatic relations with the papacy. The attempt by Rome to force the Armenian church to adopt Catholicism,[34] together with the direct threat from the Seljuks, made King Het'um I (r. 1226–1270) await the outcome of the Mongol battle against the Seljuks in Köse Dagh in 1243 before undertaking any significant diplomatic activity. The Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia chose to begin negotiations with the Mongols prior to their advance on Cilicia. In 1243, King Het'um sent his brother Smbat Sparapet (1208–1276), the Armenian commander in chief from 1226 to 1276, along with his father, Baron Kostandin, to Baiju to proffer their 'obedience'.[35] Baiju, who was advancing on western Asia Minor, demanded that Cilician Armenia deliver to him the mother, wife and daughter of the Seljuk sultan.[36] For an account of this exchange, we have the *Chronicle* of Smbat Sparapet.[37] Fearing that the Mongols would advance onto his land, Het'um decided to hand over the sultan's relatives. The Syriac chronicle of Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286) reacts to this incident critically, as a 'hateful act' of diplomacy.[38] This act was the reason some Armenian nobles rebelled against Het'um, joining the Seljuks and occupying a few Armenian fortresses.[39] However, Het'um was determined to submit to

the Mongols and, by handing over the sultan's family and turning the Sultanate of Rum into his irreconcilable enemy, he gained Mongol confidence. Het'um's foreign policy towards the Mongols started in Caesarea and paved the way for securing the survival of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia. He reached an agreement whereby Cilician Armenia acknowledged its dependence on the Mongol Empire and was obliged to supply forces and provisions when requested and send a delegation to the Mongol court. The Mongols, in turn, promised to preserve the sovereignty and independence of Cilician Armenia and to provide military protection against attacks by Cilicia's Muslim neighbours.[40] It was on these terms that Armenian sources claim Baiju sent Smbat Sparapet to the Mongol qa'an Güyük (r. 1246–1248).[41] Smbat Sparapet and his father, Kostandin, left Cilicia in 1246 for the Mongol court at Qaraqorum, where Smbat, as the ambassador of the Armenian king, made his submission to Güyük.[42] The act of submission, which was accompanied by the grant of a *jarliq* and *gerege*, indicates a royal reception.[43] Moreover, the giving of a Mongol woman in marriage and thus the creation of a vassal as son-in-law, indicated that Güyük recognized Het'um's claim to the throne of Cilicia.[44]

A brief account of Smbat's journey to Mongolia can also be found in a letter from Smbat to his brother-in-law, Henry I Lusignan of Cyprus, written in 1248 at Samarqand.[45] From this letter, we conclude that Smbat visited Qaraqorum in 1248. The letter makes it clear that the Cilician delegation came to the Mongol court to make a vow of peace and to submit to the qa'an. They were well received, and after a four-year journey, which also confirms that their journey was not to Batu Khan of the Jochid Ulus, they returned to the Armenian capital at Sis in 1250.[46] Unfortunately, the *Chronicle* of Smbat Sparapet, despite being one of the most important Armenian sources for the history of Cilician Armenia, the Crusades and the Mongols, contains little information about his visit to Mongolia.[47]

The success of the Cilician Armenian negotiations with the Mongols is a matter of interest. Through their intelligence network, the Mongols came to know well the internal and external preoccupations of the region.[48] They knew that Cilician Armenia was a small Christian state which was in conflict with surrounding hostile Muslim sultanates and that the Armenians needed an alliance with a larger power to guarantee their independence. On the other hand, the Sultanate of Rum was still 'a stumbling block' to Mongol expansion, and having a loyal vassal state to rely on would be an advantage for them. This situation assured the success of the first stage of Mongol–Armenian negotiations. However, there was one demand: King Het'um was ordered to visit the Mongol Court in person.[49] Following this 'invitation', Het'um I visited the court of the Mongol qa'an in Qaraqorum, making the journey of 3,500 miles in 1253/1254.[50]

Many contemporary Armenian authors document this historical episode. Grigor Aknerts'i states that King Het'um went to Mongolia because of his love for the Christians and his concern for his own land.[51] Vardan Arevelts'i (ca. 1200–1271) verifies that He'tum made a successful trip to Mongolia.[52] Kirakos Gandzakets'i records the journey of King Het'um to Qaraqorum and describes the historical geography of Central Asia in special detail. Zoology, mineralogy, aspects of Buddhism and folklore from Central Asia also occupied significant space in Kirakos's account.[53] He gives a list of 16 localities through which Het'um passed, some of which are recorded only in his history.[54] Het'um Patmich', the historian known as Hayton,

provides extensive references to King Het'um's journey.[55] Modern scholars have examined the routes of the journeys taken by King Het'um and other travellers of that period, such as Plano Carpini and William Rubruck, and attempts have been made to reconstruct the routes of these travellers.[56] According to Boyle, the itinerary of the Armenian king through Uyghur country seems to have been the most popular route to Mongolia. His trip along the right bank of the Syr Darya was, perhaps, the most interesting part for the medieval travellers.[57]

Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251–1259) received King Het'um (r. 1226–1270).[58] According to Smbat Sparapet, the Mongol qa'an "fulfilled all requests of the Armenian King".[59] Kirakos makes it clear that King Het'um remained in Möngke Qa'an's *ordu* for 50 days and that he gave the Armenian king an edict that "no one harass him or his country". Moreover, he indicates that Möngke gave him a document proclaiming the freedom of the church everywhere.[60] Based on these sources, it is clear that the Cilician king made his submission to the Mongols.

The only source that highlights the travel of King Het'um is the early fourteenth-century work of Het'um Patmich'. To highlight the plausibility of this source, it is worth taking an overview of the issues raised in this work. According to Het'um Patmich', Möngke Qa'an welcomed the Armenian king graciously because of his voluntary submission and his desire to establish peace and an alliance with the Mongol rulers.[61] It is said that the Armenian king discussed with the qa'an several points of assisting Christian Armenians against the Muslims, including the conversion of the Mongols to Christianity.[62]

Some scholars see the purpose of this work and this agreement itself, especially the two clauses relating to the baptism of Möngke and to the liberation of the Holy Land and its restoration to Christian possession, as sheer fantasy on the part of Het'um Patmich', who desired to "set Christian-Mongol relations on a new footing".[63] However, as was said, Kirakos clearly referred to the visit and document itself. We admit that the existence of such a document is not certain; however, the agreement illustrates the existence of Mongol–Armenian relations, and it commands attention. Het'um Patmich' wrote that the pledges given by Möngke were simply an expansion of those given by his predecessor Güyük. This implies that there was an agreement, possibly a memorandum, written or oral, between Güyük and Smbat Sparapet. Although almost nothing is known about this agreement, according to Het'um Patmich', Möngke promised to liberate the Holy Land and delegated these duties to his brother Hülegü with assistance from Batu and other Mongol *noyan*s (commanders) stationed in Russia and Rum. Moreover, the qa'an agreed to free Armenian churches and monasteries in Mongol territory from taxation.[64] In return, one can assume that the Mongols required the same things from the Armenians as that they required from their other vassals and allies: obedience, tribute, provisions and soldiers.

King Het'um returned home in 1256, encouraged by Mongol promises. On his way out and back, he passed through Greater Armenia, where many local princes and ecclesiastics welcomed him.[65] It was the first time that a ruler of Cilicia had come into direct contact with the mother country.[66] On his return, in October 1256, Het'um immediately called on Mongol backing against the Sultanate of Rum, near the city of Arakly. He went there with an army of allegedly 100,000 people,[67] including all his relatives with their *azat*s (nobles) in revenge for the devastation of

the fortress and church of Murand by the Seljuks. Evidently, the Seljuks were no longer seen as a threat by the Cilician Armenians after the latter concluded their submission to the Mongols.[68] Despite the refusal of the Latin Christian states to follow Het'um's example and adapt to changing conditions by allying themselves with the Mongol Empire, the Mongol–Armenian relationship was beneficial as long as the Mongols stayed in power in the nearby region.

CONCLUSION

In considering the Mongols' advance on their lands, the Armenian lords decided to deal with this new pressure by building personal relationships with the Mongol leaders. But the hopeless situation of the Armenian lords in the face of the barbarous invaders changed over time, and their personal contact with the Mongols turned into cooperation. The surrender of Greater Armenia proceeded gradually as each of the great princes came to terms with the nomadic newcomers. Due to these submissions, Mongol power guaranteed the Armenians not only security in their own lands but also an extension of their patrimony by removing their local opponents from the political arena. In the long run, this policy suited the Mongols. They preferred to have the Armenian lords attached to them rather than to the Georgian court, ensuring that the Georgio-Armenian lords remained disunited. The Cilician Armenians also preserved their lands through loyalty to the Mongol qa'an and military alliance with them against their Muslim neighbours. This alliance secured their political independence in the region. In return, the Mongols gained reliable vassals to assist them in their military activities.

NOTES

1 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 254–257.
2 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 257.
3 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 280.
4 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 238.
5 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 262.
6 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 263.
7 Vasil Tatar, the son of Smbat Sparapet by his Mongol wife, was baptized and knighted in 1265 and was a general-in-chief of the Cilician Armenians; Smbat Sparapet in Der Nersessian 1973, 373–374.
8 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 266.
9 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 316.
10 Vardan Arevelts'i 1991, 148; Sebastats'i 1956, 140.
11 Hovsep'ean 1928, 16–17. Babayan 1976, 546–550.
12 Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 402–403.
13 Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 409; For *enchü/injü*, see Scherbak 1997, 194; cf. *TMEN*, I, 220–225. The etymology of *enchü* is Mongolian *emchü*, which means a private property; Lessing 1973, 635. Shiraiwa suggests that *injü/ inju* is a Persianized form of the Mongolian *emchü*, and Rashid al-Din gave the term three meanings, namely, 'personal property', 'crown land', and 'immediate vassal'; Shiraiwa 1988, 371–376.
14 Shiraiwa 1988, 373.
15 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 358.
16 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 359.

17 Orbeli 1963, 158.
18 Orbeli 1963, 155–156, 163, n. 26.
19 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 269.
20 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 391.
21 Vardan Arevelts'i 1991, 152.
22 Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 411.
23 Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 414.
24 Manandian 1952, 255.
25 Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 415.
26 Melikset-bek 1936, 58.
27 The names of Khoshak and Sadun, the *atabeg*, are found in the inscription of the church of the Mother of God in Noratus; Avagian 1978, 277.
28 Melikset-bek 1936, 58.
29 Grigor Aknerts'i 1974, 49.
30 Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 418. Khoshak and Shams al-Din Juvayni had a daughter Khuandze and a son Zak'are; Rashid al-Din 1946, 115–116; Melikset-bek 1936, 60; Babayan 1969, 175.
31 Melikset-bek 1936, 60.
32 Melikset-bek 1936, 60.
33 Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 423. The first wife of Tarsaich, Aruz Khatun, was not a Mongol (as Babayan and others suggest) but an Ismaelean from Siwnik'; Step'annos Orbelian 1910, 416, 426.
34 Bundy 1987, 227; Der Nersessian 1947, 15.
35 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 285; Smbat 1869, 649; Bar Hebraeus, 408; Baghishets'i 1956, 346.
36 Kay-Khusraw II, whose wife and daughter had sought refuge at the Armenian court at the time of the Mongol attack on Konya (Iconium); cf. Cahen 1968, 138.
37 When the talks began, the Mongols threatened Het'um's delegation with an ultimatum: either the refugees of the sultan should be handed over or the Mongols would devastate their country; Smbat 1869, 649. Bar Hebraeus records this act differently, stating that Baron Kostandin (Constantine), the father of King Het'um, himself revealed the secret whereabouts of the sultan's relatives to please the Mongols; Bar Hebraeus, 408.
38 Bar Hebraeus, 408.
39 Boase 1978, 25. The Armenian noble, Constantine of Lambron, sought to revolt against King Het'um and appealed to Kaykhusraw. After the affirmation of Mongol protection over Cilician Armenia, Constantine took refuge with his Turkish friends; Cahen 1968, 270–271.
40 Grigor Aknerts'i 1974, 31–32; Galstyan 1976, 31.
41 Grigor Aknerts'i 1974, 31.
42 Smbat Sparapet in Galstyan 1962, 48; Baghishets'i 1956, 346.
43 There were cases when Mongol governors or residing princes granted *gerege* or *jarliq* to their vassals; however, the privileges they granted were more of economic concern, like taxation or compulsory labour. Thus Sartaq granted these privileges to Hasan Jalal and to Nerses, the kat'oghikos of the Caucasian Albanians as well as to churches and mosques; Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 358. The imperial court ended these independent princely acts by sending Amir Arghun to the region to bring order to the peripheries of the Mongol Empire; *HWC*, 507. Hülegü was also dispatched to put an end to the provisional regime of the Mongol military rule and fiscal administration in the region; Rashid al-Din 1946, 23.
44 Although Hülegü gave a Mongol wife to the Isma'ili Imam Rukn al-Din Khur-Shah, Hülegü sent the latter to the Mongol court in Mongolia for approval; *HWC*, 721–722.

45 Jackson 2005, 98. Galstyan suggests that the letter was written in 1247, Galstyan 1962, 64, 122–123, n. 155.
46 Het'um Patmich' 1951, 44.
47 Smbat's Chronicle is known as the Royal Chronicle or Cilician Chronicle; Der Nersessian 1973, 365.
48 Cahen 1968, 273.
49 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 366–367; Grigor Aknerts'i 1974, 31–32; Baghishets'i 1956, 346; Galstyan 1976, 31.
50 Smbat Sparapet in Galstyan 1962, 49; The journey of Het'um began at Sis and was sanctioned first by Baiju Noyan in Kars, who dispatched him to the gate of Derbend to Batu and Sartaq of the Jochid Ulus, who sent him to Mongolia; Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 366–367. This relay dispatch of visitors via Baiju and then Batu Khan was implemented for the lords of Greater Armenia (Awag, Hasan Jalal and others) as well.
51 Grigor Aknerts'i 1974, 37.
52 Vardan Arevelts'i 1991, 149.
53 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 364–372.
54 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 366–372.
55 The History of the T'at'ars (1307) by Het'um Patmich' is also a remarkable ethnographic and geographical account; Bundy 1987, 223–235.
56 Bretschneider 1888, 164–172; Boyle 1964, 175–189.
57 Boyle 1964, 177.
58 According to Het'um Patmich', the Armenian King Het'um was received in Almaliq (Ameghek) by Möngke, not in Qaraqorum; Het'um Patmich' 1951, 45.
59 Smbat Sparapet in Galstyan 1962, 49.
60 Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 367.
61 Bundy 1987, 223–235.
62 Het'um Patmich' 1951, 45. This translation is by the author of this study from the Armenian version edited by Awgerean, cf. Galstyan 1962, 68.
63 Jackson 1980, 486.
64 RHC/DA 1869, II, 297; Gandzakets'i Kirakos 1961, 367.
65 On his way to Mongolia, King Het'um stopped in the village of Vardenis (Vayots' Dzor) with his host Prince Pŕosh Khaghbakian; Babayan 1976, 618.
66 Der Nersessian 1962, 653.
67 Smbat Sparapet in Galstyan 1962, 49–50. An army of 100,000 is exaggerated. The largest joint Mongol–Armenian forces did not exceed 60,000. The joint Armeno–Georgian forces that participated in the Mongol campaigns in Syria did not exceed 30,000 men.
68 Mikaelean 1952, 326.

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TMEN, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE

THE MONGOLS IN THE EYES OF THE KORYO PEOPLE

Lee Kang Hahn

The Mongol invasion of Koryo began in 1231 and continued for almost 30 years. The Koryo government, which was dominated by the military at the time, relocated itself to Kang'hwa-do Island right after the first invasion. Nevertheless, soldiers and ordinary peasants continued to fight the Mongol troops on the mainland. Tragic stories of their struggles demonstrated their determined defense of their homeland against this nomadic adversary.[1]

The Mongol invasions continued until 1259, when Koryo finally surrendered. Yet, after almost three decades of invasion, the Korean peninsula inevitably suffered severe destruction. Every time the Koryo tried to repair damage inflicted from the most recent attack, another wave of enemy troops came and swept through what Koryo had just recently restored. Even after the surrender, although the Mongols never physically assaulted Koryo again, the fear of invasion remained, thus tensions continued for quite some time.[2]

This experience naturally made the Koryo people hate the Mongols, as from their perspective the attacks were unwarranted, unprovoked and, most of all, unbelievably brutal. Even during the Khitan invasions from the late 10th and early 11th centuries (993, 1010, 1018) Koryo never witnessed killing and destruction of this magnitude. The better portion of the peninsula was destroyed, seemingly beyond repair. Dynastic treasures were destroyed, and government operations ceased in many regions, as it was impossible to levy taxes from lands that were incinerated and people abandoned their homes. To the Koryo population, the Mongols were nothing but enemies, predators and oppressors. However, as time passed, perceptions changed considerably as the Koryo people adapted to the situation and decided to stop being victims.

The Koryo government experienced interference in its politics and diplomacy throughout the 13th and 14th centuries. But since the beginning of the 14th century, Koryo kings and officials managed to prevent imperial tampering by citing the "Old Promise of Qubilai" ("世祖舊制").[3] This concept of the "Old Promise of Qubilai", first conceptualized by Lee Ik-ju, is based on the notion that Qubilai never intended

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to change Koryo conventions. Of course, Qubilai did order several changes to be made, but this notion came to serve as a shield for the Koryo king against Yuan intervention.

Eventually, the Koryo government even devised a narrative arguing that what they were asking was only what had been approved and authorized by past Mongol emperors, as we can see from the case of King Kongmin (恭愍王, r. 1351–1374). In addition, the Koryo kings' status as sons-in-law (*güregen*) of the Chinggisid family and virtual royal princes[4] gave them enough authority to protect Koryo citizens, who were never deemed direct subjects of the Mongol emperor, thus creating a dual and unique relationship between Koryo and the Yuan.[5]

Similar efforts are seen in the area of economy and trade. The Koryo government submitted tribute to the Mongol court in the second half of the 13th century. Koryo households provided the tribute, contributing to their poverty. Yet in the early 14th century, Koryo merchants tapped into the vast global market of the Mongol Yuan Empire. Although the empire's trade policy shifted quite a bit, the expansion of the empire opened a vast network of markets, providing many opportunities for the merchants in the outlying regions. The Korean peninsula was no exception, as not only Koryo civilian merchants[6] but governmental officials and even the kings, all inspired by waves of foreign merchants visiting the peninsula, engaged in such trade, which shaped the early half of the 14th century as a unique era in the history of foreign trade with the Korean peninsula.[7]

Meanwhile, in response to the need for domestic reforms, the Koryo leaders, forced by the Yuan to drop certain conventional practices and customary habits, also learned how to either graft Yuan administrative elements onto traditional Koryo institutions or merge Mongol/Chinese policy directives with Koryo objectives.[8] Such efforts helped the Koryo cope with its troubles and changed Koryo perspective toward the Yuan in the process. The practices of the Mongol emperors and their imperial institutions were no longer those of an antagonist but were a model that could either be followed or consulted by leaders and elites situated within the Mongol order. This integrated approach is seen in the examples of kings like Ch'ungson-wang (忠宣王, b. 1275, r. 1298; 1307–1313, d. 1325) and politicians such as Yi Kok (李穀, 1298–1351) and Yi Che-hyon (李齊賢, 1287–1367). Ironically, it was under this atmosphere that the Koryo intellectuals' appreciation of their own culture grew, as we can see from the case of a prominent literary figure named Choi Hae (崔瀣, 1287–1340).

THE MONGOLS IN KORYO POLITICS

The Mongols did not exactly oppress the Koryo but instead forced certain rules upon the Koryo government and, by extension, over ordinary people as well. As a result, terms used to describe the Koryo kings' royal orders or terms related to their authority all had to be changed. Additionally, the Koryo king himself underwent the most profound change in identity as a result of this imposition.

It began when the Koryo king Wonjong (r. 1260–1274) requested a marital relationship between the Koryo and Mongol royal families.[9] Qubilai granted that request after some hesitation and deliberation.[10] Starting with King Ch'ung'ryol (r. 1275–1307) in 1274, it became normal for all subsequent Koryo kings to marry Mongol

princesses. With the Koryo kings' new status as royal sons-in-law (*güregen*), their place inside the Yuan political arena improved considerably, and their bargaining power also increased on certain issues.

Although the Koryo people rejoiced at the news of the king's marriage to a Mongol princess, figuring it ensured peace,[11] it soon became evident to them that these kings were different from previous Koryo kings, as they were now also part of the Mongol royal family.[12] In subsequent periods, this new status proved to be a mixed blessing. When used properly, it helped the kings deal with the Yuan; when it was not managed properly, it caused several problems, as seen by the cases of Ch'ungson or Ch'ungsuk (r. 1314–1330; 1332–1339). Ch'ungson loved his Koryo concubine more than his Mongol wife, and Ch'ungsuk was cold toward his three Mongol wives, causing personal incidents and even diplomatic crises, which led to grave consequences, such as Ch'ungson's abrupt dethronement in August 1298.

Meanwhile, the Koryo king's political status in relation to his own government changed as well. To oversee preparations for the upcoming Japanese campaign (1274, 1280), the Yuan first established a military unit named Chongdong Wonsubu and later enlarged it in the form of "Chongdong Haengsong", a provincial government that existed alongside the Koryo government.[13] The term "*haengsong*", which meant "province" in China under Mongol rule, technically relegated Korea to the status of a Yuan province within the empire's local administrative structure. Of course, this Haengsong installed in Koryo was a little bit different from its counterparts in China, as the Yuan central government never levied taxes on Koryo households, and the Korean peninsula was still under the administrative jurisdiction of the Koryo government. It was, rather, a military headquarters turned into a form of local administrative embassy, and its influence over the Koryo government varied through different periods. At first, it oversaw the Japanese campaign in the 1270s and '80s, and then it served as a communicative channel between Koryo and the Yuan at the end of the 13th century and the early years of the 14th. Later, it even transformed into a hotbed of illegal activities for Koryo outlaws in the mid-14th century.[14]

Nonetheless, its presence heavily affected the status of the Koryo king, who became the governor of the Chongdong Haengsong,[15] assuming yet another identity. While retaining his position as leader of an autonomous region, becoming an imperial governor was not exactly a promotion for the king. In theory, his authority should have doubled as it came to be recognized in both realms (Koryo and Yuan), but in reality his attention was split. His negotiations with the Yuan were now to be conducted based upon his new identity as the emperor's son-in-law and a local governor, instead of as the leader of the Korean peninsula. There were complications caused by that status, which never reflected well on his original authority as the leader of the Koryo people.

For example, the Koryo king was forced to assist in the Japanese campaigns, which proceeded in 1274 and 1280 with disappointing results for the Mongols. As he had no choice but to oversee preparations on Koryo's part, Ch'ung'ryol became the "bad cop", urging the Koryo people to do things they did not want to do. The Koryo diverted a significant amount of resources to the task, while countless Koryo people were mobilized for corvée labor and many Koryo soldiers were killed in battle. The Koryo people built hundreds of ships in only a few months and participated in the campaign themselves, as we can see from many records, including that of January

1274, which shows more than 30,000 Koryo workers drafted as ship builders for 300 vessels.[16] For them, being forced to join the campaign was a disaster, and the fact that their king was directing them to do so tarnished him to a degree. Their frustration reached dangerous levels, as we can see from the fact that Ch'ungryol, on the eve of the second invasion six years later, was forced to implore the Yuan imperial government to provide proper compensation to the Koryo people.[17]

Meanwhile, the king was not the only one whose identity and priorities were changing. Koryo officials also experienced something new as they began to receive "rank titles" (Kwan'gye, 官階) from not only the Koryo king but the Mongol emperor as well.

Pre-modern Chinese and Korean dynasties all observed this rank titles system, which was composed of two sub-branches, *Munsan-gye* (文散階) and *Musan-gye* (武散階), respectively, for the civil officials and military officers. These rank titles are not to be confused with actual posts the officials were assigned to, as they simply indicated the post an official could receive from the king or the emperor. Koryo also had its own rank system with fully functional *Munsan-gye* and *Musan-gye* branches, which it used for centuries. For example, titles like *Keumja Kwang'rok Taebu* (金紫光祿大夫), *Chong'eui Taebu* (正議大夫) and *Cho'eui Taebu* (朝議大夫) were used centuries before the Mongol conquest.

Then suddenly, starting in the 1280s, the Koryo officials found themselves receiving such titles from the Mongol emperor as well. They had never received them from other Chinese emperors. But records from this era – particularly the tomb epitaphs[18] – indicate that many Koryo officials held rank titles that belonged to the Mongol imperial system. Prominent officials, such as Chong Ka-shin (鄭可臣, 1224–1298), Cho In-kyu (趙仁規, 1237–1308), Yi Chi-jo (李之氐, d. 1317) and Min Chi (閔漬, 1248–1326) had titles like *Chungbong Taebu* (中奉大夫), *Ka-eui Taebu* (嘉議大夫), *Cho'yol Taebu* (朝列大夫) and *Pongjik Taebu* (奉直大夫), which were clearly imperial titles that the Koryo king could not bestow to them.

At first, such bestowals were only a symbolic gesture, arranged for prominent Koryo officials as commendations from the emperor. Then, a few years later, the Koryo king requested the emperor to bestow such titles on Koryo officials who joined the Japanese invasion. Eventually, many Koryo officials, including the ones mentioned earlier, came to bear both civil and military titles as an acknowledgement of their service to the empire. Many of the *Musan-gye* titles, such as *Soyong Taejanggun* (昭勇大將軍), *Chin'guk Sangjanggun* (鎭國上將軍), *Hwe'won Taejanggun* (懷遠大將軍), *Sonmu Changgun* (宣武將軍) and *Mudok Changgun* (武德將軍), were hereditary. It was definitely a new situation for the Koryo officials and affected how they viewed themselves, their own country and the empire, as reception of such imperial titles would mean, in theory, that they were entitled to an official post inside the Yuan government. Of course, in most cases, it did not lead to that, but for the recipient, having a Yuan title alongside their Koryo one literally meant another layer of identity added or even imposed upon the existing one as a mere Koryo official.[19]

Many Koryo officials came to receive not only rank titles but also actual posts inside the Yuan imperial government, after successfully passing the Yuan governmental exams launched in 1314.[20] Most of them were appointed to the seat of local prefects, but some served in prominent positions at the central government of Daidu,

as can be seen from the example of the aforementioned Yi Kok, who served in many senior Yuan posts and garnered a positive reputation. Membership in the Mongol Empire presented enterprising Koryo officials with new opportunities, as it became clear that they were no longer confined to the Korean peninsula. If they tried hard and were sufficiently talented, they could pursue a profession as an imperial officer. This new environment definitely changed the Koryo officials' attitude toward the empire, the Koryo government and their master, the Koryo king himself, who fueled this new situation. King Ch'ungson, who played an instrumental part in launching the Yuan governmental examination system in 1314, wanted to send more Koryo talent to the empire. It was with this hope that he modified the existing Koryo exam system to make it the subordinate level of the three-tiered imperial exam system.[21]

Most intriguingly, this kind of identity shift in the Koryo officials led to a series of new problems that further complicated the Koryo king's position. This did not mean that the Koryo turned against their king, but their sentiments changed, and records indicate that they came to feel more proud of those foreign titles than the Koryo titles they originally enjoyed.[22] The Koryo king standing was diminished in the eyes of at least some of his vassals.

Accepting the Yuan emperor as their ultimate leader was a stark departure from how the Koryo officials viewed the Mongols in the early 13th century. Although the Koryo officials maintained an extreme level of politeness in their official letters to the Mongols, such as the ones written by the famous author Yi Kyu-bo (1168–1241), in reality they considered the Mongols "jealous, cruel and generally untrustworthy beings".[23] They also condemned the Mongols' assault on the Jurchen as a "crazed attack launched by a violently savage race", as we can see from letters sent to Tongjin (東眞), or the Jurchen Jin emperor, the mortal enemy of the Mongols.

We can see that, at that time, the Koryo people had no respect toward the Mongols and, in fact, viewed them as barbaric invaders determined to annihilate the people of China and Koryo altogether. However, such sentiment quickly changed as the Koryo leaders came to view them as the new center of civilization.[24] In subsequent periods, especially following Emperor Qubilai's death, his legacy came to be considered by Yuan officials as "old rulings," "noble instructions" and "established law", which gradually turned into an imperial thesis from which no one was supposed to deviate. Such concepts came to be regarded as teachings and lessons to be honored by all imperial citizens, the people on the Korean peninsula apparently came to share the same mentality as well.

The emperor's seniority over the king was on display in the 1300s, when Koryo officials disobeyed their own king's explicit instructions to back off after they surrounded the palace and apprehended the king's corrupt closest aides with the intention of handing them over to imperial authorities. It was an action taken by the officials, who were still the Koryo king's vassals yet who firmly acknowledged the Mongol emperor's authority as superior to that of the Koryo king. In a scripted letter that was to be sent to the Mongol Emperor Temür Öljeitü (r. 1294–1307) they wrote that, "We had always endeavored to uphold the 'Noble instruction' of the Mongol emperor, and when the king's aides deviated from that, we had to expel them from the Koryo court."[25]

In this kind of environment, whenever the Yuan imperial government (led by the emperor) decided to replace the sitting Koryo king with a new one, the Koryo vassals

had to accept it. That was what happened when Ch'ungson replaced Ch'ung'ryol in January 1298, before Ch'ung'ryol was reinstated in September 1298; or when Ch'ungsuk and Ch'ung'hye (r. 1330–1332; 1339–1343) swapped the throne in 1330 and 1332. With the Koryo king reduced to a secondary figure, the emperor was now the ultimate authority in the eyes of the Koryo vassals,[26] not only because of the empire's military prowess but because "the empire was always right".

To make matters worse, some Koryo kings even faced direct challenges to their throne from their own vassals. Some Koryo officials began to consider dethroning the sitting king (in this case, king Ch'ungsuk) for the Koryo prince, who had stronger ties with the Yuan dignitaries. This happened when a faction inside the Koryo government proposed the replacement to the Yuan emperor and later even attacked the king with slander and brute force in order to replace Ch'ungsuk and Ch'ung'hye with Wang Go (d. 1345), in the 1320s and '30s. Wang Go, who was the nephew of Ch'ungson and cousin of Ch'ungsuk, was politically insignificant before being named as the heir to Ch'ungson's Shim lordship (*Shim-wang*, 瀋王). With this new position, he emerged as a political threat to Ch'ungsuk. Conspirators in both Koryo and Yuan tried to replace Ch'ungsuk with Wang Go, for no other reason than Wang Go had better connections with important Yuan figures as the husband of the niece of Ch'ungson's Mongol wife, who was from a much more dignified background than all of Ch'ungsuk's three wives. Fortunately for Koryo, all such attempts failed, despite doing considerable damage to Ch'ungsuk's leadership.[27]

Meanwhile, conspirators attempted to replace the Chongdong Haengsong with a new provincial government that would enable the Yuan leadership to have more direct control over Koryo. They made a total of seven separate attempts of this kind in the first half of the 14th century. Sometimes it was officials of the Liaoyang Haengsong provincial government. These originated from the northern regions of the Korean peninsula but left their homeland in the early 13th century and blamed the Koryo government for failing to protect them from the Mongol invasion. Thus, they carried a longstanding grudge against the Koryo leadership; also Koryo officials, who simply disliked Ch'ungsuk and wanted another figure in office. Additionally, there were Chinese or Mongol figures allied with Koryo officials, who had something to gain from the fall of Chongdong Haengsong and the establishment of a brand new provincial government on Koryo soil, conspired for change. In the end, all these attempts failed, yet they cost the Koryo government a substantial amount of political capital.[28]

One might say that Koryo was in a disadvantageous position in its dealing with the Yuan empire. Yet that observation is not entirely true. Even when the Koryo was seriously threatened, it was able to deflect some of the Mongols' demands and stand its ground. This resilience was evident when Gorgis (sometimes called "Giwargis" or "Körgüz"), a Yuan official who was appointed as second-in-command of the Chongdong Haengsong provincial government in 1299, tried to change many things in Koryo. First, he pointed out that Koryo collected too much tax from regions with populations no longer sufficient to sustain such levels and that Koryo's penal system was too harsh.[29] The Koryo leaders accommodated his demands by changing several old Koryo practices, but they did not abandon the centuries-old Koryo tradition that governed cross-class marriages, in which offspring of a marriage between a commoner and a low-born would automatically be declared low-born. Over centuries,

many Koryo people appealed their cases to the government hoping to be classified as commoner, only to fail repeatedly. After the arrival of the Mongols, children of cross-class marriages went to imperial dignitaries to have their stories heard, but in the end, the Koryo government, which had the final say on the matter, blocked these requests. Then Gorgis came along in 1299. Apparently, he ruled some children of cross-class marriages should be recognized as commoners and not as slaves. Witnessing such rulings, the Koryo government believed Gorgis was trying to reverse the Koryo's age-old principle and rule all offspring from cross-class marriages as commoners.[30] The Koryo government not only refused to comply but even lobbied to have Gorgis recalled to the Yuan. This clearly demonstrates that the Koryo leaders could occasionally defy the Chongdong Haengsong.

In the first half of the 14th century, Koryo went even further. In an attempt to bring reforms to Koryo society and subdue certain pro-Yuan Koryo factions, the Koryo kings tried to turn the tables by making requests of the Yuan government that could not possibly be denied.

In the 1330s and '40s, the Ki family (the house of Empress Ki of Yuan, Öljei Qutugh) gained prominence, and its members continuously abused their power. Their political machinations and infringements on the public interest could not be tolerated, and King Ch'ung'hye, his son Ch'ungmok (r. 1344–1348) and, later, king Kongmin (r. 1351–1374), as well as their closest aides and officials, all wanted the Ki house gone.[31] Additionally, the Koryo commoners, who suffered abuses by the Ki, also wanted them to be punished as well.

The first opportunity came in 1343, when the Yuan Emperor Toghan Temür dethroned King Ch'ung'hye. As his very young son Ch'ungmok was enthroned, the Yuan emperor urged the Koryo officials to clean house. Embracing this order, in 1347 they set up a new office named Chongchi Togam (整治都監, The Office of Decent Governance), and began to investigate and incarcerate public offenders alongside corrupted dignitaries.[32] Ironically, the commission prosecuted members of the Ki house. In other words, the new reform office set up by the Koryo government at the insistence of the Yuan empire interrogated and punished members of a household with direct links to the emperor and the empress.[33]

Estranged from his Koryo wife, Emperor Toghan Temur (r. 1333–1367) actually supported what this new office was doing. With his backing, the power of the Ki house was at least temporarily diminished. This is an example of reform-minded Koryo officials cooperating with the Yuan to subdue certain Koryo factions, which were allied with other factions in the Yuan, in this case the one led by Empress Ki, that had hurt Koryo's interests. While this new office was eventually shut down by Empress Ki, as it damaged her and her family's private interests,[34] this attack on Ki figures made possible the eventual purge of most of the Ki from the Koryo court later in 1356.

After successfully subverting the Chongchi Togam office, the atrocious behavior of the Ki house members resumed. The late father of Empress Ki received a new title (*Kyong-wang*, 敬王) from the emperor, which even surpassed that of King Kongmin. The Ki house was on the verge of replacing the Wang House as the Koryo dynasty's new royal family. Kongmin could not let that happen, so in June 1356 he invited Ki Chol, the brother of Empress Ki and the most prominent Ki member, and his associates to the palace and eliminated most of them in a surprise military assault.

More was to come as King Kongmin not only eliminated the Ki faction but used the opportunity to initiate the reforms he had not been able to pursue earlier because of the Ki interference. To succeed, he had to reinforce his position inside Koryo, and for that he sought to use the right that had earlier been promised to King Ch'ung'ryol by Qubilai to recommend officials to serve the governor/Koryo king at Chongdong Haengsong. He also tried to suppress certain Koryo figures who had been abusing their connections with the Yuan, most notably those stationed at the Military "Manhobu" headquarters.

It occurred to Kongmin that the things he wanted most could never be secured without the Yuan imperial government's approval. Thus, to secure them, Kongmin stressed that the "right of recommendation" had earlier been given to the Koryo king by Qubilai Qa'an, while also arguing that many of the Manhobu units in Koryo were actually installed very late in Qubilai's reign and thus were not part of Qubilai's original plans for the Koryo.[35] The strategy worked, the Yuan acknowledged Kongmin's rights and allowed the Manhobu units' dismantlement, enabling Kongmin to commence his reforms. If Kongmin did not draw attention to Qubilai's earlier order, his demands would have undoubtedly gone unanswered, and his reform efforts in the post-Ki environment would have died in their infancy. By using "Qubilai's promise", Kongmin secured precious momentum for countless reforms during the rest of his reign.[36] Of course, this was not a victory at the expense of the empire[37]; it was a noteworthy achievement enabled by the Koryo king's strategic calculations.

THE MONGOLS IN THE KORYO ECONOMY

In the early days, the Koryo regarded the Mongols as nothing but predators. During 30 years of war, they killed thousands of people and took away Koryo grain and assets. The Mongol commanders demanded many items, including silver, gold, textiles, *insam* (ginseng), paper and even young males and females. The imperial government ordered all sorts of items in the 1260s, '70s and '80s.[38] Two clear examples are the falcon-breeding ranges and the garrison farms.

The falcon-breeding ranges, named "Ungbang" (鷹坊), which the Mongol authorities installed in Koryo since the 1270s,[39] were for raising falcons and other animals required in royal hunts. These units absorbed precious Koryo goods, like silver and ramie products, from adjacent Koryo households in the name of securing food for the falcons.[40] The value of silver needs no explaining, but the extraction of ramie was also painful. Ramie, along with hemp, was one of the most popularly grown plants in Koryo, as its fiber was used to produce fine quality clothes. Clothes created with ramie and hemp fibers were not only light but also delicate and highly suitable for hot summer days. These products had been famous for centuries, even inside the Chinese market, during Song and Yuan rule.

Meanwhile, the garrison farms the Yuan government opened in the Korean peninsula also sapped the grain and rice produced by the Koryo people.[41] The garrison farms were intended to feed the Mongol troops stationed in Koryo, but as the farms failed to produce enough grain, the Koryo government ended up providing grain to the Mongol troops as well as the Koryo peasants who staffed the farms.[42]

The Koryo tried to rebuild its destroyed economy but made limited progress due to Mongol pillaging. Government revenue suffered due to depopulation, so the

Koryo government resorted to requisitioning things from its own marketplace to make tribute payments to the Yuan. Peasants were also forced to make up the shortfall for other villagers who had deserted their villages.

An unexpected break came when the Yuan finally defeated the Song and annexed the Jiangnan region of southern China. The obtainment of such a huge resource rendered further extraction from relatively smaller markets like Koryo unnecessary and impractical. In the late 1280s and early 1290s, with the exception of some very popular Koryo-specific items, such as porcelain or ramie products, tribute demands literally stopped, providing the Koryo households with a welcome respite to start stockpiling financial assets and increasing agricultural production.

Most importantly, this turn of events allowed the Koryo to revive external trade as well. According to *Koryosa*, our main source for events in Korea, Koryo merchants' trade expeditions to China resumed during the mid-1290s, if not earlier.[43] Trade missions are also vividly described in the 1340s in *Nogoldae*, a linguistic manual published by the Koryo government to teach the Koryo merchants either Chinese or Mongolian. In this book, Koryo merchants are described exporting ramie and *insam* to Chinese consumers while purchasing expensive silks, along with other valuable materials, to bring back to Koryo.[44] The overall amount of trade should have been huge, as Koryo produced not only ordinary ramie products but also ramie products with decorated patterns applied with gold and silver threads,[45] resembling the acclaimed *nasij* products, which usually used silk as the background fabric. The Koryo people also produced "mixed fabrics" (Kyojik, 交織) using ramie fiber and silk, which were also new and exotic in the eyes of imperial customers.

Meanwhile, Koryo porcelain was also popular in Mongol-ruled China, just as it had been in earlier periods. Although a new generation of Koryo porcelain products that resembled Yuan ceramics, particularly Jiangnan porcelain, was produced in Koryo in the late 13th and early 14th centuries for domestic consumption,[46] all the Koryo porcelain that has been excavated so far from Yuan China, especially in regions above the Huanghe River, display traditional Koryo-specific patterns, forms and shapes.[47] It appears the Koryo porcelain producers looked to sell mostly traditional Koryo items that would have been embraced as "different" by Chinese consumers instead of the "new Yuan-styled porcelain", which could have been considered mere copies.[48]

As we can see, the grim situation of the mid-13th century was replaced with a more upbeat atmosphere at the end of the century, as Koryo merchants resumed their outward activities and conducted vibrant business with their Yuan counterparts well into the middle of the next century. It should also be noted that the Koryo kings played a large role in pushing these exchanges.[49]

For example, King Ch'ung'ryol negotiated with the Yuan harbor control so that lower tariffs would be collected from incoming Koryo ships and cargo.[50] His son, Ch'ungson, opened a new Yuan-inspired office (*Chig'yom-guk*, 織染局: Office of Weaving and Dyeing) to facilitate efficient production of exportable ramie fabric and clothes, with gold and silver thread patterns, as mentioned earlier. King Ch'ungsuk befriended many Chinese and foreign merchants during his five-year detention in Daidu, and upon his return to Koryo he invited many of them to accompany him and appointed them to governmental seats or bestowed special titles, probably to recruit them as trade operatives who would represent Koryo interests in overseas

trade activities. Finally, King Ch'ung'hye built an entire palace and then converted it into a fabric production facility, which very much reminds us of the royal *tiraz* facilities of West Asia,[51] where he mass produced ramie fabric developed by his grandfather, Ch'ungson. He exported such materials not only to Chinese merchants but also to West Asian "*Huihui*" (回回) Muslim merchants, with whom he had more than amicable relationships his entire life.[52]

There was, therefore, a stark shift between the late 13th and early 14th centuries. In the former period, Koryo people suffered the extortion of their property and resources, whereas during the latter they managed to escape the situation and once again trade with their foreign counterparts on a more balanced footing. Koryo civilian merchants were enchanted with the prospect of doing business beyond China, and the Koryo kings were eager to assist them as they hoped to earn profits from their own business with foreign governments. The Koryo leaders' new relationship with the Mongol court also helped, as such relationships made it possible for them to tap into the grand trade network, which connected the eastern and western parts of the globe under imperial leadership.

THE MONGOLS IN KORYO'S INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

At the turn of the 14th century, Koryo was in need of serious political reform. The integrity of the appointment process for civil and military officials, which had been significantly compromised during the military regime period (1170–1270), was yet to be restored. Mongol interference in Koryo affairs in the 1270s and '80s also left the Koryo government in disarray, as high-ranking ministers were demoted, disrupting the chain of command.[53] Meanwhile, financial problems, such as securing revenue to pay salaries for superfluous offices, which had been newly commissioned in the late 13th century to deal with Yuan demands, threatened the government's solvency. With the tax system recovering slowly and the government still short on resources, Koryo leaders had to devise unconventional ways to increase revenue.[54]

King Ch'ung'son was well aware of the gravity of the situation. Despite his long-term stay in the Yuan court (since the year 1290), Ch'ungson was armed with detailed knowledge regarding everything in Koryo, as he received reports on his homeland from Koryo scholars who visited him in China. He also received undisclosed historical records, which were shipped to him in China at his request to the dismay of officials back in Koryo, as those records had previously never left the country. Meticulous study allowed him to ascertain the challenges Koryo was facing and even realize the merits of some old Koryo traditions.[55]

As a half-Mongol prince, King Ch'ungson was uniquely situated to mobilize the Mongol court on his behalf. Moreover, thanks to his residence at the Yuan court, which began in 1290, he had the opportunity to learn all the issues being discussed inside the Yuan government for nearly a decade.[56] In the process, he became well versed in Yuan policy and their methods of reform, more so than any other official in Koryo. Those methods were certainly different from the Koryo experience, so he had to modify them to fit Koryo-specific situations or complement existing Koryo institutions. Simply speaking, Ch'ung'son adapted Yuan or Chinese policies to resolve Koryo problems.

Ch'ung'son's determination to put his insight to action can be seen from the similarity of his orders to imperial counterparts. For example, there was Ch'ungson's decision to shut down the Chongbang office (in both 1298 and 1308).[57] Under the authority of the notorious military regime, Chongbang had usurped the power to appoint both civil and military officials and committed all kinds of fraud and illegal personnel transfers. Ch'ungson's decision to abolish this office resembles the Yuan government's efforts (since the mid-1290s) to ban the emperor's closest aides from making unauthorized and unsanctioned orders. His economic orders also shared commonalities with current Yuan policies. Ch'ungson achieved a radical reduction of the government's size in 1298 and 1308 by abolishing several ministerial seats as well as merging offices with similar and overlapping jurisdictions. The imperial government had likewise abolished all superfluous taxation offices.[58] Moreover, Ch'ungson's decision to launch a new government salt monopoly in 1309[59] coincided with a similar imperial salt distribution policy by Emperor Qaishan, with whom he lived for many years. The details were not exactly the same, but the fact that they differed from their respective predecessors in terms of method is worth noting.[60] Simply speaking, Yuan reform policies inspired Ch'ungson to employ similar measures in Koryo.

The Koryo was an ancient dynasty at this point, on the verge of entering its fifth (and final) century, and things that had been problematic even before the 13th century continued to deteriorate. Koryo local governance and the military drafting system were prime examples. A shortage of local prefects and provincial magistrates caused inefficiency in communication between the capital and local offices.[61] Koryo's age-old tradition of mobilizing only commoners for military duties was threatened by a decrease in the number of commoners the government could draft.[62] Oddly enough, both problems had never been properly addressed before the beginning of the 14th century, probably due to budgetary concerns and lack of attention to potential alternatives. Without any substantive reform, neither system would survive.

Ch'ungson drew comparisons between the situation in Yuan-ruled China and Koryo. After examining the Yuan's method of overhauling the local network (e.g., by promoting over-populated *Chu* [州] areas to higher units helmed by higher-ranking overseers), he identified possible solutions to repair the weak spots in Koryo's local governance and tripled the number of senior units.[63] He also approved of employing "low-born figures" as soldiers or support personnel, as the Mongols had been doing for quite some time in China.[64]

Ch'ungson also incorporated institutional elements that the Yuan had employed earlier in Yuan imperial reforms, such as the Chinese provincial system or the Mongol law of military conscription, to revamp Koryo's local governance and renew soldier-drafting protocols. His efforts resulted in two noteworthy outcomes: (1) a tighter, more closely knit local administrative network, with more regions serving as middle managers between the capital and junior areas, and (2) a more flexible military-personnel recruitment plan, which was designed to deploy commoners and low-born figures alike as the government saw fit. This sort of an institutional coupling turned out to be just what the Koryo system needed: a shake-up of the status quo with innovative solutions. Once again, the Yuan's methods and authority enhanced Koryo systems.

With the Koryo king leading the way, dialogue over cultural matters and exchange of institutional ideas between Koryo and Yuan only continued to expand.

Government officials on both sides forged personal ties, which led to the formation of a web of relations that eventually engulfed a better portion of intellectual elites in Koryo and Yuan.

Certain Koryo elites became high-profile figures in Yuan. The prime example was Yi Kok (1298–1351), who successfully passed the Yuan Imperial Civil Examination in 1333. He was assigned to a prestigious academic post inside the Yuan government, as his performance on the test was deemed exceptional. He received government posts from both Koryo and Yuan and enjoyed a unique status between the two countries. His status inside the Koryo and Yuan communities of academicians and poets is vividly demonstrated by the many poems written by Yuan and Koryo figures in Yi's honor, which are collected in Yi Kok's personal anthology *Kajongjib*. The deep bond conveyed through all these poems show how human networks served as a conduit for institutional ideas and administrative expertise.[65]

What is most impressive is how Yi Kok utilized his dual standing in his performance as an administrator. Appreciated by both sides, and armed with knowledge of both Yuan and Koryo state affairs, he protected Koryo interests while demanding further domestic reforms from the Koryo officials as if he were a foreign overseer. He effectively represented the Koryo government in an official appeal to the Yuan imperial court asking for the discontinuation of the tribute of female concubines.[66] Yet in his letter to high-ranking Koryo officials, he urged them to restore the integrity of the Koryo government and enhance the overall profile of the dynasty, literally acting in the capacity of a Yuan imperial official superior to Koryo officials.[67]

Meanwhile, there was a reformer named Yi Che-hyon (1287–1367), who was also a skilled diplomat and an accomplished scholar/historian. He served virtually every Koryo king in the first half of the 14th century. He also probably traveled the farthest in his generation. In 1316, he visited the far reaches of China when King Ch'ungson was sent to the Emeishan (峨眉山) mountain of the Xi Shu (西蜀) area, and in 1319 he accompanied Ch'ungson on his journey to the Baotuo-si (寶陀寺) monastery in the Zhejiang (浙江) region. In 1323, he paid a visit to Ch'ungson, who was exiled in the Gansuheng (甘肅省) province's Duosima (朵思麻) region. Considering the sheer range of land he covered in his journeys, there is no doubt that he came to realize how vast the world was and what Koryo meant on such a magnificent canvas.

These physical encounters with the empire coincided with his engagement with the Yuan philosophical community as well. He was one of the few scholars who was granted a firsthand opportunity to learn Neo-Confucianism from gifted Yuan scholars directly,[68] as he was appointed by king Ch'ungson in 1314 to study at Man'gwon-dang (萬卷堂). The Man'gwon-dang was a facility established by Ch'ungson as a hall of academic and religious activities, where the brightest minds of the Yuan Neo-Confucian community convened.[69] Through such acquaintances, Yi was able to shape his mind as a scholar and a reformer.

These two experiences provided Yi Che-hyon with new perspectives, which other ordinary Koryo individuals would not have been able to cultivate. He witnessed the vastness of the empire and understood Koryo's real position within the sphere of Yuan influence. We can see that most notably from his official request that the Koryo people should be granted the same status with the "Colored-Eyes people" (*Semu* 色

目, *Huihui* 回回).[70] Being a realist, he recognized the importance of acknowledging one's true status and position.

As a historian who also dearly loved the Koryo culture, he regularly expounded the exceptional legacy of Koryo history.[71] He collected Koryo folktales and helped document the official Koryo history.[72] While being a truly global citizen, he did not forget his roots.

Another official, Choi Hae (崔瀣, 1287–1340), who passed the imperial exam in 1320 like Yi Kok, received a local post in China but retired shortly after (in 1321) and never resumed active duties in bureaucracy. He believed that only after Koryo threw itself into the arms of the Mongol Yuan empire in the mid-13th century were "vulgar and uncivilized" Koryo things rightfully abolished and the Koryo government was adequately reformed and enlightened. Choi Hae's observation almost borders on revised history, yet he apparently could not imagine things to have been any different.

At the same time, he was also an individual proud of his people's literary achievements. Indeed, he was frustrated by the fact that the intellectuals of the empire were ignorant of Koryo, and that inspired him to compile *Tong'in-jimun* (東人之文, *Writings of the Eastern [Koryo] people*),[73] a collection of Korean traditional and classical writings containing the finest Korean writings since the Silla days.

Even Koryo law began to incorporate Yuan influences[74] after the empire was dismantled. We can see that the first step was taken in 1377 by Koryo king Wu-wang (禑王, r. 1374–1388), who issued a fascinating order instructing all local offices to consult the *Zhizheng Tiaoge* (至正條格, 1346, *Law code of Yuan*) in their dealings with criminal cases and when supervising legal procedures.[75]

CONCLUSION

Examined in this chapter is how the Koryo people viewed the Mongol conquerors. At the beginning, the Koryo people were only victims.[76] They saw the Mongols as an invincible adversary, intent upon torturing the Koryo population. However, the Koryo kings, the government, professional officials and even the most ordinary people definitely did not stay that way. They stood up and began to deal with the Yuan in many different ways. As time passed, they became more prepared and willing to embrace new challenges and, most of all, more determined to do whatever it took to help them. Accordingly, the image of the Mongols in the eyes of the Koryo people continued to change, and this process testifies to how much the Koryo people evolved in the two centuries they spent with their Mongol neighbors.

Of course, I am not saying that the Koryo people were heroic in achieving all these things or did so against all odds. I am simply suggesting that we should go beyond viewing any group of people in a particular region that was under Mongol authority as simply victims or eventual overcomers of Mongol oppression. The interaction between the Mongols and the people of Koryo is an important part of Korean history and deserves to be studied as part of the larger global history.[77] Koryo's experience with the Mongols provides a distinctive example of how a region dealt with the so-called Mongol shock. The Mongol imperial legacy may, therefore, be better explored with cases like Koryo.

NOTES

1 Yun 1991.
2 Discussions between Koryo and Yuan around the time of surrender can be seen in entries of the Kabo (甲午) day of April, Kyongjin (庚辰) day of June, and Shinsa (辛巳) day of August in 1259 from *Koryosa*'s 24th volume (卷), which is also the 24th chapter of the *Chronicles* (世家) section and the 3rd volume to document the reign of King Kojong 高宗). *Koryosa* (高麗史, 1451) is the most prominent and extensive source of information regarding Koryo history. Although published in the early Choson era, it was based upon individual records created during the Koryo period. Along with its sister text *Koryosa-jolyo* (高麗史節要, 1452, "A concise version of *Koryosa*"), *Koryosa* is considered the most reliable and legitimate source of information. Also see Roh 2019.
3 Lee Ik-ju 1996.
4 Lee Kae-sok 2013; Morihira 2013.
5 Kim Ho-dong 2007.
6 Wi 1997.
7 Lee Kang-hahn 2013a.
8 Lee Kang-hahn 2017.
9 *Koryosa*, Vol. 26, *Chronicles* XXVI, Reign of King Wonjong, Vol. 2. 11th year (1270), February, Kabsul day.
10 Lee Myong-mi 2003.
11 *Koryosa*, Vol. 28, *Chronicles* Chapter 28, Reign of King Ch'ung'ryol-wang, Vol. 1. Enthronement year (1274), November, Chongchuk day.
12 Lee Myong-mi 2016.
13 These terms appear in *Koryosa* in 1280 for the first time, as we can see from Vol. 29, *Chronicles*, Chapter 29, Ch'ung'ryol-wang, Vol. 2. 6th year (1280), September, Pyongjin day, and October, Chong'yu day.
14 Chang Tong-ik 1994.
15 *Koryosa*, Vol. 29, *Chronicles*, Chapter 29, Reign of King Ch'ung'ryol-wang, Vol. 2. 7th year (1281), March, Eulmyo day.
16 *Koryosa*, Vol. 27, *Chronicles*, Chapter 27, Reign of King Wonjong, Vol. 3. 15th year, 1274, January, Kabsu day.
17 *Koryosa*, Vol. 29, *Chronicles*, Chapter 29, Reign of King Ch'ung'ryol-wang, Vol. 2. 6th year, 1280, August, Eulmi乙未 day.
18 Kim Yong-son 2001.
19 Lee Kang-hahn 2013b.
20 Ko Hye-ryong 2001.
21 Lee Kang-hahn 2010a.
22 Lee Kang-hahn 2015.
23 *Tongguk Yi-Sangguk-jib* 1241, Vol. 28.
24 Ch'e 2003.
25 *Koryosa*, Vol. 125, *Biographies*, Chapter 38, Disloyal subjects 1, Oh Cham.
26 Lee Kang-hahn 2007a.
27 Kim Hye-won 1998.
28 Kim Hye-won 1994.
29 See *Koryosa*, Vol. 32, *Chronicles*, Chapter 32, Reign of King Ch'ung'ryol-wang, Vol. 5. 27th year (1301), April, Kichuk day.
30 Lee Kang Hahn 2010b.
31 *Koryosa*, Vol. 36, *Chronicles*, Chapter 36, Reign of King Ch'ung'hye-wang, 2nd term, 4th year (1343), August, Kyongja day; *Koryosa* Vol. 125, *Biographies* Chapter 38, Disloyal subjects 1, Shin Ye.

32 *Koryosa*, Vol. 37, *Chronicles*, Chapter 37, Reign of King Ch'ungmok-wang, 3rd year (1347), February, Kichuk day.
33 Lee Kang-hahn 2008c; Min 1980.
34 *Koryosa*, Vol. 37, *Chronicles*, Chapter 37, Reign of King Ch'ungmok-wang, 3rd year (1347), March, Mujin day.
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CHAPTER FORTY-SIX

THE MONGOLS IN THE EYES OF THE UYGHURS

Michael C. Brose

UYGHURS AMONG THE EARLY MONGOLS

Chinggis Khan's first direct encounter with the Uyghurs came in 1208, when he was pursuing two rival steppe tribes, the Merkit and the Naiman. By that time, the Uyghur state that spanned the eastern Tianshan Mountains and northern Tarim Basin had existed for almost three centuries, constructed by a diaspora group of Uyghur elites who had been driven south out of their steppe empire when they were conquered by Kirgiz tribes in 840.[1] That new Uyghur kingdom melded the Uyghurs' own steppe traditions with the indigenous Indo-Iranian population that lived in several important oasis cities across the region. Before long the Uyghurs themselves adopted that urban lifestyle, and their kingdom became a hub of international commerce, culture, and religion (Manichaeism, Nestorian Christianity, and Buddhism). Drawing on their century of imperial management in the steppe, the Uyghurs of East Turkistan (present-day Xinjiang) developed an efficient and effective administrative system that operated out of two capital cities, Beshbaliq and Qara Qocho, and it was politically independent, with regular and productive diplomatic relations with states both west and east.[2] That state, which we refer to as Uyghuristan, remained independent until the early 12th century, when it was forced to become a tributary to the new Qara Khitai state that was led by remnants of the Khitan Liao kingdom that controlled part of north China (907–1125).[3]

When Chinggis Khan defeated the Merkit and Naiman tribes in 1208, the Uyghur king Barchuq el-Tegin (fl. 1200–1250s) saw his victory as a good opportunity to shake off the increasingly harsh demands made of the Uyghurs by the Qara Khitai and to align his fortunes with the emerging Mongol powerhouse. In consultation with his high ministers, Barchuq engineered the assassination of the Qara Khitai supervisor in residence in Beshbaliq. When Mongol messengers arrived there the following year, Barchuq offered his submission and sought protection from the Qara Khitai.[4] Chinggis had undoubtedly already formed a positive view of the Uyghurs by this time since he had procured the help of a Uyghur scribe named Tatar Tongga

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(fl. 1200) to adopt his native Uyghur script to write spoken Mongolian some three years earlier. Chinggis, for his part, may have had more in mind than simply pursuing his regional rivals when he entered Uyghuristan and was confronted with the perhaps unexpected voluntary submission of Barchuq in 1209. For one thing, the Uyghur kingdom was known across the region for its commercial and religious life. Moreover, since the Uyghurs had experience managing a state that included nomadic and sedentary populations, they provided him with much-needed managerial and linguistic expertise in his growing empire. Their allegiance to Chinggis Khan also burnished Chinggis Khan's own credentials as someone interested in preserving, not destroying, cultural traditions and institutions. In return for Barchuq's submission, Chinggis Khan adopted Barchuq as a "fifth son" and gave him the youngest of his daughters by his principal wife Börte in marriage. Barchuq and Al Altun were married in 1211, and that cemented the Uyghur imperial clan firmly into the Chinggisid orbit and provided the Mongols with important Uyghur troops and administrative personnel.[5]

Barchuq's submission was also important strategically since Uyghuristan provided access to Tibet and Central Asia and control of the lucrative overland trade routes. There was no need to station Mongol troops or overseers there since Barchuq was now trusted, and the Mongols could call on Uyghur help in future military campaigns. Barchuq personally led a force of some 18,000 Uyghur mounted troops in 1216 against the remaining Naiman tribes, who had by that time fled into the Qara Khitai realm. Barchuq and Uyghur troops also participated in Mongol campaigns against the Khwarazmshah and the Tanguts, Chinggis Khan's last campaign. By 1225, many Uyghurs were dispersed throughout the Mongol military machine, and Barchuq successfully petitioned Chinggis that "all his people be returned home."[6] The fact that Chinggis Khan allowed the Uyghurs to return to Uyghuristan at that time is an indication of Barchuq's high standing in Chinggis Khan's eyes, as well as the autonomy Chinggis Khan granted to Barchuq in Uyghuristan.

UYGHURS AND UYGHURISTAN IN THE EARLY MONGOL EMPIRE

The Uyghur king was allowed to govern his own state on behalf of the Mongols, without Mongol interference. Barchuq was even allowed to keep his imperial title, *idiqut*, and his sons continued to inherit that title long after they had been driven out of Uyghuristan to reside in exile in China.[7] Barchuq's authority, and the absence of Mongol minders at his capital, is interestingly confirmed in the travel account left by the Daoist monk Changchun, who went west to meet with Chinggis Khan in 1221. When Changchun arrived in the Uyghur capital Beshbaliq, he was welcomed by a grand procession that included members of Barchuq's own family and Buddhist and Daoist priests (Barchuq was leading Uyghur troops in battle in Central Asia under the Mongol flag at the time).[8] Many Uyghur aristocrats were drafted to serve members of the Mongol ruling clan soon after 1209, especially in Ögödei's and Tolui's *ulus* areas. The stories of those Uyghurs show that they and their new masters held each other in high esteem. The Mongols were quick to put their skilled new subjects to work in their domains, which expanded greatly as the Mongols conquered large

swaths of north China and Central Asia. After all, the Mongols needed people who knew how to read and write the Uyghur script because it was used as the official writing system across the empire since Tatar Tongga first introduced it to the Mongol ruling class, as described earlier.

The Uyghur vertical script was also important in conducting business across Central Asia, which gave the Uyghur personnel even more of an edge in securing powerful roles serving the Mongols over other Central Asian personnel who joined the growing empire. At the same time, since the Mongols did not try to impose the vertical Uyghur script on their growing number of subjects, many local writing systems continued to be used. This was especially true in China and, eventually, Persia, and there was griping among some Persian and Chinese officials who complained about the fact that Uyghurs dominated the higher ranks of the Mongol administration because they knew the official writing system. That competition was one factor that convinced Qubilai to commission the Tibetan monk Phagspa to develop a new phonetic writing system that could represent all the spoken languages in the Mongol Empire in 1269. It lasted until the Yuan dynasty collapsed in 1368, after which the Mongols interestingly reverted back to using the Uyghur vertical script.[9]

One example of Uyghur recruits into the early Mongol Empire is Sevinch Toghril (fl. 1200–1230s). An official in Barchuq's court in 1209, he joined Barchuq to lead Uyghurs in the Mongol campaign against the Muslim Khwarazm state. Upon his return from that campaign, he was assigned to be a judge in Sorqoqtani Beki's (d. 1252) appanage estate in north China. This wife of Tolui was a powerful political actor in her own right, especially after her husband died in 1232.[10] Mongol judges held wide authority over legal issues, taxes, and the local population in the area they oversaw. We do not know many details about Sevinch's career as an official for the Mongols, but he must have been successful since four generations of his descendants continued to be selected for high-level government positions in China, including five grandsons and ten great-grandsons who were appointed to positions in the Mongol civilian and military bureaus.

Other Uyghurs besides Barchuq also married into the Mongol imperial clan. One example is Mengsus (1206–1267). His father was a governor in Uyghuristan in 1209, and Mengsus was, like his countryman Sevinch, drafted into the position of tax administrator in Sorqoqtani Beki's appanage estate. While there, he got to know Tolui's extended family, and he eventually married Ketülün (fl. 1250s), the sister of Qubilai's first wife, Chabui. Qubilai wanted to promote Mengsus to imperial chancellor, but he refused. When Mengsus died, Chabui herself donated funds for his tomb, something quite out of the ordinary. One of Mengsus's sons, Ashiq Temür (1249–1309), eventually filled the position of imperial chancellor, after a stellar career as a secretary in the Central Military Affairs Bureau and then as an Uyghur language tutor to the imperial Prince Qaishan (r. 1308–1311).

UYGHURS AND UYGHURISTAN AFTER CHINGGIS KHAN

The unique level of autonomy the Uyghurs enjoyed in Uyghuristan after 1209 came to an end when Ögödei (r. 1229–1241) succeeded Chinggis Khan. In 1229, the Turkic-speaking native of Khwarazm Mahmud Yalavach (d. 1254) was put in charge of

the entire population of Central Asia, which included Uyghuristan, to rebuild the important cities that were destroyed in earlier Mongol campaigns so the residents could pay taxes to the Mongols.[11] While the Uyghur capitals had not been damaged, important urban centers farther west, such as Samarqand and Bukhara, had been destroyed. Mahmud established an efficient system of resident commissioners who spearheaded reconstruction efforts and enacted a tax system that regularized payments and did away with the onerous ad hoc requests for payments imposed on the local population by individual Mongols. Mahmud was replaced in 1241 by his son, Mas'ud Beg (d. 1289), who was kept on by Möngke after 1251. The sources indicate that Uyghuristan had by that time been fully incorporated into the evolving Mongol imperium as a province headed by Mas'ud Beg.[12]

The loss of Uyghur autonomy and their full absorption into the growing empire may also be reflected in the fact that Möngke's government referred to the Uyghurs by a new term; they are described from that point as "Weiwuer," not "Huihu," which was used in earlier periods. The term "Weiwuer" was first used by the Khitans in a list of tribes who paid annual tribute to the Khitan Liao state. Uyghur loss of autonomy over affairs in their own land was cemented in the civil war between Qubilai and his brother Ariq Böke that began in 1260. Although Qubilai won a temporary victory in that protracted battle when Ariq Böke surrendered, it was taken up around 1280 by Qaidu. As a result, the Uyghur *idiqut* at the time, Qochgar Tegin (r. 1266–1280), was forced to defend his capital against Qaidu's forces. Qubilai tried several tactics to retain his hold over Uyghuristan during those years, such as establishing a Court of Justice for Uyghurs at Beshbaliq and circulating paper currency that was issued in China.[13] In desperation, Qubilai set up a Pacification Bureau to coordinate the defense of Uyghuristan against Qaidu. Qubilai gave up in 1295, which also ended any pretensions of the Uyghur *idiqut* in Uyghuristan. The *idiqut* Ne'üril Tegin (r. 1280–1318) died in Gansu in 1318 and was the last member of Barchuq's line to actually live in and act as an *idiqut* in Uyghuristan.

Ne'üril Tegin was also the first member of his family awarded another honorific title, Prince of Gaochang (*Gaochang wang*) that was made up by the Mongol court in 1316. His son, Temür Buqa (fl. 1327–1337) set the pattern for the rest of this family in Mongol China; male descendants lived in China, and some received the title *idiqut* and Prince of Gaochang, which carried small stipends but no real power. Most of the males of this family were appointed to leadership positions such as provincial governorships, the Bureau of Military Affairs (*shumi yuan*), the Censorate (*yushi tai*), and other court and provincial offices.

UYGHUR ADMINISTRATORS IN MONGOL CHINA

Persian sources have scattered references to Uyghur personnel who remained in Uyghuristan under Chaghadaid rule, but we have far more information on Uyghurs who moved to China from this point. Many Uyghurs were integrated into the Mongol government in career paths similar to Barchuq's descendants. Their stories reveal a high degree of trust by the Mongol imperial elite in their Uyghur subjects. The Uyghurs were also invested in the state they were constructing in China, one measure of which is their record of service as high ministers in the central Yuan court. No fewer than 15 different Uyghurs held the 3 highest offices in the Yuan Central

Secretariat, serving for a total of 51 years between the start of Qubilai's reign in 1260 through the end of the Yuan state in China in 1368. These were the most powerful and important officials in Yuan government, and the men selected oversaw the entire state, from revenue to legal affairs, public works, ritual matters, and managing the imperial clan. The Central Secretariat also mediated communications between the emperor and all provincial-level government agencies. It is thus noteworthy that Uyghurs were appointed to the three most important offices in the central Yuan court for almost half of the life of the Yuan state! No other group of subjects had this same record of consistent appointment to those offices. Uyghurs also featured prominently in provincial-level management; some 29 Uyghurs were appointed as provincial governors, at least 97 Uyghurs were appointed to ranks just below that of governor, and 54 Uyghurs were appointed as overseers at various levels in provincial governments.

A good example of Uyghurs who climbed the ladder of success in China under the Mongols is the well-known Lian Xixian (1231–1280).[14] Lian Xixian's father, Buyruq Qaya (1197–1265), came from a Uyghur aristocratic family and served in north China under four Mongol rulers, from Ögödei through Qubilai. In 1231, he adopted the Chinese-style surname Lian to celebrate his promotion as a surveillance commissioner in north China. He had 13 sons and 53 grandsons, and many of them followed Buyruq's career pattern of service in the Yuan administration. His second son, originally named Hindu, was the most outstanding of that group. Hindu (1231–1280) and all but one of his 12 siblings continued to use Lian as their family name. He was inducted into Qubilai's personal bodyguard at age 12 and gained his first experience as a young military officer in Qubilai's 1253 campaign across Sichuan and south to conquer the Dali state. A year later, he was appointed to the Pacification Commission in charge of Qubilai's appanage estate in Shanxi, and it was there that Lian Xixian gained his appreciation of Chinese culture.

In 1259 or early 1260, Lian Xixian traveled into the steppe to assess the strength of Ariq Böke's forces and returned and persuaded Qubilai to take the field against his rival. Harnessing his military skills, Lian Xixian then personally led troops against Ariq Böke and defeated those forces in Gansu. He also secured the surrender of Song forces that had been fighting the Mongols in Sichuan. Lian Xixian emerged as a loyal and effective minister in Qubilai's administration and is a good example of the careers that many other Uyghur aristocrats enjoyed in China.

UYGHUR INTELLECTUALS AND ARTISTS IN MONGOL AND CHINESE SOCIETY

The society the Mongols constructed and supported in China was a hybrid affair that mixed traditional Mongol and Chinese elements. This was particularly the case starting with Qubilai, who developed an early interest in Chinese culture and lifestyle and saw himself inhabiting both the position of Mongol grand khan and Chinese emperor. Many Uyghurs were appointed as officials in imperial advisory, ideological, and service bureaus at the new capital of Daidu, mainly due to their scholarly proclivities because they became experts in Confucian doctrine. One of the best examples of Uyghurs in those bureaus were several generations of the large

Uyghur family who adopted the surname Xie.[15] At least four generations of Xie men served in Yuan intellectual and advisory bureaus. One Xie family member became well known for the strict Confucian-inspired regulations he imposed on his immediate family. The story of that man, Xie Zhedu (fl. 1315–1340) and his family illustrate the ways in which Uyghurs functioned as intellectual elites in Mongol China. He was the first of five Xie family men who achieved the highest exam degree, the "presented scholar" (*jinshi*) in the same generation. He also established his own private academy in his home, where he taught students.

Other Uyghurs drew on their heritage as members of highly literate and multilingual families and became well-known visual or literary artists. For example, several Uyghurs became famous calligraphers, such as Lian Xixian's younger brother Lian Xigong (fl. 1340s), who was known and feted as an expert in the calligraphy of large-sized Chinese characters. His skills were undoubtedly part of the reason for his eventual appointment as an official in the Jixian Academy, which supervised the Chinese National Institute and College at the capital.[16] Other Uyghurs drew on their Uyghur heritage as highly literate multilingual people more directly in their careers. Prominent Uyghurs were assigned to teach Uyghur language to members of the Mongol imperial clan, such as the aforementioned Ashiq Temür. He was able to do that because he, like many fellow Uyghurs in China, was taught to speak and write Uyghur from childhood. We know this because it is specifically mentioned in many posthumous epitaph biographies of well-known Uyghurs. Proficiency in Uyghur and other non-Chinese languages must have been common among Uyghur families in China because many Uyghurs served as translators and interpreters at the court. Other career tracks held by Uyghurs, such as in the Imperial Library Directorate (*mishu jian*), would have also required a high degree of fluency in western technical writing because that bureau prepared compilations of important works for the Yuan emperor that included translations of foreign astronomical, medical, and geographic works.

As these examples show, Uyghurs were perhaps uniquely prepared to thrive in the unique hybrid society the Mongols constructed in China because of their heritage and skills. Did they experience any conflict or tension in their lives as elites in exile? We get glimpses of possible tension only in the stories of Uyghurs who left an unusually large and detailed paper trail that document their public and private lives in Mongol China, and even then only by carefully reading and comparing different sources. One example is the Uyghur Guan Yunshi (a.k.a. Sevinch Qaya, 1286–1324), whose life is documented in some 20 separate official and private sources.[17] His father began his career as a Uyghur language tutor but rose in rank as a military commander who gained fame in the Mongol campaigns against Song China. Guan's first appointments were as a police commissioner and military garrison commander, but he is mainly known as a writer.

We focus here on two important sources that document Guan's life: his official biography in the *Yuan shi* and a biography written for his gravesite by a personal friend. The official biography sketches out Guan's career as an official, emphasizing his stints in the Hanlin Academy and his life as a writer known for his poetry and prose. Guan's status as a poet is affirmed by his own known literary output and the large number of essays, poems, and forwards in his honor written by other contemporaneous Chinese and Uyghur writers. Curiously, that body of works

omits mention of Guan's other, possibly competing identity as a devout Buddhist. That side of Guan is only revealed in his posthumous spirit-way inscription, which paints a vivid picture of a man who retired from his career in officialdom early in order to spend his time itinerating across China, visiting important monasteries and respected monks and going into seclusion in his country home to meditate every summer.[18]

Guan's interest in Buddhism is consistent with his Uyghur heritage since Uyghuristan was a center of Buddhist monastic life and activity from the late 10th century when the Uyghur aristocracy shifted from supporting Manichaeism to Buddhism. Broad support for Buddhism among the Uyghurs is seen, for example, in the record of the Song envoy to Uyghuristan, Wang Yande, who traveled there in 982. He was surprised to find 50 Buddhist monasteries and a separate library of Chinese Buddhist literature just in the Uyghur city Qocho.[19] The Uyghur court sponsored the first translation of Buddhist scriptures into Uyghur around that time, and it evolved into a massive translation project that lasted at least 300 years.

The first translations were devoted to scriptures written in the local Tokharian language used across the Tarim Basin. Then, between the 11th and 13th centuries, translators turned their attention to scriptures written in Chinese. In the last phase, during the Mongol period, translators focused on Tibetan Tantric works. That last phase, in the 13th and 14th centuries, also featured block printed texts. When they lived in the Tarim Basin one of the most important Buddhist schools among the Uyghur elite was the Pure Land school, which continued to be preferred in the translated corpus until the Mongol period, when Tibetan texts took over.

CONCLUSION

So how did the Uyghurs and Mongols view each other? The Uyghurs of Barchuq's generation clearly benefitted from their early and voluntary submission to Chinggis Khan. The Uyghur aristocracy was able to remain in their homeland for about a century after their leader submitted to Chinggis Khan, with remarkably little direct oversight or intervention from their new masters. The Mongols obtained valuable additional military and managerial assets that helped them continue their momentum of conquest and rule. That situation was based on a good amount of mutual respect and, from the Uyghurs, a willingness to view their new political situation as an opportunity more than an insult forced down their throats.

That situation of mutual respect continued after the Uyghur elite were driven out of Uyghuristan. While some Uyghurs remained in Uyghuristan, we can comment most fully on those who chose or were forced to migrate to China due to the nature of the extant sources, which paint a picture of overwhelming success for the Uyghurs there. In fact, many Uyghurs chose to remain in China after 1368, when Mongol rule ended, where their descendants can still be found today. The wide range of those primary sources clearly show that Uyghurs maintained the respect and trust of the Mongol ruling elite in China and that those sentiments were returned by the Mongols to the Uyghurs in full measure. The Mongols created a much more diverse society and state in China than had previously been the case, and the Uyghur diaspora were an important part of that historical development that laid the foundations for China today.

NOTES

1 See Mackerras 1972 and Sinor 1997 for the Uyghur steppe empire. A convenient chronological study of the Uyghurs from their steppe empire to the end of the Mongol Yuan state is provided by Feng and Wu 1992.
2 Hamilton 1955, Gabain 1973 and Clark 1975 describe Uyghuristan's government and society.
3 See Biran 2005.
4 See Barchuq's official biography in *YS* 124: 3046–3048 and discussed in Brose 2007, ch. 2 and Bretschneider 1888, I, 236–263.
5 See Hambis 1954, 130–137 and Table 11 for descriptions of Barchuq's family and their marriage partners; also discussion by Broadbridge 2018, 119–120 and 186–192.
6 Allsen 1983, 248 citing the Persian historian Juvaini.
7 Qian 1955, 8333 lists the titles bestowed on or inherited by Barchuq and his descendants.
8 *TOA*, 80–84.
9 Kara 2005 provides the best description of the history of Mongolian writing available.
10 Rossabi 1979, 158–166.
11 See Allsen 1993, 122–131, for Mahmud's life and career.
12 *YS* 3: 45. See Allsen 1983, 252–253 for Masud Beg's career and discussion of Uyghuristan at that time.
13 See Farquhar 1990 for Mongol administrative terms.
14 Hsiao 1993, 480–499 provides a sketch of this man's life and family.
15 See Brose 2007 for a study of the Xie clan.
16 Ch'en 1966, 187.
17 Lynn 1980. See Lynn for the titles of Guan's biographical sources.
18 Ch'en 1966, 81–85, citing Guan's spirit-way inscription written by the famous Chinese literatus Ouyang Xuan (1273–1357).
19 Elverskog 1997, 7–11.

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TOA, See List of Abbreviations.
YS, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN

FROM BRUTES TO BODHISATTVAS

The Mongols in Tibetan sources

Soyoung Choi

After the Tibetan Empire (ca. 600–866) collapsed, Central Tibet disintegrated into many principalities ruled by families descended from imperial princes. From the eleventh and twelfth centuries on, Buddhist monasteries all over the country began entering the political arena. The most powerful Buddhist sects at the beginning of the thirteenth century were the Drigungpa (*'Bri-gung-pa*), Phagmodrupa (*Phag-mo-gru-pa*) and Karmapa (*Karma-pa*) – all three subsects of the Kagyüpa (*Bka'-brgyud-pa*) – with the fourth one being the Sakyapa (*Sa-skya-pa*). Then, in 1240, the first invasion of the Mongols into Central Tibet was launched, and after much meandering the region was subjugated.

Mongol rule ushered Tibet into a new era, in which it became an influential player in Eurasia. Tibet maintained this status until the end of the nineteenth century. However, the scantiness of secular records in Tibetan writings has made it a challenge for academics to grasp the Tibetans' view on this period of transition. By examining the fragmentary accounts of the Mongol invasion and rule in Tibetan sources, I expect to shed some light on the Tibetan historiography of the Mongol period (1240–1354/1368), and its significance in the larger context of the history of the Mongol Empire itself.

INVASION AND SUBMISSION

The Central Tibetan people may have heard about the Mongols through the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia (1038–1227)[1] before the invasion of 1240. Tibetan clerics from the Kagyüpa school often held the post of imperial preceptor at the Xi Xia court in the final decades of the kingdom's existence. Not only the imperial preceptors themselves but also other people, such as their disciples, stayed in Xi Xia, from whom Tibetans in Tibet might have heard the political circumstances of Xi Xia.[2] The Tibetans designated the Mongols and their country under the name of 'Hor' (*Hor*), which had been the appellation for the Uyghurs before the Mongol period.[3] They used 'Hor yül' (*Hor-yul*) to indicate the Mongol state or Mongolia. In addition, they

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called the Mongol people 'Sog po' (*Sog-po*), an earlier term for the Sogdian people, perhaps because they conquered Sogdia.[4]

In 1240, Köten (1206–1251), the son of Ögödei Qa'an, who was garrisoned in Jangngö (*Byang-ngos*), modern Liangzhou in Gansu, sent troops whose commander was recorded as Dorta (*Dor-ta*, *Dor-rta* or *Rdor-tha'*) in Tibetan sources. They attacked monasteries belonging to the Kadampa (*Bka'-gdams-pa*) sect and killed approximately 500 monks in the first contact between Central Tibet and the '*Hor*.'[5] The Drigungpa, the most powerful sect at that time, recorded that "a Mongol army appeared in Tibet, deprived all the people of their lives and burnt down most of the temples."[6] Jangchup Gyeltsen (*Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan*, 1302–1364) from the Phagmodrupa sect said, "All of Tibet trembled with fear."[7] Dorta seems to be Doladai in the *Jami' al-Tavarikh*, a descendant of Muqali (1170–1223) from the Jalayir tribe. Originally a *minggan* commander allotted to Tolui (ca. 1191–1232), he was given to Köten by Ögödei after the former's death, which angered the Toluid noyans.[8] He disappeared from the Persian sources after that and reappeared in Tibetan sources as the commander of the invading army, which referred to him as Dorta Nagpo, Bad Dorta.

According to Jangchup Gyeltsen, after a while Dorta tried to kill the secular head of the Drigungpa sect and was clobbered by heavy 'stone-rain' (*rdo'i char ba*) brought by the abbot of that sect, Chennga Drakpa Jungné (*Spyan-snga Grags-pa 'byung-gnas*, 1175–1255).[9] Reports of monks deterring the Mongol army by magical power are seen in biographies of other famous monks, most of whom were from the Kagyüpa sect.[10] When Dorta saw the miracle made by Chennga, Dorta paid respect to him.[11] It is noticeable that the Sakyapa authors did not record Dorta's invasion because in 1244, Köten summoned Sakya Pandita (*Sa-skya PaNDita Kun-dga 'rgyal-mtshan*, 1182–1251) of the Sakyapa sect to his court in Jangngö, and the latter went with two of his nephews, the famous Phagspa (*'Phags-pa Blo-gros rgyal-mtshan*, 1235–1280) and Chakna Dorje (*Phyag-na rdo-rje*, 1239–1267).

In Jangngö, Sakya Pandita sent a letter to ecclesiastical and lay authorities in Tibet asking them to accept Mongol sovereignty unconditionally, as it covered the whole world. He called on them to send tribute to them because the Uyghur country had already submitted to the Mongols and was enjoying autonomy, while China (that is, the Jin dynasty), Xi Xia and the Khwarazmian dynasty (*Sog-po*)[12] had collapsed because they resisted the Mongols.[13] The letter was written in 1247, during Güyük's short reign (1246–1248), but it seems that during the interregnal period before Möngke's enthronement the Mongols did not pay attention to Tibetan affairs, probably because they were busy with the succession struggle. However, after Möngke became the great khan in 1251, he dispatched troops to Tibet, who terrorized the Tibetans again. The biography of Yanggönpa (*Rgyal-ba Yang-dgon-pa*, 1213–1258) recorded this invasion:

> They killed all people they met, took away all the wealth they saw, burned all the houses and destroyed all the monasteries. They especially hated the monks. Even less than one in a hundred was a translator or someone who spoke Tibetan. Even though there were words of submission, [the Tibetan people] did not know the legal system and operations of the Mongols. Just hearing the name of the Mongol (*Hor*) and the Mongols (*Sogs-po*) (sic) made them scared and unable to stand on the earth. All the people trembled with fear as if they were in the hands of the King of the Death-Lords of the Karma.[14]

This extract shows not only the Tibetans' fear but also the difficulties of communication caused by the difference of languages. The biography also shows in a laconic style how Yanggönpa, a Tibetan monk of repute in his community, coped with this calamity. When the Mongol army arrived at his province, he was meditating in another village and came back immediately. The record says, "He advised all the chiefs of Latö (*La-stod*)[15] saying, 'Offer your submission!' and the chiefs accepted it. All the three – small, medium, [and] big- chiefs submitted."[16] This record, while very short, is more realistic than the former account of stone-rain. The biography is full of sentences recounting the fear of the residents. Yanggönpa also told people to make sacrificial cake in the hope of preventing the Mongols' coming.[17] Meanwhile, a Sakyapa source described the Mongol army in the following terms:

> The so-called Mongols are more stupid than brutes in deciding to adopt or to reject (*blang 'dor*, moral discernment). Their compassion is smaller than that of [the] Death-Lord of the karma and the power of their bodies is stronger than that of demons. They are innumerable and fearful like the army of the demigod. . . . [Sakya Pandita] saw that they destroyed everything, so out of compassion that could not bear it, he wanted to lead the minds of the Mongols into the path of religion.[18]



Map 47.1 Central Tibet (Tsang) in the Mongol Era.
Source: Created by Mapping Specialists, Ltd.

While this passage is similar to those records from other occupied parts of the Mongol Empire, the last sentence explains why the Sakya Pandita went to Köten's court, namely, to lead the "people worse than brutes" into Buddhism. It contrasts sharply with the non-Sakya narrative: repelling the Mongols by magical force, as we saw before. There seems to be no record of battle between Mongol and Tibetan forces during the conquest of Tibet. The population of Tibet at that period was small and scattered and lacked cohesion.[19] Faced with the Mongols, who were "fearful like the army of the demi-god," most Tibetans probably had little choice but to submit. These submissions, as Yanggönpa suggested, allowed Tibet to evade the complete destruction that the neighboring Xi Xia met.

RECORDS ON MONGOL RULE

The letter Sakya Pandita sent to Tibet from Jangngö listed the Mongols' conditions of submission. A census was to be carried out. The lists of the lords, their subjects and the tribute due from each of them were to be made out in three copies, one to be handed over to Köten, another to be preserved at Sakya and the third to be kept by the lord himself. The lords were to carry out the administration of their fiefs in consultation with the envoys of the Sakyapa and in conformity with Mongol law. Tribute and taxes were to be levied by the Mongols, seconded by Sakya officials.[20] These are the general policies the Mongols implemented over the subjugated people, although we do not know exactly how the policy was carried through in Tibet at that time.

The new qa'an Möngke (r. 1251–1259) carried out the distribution of appanages to his brothers, with the Buddhist sects serving as a unit. Jangchup Gyeltsen said, "Köten *aqa (a ka)*[21] adopted the resident monk;[22] Emperor Möngke had jurisdiction over the Drigungpa sect; Emperor Sechen,[23] Tselpa; Prince Hülegü, Pakmodrupa; and Ariq Böke, Taklungpa. Each of the four princes individually possessed (*sgo-bdag byas-pa*) a myriarchy."[24] From Qubilai's reign, the Mongol ruling system began to be multilayered. He dismantled the appanage system in Tibet, except for Hülegü's, as soon as he ascended the throne.[25] There was an imperial preceptor from the Sakyapa, who was also the head of the Office of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs; the chief administrator (*pönchen*, *dpon-chen*) of the Sakyapa; the Pacification Office (Tibetan *swon-wi-si* or similar forms) and the prince of Xiping and, later, the prince of Zhenxi wujing, who were stationed in or near Central Tibet and were mainly in charge of military affairs in the country. The princes were descendants of Qubilai. Under them, there were the so-called 13 Tibetan myriarchs, who took charge of the various affairs of each myriarchy of Tibet. Aside from the princes, most of the officials were Tibetan. In most cases, a myriarch visited Daidu, the capital of the qa'an, and received documents and seals that assured his authority and jurisdiction. This was an effective way for the Mongols to control Tibet because the myriarchs' titles and authorities depended upon imperial recognition. The same system accustomed the Tibetan myriarchs to Mongol culture. Zhönnu Gyeltsen (*Gzhon-nu rgyal-mtshan*), a myriarch of the Phagmodru myriarchy, was recorded to have:

> Leaned on the power and got hooked on booze and women. He wore a bamboo hat on his head, Mongolian garments on his body and Mongolian shoes on his

> feet. He held [a] bow and arrows in his hands and sang songs and danced until late at night and slept at daytime. He was a bad man but did not suffer any sanctions.[26]

While the Mongols did not force them, some high officials wore Mongolian garments, which invoked antipathy among Tibetans.[27] Another myriarch is said to have followed and served the Mongol prince of Zhenxi wujing, Temür Buqa, when the latter was stationed in Tibet. Jangchup Gyeltsen said that he even made the Phagmodrupa monastery provide fodder to Temür Buqa's horses. He was removed from the post at the request of the monks of that sect and the approval of the Mongol court.[28]

In addition, the qa'an dispatched many Mongol officials to Tibet with special tasks, which were recorded sporadically. The chief fiscal officer Sangha (*sam-gha* or *sang-gha*, d. 1291)[29] is especially noticeable in Tibetan records. Ethnically he was from the Tibetan Kamalok (*Bka'-ma-log*) tribe, who had lived in Amdo (*A-mdo*) for generations. At first, he was an attendant of Phagspa and was promoted to the chief of the Office of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs. When Phagspa was "in discord with" a Sakya pönchen, Qubilai dispatched Sangha to deal with the problem. When Sangha arrived in Central Tibet, he met the famous Ugyenpa Rinchen Pel (*U-rgyan-pa Rin-chen-dpal*, 1230–1309), a great scholar and alchemist, and arrogantly asked him "What teachings do you know?" to which he received a sarcastic answer from the latter.[30] Because Sangha summoned the chief of the Tselpa sect to court for interrogation, the Tselpa's record severely criticized him as "acting contrary to the law." The record even says that when Sangha was killed under the charge of corruption, the Tselpa chief was pleased, drank beer (*chang*) and sang songs.[31] However, the record of Peljor Zangpo from the Sakyapa says that Sangha made improvements in the postal relay system of Tibet, which pleased all the Tibetan people. Sangha was a great official who had deep belief in the teaching of Buddha and the Sakyapa. Furthermore, according to him, and contrary to the *Yuan shi*, which put him in the Biographies of the Treacherous Subjects, Sangha tried to establish central control of finance in the Yuan in order to put the treasury of the qa'an's government on a firm basis. His project was bound to harm the interests of many of the Mongol *keshig* members, such as Ulug Noyan (*U-lug no-yon*, 1242–1295), one of the four chiefs of the qa'an's *keshig*.[32] Qubilai came to know of the situation and wanted him to improve relations with Ulug Noyan, so Sangha invited him to his home, gave a big feast and asked to become Ulug's *anda* (*an-da*) or blood-brother,[33] only to be ignored and declined. The *keshig* members, including Ulug Noyan, continued to slander him in front of Qubilai and finally the great khan agreed with them and put Sangha to death.[34]

The preceding discussion has shown that the Tibetan evaluations of the Mongols depended on the sect to which the author belonged. It is natural that the biography of Ugyenpa, who kept the Mongols at a distance throughout his lifetime, is critical of Sangha, Qubilai's favorite retainer, while the Tselpa authors cursed this official because he interrogated their chief. As for the Sakyapa, Sangha came to Tibet to solidify Sakya-Mongol rule in Tibet, so their evaluation was bound to be more positive. In addition, because he was like a son of Phagspa,[35] it was a pity to them that after Phagpa's death he did not enjoy patronage in the Mongol court and was put to death by the Mongol aristocracy on a false charge.

Notably, it seems that Phagspa was also blamed by the Tibetan people, which we can surmise from several records. According to a Sakyapa source, when Phagspa came back from the great khan's court to Tibet, a Tibetan man saw him and criticized him for not being a Buddhist monk because he was surrounded by the murderous Mongolians and sitting without reciting sutras. According to the record, even though the man kept his thought to himself, Phagspa read his mind and scolded him severely. The record mentioned that this man realized the truth, saying, "I realize that Phagspa's deed is for taming beings according to their needs (*gangla gang 'dul*). I came to know that killing people, tax, and compulsory post service are according to each person's karma."[36] Phagspa left Tibet at the age of 10 and stayed with Köten and then with Qubilai, who was at first a prince and later the qa'an. After 17 years had passed, he returned to Tibet, setting the boundary between the 13 myriarchies and taking the land and people of other sects by force. This demonstrates the Sakyapa's defense against people's criticism. Firstly, Phagspa went to the Mongol court to tame them through Buddhism. Secondly, the tax and labor extracted by the Mongols occurred because of the *karma* of the Tibetan people. While we do not know in detail how the laity viewed this Mongol sponsorship because most of the authors were monks, this passage gives a glimpse of the Tibetan perception of the monks who were backed by the Mongols. Additionally, it indicates that the Tibetans felt heavily burdened by taxation, especially the post service (*jam*), which was newly imposed by the Mongols, connecting the region to Daidu.[37] It also seems that authors at that time could not blame Phagspa directly. For example, Jangchup Gyeltsen from the Phagmodrupa sect recorded in detail how Phagspa took the land and people of Phagmodrupa by force, but he did not explicitly criticize Phagspa. The reasons for not reproaching Phagspa were that the Mongol court was still powerful and, above all, the Tibetans were taught a lesson during the Drigung rebellion (1285–1290), after which the insurgent Drigungpa sect was severely subdued by the Mongol and Sakya army.[38]

Not all monks who were invited visited the Mongol court. When Phagspa met Ugyenpa in Tibet, the latter said that Avalokitesvara, a *bodhisattva*, appeared in his dreams saying "If you go to Mongolia (*Hor*), your benefit for sentient beings will reach the neck of the foot . . . if you go to Central Tibet, it will reach the crown [of the head]."[39] His words show the thoughts of the non-Sakya monks at that time: namely, the Sakyapa's service to the Mongols was not for the benefit of the Tibetan people. In addition, when Qubilai accused Karma Pakshi (*Karma Pakshi*, 1204–1283)[40] of standing with Ariq Böke, he tortured him nearly to death. When Chung Dorje Drakpa (*Gcung Rdo-rje grags-pa*, 1210–1278) from the Drigungpa sect heard the news, according to the Drigung record, he "flew three days and nights" to Karma Pakshi and consoled and protected him from the torture by supernatural power. When Karma Pakshi was freed and returned to Tibet, he visited Chung Dorje Drakpa, paid respect and gave huge donations to him.[41] Considering that there is no record that Phagspa did anything for Karma Pakshi during the latter's detention, this story shows the sentiment shared by the non-Sakya monks during the Mongol period.[42]

The Mongols' invitation to the Tibetan monks was not a one-time thing. They invited Sakyapa monks to the *ordu*, gave them the title of imperial preceptor and revered them throughout the period of Mongol rule. The power and influence of

Tibetan monks in the Mongol court was also acknowledged by Chinese and Persian sources.[43] Mongol courtiers became their donors, and they conferred Buddhist titles on them and even their ancestors. In return for this, Phagpa, in his famous work the *Elucidation of Knowledge* (*Shes-bya rab-gsal*), said that Chinggis Khan was like a Chakravartin king.[44] It is natural that the Sakyapa monks praise their Mongol patrons, but they were not the only ones. As we saw earlier, the Tselpa sect "had relations" with Qubilai and even after the Sakyapa monks became the imperial preceptors, the Tselpa maintained close relations with him and later qa'ans, gaining large donations. According to the Tselpa record, Qubilai told the secular head of the Tselpa, "You are a family member."[45] It is said that the Tselpa sect had a private chapel for Qubilai and another chapel that had a mural describing the successive Mongolian Dharmarajas.[46] Furthermore, because Hülegü sent substantial donations to the Phagmodrupa sect and was taught Buddhism by the abbot of that sect, Gyelba Rinpoche (*Rgyal-ba Rin-po-che*, 1203–1267), the latter addressed Hülegü as "bodhisattva prince' [*rgyal-bu byang-chub sems-dpa'*] who has become a master of the Buddha's teachings."[47]

Before the Mongol period, Tibetans had invited monks from India and Kashmir for Buddhist teaching, and in return they made large donations to the Indian and Kashmir monasteries. Now the situation had changed. With the virtual destruction of Indian Buddhism, the Tibetans found themselves at the center of the Buddhist world, a notion that was given greater depth and nuance by the circumstance that only Tibetan clerics were sought out by the Xi Xia and the Mongols to occupy the post of imperial preceptor, the highest position in the religious hierarchy of these dynasties.[48]

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MONGOL HISTORY

Chinggisid genealogy

Tibet was placed into a much broader context, beyond Indian history and the spread of Buddhism and into world history, through its connection to the Mongol Empire.[49] The Tibetans of the Mongol period began writing a world history on a smaller scale than the contemporary *Jami' al-Tavarikh*, the first world history, written in Persian. While this grand history, written by a vizier of the Ilkhanate, was a top-down state project funded by the Mongol rulers, the Tibetan world histories were individual productions, wherein the authors had to search for sources in person.

The *Red Annals* (Depter marpo, *Deb-ther dmar-po/ Hu-lan deb-ther*, 1346), "the earliest extant Tibetan example of an attempt at writing a global history,"[50] recorded the genealogy from Börte Chino'a to Chinggis Khan and from Chinggis Khan to Toghan Temür (r. 1333–1370). As for the ancestors of Chinggis Khan, Tibetan sources mentioned that the son of Tamacha, grandson of Börte Chino'a, was *Khyi-ji Mer-khan*,[51] which is very similar to Qiju Mergen of the *Jami' al-Tavarikh*, while the *Secret History* has Qorichar Mergen instead. In addition, neither the *Red Annals* nor the *Jami' al-Tavarikh* has the name Sali Qacha'u as the fifth descendant of Börte Chino'a, while the *Secret History* does. Although these examples show that Tibetan authors used similar sources to those of Rashid al-Din, there are exceptions as well. Rashid's *Jami' al-Tavarikh* referred to the son of Sem Sauchi, the seventh descendant

of Börte Chino'a, as Qali Qachu, for which the Tibetans wrote just *Kha-chu*[52] or *Khab-chu*.[53] We can, therefore, see that the author of the *Red Annals* was not limited to the same sources as the *Jami' al-Tavarikh* or the *Secret History*.

Another noteworthy point in Tibetan historical writings is the records on Tolui, father of Möngke and Qubilai. Phagspa mentioned in the *Elucidation of Knowledge* that Tolui "obtained the rank of emperor (*gyelpo*, *rgyalpo*)[54] and ruled supreme." Tolui was posthumously honored as Ruizong but was not a qa'an. In addition, Phagspa discussed Tolui in another book, "Being resolved to sacrifice even his own life for the sake of his elder brother (that is, Ögödei), he went to become the king of the other world (he died)." This certainly indicates the 'legend' that Tolui offered himself as a sacrifice for Ögödei, drank a bowl of water over which the shamans had pronounced their incantations and shortly afterwards died.[55] This reference coincides with the record of the *Secret History of the Mongols*,[56] the Chinese *Yuan shi*[57] and the Persian *Jami' al-Tavarikh*.[58] It is a typical pro-Toluid narrative that was spread in order to underscore the contribution and sacrifice Tolui had made for the family and empire. Furthermore, the *Red Annals* recorded,

> Because when the Emperor (that is, Chinggis Khan) was alive the two elder sons (that is, Jochi and Chaghadai) had presented documents (*yi-ge*) that they would not struggle for the throne, they were made to administer the right and left wing respectively. Their younger brother Ögödei sat on the throne for six years. . . . Because Tolui Noyan had not presented any document, he struggled for the throne.[59]

From Phagspa's period, the great khans rose from the Toluid line, and Sakya rule of Tibet leaned on them. It is therefore natural that Tibetan historians adopted this pro-Toluid narrative. This narrative is also included in *Yarlung Jowo's Religious History* (*Yar lung jo bo'i chos 'byung*, 1376) and *Archives of China and Tibet* (*Rgya bod kyi yig tshang*, 1434) by Peljor Zangpo, with small variations.

The Sakyapa also sought to bring their own history into line with the new Toluid narrative. The fact that it was prince Köten who first invited Sakya Pandita and his nephews seems to have made the Sakyapa sect hesitate to write about him. Köten was, after all, from the Ögödeid line who were suppressed by the Toluids. The Sakyapa authors therefore wrote that Köten was not just a prince but also an emperor (*rgyal-po*). Next, and more importantly, Köten was moved into the Toluid genealogy, that is, Peljor Zangpo said that the second son of Tolui was *ejen* (*e chen*)[60] Köten. It was not an error; rather, the Sakyapa intended to elevate their position by lifting the status of the man who invited their lama into power. The non-Sakya sources speak the truth in this matter: 'Prince' (*rgyalbu*) Köten summoned Sakya Pandita.[61] Phagmodru sources also referred to Köten by the title of prince. Yet the Sakya narrative, which added their own agenda to the Toluid story, was adopted by the newly rising Gelugpa sect in order to draw legitimacy from the Mongol period: the *New Red Annals* (*Deb-ther dmar-po Gsar-ma*, ca. 1538) therefore also described Köten as an emperor.[62] The Sakya narrative was also handed down to the seventeenth-century Mongol authors of the *Bejeweled Summary of the Origin of Khans* (*Qad-un undusun-u erdeni-yin tobči*, 1662), which mentioned that Köten was an emperor who ruled after Güyük.[63] This transmission shows an irony that the

distorted Tibetan version of Mongol history was later exported to, and accepted by, the Mongols to fill the gap in their own history.

The defeat of the Mongols by the Ming army

Several sources written at the end or right after the Yuan period have brief records on the political situation of the Mongol court during that time. According to *Yarlung Jowo's Religious History* (1376), just before the enthronement of Toghan Temür, astrologers said that if they delayed the enthronement for six months, the reigning period would be as long as that of Sechen Qa'an. El Temür (d. 1333), then the most powerful courtier, agreed and said that he would administer the affairs of state during the interregnum and promised that nothing was more important than the holy life of the ruler.[64] As is well known, El Temür did not want Toghan Temür to ascend the throne, and it seems that he delayed it under the pretext of fortune telling, which Tibetans in the court might have heard and told to other Tibetans. The *Archives of China and Tibet* also recorded this story, with a few variations.[65] These records have a positive view of El Temür's political activities. However, Jangchup Gyeltsen, who suppressed the Sakyapa and ruled Tibet from the mid-fourteenth century,[66] said differently:

> Even the Emperor could not protect his own son and Empress and left them to be killed. Taishi (*thas-sri*) El Temür (*Al thi-mir*) killed all descendants of his saviors. . . . Daidu has been disarranged by the people who attack the loopholes in their laws.[67]

This new ruler of Tibet was well informed of the chaotic circumstances of the Mongol court and that the Mongols could not afford to pay attention to affairs in Tibet. When he was seeing off a new Sakya imperial preceptor (who was hostile toward him) to the court, he threatened the monk, saying, "if you speak ill of me and do harm to me after you arrive at the court, I will also attack your dependents here."[68] In fact, the feebleness of the Mongols was the reason he could grab power in Tibet.[69] Jangchup Gyeltsen could defeat the coalition of Sakya, Drigung and Yazang in 1354 because the Mongol court in Daidu could not concern themselves with Tibetan affairs. This contrasts sharply with the Drigung rebellion, which the Mongol-Sakya army put down mercilessly, reportedly killing 10,000 monks of the Drigungpa sect.

In 1368, Toghan Temür was expelled from Daidu by the Ming army, led by Zhu Yuanzhang, and fled to Mongolia. Tibetan sources suggested two reasons why they were defeated by the Han Chinese. First, it was because they had killed the last emperor of the Southern Song, Zhao Xian (1271–1323), who was exiled to Sakya by Qubilai and took up a monastic life. According to Peljor Zangpo, court astrologers anticipated Zhao Xian would be a threat to Mongol hegemony and the qa'an ordered him to be killed. When he was executed, he cursed the Mongols, saying, "I will be reborn in the next life and seize the kingdom from the Mongols!" He was therefore reincarnated as Da Ming emperor (Zhu Yuanzhang) and overthrew the Mongols.[70] Zhao Xian studied Buddhism and Tibetan language in Tibet and translated several sutras into Tibetan. He was esteemed by the Tibetan people, who called him lhatsün

(*lha-btsun*),[71] and they were enraged by his execution. This narrative of Zhao Xian is the Tibetan commentary on what happened at the Mongol court and why they were defeated by the Da Ming army.

Another reason was explained by Peljor Zangpo. He wrote about a Chinese monk named Lapdé (*Lab-dwe*), who defeated the Yuan and established the Da Ming. Lapdé, the future Zhu Yuanzhang, served the army in Mentse (*Man-tse*) or South China, and was discovered and beaten severely by the crown prince because he had violated two (religious and secular) laws (*khrimsgnyis*). Angered, Lapdé rallied men of the same mind and raised a rebellion against the Mongols. He finally repelled the Mongols from Daidu and established the Da Ming dynasty.[72] What is noticeable is that, according to Peljor Zangpo, his son's speech and behavior were exactly the same as the Mongol emperor, which Lapdé thought auspicious. It reminds us of the so-called Yongle legend ascribing Mongol origins to the Yongle emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang's son. When facing rebellion and military crisis, Toghan Temür was told by his officials that later the throne of China would come back to the Mongols. He believed them and fled with his family and dependents to Mongolia, which shows the Mongols' wish to take back power from the Han Chinese. Peljor Zangpo said that he acquired this information from *baghsi*s (*dpa' shi*), who were at Daidu and witnessed the situation.[73]

CONCLUSION

Most of the Tibetans abhorred the Mongol occupation of their land. Some monks were said to have repelled them with magical power, but it was difficult to defeat the Mongols. Due to their inclusion into the Mongol sphere, they developed a new interest in writing a kind of world history, including the history of China, Xi Xia and the Mongols. Yet the new 'world' perspective was never free from the motive to promote and enforce sect, clan and local interests in competition with others, distorting history to meet their own end. The most significant development was that the invaders embraced Tibetan Buddhism and became ardent supporters and donors to the Tibetan monasteries. Now the Mongol qa'ans and princes were *bodhisattvas* and *dharmarajas* (*chos rgyal*). Financial support by these bodhisattvas did much to create and reinforce beneficent karma for both parties. The support set into motion an unprecedented transfer of imperial wealth to Tibet that had many short- and long-term consequences, from the construction of new monasteries and, concomitant with an increase in the monastic population, the rise of a new aristocratic class.[74] This partnership with the Mongols allowed Tibetans to stand at the center of the Buddhist world.[75] Tibet was invaded and subjugated by an enormous force, but then the subjects became teachers of their lords, the rulers of the Mongol world empire. Previously, China was where the Tibetans learned Buddhism, but now China was treated as just one of the peoples who were taught and initiated into Buddhism by Tibetan lamas.[76] Tibetan historians, most of whom were monks, first criticized the Mongols as brutes and death lords, but after receiving Mongol patronage, they praised the Mongols.

This patron–priest relationship between the Mongols and the Tibetan monks gradually ended with the rout of the emperor to Mongolia. About 200 years later, however, their successors, Sönam Gyatso (*Bsod-nams rgya-mtsho*, 1543–1588) from the newly risen Gyelugpa (*Dge-lugs-pa*) sect and Altan Khan (1507–1582) of the

Mongol Tümed met each other and established their legitimacy by making people believe they were reproducing the relationship of Phagspa and Qubilai. Although it was not until the fifth Dalai Lama's reign that the Gelugpa sect fully seized power in Tibet, the Gelugpa did not have to persuade the Tibetans that this alliance would be a good thing. Rather, they simply followed the trail of the Sakyapa.[77]

NOTES

1 '*Mi-nyag*' or '*Me-nyag*' in Tibetan sources.
2 Sperling 1987; Dunnell 1992.
3 For the Tibetan appellations for the Mongols, see Takao 1977.
4 Ngag-dbang Kun-dga' bsod-nam 1986, 137. See also Hoffmann 1971.
5 See Atwood 2014.
6 Bstan-'dzin padma'i rgyal-mtshan 1989, 118.
7 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 7.
8 Doladai Baūrchi, that is, Doladai ecook. (RDRM, I, 72) In another page, his name appears as Tūladai (RDRM, II, 912). See Masaaki 2004, 477 and RDT, 35.
9 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 7.
10 Everding 2002, 116–117.
11 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 7.
12 See note 6.
13 Jackson 2013.
14 Spyan-snga-ba Rin-chen-ldan 1970, 398; Spyan-snga-ba Rin-chen-ldan 1982, 64. See also Miller 2013, 19.
15 District southwest of Tibet.
16 Spyan-snga-ba Rin-chen-ldan 1970, 398; Spyan-snga-ba Rin-chen-ldan 1982, 64.
17 Petech 1990, 13.
18 Ngag-dbang Kun-dga' bsod-nams 1986, 117.
19 Haw 2014, 42.
20 Petech 1990, 9.
21 'Elder brother' in Mongolian.
22 That is, Sakya Pandita.
23 Qubilai.
24 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 8.
25 See Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1974, 245–246; Sperling 1990.
26 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 16.
27 Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje 1981, 47.
28 Dpal-'byor bzang-po 1979, 341.
29 For Sanggha, see Franke 1993.
30 Vitali 2012, 45; Kuijp 2004a, 321–322.
31 Sørensen and Guntram 2007, 187–188.
32 Yue-er-lu na-yan (月儿鲁那颜) or Yue-lu-lu na-yin (月吕禄那寅) in Chinese sources. His personal name was Yüs Temür. A descendant of Borchu, one of the 'four steeds' of Chinggis Khan.
33 *EMME*, 13.
34 Dpal-'byor bzang-po 1979, 420–421.
35 Sørensen and Guntram 2007, 188.
36 Ngag-dbang Kun-dga' bsod-nams 1986, 221.
37 See Dpal 'byor bzang po 1979, 432–435.
38 Everding 2002.

39 Vitali 2012, 44.
40 Manson 2009.
41 Bstan-'dzin padma'i rgyal-mtshan 1989, 120–121.
42 Choi 2010, 16–17.
43 Langlois 2014, 320; RDRM, I, 451.
44 Tuttle and Schaeffer 2013, 336. Chakravartin, literally 'wheel-turning emperor,' refers to a type of universal monarch within Buddhist cosmology who rules over his domain in accordance with the dharma.
45 Sørensen and Hazod 2007, 188 and 191.
46 Sørensen and Hazod 2007, 189–190. Dharmaraja, chögyel (*chos-rgyal*) in Tibetan, literally 'Buddhism-king,' refers to a king who rules in accordance with Buddhist laws.
47 Samten and Martin 2015, 311.
48 Kuijp 2004b, 54.
49 Sørensen and Hazod 2007, 327.
50 Kuijp 1996, 44.
51 Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje 1981, 29.
52 Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje 1981, 29.
53 See Atwood 2012.
54 The term 'gyelpo' (*rgyal-po*) in Tibetan was equivalent with qa'an during the Mongol period.
55 Szerb 1984, 370–373. See also Kuijp 2010, 131.
56 *SHM* § 272.
57 *YS* 115: 2887.
58 RDT, I, 380.
59 Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje 1981, 29–30; *SHM* § 255.
60 Means 'lord' in Mongolian.
61 Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje 1981, 48.
62 Bsod-nams grags-pa 1989, 50.
63 Haenisch 1955, 42–43.
64 Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje 1981, 31–32.
65 Dpal-'byor bzang-po 1979, 367; YS 3: 816.
66 Kuijp 1991, 277; Gamble and Tso 2015.
67 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 192.
68 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 248.
69 Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan 1989, 336.
70 Dpal-'byor bzang-po 1979, 369–270; Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje 1981, 25.
71 A title for royal descendants who pursue a religious life.
72 See Elverskog 2004.
73 Dpal-'byor bzang-po 1979.
74 Kuijp 2004b, 4.
75 Martin 1992, 532; Kuijp 2004b, 54.
76 Dpal-'byor Bzang-po 1979, II, 35.
77 Choi 2018, 93.

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YS, See List of Abbreviations.

CHAPTER FORTY-EIGHT

THE MONGOLS IN THE EYES OF THE IRANIANS

Michael Hope

Though situated at the western extremity of the Mongol Empire, the Islamic core territories produced some of the most detailed information on their nomadic conquerors. A rich historiographical tradition, combined with extensive trade networks across Eurasia, both of which predated the Mongol Empire, meant that the largely Persian-speaking Muslim population of Iran and Central Asia was in a better position than most to document not only their own experiences of Mongol rule but those of the people around them. The fact that Persian (Farsi) served as one of the chief literary and administrative languages of the Mongol Empire, as well as commerce, further ensured that Iranian writers were well-informed regarding the inner workings of the Chinggisid khanates. Contrary to what might be expected, Mongol rule coincided with a period of immense literary productivity across Iran. The reports, anecdotes, and opinions of the Mongols contained in these sources are equally diverse and were naturally shaped by the genre and the personal experiences of the authors. Nevertheless, we can say that Islam was the most important lens through which the Iranian sources viewed Mongol rule. God was ultimately believed to be responsible for determining the fate of both the Iranians and the Mongols based upon their adherence to Islamic laws, traditions, and expectations. No one seems to have been more aware of this fact than Ghazan Khan and his vizier, Rashid al-Din Fadlallah Hamadani. Together they sought to combine Mongol, Persian, and Islamic political traditions to situate the Ilkhans as millennial rulers and renewers of Islam.

Rashid al-Din's history was built upon close collaboration with the Mongol rulers, which reveals how important relationships of power and patronage were in shaping opinions of the Mongols. This collaboration did not occur exclusively at the Ilkhan *ordu* (camp/court). Indeed, ties between the Mongols and the native population were often more profound in the provincial capitals of Kirman, Khurasan, Anatolia, Iraq, and Mazandaran, among others. Like many earlier conquest dynasties, the Mongols drew upon the expertise, manpower, and resources of their subjects to facilitate their rule, and this in turn produced meaningful partnerships between Mongol governors, commanders, and queens and the largely urban Iranian

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powerbrokers, such as magistrates, scribes, spiritual leaders, and merchants. These connections blossomed into marriage alliances, joint commercial endeavours, and religious conversion, all of which caused the Iranian writers to identify more closely with the Mongol Ilkhan dynasty and their appointees. These ties never resulted in a universal acceptance of the Mongols among the Iranian writers, who were not a monolithic group, but there was a general acceptance that, for better or worse, the Mongols were a part of the political and cultural heritage of Iran.

EARLY PERSPECTIVES

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Persianate world had little knowledge of the Mongols, let alone their homeland in Eastern Inner Asia. The geographies of Ibn Hawqal, Istakhri, and the anonymous *Hudud al-'Alam* only cover as far as the lands of the Ghuzziyya and Kharlukhiyya, which lay to the north and east of Mawarannahr, whilst the later works of Yaqut and Marvazi conceived of East Asia being dominated by China (al-Sin), though the latter author did also reference the Yugur (Uyghur) as one of its component parts.[1] Writing on the Turk in the twelfth century, Marvrudi listed a group named the Tatar alongside the Khitan and Tibetans as some of the most important Turkic peoples of his time. This discovery, most likely facilitated by the expansion of the Qara Khitai Empire in the twelfth century, shows an improved knowledge of the peoples of eastern Inner Asia, if not the geography of the region. The term "Tatar" was later adopted by Islamic writers as a synonym to refer to the Mongols, most likely based upon Marvrudi's earlier work.[2] This may go some way to explaining the earliest account of the Mongol invaders provided by 'Izz al-Din 'Ali Ibn al-Athir (d. 1233), who describes the Mongols as coming from Tamghaj (i.e. Northern China). In the accounts of Shihab al-Din Muhammad Nasawi (1241) and Minhaj al-Din Juzjani (1260), both of whom drew upon Ibn al-Athir, China was ruled by six amirs, one of whom was Chinggis Khan. Chinggis then joined with Güchülüg, another of the six amirs, to overthrow Altan Khan, the ruler of China.[3] These rather sketchy accounts were ultimately replaced by the far more detailed and precise rendering of 'Ala al-Din Juvayni (1258–1283?) and Rashid al-Din (1316), who drew upon information provided by the Mongols themselves. Those who lived through the conquest, however, would have had scant notion of who the Mongols were or where they had come from.

Easily the most profound impression left by the Mongol invaders on the Iranians was their brutality and destructiveness, which invited eschatological explanations. Ibn al-Athir famously declared his reluctance to discuss the Mongol invasion, noting that "it horrified me and I was unwilling to recount it."[4] But recount it he did, and his narrative is replete with gory details of the atrocities committed by the incoming Mongol soldiers, including the murder of millions of Muslims and the destruction of some of their most important cities. A similar catalogue of death and ruin is provided by Juzjani, who, like Ibn al-Athir, remarked on the Mongol invasion as an unprecedented catastrophe. For the earlier author, the Mongol invasion was likely to be the most destructive event until the coming of the people of Gog and Magog at the end of time, though he also noted that even the Antichrist would not cause as much damage as they had done. Juzjani went even further and identified traditions attributed to the Prophet which foretold the coming of the Turk as the first sign

of the impending Judgement Day.[5] This apocalyptic view of the Mongol invasion probably did not stretch the imagination of those who witnessed it. The Mongols' willingness to destroy the cities and people they were conquering defied explanation, unless they had been sent by a higher power to bring about a final reckoning before the end of time, as suggested by the words attributed to Chinggis Khan by 'Ala al-Din 'Ata Malik Juvayni: "If you had not committed great sins, God would not have sent a punishment like me upon you."[6]

The fact that the Mongols had been sent by God did not make them any more popular or their rule any less oppressive. Following the defeat of the Khwarazmshah, Chinggis Khan withdrew east to Mongolia, leaving behind a *daruqachi* (overseer) in Khwarazm. The mandate of this *daruqachi* expanded to include the taxation of Khurasan during the rule of Ögödei (1229–1241) and then Azerbaijan and Persian Iraq during the reign of Möngke (1251–1259). Juvayni notes that these *daruqachi*s spent much of their time at odds with their secretaries and deputies, who were constantly seeking to denigrate them before the khan in the hopes of taking their job.[7] A *daruqachi*'s status rested upon their ability to maintain order while also providing the maximum amount of revenue. Taxes were, therefore, normally quite a heavy burden on the Iranian population and pushed a secondary migration of people west and south to escape the rapacious Mongol officials. It was only during the rule of Möngke that some semblance of balance was imposed on this system, with upper limits placed upon the amount of revenue that could be taken from the largely agrarian population, though how strictly these limits were followed is unclear.[8]

Those living on the frontier of the empire had to contend with the Mongol *tamma* armies, who were charged with aggressively extending the borders of the khan's dominion and causing havoc in the lands of their recalcitrant neighbours. Two such *tamma* armies had been dispatched to the Near East during the rule of Ögödei; the first, under the command of Chormaqan, was posted to Azerbaijan, while the second, under the command of Dayir Noyan, was sent to Afghanistan.[9] Like the earlier Mongol forays into Iran, these armies proved intimidating and destructive. The *tamma* of Chormaqan made violent raids into Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Iraq, where they were described as an elusive, mercurial, and, above all, intimidating force. The *tamma* made almost annual raids into Iraq until Chormaqan's death in 1241, which caused the population to move to the larger, better defended centres like Baghdad and Mosul. When the caliph's armies were finally able to take to the battlefield, they often found it hard to come to terms with the raiders, who would vanish back to Iran.[10] The inability of local armies to defend themselves led to a general sense of insecurity, with the late 'Abbasid historian Ibn al-Sa'i noting that the *hajj* pilgrimage was postponed indefinitely, while anxiety manifested in persecutions against Baghdad's Christian, Jewish, and foreign neighbourhoods who may have been suspected of working with the Mongols.[11]

GOD'S SECRET INTENT

Islam was the primary filter used by the Persian sources to interpret the Mongol conquest. The Mongols were of course not Muslims, yet it was believed that they had been sent by God to test the faith of His subjects and to punish the wicked. Those who suffered defeat at the hands of the Mongols were, therefore, almost universally portrayed as poor rulers and deficient Muslims. Ibn al-Athir upbraided the

leaders of the Muslim world, stating that "each of them looks to his pleasures, his sport and the oppression of his subjects. For me this is more frightening than the enemy."[12] Juzjani likewise argued that the Mongol invasion of the Khwarazmshah Empire had been provoked by Sultan Muhammad's decision to rob and slay the Muslim traders whom Chinggis had sent to his lands, saying, "God willed that this treachery would be the means for the ruin of the empire of Islam."[13] This model was then copied by historians documenting the defeat of the Seljuks at the Battle of Köse Dagh in 1243 and the capture of Baghdad in 1258. In the earlier case, the armies of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw were supposedly defeated after they had become so conceited that one of their commanders boasted that they would triumph over the Mongols even if God was with the Mongols, only to be forced to concede that God had indeed favoured the Mongols once they had been defeated.[14] Likewise, the last caliph, al-Musta'sim (r. 1242–1258) was said to have presided over a series of natural disasters and sectarian riots, all the while spending his treasury on women and music instead of the defence of Islam. According to these sources, the Mongols behaved in the manner to be expected of all *kafir* – spreading destruction and death like a natural disaster. It was the rulers of the Muslim world who deserved rebuke for failing to protect the people trusted to their care.

The widely accepted view that the Mongols were tools to achieve God's greater purpose did leave room for grudging admiration and eventually acceptance of Mongol rule. Although he believed Chinggis Khan was adept at magic and susceptible to the suggestion of demons, Juzjani also reported that the Mongol khan imposed justice upon his people so that they would not so much as pick up a fallen whip, while lying and deception were unknown among them.[15] This view was mirrored by Juvayni, whose father had entered the service of the Mongols and who himself rose to high office under the Ilkhans of Iran. He observed that, although the Mongols had previously been a poor and unruly people, Chinggis Khan had "abolished reprehensible customs which had been practiced by those peoples and had enjoyed recognition amongst them; and established such usages as were praiseworthy from the point of view of reason. There are many of these ordinances that are in conformity with the Shari'at."[16] Indeed, Juvayni was the first of a new generation of Muslim scholar-officials for whom the Mongols did not represent the end of the Muslim world, but rather the beginning of its revitalization. His *Tarikh-i Jahangusha* draws upon both Quranic scripture and Persian and Arabic verse to argue that the Mongols were part of a divine plan that would advance the cause of Islam. He advised his readers to "look to the effects of God's mercy, how he maketh the earth to live after its death," of which there seemed to be no greater sign than Chinggis Khan's heir, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241), whose generosity towards the Muslims was noted even by Juzjani.[17] Both histories brim with examples of Ögödei's generosity and favour towards Muslims, which in turn led Juvayni to conclude that

> For this reason the banner of Islam is raised higher and the candle of the Faith lit brighter, and the sun of the creed of Mohammad casts its shadow over countries whose nostrils had not been perfumed by the scent of Islam.[18]

This new interpretation of the Mongol conquest as part of a divine plan to strengthen the faith and purge it of its enemies has been described by Peter Jackson as "God's secret

intent."[19] It helped the Mongols' Muslim subjects come to terms with the fact that God had seemingly given the pagans victory over them, whilst at the same time providing a useful tool for interpreting the subsequent political history of the Mongol Empire. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of Juvayni's work for later Mongol historiography, as the next generation of historians, including Rashid al-Din, Vassaf-i Hazrat (d. 1329), and Muhammad Shabankara'i (d. 1358), based their work directly on his *Tarikh-i Jahangusha* (History of the World Conqueror).

How God's will manifested itself after the fall of the 'Abbasid caliphate in 1258 was open to interpretation, depending upon the political loyalties of each author. Juzjani, for example, saw hope in the conversion of Berke Khan (r. 1257–1266) of the Jochid Ulus to Islam, whereas Juvayni favoured the claim of his patrons, the Toluids, who had seized power when Möngke Qa'an was crowned in 1251. In his view, and indeed that of Juzjani, Möngke Qa'an had continued Ögödei's benevolent policy towards the Muslims by having the *azan* (call to prayer) recited in his camp and by tasking his brother Hülegü with the eradication of the Nizari Isma'ilis in Iran.[20] Combat with the Isma'ilis was a common source of prestige and legitimacy for Iranian rulers between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries, but Hülegü achieved the near complete eradication of the order, clearly marking him as God's chosen ruler.[21] The fact that neither man was a Muslim, though problematic, was overlooked in view of the old axiom that "a kingdom may last while there is irreligion but it will not endure when there is oppression." This sentiment, which had already been used by Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) to gloss the earlier Seljuk conquest of the Islamic core territories, was supposedly redeployed in a *fatwa* attributed to 'Ali ibn Tawus and the senior doctors of the Mustansiriyya *madrasa* to validate the overthrow of the 'Abbasids by Hülegü in 1258.[22] Moreover, although they were not Muslims themselves, Möngke and Hülegü provided patronage for the construction of mosques, madrasas, and other institutions of learning which could be cited as evidence that they ruled in accordance with Islamic tradition and law.[23] By contrast, their enemies, the Chaghadaid and Ögödeid princes of Central Asia, were characterised as enemies of Islam. Chaghadai in particular was described as an ardent opponent of Islam, who forbade his retinue from even mentioning the religion, whilst Güyük (r. 1246–1248), the last Ögödeid ruler of the empire, was portrayed as either a Christian or Buddhist fanatic, bent on the destruction of Islam.[24] Indeed, a failed coup organised by the Ögödeids shortly after Möngke's coronation was linked by Juvayni to a plot to exterminate the Muslim population of East Turkistan in a sign that the fortunes of the Islamic world were tied to the new Toluid dynasty.[25]

The rather flattering picture of the Mongols portrayed by Juvayni and his successors at the Ilkhan court was not always so clearly represented in the provincial centres of the Ilkhanate, many of which remained under the control of local dynasties. The chronicles produced at their courts tend to adopt a far more ambivalent attitude to the Chinggisids, who could either reinforce or destabilise the local Iranian princelings. The native rulers had to make regular visits to the Mongol *ordu* to maintain the Ilkhan's trust, but garrison armies (*tamma*), overseers (*daruqachii*s), tax-farmers, and envoys were often far more visible to provincial chroniclers than the Ilkhans. Authors like Ibn al-Fuwati (d. 1328) and Karim al-Din Mahmud Aqsarayi (1332–1333), writing in Baghdad and Anatolia respectively, wrote pro-forma endorsements of each of the Ilkhans as spreaders of justice and security, but

they were far more keenly aware of the machinations and intrigues of the Mongol commanders and *diwan* officials who cooperated directly with local rulers to fight off rebellions and foreign enemies, administer the census, and collect tax.

Personal interactions between the Iranian princes and the Mongols produced a complicated picture of Ilkhan rule, which was neither entirely positive or negative. Mongols who were permanently based in a particular territory often had far more congenial relations with the locals than those who were passing through on temporary assignments. Both Ibn Bibi and the anonymous *Tarikh-i Al-i Saljuq* echo the later report of Rashid al-Din that Mongol envoys (*elchi*s) would regularly extort money and provisions from the towns and villages they visited on their travels through Anatolia, often forcing the population to migrate west into the lands of the Turkmen beyliks.[26] The temporary deployment of Chinggisid princes, like Ejai (1271) and Qonqurtai (1279), to repel Turkmen invasions likewise proved a source of trouble as they indiscriminately punished the entire population of Anatolia.[27] Yet there are also accounts of cooperation and mutual dependence between Mongol garrisons and local powerbrokers, which suggest a blurring of the lines between the conquerors and the conquered. The *waqfnama* of Nur al-Din ibn Jaja, whose family served the Seljuk dynasty before the arrival of the Mongols, is one such example. His charitable endowment of land, which begins with praise of the defunct ʻAbbasid dynasty, was recorded in both Arabic and Mongolian, complete with a date according to the Mongol zoological horoscope. Most important, however, was the fact that the document contained the names of the local Mongol garrison commanders who endorsed the endowment. Not only the senior Mongol commanders but also their junior officers, signed off on the *waqf*, illustrating the need for cooperation between the Seljuk aristocracy and the new Mongol leadership.[28]

These close relationships played an important role in the gradual Islamization of the Mongols. As Judith Pfeiffer has noted, this process most likely began in the provinces before moving to the *ordu* and was influenced by an array of factors, including marriages, trade ties, and political alliances, which served to integrate the Mongol and native populations. The rate and scale of this conversion is hard to measure but most likely began even before the arrival of Hülegü to Iran in 1256.[29] By the reign of Arghun (r. 1284–1291), however, the *Tarikh-i Al-i Saljuq* reports that the Mongol troops in Anatolia stood alongside the Muslims in celebrating the *ʻayd-i qurban* (festival of the sacrifice).[30] Such references are often short and without much detail, but they do confirm the spread of Islam among the Mongol armies. A similar case is presented in the *Tarikh-i Qarakhitayan*, which states that a Mongol commander who accompanied Terkan Khatun (r. 1257–1282) to her patrimony of Kirman in 1265 had also converted to Islam.[31] By the end of the thirteenth century, however, the list of converts included senior officials, such as Amir Nawruz, the commander of Khurasan, and Amir Choban, who came to prominence for his bravery during the reign of Arghun Khan (r. 1284–1291). These Muslim converts were generally treated more favourably by the provincial chronicles, though this was not always the case. Choban was praised for his piety by Shaykh ʻAla al-Dawla Simnani (d. 1336) and was described by Darvish ʻAli Buzjani (1523) as enjoying cordial relations with Shaykh Shihab al-Din Isma‘il of Jam, but the same sources claim that Nawruz was spurned by these Islamic mystics, despite his best efforts to mollify them with patronage and shows of deference.[32] Apparently even the Sufi *tariqa*s were involved

in the factional struggles at the Ilkhan court, and their political preferences dictated how individual Mongol princes and commanders were represented in their texts.

The gradual Islamization of the Mongols in Iran culminated in the conversion of the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1295, at which point there was a more concerted effort towards shaping an Ilkhan historical narrative. The chief author of this new Ilkhanid tradition was Rashid al-Din Fazlallah Hamadani, a Persian physician of Jewish extraction who had converted to Islam and took up office in the household of Ghazan's grandfather Abaqa before entering the service of Ghazan himself in Khurasan.[33] His *Tarikh-i Mubarak-i Ghazani* (Blessed History of Ghazan) was simply one of a number of histories produced at the beginning of the fourteenth century, ostensibly celebrating the Ilkhan's conversion to Islam as the beginning of a new age. Indeed, Jonathan Brack has recently suggested that the core of Rashid al-Din's narrative was most likely lifted from another history commissioned by Ghazan and written by 'Abd Allah Qashani, who also wrote a volume on the reign of Ghazan's brother Öljeitü.[34] Earlier histories included the *Nizam al-Tavarikh* (1275) of Qadi Nasir al-Din 'Abdallah Baydawi, the anonymous *Akhbar-i Mughulan* (1282), and the *Tarikh* of Vassaf-i Hazrat (1302). Charles Melville has noted that Baydawi's *Nizam al-Tavarikh* in particular situated the Mongol Ilkhans alongside earlier Iranian dynasties in a line stretching all the way back to Adam and the mythical kings of the *Shahnama*. Baydawi was one of a number of historians to identify the Ilkhanate with '*Iran-zamin*' (Greater Iran), whilst also drawing parallels between Ghazan and the likes of Rustam, Hatim Ta'i, and Khusraw Anushirvan, marking him out as an archetypal Iranian king. Yet he also sought to emphasise Ghazan's patronage for religious and charitable endowments, which promoted the health of the Islamic *umma* and the spread of the faith, prompting "the people of Islam to love him."[35]

Rashid al-Din moved in a significantly different direction, presenting Ghazan and his brother Öljeitü as universal rulers, sent by God to revitalise Islam. Rashid al-Din was a student of Juvayni's earlier history, and he sought to portray the reign of Ghazan as the final stage in God's plan. Drawing upon Qashani's manuscript, the *Siyasatnama* of Nizam al-Mulk, and the *Mirsad al-'Ibad* of Najm al-Din Razi, Rashid al-Din portrayed Ghazan as a divinely inspired lord of the auspicious conjunction (*sahib qiran*).[36] In his rendering, Ghazan was an all-knowing adept; a master of many sciences, crafts, and languages; a natural ruler, who showed signs of kingship from the cradle; one whose every action was blessed with good fortune and success.[37] As the khan who reconciled the Chinggisid and Muslim traditions, Rashid al-Din presented Ghazan as a new source of royal emulation and included an extensive catalogue of the wise advice and auspicious edicts enacted during Ghazan's rule. These wise sayings, or *bilig*s, many if not most of which were surely the creations of Rashid himself, not only served to glorify Ghazan but also provided a roadmap for his successors to follow.[38] Indeed, the *Tarikh-i Mubarak-i Ghazani* was only completed during the reign of his brother Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316), who made sure to show due reverence to his legacy by making regular pilgrimages to the latter's tomb.[39]

MONGOLS AS PERSIAN KINGS

Rashid al-Din's history, combined with the patronage of his family, had a profound influence on the writers who followed him, including Davud Banakati (1317),

Hamdallah Mustawfi (1335), and Ahmad Tabrizi (1337–1338). Without necessarily adopting the same messianic tone as Rashid al-Din, each of these writers incorporated the narrative of Rashid al-Din into their histories, which situated Ghazan as the catalyst for a new age of Islamic Persian kingship. Banakati, who served as the court panegyrist of Ghazan's reign, provided an abbreviated account of Rashid al-Din's *Tarikh-i Mubarak*, replete with poetry praising Ghazan as the "*mahdi akhar-i zaman*" (messiah of the end of times) and noting that "the faith and state will remain secure for as long as he is alive."[40] For their part, Ahmad Tabrizi and Hamdallah Mustawfi sought to bring the reign of Ghazan and his successors into line with popular Persian literary conventions. The Ilkhanid period coincided with the proliferation of *Shahnama* manuscripts, and both men adapted Rashid al-Din's historical narrative to verse, imitating the style of Firduwsi and acting as his continuators.[41] Stephen Kamola has noted that Hamdallah Mustawfi's *Zafarnama* also incorporates aspects of the mirror for princes genre, in which he presents Ghazan meeting with his vizier, Rashid al-Din, and receiving regular lessons on good kingship, often explained in the form of anecdotes with reference to heroes from Iran's past, such as Hatim Ta'i, Alexander, Mahmud of Ghazna, and Bahram Gur. These stories complemented an abbreviated list of the *bilig*s of Ghazan, which continued the process begun by Rashid al-Din of situating Ghazan as a model for good Persian-Mongolian kingship.[42]

Each of the aforementioned authors benefited from a close relationship with Ilkhanid patrons. Rashid al-Din was not only an intimate of Ghazan, but a long-serving member of his household with alliances among the senior Mongol amirs, not least Qutlughshah and Amir Choban, two of the leading figures in the final decades of Ilkhan rule. The same could be said for Hamdallah Mustawfi, who served the Ilkhan *diwan* in addition to enjoying the patronage of Rashid al-Din's son and eventual successor, Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad. Others outside the Ilkhan's immediate circle pursued the patronage of Mongol governors and commanders. Nasir al-Din Munshi Kirmani dedicated his *Simt al-'Ula'* (1320) on the history of Kirman to the commander Esen Qutlugh, whose family were of Uyghur extraction. Kirmani described him as the *sahib qiran* and Bahram of greatness. Yet he also claimed that Esen Qutlugh was descended from Altan Khan, giving him a pedigree second only to the Chinggisids. Kirmani praised Esen Qutlugh as a patron of both literature and '*ilm* (knowledge), in which capacity he was an example to all warriors.[43] Karim al-Din Aqsarayi likewise dedicated his history of Anatolia to the Mongol commander, Timurtash the son of Choban, whom he dubbed the *mahdi al-zaman*, comparing his government to the caliphate of 'Umar and the reign of Fraydun.[44] The conversion of the Mongols to Islam presented new possibilities for the Muslim scholars to win patronage by portraying the Mongols as protectors of the faith and paragons of good kingship.

This all meant that the Chinggisids were fully incorporated into the Iranian historical narrative. Even as early as 1302, Ibn al-Tiqtaqa's mirror for princes, entitled *Tarikh al-Fakhri*, held up Juvayni's accounts of Ögödei as a model of good charitable kingship. Although his work focuses primarily upon the earlier 'Abbasids and Seljuks, Ibn al-Tiqtaqa claimed that "history does not record, nor biography contain mention of a dynasty enriched with as much military and civil obedience as the victorious Mongol dynasty."[45] In a similar vein, the manual of secretarial composition penned by Muhammad b. Hindushah Nakhjivani for the Jalayirid prince Shaykh Uways (1366) drew upon Rashid al-Din's *Tarikh-i Mubarak* for stories of

Ghazan's compassion towards the common people alongside similar stories about 'Ali ibn Abu Talib and Alptegin, suggesting that the Ilkhan had truly become an exemplar of good kingship for later dynasties.[46] Alongside these works, the *Ghazan-nama* of Nuri, which was also dedicated to Shaykh Uways in 1362, provided yet another verse rendering of Rashid al-Din's *Tarikh-i Mubarak*, to which the author added new fanciful adventures. These episodes, which typically begin with Ghazan going hunting, see him enter a hidden cave to slay a dragon and retrieve the crown of Alexander, meet with wisemen whom he quizzes on kingship and faith, and of course engage in romantic trysts with his wives Bulughan Khatun and Kökechin, based upon comparisons with the story of *Layla and Majnun*.[47] In short, Ghazan had become an epic hero, whose legacy survived the collapse of his dynasty.

CONCLUSION

The Ilkhan historiography pushed by Rashid al-Din and his acolytes was never accepted entirely, especially among the provincial dynasties, which could not claim Chinggisid heritage. Many of the sources written after the decline of the Ilkhanate are ambivalent towards the Mongols, on the one hand lamenting the destruction caused by the initial invasion, whilst also recalling the stability and prosperity of Ghazan's reign with clear fondness. This nostalgia for the late Ilkhanid period became especially acute after the death of the last effective Ilkhan, Abu Sa'id, in 1335 and the division of the Ilkhanate into a series of warring states. Forced to flee as a result of the conflict in his own home in 1349–1350, the historian Amuli mourned the passing of the Ilkhanate, especially the time of Abu Sa'id, stating, "in truth, there was never a padishah or a century in which there was such felicity and blessings."[48] His comments were echoed by his continuator Zahir al-Din Mar'ashi (d. 1489), who noted that for the eighty years of Ilkhan rule, "Iran was free from attack, especially in the time of the sultanate of Ghazan Khan, Öljeitü Khan Khudabanda and Abu Sa'id Bahadur Khan."[49] This prosperity may have only been the invention of Juvayni and Rashid al-Din, but their historical narrative proved highly resilient. As late as the sixteenth century, the Safavid cataloguer Qadi Ahmad included the *bilig*s of Chinggis Khan and Ghazan alongside the stories of other exemplary Iranian rulers in his *Tarikh-i Nigaristan* (1569), a mirror for princes presented to the Safavid monarch Shah Tahmasp.[50] The Mongols had been given their place among the Iranian dynasties of the past and their history would inform later traditions of Persian kingship.

NOTES

1 Yaqut 1957, III, 440; Ibn Hawqal 1992, 381; al-Istakhri 1927, 284, *HA* 94–100.
2 Marvrudi 1927, 47; Biran 2005, 98.
3 *KFTR*, 204; Nasawi 1965, 7–10; *TNR*, 936–937.
4 *KFTR*, 202.
5 *KFTR*, 202; *TNR*, 935 & 1259; May 2018, 42.
6 *HWC*, 105; May 2018, 32–57.
7 *HWC*, 497–508.
8 *HWC*, 519–521.
9 May 2020, 276–277; May 2017, 97.

10 Ibn al-Fuwati 1381/2002, 17–18, 52, 61.
11 al-Dhahabi 1419/1999, XLVI, 38; Ibn al-Fuwati 1381/2002, 41 & 91.
12 *KFTR*, 304.
13 *TNR*, 967.
14 Ibn Bibi 1971, 238, 244.
15 *TNR*, 1077–1079.
16 *HWC*, 25.
17 *HWC*, 4; *TNR*, 1106.
18 *HWC*, 13.
19 Jackson 2009, 209. Also see Lane 2013, 2; Atwood 2010, 119.
20 *TNR*, 1283; *HWC*, 600.
21 *HWC*, 725.
22 Ibn al-Tiqtaqa 1947, 14; Tusi 2002, 12. Ibn al-Tiqtaqa states that Hülegü specifically sought a ruling "as to whether a just infidel emperor were better or a believing unjust emperor."
23 Lane 2003, 19.
24 *TNR*, 1111, 1144; Shabankara'i 1984, 255; Haravi 2016, 200.
25 *HWC*, 48–53.
26 Jalali, ed. 1377/1957, 111; Ibn Bibi 1971, 283.
27 al-Yunini 1955, III, 34; Ibn Shaddad 1983, 62; Aqsarayi 1984, 127.
28 Temir 1989, 163–164; Shiraiwa 2020, 39–52.
29 Pfeiffer 2012, 369–389.
30 Jalali ed. 1377/1957, 120.
31 Bastani Parizi ed. 1976, 196.
32 Simnani 1988, 185 & 190; Buzjani 1966, 71, 103.
33 Jahn 1967, 79–87; Krawulsky 2011, 122.
34 Brack 2016, 135–139; Kamola 2019, 33. Also see Pfeiffer 2013, 57–71. For an alternative view, see Morgan 1997, 179–188.
35 Melville 2007, 62; Fragner 1997, 121–131.
36 Petrushevsky 1970, 152; Brack 2016, 149, 165, 173; Kamola 2019, 91.
37 RDRM, II, 1210 & 1336–1339.
38 RDRM, II, 1326–1540.
39 Qashani 1969, 44, 74, 83.
40 Banakati 2000, 466, 468.
41 Tabrizi n. 2780; Ward 1983.
42 Kamola 2019, 166–168; Ward 1983, 431–479.
43 Kirmani 1983, 8–10.
44 Aqsarayi 1984, 4, 6, 325.
45 Ibn al-Tiqtaqa 1947, 20 & 23.
46 Nakhjivani 1964, I, 73, 104, 181, 199.
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48 Amuli 2014, 122.
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CHAPTER FORTY-NINE

THE MONGOLS IN THE EYES OF THE RUS'

Donald Ostrowski

The Rus′ian sources provide testimony regarding the *Ordu* (in Russian, the term is *Orda)*, not the Mongol Empire as a whole. For them, the *Ordu* was the Ulus of Jochi, to which the descriptive term "Qipchaq Khanate" has been used by later historians. No source contemporary to its existence refers to the Ulus of Jochi as "Golden Horde" (*Zolotaia orda*), which in the context of that time would be applicable only to a palace or encampment.[1]

Those Russian sources that carry testimony regarding the Ulus of Jochi and its successor states can be divided into three genres: (1) chronicles, (2) tales and saints' vitae, and (3) documents (such as official and state papers). One can further categorize the sources according to provenance, whether they were written by churchmen or government officials. After the initial expression of bafflement for the first Mongol incursion in 1223, those sources written by churchmen went through three chronological stages of interpretation: 1237–1252 (pejorative Christian religious denigration); 1252–1448 (neutral description); 1448+ (return to pejorative Christian religious denigration). Those sources written by government officials remained neutral in wording throughout.

RUSSIAN VIEWS OF THE MONGOL INCURSIONS

The first mention of the Mongols appears *sub anno* 1223 in three early chronicles – the Laurentian, the Suzdal′, and the Novgorod I. The Laurentian and Suzdal′ chronicles are in the same Laurentian manuscript codex, which dates to 1377. The current consensus is that both chronicles derive from a non-extant compilation (*svod*) of 1305. Since there is a gap of 154 years between the time of the entry and the extant manuscript, and a gap of 72 years between the time of entry and the supposed source compilation, we need to search for independent confirmation that the 1223 entry was not altered significantly in the subsequent copying and editing. The Novgorod I Chronicle of the Older Redaction provides that confirmation because it represents an independent chronological line and because the entries

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about the coming of the Mongols coincide. These chronicle accounts describe the Mongols (Tatars) as defeating the Rus' princes "because of our sins":

> That same year, [Novg. I and Suzdal' chronicles add: for our sins, unknown] peoples [*iazytsi*] came, [Suzdal' Chronicle adds: Godless Moabites called Tatars] whom no one knows well, who they are, nor from where they came, nor what their language is, nor of what tribe *[plamene]* they are, nor what their faith is. But they call them Tatars, and others say Taumen, and others Pechenegs, and others say that they are those of whom Methodius, Bishop of Patmos, testifies, that they came out from the Etrian Desert, which is between East and North.[2]

When the Mongols returned home, the chroniclers reported: "we do not know from where they came and to where they went again only God knows [Novg. I adds: whence he fetched them against us for our sins]."[3]

Initially, the chroniclers used pejorative language about the Mongols, drawing on Christian religious terminology.[4] In descriptions of the conquests of 1237–1240, the Mongols are characterized as "godless," "lawless," and "accursed," but phrases like "there was no opposing the wrath of God" also appear.[5] Perhaps the fullest expression of this viewpoint appears in the Novgorod I Chronicle's account of the Mongol conquest of Rus':

> Let brothers, fathers, and children, whoever see God's infliction on the entire Rus' land not weep. God loosed the pagans on us because of our sins. God, in his wrath, brought foreigners against the land, and thus crushed by them they [the Rus' people] will remember God. . . . God punishes lands that have sinned either with death or famine or an infliction of pagans or drought or heavy rain or other punishment, to see if we will repent and live as God bids us.[6]

These expressions indicate a genuine bafflement on the chroniclers' part concerning who the Mongols were because they did not fit into the existing Rus' worldview. The claim that the Mongols were sent to punish the Rus' for their sins is a *topos* that served to place the Mongols' existence within the context of a Christian universe.

When the Mongols returned to the western steppe, the chroniclers used the same rhetorical tropes they had used to denigrate the Polovtsians (Qipchaqs) earlier. But this particular interpretative paradigm ended in northeastern Rus' within fifteen years of the Mongol conquest.

RUSSIAN VIEWS OF THE ULUS OF JOCHI

After 1252, in areas where the Rus' Church was under the Patriarch of Constantinople, we find an absence in the sources of the pejorative terminology that characterized the initial reception.[7] The elimination of pejorative terminology and the neutralizing of the descriptions of the Mongols in northeastern Rus' sources were probably the result of the alliance between Byzantium and the Ulus of Jochi. It would not have been appropriate for Rus' chroniclers to write critically about an ally of the Byzantine Empire. This alliance, except for brief exceptions, remained in place until the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. In addition, the Church

benefited from the patronage of the khan through freedom of worship, being allowed to own land, and exemption from taxation. Rus′ churchmen, in return, prayed for the well-being of the khan and his family. In addition, the Rus′ Church in 1261 established an archiepiscopal see in Sarai, the prelate of which attended to the Rus′ princes and their entourages when they journeyed there to fulfill their duties to the khan. The archbishop of Sarai also acted as diplomatic liaison with Constantinople. Before Özbeg Khan's conversion to Islam in the early fourteenth century, there may also have been some hope that the archbishop would have a hand in converting the khans and their court to Orthodox Christianity.

The chroniclers and other writers describe the relationship of the Rus′ princes and prelates to the rulers of the Qipchaq Khanate in a matter-of-fact way, never going into detail about why the Mongols were ruling Rus′. In the fourteenth century, for example, the chronicles describe many trips of the Rus′ princes and grand princes to the capital of the Jochid Ulus but rarely provide a reason for those trips. The closest statement of explanation comes from the author of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, where, *sub anno* 1287, he writes: "for at that time the princes of Rus′ were Tatar subjects, having been conquered by God's wrath."[8]

In yearly entries and compilations made between 1252 and 1448, Rus′ ecclesiastical writers and chroniclers describe Mongol-Tatar raids as though those raids were motivated by God with the Mongol-Tatars' acting as divine agents. The phrase "favored by God and the tsar" (i.e., the Tatar khan) appears frequently in the chronicles.[9] Any disparaging verbiage directed at the Tatars found in a northern Rus′ chronicle entry between 1252 and 1448 can be easily traced to a later interpolation in that entry during redaction or revision after 1448.

One of the more cryptic episodes described in Rus′ chronicles is the Mongol-Tatar campaign to the Suzdal′ land against Alexander Nevskii's brother Andrei in 1252.[10] The problem is exacerbated by contradictory reporting in the sources. The chronicles and the *Life of Alexander Nevskii* treat the Tatar campaign in a variety of ways but are chary about supplying crucial details. The *Novgorod I Chronicle (Older Redaction)* does not mention this episode at all.[11] The *Suzdal′ Chronicle* (titled *Continuation of the Suzdal′ Chronicle according to the Academy Copy* in *PSRL*) states that Nevriui (it is not specified as to who he was or who sent him) went against Andrei Iaroslavich and chased him beyond the sea.[12] The *Laurentian Chronicle* (titled *Suzdal′ Chronicle according to the Laurentian Copy* in *PSRL*) states that Andrei "with his boyars thought to run rather than serve the khan and he fled to an unknown land with his princess and his boyars."[13] Without mentioning the name of Nevriui, the chronicle continues that the Tatars chased after Andrei and went to Pereyaslavl, where they fought a battle. Then "the Tatars scattered throughout the land," perhaps in search of Andrei. They killed the commander (*voevoda*) Zhidoslav, and they took "the princess" and "children" away. They also "took numerous people as well as horses and cattle and caused much misery when they left."[14] Later (post-1448, pre–*Nikon Chronicle*) chronicles state that Nevriui went "against the Suzdal′ land" as well.[15] To this story, the sixteenth-century *Nikon Chronicle* introduces, besides other anti-Tatar elements, an anti-Tatar speech that it puts in the mouth of Andrei Iaroslavich: "O Lord, why do we quarrel among ourselves and lead the Tatars against one another! It would be better for me to flee to a foreign land than to be friends with, and serve, the Tatars."[16] This speech does not appear in earlier

chronicles but does represent the further development of an idea that was expressed in the fourteenth-century *Laurentian Chronicle* and the fifteenth-century *Simeonov Chronicle sub anno* 1252: "Prince Andrei Iaroslavich thought with his boyars that it was better to flee than to serve the khan."[17] The *Nikon Chronicle* changes the focus from a specific political decision not to serve Batu to a general religious decision not to serve the Tatars. Although Batu was not Muslim, the Rus' Church, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was promoting the idea that a "Russian" was someone who accepted Christianity under the aegis of the head of the Rus' Church, and by that time being "Tatar" was equated with being Muslim.

The First Redaction of the *Life of Alexander Nevskii* (from the fifteenth century) implies that Alexander went to see Batu in 1249 and an unnamed khan in 1262/1263 just before his death but does not mention Alexander's trip of 1252. The *Nikon Chronicle* interprets it differently by explaining that Alexander left Andrei in charge of Vladimir and the Suzdal' land while he was gone, since he (Alexander) had been grand prince of Vladimir and all Rus' all along, in the view of the chronicler. In neither instance do the authors of these texts stipulate any connection between Alexander's trip and the khan's move against Andrei. None of the extant chronicles has Alexander complain to the khan about Andrei during his 1252 trip to Sarai, as the nineteenth-century Russian historian Sergei M. Solov'ev had proposed.[18]

It seems that Andrei thought better of his decision not to "serve the Tatars" or to recognize the right of the khan of the Jochid Ulus to review the *yarligh* to the grand prince of Vladimir, for, despite the report in a few chronicles of Andrei's demise in exile,[19] most of the others report that by 1256 he was back in Rus' as the prince of Suzdal', traveled with Alexander to Sarai in 1257 and died in 1264.[20]

Another case highlights a typical problem one encounters in dealing with chronicle information about the Mongol/Tatars. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle characterizes Noqai, who ruled the western part of the Ulus of Jochi under the ostensible overlordship of the khan from the 1260s until 1299, as "lawless," "damned," and "accursed." Yet those epithets do not seem justified within the context of the chronicler's description of what Noqai was supposed to have done. Under the entry for 1277 (6785),[21] the chronicle characterizes Noqai as "accursed and lawless," but the accompanying text describes Noqai responding to complaints by the Rus' princes Lev Danilovich, Mstislav Danilovich, and Volodimir Vasil'kovich about the Lithuanians. Noqai sends his envoys with documents. He instructs those Rus' princes to accompany the army he is sending led by the commander (*voevoda*) Mamshei against the Lithuanians.[22] Under the entry for 1280 (6788), Prince Lev Danilovich is described as going to the "accursed damned Noqai" for help in going against the Poles. In response, Noqai sends the "accursed Konchak, Kozei, and Kubatan to help him."[23] Under the entry for 1282 (6790) [=1285], the chronicler again characterizes Noqai as "accursed and lawless" but describes him as going with Khan Töle Buqa against the Hungarians and as ordering four Rus' princes to accompany them against their common enemy.[24] At this point, as well as later in the text, the Rus' chronicler states that "the princes of Rus' were Tatar subjects," one of the few times this is acknowledged in the Rus' sources. And the Galician-Volhynian chronicler uses the phrase "for at that time the Rus' princes were under Tatar rule" (*v voli tatar'skoi*) to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Jochid khan.[25] Later in the same chronicle but still under 1287, the chronicler declares, "God sent His sword against us which

serves His wrath for the proliferation of our sins" and explains that "at the time the princes of Rus′ were subject to (*v voli*, lit. in the power of) the Tatars having been conquered by God's wrath." The text does not make clear how any of these actions make Noqai lawless, damned, or accursed. He appears to be just the opposite, for the chronicler describes Noqai as sending armies to help Rus′ princes combat their enemies at their request and including Rus′ princes along with his army against a common enemy – the Hungarians.

In addition, the chronicler specifically indicates under the entry for 1283 (6791) [=1287] that on the way back from another campaign against the Poles, Töle Buqa and his army ravaged the land of Prince Lev but that the "accursed Nogai" did not take part in this devastation of a Rus′ prince's land because he went a different route.[26] Töle Buqa is also characterized by the chronicler as "accursed and lawless" although fewer times than Noqai is. The chronicler denigrates Noqai but provides no reason for doing so. One possibility is that Noqai was supposed to have converted to Islam, but the chronicler never mentions that occurrence. The Galician-Volhynian chronicler was not under the authority of the metropolitan of Rus′. The rulers of Galicia-Volhynia received authorization from the patriarch in Constantinople to establish their own separate autocephalic church.[27] Therefore, they were not constrained by the same diplomatic pressures that precluded church writers from denigrating the Mongol/Tatars.

After 1448, the chronicles in the area of the Rus′ Church under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan of All Rus′, Iona, revert to the pre-1252 pejorative terminology about the Tatars. Nonetheless, one can extract some information about those khanates. The compilation of the *Nikon Chronicle* represents an important stage in the revision of the Muscovite virtual past.[28]

We can see three types of interpolation of earlier chronicle entries by the editor of the *Nikon Chronicle*.[29] The first type is the simple revision, which modifies an earlier entry that is neutral toward the Tatars to put an anti-Tatar spin on it. The second type of interpolation is the double-layered revision, where a post-1448 but pre–*Nikon Chronicle* revision puts an anti-Tatar spin on an earlier entry and is then further revised and enhanced in the *Nikon Chronicle*. The third type of interpolation is inclusion of anti-Tatar material where no previous entry exists in the earlier chronicles. The chroniclers were aware that Rus′ princes had often allied with the Tatars, although after 1448 the chroniclers openly deplore such alliances.

In their depiction of the Tatars, the chronicles after 1448 proceed along an increasingly radical trajectory. Whereas the *Nikon Chronicle* represents a culmination of textual modifications and interpolations in the chronicle representations of the Mongols, of Batu, and of Alexander Nevskii, *Great Menology* (*Velikie Minei Cheti*) and *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia kniga*) do not draw on the *Nikon Chronicle* accounts about the mid-thirteenth century. Instead, they draw on pre–*Nikon Chronicle* accounts. The *Great Menology* and *Book of Degrees* do, however, represent a further conceptual development of the "cruel Mongols" that is depicted in the *Nikon Chronicle*.

The chronicles also variously describe the so-called Stand on the Ugra of 1480.[30] A prominent feature of the interpretive paradigm was to turn the events in the fall of 1480, in which Ivan III and Ahmed Khan and their armies faced off against each other over the Ugra River for a couple of weeks, into a major historical event. Ahmed

Khan had moved his army to the southwestern border of Muscovy in the hope of meeting up with a Polish-Lithuanian army under Kazimierz IV Jagiełłonczyk, the king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania, and of proceeding together with it against the Muscovite army. But Kazimierz did not show up, possibly because Ivan had arranged for his own ally, Mengli Girei Khan, to attack the southern reaches of Kazimierz's realm with his Crimean Tatar forces. Eventually, on November 11, according to the chronicle account, Ahmed and his army withdrew. The chronicles of the time depict the Rus' and Tatar armies as disinclined to fight each other.

Vassian Rylo, the archbishop of Rostov and member of the war council, wrote a harsh letter to Ivan III upbraiding him for his indecisiveness. Although the standoff at the Ugra River was not unlike a number of other steppe military encounters, where neither side obtained military superiority, Vassian viewed the events differently. Not much of political, military, or diplomatic significance occurred at the Ugra in November 1480, other than that it was the last encounter between the Muscovite grand prince and the khan of the Qipchaq Khanate. Churchmen, nonetheless, developed their subsequent descriptions of this non-battle into an event of major importance, depicting it as the overthrow of Tatar domination. In the 1550s, an account of the "Stand on the Ugra," written by a churchman, presented it as one of the most significant occurrences in the history of the world.[31] Another event that was made prominent by this interpretive paradigm was the battle on the Don River in 1380, which will be discussed later. Instead of the Muscovite grand prince providing Rus' forces in support of Toqtamish Khan in a civil war, the battle was depicted as Dmitrii Donskoi's defeat of the Tatars.

TALES AND SAINTS' VITAE

Both tales (*povesti*) and saints' vitae (*zhitiia*) are narratives written by ecclesiastical writers, usually monks. Tales could be about secular personages, such as the *Tale about Tsarevich Peter* (*Povest' o Petre, Tsareviche Ordynskom*) or events such as the *Occurrence beyond the Don* (*Zadonshchina*) or the *Tale about the Battle with Mamai* (*Povest' o Mamaevom poboishche*). But a tale could also be written about a prelate or monk that the tale writer wanted to be considered for sainthood. If the subject of the tale was declared a saint by the Rus' Church, then the tale (*povest'*) became a *vita* (*zhitie*). Tales and saints' vitae could be incorporated into a chronicle or be copied as stand-alone works. Rus' saints' vitae are an offshoot of Byzantine saints' vitae. Whereas scholars have used Byzantine saints' vitae as sources of historical evidence, they have found Rus' saints' vitae to be more problematic. The Russian historian Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii (1841–1911), in his study of Rus' saints' vitae as a historical source, concluded that the rules and commonplaces were followed so rigidly that they could provide little of value for the scholarly investigator. He did allow, however, that the miracle stories attached subsequently to the end of a saints' vitae might provide some evidence concerning the time of their writing.[32]

Tales and saints' vitae present, with some exceptions, highly stylized testimony in regard to the Tatars. Those that were written between 1252 and 1448 in northeastern Rus' exhibit the same neutral attitude the chronicles do (provided they were not interpolated later). An example is the *Tale about Tsarevich Peter*, the composition

of which can be dated to the mid-fourteenth century, which describes in a neutrally worded way the adjudication by the Jochid khan of a land dispute in Rostov.[33]

Other tales and saints' vitae written before 1448 that were interpolated after that year often display contradictions in their narratives. A typical kind of contradiction one encounters is the name of the khan whom Alexander Nevskii went to see and who sent the Tatar expedition against Rus′ in 1252, that is, whether it was Batu or Sartaq. The account under 1247/1248 of the killing of Batu, "the impure khan," by King Vladislav of Hungary[34] helps to explain this contradiction. This story, the *Tale about the Death of Batu* (*O ubienii Batieve*), is a fabrication that first appears in chronicles of the second half of the fifteenth century.[35] One also finds a version of it in the sixteenth-century Vasilii-Varlaam Redaction of the *Life of Alexander Nevskii*[36] and in the sixteenth-century Iona Dumin version of the *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia kniga*).[37] An allusion to it appears in the seventeenth-century *History about the Kazan' Khanate* (*Istoriia o Kazanskom tsarstve*).[38] Halperin referred to it as part of the "fictionalizing" about Batu and the Tatars going on in Muscovite Church writing of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[39] He pointed out that, in contrast, "[t]hirteenth-century sources created an image of Batu which accurately reflected his power and influence over Russian affairs, and which resonated with the reality of Mongol superiority over Russia at the time."[40] One of the texts from this later period engaged in fictionalizing the account of Batu is the *Tale about Merkurii of Smolensk* (*Povest' o Merkurii Smolenskom*), in which Batu is prevented from taking Smolensk, in great part due to the intervention by Merkurii, a Moravian Slav in the service of the king of Smolensk in 1239. According to the tale, Merkurii led "a Godly life, labored in fasting and charity." He entered the Tatar camp at night and killed many of the enemy. He was killed in the ensuing battle and had his head cut off. At that point, the Tatars "dropped their weapons and, driven by some unknown force, fled from the city."[41] In the *Tale about the Death of Batu*, not only is Batu defeated in battle when he invades Hungary, he is killed as well. We have no evidence other than the *Tale about Merkurii* that Batu was defeated in Rus′ at any time, nor any evidence other than the *Tale about the Death of Batu* that he was killed when he led his army into Hungary. As Halperin characterizes them, both the *Tale about Merkurii* and the *Tale about the Death of Batu* are texts that "would nowadays be labelled a work of historical fiction."[42]

Halperin, furthermore, pointed out that since Batu died in 1255, many years after his invasion of Hungary, the chroniclers had a problem of where to insert the *Tale* in their chronicles. A period of fourteen years separates Batu's invasion of Hungary from the year of his death. It would have been bad form to describe his death one year, then in subsequent years describe him as still being alive. So, instead of inserting the *Tale about the Death of Batu* under 1241 when Batu was in Hungary, the chroniclers placed it under 1247/1248 because they may have had no entry (or few entries) specifically naming him between then and the succession to the throne by his son, Sartaq, in 1255.[43] If they did come across a specific reference to Batu for an entry between 1247 and 1255, all they had to do was substitute the name "Sartak" for "Batu," or, as in the case of the *Nikon Chronicle*'s account of the uprising of 1262, the formula "after the killing of Batu, so did his son Sartaq" was used (see earlier in this chapter).

The chronicles that incorporate the *Tale about the Death of Batu* then add "Sartak" to any reference to "khan" after 1247/1248. Thus, they assert that the khan who sent Nevriui against Andrei was Sartaq, the son of Batu, although Batu was still khan in 1252. Both the First Redaction and the Vladimir Redaction of the *Life of Alexander Nevskii*, in contrast, state that Batu became angry with Andrei.[44] Neither the First Redaction nor the Vladimir Redaction of the *Life* incorporates the *Tale about the Death of Batu*, and both of them continue to name Batu as the khan who sent Nevriui.[45] Some historians have made an attempt to reconcile the contradiction by explaining that Batu and Sartaq were co-khans.[46] While examples of co-rulers appeared in Byzantium, we have no evidence of such a phenomenon in the Jochid Ulus.

The Vasilii-Varlaam Redaction of the *Life of Alexander Nevskii* for Makarii's *Great Menology*, the Chudov version of the *Book of Degrees*, and the Iona Dumin Redaction of the *Book of Degrees* (all compiled in the sixteenth century) incorporate the story of Batu's being killed by Vladislav.[47] In each of these texts, the khan who sends Nevriui against Andrei and the Suzdal' land is Sartaq rather than Batu. For the compilers of chronicles and the *Book of Degrees*, the fictional story of the killing of Batu in Hungary in 1247/1248 by Vladislav had become established historical fact. But the redactors of the *Life of Alexander Nevskii* continued to consider Batu as khan in 1252. The Iona Dumin Redaction of the *Life*, however, adapted the testimony of the Chudov version of the *Book of Degrees* that Sartaq was khan at the time.

The version of the *Tale about the Death of Batu* that was added to the Iona Dumin Redaction in the *Life of Alexander Nevskii* is characterized not so much by an increase in the number of formulaic slurs but in their intensity. In the title, instead of "About the Death of Batu Khan" or "The Death of the evil-doing Batu in Hungary" as in the chronicles,[48] we find "About the Death of the God-Reviled Dog, Batu Khan." The phrases "accursed Batu" and "Godless Batu" appear frequently: "The accursed Batu went to western Hungary. . . ." and "the Godless Batu. . . ."[49] In the first redaction of the *Life of Alexander Nevskii*, in contrast we find no demeaning epithets attached to Batu, who is reported as saying, "Alexander, do you know that God has submitted many nations to me?[50]

The beginning of the anti-Tatar interpretative framework is 1448. At that time, the Rus' bishops and the Muscovite grand prince, Vasilii II, declared the Rus' Church to be administratively autonomous in relation to the patriarchate of Constantinople. The council of bishops nominated one of their own, Iona, the archbishop of Riazan', to be metropolitan, and the grand prince appointed him to that position. As a result, the Rus' Church was no longer constrained by the foreign policy interests of Byzantium. An anti-Islamic, anti-Tatar ideology developed and was featured in such works as *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* (*Legend of the Battle against Mamai*), *Slovo o pogibeli Russkoi zemli* (*Discourse about the Ruin of the Rus' Land*), and *Povest' o razorenii Riazanii Batyem* (*Tale about the Destruction of Riazan' by Batu*), all of which date to the second half of the fifteenth century. Anti-Tatar remarks were also interpolated into earlier Rus' chronicle accounts. This interpretive paradigm was characterized by calling the Tatars "godless," "sons of Hagar," "Moabites," and so on, but it went much further. While it was admitted that Batu conquered the Rus' land, that is to say, "it was God who punished the Rus' for its sins," nonetheless, in

the words of the author of *Zadonshchina* (*The Event beyond the Don*), which he put in the mouths of the Italians at Kaffa, "it will no longer be, as in the early times."[51] That is, Mamai would not conquer Rus′ as Batu did. Church writers developed a Manichaean-like (Rus′-Tatar) dichotomy. Jaroslaw Pelenski discerned seven pairs of binary oppositions in the writings of Metropolitan Makarii (1542–1563) regarding the differences between Muscovites and Tatars: believers versus nonbelievers; religious versus godless; Christian versus pagan; pious versus impious; pure versus unclean; peaceful versus warlike; and good versus bad.[52]

The Tales of the Kulikovo Cycle were written after 1448 and provide fictionalized accounts of the supposed battle in 1380 on the upper reaches of the Don River between forces led by Grand Prince Dmitri Ivanovich (Donskoi) on one hand and forces led by the emir Mamai on the other. The Kulikovo tales ostensibly derive from chronicle accounts, but those accounts provide minimal testimony about the battle, only indicating that Dmitrii's forces won.[53] Among the tales are *Narrative of the Battle with Mamai* (*Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*) in four redactions,[54] *Event beyond the Don* (*Zadonshchina*) in two redactions,[55] and *Oration concerning the Life and Passing Away of Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich* (*Slovo o zhitii i prestavlenii velikogo kniazia Dmitriia Ivanovicha*).[56] Significant issues of dating the various accounts and narratives and of their relationship to each other abound. Scholars have tried to use the accounts in this cycle of tales to reconstruct the battle, but the results are questionable at best.[57] The lack of archaeological evidence from the supposed battle site compounds the problem.

Another genre of tale is problematic as a historical source. *Byliny* (sing. *bylina*) are oral epic poems or songs. We do not know when they were composed. Most of them were written down in the nineteenth century (except for a few that were written down in the early seventeenth century).[58] Some scholars think they are contemporary with the pre-Mongol and Mongol periods.[59] *Byliny* do not have much about popular attitudes toward the Mongols except insofar as the hero is battling some stylized enemy, who sometimes is identified as "the Tatars"; thus, their allusion is interchangeable with the pre-Mongol Qipchaqs and the Mongols themselves.

DOCUMENTS

The manifestation of a neutral attitude toward the Tatars ended in church sources in 1448 but continued in state documents. The state view, as in part represented in the *Posol'skii prikaz* (Foreign Office) documents, contain neither anti-Islamic nor anti-Tatar rhetoric. Those who composed state documents wrote them in straightforward language as though the state representatives/agents were dealing with co-equals. The principle of realpolitik characterized Muscovite state dealings with the Tatars.

Documents tend to be the most reliable sources of information about the Mongol/Tatar khanates. For example, an agreement (which can be dated to June 28, 1404) between Grand Prince Vasilii Dmitrievich (r. 1389–1425) and Metropolitan Kiprian (1376–1406) indicates the fiscal responsibilities of the metropolitan included having to pay tribute to the Tatars.[60]

There are six *yarlighs* preserved in the Rus′ metropolitan archive (constituting the so-called Short Collection) considered to be translations into Russian of authentic patents issued from the Jochid Ulus: (1) from Tiuliak Khan (Tulunbek, Toqtaqiya) of

Mamai's Horde to Metropolitan Mikhail (Mitia) (1379); (2) from Taydula Khatun to Metropolitan Ioann (Feognost'?) (1347); (3) from Möngke-Temür Khan to the Rus' clergy and monasteries (1267); (4) from Taydula Khatun to Metropolitan Feognost' (1343, 1351); (5) from Berdibeg Khan to Metropolitan Aleksei (1357); (6) from Taydula Khatun to Metropolitan Aleksei (1354). A seventh *yarligh*, which purports to be from Özbeg Khan to Metropolitan Peter (found in the so-called Full Collection) has been determined to be a sixteenth-century forgery.

In 1969, the historian Edward L. Keenan (1935–2015) questioned the authenticity of a *yarligh* that is not part of the Short Collection – the *Yarligh of Ahmed-Khan to Ivan III*. He concluded, after a cross-language (Turkic–Russian) comparison, that "it is not a contemporary Old Russian translation of a diplomatic document from the chancellery of the Great Horde."[61] Instead, he called it "a historical ballad, in epistolary form"[62] and, as with the *Kazanskaia istoriia*, saw it originating in "the circles of the *Posol'skij prikaz* [Ambassadorial Chancellery]" of the early seventeenth century.[63] Since the *Yarligh of Ahmed-Khan* follows neither the formulae of official translation nor the formulae of diplomatic structure for its genre, Keenan argued that it cannot be considered a genuine *yarligh*. The genuine *yarligh*s to the metropolitans, in contrast, affirm the immunity of the Church from taxes and tributes and declare that the Church's property should be protected from expropriation or damage as long as Rus' churchmen pray for the well-being of the khan and his family.

The wills of the grand princes are also another documentary source that provides evidence concerning the tribute (*dan'*) to the Tatar khan. They contain evidence from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries that the grand princes were looking forward to a time when the Tatar khan was no longer their suzerain. In particular, they stipulate that the tribute is still to be collected by family members from the populace and kept for themselves. Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich (Donskoi) wrote in his second will (1389) about the possibility of no longer having to pay tribute to the khan: "And should God change the Orda [so that] my children do not have to pay the out-go (*vykhod*) to the Orda, then the tribute (*dan'*) that each of my sons collects in his own appanage (*udel*) will be his."[64] By the time of the first will (1406/1407) of Grand Prince Vasilii I (r. 1389–1425), that formulation became: "And if God brings about a change concerning the Tatars, then my princess shall take the tribute [*dan'*] for herself from these volosts and villages, and my son, Prince Ivan, shall also not interfere in this tribute."[65] The second will (probably 1417) and third will (probably 1423) of Vasilii I have a similar formulation: And if God brings about a change concerning the Orda, then my princess shall take this tribute for herself, and my son, Prince Vasilii, shall not interfere."[66] The will (1461/1462) of his son Vasilii II (r. 1425–1462) makes the same stipulation: "And if God should bring about a change concerning the Orda, then my princes and my children shall take tribute [*dan'*] for themselves from their patrimonial principalities, and my son Ivan shall not interfere in this."[67]

Another document, however, indicates that a change had already occurred concerning the *Ordu*. In 1449, in a treaty with the Suzdal' prince, Vasilii declares:

> You are not to have dealings with the Orda. You, Prince Ivan, are to hand over to me and my sons, without any trickery, any old *yarlighs* [*iarlyki*] you might have

> for Suzdal′, Nizhnii Novgorod, or Gorodets, or for the [Nizhnii] Novgorodian principality as a whole. You are not to accept any new *yarlighs* [*iarlyki*]. And any *yarlighs* [*iarlyki*] for [Nizhnii] Novgorod or Suzdal′ that any khan might give you or send to you, you are to surrender them to me, the grand prince, and my sons according to our pact. You are not to keep them.[68]

Previously, all princes who ruled a town received their patent directly from the Tatar khan. By requiring the Suzdal′ prince to have no dealings with the *Ordu* and through demanding that he turn over any patents from the khan, Vasilii established himself as the authority over Suzdal′, replacing the khan in Sarai. At the same time, Vasilii declared his son Ivan co-ruler without bothering to obtain approval from the khan, making him the first ruler in Rus′ to not get approval from the khan since 1240. Vasilii was the last grand prince to be authorized to rule by a *yarligh* from the Tatar khan in Sarai. Although Vasilii's son, Ivan III (r. 1462–1505), continued to pay tribute to the *Ordu* until 1503, he ruled completely independently.

RUSSIAN VIEWS OF THE SUCCESSOR KHANATES OF THE JOCHID ULUS

The five successor khanates to the Jochid Ulus were the khanates of Astrakhan′, Crimea, Kazan′, Kasimov, and Sibir′. Russian rulers continued to pay tribute to the Crimean khan, their ostensible suzerain, until 1700 (although the Russian sources call the payments "gifts"). In any case, the Treaty of Constantinople (July 3, 1700) absolved Russia of any further tribute/gift obligation to the Crimea khan.[69]

Within this period, we also begin to see the previous centuries of Tatar rule being referred to as a "yoke." The phrase "yoke of slavery" (*rabotno igo*) had already appeared in the sixteenth-century *Life of Merkurii of Smolensk* as applied to the period of Chinggisid hegemony in Rus′. The phrase "Tatar Yoke" (*jugo Tatarico*) was first applied to the period of Chinggisid hegemony in Latin by non-Russians. The Polish historian and cartographer Maciej z Miechowa used it in his *Chronica Polonorum* of 1519 to apply to the period of Chinggisid hegemony.[70] In 1575, the imperial ambassador Daniel Prinz also used the term.[71] Direct evidence of its usage in Russian sources does not appear until the 1660s with an interpolation in one of the copies of the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*. Subsequently, this term appears in the *Synopsis* of Innokentii Gizel′ in 1674.[72] From there it entered the mainstream of Russian nationalist historiography in the late eighteenth century through the multivolume history of Russia by M. M. Shcherbatov.[73] The term "Tatar yoke" sums up the Church's position about the period of Chinggisid hegemony.

After the end of the Jochid Ulus, the two "discourses" that began in the Russian sources in 1448 continued on in regard to the successor khanates. The Church's attitude was that the sons of Hagar were pagan and godless. It was basically an antiMuslim ideology. So, the Tatars themselves were not inherently bad in the church view of things; they were bad insofar as they were Muslim. Once the Tatars converted to Christianity, their Islamic background was forgotten. Those born Tatar who converted to Orthodox Christianity were then accepted as Russians. The attitude of the state and secular authorities, as reflected in the documents, was that the Tatar khanates and Muscovy were part of the

same inter-state system, sometimes allied and sometimes opposed. Individual Tatars fought in the Muscovite cavalry and led regiments as Tatars. Those who converted to Christianity, advanced through the political system and a few, like Peter Ibramovich[74] and Simeon Bekbulatovich,[75] both of whom were Chinggisids, attained positions of high status in Muscovy.

NOTES

1 See Ostrowski 2004a, 571–573; Halperin 2011, 58–59.
2 *PSRL* 1997, 1: cols. 445, 503. *PSRL* 2000, 3, 361–362.
3 *PSRL* 1997, 1: cols. 445, 503; *PSRL* 2000, 3, 62.
4 Chekin 1992, 9–28.
5 *PSRL* 1997, 1: cols. 467–470; *PSRL* 2000, 3, 76.
6 *PSRL* 2000, 3, 62.
7 Fennell 1970, 105–111.
8 *PSRL* 1908, 2: col. 897.
9 See, e.g., *PSRL* 1904, 13.1: 92 (*sub anno* 1339); *PSRL* 1922, 15.1: col. 56 (*sub anno* 1344); and *PSRL* 1913, 18: 92 (*sub anno* 1344).
10 For a more detailed discussion of Alexander, see Ostrowski 2009, 46–64.
11 *PSRL* 2000, 3: 80.
12 *PSRL* 1997, 1: col. 524. The *Patriarch of Constantinople Nikifor's Short Chronicle* has the same information but uses the spelling "Nevron." Tikhomirov 1962, 239 (fol. 575).
13 *PSRL* 1997, 1: col. 473; cf. *PSRL* 1913, 18: 70.
14 *PSRL* 1997, 1: col. 473. The reference to "the princess" is probably to Anastasiia, the daughter of Prince Daniil of Galicia and wife of Andrei. The "children" could refer to Iurii and Mikhail, the sons of Andrei and Anastasiia, who would have been held in Sarai as hostages. Iurii later became Prince of Suzdal' and died in 1279.
15 *PSRL* 2000, 3: 304; *PSRL* 2000, 6.1: col. 327; *PSRL* 1856, 7: 159; *PSRL* 1863, 15: 396; *PSRL* 1921, 24: 98; *PSRL* 1959, 26: 86; *PSRL* 1963, 28: 57 and 216; *PSRL* 2002, 42: 118.
16 *PSRL* 1965, 10: 138.
17 *PSRL* 1997, 1: col. 473.
18 Solov'ev 1960, 3: 157.
19 *PSRL* 2000, 3: 304; *PSRL* 1915, 4.1: 230; *PSRL* 1929, 4.3: 596; *PSRL* 2000, 6.1: col. 327; *PSRL* 1922, 15.1: col. 31; *PSRL* 1863, 15: 396–397; *PSRL* 1959, 26: 86; *PSRL* 1962, 27: 47; *PSRL* 1977, 33: 71.
20 *PSRL* 1997, 1: cols. 474, 524; *PSRL* 1915, 4.1: 234.
21 6785 marks the year from creation as marked by the Orthodox Church, which would be used in the chronicles.
22 *PSRL* 1908, 2: col. 876.
23 *PSRL* 1908, 2: col. 881.
24 *PSRL* 1908, 2: col. 888. Some of the *sub anno* dates in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle are out of sync with other contemporary sources.
25 *PSRL* 1908, 2: cols. 888 (*sub anno* 1282), 897 (*sub anno* 1287).
26 *PSRL* 1908, 2: col. 894.
27 Pelenski 1992, 8–15.
28 On the concept of the "virtual past," see Ostrowski 1989, 201–220.
29 For this section, I draw on Ostrowski 1998, 149–155.
30 Lur'e 1994, 174–189.
31 Golokhvastov and Leonid 1874, 71–72.
32 Kliuchevskii 1871.

33 Skripil 1958, 98–105; Halperin 1973, 324–335.
34 *PSRL* 1885, 10: 135–136.
35 *PSRL* 1856, 7.1: 157–159; *PSRL* 1863, 15: cols. 394–395; *PSRL* 1913, 18: 69; *PSRL* 2004, 20: 161; *PSRL* 1908, 21.1: 288; *PSRL* 1911, 22.1: 400–401; *PSRL* 1910, 23: 82–83; *PSRL* 1921, 24: 96–98; *PSRL* 1949, 25: 139–141; *PSRL* 1963, 28: 56–57; *PSRL* 1977, 33: 71.
36 Mansikka 1913, 45 (2nd pagination).
37 Mansikka 1913, 89–90 (2nd pagination).
38 *PSRL* 1903, 19: col. 10; and Glazatyi et al. 1954, 46.
39 Halperin 1983, 50, 60.
40 Halperin 1983, 51.
41 Budovnits 1958, 171–175.
42 Halperin 1983, 62.
43 Halperin 1983, 63.
44 See Begunov 1965, 174–175, 192.
45 Mansikka 1913, 24 (2nd pagination).
46 See, e.g., Vernadsky 1953, 148; and Zenkovsky 1986, 27, fn. 42.
47 Mansikka 1913, 45 (2nd pagination), 89–90 (2nd pagination). *Stepennaia kniga* 2007, 1: 526–527. The Vasilii-Varlaam Redaction changes the name of the land where Batu meets his demise at the hands of Vladislav from *Hungary* to *Bulgaria*. Mansikka 1913, 45 (2nd pagination). This Redaction also appears in the Uvarov no. 1787 (517) (378) copy of the *Velikie Minei Cheti*.
48 *PSRL* 1921, 24: 96; *PSRL* 1949, 25: 139. See also Rozanov 1916, 110.
49 Mansikka 1913, 89–90 (2nd pagination).
50 Begunov 1965, 174.
51 Jakobson and Worth 1963, 64.
52 Pelenski 1974.
53 The chronicle accounts are the Suzdal′ Chronicle (*PSRL* 1997, 1: col. 536); the Novgorod I Chronicle (*PSRL* 2000, 3: 376–377); the *Short Chronicle Tale* (*Kratkaia letopisnaia povest′*) as maintained in the Rogozhskii and Simeonov Chronicles (*PSRL* 1922, 15.1: cols. 139–141; *PSRL* 1913, 18: 129–131); Dmitriev and Likhacheva 1982, 14–15 with variants on 374; and the *Expanded Chronicle Tale* (*Prostrannaia letopisnaia povest′*), as maintained in the Novgorod IV and Sofiiskii I Chronicles (*PSRL* 1853, 4.1: 90–91, 95; *PSRL* 1915, 4.1.1: 311–320; *PSRL* 1925, 4.1.2: 321–325; *PSRL* 1859, 8: 34–39; Dmitriev and Likhacheva 1982, 16–24 with variants on 374–375.
54 Dmitriev and Likhacheva 1982, 25–127 with variants on 375–378.
55 Dmitriev and Likhacheva 1982, 7–13 with variants on 369–374.
56 *PSRL* 2000, 6.1: cols. 491–507; Salmina 1981, 208–229 with commentary on 560–563.
57 See, e.g., Nabiev 2010.
58 Alexander 1973, 13.
59 Maikov 1863, 139; Oinas 1978, 238.
60 Shchapov 1976, 176–179.
61 Keenan 1969, 47.
62 Keenan 1969, 44.
63 Keenan 1969, 47.
64 *DDG*, n. 12, 36.
65 *DDG*, n. 20, 56.
66 *DDG*, n. 21, 59; *DDG* n. 22, 61.
67 *DDG*, n. 61, 197.
68 *DDG*, n. 52, 156.
69 Davies 2007, 187.

70 Maciej z Miechowa 1521, book 4, chap. 85, 377; Keenan 2009, 241.
71 Prinz 1681, 203, reprinted in *Scriptores Rerum Livonicarum* 1853, 721.
72 Rothe 1983.
73 Shcherbatov 1770–1791, esp. vols. 3 and 4.
74 See Ostrowski 2004b, 697–719.
75 See Ostrowski 2012a, 269–299, 339–345; and Ostrowski 2012b, 27–36.

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DDG, See List of Abbreviations.

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PSRL, See List of Abbreviations.

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CHAPTER FIFTY

THE MONGOLS IN THE EYES OF THE PAPAL AND ROYAL MISSIONS TO MONGOLIA AND CHINA (C. 1245–1370)

Antti Ruotsala

Since the middle of the thirteenth century, the Franciscans and the Dominicans belonged to the religious-intellectual elite of the Catholic Church. They were not monks but wandering friars, called mendicants. The mendicants (Lat. *mendicare* = to beg) were a new entity. The monks (Lat. *monachus*) lived in monasteries, often in distant places, but wandering friars (Lat. *frater*) were open to the world, moving between convents (Lat. c*onventum*), i.e., dwelling communities. In the Middle Ages, the two mendicant orders carried out missionary work and executed diplomatic functions outside the borders of Western Christendom. In practice, the orders usually co-operated harmoniously when they came into contact, but the Catholic Church granted exclusive rights to one order in each territory to prevent rivalry and competition.[1] The Franciscans succeeded in taking over the Mongol mission and managed to keep it in their control for the entire thirteenth century. The mendicants travelled through Mongolia (c. 1245–1260), the Jochid Ulus, the Ilkhanate,[2] and the Chaghadaid Ulus as missionaries, but their ultimate destination was the Mongol Yuan Empire of East Asia (c. 1271–1370).

THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN–MONGOL ENCOUNTERS

By the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Islamic world had separated Europe and Asia from each other for hundreds of years, and in the Latin West, knowledge of Asia, for instance China and India, was received mainly through the authors of classical antiquity and biblical history. The known world ended at Jerusalem and the river Don. Crossing these borders was a jump into the unknown.[3] The Crusades disturbed this situation; however, only the expansion of the Mongols, their invasion of Europe in 1241–1242, and their subsequent appearance in the Middle East brought significant change.

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For the West, the Mongol invasion of Europe (Hungary, Poland, Moravia, Bohemia, and the Balkans) was a physical and intellectual shock. Fear of the Mongols conjured up an apocalyptic atmosphere which was expressed by the chroniclers of those days, such as Roger of Torre Maggiore and Thomas of Spalato. The Mongols might have even been seen as cannibals. They were often associated with the troops of the Antichrist, anticipating the end of the world, or they were seen according to the prophecies of the Old Testament as God's trial of sinful Christians. A crusade was planned against the Mongols and authorized by Pope Gregory IX in June 1241, but there was not enough time to realize it.[4]

Those earlier unknown "barbarians" were mostly called Tartars (*Tartari*). The name was derived from the Latin word *Tartarus* (the Underworld of Greek mythology), in which case the Mongols would have come, of course, *ex Tartaro*. Usually *Tartarus* was regarded more as a moral classification than an actual abode of the Mongols.[5]

In this new situation, the Western powers – popes and secular rulers – tried to make contact with the Mongols as well as discover their empire. There existed a strong fear of a new invasion but also curiosity.

THE MENDICANTS AND THEIR WRITINGS

The early Franciscans and a few Dominicans wrote travel accounts and shorter reports of their experience in Mongol-held territory. After returning, they always had to write a report for their principals. In these sources, they described their encounters with the Mongols as well as their worldwide empire and revealed their attitudes towards the Mongols. They also carried letters from both sides. The mendicants in China usually stayed there until the end of their life and sent letters from there to the popes and papal curia. These are the only Western eye-witness narratives of this area, besides some merchant accounts, such as Marco Polo's *Description of the World* (1298), not in Latin but in vernacular. Most of those writers were of Italian origin.

There exist about 20 mendicant sources: five are monographs by John of Plano Carpini (1247), Simon of Saint-Quentin (1248, dom. Caucasia), William of Rubruck (1255), Odoric of Pordenone (1330), and John of Marignolli (1355–58). These texts tell us much about the Mongol rulers, and their attitudes as well as their imperial administration and warfare. The first accounts of Mongolia, in particular, offer a lot of ethnographical information: how the Mongols lived and married, what and how they ate and drank, in which spiritual powers they believed, and how they practiced their faith. William of Rubruck even described traditional Mongol dances and the trance of a Mongol shaman.[6]

THE MENDICANTS TO MONGOLIA (C. 1245–1260) AS ENVOYS AND SPIES

The Mongols were a central theme in the First General Council of Lyons convoked by Pope Innocent IV in the summer of 1245. Who were they really, what were their plans, and how should they be treated in the future? Some experts, mostly Eastern

Europeans, related both their experiences and their views concerning the Mongols. The Council decided to send four separate papal embassies, two Franciscan and two Dominican, to the Mongols.[7]

As a result of the Mongol invasion, one might expect that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the Western Christians and the Mongols. However, the intellectual culture of the Mongols and the character of their empire included many elements, which promoted peaceful interaction as well as communication with different cultures. The territory of the Mongols had always been very open to acculturation, and they were in contact with almost all the major religions of their days. The eastern branch of Christianity, Nestorianism, had even gained a foothold among them due to many of the earliest and most trusted allies of the Mongols being Nestorian, such as the Kereit and the Önggüt. Further, the pluralistic and syncretic Mongols both accepted and respected all religions, which was guaranteed by their law code, the *jasaq*. The Mongol postal relay system, the *jam*, also provided Western mendicants a hard but fairly safe route into the Empire.

Of all the embassies, the one led by an Italian Franciscan, John of Plano Carpini (c. 1190–1252), an early follower of St Francis, was the most authoritative. Its task was to contact the king of the Mongols (*rex Tartarorum*) directly with two papal letters.[8] The multi-national embassy left Lyons on September 16, 1245, its members being John of Plano Carpini, Stephen and possibly Ceslaus of Bohemia, and an interpreter of Slavonic languages, Benedict the Pole. The envoys travelled through Southern Russia via the ravaged Kiev to Batu's encampment on the lower Volga. From there John of Plano Carpini and Benedict the Pole were ordered to make their way to Mongolia. After four months they arrived near Qaraqorum, where they witnessed the enthronement of the new Great Khan Güyük. The envoys returned to Lyons carrying the haughty response of Güyük on November 13, 1247.

John of Plano Carpini wrote about his experiences in a travel account, the *Historia Mongalorum* (1247/1248). The journey of his embassy was also described briefly by his companion Benedict the Pole in his *Relatio*, dictated in Cologne in 1247. The *Historia Tartarorum* (discovered only in 1958), written by Polish Franciscan C. de Bridia, is mostly based on information which John of Plano Carpini, Benedict, and Stephen gave him on their return journey.[9] Nothing is known about the journey of the other Franciscan embassy led by Lawrence of Portugal. Probably his embassy never left Europe.[10]

The two Dominican embassies sent to the Muslim regions of Asia Minor, Palestine, and Syria were more successful. They were led by Andrew of Longjumeau and Ascelin (probably from Cremona). Both the letters carried by them and their copies have disappeared. Only a summary in the *Chronica majora* by Matthew Paris has survived from the journey of Andrew of Longjumeau.[11]

The travel account of Ascelin's embassy, *Historia Tartarorum*, was written by its member, Simon of Saint-Quentin. Ascelin left Lyons in the spring of 1245 and returned only in the autumn of 1248. His party also consisted of Albert, Alexander, and Guichard of Cremona. These five Dominicans arrived at last, through the Levant and Tiflis, in Armenia close to Sisian. There he encountered a great military encampment of Mongols under the leadership of Baiju, the commander of the Mongol army in Persia. On its return, the embassy was accompanied by two Mongol envoys carrying a letter from Baiju to the Pope as well as an edict from Güyük.[12]

All the sources mentioned previously are dated between 1245 and 1248. They were written soon after the Mongol invasion of Europe and are closely connected with each other. Their counterpart is the large and famous travel story *Itinerarium* of 1255 and other sources associated with it. The *Itinerarium* was written by the Flemish Franciscan William of Rubruck (b. c. 1215–1230 – alive in 1256–1257), a missionary and envoy of Louis IX. His journey took place between 1253 and 1255.

The French King Louis IX started his crusade to Egypt in 1248, but at first he landed with his troops in Cyprus. William of Rubruck was already there. In December 1248 two Nestorian envoys sent by the Mongol commander Eljigidei, the successor of Baiju, arrived in Nicosia. They carried a letter in Persian, which expressed great "sympathy" for Christianity, reported the good state of the Christians in the Mongol Empire, and wished the king well in his fight against those who despise the cross (*contemnentibus crucem*). This letter differed a great deal from previous Mongol ultimatums delivered during the Mongol invasion of Europe or the correspondence between Innocent IV and the Great Khan Güyük. Negotiations with the Nestorian envoys were mediated by the aforementioned traveller Andrew of Longjumeau, who was probably skilled in Persian.

In January 1249 the French King Louis IX sent a seven-man embassy, led by Andrew, to the Mongols. It has usually been thought that a mutual effort to create a coalition against the Muslims lay behind these contacts. The Mongols were planning to besiege the Abbasid capital, Baghdad (eventually conquered in 1258), and hoped that the Franks would prevent the Sultan of Egypt from coming to the aid of the Caliph.[13]

In 1250 King Louis IX at last invaded the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, where the Crusaders suffered total defeat. Louis himself was taken prisoner. However, the enormous ransom of the King was soon paid, and he was released before moving to Palestine for nearly four years. At that time Andrew's embassy was already on its way back from Qaraqorum, having travelled through Persia via Eljigidei's encampment. The embassy did not encounter Güyük Qa'an (d. 1248), but his widow Oghul Qaimish, and had to return with regrettable news to Palestine in April 1251. Oghul Qaimish sent a very belligerent letter to Louis IX, possibly to heighten her prestige in the struggle for power among the Mongol aristocracy. Her letter demanded that Louis pay tribute to the Mongols henceforth, otherwise the King would be destroyed.[14]

In March 1253, Louis IX once more tried to contact the Mongols, sending William of Rubruck from Palestine to Batu's son Sartaq, whom it was thought was a Christian. To Friar William's party belonged a Franciscan, Bartholomew of Cremona, a clerk called Gosset, an interpreter known as "Homo Dei", and a slave boy, Nicholas, as a servant. The embassy travelled first by ship to Constantinople and from there to the Crimea. Sartaq's encampment was reached on the lower Volga. Because Friar William was regarded as a representative of the French king, Sartaq sent him to Batu's encampment nearby, from which Friar William had to travel to Mongolia, to the Great Khan Möngke. Bartholomew was now his only companion. They reached Möngke when the Great Khan was moving to Qaraqorum. For the following six months Friar William and Bartholomew stayed in Qaraqorum and its surroundings. Friar William returned alone to the Near East in the spring of 1255.

The Franciscan provincial minister of the Holy Land ordered Friar William to become a teacher of theology in the Franciscan convent of Acre, where he finished his travelogue called *Itinerarium*. The letter of Louis IX to Sartaq as well as the reply and an edict from Möngke have disappeared, but William of Rubruck quotes them in his work.[15]

RESULTS: A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE MONGOLS AS A PART OF GOD'S CREATION

These first mendicant embassies had significant effects. They established diplomatic relations with the Mongols; began the exchange of letters between the popes, the Western monarchs, and the Mongol khans; and started missionary work among them.

The name *Mongol/Mongal* became known among the Western Christians. John of Plano Carpini's work starts: "Here begins the History of the Mongols whom we call the Tartars."[16] Much more important was that through the newly detailed ethnographic knowledge the picture of the Mongols sharpened and became realistic. The Mongols were both humanized and given their own place as a part of mankind and God's order of creation. It is noteworthy that only the leader of the Dominican embassy, Ascelin, as recorded by Simon of Saint-Quentin, had strong hatred towards the Mongols. Ascelin's embassy fell into dangerous situations because of the uncompromising attitude of its leader. The worst thing was that he categorically refused to genuflect thrice (a Christian Trinitarian act) in front of Baiju, the delegate of Great Khan Güyük. According to Ascelin, the Mongols considered their khan as a son of God. Thus, this rite would have been pagan idolatry but also would have shown the subordination of the Roman Church to the qa'an. Three times Baiju ordered the envoys to be executed, and their lives were saved only because of their diplomatic status. There was a question of Ascelin's own personality and fanaticism. The other embassies did not refuse these kind of rituals.[17]

Concerning the Mongols, there were negative (e.g., their cruelty, greediness, dirtiness, ugliness of their females) as well as positive (e.g., their poor and humble lifestyle, endurance, living in mutual harmony, obedience to their superiors) ethnocentric stereotypes in all early mendicant writings – but not at all racist elements. Further, the Mongol religion seemed to include monotheistic elements, chiefly because of the central position ascribed to Eternal Heaven in their divine hierarchy.[18]

The Mongol khans, e.g., Batu, Güyük, and Möngke, were not demonized. They were encountered with respect but also disgust and fear: the khans might often be portrayed as arrogant because of their hegemonic position in the world, but they were human beings who showed respect for diplomatic etiquette and also benevolence to envoys from distant lands.

In general, there existed various attitudes towards the Mongols. According to Simon of Saint-Quentin, the Mongols regarded other people – including the Pope and the Christians – as cattle and dogs.[19] On the other hand, William of Rubruck describes a developing friendship between his embassy and its Mongol guide. The hour of parting between the embassy and its guide has been described in detail:

> and he left us in a conciliatory fashion, asking for our hand and acknowledging his fault if he had let us go hungry or thirsty on the journey. We forgave him, and similarly sought pardon from him and all his company for any bad example we might have set them.[20]

The Franciscan scholar, Roger Bacon, who had read William of Rubruck's *Itinerarium* and consulted its author, stated in his *Opus majus* (c. 1267): "There is one God and there is one mankind."[21] The Mongols, who were also descended from Adam and Eve, had souls and indeed belonged to the common unity of mankind. On the other hand, this statement, in its monotheism, was against the religious world view of the polytheistic Mongols for whom the whole world was full of supranormal forces, and it would have been foolish to insult them. Möngke Qa'an revealed his faith to Friar William:

> We Moal´s [Mongols] believe that there is only one God [the Eternal Heaven], through whom we have life and through whom we die, and towards him we direct our hearts. . . . But just as God has given the hand several fingers, so he has given mankind several paths. . . . So, then, God has given you the *Scriptures* . . . whereas to us he has given soothsayers [at that time, mainly shamans], and we do as they tell us and live in peace.[22]

In any case, peaceful and rational dialogue between Europeans and Mongols was now possible.

THE MENDICANT MISSIONARIES AND YUAN DYNASTY CHINA (1271–1370)

The contacts with Ilkhanid Persia were an important stimulus for the Mongol mission to China – in particular, the letter of Ilkhan Arghun and the journey of the aforementioned Rabban Sauma's embassy (1287–1288) to the West, and also the earlier visit of Qubilai's official Isa Kelemechi (1285), also sent by Arghun.[23] Further, Qubilai's request for 100 learned Latin Christians through Marco Polo's father and uncle, Niccolò and Matteo, had been significant (1269). Later there were plenty of Venetian and Genovese traders in China.[24]

Most Franciscan missionaries in China were Italians, such as John of Montecorvino (in China 1294–1328, Archbishop of China and Patriarch of the Orient in 1313, letters in 1305, 1306), Peregrine of Castello (d. 1322?, letter in 1318), Andrew of Perugia (1313–1332, letter in 1326), and two *Relatios* (travel accounts) written by Odoric of Pordenone (1330) and John of Marignolli (in his *Cronica Boemorum* from 1338 to 1358, which describes, among other things, his years in China from 1342 to 1346). Further, there were also two Dominican Archbishops of Sultaniyya (Soldaia) in Persia with their chronicles: John of Cora (possibly visited China around 1330, his chronicle in 1330) and John III (his chronicle in 1404 contains a brief account of the Christians after the fall of the Yuan dynasty).[25] Several papal letters to the missionaries as well as an exchange of letters between them and the Mongol rulers of China have also been preserved.[26]

These mendicants usually sailed by the sea route, often via India to China, and travelled then to the Mongol Yuan capital Khanbaliq (modern Beijing). The Mongol Empire had dissolved into four distinct khanates in 1264. Their hostility to each other brought an end to the so-called *Pax Mongolica*. Due to various conflicts along the land route, sailing was now safer.

The first mendicants to visit the Mongols (1245–1260) were not well prepared. They were diplomats and spies with missionary aims in a world not seen and only a little known. Their accounts were written quite autonomously and independently of each other. The mendicants who departed for China (1271–1370) had much better knowledge about their destination, probably competence in a few languages (usually Persian, Armenian, and even Turkic), and were oriented expressly to missionary work. They had often been trained in their convents in Asia, especially in the region of the Black Sea.

Above all, those Franciscans who went to China were expressly missionaries, rather than diplomats or collectors of information. They did not encounter the Mongol nomads, but rather the Mongol ruling elite of China, hence why their writings include little, if any, ethnographical information concerning the nomadic Mongols. As missionaries they reported much about the religious circumstances of Mongol China, particularly their Eastern Christian rivals, the Nestorians, whose first co-religionists arrived in the region in the middle of the seventh century during the Tang dynasty.[27]

China under Mongol rule was a place of various religions and religious views competing against each other, most notably the Buddhist–Daoist controversy and rivalry. Christianity was only a small minority religion there, even though the Mongols in China knew the Nestorians well. Mongol rule gave the Franciscans freedom to carry out their missionary work, but the field of that work differed entirely from Europe or its pagan borders. The mendicants succeeded in their mission best with Eastern Christian Armenians and Iranian Alans from Caucasia as well as with the Önggüt already connected with the Nestorian church. It is clear that a strong Nestorian–Catholic controversy developed. For instance, John of Montecorvino had nothing positive to say about the Nestorians.

Among the Chinese population the missionary work was very challenging. The Chinese language and its writing were difficult to learn,[28] and preaching had to be done through interpreters. Baptism, which was so important for missionary workers, was usually seen more as a ritual bath without any commitments – and not only among the Chinese.[29]

Further, it was disappointing that the Mongol ruling elite was not at all interested in Catholic conversion. They were benevolent towards the mendicant missionaries, protected and supported them due to their role as envoys of the Latin West, but were much more interested in Tibetan Buddhism, as well as their traditional folk religion. The mendicant attitude towards the Mongol rulers in their letters was, however, all the time correct and respectful. They highlighted the wealth of the qa'an and his realm too.

The missionary work of the Franciscans declined during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), following the collapse of the Yuan dynasty and China's separation from the West. The last Franciscan archbishop, Andrew of Perugia, died in 1332, and the last Franciscan embassy to China departed in 1370 but never reached its destination,

and its fate is unknown. Cut off from the West, the Catholic convents, churches, and parishes seem to have gradually begun to disappear prior to the Yuan–Ming transition.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

How did the mendicants see the Mongols? Their attitudes towards the Mongols were informed by their circumstances. Some of them had probably studied at university (William of Rubruck at the University of Paris). At least in their convents all of them had learned about their times, foreign languages, and methods of missionary work. They were, no doubt, in high positions in their religious orders. Going to the Mongol Empire was an important task, which was not entrusted to just anyone.

The time span of their missions is wide: 130 years. Thus, there were historical developments and changes: for instance, John of Plano Carpini and John of Montecorvino already lived in different worlds. However, between their attitudes were many similarities – much more than differences. First of all, all the Franciscans were *homines religiosi* (religious men), who had the world view and ethos of their order (poverty and following Christ, *imitatio Christi*) and a strong vocation for missionary work.

As literati they shared the common Western scholarly view of humanity and the moral principles of natural law (*ius naturale*) – moral values given by God to all mankind. Further, they were much more interested in the inner moral qualities of the Mongols than their outer appearance. In particular, the religious world of the Mongols and the whole empire was brought into focus. They did not favour luxuries and precious articles as the Western traders, such as Marco Polo. On the other hand, the works of Odoric of Pordenone and John of Cora resemble the book of Marco Polo in their admiration for the wealth and riches of the qa'an and Mongol China.

In the early encounters and letters (1245–1260) the Mongols were perceived as arrogant and aggressive. The Mongol rulers had the superior position in the world, and the Western powers were hierarchically under them. In China the Mongols were more equal. The Latin West was far away, and they wanted to contact it, without the aim of invasion or taxation. In any case, the Mongols were always the stronger party in the encounters outside Western Christendom. For the mendicants, their own superiority was based on Christian religion. In this sense, the Mongols could only have redeemed themselves by adopting the Christian faith in its Roman Catholic mode and acculturating themselves to Christendom, to *Corpus Christianorum*. However, the Mongol ruling class seemed to be religiously indifferent. How could the Mongol rulers, in their multi-cultural and multi-religious empire, have chosen such a small *post-mortem* salvation religion (Catholic Christianity) as their only faith?

In sum, during their invasion of Europe (1241–1242) the Mongols were often considered a monstrous race or even an eschatological phenomenon. In later mendicant accounts they were both humanized, incorporated into the historiography, and put in their own place as a part of mankind and God's order of creation. The information was reliable and very useful for the Christian West. The mendicant travellers were in no way responsible for the later bad reputation of the Mongols.

Many old myths, pictures, and stereotypes about the world beyond Christendom now took new forms when projected onto reality. Furthermore, the beginning of the

Western examination and exploration of Asia and other lands, the Age of Discovery, can, in a way, be found in the Mongols and their worldwide empire.

NOTES

1 Jackson 2005, 256–259; Schmieder 1994, 129–130, 133–136.
2 Aigle 2005; Jackson 2005, 165–175; Lupprian 1981, passim.; de Rachewiltz 1971, 149–159; Schmieder 1994, 328–335.
3 Jackson 2005, 65–66, 147–150; Klopprogge 1993, 19–21, 30, 34–35; Reichert 1992, 65–68; Ruotsala 2001, 35–36.
4 Especially Bezzola 1974, 66–109; see also Jackson 2005, 65–66, 147–150; Ruotsala 2001, 33. About the chronicles: Bezzola 1974, 86–89, 91–97; Ruotsala 2001, 52.
5 While the Tatars were quite powerful in Eastern Mongolia, it also served as a generic term for nomads in the Chinese sources and eventually became used as such by Islamic sources as well, eventually creeping into European literature.
6 Rubruc 1929, 176, 305.
7 Tanner et al. 1990, 297, 278–301. See Bezzola 1974, 110–118; de Rachewiltz 1971, 84–88; Ruotsala 2001, 40, 60. The information delivered by a Russian archbishop, Peter, has been preserved; edited in Dörrie 1956, 187–194. See Ruotsala 2001, 40, 153–155. The council probably knew also the (second) travel account of Hungarian Dominican Julian (1237/1238), which has been regarded the first comprehensive and realistic Western description of the Mongols; edited in Dörrie 1956, 165–182 . See Bezzola 1974, 37–53, 41; Ruotsala 2001, 51–52.
8 The original destination of Plano Carpini's embassy was obviously Batu because the great khan was not yet known in Europe.
9 The best Latin edition of John of Plano Carpini's travel account is in *Storia dei Mongoli* 1989; see also its articles and commentaries. On Plano Carpini's embassy and its sources: Bezzola 1974, 119–122; de Rachewiltz 1971, 89–111; Ruotsala 2001, 41–43.
10 Lupprian 1981, 49–50; Guzman 1968, 36–37.
11 *CM*, VI, 113–115. On Andrew of Longjumeau and his embassy: Lupprian 1981, 41–45; Pelliot 1931/32, 3–12; de Rachewiltz 1971, 112–115.
12 Guzman 1968, passim.; Lupprian 1981, 53–56; Pelliot 1924, 262–335; de Rachewiltz 1971, 115–119; Ruotsala 2001, 43–44; Bezzola 1974, 123–149. The articles by Paul Pelliot have formed the background of all research concerning Andrew's and Ascelin's embassies. Simon's account survived only because the Dominican, Vincent of Beauvais, included it in his encyclopedic historical work *Speculum historiale* (1248–1253); Guzman 1974, 300; Ruotsala 2001, 33, 43.
13 Bezzola 1974, 150–157; Jackson 2005, 98–99; de Rachewiltz 1971, 120–122; Ruotsala 2005, 302–303.
14 Bezzola 1974, 156–157, 163–164; Pelliot 1931/1932, 38–84; de Rachewiltz 1971, 121–124; Ruotsala 2001, 45–46.
15 Bezzola 1974, 168–182; de Rachewiltz 1971, 125–143; Ruotsala 2001, 44, 46–47.
16 "Incipit Historia Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus", Carpine 1989, 277, also 316; cf. Rubruc 1929, 205; Simon of Saint-Quentin 1965, 92.
17 Simon of Saint-Quentin 1965, 98–107; see more detailed Ruotsala 2001, 80–84.
18 E.g., Carpine 1989, 236; Andrew of Longjumeau in *CM*, VI, 114; Rubruc 1929, 232, 233, 298.
19 Simon of Saint-Quentin 1965, 34, cf. 100–101.
20 Rubruc 1929, 251; Jackson 1990, 182. Cf. Bezzola 1974, 176; Ruotsala 2001, 134.
21 ". . . unus est Deus, et unum est genus humanum", Bacon 1964, II, 386. On Bacon and Rubruck; see Bacon 1964, I, 305; Ruotsala 2001, 44; Ruotsala 2013, 350.

22 Rubruc 1929, 298; Rubruck, 236–237.
23 See note 3.
24 Marco Polo in Yule 1914, 7–8; see de Rachewiltz 1971, 160–161; Standaert 2001, 68–70.
25 Standaert 2001, 47–49. Folker E. Reichert has listed all the known Latins who went to East or Central Asia in 1242–1448; Reichert 1992, 287–293.
26 Sources especially in Lupprian 1981; Moule 1930; Wadding 1733; Yule 1914.
27 The origin of Nestorianism in China; see especially Moule 1930, 27–77. Standaert 2001, 1–2, 43.
28 Peregrine of Castello in van den Wyngaert 1929, 366–367.
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PART XI

BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

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CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE

MONGOLS IN THE MAMLUK SULTANATE

Josephine van den Bent

To the southwest of the Mongol Empire lay the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria. To the early Mamluk Sultanate, the Mongols of the Ilkhanate were the primary and most threatening enemy, while the Jochid Ulus was an important ally. Yet there was a third category of Mongols with whom the Mamluks maintained even closer ties: those who lived inside the realm. They arrived in the sultanate in different ways and would come to hold varying positions within Mamluk society – from lowly soldier to sultan. This section discusses the Mongol diaspora within the Mamluk Sultanate in the second half of the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century.

THE MAMLUK SULTANATE AND THE MONGOLS

The ruling elite of the Mamluk Sultanate was composed of men who had arrived there as mamluks. The Arabic term *mamluk* literally means 'owned', i.e. a slave, and from the ninth century onwards it came to specifically mean 'military slave'. Most of the mamluks in Egypt in this period were taken from the Turkic-speaking areas of Central Asia (in later times, the balance shifted towards the Caucasus). In 1250, they took power by deposing and killing the Ayyubid ruler of Egypt, al-Muʿazzam Turanshah.[1] Although the following ten years would prove to be rather tempestuous with many changes of power, the Mamluk Sultanate was born, and it soon came to include Syria, following the Mamluk defeat of Hülegü's troops at the battle of ʿAyn Jalut (Goliath's Spring) in 1260.[2]

Hostilities between the two powers continued, both as full-on military battles and in ways that Reuven Amitai dubbed a cold war, until the peace agreement of 1323.[3] At the same time, the sultanate had developed friendly diplomatic relations with the Golden Horde khanate. Sharing an enemy in the Ilkhanate, the Jochid Ulus and the Mamluks were allied from the early 1260s onwards, trading and exchanging diplomatic missions.[4] As a result of the Mamluks' relationships with these Mongol states, as well as through the sultanate's importation of mamluks, a significant number of ethnic Mongols came to reside in the Mamluk Sultanate. Arriving in different ways,

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as imported slaves, but also as war captives and immigrants, they played a significant role: Mongol soldiers and mamluks served in the Mamluk armies, Mongol Mamluk amirs (commanders) were among the ruling elite, and Mongol women married Mamluk amirs and (later) sultans.

MONGOL MAMLUKS

The military was of vital importance to the sultanate's survival – not in the least against the Ilkhanate – and for that, a continuous influx of new mamluks was required. Young male slaves were imported by traders and purchased by amirs or the sultan, after which they were converted to Islam and received military training. After manumission they began their careers, and some eventually became high-ranking amirs or even sultan.[5] Most of these mamluks were ethnically Turkic. According to Islamic scholarly tradition, originally developed from Greek climate and humoral theories, northern peoples, which included Turks, were particularly courageous due to their hot nature caused by their cold surroundings. They were therefore particularly suited to the role of military slave. For example, regarding 'men of war and courage', Ibn Butlan (d. 1066) wrote in his slave-buying manual, 'chosen for this are the Turks and the Slavs, because of the heat of their hearts'.[6] So mamluks came from the north and, under Ayyubid rule, were mostly imported via Mesopotamian routes. These, however, were disrupted by the Mongol conquests, which meant that the sultanate was increasingly reliant on the sea route from the Black Sea area and the territory of the Jochid Ulus was the primary source for mamluks in the early decades of the Mamluk Sultanate. Good relations with the Golden Horde were thus essential.[7]

Most of the mamluks who ended up in the sultanate had a Turkic background, but there were Mongols among them as well.[8] Ideas about 'northern' courage and fighting prowess applied to them too: Mongols were considered to be closely related to Turks, if not a subgroup of the latter.[9] The number of Mongols who ended up in the Mamluk ranks in this manner unfortunately remains difficult to ascertain. Even in the case of those who played an important enough role to be named in the chronicles and other sources of the time (and the majority of mamluks did not), it is not always possible to determine their ethnic background.[10] Exact numbers, or even proportions, thus remain elusive for now,[11] but it is clear that ethnically Mongol men formed a significant part of the Mamluk military forces. A famous quote in this regard is the statement that Sultan Qalawun (r. 1279–1290) acquired some twelve thousand 'Turkish, Mongol, and other mamluks'.[12] Various other Mamluk sources similarly point to the importation of Mongol mamluks to the sultanate, mentions that have been collected by David Ayalon and Reuven Amitai.[13] For instance, the encyclopaedist al-ʿUmari (d. 749/1348–1349) reports both the kidnapping and selling of Mongol children in the Jochid Ulus by members of other ethnic groups and the selling of Mongol children by their own parents.[14] Although there is some evidence for the sale of children, most of those sold as slaves were actually captured in war or during raids.[15] Civil war in the Jochid Ulus therefore also affected the influx of mamluks from this region into the Sultanate, as the amir and chronicler Baybars al-Mansuri (d. 1325) reported for the year 699/1299–1300: the conflict between Toqta Khan and the general Noqai led to the sale and export of a large number

of prisoners – both men and women. Captives from the losing side of Noqai were purchased by the sultan and the amirs in Egypt.[16] As Amitai points out, it is more than likely that these new mamluks included Mongols.[17]

The prevalence of Mongol mamluks in the sultanate is underlined in a model of a sales contract given by Shams al-Din Muhammad al-Asyuti (b. 1410–1411), who though writing at a time when the balance had shifted to mamluks of Circassian stock, could still give as an example: 'And if the sold is a Turkish mamluk, write "a whole Turkish Mongol mamluk (*jamiʿ al-mamluk al-turki al-mughuli*), or something else"'.[18] Mongol slaves who ended up in the sultanate via the Black Sea route predominantly came from Jochid Ulus territory, although some reportedly also came from Qaidu's territory, possibly via the Jochid Ulus.[19] Finally, it should be noted that although this paragraph has only discussed male slaves so far, many female slaves, on whom there is even less documentation, were imported to the sultanate from the Black Sea area as well, among whom there surely were women of Mongol ethnicity.[20]

Just as the generally good relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Jochid Ulus were reflected in a lively slave trade, the hostilities between the sultanate and the Ilkhanate could also bolster the Mamluks' army ranks or provide labour elsewhere in the form of enslaved war captives. Ibn Shaddad (d. 1285), in his biography of the sultan Baybars (r. 1260–1277), reports that Mongol captives were paraded through the streets of Cairo in 1273 following a battle at the Euphrates. This procession may have included as many as two hundred Mongols, as that is the number of captives he reported for the battle.[21] Prisoners could become mamluks, and given their previous fighting experience it is apparent why that was attractive. Their recent capture and enslavement, however, meant that their loyalty to the sultanate might well have been less than unwavering. One such example is a youth who had come to Cairo with envoys from Hülegü. Sultan Qutuz (r. 1259–1260) had the messengers executed but spared the youth and added him to his mamluks. That almost cost the sultan dearly: at the Battle of ʿAyn Jalut, the newly made mamluk made an attempt at the life of the sultan.[22]

Yet this was not the norm. Of six senior Mamluk amirs of Mongol descent whose careers were discussed by Amitai, four came to the sultanate as captives.[23] Zayn al-Din Kitbugha al-Mansuri (d. 1303), then still a youth, was captured at the first Battle of Hims in December 1260.[24] Sayf al-Din Salar al-Mansuri (d. 1310), Sayf al-Din Qibjaq al-Mansuri (1310), and Sayf al-Din Almalik (d. 1346) were all taken prisoner at the Battle of Abulustayn of 1277. The provenance of the two others, the close friends (or perhaps even brothers) Sayf al-Din Aytamish (d. 1336) and Sayf al-Din Aruqtay (d. 1349) is unclear, but it appears most likely that they came from the Jochid Ulus.[25] Various other Mongol amirs were active during this period, but the members of this group form instructive examples.

All of them played important roles in the sultanate. Almalik served as intermediary between the amirs in Cairo and Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad during his second exile.[26] Aruqtay was governor of Safad for twenty years, until 1336, when he was called back to Egypt and Aytamish took over the position – having held other positions, including the governorship of Karak, in the past – only to die a few months afterwards. In later years, Aruqtay would briefly serve as governor of Egypt and later of Aleppo.[27] Qibjaq acted as governor of Damascus in the late seventh/thirteenth century, before fleeing to the Ilkhanate. After his return, he held the governorships

of Shawbak and Hama.[28] The Oirat Salar rose to the position of *naʾib al-saltana*, viceroy, during the second reign of the young sultan al-Nasir Muhammad, and effectively ruled the sultanate together with Baybars al-Jashnakir.[29] But the highest post of all Mongol mamluks was reached by Kitbugha. He became sultan.

The way Kitbugha became sultan attests to the integration of Mongol mamluks into the military and ruling elite.[30] Following his capture, he rose through the Mamluk ranks, and when Sultan Qalawun died he was a powerful amir. During the reign of Qalawun's son al-Ashraf Khalil (r. 689–693/1290–1293), Kitbugha grew even more powerful and played a key role in the factional struggles following the sultan's murder in 693/1293 by a coalition of amirs headed by another Mongol amir called Badr al-Din Baydara. Another group, led by Husam al-Din Lajin al-Rumi Ustadar and Kitbugha, wanted to avenge the sultan, and they won the resulting battle.[31] Qalawun's young son, al-Nasir Muhammad, was crowned, but he was only nine years old; actual power lay with a group of senior amirs, including Kitbugha, who became viceroy.[32] Conflict broke out, however, between Kitbugha and the vizier al-Shujaʿi. Al-Shujaʿi had made plans to arrest Kitbugha, but these plans were divulged by another Mongol named amir Sayf al-Din Qunghur al-Tatari and his son Jawurshi, the former having apparently immigrated to Egypt during the reign of Baybars.[33] According to some sources, he did so on account of 'feelings of *jinsiyya*', ethnic solidarity.[34] Kitbugha took action, and al-Shujaʿi was eventually killed, leaving Kitbugha as the sole regent for al-Nasir Muhammad in January 1294.[35] A revolt of al-Ashraf Khalil's mamluks eventually resulted in the removal of al-Nasir Muhammad from the throne, and Kitbugha declared himself sultan in November/December 1294, taking on the title al-Malik al-ʿAdil.[36]

Kitbugha thus came to power in the context of a struggle between different Mamluk factions, and these conflicts impacted the success and duration of his rule. Many considered him a usurper of al-Nasir Muhammad's throne.[37] It did not help Kitbugha that he also had to deal with a major famine.[38] His advancement of his own mamluks and their behaviour was also a source of criticism,[39] but his greatest mistake was his approach to the large group of Oirat Mongol immigrants that arrived in Cairo in 695/1296 (see later in this chapter). Kitbugha was an Oirat as well, and his favouritism towards them was interpreted in terms of ethnic solidarity (*jinsiyya*). Ibn al-Dawadari, for instance, stated that Kitbugha 'felt sympathy for them, because of his ethnicity (*jins*), for he was Oirat, and they were his tribe and his people'.[40] Ultimately, while in Syria, Kitbugha was forced out of office in 696/1296, and Lajin was declared sultan. Kitbugha was sent to the citadel of Salkhad (Sarkhad)[41] and from there played a small role in the sultanate until his death in 703/1303.[42]

In a few decades time, a young Oirat Mongol prisoner of war thus managed to become ruler of the Mamluk Sultanate. In general, there was a significant Mongol presence in the higher echelons of the sultanate in this period. Yet most Mongol mamluks lived unrecorded lives.

IMMIGRANTS

Not all Mongols in the Mamluk Sultanate arrived there through the slave trade or as enslaved war captives. I have already briefly mentioned the arrival of a group of Oirat immigrants. That group was the largest but by no means the first. Groups

seeking refuge in the sultanate repeatedly appeared, and they are generally referred to as *wafidiyya* in present-day scholarly literature, meaning 'those arriving in a group'. Most Mamluk-era authors employ slightly different terminology, but based on the same root, like *wufud* or *wafidun*. Among the *wafidiyya* turning up in the sultanate in the first eighty years or so of the Mamluk Sultanate were various groups of Mongols, coming both from the Golden Horde and from the Ilkhanate.[43]

There has been some academic debate around why groups of Mongols immigrated to the Mamluk Sultanate. Ayalon, who wrote the first extensive study on the phenomenon, appears to suggest that the relatively large influx of Mongol *wafidun* during the reign of Baybars was connected to that sultan's supposed admiration of Mongols as well as the generous reception he gave them. In the case of the Oirat immigration under Kitbugha, he points to the shared ethnic background between the immigrants and the sultan.[44] Nakamachi Nobutaka, however, has rightly argued that we should look at internal factors in the Mongol khanates, the 'push factors', rather than just the possible 'pull factor' of the Mamluk Sultanate.[45] The Mamluk-era authors themselves – although making claims that could be described as pull factors[46] – emphasise developments within or between the Mongol khanates in their explanations for the arrival of Mongol *wafidun*.

Aside from the Oirat *wafidiyya* arriving during the reign of Kitbugha, the largest groups of Mongols to come to the sultanate did so under Baybars. Smaller groups arrived, for instance, in 1282–1283, during the reign Qalawun, when an Oirat called al-Shaykh ʿAli came to Egypt with a group of Mongols;[47] in 1304, when some two hundred horsemen appeared with their families;[48] and in 1317, when the commander Tati arrived with a hundred horsemen and their households.[49] But it is the large groups that came during the reigns of Baybars and Kitbugha that contemporary sources pay the most attention to. They can also provide insights into the sultanate's relationship with the Jochid Ulus and the Ilkhanate respectively, and – to a certain extent – to what happened to the members of these *wafidiyya* groups. The first major arrival was a group of Jochid Mongols in 1262. Three other parties followed shortly afterwards in 1263. Contemporary sources often mention them as a single group.[50] The aforementioned Oirats, arriving in 1296, came from the Ilkhanate.

According to the most detailed source on the first groups of Mongol *wafidun*, the biography of Sultan Baybars by Muhyi al-Din ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir, Cairo first learned about their approach when the governor of Damascus sent word ahead that his scouts had come across a group of Mongols on their way to Cairo. They were reported to be troops from the Jochid Ulus, who had originally been sent to Hülegü as reinforcements. When conflict between the Ilkhanate and the Jochids broke out,[51] Berke instructed these troops to attempt to return to him, but if that were impossible, to head to Egypt. As a result, on Saturday 11 November 1262, Sultan Baybars welcomed commander Suraghan (?) Agha with some two hundred troops and their families. They were settled in the neighbourhood of Al-Luq, their leaders were awarded amirates, and the rest of the troops were divided among his Bahriyya regiment and the sultan's mamluks.[52] A little under a year later, in September 1263, word arrived again from Syria that another group of Mongol riders was approaching, some 1,300 this time. They were followed shortly afterwards by two more groups, the first of which was headed by Geremün (Karamun in the Arabic sources) Agha. Like their predecessors, all received a warm welcome.[53] 'Then', Ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir

writes, 'the sultan suggested Islam to them and they became Muslims by his noble hand and they were all circumcised'.[54]

In general, these groups of immigrant Mongols get little further attention in the sources, although some individual members are mentioned.[55] The Oirat *wafidiyya* of 1296 received significantly more attention, which was rather negative. As mentioned, they arrived during the reign of Kitbugha, who made some severe errors of judgement in his dealing with them. The Oirats came from the Ilkhanate, where their leader, Taraqai (Taraghay), had become entangled in the rather unstable Ilkhanid political situation of that time and came into conflict with the new Ilkhan, Ghazan.[56] He led his followers into Syria. Kitbugha, having been informed of the approach of a large group of Mongols, consecutively sent out the amirs ʿAlam al-Din Sanjar al-Dawadari, Shams al-Din Sunqur al-Aʿsar, and Shams al-Din Qarasunqur al-Mansuri to meet them.[57] The group was large, consisting of either ten thousand[58] or eighteen thousand[59] households, which included men, women, children, and livestock. The Oirat leaders were received and fêted in Damascus, after which they were taken to Egypt by Qarasunqur al-Mansuri, while Sanjar al-Dawadari remained in Syria with the other Oirats. Kitbugha had ordered them to be settled on the coast. On the way to the area of Atlit, where they would come to reside, they were not allowed to enter the cities they passed – traders had to come out to them instead.[60]

In Cairo, the Oirat leaders enjoyed an enthusiastic welcome by the sultan, giving them honorary robes, amirates, *iqtaʿat* (land allocations), and other gifts.[61] This created bad blood among the amirs, and their complaints are reflected in al-Nuwayri's statement that Kitbugha 'exaggerated in bestowing honours on them' and, moreover, granted them the rank of amir 'even though they were infidels'.[62] Indeed, the Oirats' enduring and at times blatant heathenism – they ate in public during Ramadan, among other things – was a major issue.[63] Besides, the preferential treatment the Oirats received reportedly made them arrogant, seating themselves among higher-ranking amirs, where they did not belong, as well as generally acting in a rude manner.[64] The Oirats were also widely viewed with suspicion. That did not just apply to the main body of the *wafidiyya*, who had after all not been allowed to enter the cities they encountered on their way to the Syrian coast,[65] but also to the Oirat elite in Cairo. Kitbugha's favouritism towards the Oirats contributed significantly to his deposition. Under Lajin, the Oirat commander Taraqai and several others were arrested and sent to Alexandria, where most of them were apparently killed. The remainder were divided among amirs and some were sent to Syria.[66] One of the Oirat commanders, named Ulus, returned to Cairo from Alexandria and he and a group of co-conspirators attempted to restore Kitbugha to the throne in 699/1299, while the army was on its way to Syria to face an impending Ilkhanid attack. They intended to kill Salar and Baybars al-Jashnakir and wished to take revenge for the Oirat amirs who had been killed previously. They failed, however, and Ulus and the other Oirat leaders who were involved were executed.[67] Still, other Oirat amirs continued to move in the ruling circles. According to al-Maqrizi, Oirats were banned from serving the sultan al-Nasir Muhammad in 1310. Apparently, they had first been in the service of various amirs but 'plotted against their masters and left for the sultan in Karak', where he was staying during the brief reign of Baybars al-Jashnakir (r. 708/1309–709/1310). Once al-Nasir Muhammad had returned to the throne, the sultanic mamluks reportedly took offence at the Oirats' high position.

Al-Nasir Muhammad apparently caved in the face of their arguments that the Oirats were untrustworthy and banned them from his service.[68]

INTEGRATION INTO THE SULTANATE

Yet, the Oirats did not disappear. As al-Nuwayri wrote, somewhere between the 1310s and his death in 1333,[69] 'amirs took their grown sons, who were the most beautiful people, into their service', and 'soldiers and others married their daughters', while 'those of them who remained are still in the military today'.[70] The same applies to the earlier *wafidiyya* groups. Although they do not appear as a group in the sources in the way the Oirats did – the latter also remained active as a group for a longer period of time, even when split up among different amirs[71] – they also continued to play a role in the Mamluk military. The majority of the Mongol *wafidun* were integrated into the personal troops of amirs and into the *halqa*, a largely non-mamluk army unit of lower status than the mamluk troops of the sultan and the amirs.[72] And while their leaders were generally made amirs, the status these Mongol immigrants could reach has been the object of some scholarly debate.

Ayalon argued that the positions the *wafidiyya* received upon arrival were relatively low and that they had limited opportunities for promotion: *wafidi* Mongols seldom attained a higher position than that of amir of forty/amir of *tablkhana*. According to him the reason was that they arrived as free men rather than as military slaves – without the experience of being enslaved and then manumitted, one could not attain a high military post in the sultanate.[73] Half a century later Nakamachi argued against Ayalon's interpretation, stating that the division between mamluks and free soldiers was not as clear-cut and that it was therefore not a major deciding factor in the position of Mongol *wafidun*.[74] Amitai then responded to Nakamachi, agreeing that the gap between the Mamluk elite and the *wafidiyya* was not as wide as had been assumed, but pointing out that these immigrants never belonged to the circles where true power lay. Career opportunities for the *wafidun* really do appear to have been limited.[75]

The Mongol men were thus integrated into the military ranks, but Mongol women, as the quote by al-Nuwayri shows, became part of Mamluk society as well. Members of the *wafidiyya* and their children frequently intermarried. There was also frequent intermarriage between members of the *wafidiyya* and their offspring and the Mamluk nobility.[76] Three of Baybars' wives were *wafidiyya* women, unnamed daughters of the amirs Sayf al-Din Noghai al-Tatari, Sayf al-Din Karay al-Tatari, and Sayf al-Din Dumaji al-Tatari.[77] Similarly, Qalawun married three women from among the *wafidun*. The first of them, known as Umm al-Salih ʿAli (d. c. 682/1284), was the daughter of Sayf al-Din Geremün, leader of the 661/1263 *wafidiyya*, who married Qalawun in 664/1265–1266, and was, as her *kunya* indicates, the mother of his son al-Malik al-Salih ʿAli (d. 687/1288).[78] The *wafidi* leader thereby became the later sultan's father-in-law.[79] After her death, Qalawun married her sister.[80] Qalawun also married Ashlun Khatun, a Mongol woman who had arrived with a smaller group of immigrants led by Husam al-Din Bijar al-Rumi in 675/1277.[81] She was the mother of al-Nasir Muhammad. Like many others in the highest ranks of the sultanate, one of the greatest Mamluk sultans and the longest reigning was half Mongol.[82]

Al-Nasir Muhammad himself even married a Chinggisid princess, Tulunbay Khatun. She was a family member of the Jochid khan, Özbeg (r. 1313–1341), and arrived in Egypt in May 1320.[83] The festivities were lavish and dazzling, but the marriage itself was not a success. The sultan became convinced that Tulunbay was an impostor and not of Chinggisid descent (although that was, as Anne F. Broadbridge points out, highly unlikely). He eventually divorced her in 1327–1328, after which Tulunbay married Sayf al-Din Mankali Bugha, one of al-Nasir Muhammad's amirs, and would marry twice more after the latter's death.[84] Relations with the Jochids were strained at this point for a number of reasons, and this episode did not improve the relationship with Özbeg when he learned the news, although al-Nasir Muhammad attempted to placate him by saying that she died – even though that was not the case. Diplomatic relations appear to have improved somewhat afterwards. Tulunbay lived in the sultanate until her death in 1340.[85]

Although Tulunbay's story is unique, it does exemplify another form of Mongol immigration to the Mamluk Sultanate: those triggered by direct relationships, whether diplomatic or personal. With Tulunbay, who brought an impressive retinue, was the eighteen-year-old Mongol merchant Qawsun. After having caught the eye of al-Nasir Muhammad, he eventually agreed to be sold to the sultan, thereby becoming a mamluk. He rapidly made his way through the Mamluk ranks, becoming an amir of one hundred, commander of one thousand, and a member of the *khassakiyya* (the bodyguard),[86] marrying a daughter of al-Nasir Muhammad, and became one of the most powerful amirs in the sultanate in a matter of just six years.[87] In the years that followed, Qawsun brought several of his relatives to the sultanate (his brother Susun became Tulunbay's third husband).[88] He was certainly not the only Mongol mamluk to do so: Salar, for instance, brought over his mother and brothers from the Ilkhanate in 1305.[89] Various Mongol relatives of al-Nasir Muhammad came to the sultanate as well. An Ilkhanid embassy in June 1326 was accompanied by Tayirbugha, the Ilkhanid governor of Akhlat in Anatolia, together with his son Yahya, said to be related to the sultan. They were welcomed by him and made commanders of forty (later one hundred) and ten respectively.[90] The following year, one Muhammad Bey, son of Jamaq arrived with another group of emissaries from the Ilkhan. He was the son of Tayirbugha's sister, which similarly made him a relative of the sultan, who made him an amir of forty as well.[91]

THE MONGOL ASPECT

Throughout the first Mamluk period, there was a significant Mongol presence in the Mamluk Sultanate. In one way or another, they arrived in the sultanate through its relationship with the Jochid Ulus and the Ilkhanate, whether through immigration or the slave trade, through war or for family reasons. And although it was not without the occasional hiccough, they were integrated into Mamluk society. Even the Oirats converted to Islam within a relatively short period of time, although their reputation remained less than stellar: even in the fifteenth century they were apparently seen as malicious, violent, and prone to gangsterism, though very courageous.[92] One question remains, however, when we look at these Mongol amirs, immigrants, and others: did their Mongol ethnicity matter, and if so, how much, when, and why?

After all, the sultanate was at war with the Ilkhanid Mongols for decades: were Mongol mamluks regarded as a fifth column?

In some ways, it absolutely mattered. Mongol mamluks could take on roles that others could not, or at least carry them out to greater success. Aytamish played an important role in the peace process between the sultanate and the Ilkhanate as an envoy to Abu Saʿid.[93] One Oirat *wafidi*, called Qararnah al-Silahdar (d. 1349) was similarly sent as an envoy to the Ilkhan Abu Saʿid by al-Nasir Muhammad. He made various other missions in the 1340s to Shaykh Hasan Buzurg, ruler of Baghdad, under al-Nasir Muhammad's sons, after which he was promoted to amir of forty.[94] The aforementioned Qawsun translated correspondence with the Ilkhanate and the Jochids for al-Nasir Muhammad.[95] Their Mongol background meant that they had linguistic and cultural skills that others lacked.

These are very practical matters, however. The question of what ways and to what extent ethnic background affected social relations is much harder to answer, and there has been much debate about the topic. As Koby Yosef has pointed out, ethnic origins are frequently mentioned in the Mamluk sources, which suggests that they mattered.[96] The case of Kitbugha and the Oirats also shows that a common ethnic origin could matter. Not only was Kitbugha reportedly warned by Qunghur al-Tatari on account of *jinsiyya*, according to contemporaries, but ethnic solidarity also caused him to give the Oirats preferential treatment. Two things should be noted here. First, as both Amir Mazor and Amitai have emphasised, the *jinsiyya* in this episode appears to be quite unique, if not in its appearance at least in its extent.[97] The uncommonness of it may well explain in part why other political actors were so bothered by it. Second, the criticism levelled at Kitbugha by his contemporaries is in the first place *jinsiyya*, not *jins*, i.e. their Mongol ethnicity itself. The problem was not that he was an Oirat – although the fact was at times employed in scolding poetry, for instance[98] – but his favouritism towards other Oirats.[99]

Yosef has argued that, within the Mamluk Sultanate, affiliations and identities were based first and foremost on ethnic background.[100] Similarly, he has argued that Mongols within the Mamluk Sultanate, in particular *wafidiyya* and war captives, were widely considered to be treacherous.[101] There were indeed cases of plotting, some of which have been discussed, as well as defections. One important Mongol amir to defect to the Ilkhanate was Qibjaq al-Mansuri. He did so, however, to avoid arrest by Lajin's viceroy and quickly regretted it when both sultan and viceroy were murdered shortly afterwards, but he was already in the Ilkhanate. He became part of the Ilkhanid occupation of Damascus in 1299–1300 but appears to have collaborated with the Mamluks there and allowed to reintegrate, albeit at a lower position. Amitai pointed to the various loyalties that were at play here, with the Mamluk ones apparently winning out.[102] Other authors, including Amitai and Mazor, caution against overdue stress on the importance of ethnic solidarity among the Mamluk elite. They point out that many close friendships existed between amirs of different ethnic backgrounds, while animosities could well play out between members of the same ethnic group. Other loyalties, such as those to mamluks of the same master, those to patron and sultan, and to Islam, played a key role.[103] Nor was the image of such Mongol mamluks necessarily poor. At times when that was politically expedient, Mamluk actors could take recourse to negative images of Mongols in general, which included untrustworthiness but also unbelief and violence. Kitbugha

and the Oirats are a clear example. But for the most part, Mongols integrated into the sultanate without too many problems, and Mongol amirs were an everyday part of the Mamluk elite.

NOTES

1 Irwin 1986, 1–26.
2 Amitai-Preiss 1995.
3 Amitai 2005, 359–390.
4 Favereau 2019, 302–326; Favereau 2017, 93–101; Broadbridge 2001, 95–105; Broadbridge 2008.
5 Rabie 1975, 153–163; Ayalon 1994, 9–13; Levanoni 1995, 14–19; Mazor 2015, 20–23, 40–56; Barker 2019, 23.
6 Ibn Butlan 1954, IV, 351–389, 387; Frenkel 2005, 201–241; Frenkel 2015.
7 Amitai 2008a, 349–368; Ehrenkreutz 1981, 336–237, 340–342; Northrup 1998, 284–285; Barker 2019, 130, 133.
8 Amitai 2008a, 350–351; Amitai 2008b, 120–122.
9 Abu Shama (d. 665/1268) described the Mongols as 'the infidels among the Turks' (Abu Shama 1947, 165) and the Syrian al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348) described them as 'a kind of Turk' (al-Dhahabi 1985, XXIII, 290). See also Ayalon 1963, 47–52; Jackson 2017, 68; van den Bent 2020, 49–80.
10 Ayalon 1975, 189–232, 219–223; Ayalon 1994, 7–8; Mazor 2015, 36–37.
11 Mazor 2015, 36–40; Yosef 2019, 149–214, 159–160.
12 Ibn al-Furat n.d., VIII, 97. See also Ayalon 1951, XXV, 89–104, 103; Ayalon 1953a, 203–228, 223; Ayalon 1972, 113–158, 124–125; Amitai-Preiss 1995, 120.
13 Ayalon 1951. 103–104; Ayalon 1994, 3; Amitai 2008b, 120–122.
14 al-ʿUmari 2004, III, 182–183; Umari, 140; Ayalon 1994, 3; Amitai 2008b, 121; Barker 2019, 126.
15 Barker 2019, 121–128.
16 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 347; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 159; Amitai 2008b, 121.
17 Amitai 2008b, 121.
18 al-Asyuti 1990, 97.
19 Amitai 2008b, 122.
20 Barker 2019, 69–70, 122.
21 Ibn Shaddad 1983, 56–57.
22 al-Maqrizi 1932, 429, 431; Broadbridge 2008, 28–30; Yosef 2019, 161–165.
23 Amitai 2008b, 122–126.
24 al-Safadi 2000, XXIV, 240; al-Safadi 1998, IV, 145; Amitai 2008b, 122–123.
25 Amitai 2008b, 123–126. The Mongol origins of Almalik are not entirely certain (pp. 125–126).
26 al-Safadi 2000, IX, 214; Amitai 2008b, 125–126.
27 al-Safadi 2000, VIII, 233–234; al-Safadi 1998, I, 476–480; Ibn Hajar 1993, I, 354 (on Aruqtay); al-Safadi 2000, IX, 249–250; al-Safadi 1998, I, 634–635; Ibn Hajar 1993, I, 423–424; al-Yusufi 1986, 329–331 (on Aytamish). On Aytamish, see Ayalon 1973, 107–156, 131–146; Little 2006, 387–401; Amitai 2007, 263–275.
28 al-Safadi 2000, XXIV, 133–138; al-Safadi 1998, 61–72; Ibn Hajar 1993, III, 241–243; Amitai 2008b, 123–124; Amitai 2004, 21–41.
29 al-Safadi 2000, XVI, 33–35; al-Safadi 1998, II, 489–494; Amitai 2008b, 123–124; Broadbridge 2011, 1–18, 4–8.
30 For an overview of Kitbugha's rise to power, see Mazor 2015, 81–95.

31 Mazor 2015, 81–83; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 295–297; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 165; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 166–171. According to some, Kitbugha was actually involved in the murder plot (e.g. al-Jazari 1998, I, 192–193). See also al-Dhahabi 1988, 361–362; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 349–350. On Kitbugha's career as a Mansuri mamluk, see Mazor 2015.
32 Mazor 2015, 83–86; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 295–298; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 137–138; al-Jazari 1998, I, 192, 196; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 165–168; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 345–351; Ibn al-Furat n.d., VIII, 166–172.
33 Mazor 2015, 85, 167–168; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 139–140; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 301; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 172–173; Ibn al-Furat n.d, VIII, 179. See also Amitai 2008b, 129–130.
34 al-Jazari 1998, I, 196–197; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 179; Mazor 2015, 167–168.
35 Mazor 2015, 86–89; al-Safadi 2000, IV, 252; al-Safadi 1998, V, 76; al-Jazari 1998, I, 197–199; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 180–183.
36 Mazor 2015, 89–90; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 303; al-Jazari 1998, I, 207, 247; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 356; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 175–176, 179–180; al-Safadi 2000, IV, 252; al-Safadi 1998, V, 78; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 184–185, 191–193.
37 See, for instance, Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 305; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 7, 357–358.
38 Mazor 2015, 92–93; al-Safadi 2000, IV, 252–253; al-Safadi 1998, V, 78–79; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 306; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 363–364; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 185; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 199–200; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 145; al-ʿUmari 2004, XXVII, 475; Ibn Hajar 1993, III, 263; al-Jazari 1998, I, 256–257.
39 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 310; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 146; al-ʿAyni 1990, III, 307; Mazor 2015, 91, 95.
40 Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 361. See also Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 146; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 188; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 205; al-ʿAyni 1990, III, 312; Ibn Hajar 1993, III, 263–264; Ayalon 1951, 91; Landa 2016, 162n52–163n53; Mazor 2015, 91–95.
41 Mazor 2015, 93–95; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 310–312; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 147; al-Jazari 1998, I, 333–337; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 365–367; al-Safadi 2000, IV, 241, 253; al-Safadi 1998, IV, 145; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 192–202; al-ʿUmari 2004, XXVII, 477–478; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 212–214, 220–229; Ibn Hajar 1993, III, 263.
42 Abu al-Fidaʾ 1999, IV, 56–63; al-Safadi 2000, XXIV, 241; al-Safadi 1998, IV, 145; al-ʿUmari 2004, XXVII, 495; al-ʿAyni 1992, IV, 296.
43 Nobutaka 2006, 55–81, 57–60; Ayalon 1951, 101–102.
44 Ayalon 1951, 34; Ayalon 2013. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_7813.
45 Nakamachi 2006, 55–56, 61–62.
46 According to Muhyi al-Din Ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir (1976, 138), word of Baybars' kindness and generosity towards the Mongols spread, resulting in them arriving 'group after group'. See also al-Nuwayri, who follows Ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir (al-Nuwayri 2004, XXX, 38).
47 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 217; Nakamachi 2006, 58.
48 al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXII, 61; Ayalon 1951, 101; Nakamachi 2006, 59.
49 al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXII, 195; Ayalon 1951, 101; Nakamachi 2006, 59.
50 Nakamachi 2006, 60; Ibn Shaddad 1983, 337–338. See also Nakamachi 2006, 56–57.
51 Morgan 1986, 143–144.
52 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓahir 1976, 135–138, 180. See also, al-Nuwayri 2004, XXX, 37–38, 90; Ibn Shaddad 1983, 337–338; al-Maqrizi 1971, 473–474; Ayalon 1951, 98; Nakamachi 2006, 62–68; Amitai 2008b, 128.
53 Ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir 1976, 177–181; al-Yunini 1954, I, 534; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 84; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 51; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXX, 55–56; al-Maqrizi 1971, 501.

54 Ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir 1976, 180. See also Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 84–85; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXX, 56; al-Maqrizi 1971, 501.
55 Nakamachi 2006, 77–81.
56 Landa 2016, 151–157; Broadbridge 2016, 121–135; Broadbridge 2018, 260–295.
57 Abu al-Fidaʾ 1999, IV, 44; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 309–310; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 146; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 187–188; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 361; al-Jazari 1998, I, 286–287; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 203–204; al-Maqrizi 1998, II, 412. See also Landa 2016, 157–161; Nakamachi 2006, 61–62.
58 Abu al-Fidaʾ 1999, IV, 44; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 361.
59 al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 187; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 203; Ayalon 1951, 99.
60 al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 188–189; Ibn al-Dawadari 1971, VIII, 361–362; al-Jazari 1998, I, 287–288; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 204–205. See also Ayalon 1951, 100; Landa 2016, 180.
61 Abu al-Fidaʾ 1999, IV, 44; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 188; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 310; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 146; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 204; al-ʿAyni 1989, III, 306. See also Landa 2016, 161.
62 al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 188. See also Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 310; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 146; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 204; Landa 2016, 162.
63 al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 188; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 204; al-ʿAyni 1989, III, 308; Ibn Hajar 1993, III, 263; Nakamachi 2006, 72–73; Landa 2016, 162.
64 Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 146; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 188; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 205; al-ʿAyni 1989, III, 306; al-Maqrizi 1998, II, 413.
65 This may, however, have been a standard way of dealing with large groups of immigrants. On the Oirats in Syria, see Landa 2016, 179–181.
66 Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 205; al-ʿAyni 1989, III, 355–356; al-Maqrizi 1998, II, 414; Landa 2016, 162–163.
67 Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 156; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 330; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 240–241; Ibn al-Dawadari 1960, IX, 15; al-ʿAyni 1989, III, 462–468. See also Landa 2016, 163; Ayalon 1951, 100–101; Nakamachi 2006, 69; Amitai 2008b, 130–131.
68 al-Maqrizi 1971, 83. See also Landa 2016, 182; Ayalon 1951, 100–101; Nakamachi 2006, 69.
69 Muhanna 2018, 13–14.
70 al-Nuwayri 2004, XXXI, 189; Landa 2016, 178. The beauty of the Oirats mentioned by al-Nuwayri is a recurring theme in Mamluk sources (see, for instance, Ayalon 1951, 100).
71 al-Yusufi 1986, 230; al-Maqrizi 1998, II, 412–415; Landa 2016, 180–182.
72 Ayalon 1951, 98–99; Ayalon 1972, 134; Amitai-Preiss 1995, 71; Levanoni 2011, 37–65, 39–42; Landa 2016, 181–182. On the *Halqa*, see Ayalon 1953b, 448–476; Levanoni 2011.
73 Ayalon 1951; Ayalon 2013. Amir of *tablkhana*, or amir of forty, was one of the officer ranks in the Mamluk sultanate. It meant that an amir had the right to keep at least forty mamluks, as well as a musical band (the *tablkhana*). The other two ranks were amir of ten and amir of hundred.
74 Nakamachi 2006.
75 Amitai 2008b, 128–129. See also his earlier article, Amitai-Preiss 1997, 267–300, 286–287.
76 Ayalon 1951, 90. Amitai 2008b, 135, has pointed to the desirability of a study into the gender and family aspects of Mamluk politics. See also Holt 1995; Northrup 1998, 116–118.
77 Ibn Shaddad 1983, 233; al-Safadi 2000, X, 212.
78 Shafiʿ ibn ʿAli 2000, 203–207; Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 102; Baybars al-Mansuri 1987, 56; Holt 1995, 313; Northrup 1998, 116, 118, n. 402.
79 On Geremün's career in the Mamluk Sultanate, see, for instance, Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓahir 1976, 263; Shafiʿ ibn ʿAli 2000, 203–204; al-Nuwayri 2004, XXX, 85; Nakamachi 2006, 73; Amitai 2008b, 129.

80 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 228. See also Mazor 2015, 34, n. 12; Holt 1995; Northrup 1998, 116–117.
81 Abu al-Fidaʾ 1999, IV, 30; Ibn al-Furat n.d. VIII, 172. See also Northrup 1998, 116–118; Broadbridge 2019, 263–301, 278, n. 77.
82 Holt 1995; Northrup 1998, 116–118.
83 Broadbridge 2008, 132–133.
84 al-Safadi 2000, VIII, 237; al-Safadi 1998, I, 482; al-Safadi 1998, V, 453.
85 Broadbridge 2008, 132–137.
86 Ayalon 1953a, 213–216.
87 al-Shujaʿi 1977, I, 159–160; al-Safadi 2000, XIV, 207–209; al-Safadi 1998, IV, 136–141; Van Steenbergen 2001, III, 449–466; Levanoni 1995, 34–36, 39.
88 al-Safadi 2000, IV, 209; al-Safadi 1998, IV, 140; al-Yusufi 1986, 212; Levanoni 1995, 39; Van Steenbergen 2001, III, 454; Broadbridge 2019, 278; al-Yusufi 1986, 212.
89 Baybars al-Mansuri 1998, 385; Ibn al-Dawadari 1960, IX, 131; Amitai 2008b, 123.
90 al-Maqrizi 1971, 273; Broadbridge 2019, 278–279.
91 al-Maqrizi 1971, 283–284; Broadbridge 2019, 279.
92 al-Maqrizi 1998, II, 414.
93 Little 1979; Amitai 2005, 170–171; Amitai 2008b, 124–125; Broadbridge 2008, 107; Broadbridge 2019, 267.
94 Landa 2016, 183; Nakamachi 2006, 74, 80.
95 Van Steenbergen 2001, III, 453.
96 Yosef 2012a, 387–410.
97 Amitai 2008b, 130–131; Mazor 2015, 168–170.
98 al-ʿAyni 1989, 306; al-Maqrizi 1998, II, 413. Cf. Yosef 2012a, 395–396.
99 van den Bent 2020, 234–237.
100 Yosef 2012b.
101 Yosef 2019.
102 Amitai 2004; Amitai 2008b, 132–133; al-Safadi 1998, II, 344.
103 Mazor 2015, 166–170; Amitai 2008b, 131–137.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-TWO

THE OUTER LIMITS OF STEPPE POWER

Mongol excursions in Southeast Asia

James A. Anderson

During the second half of the 13th century, Mongol military forces attempted on several occasions to expand southward into Mainland and Island Southeast Asia. Tansen Sen argues that "(the) Chinggisid civil war that centered on Qaidu in Central Asia seems to have forced Qubilai to explore the maritime routes for military expansion, political alliances, and commercial profit."[1] These overland efforts brought mixed results for the Mongol conquerors and their local supporters, which were coordinated with maritime expeditions that exploited existing coastal trade routes connecting the coastal emporia of Champa to the Malay Peninsula and southward to Java. The Mongol navy scored several notable victories against Southeast Asian defenders, but the nature of warfare in tropical Southeast Asia and the lack of local allies undermined the Mongol advance. Eventually Yuan forces withdrew from the region, acknowledging that trade would provide the northern court with the wealth that military conquest had failed to deliver. Trade, rather than military force, would be the manner with which the Mongol Empire maintained its intervention through most of the Southeast Asian region.

To understand better the nature of Mongol encounters with Southeast Asian states in this period, one needs to understand the basic political and economic realities of these communities. In his article introducing the general outlines of Southeast Asia, Craig Lockard wrote,

> The most populous societies lived along the coastal plains or in the river valleys where irrigated rice cultivation was possible. . . . The more thinly spread, less technologically advanced shifting cultivators who dwelled in the highlands and rainforests lived in politically-decentralized, often semi-nomadic communities. The dichotomy between lowlanders and highlanders, each with differing social, economic, political, and cultural systems, produced a situation of cores and fringes; the 'core' societies in the lowlands attempted to influence or control the 'fringe' peoples with mixed success, and the lowland states were essentially fluid spheres of influence sometimes extending into nearby fringe zones.[2]

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The highland-lowland divide complicated the Mongol advance into Southeast Asia when lowland rulers would melt into the surrounding hills and mountains at the sight of the Mongol armies and use the safety of remote highland retreats to plan and coordinate their defense and eventual counterattacks.

On the eve of the Mongol conquests, Chinese trade connections emanating southward from the South China Sea (Eastern Sea) provided the maritime signposts utilized by Mongol naval expeditions in their efforts to continue the "southernization" of the Mongol Empire. In this chapter, I have included several case studies, involving Mongol encounters with Southeast Asian states to illustrate the strategy employed by the Yuan court and the difficulties faced in attempting to implement this strategy. Ultimately, much of the Southeast Asian region proved to be a "bridge too far" for Mongol forces, and it is this realization that we explore.

DALI KINGDOM

To better understand the path taken by Qubilai's forces in their conquest of the Dali 大理 Kingdom (937–1253), located in modern-day Yunnan, one needs to look at the strategic concerns of the state that occupied the region during the Tang dynasty, the Nanzhao 南詔 Kingdom (738–937). Grant Evans argued that Nanzhao had thrived on interregional trade and that the only manner by which this kingdom could have expanded was to extend its control of the territory along the Southwestern Silk Road that supported this trade.[3] Evans quotes C.P. Fitzgerald in summarizing the strategic difficulty that confronted the Nanzhao leadership:

> (to) gain real strength beyond the narrow rice plains and valleys of Yunnan, separated as they are by great tracts of empty mountain country, (Nanzhao) must occupy permanently and then fully (colonize) and assimilate a truly rich region of heavy population.[4]

The Nanzhao's efforts to remain a unified polity in a rugged landscape that tended toward fragmentation caused the kingdom's leadership to rely even more heavily on their control of trade.

Evans argued that the Nanzhao leadership failed to fully colonize their region or expand into neighboring Sichuan and that this failure hastened the kingdom's demise.[5] As Evans wrote,

> (the Dali) Kingdom thereafter turned inward, not unlike its Buddhist kings, and became quiescent. The edges of the kingdom, made up of many different ethnic groups brought under control by the Nanzhao ruler Ge Luofeng 閣羅鳳 (r. 748–779), gradually slipped out of its grip, and by this time the Tai were on the move.[6]

This failure to control the surrounding upland peoples played a large role in the weak defense the Dali Kingdom presented when Mongol forces converged on its political capital in the 1250s.

Two years after ascending to the throne as qa'an in 1251, Möngke (1208–1259) chose his brother Qubilai (1215–1294) to develop an attack strategy to the south,

avoiding the Song Army's main line of defense.[7] Qubilai and his advisers soon announced a plan to attack and defeat the Dali Kingdom, thereby bringing men and material resources through the southwest to encircle Song defenses prior to an all-out invasion of the Chinese empire. Mongol forces had sought to attack Dali in 1244 and again in 1248, in part from routes that passed through neighboring Tibet after that kingdom had surrendered to Mongol armies dispatched by Ögödei and later by Ögödei's son, Güyük (r. 1247–1248), but Dali forces under their ruler Duan Xiangxing (r. 1239–1251) and Song forces based in Sichuan thwarted these attempts.[8] In the autumn of 1253, Qubilai ordered the general, Uriyangqadai (1202–1272), the eldest son of Sübedei (1176–1248), to assemble an army of 100,000 men in the region of modern-day Henan. In the summer of 1254, the forces under Uriyangqadai were assembled in Lintao (in present-day northwest Shanxi) for training.[9] At the same time, a second Mongol military commander, Wang Dechen (1222–1259), arrived from Jiading (modern-day Leshan in Sichuan province) to join Qubilai's forces.

In autumn 1255, Uriyangqadai seized the Shanchan garrison at modern-day Kunming, taking the last Dali ruler, Duan Xingzhi (r. 1251–1253), prisoner and causing Duan's vanguard of 20,000 soldiers to surrender unconditionally. The entire Dali region was now under Mongol control, and it was with the help of certain indigenous groups that Qubilai's forces achieved their victory. According to the official *History of the Yuan Dynasty* (*Yuan shi*), in the same year Qubilai sent Duan Xingzhi north with his uncle Duan Fu for an official audience at the court of Möngke.[10] After Möngke received the two men, he gave the Dali ruler a golden seal to confirm his position as a Mongol vassal, and in the following year, Duan Xingzhi presented the Mongol ruler with a map of Dali. Möngke was reportedly overjoyed with this gift, and he subsequently gave Duan Xingzhi the title "Maharaja (*mo he luo cuo* 摩訶羅嵯)."[11] The once-dominant Duan clan was granted a ceremonial role in the administration of Dali after the Mongol conquest, but a Mongol overseer (*daruqachi*, Chin. *daluhuachi* 達魯花赤) was appointed by Möngke to supervise the leadership of Duan Xingzhi and the conquered Dali court.[12] Numerous court appointees from the Central Asian region filled administrative roles at all levels, such as Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din (1211–1279), who served as the Mongols' first governor of the newly created Yunnan province and who, along with his descendants and other Central Asians, brought a connection to the Islamic world through trade and cultural exchange.[13] John Herman notes that most of the local elite who elected to serve the Mongols had not held positions of authority within the Dali political order.[14]

The Mongols established commanderies throughout the formerly autonomous kingdom to displace the overarching authority of the Duan clan. According to the *Yuan shi* account, 100,000 troops followed the Mongol military command to the Yunnan region, where they settled in several villages south of modern Kunming.[15] Still, space remained for local self-rule, and the native clout of the Duan was never eliminated. As Bin Yang has argued, the Mongol leadership never displaced the Duan completely, and the Mongols "relied on the Duans to contain and comfort small native chieftains, and, if necessary, to suppress local rebellions."[16] Michael C. Brose notes that Mongol control of Yunnan, "the last of [the] Mongol loyalists," did not end until 1382, when Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang sent a force of 300,000 troops under the Muslim generals Lan Yu and Mu Ying to demand the submission of the Mongol Prince Basalawarmi, who committed suicide when confronted with

this force. As Brose notes, the Ming generals were also required to subdue the Duan clan, still present in the region, and to confirm its leadership as subordinates of the Ming court.

PAGAN

Mongol military advances had a regional impact on other areas of Mainland Southeast Asia. Bin Yang notes that the Duan clan had also been recruited to assist with the further invasions of the Burmese kingdom of Pagan (1044–1287) and the initially successful attack on the Tran rulers of the Dai Viet kingdom, about which more is written later.[17] During the reign of Pagan's final ruler, Narathihapate (r. 1256–1287), internal and external tension began to undermine the state's foundations, and leaders of rival upland polities challenged Pagan authority from the periphery. For example, the Mon elite of Lower Burma launched a rebellion in 1273, and in 1281, Mon forces captured the coastal region of Martaban from Pagan, which became a separate state under the leadership of Wareru (r. 1287–1307).[18] In this time of unrest, the Mongols continued their advance against the smaller polities occupying modern-day Southwest China, as well as the northern region of modern Myanmar. In 1271, shortly after founding the Yuan dynasty, Qubilai sent envoys to Pagan to request submission to Mongol rule, but the envoys did not receive an audience with the Pagan ruler Narathihapate, meeting instead with his ministers. Sun Laichen argues that this act of dispatching subordinates demonstrates that the Pagan ruler did not take the Yuan seriously and therefore did not bother to meet them.[19] In 1277, the Yuan court sent another diplomatic mission, including several high-ranking court officials. Despite some ambiguity in the sources, the entire mission was reportedly executed by order of the Pagan court.[20] The Mongol leadership then turned to military means of persuasion. In early 1278, Mongol forces attacked the northeast regions of Bhamo and Nga Hsaunggyan, but the troops eventually withdrew due, according to the sources, to the humid, miasmic climate. In late 1283, Mongol forces attacked again, and then in late 1285 attempted a diplomatic settlement, which failed again with the Mongol envoys likely executed. In early 1287, Yuan forces based in Yunnan directly attacked and captured the capital city of Pagan, defeated the Pagan court and extracted a promise of tribute.[21] As Sun Laichen notes, even this defeat did not cause the Pagan ruler Narathihapate to capitulate completely. He refused to visit the Yuan court in person, and from 1287 until 1332, not a single Burmese ruler would travel to the Mongol court.[22]

Mongol attacks into Southwest China and northern Southeast Asia had a deep impact on state building in the region. As Grant Evans wrote,

> (it) now seems indisputable that the Mongol destruction of the Pagan kingdom in 1287 facilitated the rise of Tai/Shan principalities in northern Burma and Thailand, and Tatsuo Hoshino argues that some eighty years later the rise of the Lao Kingdom, Lan Xang in Luang Prabang, was a direct outcome of Mongol strategy.[23]

Michael Aung-Thwin and Maitrii Aung-Thwin dispute Evans's point regarding Mongol conquest, arguing that the Mongol armies were ultimately unable to topple the Pagan state but that

> (the Mongols) did *accelerate* [authors' italics] the long-term trends and patterns already in progress, exacerbating them further. The resources and energy spent in the (defense) of the kingdom also exacted a heavy toll on state and society, which when combined with the already depleted treasury was a burden from which the dynasty could not recover intact.[24]

Change was already in motion for Pagan with its own inherent political weaknesses, but the destabilizing effect of the Mongol advance allowed smaller polities to gain traction and for the region's larger states to fragment into competing factions.

Trade and migration were the longest-lasting outcome of Mongol military activities in this region. As Andrew Forbes noted, Arab and South Asian Muslim traders in the early period of the maritime expansion of Islam across the Indian Ocean network into the Bay of Bengal must have visited the coasts of Arakan and the Gulf of Martaban from at least the reign of Pagan's founder Anawrahta (1044–1077).[25] It was, however, during the Mongol-appointed administration of Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din and his son, Nasir al-Din (d. 1292), that trade and traders from overland routes originating in Inner Asia were connected to the eastern borderlands of the kingdoms occupying modern-day Myanmar.[26] Nasir al-Din had been appointed pacification commissioner and concurrently commander-in-chief (*xuan wei shi dou yuanshuai* 宣慰使都元帥) for the Yunnan Circuit,[27] and in early 1278 Qubilai ordered that he lead 10,000 troops in the first punitive expedition against Pagan.[28] Under the leadership of Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din and his extended clan, the Yuan court had a large number of Muslim soldiers of Central Asian origin transferred to the former territory of the Dali Kingdom in western Yunnan. These troops participated in the Mongol invasions of the Pagan Kingdom during the Yuan period, and their descendants formed the basis for the modern-day Chinese Muslim population in both Yunnan and Myanmar.[29] While the Mongol military may not have caused the complete collapse of the Pagan state, the excursions shook the foundations of the Pagan political order and the movement of other peoples into the region would leave a lasting impact on post-Pagan society.

DAI VIET KINGDOM

During the Tran 陳 (1225–1400) dynasty, the territorial integrity of Vietnam was successfully defended on three occasions (1257–1259, 1284–1285, and 1287–1288) against Mongol expansion, beginning with the campaigns that followed the Mongol conquest of the Dali Kingdom. The Mongol armies faced a very different foe in Tran-era Vietnam than they did with Dali. The Dali Kingdom fit what Roshan de Silva Wijeyeratne defines as a "galactic polity"–style state organization, in turn quoting Stanley Tambiah by noting that such states "'modelled on mandala-type patterning had central royal domains surrounded by satellite principalities and provinces replicating the center on a smaller scale', while at the margin, there were 'even more autonomous tributary principalities.'"[30] As I have noted elsewhere,

> (while) the more fluid mandala state of the Dali kingdom never achieved the conditions necessary for the transition to a new political order, the Dai Viet kingdom progressed from its founding until the era of its confrontations with

the Mongols through a period of state-building shared by the other Classical Era (800 CE–1200 CE) Southeast Asian states.[31]

The Vietnamese expelled the Mongols following their first invasion of the region, although the Mongols sacked the Tran capital at Thang Long in the attempt.[32] Qubilai desired to use the Tran kingdom as a stepping-stone into the Southeast Asian region, but the Mongols were thwarted. In late 1257, Qubilai sent a force of several thousand Mongol troops and upland Yi militia from the Dali region into Tran territory under the command of Uriyangqadai.[33] Tran forces, with native upland allies from the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands halted the Mongol military advance, which resulted in a stalemate at the frontier. Eventually, in the summer of 1259, the Mongol court ordered Uriyangqadai's forces to withdraw from Dai Viet territory to join other Mongol armies in a concerted assault on Southern Song defenses in the area of modern-day Guangxi and Guilin.

The second expedition against the Dai Viet kingdom waited until Qubilai established his own court in Daidu in 1260. Diplomatic tensions with the Tran court had been building in this period. As Kathlene Baldanza has noted, the Dai Viet kingdom's leadership had rejected as demeaning the Yuan court's attempt to appoint a *daruqachi* to their state, which had been one of the Yuan's 1267 "Six Duties" (*liushi* 六事) following their first failed invasion in 1257.[34] It may be that the Mongols also wished to prevent a joint anti-Yuan effort by Southern Song Dynasty exiles and Dai Viet. The exiled Song scholar Zheng Sixiao 鄭思肖 (1241–1318) observed that in the early Yuan "many civilian and military officials (of the fallen Song) went into exile abroad, took up official service in Champa, married into the ruling elite in Jiaozhi (Dai Viet), or left to drift abroad in distant kingdoms (諸文武臣流離海外, 或仕占城, 或婿交趾, 或別流遠國)."[35] The Tran court continued to maintain tribute relations with the Southern Song court until shortly before the dynasty finally collapsed in 1279.[36]

For all these reasons, Qubilai increased pressure on the Vietnamese Tran court. During the early 1280s, Mongol armies serving the court of Qubilai were making ever-deeper inroads along the Southeast Asian Peninsula. In 1281, when Mongol forces first threatened the ruler of Champa,[37] Indravarman V, the Tran leadership at the Dai Viet court declined requests from the Yuan to assist with these southern expeditions.[38] In the summer of 1283, Qubilai's court sent a Uyghur envoy, Ariq Qaya (1227–1286), to the Tran court with another request for troops and assistance in a military assault on Champa.[39] The new Tran emperor, Tran Nhan Tong (r. 1279–1308), again refused to offer assistance, but instead prepared for another Mongol attack.[40] The Tran defenses were readied by the emperor's uncle Tran Quoc Tuan (1226–1300), best known to future generations by his honorific title, the Hung Dao Prince. By 1284, Mongol troops had landed on the frontier between Champa and the Dai Viet kingdom. Under the leadership of Qubilai's son Toghon, this force planned a second attack, coordinating a northward push along the coastline with another military force sweeping southward from Lang Son to invade the Vietnamese across two land borders and from the sea. Early in this second invasion, the situation looked bleak for the Viet defenders. In early 1285, the northern force crossed into Viet territory, sacking Thang Long for a second time and executing its defending general Tran Bình Trong 陳平仲 (1259–1285). The Tran court had abandoned the

city prior to the Mongol assault, regrouping on their estates further out in the Red River delta.[41] At this point, Toghon's army moved north into the province of Nghe An, where the Mongols defeated a Vietnamese army under the command of General Tran Quang Khai 陳光啓 (1241–1294), the former student of historian Le Van Huu 黎文休 (1230–1322). General Tran Kien 陳鍵 (?–1285) had been left in charge of defending Nghe An; however, when faced with this formidable invasion force, the general instead turned his services (and troops) over to the Mongol invaders.[42] Le Tac 黎崱 (dates unknown), future author of the well-known historical text *An Nam chi luoc* 安南志略, professed loyalty to the incoming Mongols, as did other members of the imperial clan, including Tran Van Long 陳文弄 (?–1313), the Van Chieu 文昭 marquis (hau 侯), Tran Ich Tac 陳益稷 (1254–1329), the Chieu Quoc 昭國 prince, and Tran Tu Vien 陳秀崵, among others. Tran Ich Tac's reasons for collaborating with the invading Mongols now seem obvious, given the fact that he wished to take the throne for himself as a tributary vassal of the Yuan court.[43] The remaining collaborators may well have supported Tran Ich Tac's bid for power against the other factions within the imperial household.

The remaining Vietnamese guardians serving the Tran emperor-in-exile soon benefited from the astute leadership of General Tran Hung Dao. According to the 15th-century *Complete History of the Great Viet* (DVSKTT 大越史記全書), by the summer of 1285, the Yuan general Sögedü had allegedly replenished the Mongol force with some half a million men, comprised of militia from Yunnan and troops from the Champa campaigns.[44] However, the Vietnamese defenders adopted new, more effective tactics, such as "scorched earth" attacks on Mongol supply lines.[45] Yuan troops failed to supply themselves through foraging, casualties among Mongol forces increased, and the Mongol collaborators from the Tran court were suddenly on the run. Fearing for his life, Tran Kien and his supporters fled toward Daidu with Qubilai's son Toghon and his retreating armies. The Vietnamese forces soon caught up with Toghon's army in modern-day Lang Sơn. Tran Kien was killed, and 50,000 Mongol troops were captured.

Qubilai was so enraged by this defeat that his court's efforts to amass a third expeditionary force to attack the Vietnamese contributed to a postponement of a planned third invasion of Japan. In early 1288, Qubilai chose the royal defector Tran Ich Tac 陳益稷 (1254–1329) to replace the reigning king Tran Nhan Tong 陳仁宗 (1258–1308) as the puppet "king" of a Mongol-controlled "An Nam," adopting the pejorative Tang-era title for this state.[46] The Mongol court then assembled an invasion force of 70,000 Mongol and Han troops, 500 warships, 6,000 troops from Yunnan (former Dali Kingdom territory), and 15,000 native borderlands militia.[47] The supreme commander was again Toghan, who likely wished to complete the work he started with the previous invasion effort. In the spring of 1288, the Mongol army again captured Thang Long, which they burned and looted on this occasion. Vietnamese forces fled Thang Long in disarray, but efforts to reorganize began immediately. Eventually, Tran troops cut off the Mongols' overland supply lines, while the Vietnamese naval forces scored a victory at sea in late 1287 against the Mongol fleet at Van Dòn Island, causing an even greater loss of provisions to the Yuan military.[48] Toghon called for part of his forces to retreat by sea, and he chose to lead the overland withdrawal of the remaining Yuan army, which retreated to the region of the Bach Dang River. It was at this site where General Tran Hung Dao used

the 10th-century local strongman Ngo Quyen's (897–944) iron-tipped stake defense of 938 to trap the remaining fleet in the river at low tide for a second remarkable success.[49] The Yuan land forces were completely routed in a subsequent series of skirmishes, and Toghon, wounded by a poisoned arrow, retreated to southern China and ultimately withdrew in shame from public life.

Soon thereafter, Tran Nhan Tong sent a delegation to Daidu to present tribute and request vassal status. There is no evidence of Mongol resettlement in Vietnamese territory after the conflict's conclusion. The Vietnamese released all prisoners of war, except one leading general. When this general was finally released, Tran Hung Dao had his ship home sabotaged at sea. In 1289, the Chengdu Protectorate military commander Liu Delu 劉德祿 memorialized Qubilai with the following request, "I wish to take a force of five thousand men to demand the surrender of the southwestern communities of the 'Eight Barbarians Militarized Region (八番順元宣慰司)' in order to invade and conquer Jiaozhi (願以五千人招降八番蠻夷, 用以進取交趾)."[50] Liu received approval from Qubilai for the plan, and in 1291 and 1293 additional invasion plans were proposed, but with the death of Qubilai in 1294, these plans were never realized.[51] After Chengzong 成宗 (Temür Öljeitü, r. 1294–1307) came to the throne, the Yuan court implemented the conciliatory policy of "great forgiveness, far and near (大肆赦宥, 無問遠近)," while the Vietnamese court too adopted a matching policy of "great forgiveness (寬宥)" regarding its northern neighbor.[52] The Dai Viet kingdom subsequently continued to act as a tributary vassal throughout the Yuan dynasty, although it and the neighboring Southeast Asian states, with the exception of Pagan Burma, all avoided the harsh demands for tribute items and tribute missions imposed by the Mongol leadership.[53]

The Mongol efforts against the Tran court were as commercially oriented as they were politically directed. Francesca Fiaschetti's suggestion that the attacks on the Dai Viet were as much efforts to seize control of Cham commercial routes as they were a strategy to gain access to the Song dynasty's "soft underbelly" is a useful alteration of the prevailing view of these campaigns.[54] This effort to dominate lucrative trade is very persuasive, given Mongol efforts elsewhere in the region.

CHAMPA

The Mongols, having taken the Song throne in China, looked to control the sea lanes of maritime Southeast Asia, this time with their sights set on the conquest of Dai Viet's southern coastal neighbor, Champa (*Zhancheng* 占城). Champa is the region of modern-day Central Vietnam between Quang Binh in the north and Phan Thiet and Bien Hoa in the south. As Masaki Mukai and Francesca Fiaschetti note, both Dai Viet and Champa had maintained regular trade and tribute relations with the Song court and had attempted to maintain these relationships even as the Mongols first sought the submission of these two Southeast Asian polities.[55] When questioned by Qubilai's court, the Guangnan Western Circuit (modern-day Guangxi) Pacification (*xunweishi* 宣慰使) Commissioner Ma Chengwang 馬成旺 claimed confidently that he would be able to lead a force of 3,000 troops and a cavalry of 3,000 horses to victory against Champa.[56] In 1279, Qubilai appointed a trusted mixed lineage Tangut-Mongol military commander Sögedü (*Suodu* 唆都, d. 1285) to the position of provincial secretary (*xingsheng zuocheng* 行省 左丞) in the port of Quanzhou 泉州

"to spread word of the Yuan's founding" to the various Southeast Asian kingdoms.[57] Momoki Shiro notes that the establishment of a foothold in Champa by an official of this position, entrusted with the administration of conquered territory, is evidence that the Yuan court regarded Champa as a pivotal region for the dominance of trade between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.[58] In 1278, Sögedü was sent to the Cham court to invest its ruler Indravarman V (r. 1257–ca. 1285) with a mandate to rule and bring Champa into tributary relations with the Mongol court. Accompanying Sögedü as envoys were Meng Qingyuan 孟慶元 and Sun Shengfu 孫勝夫, the Guangzhou pacification commissioners (*Guangzhou xunweishi* 廣州宣慰使).[59] Although Sögedü announced to the Yuan court that the Cham leadership was willing to accept an alliance as an "interior (within the Yuan empire) dependency" (*neifu* 內附) and tributary state, when he brought a "tiger tally" (*hufu* 虎符) to Champa to confer this status on Indravarman V, the Cham court had changed its position and was no longer willing to submit.[60] When Indravarman V refused to accept this investiture in person and allow the Yuan to use Champa as a launching pad for naval expeditions further into Island Southeast Asia, the Mongol authorities took this diplomatic slight as a pretense for a punitive military expedition. According to the *Yuan shi* account, in the summer of 1282, Qubilai ordered the assembly of a fleet of 100 ocean-going vessels (*haichuan* 海船) and 250 battleships (*zhanchuan* 戰船),[61] along with 5,000 soldiers called up from Southeastern China, to be placed under the leadership of Sögedü for the purpose of carrying out this expedition.[62] The large Mongol fleet arrived off the coast of Champa in early 1283, capturing the capital Vijaya (modern-day Binh Dinh) in the same year, forcing the Cham king Indravarman V and his court to escape into the mountains.

Modern scholar Lo Jung-pang located the central rationale for this Mongol expedition in the following *Yuan shi* passage:

> The court discussed sending troops on punitive expeditions to invade Sukhothai (*Xianguo* 暹國), Lopburi (*Luohu* 羅斛), Malabar (*Mabaer* 馬八兒), Kaulam (*Julan* 俱藍), Samudra (*Sumudula* 蘇木都剌), among other kingdoms. (Ethnic Uighur scholar) Jialunatasi 迦魯納荅思 (d. 1314) presented a memorial to the emperor saying: "As for these various small kingdoms, of what benefit would their conquest be to us? To launch a war would be to risk the lives of our people for no useful purpose. It would be better to send envoys to advise them of the disaster [that would befall them if they do not submit] and the good fortune [they would share if they submit]. If they do not submit, it would not be too late to invade them."[63]

The decision of the court was to proceed with the control of commerce from these regions through regulating the tribute system and to make Champa a stable Mongol-friendly coastal node on this trade network. Armed entourages were sent to each of the states listed in the previous passage, as well as other trading states in southern India and Island Southeast Asia. The common transit node from all points throughout this trade network would be Champa.[64] Geoff Wade contends that Arab and Persian traders operating in the South China Sea could have been the managers of trade from several of the Cham polities, gaining access to commodities from Africa, the Persian Gulf, as well as Island Southeast Asia.[65] In this manner, the

Mongol world of the late 13th century attempted to merge the Indian Ocean world that had already for centuries extended along the southernmost reaches of Eurasia. Tributary relations, however, did not develop easily between Champa and the Yuan court. As Lo notes, envoys from Daidu in the summer of 1282 had been detained by Cham authorities, an act that had caused Qubilai Qa'an to order a punitive expedition.[66] The Cham ruler and his entourage remained in the mountains for two years, and they refused to negotiate with Yuan envoys dispatched to speak with them. The Chams also executed two of the Yuan envoys they had captured earlier and 100 of these envoys' retainers.[67] The Mongols soon learned that the Cham ruler had issued calls for assistance to the courts of the Dai Viet, Angkor (*Zhenla* 真臘), and Java (*Dupo* 闍婆), and that the Chams had no intention of surrendering to the Yuan forces.[68] Sögedü's army was running low on supplies, and the Yuan court was preoccupied with a planned third invasion of Japan, so the Yuan soldiers were forced in the summer of 1284 to clear land and plant rice for their own survival while waiting for reinforcements. It was not until the spring of 1285 that a relief expedition was sent by the Yuan court to Champa. When the replacement forces arrived, they discovered that Sögedü's camp outside of the Cham capital had been burned to the ground by Cham prisoners of war after Sögedü had led most of his forces north to take control of the Tran prefectures of Thuan Chau 順州 and Hoa Chau 化州 and join Mongol forces assembling for the second invasion of the Dai Viet kingdom.

The Cham ruler Indravarman V had still refused to submit to Mongol authority, which enraged Qubilai, who dispatched another army to attack Champa from the north through Dai Viet territory. In 1285, the Cham prince and military commander (and future ruler Jaya Simhavarman III, r. 1288–1307) Che Man led a successful assault on the Mongol forces still present and drove them from northern Champa. The Mongol leader Sögedü had already memorialized the Yuan court with a plan to seize the Dai Viet kingdom and use this territory as an access point to the other polities of Mainland Southeast Asia and southwestern China. This successful Cham military move played a significant role in prompting the second Mongol invasion of the Dai Viet, which ended with the death of Sögedü and many of his men, described earlier in greater detail. After the third attempted invasion of Dai Viet in 1287, interest in occupying Cham territory largely subsided. The network of coastal entrepot polities that comprised "Champa" extended from Indrapura (modern-day Da Nang) to the region near Tuy Hoa at the mouth of the Da Rang River, which comprised a long stretch of coastline.[69] The Mongols could not control the region territorially, although trade continued with one or another of the ports throughout this period. Cham under Jaya Simhavarman III and Vietnamese Tran forces briefly allied to defend against additional Mongol invasions, but the alliance crumbled shortly before the decline of the Yuan dynasty.[70]

JAMBI-PALEMBANG (MALAYU)-JAVA

Mongol interest in Island Southeast Asia was deeply influenced by this region's pivotal importance in connecting points of long-distance trade across the Indian Ocean networks to southern Chinese ports. At the center of this trade were maritime empires, the most prominent of which in the pre-Mongol era was the Srivijaya 三

佛齊 Empire, which functioned in many ways like its inshore neighbors. Far-flung maritime connections caused Srivijaya to become embroiled in a regional rivalry with its South Asian rival the Chola Empire, but its economic base remained fixed on the upland region, supported by ties Srivijaya leaders maintained with local chieftains. Hall and other scholars noted that

> (while) a royal navy of maritime sojourners based at the Srivijaya port who had sworn their alliance maintained the capital's position as the dominant port on the Sumatra coast, a network of ritualized alliances with its hinterland tribesmen allowed a flow of goods from the interior to the ports to sustain the port's resident community as well as provide them with desirable commodities for export – giving Srivijaya its economic and thus it political strength.[71]

The Javanese defeat of Srivijaya allowed for a shift eastward of the region's center of economics and political power with the Singhasari kingdom (1222–1293), followed by the more expansive Majapahit kingdom (1293–ca. 1520s), marking the growth and consolidation of East Javanese (zhaowa 爪哇) power and influence. As Thomas Hunter notes,

> Wisnuwardhana's rule (1248–68 CE) appears to have marked the beginning of a reunification of East Java, an effort consolidated by his son, (Kertanagara) (1268–92 CE), who first established his control over the region, then went on to ensure Javanese hegemony over the all-important trade routes of the archipelago with his campaign to ensure the fealty of the Malay states of coastal Sumatra.[72]

The Singhasari court sent an expedition to the Jambi-Palembang region in 1275 in an attempt, some scholars argue, to fend off the Mongol advance.[73] Kertanegara had consolidated control over the spice trade coming from the Moluccan Archipelago, and he wanted to keep control of this section of the Maritime Silk Road and keep out Mongol encroachment. In 1279, a small Mongol fleet carrying envoys who sought Javanese submission to Mongol authority was driven back by Javanese naval forces, angering Qubilai's court.[74] In 1282, Meng Qingyuan and Sun Shengfu, Yuan envoys earlier sent to Champa, were dispatched in another diplomatic mission to Java. After this cordial ambassadorial effort failed, Qubilai sent his envoy Meng Qi to Kertanegara's court to demand that Javanese leadership submit to Mongol control. Kertanegara responded by ordering that the Mongol envoy be branded on the face and expelled from his kingdom.[75] David Bade has noted that Qubilai Qa'an's desire to bring skilled artisans to his court and for the Mongol Empire to have unfettered access to Southeast Asian trade were primary drivers in the push to control Java.[76] We have already examined how the network of trade from the region around Java north across the Malay Peninsula to coastal Mainland Southeast Asia was interconnected in its economic exchange and that upland access to trade items was as important as control of the coastal ports. These factors played important roles in how reactions to the Mongol advance were handled.

Tensions between the Mongol leadership and Kertanegara's court were manifested in a series of aggressive moves that culminated in the 1292 Mongol naval invasion of Singhasari.[77] Qubilai's forces consisted of 20,000 men, 1,000 ships, and a year's

supply of provisions.[78] Kertanegara's forces had been dispatched to Champa and along the Malay Peninsula to prevent a direct encounter with the Mongols and to urge an allied response from leaders in this region. Although there is no evidence that the Javanese and Mongols clashed in Champa, his army's departure also emboldened his political rivals and following an internal power struggle, Kertanegara was killed and power was transferred to his son-in-law, Raden Vijaya.[79] After initially cooperating with the Mongol invaders, Raden Vijaya convinced most of the Mongol forces to attack and kill the rival, who had murdered Kertanegara, and for part of the Mongol army to accompany Raden Vijaya to the coastal village of Majapahit. On route to Majapahit, the ruler set an ambush for his Mongol escort, and he had all the troops captured and killed.[80] The few remaining Mongols withdrew from the region, the great Javanese maritime empire of Majapahit (1293–1527) was established, and the greatest reach of Mongol military power was confirmed.

Military conquest was not the greatest legacy of the Mongols in Island Southeast Asia. The extent to which trade under the Mongols was present in the region following these attempted territorial conquests may be viewed through the archeological records. Leong Sau Heng noted that in an archeological site near the modern village of Pengkalam Bujang located in the northwestern part of Peninsular Malaysia, over 10,000 shards of Song- and Yuan-period ceramics were found, along with Southeast Asian earthenware and Middle Eastern glassware.[81] This ancient port connected goods from the South China Sea (Eastern Sea) network with the Indian Ocean trade network, and it provided the Yuan elite with access to trade items from distant mercantile centers, even though the region remained beyond direct political administration by the Mongol leadership.

The Mongol expansion elsewhere in Southeast Asia was more diplomatic and trade oriented, and, for that reason, more successful, than the efforts mentioned earlier.[82] Following a period of conflict, the northern Thai polities of Chiang Mai and Chiang Hung established peaceful tributary relations with the Mongol court, with Chiang Hung sending six tribute missions between 1315 and 1347.[83] Despite unrest caused by Kertanegara's struggle with the Mongols, the tiny 13th-century maritime kingdom of Malayu Dharmasraya on the Malay peninsula engaged in peaceful tributary relations with Daidu,[84] which stimulated additional trade of the sort noted in the aforementioned shipwreck.

CONCLUDING POINTS

The Mongol inability to secure any territorial conquests in Southeast Asia was blamed in subsequent court chronicles on the perceived impact of tropical climate and local "miasmas" that weakened and sickened the Mongol armies. Examining the substitution of trade relations for military domination helps us move beyond these general tropes, regarding the limits of Mongol power emanating from the steppe region of Eurasia. The East Asian system that the Mongols controlled during the 13th and 14th centuries became more actively interconnected through trade with a maritime network that spanned Eurasia. The central node of this growing trade network was Island Southeast Asia. As Tansen Sen notes, Java in the 13th century took a central role in supplying South Asian goods to the East Asian market, "the Chinese eventually also took on the role of tax collectors in Java . . . and became

involved in Indian Ocean commerce."[85] John Chaffee writes that "(because) of internecine Mongol conflicts on the continent in the late thirteenth century, the sea route to western Asia gained strategic as well as economic importance, since it connected (Qubilai) to his allies in the Persian Il-Khanate."[86] Yuan-period trade would come to be dominated by Muslim traders, so such connections proved to be vital.[87] Derek Heng concludes that the fiscal administrators of Yuan-period China depended much more on the import of foreign goods than was the case under the Song.[88] Chaffee moderates Heng's conclusion with the following point:

> lest we imagine the Mongols to be precursors to Adam Smith, we should remember that they were warriors and empire-builders first and foremost, who over the course of their conquests had developed a particular approach to trade and traders that differed dramatically from that of previous dynasties.[89]

The Mongol conquests in Southeast Asia may have been initiated with military or diplomatic goals in mind, but the result of Yuan-period interactions in this region corresponded with, and stimulated in many cases, greater trade contact and commercial exchange. The regions targeted by Mongol forces also largely correspond to the "classical states" that emerged around the first millennium CE with political centers located in what is today Cambodia, Myanmar, Java, Sumatra, and Vietnam.[90] These states were tested in their confrontations with Mongol armies, and through these tests there emerged stronger, centralized political orders that would strongly influence the next period of state-building in both Mainland and Island Southeast Asia. However, the thread that joined these states with other regions of Eurasia was a new web of cultural and commercial ties stimulated by the Mongol leadership's desire to facilitate both overland and maritime long-distance trade. Pondering the outcome of the Mongol intervention in Southeast Asia, Qubilai is recorded in the *Yuan shi* as asking, "who benefits from force?"[91] The answer appears to be the Mongol legacy in the region.

NOTES

1 Sen 2006, 324.
2 Lockard 1995, 14.
3 Evans 2014, 244.
4 Fitzgerald 1972, 58.
5 Evans 2014, 244.
6 Evans 2014, 244.
7 For a more detailed account of the Mongol conquest of Dali, see Anderson 2015, 106–134.
8 Li 1988, 640. See also Duan 2003, 66–67.
9 Rossabi 1994, 24.
10 *YS* 97: 3910. Duan 2003, 67.
11 *YS* 97: 3910. Duan 2003, 67.
12 Grousset 1970, 284. See also Brose 2015, 135–155.
13 Petersen 2018, 39.
14 Petersen 2018, 39.
15 *YS* 121: 2977. PRC data from early in the 1980s, prior to mass migrations associated with the reform era, indicated that more than 5,000 "Yunnan Mongols" still lived in the region. Schwarz 1984, 100.

16 Yang 2009, 116.
17 Yang 2009, 93–94. See also Sun 2015, 193–231.
18 Aung-Thwin 1985, 195.
19 Sun 2015, 203.
20 Sun 2015, 203–204.
21 Sun 2015, 205.
22 Sun 2015, 205–206.
23 Evans 2014, 247.
24 Aung-Thwin and M. Aung-Thwin 2012, 105.
25 Khan 1936, 409–14; Gaffari 1954, 23–24; Tibbetts 1979, 71–75. Cited in Forbes 1986, 385.
26 Forbes 1986, 385.
27 *YS* 97: 3067.
28 *YS* 17: 222. Phayre 1969, 53–56; Shin 1969, 100–101. Cited in Forbes 1986, 385.
29 Forbes 1986, 385.
30 Tambiah 1992, 173. Cited in Wijeyeratne 2014, 579.
31 Anderson 2015, 111.
32 *YS* 209: 1.
33 *YS* 97: 2981. Anderson 2015, 121.
34 Baldanza 2016, 19–20; Fiaschetti 2017, 89, 93.
35 Sixiao 1894, 70. Cited in Huang 2010, 95.
36 Anderson 2015, 122.
37 Hardy et al. 2009, 45–55.
38 Anderson 2015, 122.
39 Anderson 2015, 123.
40 Fiaschetti 2017, 92.
41 Anderson 2015, 125.
42 Tran 1920, 117.
43 Poliacop 1996, 216–217.
44 Ngô 1993, 5: 359.
45 Anderson 2015, 126.
46 In 679, during the early Tang dynasty, the Han period name for modern-day northern Viet Nam Giao Chỉ (Jiaozhi 交趾) had been changed to An Nam 安南 (the Pacified South), indicating the position, according to the Chinese leadership, that Vietnam occupied within the Tang Empire. See Anderson 2014, 22.
47 Anderson 2015, 127.
48 Anderson 2015, 128.
49 Lê 2000, 147.
50 *YS* 15: 320.
51 Anderson 2015, 130.
52 *YS* 209: 4650.
53 Sun 2015, 228.
54 Fiaschetti 2018, 1119–1135.
55 Mukai and Fiaschetti 2020, 89.
56 *YS* 210: 4660.
57 *YS* 129: 3152.
58 Momoki 2011, 127.
59 *YS* 17: 235. See also Lo 2012, 285.
60 *YS* 97: 4660.
61 These battleships constructed under orders by the Mongol court, initially for use against Japan, but later committed to the invasion of Vietnam, included a variety of vessels, as

Randall Saski notes, tower ships (楼船), combat junks (*zhanjian* 戰艦), sea-hawk ships (*haigu* 海鶻), covered swoopers (*mengchong* 蒙衝), flying barques (*zouge* 走舸), patrol boats (*youting* 遊艇). See Sasaki 2015, 34. Translations of the terms first appeared in Wang et al. 1971, 686.

62 *YS* 12: 243–244. Cited in Mukai and Fiaschetti 2020, 89.

63 Translation somewhat revised from Jung-pang Lo's translated passage in Lo 2012, 286. Original passage found in *YS* 97: 3260. The original passage is as follows: "朝議興兵討暹國、羅斛、馬八兒、俱藍、蘇木都剌諸國，迦魯納答思奏：「此皆蕞爾之國，縱得之，何益？興兵徒殘民命，莫若遣使諭以禍福，不服而攻，未晚也. "

64 Lo 2012, 286.

65 Wade 2011, 162.

66 Lo 2012, 287.

67 Lo 2012, 288. See *YS* 917: 4662.

68 *YS* 917: 4663.

69 Hardy 2009, 46–47. Momoki Shiro has argued for the term "Mandala Champa" to depict more clearly the network of ten possible polities engaged in coastal trade described collectively in Song-period Chinese sources. See Momoki 2011, 131.

70 Schweyer and Piammettawat 2011, 37.

71 Hall 2011, 19. See also Andaya 2008, 77–81.

72 Hunter 2007, 28.

73 Andaya 2008, 59.

74 *YS* 47: 227.

75 Rossabi 1994, 219.

76 Quoting Rossabi 1994, 448; Bade 2013, 9.

77 Bade 2013, 280.

78 Rossabi 1994, 219.

79 Hall 2011, 256.

80 Rossabi 1994, 220.

81 Heng 1990, 27.

82 I wish to give special thanks to Francesca Fiaschetti for highlighting this comparative point in an October 2019 email correspondence.

83 Yian and Miksic 2016, 456.

84 Yian and Miksic 2016, 483.

85 Christie 1998, 369. Cited in Sen 2014, 43.

86 Chaffee 2018, 13. See also Ciocîltan 2012, 35; Kalra 2018, 82.

87 Prange 2019, 210.

88 Heng 2009, 67. Cited in Chaffee 2018, 126.

89 Chaffee 2018, 126.

90 Lockard 1995, 8.

91 *YS* 210: 4656. The original text is 至若用兵，夫誰所好.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE

THE MONGOLS IN SOUTH ASIA

Michael Hope

The Mongol conquest of Central Eurasia had a transformative effect upon the political, social, and economic history of South Asia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Beginning in 1219, Chinggis Khan's invasion of the Khwarazmshah Empire set in motion a wave of migrations out of Mawarannahr, Khurasan, and Persian Iraq, which saw the increased dissemination of Turkic, Persian, and Islamic culture in Kashmir, Sind, and the Gangetic Plains. Moreover, the ongoing threat posed by Mongols based in the Helmand River Basin and Ghazna played no small part in a much larger shift of Muslim political power in South Asia from Lahore to Delhi. As a safe haven for refugees and a bulwark against further Mongol expansion, Delhi became one of the great metropolises of the Middle Ages, attracting scholars, merchants, spiritualists, as well as a large Mongol diaspora community. These migrants played a critical role in shaping the political history of South Asia, whilst also serving as a bridge between South and Central Asia, proving once and for all that the effects of the Pax-Mongolica stretched well-outside the borders of the Mongol Empire and its successor states.

INITIAL ENCOUNTERS

The Mongols were first drawn to South Asia during their incursions into Khurasan (1220–1221), which formed part of a larger assault on the Khwarazmshah Empire. Earlier Mongol attacks on Mawarannahr and Khwarazm pushed a number of the Khwarazmshah's supporters to Ghazna, where they regrouped under the leadership of Jalal al-Din Mangubirni, Sultan Muhammad's son. This rump of the Khwarazmshah army put up a strong, though ultimately futile, resistance, before being defeated on the Sind River. Jalal al-Din managed to extricate himself from the battle and escaped into Hindustan with a small group of survivors, where he hoped to rebuild his power. Chinggis Khan became aware of his plans and dispatched two of his commanders, Dörbei Doqshin and Bala Noyan, to weed out the renegade prince. Jalal al-Din lacked the strength to resist his Mongol pursuers and fled towards Delhi, but finding no support in that direction, he exited South Asia via Makran into Iran. Having failed to come to grips with their quarry, Dörbei and Bala took the opportunity to raid Sind. They began by sacking the fort of Nandana

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in the Salt Range, before moving on to besiege Multan. The siege lasted for several days and the Persian scholar-bureaucrat, 'Ala al-Din 'Ata Malik Juvayni noted that the Mongol mangonels had battered down much of the city's walls before Dörbei decided to withdraw across the Sind River due to the oppressively hot weather.[1] Dörbei's brief, though highly destructive, campaign was the first of many Mongol attacks into the region over the course of the next century and a half.

A second and far more serious assault was launched by Chinggis Khan's heir, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241), who ordered his brothers to contribute soldiers for a *tamma* (garrison) army in Khurasan, which would begin operations to subjugate Hindustan. The *tamma* army was initially commanded by Dayir Noyan, who arrived in Khurasan in 1230.[2] In 1241, he led a campaign against Lahore, then the largest and most important city in Sind. The campaign was aided by the growing instability at Delhi, where the heirs of Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish (r. 1206–1234) fought amongst themselves for the throne and were incapable of mounting an effective resistance. Thus, Dayir's army seized Lahore, along with much of the Sind River valley, with little difficulty.[3] Around the same time as the attack on Lahore, Dayir also sent a separate detachment under the leadership of Huqutu Noyan (also Oqotur) against Kashmir. There are scant details about this second campaign, but it is clear that the Mongol army seized Srinagar and appointed a *daruqachi* (overseer) there before returning to Khurasan.[4] The gains made by Dayir in Sind and Kashmir proved temporary, however, as the Kashmiri ruler, Ramadeva (r. 1235–1252), and Sultan Muʿizz al-Din Bahram of Delhi (r. 1240–1243) restored control over these territories once Dayir and Huqutu had withdrawn to their base on the Helmand River. Nevertheless, this demonstration of force did bring the submission of other regional warlords. Hasan Qarluq and Yughrush Khalji, the rulers of Binban and the Kuh-i Jud, both came to profess their loyalty to the qa'an shortly after Dayir's attack on Lahore. Both men remained loyal to the Mongols until the rule of Nasir al-Din Mahmud (r. 1249–1266), when the Delhi Sultanate moved to secure its north-western border.

A more determined effort to conquer Sind and Kashmir was launched during the rule of Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251–1259), who dispatched Sali Noyan to assume control of Dayir's troops. Möngke had been encouraged in this policy by renewed instability within the Delhi Sultanate, which had caused one of Iltutmish's sons, Jalal al-Din Masʿud, and two leading commanders, Kushlu Khan Balban and Qutlugh Khan, to seek asylum in the Mongol court. Jalal al-Din set out for Mongolia in 1248 and was warmly received by the Mongol emperor, who provided him with a *jarliq* appointing him as the new ruler of Hindustan.[5] Möngke ordered Sali to support Jalal al-Din and he dutifully obeyed, seizing control of Multan and Uch in 1257. His attack coincided with the arrival of Möngke's brother, Hülegü, who had been appointed to advance Mongol claims to Iran and Iraq, whilst also overseeing Sali's progress. The *tamma* commander quickly sent his new master a glut of captives from the newly conquered territories by way of tribute.[6] Yet Sali refused to advance further into northern India, again contenting himself with the conquest of Sind, which was entrusted to Jalal al-Din Masʿud and his allies.

Sali also led a campaign against Kashmir, where he seized Srinagar and massacred all the adult males before enslaving the women and children. It is, however, unclear to what extent this invasion resulted in Mongol control of Kashmir. Rashid al-Din, a servant of the Mongols in Iran, claimed that the Kashmiri king, Laksmanadeva

(r. 1273–1286), sought a *jarliq* from Möngke and Hülegü to assume the throne, which suggests the Mongols had successfully subjugated the region.[7] But both rulers had long since died, and neither the *Tarikh-i Kashmir* nor the native chronicle of Jonaraja confirm his story. Indeed, with the exception of a few superficial reports of Sali's campaign sprinkled throughout the Persian sources, there is virtually no evidence that the Mongols maintained any presence in Srinagar. Even Laksmanadeva's appeal to Möngke, assuming it ever took place, was more likely a strategy to leverage support against his overweening nobility, who had left Laksmanadeva ruling a severely truncated realm. The limited literary evidence therefore points to the Kashmiri monarchy accepting their nominal subordination to the qa'an, whilst retaining autonomous control over their dominion.[8]

Whether Sali had plans to advance Mongol control further into South Asia is also unclear. His mission seems to have corresponded closely with the earlier campaigns of Dayir Noyan, which suggests that he was only charged with capturing Sind. Yet even his gains on that front were squandered when Jalal al-Din Masʿud was reconciled with his nephew, Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud, in 1258.[9] Despite a further raid into Sind during the same year, Mongol expansion was halted when Hülegü opened up communication with Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud and his chamberlain, Ulugh Khan Balban, around 1260. It is unclear who initiated this contact, as the chroniclers of Delhi appear to have been embarrassed by their masters' willingness to engage with the supposed enemies of Islam. Neither they nor the histories emanating from the Ilkhanate give any information about the content of the messages exchanged between Hülegü and Nasir al-Din. Yet the clandestine negotiations were clearly significant since Hülegü soon ordered Sali Noyan to avoid transgressing the lands of the Delhi Sultanate under threat of severe punishment.[10] These brief diplomatic exchanges fell shortly after the death of Möngke in 1259, when the division of the Mongol Empire in civil war made it necessary for Chinggisid princes like Hülegü to seek alliances with neighbouring rulers. Indeed, Juzjani also observed visitors from the territory of Hülegü's chief rival, Berke Khan of the Jochid Ulus, at roughly the same time.[11] The ongoing conflict between the Chinggisid princes temporarily saved Delhi from further Mongol attacks until 1268. Nasir al-Din and Ulugh Khan Balban used this period of peace to consolidate their control of Sind, permanently withdrawing the region from Mongol control.

POST-DISSOLUTION ENCOUNTERS

The chaos that followed the death of Möngke also put an end to Sali Noyan's leadership of the *tamma* army. Conflict amongst the Chinggisid princes divided the Mongol territory in Central Eurasia between Hülegü, who held Iran and Khurasan to the south-west of the Amu River, and the descendants of Chinggis Khan's second son, Chaghadai, who held Mawarannahr and East Turkistan in the east. The *tamma* army of Sali found itself on the frontier between these two rival khanates and in 1261, Alghu, the new ruler of the Chaghadaids, sent his own agent, Sadai Elchi, to arrest Sali and assume control of the army.[12] From that point onwards, with only brief exceptions, the *tamma* army remained independent of the Hülegüids and drew the majority of its commanders from among the Chaghadaid princes. This *tamma*

division, subsequently known as the 'Qaraunas' (also Negüderis), were the most persistent threat to the Delhi Sultanate over the following century.[13]

From their bases in Ghazna and Teginabad, the Qaraunas led almost annual raids against Hindustan throughout the rule of Ghiyath al-Din Balban (formerly Ulugh Khan, r. 1266–1287). There is little information about many of these raids in the sources emanating from Delhi, which either took them to be too embarrassing or too commonplace to be worth mentioning in any detail. Most of the attacks targeted the urban settlements of Sind, where the Mongols' primary objective was to obtain slaves for sale in Khurasan. Such raids had begun as early as the rule of Ögödei, when numerous captives had been sent to Iran and Mawarannahr from Lahore and Multan. The attacks only increased under Sali Noyan and in 1258 when Ulugh Khan Balban intercepted a Mongol force near the Sind River, he found that they were transporting many thousands of captives for sale in the slave markets of Khurasan.[14] Ibn Battuta reported that this practice was still common in the fourteenth century, when the newly Islamized Mongols indiscriminately raided Muslim settlements for slaves, which they pretended were Hindus in order to sell them in Herat.[15] The raids reached a peak after the death of Balban's cousin, Shir Khan (d. 1268), the governor of Multan and Lahore. Balban sought to stem the flow of Mongol attacks by sending his son, Muhammad Khan, to organize the protection of the Sind River Valley, whilst another son, Bughra Khan, supported him from fortresses built further south at Samana and Sunnam. Balban also recruited a new army to permanently guard the northern marches and help the princes in their task. Yet even these measures failed to stem the problem completely, and Balban was famously said to have avoided any large-scale campaigns against the Hindu *rai*s for fear of being outflanked by the Mongols.

The accession of Du'a Khan (r. 1282–1307) to the throne of the Chaghadaids and his detente with Qaidu Khan in East Turkistan stabilized the Mongol polity in Central Eurasia and allowed the Qaraunas to increase the ferocity of their attacks. A Mongol assault against Multan, Deopalpur, and Lahore in 684/1285 claimed the life of Prince Muhammad, who was posthumously known by the title of '*Khan-i Shahid*' (the Martyred Prince) in the court histories of Delhi.[16] The frequency and severity of attacks grew even greater at the end of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, when the ineffective rule of Muʿizz al-Din Kayqubad (r. 1287–1290) and a coup led by Jalal al-Din Firuz Khalji (r. 1290–1296) left the sultanate vulnerable. The Mongols invaded in 1287, 1292, 1297–1298, 1299–1300, 1303, 1305, and 1306, with at least three of these attacks targeting Delhi.[17] The campaign of the Chaghadaid prince, Qutlugh Khwaja, at the head of a Qaraunas army reputedly numbering 200,000 people was one of the more serious attacks. In 1299 his forces advanced virtually uninhibited from the Sind River to the outskirts of Delhi, where he was met by Sultan ʿAla al-Din (r. 1296–1316) in the plain of Kili. The battle was begun by Zafar Khan, who commanded the right wing of ʿAla al-Din's army. He chased the Mongols from the field in a heroic charge that earned him gushing praise from sources written in Delhi, but his bravery came at a heavy cost. It appears Qutlugh Khwaja led his army in a tactical retreat, commonly employed by Mongol armies. Withdrawing from the battlefield, he lured Zafar Khan into an ambush and annihilated his army before returning to Kili to confront ʿAla al-Din a second time.[18] The two armies faced one another briefly before the Mongols withdrew from the

field of battle and returned to Khurasan. Qutlugh Khwaja died upon his arrival in Ghazna, but one of his commanders, Amir Taraghai, led a further attack on Delhi in 703/1303. This time, ʿAla al-Din's armies were absent in a separate campaign against the fortress of Chittor, and the sultan could do nothing but watch as Delhi was enveloped in a siege for nearly two months. The city was on the verge of capitulation when Taraghai returned to Khurasan without any clear justification.[19]

Further Mongol attacks in 1305 and 1306 spurred ʿAla al-Din to embark on a dramatic campaign of military reform. The Sultan ordered the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers to man the frontiers, whilst simultaneously refurbishing the defences of the major urban centres of the Sind River. The size of the new army necessitated even more dramatic agricultural, commercial, and financial reforms that strengthened the power of the sultan and increased his revenues. At first, these measures did not stem the Mongol attacks, but they did allow the sultan's soldiers to contain them to Sind and prevent the Mongols from threatening Delhi. ʿAla al-Din was also helped by the death of Du'a in 1307, which destabilized the Chaghadaids in Central Eurasia.[20] It was not until 1327 that another large-scale Mongol invasion, this time led by Tarmashirin Khan (r. 1327–1334), reached Delhi. There is, however, very little information on this attack; most of the contemporary sources simply note Tarmashirin's defeat. The one exception is the Mughal historian, Firishta, who claimed that Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq (r. 1325–1351) had been unable to match Tarmashirin's army and had paid the Mongol leader a ransom totalling 'almost the price of the kingdom' to obtain his withdrawal.[21] Whether Tarmashirin was indeed defeated or whether he departed Delhi with a large payment, the Mongols caused widespread damage before passing through Gujarat and Sind, looting and killing on their way back to the Sind River.

Tarmashirin's attack was the last time that the Mongols threatened Delhi. Tarmashirin's death in 1334 saw the Chaghadaids permanently divided into eastern and western factions, whilst an unceasing series of dynastic disputes weakened their rulers and strengthened the hand of provincial warlords. We therefore only read of small incursions after 1334 targeted at plundering and kidnapping, such as the attack made against Deopalpur in 1357–1358.[22] During this period, the Mongol commanders in Khurasan and Mawarannahr appear to have enjoyed relatively cordial relations with the rulers of Delhi. The change in circumstances was such that in 1351 Qazaghan, the commander of the Qaraunas, provided 5,000 soldiers to assist Sultan Muhammad b. Tughluq to put down a revolt in Thatta near the Arabian Sea.[23] Ziyaʿ Barani also reported that a large number of Mongol commanders travelled to Delhi to receive gifts and stipends from Sultan Muhammad, before returning to their patrimonies.[24] These gifts were most likely intended to win alliances with the Mongols in Mawarannahr ahead of a projected campaign to capture Khurasan and to garner support against internal rebellions. But this period of relative tranquillity only lasted as long as the former Chaghadaid territories remained divided. When Amir Timur unified Mawarannahr and Iran under his control he led a devastating raid, successfully capturing and sacking Delhi in 1398 before returning to Central Eurasia.

Mongol attacks on Kashmir also decreased in the first half of the fourteenth century, though the region still saw intermittent raids by Mongol commanders based in Central Eurasia. Easily the most devastating raid on Kashmir during this period

was led by a Mongol known as 'Dulucha' (also Zulaji) during the rule of Suhadeva (r. 1301–1320). Little is known about Dulucha outside of Kashmir, and it is difficult to identify him with any of the Chaghadaid or Qaraunas commanders of the fourteenth century.[25] What is certain is that his assault on Kashmir was bloodier than those of Huqutu and Sali. He either massacred or enslaved a large portion of the population before burning the food and crops that his army had not already consumed. The destruction was such that the anonymous *Baharistan-i Shahi* claimed that later generations of Kashmiris would refer to uncultivated wasteland by saying 'here Dulucha cultivated turf.'[26] His attack was followed by another incursion around 1326, which may have been orchestrated to coincide with Tarmashirin's march on Delhi, though Peter Jackson has suggested that this invasion may in fact have been conducted by the army of Delhi as part of Muhammad b. Tughluq's ill-fated 'Qarachil' campaign. Once again, discrepancies between the Kashmiri and Persian sources make it hard to positively identify this army as coming from either the Mongol-ruled territories or from Delhi. In any case, the Kashmiri queen, Kota Rani, managed to rally the nobles and defend the countryside from the invaders before negotiating a truce, which saw the foreign army withdraw.[27] No further Mongol invasions were recorded by the Kashmiri sources during the fourteenth century, though connections between Srinagar and the former Mongol territories remained intact as religious leaders, merchants, and immigrants from across Iran and Mawarannahr continued to travel back and forth from Kashmir, contributing to the Islamization of the court at Srinigar and the spread of Persian as the new court language.

SLAVES AND SERVANTS

Not all Mongols fought against the Delhi Sultanate. A great many of them entered the sultans' service, either as slaves or as freemen, though it is not always easy to trace their careers once they moved south of the Sind River. The Mongols' prominence can be attributed to the fact that throughout the fourteenth century, Delhi acquired most of its elite soldiers from Central Eurasia. The Delhi Sultanate was founded by the ostensibly Turkic slave soldiers (*mamluk*s) employed by Muʿizz al-Din Muhammad Ghuri (d. 1206) and once manumitted, they replenished their ranks by purchasing more slaves from Central Eurasia. The 'Turks' (referring to all nomads from the Eurasian steppe) were popularly regarded as the best warriors of the Islamic world and, according to the history of Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah Marvrudi, were the most faithful defenders of the faith once they had been converted.[28] These Turkic military elite made up a ruling minority that proudly distinguished itself from the native Hindu agrarian population and disdained the idea that any other group should be allowed to hold power.[29] The fall of Central Eurasia to the Chinggisids in the first half of the thirteenth century, however, necessitated interaction between the Delhi sultans and the Mongols if they wanted to increase their stock of Turkic slave soldiers.

The slave trade with Delhi was controlled by a chain of merchants operating across political boundaries. Those with access to the slaves of Central Eurasia were known as the '*khwaja*s' (i.e. masters) in the Delhi chronicles. They operated with the permission of the Mongol rulers of Mawarannahr and Khwarazm, who granted

them *gereges* (diplomas of entitlement) to travel and deal throughout the Mongol Empire.[30] Once sold in Mawarannahr, the slaves were acquired by merchants operating out of Multan, Lahore, and Uch, who transported them to Sind or onwards to Delhi, where the wealth of the sultanate was concentrated. This was the fate of Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish (r. 1210–1236), of the Ölberli Qipchaqs, who was initially brought to Bukhara before being moved on to Ghazna and then Delhi, where he was sold.[31] Such were the connections between the traders of Sind and Mawarannahr that when the Mongols assaulted Lahore in 1241, the local governor, Qaraqush, claimed that the residents refused to resist the invaders. The historian Juzjani explained that the merchants had close ties to the Mongols and therefore did not mind being absorbed into their empire.[32]

Yet commerce was only one source of slaves. A far more reliable avenue for a Mongol slave to enter the Delhi Sultanate was as a captive. Virtually all of the Mongol armies that invaded the Sultanate between 1239 and 1357 were accompanied by their families.[33] Their presence meant that whenever a Mongol army was defeated in India, a large number of Mongol women and children came into the sultan's possession. For instance, in 1305, when Sultan ʿAla al-Din's armies successfully put down an invasion by Aybeg Khan in the Siwalik Mountains, some 3,000 Mongols fell captive to his army.[34] These prisoners were sent to Delhi, where the men were trampled by elephants and the women and children were sold into slavery. Similarly, when a Mongol army raided Gujarat around 1303, the local governor, Alp Khan, is said to have captured 18,000 women and children.[35] These captives supplemented the stock of slaves available to South Asian buyers and helped replenish the number of Central Eurasians serving at the sultan's court.

Many of these enslaved Mongols joined the ranks of the sultan's armies and attained high posts at the court in Delhi. The most famous of these slaves was the future sultan, Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq (r. 1320–1324), whom the traveller Ibn Battuta described as being a member of the Qaraunas.[36] The information provided by Ibn Battuta on Tughluq's origins is not directly confirmed or refuted by any other contemporary source, although the Mughal chronicler, Firishta, who travelled to Tughluq's former patrimony of Deopalpur to inquire about his early life, claimed that no one knew anything about him, save for a story that his father was a Turkic slave belonging to Ulugh Khan Balban.[37] Nevertheless, Ibn Battuta's account rings true when we look at the background of the other senior commanders charged with protecting the northern marches at the end of the thirteenth century. A great many of these commanders were of Mongol origin. Tughluq's most avid supporter, Bahram Ayba, the governor of Uch, was described by Firishta as 'a Mongol chief of some note in that quarter,' whilst 'Karri' (Girey?) another of Tughluq's commanders who helped him capture Delhi, is described by the historian ʿIsami as 'a Mughal.'[38] Even some of Tughluq's enemies in Sind were of Mongol extraction. The governor of Multan, who refused to join Tughluq's march on Delhi in 1320, shared his name with a Mongol commander who had attacked Uch in 643/1245 – 'Mughaltai.'[39] Though the trend of renaming slaves makes it possible that Mughaltai was not his real name, the ethnonym suggests that he was indeed of Mongol origin. It is therefore not difficult to see why Ibn Battuta would have believed Tughluq to be a Mongol; nearly all the senior military commanders of Sind in the 1320s were of the same origin.

The Mongol slaves are, however, often overshadowed in the sources by the free Mongols, who voluntarily entered the service of the sultans at Delhi. These Mongols either submitted to the sultan in the expectation of material rewards or as a result of political upheavals in the Mongol Empire. In most cases, they arrived with their own armies, which operated as an auxiliary force supplementing the mamluk army of the sultan. The terms of their submission may have varied, but the one unconditional requirement of all incoming Mongol vassals was that they convert to Islam. Shared religious faith was a means of providing the often-diverse slave soldiers of Delhi with a sense of corporate identity, which distinguished them from the largely Hindu agricultural population. Accepting this state ideology was, therefore, a necessary precursor to joining the sultan's court and it was something that most of the Mongol recruits, and even some of those captured during war, were only too willing to accept. The Delhi chroniclers, beginning with Ziyaʿ Barani, referred to these Mongols as 'New Muslims,' a classification which may have been intended to cast doubt upon the depth and sincerity of their newfound faith.[40] Yet by the end of the thirteenth century, many Mongols across Central Eurasia had already converted to Islam, making it easier for them to integrate into their new home.

The free Mongols were most prominent during the regular convulsions that followed upon the accession of a new ruler in Delhi. In these unstable times, the Mongols provided the sultan with support to counter-balance other factions at court. Some of the most enthusiastic recruitment of Mongol auxiliaries came during the rule of Ulugh Khan Balban (r. 1266–1287), who worked to oust or demote the Shamsi mamluks who had defined the political landscape of north India until that point.[41] The Mongols presented Balban with an external source of political strength to offset the power of 'the forty' most senior commanders in the empire, albeit that the sources remain largely silent on their activities and it is only during the rule of his delinquent grandson, Kayqubad (1286–1290), that their true power came into focus. A similarly welcoming policy was adopted by Jalal al-Din Firuz Khalji (r. 1290–1296) when he seized the throne in 1290. As a commander from the northern frontier, Firuz was regarded as an outsider by the Delhi establishment and his power was challenged by the traditional Turkic military leadership.[42] The Mongols provided Firuz with reinforcements to stabilize his position. Indeed, sources written in the Ilkhanate report that Firuz was accused of making alliances with Mongol leaders in Mawarannahr and Khurasan prior to coming to the throne. These stories might not be far-fetched, as his father, Yughrush, is known to have served as a Mongol vassal in Binban.[43] The most prominent Mongol at Firuz's court was a Chinggisid prince by the name of Alughu Khan (also Ulghu Khan), who enjoyed such intimacy with the sultan that he referred to Firuz as 'father' and was purged along with Firuz's children during ʿAla al-Din's coup.[44] Alughu was not alone. The numbers of Mongols entering Delhi during Firuz's reign were so high that they were given their own quarter of Delhi to settle in, known as 'Mughalpur' (also *mahala-yi changizi*).[45]

Yet the most aggressive recruiter of Mongols was surely Muhammad b. Tughluq (r. 1325–1351). Like Balban, Muhammad had pushed for a number of radical reforms, including the relocation of the political capital of the empire from Delhi to Dawlatabad (Deogir) and the introduction of a new copper token currency, most likely modelled upon the monetary reforms of Qubilai Qa'an and Gaykhatu Khan.[46] The failure of these reforms combined with severe climatic changes, the spread

of disease, widespread droughts, and famines caused a succession of rebellions throughout Muhammad's long reign. The sultan sought to offset opposition to his rule by encouraging new alliances with the Mongols and other emigres from Iran and Mawarannahr. Despite Tarmashirin's invasion in 1327, Ibn Battuta claimed that a number of religious and political officials in Mawarannahr enjoyed cordial relations with Muhammad, and he also entered diplomatic correspondence with Bahadur Khan of the Ilkhanate, presenting what Ibn Battuta describes as the most lavish gift he had ever witnessed to the Ilkhan's uncle, Hajji Ke'ün, who remained in Delhi until 1341.[47] These friendly relations opened up exchanges of people and goods between South Asia and the Mongol successor states, which Muhammad used to bring fresh soldiers into India. He did so by providing lavish rewards in the form of offices, salaries, and property to those who travelled to his court. His generosity was not limited to the Mongols but was also extended to Persian and Turkic spiritual leaders, bureaucrats, artists, and traders. Nevertheless, a large number of Mongols entered Hindustan during the last two decades of his rule, most prominent among them being Amir Nawruz Güregen, the son-in-law of Tarmashirin, who was appointed as the 'chief of the Mongols' in India. Nawruz was reputed to have come to Delhi, along with 40,000 Chaghadaid soldiers, after Tarmashirin was deposed by his nephew, Buzan, in 1334.[48] Following his arrival, Nawruz provided critical support to help Muhammad suppress rebellions in the Deccan and Gujarat before participating in the Sultan's final campaign into Thatta in 1351. The target of the Thatta campaign was a renegade slave, most likely of Mongol extraction, against whom Muhammad mobilized not only Nawruz's Mongol soldiers but also a Qaraunas force led by Altun Bahadur.[49] Few other campaigns provide clearer confirmation of how prominent the Mongols had become in the military and political establishment of the Delhi Sultanate by the fourteenth century.

The rising fortunes of Mongol commanders and slaves quickly earned them enemies at court. One of the earliest antagonists of the Mongols in Delhi was the vizier, Nizam al-Din, who served Sultan Muʿizz al-Din Kayqubad (r. 1287–1290). Nizam al-Din made it his mission to stabilize government by undermining the power of the Turco-Mongolian military elites and, in so doing, robbed the Mongols of much of their influence. The Mongols responded by plotting to assassinate Nizam al-Din, but their plans were discovered, and Kayqubad ordered a purge of their leaders. Even Turks and Persians who were known to have intermarried and associated with the Mongols suffered imprisonment, exile, and execution.[50] This purge did not end the presence of the Mongols at Kayqubad's court, but it did diminish the strength of the Mongols in relation to other groups, most notably the faction orbiting around Jalal al-Din Firuz Khalji. When Kayqubad eventually became incapacitated as a result of excessive drink, the Khalji faction was best placed to seize power with only minor resistance from the Turco-Mongolian courtiers in Delhi.

A group of Mongol commanders would again push for power during the rule of ʿAla al-Din (r. 1296–1316). The new sultan had decided to weaken the Turco-Mongolian military aristocracy by depriving them of their *iqta*ʿs and stipends and imposing higher taxes, using the revenue to build a new army. The policy reputedly caused a number of Mongols to become destitute, and they were seen wandering the streets of Delhi in a pathetic state.[51] Their breaking point came in 1297, when the sultan sent an army against Gujarat under the command of his cousin, Ulugh Khan.

Following the capture of the cities of Nahrwala and Kanbhaya (Cambay), Ulugh Khan aggressively demanded the *khums* (1/5 tax) from the loot taken by the sultan's soldiers. He is said to have despoiled the tents of his own army, ransacking their belongings in search of this revenue when a group of Mongols, led by a commander named Muhammadshah, rose up against him. They assaulted Ulugh Khan's tent, but finding it empty fled to Ranthambhor, where they took refuge with the *rai* of the city, Hammiradeva.[52] Muhammadshah and his allies held out in Ranthambhor and even repulsed an attack on the city in 1299. Those Mongols who did not take part in the rebellion at Gujarat were also sick of ʿAla al-Din's rule, and a plot was allegedly hatched to overthrow him. Once again, the plot was betrayed to the sultan, who ordered the massacre of all Mongols throughout the empire. Ziyaʿ Barani claims that as many as 20,000–30,000 Mongols were killed as a result of ʿAla al-Din's order.[53] If these figures are to be believed, they give us some sense of the high number of Mongols residing in the sultanate at the end of the thirteenth century.

In spite of ʿAla al-Din's attack, a large number of Mongols still remained in the Delhi Sultanate. These Mongols were even able to lend their weight to a second coup attempt, this time planned by ʿAla al-Din's nephew, Akkat Khan. The unnamed Mongols fell upon ʿAla al-Din when he temporarily moved away from his army to hunt, whilst on march against Ranthambhor. Firing a volley of arrows, they knocked him from his horse and injured his hand before leaving him for dead. Akkat Khan then proceeded to the sultan's camp and called for the *khutba* and coins to be made in his name before ʿAla al-Din arrived to prove that he was still alive.[54] Once again, those involved in the conspiracy were brutally put to death.

We should not, however, assume that the Mongols formed a single homogenous faction. Whilst ʿAla al-Din was busy suppressing the rebellious elements in Gujarat, Delhi, and Ranthambhor, he also appointed Tughluq to Deopalpur to guard against invasion from the north and recruited other Mongol slaves to join his army. Even Muhammad b. Tughluq, who encouraged a huge migration of Mongol soldiers into northern India, is known to have faced several uprisings led by Mongols. At an unknown date (possibly 1335 or 1342) he suffered a rebellion by 'Malik Hülejü' at Lahore, and Firishta claims that Mongols and 'foreign officers' also contributed a significant number of soldiers to the uprising of Ismaʿil Mukh in the Deccan in 1345.[55] Just as Barani was concerned about the influx of 'New Muslims' into India during the rule of Balban, so too Firishta was worried about the power of the Mongol '*amiran-i jadid*' (new commanders) that threatened the power of Muhammad b. Firuz (r. 1390–1394).[56] Muhammad Bihamadkhani confirmed that the sultan was indeed at odds with his father's 'foreign troops,' who fought vigorously to keep him out of Delhi before he in turn expelled them from the city.[57] These examples suggest that the Mongols were never a unified political faction working for a shared interest. Rather, the status of individual Mongols at the Delhi court could improve through alliances and covenants with all manner of people in the sultanate.

CULTURAL EXCHANGE

The limited source material on the court culture of Delhi during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries makes it difficult to get a clear picture of how the Mongols might have altered everyday life in the sultanate. The growing population of

Persian-speaking scholars, bureaucrats, and religious officials, who often arrived alongside the Mongols, produced the vast majority of written sources in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and have therefore garnered the most attention from modern historians. Nevertheless, the high volume of Mongols entering Hindustan during the same period caught the attention of these writers, who described their imprint on the court at Delhi.

As was the case throughout much of the Islamic world, writers in Delhi were torn between stereotypical depictions of the Mongols as savage barbarians on the one hand and the high culture espoused by the Mongol courts of Tabriz, Daidu, and Sarai on the other. The fourteenth-century Sufi chronicler ʿIsami was probably voicing the opinion of many in Delhi when he described the Mongols as possessing 'a hideous look; their features were repulsive and their language rude and impolite. Their countenance, their hair and their nature were repugnant and their sweat smelt foul.'[58] His views were echoed by Juzjani, ʿAfif, and Amir Khusraw, who had relocated to India as a result of the Mongol conquests and therefore had a poor impression of his northern neighbours. Barani recorded the public execution of Mongol captives in Delhi with relish and Juzjani repeated prognostications that the Mongols were the harbingers of the apocalypse.[59] The same authors described the Delhi Sultanate as an island of Islamic civilization between the pagan Mongols in the north and the heathen Hindus in the south. They regarded war with the Mongols as one of the sultan's primary duties. To this end, Amir Khusraw observed that the 'walls of Delhi have been built with Mongol blood,' a statement which was intended to be taken literally as he described how ʿAla al-Din had used the blood and severed heads of Mongol captives to finish work on the fortifications at Delhi and Siri.[60] The conversion of the Mongols in Iran and Mawarannahr to Islam did very little to reverse these views. The Mongols were perceived to be a barbaric and above all pagan people who needed to be combated.

Yet the views of the Persian-speaking bureaucracy were not always in harmony with those of the military leadership of the Delhi Sultanate, which held a grudging admiration for the Chinggisid venture. In their conception, the Mongols were simultaneously rivals and objects of emulation. Moreover, the Mongols provided a framework for the sultans of Delhi to understand political power across Eurasia and even within their own dominion. Hence, when Muhammad b. Tughluq undertook the construction of a mausoleum for Sultan Qutb al-Din Mubarakshah (r. 1316–1320), he made sure that the cupola would exceed that of the Ilkhan Ghazan by 20 cubits, thereby making a bold statement about the sultanate's status in relation to the Mongol imperium.[61] Similarly, historians and poets writing in Delhi regularly cited the Mongols alongside the *Shahnamah* as allegories for political power. When the poet ʿAmid wanted to eulogize Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud, he drew on familiar Mongol tropes, writing 'in the face of thy decree, what is the Khaqan and what is Hülegü?'[62] In the same way, when ʿAla al-Din Khalji was accused of entertaining plans to conquer the world and create his own religion, Barani invoked the example of Chinggis Khan and the conversion of the Mongols to Islam as a means of tempering his ambitions.[63]

Some of the sultans appear to have tried to link themselves directly to the Chinggisid dispensation. Jalal al-Din Firuz Khalji was perhaps the most aggressive in his attempts to derive political legitimacy from his connections to the Mongols,

no doubt as a means to overcome criticism of his humble origins. Not only did he grant Mongols high office, he also married his daughter to the Chinggisid prince, Alughu, a move which rendered his male grandchildren *güregen*s – the designation for imperial sons-in-law. That Jalal al-Din took this royal connection seriously is indicated by the fact that one of his grandsons was named Mengu Khan (Möngke Qa'an) after the great khan of the Mongol Empire.[64] This connection may have given rise to stories attributed to Nizam al-Din Ahmad and Shihab al-Din Hakim Kirmani, which claimed that the Khaljis were in fact Mongols. It was asserted that the Khaljis were descended of Khalij Noyan, a son-in-law (*güregen*) of Chinggis Khan. Khalij and his wife constantly bickered and, fearing for his life, Khalij fled to the mountains of Ghur. The progeny of Khalij Noyan then travelled to Delhi, where they resided until Jalal al-Din became their leader.[65] It is no great stretch to assume that Jalal al-Din and his descendants were responsible for promulgating the story linking them to the Chinggisids in the same manner that Iltutmish and Balban liked to claim that they were descended from khans of the Ölberli Qipchaqs.

Respect for the Mongols was far from universal, but there are signs that the number of Mongols residing at the Delhi court and the increasingly positive view of the Chinggisids held by many of the sultans may have had some impact upon the court culture of the Delhi Sultanate. This change was evidenced in the language employed by the Persian chronicles, which incorporated Mongol words into their lexicon, hinting at a much broader social and cultural shift. For example, Barani used the Mongol word '*nerge*' to describe the large hunting circles comprised of many thousands of soldiers, often used to train Mongol armies.[66] The qa'ans were avid hunters and allocated huge resources to the sport wherever they went. Sultan Balban was particularly enamoured with such large-scale hunts, which were again justified through reference to familiar Mongol precedents. Barani claimed that Hülegü Khan was aware of Balban's love of the *nerge* and remarked that 'the king does not waste his time in hunting but in fact he is safeguarding the empire.'[67] Similarly, Amir Khusraw adopted the Mongol term '*bulghaq*' to refer to acts of rebellion and sedition, whilst also using the Mongol word '*tümen*' to describe units of 10,000 soldiers.[68] Yet a far deeper accommodation with Mongol culture may be suggested by the title '*qamizi*,' given to the Mongol commander Muhammadshah at the court of ʿAla al-Din. The title appears to be derived from the Mongol word '*kumiz*,' referring to fermented mare's milk. If so, the Mongols in South Asia, like their compatriots at the Mamluk Sultanate, were responsible for introducing the popular drink to Hindustan, and its procurement constituted one of Muhammadshah's chief offices.[69] Clearly, the arrival of such large numbers of Mongols in Delhi was the catalyst for a broad cultural exchange in which aspects of Mongol imperial culture were transmitted to South Asia.

Such exchanges would have only been encouraged further by the maritime and overland trade networks that linked the Delhi Sultanate to the Mongol Empire and saw an influx of people, goods, and ideas from the territories subject to Mongol rule. Many of these connections pre-dated the rise of the Mongol Empire, but their temporary consolidation as part of a single imperium undoubtedly enhanced their scope. In most instances, these exchanges were of such a mundane nature that they almost escaped the chroniclers' notice. Muhammad b. Tughluq, for example, was reputed to have favoured the import of fruit from Khurasan and Mawarannahr, whilst

contemporary merchants based in Fars made enormous profits dealing in horses with the Delhi Sultanate.[70] Both Mongol and Chinese merchants were recorded trading in textiles, slaves, and herbal medicines, all the while adding to the Indian conception of the Mongols as brokers and patrons of commerce. Such was the Mongol trade in cotton based largely out of East Turkistan that Amir Khusraw saw fit to refer to the Mongols as 'cotton-wearers.'[71] Meanwhile, the trade in aromatics originating out of East Asia was at such a volume that the poet 'Amid saw fit to compare 'the aromatic odour' of Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud's good character to 'the wrinkled mouth of the musk bag of Tatar.'[72] The Mongol Empire was known for its wealth and power, and the sultans of Delhi sought to increase their prestige by trading with them, as demonstrated by the jubilant report of the gifts sent to Muhammad b. Tughluq by the Yuan emperor, Toghon Temür, which included 100 slaves, 500 pieces of velvet cloth, 5 maunds of musk, 5 bejewelled robes, 5 embroidered quivers, and 5 swords.[73] Whether Ibn Battuta faithfully recorded the purpose of this mission and his own visit to China is highly debatable, but the idea that the Mongol emperor of China would seek to contact the Sultan of Delhi certainly affirmed in Ibn Battuta's mind that the latter had become one of the most powerful rulers in the world.

Changes to the material culture and patterns of consumption in Delhi, like attitudes to Mongol influence more generally, produced curiosity and consternation in equal measure. Mongol soldiers, Khurasani scholars, and the merchants working alongside them were free agents, who initially operated outside the factional groupings of the sultanate, allowing them to advance quickly through social, economic, and political hierarchies. The wealth and power they acquired made them exemplars of the new cosmopolitanism of the Mongol age, while also targets of resentment and jealousy. Hence, the luxury items they chose to spend their wealth on, many imported from the Mongol Empire, also came under attack. Sirhindi, for example, reported with a clear note of envy how émigrés from Ilkhan-ruled Khurasan used grants from Sultan Muhammad b. Tughluq to purchase slaves, paper, and books in Delhi.[74] Barani likewise mentioned the popularity of gold trimming (*zar-baft*) and foreign 'Tabrizi' and 'Chini' garments among the New Muslims. The same ostentation was noted by Firishta in his characterization of Balban's Tatar guard, which 'appeared in glittering armour, mounted on the finest steeds of Persia and Arabia, with silver bits, and housings of rich embroidery.'[75] These were imported luxuries outside the reach of many in Delhi society.[76] Barani therefore gleefully recalled how Sultan ʿAla al-Din clamped down on these goods from the Mongol Empire. Foreign cloth and clothing were subject to additional taxes along with horses, while 'Chinese drinking cups inlaid with gold' were to be broken, just as the beverages drunk from them were poured into the street.[77] Yet these periodic crackdowns were clearly limited to the luxury items associated with Mongol flamboyance, which fuelled the resentment of scribes and secretaries. Trade in more innocuous items, such as agricultural produce from Khurasan and sheep from Turkistan, the likes of which were described by Ibn Battuta during his visit to India, does not appear to have been significantly curtailed.[78]

CONCLUSION

The Mongol conquest was an integral factor in shaping the constitution of the early sultanate of Delhi. From its early inception, the Muslim state of Hindustan

posited itself as the last bastion of Islamic civilization not to have been destroyed by the Mongols. As the guardians of Islam, it almost became a necessary criterion for princes aspiring to the throne of Delhi to claim some past victory against the Mongols. Yet this propaganda masked a far more profound interaction between Delhi and Central Eurasia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Delhi built up a large Mongolian diaspora community, made up of slaves, princes, traders, and soldiers of fortune, who sought to share in the protection and prosperity of the sultanate. The Mongols in South Asia not only had a heavy hand in shaping the political fortunes of the sultanate of Delhi and the kingdom of Kashmir, but also in maintaining the well-established contacts that have linked the Gangetic Plains, the Sind River Valley, and the Himalayas to Central Eurasia for thousands of years.

NOTES

1 Jackson 1990, 9; Jackson 2003, 34; *HWC*, I, 112.
2 RDRM, I, 664; Jackson 2003, 105; May 2020, 276–281.
3 Wink 1997, II, 204; Srivastava 1950, 148; Jackson 2003, 105.
4 Wink 1997, II, 208; Rashid al-Din 2005, 74.
5 Kumar 2007, 280; Jackson 2003, 111.
6 RDRM, I, 88.
7 Rashid al-Din 2005, 74. Only the much later *Baharistan-i Shahi* confirms Rashid al-Din's account. *BS* 4.
8 Hasan 2005, 35; Jahn 1956, 176–180; Wink 1997, II, 208.
9 Jackson 2003, 74; Kumar 2007, 280.
10 *TNR*, II, 851 & 860–863; Srivastava 1950, 156; Jackson 2003, 114; Kumar 2007, 327.
11 *TNR*, II, 1288; Jackson 2003, 114.
12 Aubin 1969, 82; Jackson 1978, 243.
13 On the Qaraunas, see Aubin 1969, 65–94; Hirotoshi 1977, 162; Martinez 1986–8, 232–235; May 2020, 272–320.
14 ʿIsami 1967, 272.
15 Ibn Battuta 1987, 391.
16 Jackson 2003, 53; Srivastava 1950, 171; Wink 1997, II, 207.
17 Jackson 1986, 18.
18 Qashani 1969, 192–193; ʿIsami 1967, II, 431–443; Sirhindi 1932, 70.
19 Lal 1980, 163; Jackson 2003, 223.
20 Lal 1980, 175; Jackson 2003, 173.
21 Prasad 1936, 96–99; Husain 1938, 100–107; Jackson 1975, 120–128; Firishta 1908, 413.
22 Sirhindi 1932, 132; Firishta 1908, 451.
23 Jackson 2003, 235; Husain 1938, 210.
24 Barani 2015, 307.
25 The Kashmiri chronicler Jonaraja simply described him as being 'the great king of Karmmasena.' Jonaraja 1879, 16.
26 *BS* 9; Hasan 2005, 35–37; Jackson 1975, 138.
27 Hasan 2005, 41; Jackson 1975, 139.
28 Marvrudi 1927, 36; Jackson 2003, 64.
29 Srivastava 1950, 260.
30 Wink 1997, II, 198.
31 *TNR*, I, 599.
32 *TNR*, II, 1132.
33 Jackson 2003, 236.

34 Firishta 1908, 363.
35 ʿIsami 1967, II, 464.
36 For Tughluq's origins, *see* Prasad 1936, 1–6; Wink 1997, II, 209–210; Husain 1938, 50–51; Jackson 2003, 178; Kumar 2009, 51–52.
37 Firishta 1908, 401.
38 Firishta 1908, 397; ʿIsami 1967, II, 586.
39 Firishta has 'Mughal-Tegin.' Sirhindi first mentions Mughaltai during the reign of Jalal al-Din Firuz. Firishta 1908, 397; Sirhindi 1932, 60–61; Dihlawi 1933, 57.
40 Kumar 2007, 316.
41 Wink 1997, II, 211; Kumar 2007, 315.
42 Jackson 2003, 83; Srivastava 1950, 201.
43 Qashani 1969, 186; Vassaf/Ayati 1346/1967, 188; Jackson 2017, 396.
44 Srivastava 1950, 207 & 217; Lal 1980, 37 & 74.
45 Lal 1980, 38; Wink 1997, II, 211.
46 Prasad 1936, 102; Husain 1938, 133.
47 Ibn Battuta 1987, 385 & 457; Prasad 1936, 118; Jackson 1975, 130.
48 Ibn Battuta 1987, 382. Ibn Battuta also claims that Tarmashirin's son, Bashay Oghul, and his sister were among those to seek refuge at Delhi before moving on to the Injuid court of Shiraz. These claims seem highly dubious and are unsupported by contemporary sources in the Ilkhanate or the Delhi Sultanate.
49 Husain 1938, 211.
50 Jackson 2003, 53; Wink 1997, II, 211.
51 Lal 1980, 295; Barani 2015, 205.
52 Lal 1980, 87; Athar 2006, 26; Srivastava 1950, 221.
53 Barani 2015, 205.
54 Barani 2015, 166. Bada'uni records the prince's name as Sulaymanshah Rukn Khan. Badaʿuni 1898, I, 338.
55 Firishta 1908, 429 & 440; Jackson 1975, 152; Husain 1938, 161.
56 Firishta 1908, 433–434, 435, 438–439, 460, 470.
57 Bihamadkhani 1962, 32.
58 ʿIsami 1967, II, 701.
59 Barani 2015, 195; *TNR*, II, 935.
60 Dihlawi 1931, 18.
61 Ibn Battuta 2003, 196.
62 Badaʿuni 1898, I, 145.
63 Barani 2015, 162.
64 Barani 2015, 168.
65 Badaʿuni 1898, I, 230; Firishta 1908, 286.
66 Barani 2015, 165 & 246; Jackson 2003, 240.
67 Barani 2015, 35.
68 Dihlawi 1933, 104; Jackson 2003, 90.
69 ʿIsami 1967, II, 424–425, 446.
70 Ibn Battuta 2003, 148 & 187; Sirhindi 1932, 132.
71 Dihlawi 1931, 32.
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CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR

THE MONGOL INVASIONS OF JAPAN AND THEIR LEGACY

Li Narangoa

The Mongol invasions of Japan in the 13th century had a profound impact on the country. The two invasions, led by Qubilai Qa'an in 1274 and 1281, are known in Japan as *Bun'ei no eki* (the Bun'ei War) and *Koan no eki* (the Koan War) respectively according to the Japanese-era names of the time.[1] Although the Mongol armies were defeated in both cases, these wars brought huge social, economic and political challenges and changes to Japan. These Mongol invasions were also the only severe threats to Japan from overseas invaders prior to Western threats in the second half of the 19th century. As a result they left a long-lasting imprint upon the Japanese collective memory.

QUBILAI AND JAPAN

The Mongol invasions were an extension of Qubilai Qa'an's plan to isolate the Southern Song dynasty from its trade network and undermine their ability to resist the Mongols. He also sought to gain access to the coastal trade network to extend his maritime empire.[2] The Song strongly resisted Mongol conquest until 1279. After putting the Korean Peninsula under his control, Qubilai hoped to use diplomatic pressure to convince the Japanese to surrender. He sent envoys to the Japanese via Korea several times between 1266 and 1273. The first mission in 1266 returned without reaching Japan. Qubilai then ordered the Korean king to send envoys to Japan with a letter the following year. The envoys arrived in Dazaifu (today's Fukuoka) in 1268. The letter started with the typical style of the Mongol khans 'Cherished by the Mandate of Heaven, the Great Mongol emperor sends this letter to the king of Japan' and asked to 'communicate with each other and become friendly'. The letter also ended with the typical Mongol threat: 'Nobody would wish to resort to arms'. No reply was received. A third envoy was sent in March 1269, but all they managed was to capture two locals from Tsushima before returning home. Half a year later, in September 1269, a further envoy was sent along with the two captive Japanese. The Japanese imperial court wrote a response, but the Shogunate decided to ignore the Mongol demand, and a reply was not sent. In September 1271,

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Qubilai Qa'an sent an embassy of 100 people led by Zhao Liangbi, a high official. Upon arrival in Hakata, Zhao insisted that he would only submit the khan's letter to the emperor in person. This was not permitted, so he made a copy of the letter to Shoni Sukenori, a shogunate official in Hakata. The letter reached the shogunate and the imperial court in October. The letter was much more provocative than the earlier ones and in fact was an ultimatum. '[We] had sent several letters, but received no response at all. We will, however, wait until the coming November, and if there is still no response, battle ships will be prepared'.[3] Japan did not respond but began to prepare for a war with the Mongols instead. Zhao returned with his group but once again went back to Japan the following year. He remained there a year waiting for a response from the Japanese, but he failed to see the shogun and emperor, so he returned.[4]

After the failure of these diplomatic attempts, Qubilai decided to attack Japan. On 3 October 1274, a combined Yuan and Koryo force under the command of Mongol general Xin Du (Hundun) moved on Tsushima. It is reported that a combined army of Yuan soldiers and Koreans arrived at Komoda port on Tsushima two days later.[5] Tsushima did not possess any great defence. Sosuke Kuni, the head of the local garrison, died in the battle against the Mongol forces, and the island was taken. On 14 October, the Mongol armada landed on Ikishima, a small island between Tsushima and Hakata (today's Fukuoka). Local soldiers battled the invaders but were overwhelmed. The Mongol armada also attacked smaller islands along the way, including Hirado and Takashima. It landed at today's Fukuoka on 20 October. Despite the fact that the Mongols were winning, their forces withdrew to their ships at the end of the day to rest. Overnight the Mongol ships mysteriously disappeared.[6]

There are different arguments as to why and how the Mongol ships suddenly disappeared. Most Japanese research done before 1960 argued that a storm (*taifun*, typhoon) wiped out the Mongol ships. Others argue that the Mongol general decided to withdraw due to bad weather, disagreements and communication problems between the generals. According to this line of explanation, the loss of the 200 ships and 13,000 soldiers at sea was due to a combination of the battle, bad weather on the return journey and the shoddy quality of ships rather than a typhoon. This view was represented by meteorologist Arakawa Hidetoshi, who was the first scholar to contest the conventional view.[7] This hinges upon the thesis that the Japanese fabricated the destruction of the Mongol ships by typhoon for political-religious reasons. Shinto priests, Buddhist monks and others prayed before and during the Mongol invasion to avert the foreign enemy. For them, the idea that the gods sent a divine wind (*kamikaze*) to protect Japan was highly appealing, especially for priests trying to garner support from the shogunate. This idea of *kamikaze* led to the ideological concept that Japan is a divinely protected nation from the 19th century to WWII. After WWII, the divine element disappeared, but the typhoon theory continued to hold. From the 1960s, and especially during the 1970s, Japanese historians gradually accepted Arakawa's no-typhoon theory.[8]

After the failure of the first invasion, Qubilai Qa'an did not stop sending envoys to Japan. The Japanese, however, were even more determined not to meet the Mongol Khan's requests for diplomatic relations. The Japanese shogunate even planned to attack Korea in revenge for the Mongol invasion attempt, while strengthening their defence line at Kyushu, south-western Japan. However, the plan was cut short, due

allegedly to insufficient funds. Building a defensive wall and other associated costs did not leave much for a military expedition to Korea.[9] In February 1275 a group of five envoys was sent to Japan. This was led by two of Qubilai's high officials, the Mongol Du Shizhong (whose role was equivalent to today's deputy minister for culture), and his deputy, the Chinese official He Wenzhu (deputy minister of military affairs).They arrived at Nagato (Shimonseki) and were then sent to Hakata and finally in late July to Kamakura, where the shogunate was located. The shogunate responded by beheading them at Tatsunokuchi on 7 September. Having no knowledge of what had happened to his envoys, Qubilai sent another group of envoys to Japan after conquering the Southern Song dynasty in 1279. These envoys were also executed.[10] A second invasion attempt thus became inevitable.

Qubilai sent his army in two divisions: the Eastern Army (consisting of a Mongol army and a Korean army) from Korea and the Jiangan army from south China. The Eastern Army, led by the Mongol general Hudun, who had also commanded the first invasion, left Korea in early May and arrived at Tsushima on 21 May 1281. After attacking Tsushima, the armada left for Ikishima on 26 May on their way to Hakata. Part of the Eastern Army also attacked Nagato. At Hakata, however, the Mongols were hindered by the city's long, high stone defensive walls. After failing to land at Hakata, the Mongol armada occupied Shikajima on 6 June and made a base there. Three days later, however, the Mongols had to retreat to Ikishima to wait for the arrival of the Jiangan army from Southern China. Nonetheless, the Jiangan army did not arrive on 15 July, as had been planned. This was due to prolonged preparation and ill health on the part of the Mongol general assigned to command it. While waiting for the Jiangan army's arrival, the Eastern Army was itself stricken with illness. This was caused by the unfamiliar hot and humid climate and cost many lives. The Japanese, meanwhile, organized themselves and attacked the Mongol army at Ikishima. The Jiangan army only began to arrive late in the month. The combined Mongol armies were moved to Hirado Island, which was much closer to the Japanese mainland. By the end of July all were ready to attack the mainland, but, on 30 July, a storm struck, causing serious damage to the Mongol armada and demoralizing the army. In early August the Japanese attacked the remaining Mongol ships. Those ships which were still able to sail departed for Korea, but many soldiers, left without ships, found themselves stuck. They were slaughtered or captured by the Japanese samurais.[11]

Qubilai Qa'an prepared for a third invasion, planned for August 1286, but this was cancelled due to the defeat of the Mongols in their Vietnam campaign. Internal unrest also made later plans impossible to carry out. The Japanese, however, continued their preparation against possible Mongol attacks. In 1289, the shogunate gave the order to the *shugo* (constables) in Kyushu to have the temples make prayers to repel possible attacks from the Khan, even though by this time Qubilai Qa'an neither had a working plan nor the necessary conditions to make an invasion due to internal unrest represented by princes Nayan and Qaidu.[12] By 1292, however, Qubilai had settled internal unrest in his empire and asked the Korean king to send another envoy to Japan. At the same time a letter was sent to the Japanese via a trading ship from Southern China. These only allowed the Japanese to further tighten their defences, prepare armies, and, by the end of 1292, they had readied themselves for war. In early 1293, high-ranking commanders from the Hojo family

were sent from Kamakura to Kyushu to upgrade the Kyushu administration to a deputyship (*Chinzei Tandai*) and to tighten administrative control in Kyushu. This new, upgraded institution not only had command over the armies in wartime but also controlled the daily and judicial affairs of the warriors. This was done so the warriors and administrators did not have to go all the way to Kamakura for administrative and legal decisions. They could now concentrate on the business of defence. The regions (*kuni*) in Kyushu were asked to patrol the shores against a possible foreign invasion. This was organized in a rotating system, whereby each region was responsible for 3- to 12-month deployments of sentries.[13] Not only the temples and shrines but also the imperial family were actively engaged in prayers to assure the defence. In March 1294, to efficiently communicate between the islands that lay between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, fire signal exercises (lighting fires on hills) were ordered to be carried out in Ikishima, Oshima and Takashima, which could be seen from Hakata, the end station.[14] Before the third invasion, however, Qubilai Qa'an died in 1294. A few small-scale local clashes were reported in 1297, 1301 and 1314. It is, however, not clear if they were official Yuan troops or just pirate ships. Still, the perceived fear was greater than the actual clashes. Rumours of Mongol invasions continued until the very last year of the Yuan dynasty, and caution against external intruders and emergency defence regulations continued.[15]

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INVASIONS

Though the Japanese had defeated the Mongol invasions, the attacks still brought enormous socio-political changes for the country as well as a profound fear towards outsiders and pride at the successful defence of their country. Firstly, the invasions strengthened the centralized power of the shogunate or military government. In the name of war against foreign invaders, the shogunate was able to issue laws covering areas that were traditionally outside its jurisdiction. At the time of the Mongol invasion, the Japanese political structure was based on two poles: the shogunate government, which had its power base in the eastern part of Japan, centred in Kamakura (east of today's Tokyo), and the imperial court, which ruled from Kyoto with its own sphere of influence in the western part the country. Real power rested with the shogunate, but the imperial court had power over the imperial household, the court nobles, most of the shrines and temples (except those in the east) and their estates. The imperial court was also responsible for the external relations of the country.[16] The Mongol invasions, however, helped to blur the administrative and territorial lines of these two institutions.

During the war, or, more correctly, immediately after the war, for it was not yet clear that the Mongol invasions would cease, the shogunate declared that both the *gokenin* (shogun's warriors) and non-*gokenin* in Kyushu must participate in the military efforts. Also, those whose estates had traditionally been outside the shogunate's control (estates owned by nobles or shrines and temples that were under the rule of the imperial court) were ordered to contribute to the defence against the invaders. In other words, not only warriors but also the court nobles and religious institutions, which had previously not been involved in military efforts, had to participate in defence.[17] As Amino points out, this was the biggest reform since the establishment of the shogunate in the late 12th century. Though it was restricted to wartime, access

to the privileges of the nobles and the temples opened up the path for the shogunate to expand its power into an area that had traditionally not been under its control. This order was formalized into law in the immediate aftermath of the second invasion of 1281.[18]

Secondly, the Mongol invasions also further strengthened the authoritarian power of the shogun's regent (*shikken*), and the power of his clan. Although real power resided with the shogunate in Kamakura Japan (1185–1333), the shogunate was very much a divided and complex institution. From the beginning of the 13th century, the shogun increasingly lost power and became a puppet of his own regent, a position exclusively reserved for the main branch of the Hojo clan. Nonetheless, all laws and orders were still issued under the name of the shogun. The shogun, at least nominally, had control of his warriors or housemen (*gokenin*) and everything related to them, such as rewards and the power to recommend warriors to become part of the *gokenin*. The fiefdoms under the shogunate were managed by *shugo* or constables who were chosen from among the powerful *gokenin* (including the Hojo family). At the time of the Mongol invasion, Hojo Tokimune was the seventh regent of the shogun. The invasion offered Tokimune the chance to wield emergency powers and become the real commander in chief over both the warriors (including *gokenin* and non-*gokenin*) and court nobles. Tokimune even went as far as issuing laws under his own name rather than the shogun's during the second Mongol invasion. To prepare for war, he also sent his most trusted people to Kyushu as *shugo* (constable) to command the warriors.[19] As a powerful family of *gokenin*, the Hojo family was also entitled to have *shugo* positions. As the regent's powers increased, the number of *shugo* from his clan increased from 2 in 1200 to 17 in 1250. In the aftermath of the Mongol invasion more than half of the known *shugo* of 68 in 1285, and thus most of the country, came to be managed by the Hojo family.[20] *Shugo*, especially those who commanded the western shore of Japan, grew more powerful during this time of war. Extensive authority was not only given to *shugo* in Kyushu but also to the *shugo* in the provinces of Suo and Nagato neighbouring Kyushu on the western-most point of the Japanese main island. The most important administrative and military posts were all given to the regent's family members in these geopolitically important places.[21]

Thirdly, the shogunate exerted greater control over Kyushu. Located far away from both Kyoto and Kamakura, the shogunate's control was weak in Kyushu. As a commercial gateway to Asia, the main town Hakata had a strong autonomous character during the Middle Ages. Its Dazaifu (governing agency) was even called *To no mikado* ('Distant imperial court').[22] Although the founder of the Kamakura shogunate installed his trusted private warriors (*gokenin*) as *shugo* (constable) to manage warriors, there were many estates that were not under warrior rule. Yet in order to mobilize people for the war against the Mongols, those who were not warriors in Kyushu were all put under the command of *shugo*. On the eve of the first Mongol invasion the shogunate ordered the *gokenin*, who resided in the east but possessed estates in the west (Kyushu), to go to the west or send their representatives to participate in the preparations against the external enemy.[23] An estate and land survey of *gokenin* was carried out to efficiently mobilize their human and material resources, and selling land to non-*gokenin* was forbidden. The shogunate also put many estates owned by non-warriors in northern Kyushu into the hands of warrior

officials by offering them comparable land close to Kyoto. The aim was to simplify and unify the control of estates, which until then had been administered in a complicated multi-level structure involving the owner, administrator, and farmer who cultivated the land. These reforms were aimed at securing the provision of grain and materials necessary for defence purposes.[24]

In the aftermath of the first Mongol invasion, a formal guard system was established to patrol the northern Kyushu shores in case of foreign invasion. Two or three Kyushu fiefdoms (regions) would take turns patrolling for 3 to 12 months. All Kyushu regions were to build walls along the northern shoreline from 1276 onwards. Estate owners, warriors, court nobles and temples had to build and maintain a certain length of wall according to the size of their estates.[25] The bigger the estates the longer the wall they had to build and provide upkeep for. To prepare for a third possible Mongol invasion, the shogunate, as mentioned previously, upgraded its administration in Kyushu to a deputyship (*Chinzei Tandai*) model that not only managed defence against foreign invaders but was now also able to manage the judicial affairs for all Kyushu.[26] The deputyship was also given the right to manage and oversee people from overseas.[27] The Mongol plan for a third invasion of Japan never materialized. Qubilai became ill and was succeeded by his grandson, who sent a rather mild diplomatic letter to Japan via a Buddhist monk in 1299. Though there was no hint of a threat from the Mongols, the shogunate still continued to tighten its control in Kyushu in the name of defence. Many *gokenin* from the east moved to the region and settled there.[28] The development of Hakata (Fukuoka) was altered due to the administrative changes and the building of the defensive wall. The business and trade centre of the town was moved to the interior, changing the town's urban development.[29]

Fourth, the Mongol invasions also created social problems in Japan. Before and during the war, warriors were promised that they would be handsomely rewarded for fighting the foreign enemy. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the shogunate was expected to follow through on this. In the past, when the samurai had fought against internal enemies under the shogun, they were rewarded with the lands of defeated lords or clans. The external enemy, however, did not bring any land, and the shogunate government did not have the capacity to immediately pay the massive number of people who had participated in the war. The shogunate tried to both meet and hedge on its promises by instituting a slow and very strict evidence-based process for granting awards. Even a strip of shoreline that had been allocated as part of the shogun's personal holdings (*kanto goryo*) was used to meet the land shortage for the awards in Kyushu. Later, the shogun awarded some warriors lands taken from the defeated warlord Yasuda Yasumori and his followers following internal political upheavals in 1286. To strengthen the defence in Northern Kyushu, where the Mongols were most likely to land again, warriors were given lands from this region as their rewards, even if they were from Southern Kyushu. Since the shogunate did not want warriors to move out from Kyushu, land rewards were restricted and were divided into smaller areas to meet more people's needs. This not only led to a major shift in landholding patterns in the region but also caused enormous challenges to many new owners to manage the land from a distance. The shogunate attempted to meet their demands as far as possible, and some cases were not settled until 1307. The long process, the inequality and also the challenges to manage distant land,

however, caused the soldiers much frustration.[30] Temples and shrines also claimed rewards for their contribution to fighting the Mongol invasions. Large temples and shrines (Kobunji and Ichinomiya) had been mobilized to pray to avert or defeat the Mongol invasions. New laws were therefore issued to reward and support temples and shrines in 1284 and 1301. All warriors and commoners who owned land which had been part of a religious estate were to be returned for free. This caused tension amongst different groups of the society.[31] Moreover, the expense of building defensive fortifications had been a drain on the local economy in the regions around Kyushu, causing a great deal of social dissatisfaction that lasted beyond the immediate period of mass mobilization.[32]

Against all odds, trade went on as usual during the interwar period and also after the war, with the exception of a 10-year period of suspension between 1330 and 1340 due to social and political unrest in both Yuan China and Japan.[33] Despite continued trade, the domestic economic and social challenges caused by the Mongol invasions contributed to the downfall of the Kamakura shogunate. Although the shogunate gained momentum in its efforts to extend its power more fully across Japan, the Mongol invasion also amplified internal conflicts. While the regent increased his power, this also caused conflict between the *gokenin* followers of the Shogun and the *miuchibito* followers of the Hojo family. So too between the main-line Hojo family and its branch families in the shogunate.[34] This caused several bouts of social unrest and destabilized the Kamakura shogunate. In the end, however, the regents themselves became puppets of their own advisory groups, and power was destined to be handed over to the *gokenin*. Coupled with the social and economic problems, the internal political conflicts ended the Kamakura shogunate in the early 14th century.[35]

THE MONGOLS IN HISTORICAL MEMORY

Apart from the social and political legacies, the Mongol invasions also etched a long-lasting legacy of isolationist fear and pride on the Japanese historical memory. The invasions precipitated a newfound fear of the outside world. The Mongol army's onslaught and the suicide of defeated Japanese warriors at Kyushu, Tsushima, Ikishima and other small islands introduced the Japanese to the terror of invasion by foreign enemies. The Japanese have recalled the Mongol invasions whenever they have faced a foreign threat over the centuries. Images of the Mongol invasions resurged in Japanese popular memory in the 18th century, when Japan faced the Russian threat from the north. It is no coincidence that the 'Mongol invasion picture scroll', which was recorded by Kinaga Takezaki, who participated in the battles against the Mongols, was 'discovered' five centuries later at the end of the 18th century. Many people were interested, and many copies were made, and there are 40 different copies known today. Artists also depicted the Mongol invasions in their work based on the scroll.[36]

A feeling of fear set in lasting many generations, so long in fact that there are still popular sayings and stories about the Mongol invasions in southern Japan. For example, parents would say: *Mukuri kokuri no oni ga kuru* [The demons of Mukuri Kokuri are coming], to stop them from crying.[37] The Mukuri Kokuri demons were a reference to the Mongols. To prevent children from getting close to

water unattended, they were told that the demons known as *Kappa* would call out '*moko moko*' or '*mokko mokko*' and take the children into the water! Interestingly the sound of the *Kappa* is a reference to the Mongols (*moko* means Mongol or Mongolia). The memory of the Mongol invasions is still visible today in Fukuoka, Takashima, Tsushima and Ikishima, in the form of monuments, memorial signposts, songs, writings and museums. Apart from fear, the Mongol invasions brought a sense of unifying pride to the Japanese. Japan had won against the foreign invasions, and in the future, should there be more, they would surely triumph. The term *kamikaze* (divine wind) and the belief that the gods had protected Japan from foreign attack, originated from this experience.[38] This provided a sense of confidence and pride that outlasted Kamakura Japan and would continue to inform the nationalist imagery of modern Japan several centuries later.

These fear- and pride-laden memories of the Mongol invasion were later used at local and national levels for mobilizing the Japanese in the 19th and 20th centuries against foreign invaders and towards empire-building of their own in Asia. The first of such campaigns took place when Japan's sovereign right was challenged in the second half of the 19th century by Western powers. Memories of the Mongol invasions were called upon to create a unified Japanese national consciousness. This time the unification was not under the shogunate but under the name of the emperor, who in 1868 had been restored to power in place of the ruling Tokugawa shogunate. This was a politically and socially unstable period – the old shogunate system was gone, but the new emperor-centred and modernized political system was still rather divided. There was a profound need for the unification of Japanese society to deal with the Western threat. The message was simple and clear – that the Japanese had been unified during the Kamakura period and this allowed them to defeat foreign invaders. This could be repeated – 'we defeated the Mongols and so we will win against any intruders from outside'. The memories of the Mongol invasions informed Japan's sense of itself as a divinely protected land which had triumphed over its enemies. Popular artwork was published to illustrate fighting scenes between the Mongols and the mighty Japanese as the *kamikaze* blew away the Mongol ships and soldiers. Thirteenth-century Japan was presented as a unified country with fully formed 'national awareness'.[39]

Commemorations of historical persons connected with the invasions became ever more important. Taira no Kagetaka and Sosuke Kuni, who were acting *shugo* (constable) on the Iki and Tsushima islands respectively and fell during the first Mongol invasion of 1274, were celebrated as national heroes. Commemorations were conducted and shrines were built to worship them on Iki and Tsushima. In 1896, both Taira no Kagetaka and So no Sukekuni were posthumously promoted to higher ranks by the imperial household for their 'heroic spirit'.[40] This recognition came some 622 years after their deaths![41]

In Fukuoka statues were erected of Emperor Kameyama (r. 1260–1274 as emperor and 1274–1287 as cloistered emperor), who reigned when the Mongols invaded Japan, and Nichiren, the founder of the Nichiren Buddhist school, who was said to have prophesized the Mongol invasion, to commemorate the invasion events in November 1904.[42] The former was initiated by Yuchi Takeo (1847–1913), a chief constable of Fukuoka, and the latter by Sano Zenrei, a Nichiren priest. Yuchi originally started with the idea of constructing a monument to Hojo Tokimune, the

regent of the Kamakura shogunate during the invasions. His idea, however, faced much protest because it was not in line with the political and ideological framework of the time, which was focused on restoring imperial power rather than promoting the shogunate.[43] In 1899 it was decided that a bronze statue of Emperor Kameyama (1249–1305) should be made instead. The reasoning behind this was that he had supposedly gone from shrine to shrine across the country before and during the Mongol invasions, and his prayers were the reason that the *kamikaze* destroyed the Mongol fleets. Yuchi believed that constructing memorials to the Mongol invasions would not only preserve history but that it would also rally the spirit of the people against foreign powers.[44] The initiator of the statues presented the projects as a great undertaking for national defence and the protection of the country. Offices were set up in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, Mie, Hiroshima and Nagasaki to make people more aware of the importance of remembering the Mongol invasions and to raise funds for monuments. Touring around the country, Yuchi gave slide shows (using a lantern projector), talks on the Mongol invasions, and organized exhibitions. His audience reportedly reached over a million by January 1901. Artists were inspired by his talk and enthusiastically supported his projects.[45]

In 1892 Naga'i Kenko, who was then working in an army band, wrote a song entitled 'Genko' [The Mongol Pirates] to support Yuchi's efforts to construct monuments in Fukuoka. Naga'i Kenko's song became very popular all over Japan and helped to celebrate the victory over the Mongol invaders and promote national unity.[46] Special concerts and theatre performances were also held for this purpose.[47]

A local artist, Yada Issho also completed 14 huge panoramic oil paintings depicting the Mongol invasions to support the statue construction projects in Fukuoka. His paintings were described as 'powerful', 'realistic' and a perfect depiction of Japanese resoluteness in defence of their land (*gokoku tekki no ki*) by reporters. Yada's paintings presented a coherent story of why Qubilai Qa'an attacked Japan, how the Japanese samurai fought heroically, and how horribly the Japanese suffered.[48] Marco Polo was depicted as the antagonist, historically advising Qubilai Qa'an to invade Japan for its rich resources. This depiction reflected the anti-Western atmosphere within Japanese society at the time.[49]

The commemoration projects mostly began at the local level but were soon promoted as national projects supported by the imperial government because the local initiatives advanced the policy of creating a single coherent national narrative with a unified history. As mentioned earlier, at the time of the Mongol invasions, samurai mostly participated in the war to be awarded land, but 600 years later, they were depicted as national heroes who died protecting the 'entire nation' and were awarded posthumously with imperial medals. People who experienced the Mongol invasions in the 13th century were seen as suffering 'imperial subjects' (*teikoku no gunmin*).[50] Yuchi Takeo and Sano Zenrei's initiatives of building local monuments were seen as projects of national interest. Erecting memorials across the natural landscape creates an environment in which people think about stories and heroes of the past and feel a common sense of belonging. In Haga Shoji's words, they served to create a 'logical community' (*rinri teki kyodotai*). This 'logical community' was created on the basis of virtue, morality and honour.[51]

Interest in the Mongol invasions was rejuvenated in the early 20th century to mobilize the nation for war as Japan began building an empire in Asia. This time,

the memory of the Mongol invasions became a basis for conveying the ideal of a selfless Japanese military spirit. The 650th anniversary of the Mongol invasions was celebrated enthusiastically across the country. A memorial rally was held in Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo to commemorate the first Mongol invasion of 1274.[52] A memorial was also constructed for Qubilai Qa'an's five ambassadors led by Du Shizhong in Takiguchi, close to Kamakura, where the group was beheaded in 1275. The Ministry of Education together with Tokyo City organized a memorial festival to commemorate the 650th anniversary of the second Mongol invasion of 1281 on 1 July 1931. Flyers and reports emphasized that 'we Japanese defeated the strongest enemy in the world by the grace of god'.[53] Along with film and music, a dance performance showed how the prayers of the imperial family in the Ise shrine were heard by the god-of-the-wind, and how the god-of-the-wind created the *kamikaze* to defeat the Mongol army and protect the Japanese people. Ten years later, in November 1941, the same kind of three-day memorial rally was organized in Tokyo to commemorate the 660th anniversary of the second Mongol invasion.[54] These commemorative activities continued to the end of the war.

The memories of the Mongol invasions became a subject of mass media interest, especially radio and film. Soon after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, a film entitled *Mongol Invasions: The Surrender of an Enemy Nation* (*Moko shurai: Tekkoku kofuku*) was produced by the Shochiku film company in Kyoto in 1937. Its theme was the Japanese samurai under Hojo Tokimune defeating the Mongol invaders. This grandiose film aimed to conjure up Japanese patriotic feelings. The film was advertised with slogans such as 'national crises!', 'entire nation should watch!', 'a great history of loyalty and patriotism!'[55] In a certain sense, the film encapsulated the narrative that had been avidly promoted since the second half of the 19th century. Naga'i Kenko's 1892 song 'Genko', which had been written to support the huge memorial statues of Hojo Tokimune (later emperor Kameyama, as mentioned earlier) was used in the film.[56] The film was praised by the Ministry of the Interior as the first historical film to be appropriate to current times.[57] The censorship fee was even waived because the film 'presented the Japanese spirit in the war against the Mongol invasion that marked a shining page in Japanese history, and it aimed for common good'.[58] When the film was screened in September 1937, the box office sold out every day at big cinemas in Tokyo and Kyoto.[59]

The stories of the Mongol invasions came to represent Japanese solidarity and fighting spirit during WWII. One of the largest national newspapers claimed in December 1939 that the situation at the time of the Mongol invasions could be applied to the current war; Japanese fighting spirit was destined to defeat the foreigners (the Westerners this time), just as it had done in the 13th century against the mighty Mongol Empire.[60] Sensationally heroic stories of samurai and their families defending Japan during the Mongol invasions were depicted in newspapers, such as a samurai's wife who tried to bring *onigiri* (rice balls) to her fighting husband.[61]

CONCLUSION

The two Mongol invasions of the 13th century not only exerted powerful political and social changes in Kamakura Japan, they have also been of great importance for shaping Japanese self-image in modern times. The Mongol invasions helped to

expand the authoritarian power of the Kamakura shogunate, especially the power of the regent, Hojo Tokimune. However, this heightened power in turn contributed to the downfall of the Kamakura shogunate. Similarly, memories of the Mongol invasions in the 19th and early 20th centuries contributed to creating an image of a divinely protected land and of the Japanese as a people superior to their enemies. The Mongol invasions played an important part in the process of modern Japanese nation-building, but the strong sense of superiority led Japan into war and eventual defeat. While the Mongol invasions in the 13th century were real, the memories of the invasions in the 19th and early 20th centuries were the socially constructed product of a Japan desperate for unifying myths. Through commemoration, artwork, press, radio and film a 'collective heartbeat' and new memories were created. More recently, the sites of the Mongol invasions have become places of local historical and cultural heritage, contributing to local identity in a globalized world rather than a nationalist one. What will the Mongol invasions bring in the future? As Jacques Le Goff once pointed out, the relationship between present and past is never ending.[62]

NOTES

1 Bun'ei 文永 (1264–1275); Koan 弘安(1278–1288).
2 Li 2017, 163–167; Verschuer 2010, 15; Sugiyama 1995.
3 Cited in Saeki 2003, 81.
4 Aida 1958; Kaizu 1998; Kakehi 2001; Seki 2001.
5 On troop and naval strengths, see Conlan 2001, 264; Rossabi 1987, xiii; Turnbull 2010, 49; Verschuer 2010, 89.
6 Rossabi 1994, 414–489 (here 437–442; 482–87).
7 Arakawa 1958, 41–46; Arakawa 1960, 113–116.
8 Amino 1989, 162–164. For further scholarly argument on this, see Chikushu 1972; Kawazoe 1977; Kaizu 1998, just to name a few.
9 Fukuoka 1962, 61; Amino 2000, 241–244.
10 Aida 1958. See also Kawazoe 2001, 144.
11 Amino 1989, 270–274.
12 Masson Smith Jr. 2000, 33–35; Clements 2010; Grousset 1970, 293–294.
13 Amino 1989, 319–322.
14 Saeki 2003, 167.
15 Kaizu 1995, 25–26.
16 Hurst 1995, 3–28; Mass 1995, 46–88.
17 Kaizu 1998, 22–24; Hori 1967.
18 Amino 2000, 210–213.
19 Amino 2000, 188–200.
20 Ishii 1995, 74 (44–90).
21 Ishii 1995, 76; Hori 1967, 152–153.
22 Batten 2013, 13–24.
23 Kawazoe 1971, 57.
24 Amino 2000, 35; 52–55.
25 Amino 2000, 46–47.
26 Ishii 1995, 76.
27 Murai 2013a, 242–272 (here 265).
28 Kawazoe 1971, 57.

29 Anno 2000, 19–26; Murai 2013a, 242–272.
30 Ishii 1995, 70; Amino 1989, 305–307; Hori 1967, 225–228.
31 Kaizu 1995, 96–120; Maekawa 2018, 82–91.
32 Saeki 2003, 175–188; Cobbing 2008, 119–121.
33 Li 2017, 30–31; Enomoto 2007, 106–117.
34 Hori 1967, 213–218.
35 Hosokawa 2011b, 132–133; Hosokawa 2011a, 90–95; Goble 1995, 168–190.
36 Kim 2019, 136–156. Available https://irdb.nii.ac.jp/01127/0004303244.
37 Saeki 2003, 248; Kaizu 1995, 10–36.
38 Saeki 2003, 243–248.
39 Narangoa 2009, 404–414. The following sections are a modified and summarized version of the previous article.
40 'Moko shurai no saini tatakatta busho futari ni so'I' [Upgrading two generals' ranks who fought against Mongol Invasion], *Yomiuri Shimbun* 1896, 2.
41 Narangoa 2009, 404–414.
42 Kawazoe 1977, 116.
43 Nozomi 1931.
44 Yuchi 1909. Available www.dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/850437, ID 000000487521; Kawazoe 1977, 111–115.
45 For detailed activities of Yuchi, see Nakamura 2015.
46 'Geko: Gunka' [Mongol Invasions: Military Song], Available https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%83%E5%AF%87_(%E8%BB%8D%E6%AD%8C) (accessed on 20 February 2018). For the English translation of the song, see Delgado 2008, 17–18.
47 *Yomiuri shimbun* 9 November 1893; 23 November 1893.
48 'Geko egai'ita dai abura'e' [Grand oil paintings of Mongol Invasions], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 29 July 1896, 3.
49 Narangoa 2009, 404–414.
50 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 1 October 1893, 3; for paintings of Yada, see *Yomigaeru Meiji Kaiga* 2005, 20–51.
51 Haga 1998, 15, 183.
52 'Genko no eki kara 650-nen' [650 Years since the Mongol Invasion], *Yomiuri Shimbun* 8 December 1924, 2.
53 'Shichigatsu tsuitachi Hibiya kokaido de Genko kinensai' [Memorial Festival of Mongol Invasion will be held in Hibiya Hall on 1 July], *Yomiuri Shimbun* 28 June 1931, 1.
54 'Genko roppyaku rokujunen kinen taikai' [Commemoration of 660th anniversary of Mongol Invasion], *Yomiuri Shimbun* 31 October 1941, 3.
55 *Yomiuri Shimbun* 27 September 1937, 3; 1 October 1937, 3.
56 *Yomiuri Shimbun* 18 September 1937, 2.
57 *Yomiuri Shimbun* 30 September 1937, 3.
58 *Yomiuri Shimbun* 28 September 1937, 3.
59 *Yomiuri Shimbun* 2 October 1937, 2.
60 'Moko kuru' [Mongols Coming], *Yomiuri Shimbun* 11 December 1939, 2; Genko no kyokun' [A Lesson from Mongol Invasions], *Yomiuri Shimbun* 23 October 1942, 2.
61 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 February 1943, 2.
62 Le Goff 1992, 111.

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PART XII

THE MONGOL LEGACY

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CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE

THE CHINGGISID LEGACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Patrick Wing

The Chinggisids' impact on the history of the Middle East was profound and long lasting, despite the relatively short period that they ruled. Although just over a century elapsed from the first Mongol invasions against the empire of the Khwarazmshah in 1218 to the death of the last Chinggisid Ilkhan, Abu Sa'id Bahadur Khan in 1335, many aspects of political, religious, and intellectual life in the Middle East were transformed by the Mongols. In what follows, we will examine some of these transformations, and the long-term consequences that the Chinggisids had on the Middle East, and particularly the territory of the Ilkhanate, between the Euphrates and Amu Darya rivers.

There were many examples of dramatic, often destructive encounters between the Mongols and the peasants, nomads, townspeople, and elites in the Middle East, which resulted in long-term material consequences. Cities like Balkh and Tus in Khurasan were erased from the map in the initial onslaught, although both of these places re-emerged as important shrine centers in the later years of Mongol rule. Other cities survived, but in new relationships to the world around them because of the Mongol conquests. Baghdad was transformed from the center of Sunni Muslim learning and spiritual authority under the Abbasid Caliphate, to more of a provincial center, second to Tabriz in terms of political importance to the Mongols, and second to Cairo in terms of importance to Islamic learning. And, of course, political dynasties were swept away and were replaced by Mongol khans.

TEMPORAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Beyond these immediate changes, the Mongols set in motion other less obvious and more gradual transformations in the political and religious life in the Middle East, which also had long-term consequences. One of the most important legacies of the Mongols in the Middle East was the way changes brought about by the Mongol conquests prompted new ideas about who had the right to rule and on what grounds they had such authority.

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To understand this process, it is useful to consider the political situation before the Mongols. In the year 1200, before the first wave of Mongol armies arrived in the Middle East, political authority was generally held by rulers whose *de facto* military and political power was legitimized through a formal allegiance to and recognition from the Abbasid caliph, a descendant from the family of the Prophet Muhammad and member of a dynasty that had ruled since 750. Although shorn of much of his political power by the 13th century, the caliph continued to enjoy moral and ideological authority as the 'Commander of the Faithful' and head of the Muslim community. He had the final say on scriptural disputes concerning jurisprudence and was still nominally charged with the spiritual guidance of the Muslim world, enjoining the good and forbidding the bad. Recognition of this *de facto* situation defined the Sunni political order and had more to do with an acknowledgement of the political status quo than any religious doctrine. For Shi'i Muslims, such an arrangement was theoretically illegitimate, for the only legitimate ruler from a Shi'i perspective was the imam, who, for the majority Shi'i sect, known as the Twelvers, was in occultation by the 10th century.[1] Thus, for the rulers of the Middle East on the eve of the Mongol invasion, legitimate rule involved a condominium of sacred and worldly authority. A sultan, such as a ruler from the Seljuk dynasty, legitimized his rule as sultan through his relationship with the Abbasid caliph.

The Mongol conquest of Baghdad and overthrow of the caliphate in 1258 put an end to this pattern of sacralizing kingship in the Middle East. The Abbasid Caliphate did not go away; an Abbasid caliph soon reemerged in Cairo in 1261. This caliphate, however, was a creation of the Mamluk sultans who had seized power from the Ayyubids there in 1250 and was not recognized outside the Mamluk domains in Egypt and Syria. Thus, the Euphrates River, dividing the Mamluk Sultanate from the Mongol Ilkhanate also became the boundary between notions of legitimate authority during the Mongol period and after.[2]

The end of the Abbasid Caliphate as a sacralizing genealogy in condominium with political, military authority opened the door to new solutions to the question of who has the right to rule and on what grounds. The eclipse of the caliphate as an instrument of public acknowledgement of universalizing political authority in the lands east of the Mamluk Sultanate meant that new ideas, symbols, and memories were used to explain why a sultan had the right to rule his subjects. Here is where we need to consider what John Woods has called the "era of great experimentation and innovation in political thought and practice."[3] Such experimentation was both a product of the Mongols' own ideas about legitimate authority, as well as a product of the social and intellectual transformations that took place due to Mongol rule in the Islamic Middle East. What were some of the various alternatives to the caliph-sultan pattern that had existed in the Middle East before the arrival of the Mongols?

One alternative was a completely new genealogical basis for legitimate authority, based upon descent from Chinggis Khan himself. Everywhere the Mongols conquered, the Chinggisid principle followed; that is, legitimate rule belonged to a patrilineal descendant of Chinggis Khan. In the Ilkhanate, this meant descendants of Hülegü, the conqueror of Baghdad who established the Toluid *ulus* between the Oxus and Euphrates. Tension existed throughout the Ilkhanid period, between sons of khans and their uncles who could also claim legitimate authority and led to periods of civil war in 1282 and 1295. When Abu Sa'id Bahadur Khan died in 1335, a new period

of unrest broke out which was never fully resolved. Or more precisely, a Chinggisid khan never again held power in the Ilkhanid *ulus*.

To what extent then can we speak of Chinggisid heritage as part of the legacy of the post-Chinggisid Middle East? In the immediate aftermath of the upheaval that followed Abu Sa'id's death, the amirs who sought control of the *ulus* claimed to rule in the name of the descendants of Chinggis Khan. These figureheads had little real authority, for power in the Ilkhanate had shifted from the khan to the amirs even before the Ilkhanate collapsed. Thus, for example, the Jalayirid amir Shaykh Hasan-i Buzurg ruled in Baghdad in the name of Muhammad Khan, a descendant of Hülegü's son Möngke Temür, and later in the name of a descendant of Gaykhatu named Jahan Timur. At the same time, the Chobanid amir Shaykh Hasan-i Kuchak claimed to rule in the name of Sati Beg, the daughter of Öljeitü, and then to Sulayman Khan, a descendant of Hülegü's son Yoshmut.[4]

We might usefully ask why this happened and what the long-term consequences were for the region. Recently, scholars have questioned the conventional wisdom that the Ilkhanate collapsed due to the fact that Abu Sa'id died without a son to succeed him. Charles Melville has pointed out that there was no lack of eligible Chinggisids in Iran in 1335, even if they were from other family lines, and thus there may have been other reasons for the conflict that followed Abu Sa'id's death.[5] Melville builds on an idea developed most systematically by Michael Hope, that the upheaval after Abu Sa'id's death was more about a clash between two visions for the *ulus*, one traditional and decentralized and one more in line with the centralizing tendencies that the Ilkhanate had been undergoing since the period of Ghazan Khan and Rashid al-Din.[6]

The fact that the Ilkhanate did not suddenly transform into a centralized, agrarian, Islamic sultanate is only surprising if we accept the vision of the state and a narrative of history put forth by court officials like Rashid al-Din.[7] For the *qarachu* amirs, or the non-Chinggisid elites, Chinggisid genealogies were not useful. However, appeals to a Chinggisid legacy, characterized by nomadic culture, military conquest, and redistributive economic mechanisms were extremely valuable to the military aristocracy for whom the Ilkhanid *ulus* was the framework for political action.

Military elites seeking to uphold Chinggisid tradition often expressed this tradition with reference to the *yasa* of Chinggis Khan. There has been a good deal of debate about the precise nature of the *yasa*.[8] Although no single *yasa* document exists, we might usefully think of the *yasa* as the laws and decrees that Chinggis Khan promulgated during his lifetime and which were upheld by his successors.[9] For many Mongols among the military elite, the *yasa* came to mean tradition, the way things used to be done, and thus the proper way to do things. Such sentiments could provide a shorthand for the grievances felt by members of the military elite who favored what Hope has called a "collegist" (collegial) approach to governance, characterized by consultation by the khan (with) his amirs, and the *quriltai* assembly as a mechanism to accommodate concerns among the elite, both military and civilian.[10] The *yasa* as Chinggisid tradition appears in the sources as distinct from, and often in conflict with Islamic law (*shari'a*). More broadly, proponents of the *yasa* resisted the centralizing reforms begun during the reign of Ghazan Khan, which included an attempt to limit the authority and consultative power of the amirs. Thus, post-Chinggisid rulers who sought the valuable support of the military

elite, but who could not claim Chinggisid descent for themselves, looked to an articulation of legitimate authority in which they upheld Mongol tradition and the *yasa* of Chinggis Khan.

Conflict over the law, about the primacy of *yasa* or *shari'a*, was sometimes a reflection of conflict about distribution of resources. We can see an example in the question of the legality of the *soyurghal*, a type of land grant that became common in the post-Ilkhanid period. A *soyurghal* was a grant of proprietorship over land revenue and peasant labor, with total tax immunity and freedom from any interference from state administrators.[11] In the late 15th century, the Timurid Sultan Husayn Bayqara (r. 1469–1506) and the Aq Qoyunlu Sultan Ya'qub (r. 1478–1490) both tried to reform the decentralized, *soyurghal*-dependent land revenue system in their realms, through a return to Islamic law.[12] Yet, the *soyurghal* persisted as a cost-effective way to reward members of the military aristocracy, even as it eroded central administrative control over territory.[13]

Not all post-Ilkhanid rulers relied on Chinggisid genealogy or Chinggisid tradition, but instead sought to draw on alternative dynastic genealogies. The Chobanid ruler of Azerbaijan, Malik Ashraf (r. 1343–1357), ruled in the name of a certain Anushirvan, whose legitimacy seemed to be based on a pre-Islamic notion of Iranian kingship.[14] The Muzaffarid ruler, Mubariz al-Din, attempted to base his claim to authority in Shiraz, Isfahan, and Kirman on recognition from the Abbasid caliph in Cairo.[15] The Kart *maliks* in Herat recognized and paid tribute to Taghay Timur Khan, who, although he was related to Chinggis Khan (he was descended from his brother), was not technically a Chinggisid.[16] Thus, among the military elite, several different legitimizing ideologies were employed, from Chinggisid lineage, Chinggisid tradition, as well as support for non-Chinggisid figureheads.

SACRAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Yet, however much the post-Ilkhanid rulers in the Middle East sought to convert their roles as conquerors into sultans, the sacralizing element that had formerly been represented by the sultan-caliph condominium was also reimagined in the period after the end of the universal caliphate in Baghdad. If the world order over which one rules is an Islamic one, where does Islam intersect with kingship? How does one rally the religious elites of society, and the rest of the populace along with them, without a clear conduit through which God's will, law, and judgment can be known by his subjects?

A useful way of thinking about the intersection of kingship and religion is to consider notions of the acquisition and transmission of religious knowledge. How does one know what God wants him or her to do? Throughout Islamic history, there had been two basic ways to answer this question. The first was the answer of the traditional Sunni *ulama*, the religious scholars for whom the primary modes of intellectual activity were textual and legalistic. The main sources of knowledge were the Quran and the hadith, which in combination with rationality and tradition, could produce answers to the questions of how God wants us to live. We can think of this type of knowledge as exoteric, available to anyone able to read the texts and interpret their apparent meaning. The second was an answer shared by both Shi'is and sufis, for whom the sources of religious knowledge included not only the

Quran and the hadith, but also the esoteric understanding of their meanings, which could not necessarily be discerned by anyone simply reading words on the page. Real religious knowledge required understanding the hidden meanings of things, which were not necessarily accessible to everyone, no matter how much reading and studying they did.

There were some important developments that coincided with Chinggisid rule that contributed to an expansion of these modes of esoteric knowledge in the Middle East, and new ways of thinking about legitimate authority. One development had been underway before the arrival of the Mongols, which was the growth of sufism as both a mode of religious practice, as well as of social organization. Sufism promised a mystical connection to God, in which the direction of a spiritually excellent guide (*shaykh*, *murshid*, *pir*, etc.) could offer an alternative to the textual methods of the traditional *ulama*. Mystical knowledge of God through meditative or ecstatic communal rituals, in connection with the divine blessing (*baraka*) of a saintly *shaykh* was an attractive avenue for devotion and the spread of Islam. Through the 12th and 13th centuries, sufi devotion had more and more commonly come in the form of distinct brotherhoods, or paths (pl. *tariqat*) to mystical enlightenment. Sufi orders served as a form of social organization and hierarchy, with the shaykh at the top. The social functions of *tariqat* could include the provision of social services and charity. They could also provide the framework for authority parallel to that of the political-military elite of the sultan and his amirs. In fact, the succession to the leadership of sufi orders were commonly "dynastic," with leadership passing from father to son. In the period after the eclipse of both the Abbasid and Chinggisid dynasties, the succession of *shaykhs* and the transmission of spiritual authority from father to son could offer an alternative to the sultan-caliph condominium of the pre-Mongol period.

Parallel to, and sometimes intersecting with this pattern of spiritual authority among sufi orders was the Shi'i concept of rightful leadership of the Islamic community belonging solely to the imam. For Shi'is, the imams' claim to leadership was based on esoteric religious knowledge passed down from father to son, going back to 'Ali b. Abi Talib. The sacred genealogy of the imams shared many similarities with the *tariqa* genealogies, and both offered a model for Islamic political leadership.

What were some of the real-world implications of these developments? Generally speaking, the post-Chinggisid Middle East saw a variety of attempts to combine esoteric spiritual knowledge with a charismatic genealogy. We have already indicated the ways in which Chinggisid descent offered a powerful basis for authority, especially when combined with command of tribal military forces. Yet, there were alternatives to the Chinggisid principle. Perhaps the most significant political development associated with the expansion of Twelver Shi'i and sufi patterns of spiritual leadership was the appearance of messianic political movements in the post-Chinggisid Middle East. The messianic deliverer, the *mahdi*, was a figure who would appear at the end of time to bring justice and right religion to the world. The notion of the *mahdi* had a long history in Islam.[17] Although Sunnis and Shi'is at different times and places awaited the appearance of the *mahdi*, Twelver Shi'is developed the most extensive theological account of the concept of the *mahdi* as messiah and identified him with the Twelfth Imam, who disappeared in the 9th century. By the

Mongol period, an expectation of the *mahdi*, as well as reverence for ʻAli and his descendants, had become accepted among Sunnis as well as Shiʻis.[18]

Individuals put forth messianic claims even before the end of the Ilkhanid period. In 1324, Timurtash, son of Amir Choban, who was the real authority in the Ilkhanate during the early reign of the young Abu Saʻid, raised an insurrection and claimed the title of Messiah of the Age ("*mahdi al-zaman*").[19] In the period after the end of Chinggisid rule, a number of other *mahdi*-claimants emerged, all of whom led movements offering new ways of joining spiritual knowledge with political power and authority. In Khurasan in the 1330s, the successors to a sufi leader named Shaykh Khalifa, who were known as the Sarbadars, forged an alliance with the local Mongol military elite, as well as with crafts and artisan guilds, centered around the expectation of the imminent return of the *mahdi*.[20] To the west, Fazlallah Astarabadi (d. 1394) claimed to be the *mahdi*, based on his esoteric understanding of the hidden meanings of the Persian-Arabic alphabet. His movement, known as the Hurufiyya ("lettrism"), posed a political challenge to Timurid rule in Azerbaijan.[21] In the 15th century, Muhammad b. Falah Mushaʻshaʻ (d. 1462) claimed to possess the spirit of the hidden Twelfth Imam and thus acted in the name of the *mahdi*. Muhammad Mushaʻshaʻ's followers carried out armed insurgence in his name in southern Iraq and Khuzistan.[22] Additionally, the Nurbakhshiyya developed another messianic movement, under the leadership of Muhammad Nurbakhsh (d. 1464), who also claimed to be the *mahdi*. Nurbakhsh's following threatened the authority of the Timurid ruler Shahrukh (r. 1405–1447), who imprisoned Nurbakhsh on several occasions during his reign.[23]

What accounts for such a rise in messianism in the post-Chinggisid period? In addition to the quest for an acceptable articulation of sacred political authority, as discussed earlier, religious speculation derived from the unitive cosmology of Ibn ʻArabi (d. 1240) helped to open the door for individuals to claim to be messianic deliverers. Although Ibn ʻArabi died before Hülegü came to Baghdad and did not live within the Mongol realm, he was probably the most influential thinker across the Islamic world in the period. Central to Ibn Arabi's thought was the notion of *wahdat-i wujud*, or the oneness of being, an idea that involved a unity between the divine and the profane. God is not completely otherworldly because nothing exists apart from God, human beings included. Because humanity shares aspects of divine nature, it is possible that a person could achieve his or her full potential as a reflection of God, and as such become a "perfect person" (*insan-i kamil*).[24]

What does Ibn ʻArabi's thought have to do with the Mongols? Ibn ʻArabi's ideas suggested the possibility that esoteric knowledge of God was available not just to the hidden imam or to a sufi saint, but to anyone, including members of the military aristocracy and ruling elite. Furthermore, such a spiritually excellent individual had the potential to undermine the authority of the traditional *ulama*. How could a madrasa-trained scholar challenge the spiritual authority of the axis of the age, the messianic deliverer of the world?

The persistence of messianism as part of a political framework in the post-Mongol period is evidenced by its appearance in the legitimizing ideology of 16th-century Islamic dynasties. Shah Ismaʻil, who claimed the throne in Tabriz for the Shiʻi sufi order of Ardabil known as the Safavids (Safaviyya), took over as leader of a movement whose leaders had made messianic claims since the mid-15th century. By the time

young Isma'il became shah, he was making claims even more beyond the pale of mainstream Shi'i theology, including an assertion of his own "divine nature."[25] Even after the zealotry of the Safavids' Turkman followers was countered with the invitation of mainstream Shi'i scholars in the early 16th century, the messianic strain remained. In 1593, the messianic Nuqtavi movement attempted to overthrow the Safavid dynasty.[26] In the case of the Ottoman Empire, Cornell Fleischer has shown the ways in which Sultan Suleyman (r. 1520–1566) sought to suggest that he was the messianic ruler who would fill the world with justice.[27] Suleyman cultivated an image and ideology that connected an emphasis on justice with expectations about the *mahdi*, at a time when many believed the Millennium (perhaps corresponding to the year 1000 in the Islamic calendar [1591–1592 CE]) was imminent.

RISE OF CAIRO AS AN INTELLECTUAL CENTER

We have focused up to this point on the legacy of the Chinggisids within the territory of the Ilkhanate. Can we also speak of an impact beyond the regions the Mongols ruled? The lands west of the Euphrates were threatened by Hülegü's army following the fall of the Baghdad caliphate, but after a decisive victory at Ayn Jalut in 1260 (in present-day Israel), the Mamluks prevented the Ilkhans from conquering Syria, despite a long period of war and tension.[28] In this conflict, a number of Mongols made their way to the Mamluk Sultanate, at times taking refuge from their enemies or seeking their fortunes in the elite military structure ruled by the sultan in Cairo.[29] Parallel to this migration of Mongols to the west was the movement of intellectuals and seekers of religious education from the lands of the Ilkhanate to Mamluk territory. Part of this process was related to the Mongols' conquest of Baghdad and the realignment of Ilkhanid priorities away from Iraq to Azerbaijan. In the centuries before the Mongol conquests, Baghdad had been a center of Islamic learning and patronage, even after the effective political power of the caliph had declined. Although Cairo was the capital of the Fatimid Caliphate from its founding in 969, Baghdad remained preeminent for Sunni Muslims who sought the study of religious and natural sciences, and the financial resources to support a life devoted to scholarship. This pattern began to change after the fall of Abbasid Baghdad and the establishment of Mamluk control over Egypt and Syria. Cairo became the new center of Sunni Islamic learning and patronage in the post-Chinggisid period.

The Mamluk amirs and sultans had an uneasy relationship with the *ulama* of Cairo and other Egyptian and Syrian cities. On one hand, they relied on the *ulama* to lend legitimacy to their rule. After all, the Mamluks were foreigners who had different customs, spoke a different language, and were converts to Islam. To strengthen their authority over their realm, Mamluk sultans and amirs forged ties with elite local families (*a'yan*) through marriage as well as through distribution of offices (*mansab*s).[30] On the other hand, the Mamluks often saw local elites as rivals for influence and resources and attempted from time to time to seize their wealth, which was often preserved in pious endowments (*waqf*).[31] One of the strategies the Mamluks used to erode the influence of the local elites was to invite other foreigners, commonly Persian and Turkish speakers from Ilkhanid Iran, Iraq, and Anatolia, to Cairo to fill official positions as qadis and teachers in madrasas.[32] These newcomers were often sufis who established *khanqah*s (lodges), institutions that expanded in

Egypt and Syria in the 14th century.[33] Thus, the Mongol conquests provided impetus for sufis and religious scholars from Ilkhanid territory to seek new sources of knowledge and support in Mamluk Syria and Egypt. At the same time, the particular social and political dynamics in the Mamluk Sultanate provided ample opportunities for scholars from the east to find an education and a lucrative position in cities like Cairo and Damascus.

The movement of Persian and Turkish speaking sufis and others to the Mamluk realm illustrates the fact that despite the political boundary separating the Mamluk and Mongol (and later Timurid and Turkman) lands from each other, the entire region, from Cairo to Konya, Tabriz, and Baghdad, formed a common cultural and intellectual zone. Scholars moved between cities in search of a learned teacher or lucrative office. Networks formed among individuals who not only came from different backgrounds, regions, and polities but who also studied a wide range of subjects, from Hellenic medicine and astronomy to Islamic law, sufism, and even occult sciences. In many ways, this pattern was not new and had existed before the Mongols. Islam had long offered a cultural and spiritual realm common to people who lived under a variety of polities. However, the legacy of the Chinggisids in this process was the opening up of the range and variety of intellectual pursuits that could also find favor at royal courts and amiral households.

Consider the life of Badr al-Din Mahmud Simavi, known more commonly as Shaykh Bedreddin (d. 1416). Known mainly for the uprising he led against the Ottomans in 1416, Shaykh Bedreddin's life illustrates the connectedness of the Islamic Middle East, as well as the wide range of religious and political networks and movements that existed in the post-Chinggisid period. Bedreddin was born to a Turkish family near Edirne in the middle third of the 14th century. He studied grammar in Edirne and later studied logic and astronomy in Konya. He then went to Mamluk Jerusalem to study hadith and Cairo to study logic and philosophy. From Cairo, Bedreddin traveled to Tabriz, then returned to Cairo, and eventually headed back to Ottoman Edirne, where he became a military judge under the Ottoman prince Musa Celebi in 1411. When Musa lost his bid for the throne in 1413, Bedreddin was exiled to Iznik and later raised a rebellion against the Ottomans, declaring himself sultan and caliph. He was captured and executed by the Ottomans in 1416.[34] Bedreddin's life encapsulates both the open possibilities for seekers of knowledge of all kinds, from Hellenic to Islamic to the occult (which he became acquainted with through his teacher in Cairo, Sayyid Husayn Akhlati), as well as the ways such a person could come to lead a political movement against a ruling dynasty.

Scholars from lands peripheral to the Mamluk Sultanate could attain an education, as well as the social capital that came with it, in Cairo, and then return to the periphery to disseminate their learning among non-Arabic speaking provincial populations.[35] Sara Yildiz has traced the life of a religious scholar and physician named Hajji Pasha, who was educated in Cairo by Persian teachers from Iran and later served the Aydinid ruler 'Isa Bey in western Anatolia, where he taught students at a madrasa in the town of Ayasuluk. We see from examples like Shaykh Bedreddin and Hajji Pasha that the post-Chinggisid Middle East was thus characterized by a great deal of intellectual activity, innovation, and opportunities for people of many educational, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds.

ART

Finally, we should also consider the Chinggisid legacy for artistic developments in the lands that they ruled in the Middle East. While Cairo became a center of scholarship, the courts of the former Ilkhanate became centers for patronage and production of a new style of painting, primarily used to illustrate books. Painting under the Mongols and their successors provided a model for so-called Persian miniatures under the Timurids, Ottomans, and Safavids, which, by around 1500, had reached a high point of technical refinement and splendor.

The Mongols' role in the development of painting in the Middle East was as patrons of books, particularly of history and poetry. As Robert Hillenbrand has pointed out, all the illustrated books produced under the Mongols aimed to assert and promote either religion or heritage.[36] In these books, which began to be produced following the Ilkhanids' conversion to Islam under Ghazan Khan, the new rulers of Iran were expressing a new and public commitment to the religion and cultural heritage of the lands they had devastated two generations before.[37] As the major architect of the Ilkhans' Islamization and Persianization, Rashid al-Din played a major role in the project of connecting the Mongols to Persian heritage through book painting. His library workshop at his complex outside Tabriz produced an early example of this new style of painting in two surviving manuscripts of his monumental historical compendium, *Jami' al-Tavarikh*.[38] There was certainly something new and different about these illustrations. As art historian Sheila Canby has put it, the *Jami' al-Tavarikh* paintings represent a conscious effort to produce a new genre.[39] Although illustrated book production suffered when Rashid al-Din was executed and his library ransacked in 1314, by the end of the Ilkhanid period, Mongol patronage of illustrated manuscripts produced one of the greatest examples of Persian Mongol painting, in what has become known as "The Great Mongol *Shahnama*," also known as the Demotte *Shahnama*.[40] This manuscript no longer exists in bound form, its paintings having been removed, sold, and scattered around the world in the early 20th century. There has long been a debate about when and where it was produced. However, a widely held scholarly view is that the Great Mongol *Shahnama* was produced in the 1330s in Tabriz for a royal patron, most likely Abu Sa'id.[41] Its paintings are remarkable for their size and vivid depictions emotional scenes, as well as the way the artists drew on elements from other cultural traditions, including from Europe and China.[42]

Unfortunately, we know very little about the identities of the artists of most of the paintings from the Chinggisid and post-Chinggisid periods. The few clues we do have leave us with many gaps and a good deal of uncertainty. A well-known passage in a 16th-century history of Persian painting by Safavid royal librarian Dust Muhammad attributed the creation of the style of painting that was current in the Safavid period to a certain Ahmad Musa, who, he writes, "lifted the veil from the face of depiction, and the style of depiction that is now current was invented by him."[43] While little is known about the details of Ahmad Musa's life, this passage does reveal an acknowledgement in the 16th century that the late Ilkhanid period represented a turning point in Islamic painting.

The new style of painting that began under the Ilkhans continued after the fall of the Chinggisids and was supported by 14th-century dynasties, such as the

Injuids, Jalayirids, and Muzaffarids. Baghdad, Tabriz, and Shiraz were major centers of illustrated book manuscript production and were joined by Herat under the Timurids in the 15th century. The flourishing of Persian manuscript painting between 1335 and the fall of Timurid Herat in 1506 can be considered part of the Chinggisid legacy in the Middle East. Political ties between the Ilkhans and the Yuan dynasty provided the opportunity for considerable cultural exchange between Iran and China. Artistic style was part of this exchange. It is difficult to miss the influence of Chinese painting on early Ilkhanid book illustrations, especially considering the fact that there were few examples of the kinds of depictions of people in Islamic art before the Mongols. Without the contacts the Chinggisids had with each other across Eurasia, and without their interest in patronizing Persian literature, poetry, and history, such works likely would not have been illustrated in the style that came to represent quintessential Persian miniature painting by the 16th century.

CONCLUSION

J. J. Saunders ended his 1965 book *A History of Medieval Islam* with a chapter titled "The Mongol Disaster." Saunders characterized the Mongol encounter with the Islamic Middle East in this way:

> At the opening of the thirteenth century . . . the Muslim world was in fact on the eve of its greatest disaster. The thirteenth century was the age of the Mongol conquests, the last and most dreadful of all the nomadic assaults on civilization. China, Europe, and Islam were all to suffer, but the appalling avalanche of destruction which rolled over a vast segment of the globe from Korea to Germany nearly engulfed Islam completely.[44]

In the more than fifty years since Saunders' account of the "Mongol disaster," scholarship on the Mongol Middle East has come a long way, even if the popular memory of the Mongols might still be an "appalling avalanche of destruction." Destruction did indeed follow the Mongol armies' campaigns, although we have a much more thorough and nuanced understanding of the Mongols' military strategy and operations today than a generation ago.[45] And yet, there are many other ways the Chinggisids shaped the history of the Middle East long after their rule came to an end. The Mongol conquests and the decisions the Mongols made after the conquests ended had a profound impact on several aspects of life, including questions of political legitimacy and the proper relationship of religion to political authority. Along with these questions, the Mongols also created circumstances in which sufism, Shi'ism, and messianism all came to play a much more significant role in political life than they had previously. The Chinggisids also helped to reorient the center of Islamic learning away from Baghdad to Cairo, where the Mamluks sought to incorporate and manipulate to their advantage the learned Muslim elite, which, in the 14th and 15th centuries, came to include sufis in addition to traditional *ulama*. The Mongols also helped in the development of manuscript painting, beginning under the Ilkhans, and continuing to magnificent examples by the end of the 15th century and beyond, particularly at the courts of the Ottomans and Safavids, as well as the Timurids in India. Marking the Mongols' arrival as a "disaster," or the final chapter in the story

of the medieval Islamic world is to discount the significant role the Chinggisids played in the creation of the late medieval and early modern Middle East.

NOTES

1 Momen 1985, 147–171.
2 See Broadbridge 2008.
3 Woods 1999, 9.
4 Wing 2016, 84–88.
5 Melville 2016, 307–335.
6 Hope 2016, 201 and *passim*.
7 Hope 2016, 199.
8 See Ayalon 1971, 34, 36, 97–140, 151–180; 1972, 38, 113–158; 1973, 107–156; Morgan 1986, 163–176; Aigle 2014, 134–156; Jackson 2017, 304–310.
9 Jackson 2017, 304.
10 Hope 2016, 201.
11 İnalcık 2006, 112; Petrushevsky 1968, 520.
12 See Subtelny 1988, 123–151. On the reforms of Qazi ʻIsa on behalf of Yaʻqub, see Woods 1999, 144–145.
13 The Ottomans preserved the soyurghal under the name *temlikname*. See İnalcık 2006, 115.
14 Broadbridge 2008, 159.
15 Album 1974, 167.
16 Roemer 1986, 17, 29.
17 Bashir 2003, 3–28.
18 On "ʻAlid loyalism" in this period, see Hodgson 1974, 203–204; Bashir 2003, 39.
19 Hope 2016, 192.
20 Masson Smith, Jr., 1970.
21 Bashir 2005.
22 Bashir 2001, 22–26; Bashir 2003, 36.
23 Bashir 2001, 25–26.
24 Knysh 1999.
25 Minorsky 1942, 1043a.
26 Babayan 1994, 137.
27 Fleischer 2000, 45–46.
28 Amitai-Preiss 1995.
29 Ayalon 1951, 89–104.
30 Chamberlain 1994.
31 Levanoni 2010, 79; Petry 1994.
32 Levanoni 2010, 80–82.
33 Fernandes 1988, 12.
34 This account of Shaykh Bedreddin's life is taken from Binbaş 2016, 123–128.
35 Yıldız 2014, 263–297.
36 Hillenbrand 2002, 137.
37 Hillenbrand 2002, 137.
38 Two illustrated fragments of these early copies of the *Jamiʻ al-Tavarikh* survive, one produced in 1306–1307 and the other in 1314.
39 Canby 1993, 32.
40 There is some debate about the date of the Demotte *Shahnama*'s production. See Hillenbrand 2002, 155–167, and particularly 158 for discussion of questions of the date this *Shahnama* was produced.
41 Hillenbrand 2002, 158.

42 Hillenbrand 2002, 162–165.
43 Thackston 2001, 12.
44 Saunders 1996, 170–171.
45 See in particular May 2016, 13–37; May 2007.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-SIX

THE TIMURIDS AND THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Evrim Binbaş

This chapter on the legacy of the Mongol Empire in the Timurid period in Iran and Central Asia (*ca.* 1370–1510) assumes that the Timurid Empire was not part of the Mongol Empire but was merely influenced by it, absorbing various elements of Mongol imperialism. This has not always been the universally accepted approach in scholarship on the Mongol and Timurid empires. For instance, René Grousset treated the Timurid dynasty as part of the "Jenghiz-Khanite Mongols" in his classic work titled *The Empire of the Steppes*.[1] But David Morgan, the renowned historian of the Mongol Empire, who published a widely used introduction to the Mongol Empire in 1986, left the Timurid dynasty entirely out of his monograph *The Mongols*.[2] There is in fact no inconsistency between these two positions. An empire is an administrative, political, and military organization, but above all, it is an idea, and imperial ideas often live longer than the empires themselves. While the Great Mongol Empire as imagined by Chinggis Khan ended when Qubilai Qa'an, the last universally recognized great khan, died in 1294, the idea of the Mongol Empire lasted for centuries.[3] With this idea in mind, Marshall G. S. Hodgson formulated the concept of the "Age of the Mongol Prestige" to study the period between 1258 and 1503, that is, the era between the conquest of Baghdad by the armies of Hülegü in 1258 and the rise of the Safavid Empire in Iran. According to Hodgson, the Age of Mongol Prestige was a period when new standards of politics, law, and art emerged under the influence of the Mongols. The driving force of this innovative phase in the history of the Middle East was the challenge of the Mongols to Islamicate life. First the non-Muslim Mongols' rule over majority Muslim regions from Mawarannahr to Syria and then the Mongols' conversion to Islam paved the path for new and radical intellectual movements, which coexisted and often clashed with the Islamicate conservative spirit. This Hodgson identifies as one of the main features of pre-Modern societies.[4]

Effective Mongol rule in Iran and Central Asia may have ended with the death of Abu Saʿid Bahadur Khan in 1335, but the non-Chinggisid rulers, or *qarachu*s, who came to power in Central Asia and Iran, including the Timurids, were very well aware of the fact that they were operating in a political and constitutional

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framework whose main outlines were drawn by Chinggis Khan and his descendants. For instance, Shaykh Uways (d. 1374), the Jalayirid ruler of Azerbaijan and Iraq considered himself as the "resurrector of the traditions of the Changizkhanid state . . . unfurler of the banners of the Sacred Law of the Prophet, kindler of the flame of the Muhammadan faith, distinguished by the support of God, Lord of the worlds."[5] As I will discuss, Timur (d. 1405) ruled under the nominal sovereignty of Chinggisid rulers until the end of his reign, with the exception of the last two years of his life. These non-Chinggisid or *qarachu* "commoner" rulers were aware that effective Mongol rule and prestige never ceased to exist. They knew that the Jochids were still in power in the North, and those were the Chinggisids who initiated a Chinggisid revival after the fall of Timurid rule in Central Asia.[6] It would be a mistake to think that Mongol prestige was effective only in the areas previously controlled by the Mongol Empire. Even the institutions of the Ottoman Empire were shaped by the influence and prestige of the Mongol Empire, causing constant embarrassment for an empire who claimed the leadership of the Islamic world in the early modern period.[7] When the rebellious Ottoman Sufi scholar Niyazi-i Mısri (d. 1694) shouted, "The Ottoman dynasty is like a rotten egg! The throne belongs to the Tatars!" he was most probably referring to the centuries-old prestige of a dynastic and political institution, not to a specific Chinggisid ruler, although it is true that there was indeed a Chinggisid ruler, the khan of Crimea, who could be a possible claimant to the Ottoman throne. Mısri said: "What sultans really need is faith and justice. The Tatars have both."[8] This was not just the delirious utterance of a grumpy Ottoman Sufi master about his enemies. Whenever the Ottoman bureaucrats dared considering the possibility of ousting the Ottoman dynasty from power, the Chinggisid Crimean khans were the first in line to replace the dynasty in Istanbul.[9]

These examples suggest that the greatest legacy of the Mongol Empire was the Chinggisid dynasty. For centuries after the dissolution of the Great Mongol Empire at the end of the 13th century, the descendants of Chinggis Khan, or *altan urugh* (golden seed), were catalysts in the formation and articulation of political ideologies throughout Islamicate Eurasia from the Kazakh steppe in the east to Ottoman Constantinople in the west.[10] However, this is just half of the matter that we need to understand. We cannot assume that the presence of and references to the Chinggisid dynasty in different contexts mean the same thing, and it is important to define what the Chinggisid dynasty, or the Mongol legacy for that matter, meant in each context. According to Robert McChesney, the Chinggisid legacy manifested itself in three distinct political, legal, and administrative principles: 1. the idea of universal peace created and maintained by an empire; 2. the principle of clan sovereignty, in which sovereignty belongs to the ruling lineage, not to the ruler himself or herself; and 3. the idea of *yasa*, customary law, which was believed to be issued by Chinggis Khan.[11] The legacy of the Mongol Empire was in fact a constant fight over these three principles. The Mongol legacy was adapted, contested, and always imagined throughout history, and I will discuss these debates in the context of the Timurid Empire.

THE MONGOL LEGACY ADAPTED

The Timurid Empire emerged under the leadership of Timur out of the Ulus Chaghadai, the confederation of Turco-Mongol tribes that inhabited the domains of

Chaghadai, the second son of Chinggis Khan, in Central Asia in the second half of the 14th century. Timur became the leader of the Barlas tribe in 1360, and ten years later, in 1370, he controlled the entire Ulus Chaghadai. After establishing himself as the ruler of the ulus, Timur designed a constitutional fiction along the lines of dual kingship, according to which *de jure* or nominal sovereignty was invested in a member of the Chinggisid family and *de facto* sovereignty remained in the hands of Timur. Since Timur was not a Chinggisid himself, he could not exercise legitimate sovereignty according to the Chinggisid constitutional fiction, so he needed a Chinggisid in order to be able to legitimize his polity. In other words, as far as Timur's constitutional fiction goes, Timur's empire was yet another Chinggisid dispensation that emerged after the dissolution of the Great Mongol Empire. Throughout his career, Timur had two nominal Chinggisid khans: Soyurghatmish Khan b. Danishmandcha between 1370 and 1388, and Sultan Mahmud b. Soyurghatmish between 1388 and 1402. The names of these two nominal sovereigns appeared on the coins and edicts of Timur and his third son, Miranshah.[12] On a unique Timurid coin minted in 1398 in Samarqand, a second son of Soyurghatmish, Sultan Ahmad, was cited as the nominal sovereign, but the rule of this Chinggisid khan is yet to be confirmed in other contemporary sources.[13]

These Chinggisid sovereigns played an important role in Timurid political rituals and ceremonies beyond being simple figureheads, as contemporary observers of Timurid politics recorded their existence in Timur's entourage.[14] John E. Woods made three observations regarding Timur's relationship with these two or more sovereigns of the Timurid Empire. Soyurghatmish Khan died in 1388, and Timur did not appoint Sultan Mahmud immediately because Toqtamish, a Chinggisid ruler of the Golden Horde, had just attacked Mawarannahr, and Timur did not want to take the risk of having a Chinggisid sovereign, albeit a ceremonial one, while another Chinggisid was threatening his rule.[15] Secondly, although Timur's empire emerged out of the Ulus Chaghadai, Timur preferred his khans to come from the Ögödeid line of the Chinggisid family. According to Woods, this is not a random choice and reflects Timur's multilayered approach to the legacy of the Mongol Empire. In Timur's perspective, Chinggis Khan bequeathed Central Asia to his son Chaghadai, and Iran and Iraq became a Chinggisid appanage-state when Möngke's brother Hülegü established his own dispensation there in 1256. When Möngke came to power after the so-called Toluid Revolution and Hülegü invaded Iran and Iraq, the Toluids usurped what rightfully belonged to the Ögödeids. Therefore, as far as Timur was concerned, the Timurid Empire was an Ögödeid-Chinggisid polity and an attempt to restore Chinggis Khan's original will. In other words, Soyurghatmish and Sultan Mahmud were not mere "puppet khans," as they are sometimes labeled in secondary literature, but they were pillars of the constitutional organization of Timur's empire. Finally, Woods suggested that Sultan Mahmud Khan died in 1402, and Timur did not fill the vacancy that his death created. This means that he ruled for three years without a nominal Chinggisid sovereign, and perhaps more importantly, when he launched what turned out to be his final campaign to China, he was both the nominal and actual sovereign of his empire. Therefore, Woods argued, Timur may have intended to establish his independent dispensation after the death of Sultan Mahmud in 1402.[16]

Timur's program of dual kingship was underpinned by the Timurid dynastic genealogy. According to the Timurid genealogical fiction, Timur was not a descendant of Chinggis Khan, but his ancestry went back to Tumanay Khan, second great-grandfather of Chinggis Khan. Hence, Timur's dual kingship arrangement was also "codified" through genealogical speculation. This genealogical fiction is found in a range of literary, genealogical, and epigraphic sources, meticulously discussed by John E. Woods. However, it is not easy to determine if this genealogical fiction began at the time of Timur or if it emerged in the political and ideological competition between various branches of the Timurid dynasty after the death of Timur. Woods surmised that Timur developed this genealogical fiction in the last decade of the 14th century, especially after Toqtamish Khan of the Golden Horde invaded and pillaged the power base of Timur in Mawarannahr in 1388.[17]

The prestige of the Chinggisid dynasty extended beyond the sphere of the two nominal sovereigns. Chinggisid princesses were the preferred wives of members of the Timurid dynasty. Timur himself married a Chaghadaid-Chinggisid princess, Saray Malik Khanum, and all his children, Jahangir, ʿUmar Shaykh, Miranshah, and Shahrukh, married Chinggisid princesses at some point in their lives.[18] Marrying a Chinggisid princess allowed a Timurid prince to use the prestigious title *güregen* (son-in-law), although not every Timurid prince who married a Chinggisid princess used it. For instance, we have firm evidence to suggest that both Timur and Miranshah used the title on their coins and edicts, but Shahrukh did not include it in his political vocabulary. After the second generation, various Timurid family members married Chinggisid princesses, but whether they emphasized their relationship with the Chinggisid dynasty is a topic that requires further research. Although many Timurid princes married Chinggisid princesses, only Miranshah, Pir Muhammad b. Jahangir, Ulugh Bek b. Shahrukh, and Sultan Abu Saʿid b. Sultan Muhammad highlighted their connections to the family of Chinggis Khan in their political language.[19]

The Chinggisid dynastic discourse, be it real or fictional, meant something more than just a legitimizing nomenclature that served to validate the rule of a *qarachu* dynasty in an area previously controlled by the Mongols. The Chinggisid discourse was a critical part of the scaffolding of Timurid sovereignty through which a range of economic, legal, and social policies and political practices were implemented.[20]

Arguably, the most important of these policies in the Timurid period was the concept of corporate sovereignty. The Chinggisid practice of collective sovereignty meant that authority was invested in the corporate persona of the dynastic family, not in the corporeal body of the dynast himself or herself. This constitutional arrangement had two significant consequences. The first was the territorial apportionment of governed territories among the members of the dynastic family. Timur initiated the process by allocating specific provinces and regions to his four sons, ʿUmar Shaykh (d. 1394), Jahangir (d. 1376), Miranshah (d. 1408), and Shahrukh (d. 1447), and the practice was continued by Shahrukh, who emerged victorious at the end of the first Timurid Civil War between 1405 and 1418. Shahrukh divided his domains among his children Ulugh Bek, Ibrahim Sultan, and Baysunghur, as well as his grandchildren. The appanage allocations to Timurid princes continued until the end of the dynasty in the first decade of the 16th century, but its exact extent and scope is yet to be properly studied.[21]

The appanage system in the Timurid Empire did not have a uniform structure. Certain appanage holders, such as Ulugh Bek in Samarqand between 1409 and 1449, acted semi-independently in their political and military affairs. Sultan Muhammad b. Baysunghur's appointment to ʿIraq-i ʿAjami in 1443 is often labeled as the formation of a new Timurid dispensation.[22] Furthermore, the Timurid Empire from the death of Sultan Abu Saʿid in 1469 until the late 15th century can only be considered a diarchy, whereby the ʿUmar-Shaykhid Sultan-Husayn and his two sons, Badiʿ al-Zaman and Muzaffar Husayn, ruled – as a condominium during the latter two's reign – in Herat until 1507 and the Miranshahid Sultan Abu Saʿid and his descendants ruled in Samarqand until 1500.[23] In other words, the Timurid Empire turned into being the Timurid diarchy between 1469 and 1500. Unfortunately, we know very little about Sultan Abu Saʿid's children and their activities in Mawarannahr. Our view of Timurid history in the second half of the 15th century has been dominated by the sources written at the court of Sultan Husayn Bayqara.

The second significant consequence of corporate sovereignty in the Timurid period was the uncertainty of succession protocols after the death of a specific ruler. The idea of collective sovereignty prescribes that every male member of the dynastic family has a right to claim rule for himself, and this idea has often been blamed for the quick disintegration of nomadic polities in the medieval and early modern periods. This is indeed a highly romanticized view of Timurid dynastic politics, but it assists in understanding certain dynamics in specific periods.[24] At no point in Timurid history was the succession to the ruler's position an orderly affair. Imitating Chinggis Khan, Timur tried to regulate the succession processes after his death, but his wishes were even more quickly violated by his sons and grandsons than that of Chinggis Khan, whose favorite Ögödei and his son, Güyük, ruled the Mongol Empire for almost twenty years after his death. As soon as Timur died in 1405, the Timurid Empire plunged into a protracted civil war waged by sword as well as by pen. The First Timurid Civil War ended in earnest only in 1418, when Shahrukh replaced the appanage holders installed by Timur with his own children.[25]

Succession to the throne after Shahrukh's death was no less brutal. We have indirect evidence suggesting that Shahrukh favored his son Baysunghur, but his influential wife Gawharshad favored ʿAlaʾ al-Dawla b. Baysunghur. Just like the First Timurid Civil War, the subsequent struggles among various pretenders to the throne, a period we can name the Second Timurid Civil War, produced an unexpected winner, Sultan Abu Saʿid, a grandson of Miranshah.[26] The same scenario repeated itself, albeit with fewer pretenders, mainly because of the establishment of the Timurid diarchy described earlier, when Sultan Abu Saʿid was killed during his campaign against the Qaraqoyunlu and the Aqqoyunlu Turkmen in 1469. Timurid succession struggles, or civil wars, were not disorderly power struggles. Rather, they were moments of political crisis during which political alliances matured and new political and ideological formulations were tested. One of the important aspects of the Timurid civil wars was that the power struggle between the dynastic family members gives only a section of the entire story. The way economic and political resources were cultivated during civil wars tells more about the unique nature of political competition in a given moment. Hence, the Timurid civil wars were, on the surface, a true legacy of the Mongol Empire, but underneath the surface they were genuine Timurid or 15th-century political practices.

The Timurids inherited many of their economic and legal practices from the Mongols. Most of these practices were not entirely continuations of early Mongol conventions, but they were the amalgamation of Mongol processes with earlier and contemporaneous Islamic customs. For instance, the much-discussed practice of *soyurghal*, the grant of privileges and tax exemptions, had its roots both in the Chinggisid *soyurghamisihi* and the medieval Islamic grants of *iqtaʿ*. While the Mongol concept of *soyurghamishi* in Mongol administrative language and practice simply meant "grant of favors" by the sovereign ruler to influential members of the administration, army, and society, the *iqtaʿ* meant land grants in return for specific services to the sovereign. Throughout the 14th century, and especially in the 15th century, these two conventions merged, and the practice of *soyurghal* emerged as a uniquely late medieval administrative tool. *Soyurghal*s were hereditary grants that provided a range of privileges to the grantee. A *soyurghal* may have consisted of tax immunity, shares from taxes, or even grants of outright ownership (*tamlik*). In large *soyurghal*s, the privileges granted to a specific person may have led to complete political autonomy.[27] Other forms of land grants, tax immunities, and the recognition of autonomous enclaves also had their roots in the Mongol system. For instance, the hereditary *tarkhan* status was given to high-level aristocrats and religious figures, and the status came not only with tax immunities and land privileges that amounted to private property, it also entailed immunity against up to nine criminal prosecutions. Tarkhans were originally Mongol nobles, but by the 15th century, the status had been granted to non-Mongol and even non-Muslim dignitaries.[28]

THE MONGOL LEGACY CONTESTED

The Timurids and other late medieval polities of Western Asia did not merely adapt the Mongol political, administrative, and cultural practices, they also contested them. No other theme, practice, or policy was discussed in our sources more than the Chinggisid *yasa*, *töre*, and *jarghu* as legal-cum-administrative practices and the *tamgha* as a practice of taxation. There is now a relatively advanced literature on these processes, on which we do not need to dwell here.[29] As far as the late medieval commentators were concerned, *yasa* and *töre* meant a set of loosely defined political and legal practices that were believed to be issued and codified by Chinggis Khan. *Jarghu* was a court and an unspecified legal procedure, whereby *yasa* and *töre* were implemented. It is worth noting here that the information we have regarding the contents of the *yasa* and *töre* as well as the specifics of the *jarghu* is very insubstantial. *Tamgha*, on the other hand, was a more tangible practice. It was a form of tax levied upon commercial transactions and industrial production in cities. *Tamgha* was not the only form of tax the Mongols introduced to the Middle Eastern economy. Other forms of taxation, such as *qubchur* and *qalan*, were also introduced by the Mongols in the Middle East. The *qubchur* was initially a pasture tax on nomads, but it was eventually collected from livestock as well as pastures and arable land. In certain cases, the *qubchur* tax became a poll tax on both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In fact, the term "*yasa*" was often used as an umbrella term that referred to the legal application of these various forms of non-canonical taxes.[30] In the Mongol and post-Mongol periods, these non-canonical taxes emerged as a parallel system

of taxation to four canonical taxes, that is, *kharaj* (tax on land and agricultural products), *ʿushr* (tithe), *zakat* (alms tax), and *jizya* (poll tax on non-Muslims). The most important difference between the canonical and non-canonical taxes were that whereas the rates of the canonical taxes were fixed by the *shariʿa*, the rates of the non-canonical taxes were set independently by rulers and other authorities who had the right to collect taxes, although there were semi-successful attempts to codify non-canonical taxes as well.[31]

Yasa, *jarghu*, *tamgha*, and other taxes were seen as anathema to the religious establishment of the late medieval period, and the ulama fiercely opposed these practices due to their non-canonical nature. This antagonism was highlighted especially during certain political crises in the Timurid period. During the First Timurid Civil War, for instance, the renowned *muhtasib* of Herat Jalal al-Din al-Qayini (d. 1434) praised Shahrukh for abolishing *jarghu* courts and abrogating *yasa* and *törä*, "which had been observed by Turko-Mongolian rulers since ancient times."[32] Similarly, Saʾin al-Din Turka (d. 1432), one of the foremost intellectuals of Timurid Iran, hailed him, certainly under duress due to the political pressure that he was under during Shahrukh's clash with the informal intellectual networks, for abolishing the *tamgha* and *yarghu* and restoring the *shariʿa* in the Timurid Empire.[33] When Ulugh Beg's son ʿAbd al-Latif clashed with his father, one of the points of contention was Ulugh Beg's adherence to the *tamgha* tax, which ʿAbd al-Latif was reported to have abolished after assassinating his father in 1449.[34] In the second half of the 15th century, Sultan Abu Saʿid abolished the *tamgha* in Bukhara and Samarqand on the request of the Naqshbandi shaykh Khwaja Ahrar (d. 1490), an act that contributed to an increase in the Naqshbandi shaykh's wealth and authority while also impoverishing the Timurid ruling elite.[35] These debates continued well into the 16th century and beyond in the political language of Central Asia and Iran.

However, there is now an increasing appreciation of the fact that the conflict between the *shariʿa* and *yasa* as well as the debates on non-canonical taxes were non-debates or just clashes on the nature of politics in a given moment. İsenbike Togan argued that what was debated was actually whether the Timurid polity should have been a centralized or decentralized polity, and there were no fixed meanings attached to each position in the 15th century. Religious scholars as well as *soyurghal*-holding Turco-Mongol aristocrats defended a decentralized political system by favoring *shariʿa* in order to maintain their local privileges in the first half of the 15th century, but the same groups defended a centralized government by evoking the same principles of the *shariʿa* at the end of the century.[36] Thomas Welsford suggested that evoking the *yasa* and *töre* was merely a way of referring to Chinggisid dynastic prestige, which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter.[37] As for the non-canonical taxes, although their names were certainly Turkic or Mongolian, they were hardly novel, even under the Ilkhanids in the 13th century. Barthold warned us long ago that the *tamgha* tax was no different than the *baj*, a form of road and merchandise tax.[38] The *tamgha* tax is also very similar to, one can even dare say the same as, *maks* (pl. *mukus*), a non-canonical tax widely used by medieval Islamic dynasties. Like *tamgha*, the *maks* was equally controversial among Muslim religious scholars, and the arguments against its application are well documented in medieval Islamic sources.[39] The *jarghu* courts, which are often contrasted to the *mahkama*s, or *qadi* courts, and seen as the venues where the *yasa* was implemented, are very much akin

to *mazalim* or even to the judicial processes conducted in the *diwan*, or the courts at the governor or ruler's court.[40]

In other words, it would certainly be a mistake to consider the debates on *yasa* and *shariʿa* in cultural, civilizational, or ethnic terms, such as Mongol politics vs. Islamic politics or Turco-Mongol forms of taxation vs. Islamic forms of taxation. It is more fruitful to study each concept in its specific context and consider these terms and concepts as part of a broader political language that developed in unique circumstances of the post-Mongol period. As our understanding of Islamic politics, law, and society has become more receptive to the diversity and plurality we observe in medieval societies, we are less inclined to see sharp clashes between certain Mongol and Islamic practices in these areas. In other words, a non-canonical practice does not mean non-Islamicate practice. However, the debates on these practices were real, and they are well attested in our sources. But as Robert McChesney warned us before, we know more about the views of those who opposed these practices, most importantly the ulama and Sufi shaykhs, as well as bureaucrats (*ahl-i qalam*), than those of the Turco-Mongol military elite. In fact, most of our knowledge about the *yasa* comes from those who actually opposed it and even tried to eradicate it.[41]

The conflict between the *yasa* and the *shariʿa* was certainly a discursive one, but that does not mean the conflict was not a reflection of deeper and broader conflicts over politics and resources.[42] Whether a practice's genealogy was traced back to the Mongols or to a non-canonical Islamic practice, its practitioners had vested interests in its continuing existence, and in equal measure its detractors found its disappearance advantageous to their interests in a given historical moment. A case in point is Shahrukh's well-publicized declarations regarding the abolition of the *yasa* and *yarghu* and the strengthening of the *shariʿa* in his realm. We have no reason to doubt the veracity of this claim because he clearly announced that he would abolish the "*yarghu* and the Chinggisid practices (*yarghu wa qawaʾid-i Chingiz Khani*)" in his 1412 letter to the Ming emperor Zhu Di (r. 1402–1424).[43] At around the same time, as mentioned, al-Qayini praised Shahrukh for his commitment to the *shariʿa*. Later, Shahrukh made his commitment to the *shariʿa* even more pronounced by adopting the title caliph (*khalifa*) for himself and he even minted coins carrying the title between 1416 and 1422.[44] However, we have very little evidence to suggest that Shahrukh maintained this discursive position throughout his reign. Ibn Arabshah (d. 1450), a keen observer of the Timurid political system, expresses his doubts on the abolition of the *yasa* during Shahrukh's reign:

> He [i.e., Timur] clung to the laws of Jenghizkhan, which are like branches of law from the faith of Islam, and he observed them in preference to the law of Islam. Thus it is also with all the Jaghatais, the people of Dasht, Cathay and Turkistan, all which infidels observe the laws of Jenghiz Khan, on whom be the curse of God! rather then [sic] the laws of Islam. . . . It is said however that Shahrukh repealed the law and customs of Jenghizkhan and ordained that they should make his rule flow along the streams of the law of Islam, but this I do not consider true, since it is considered among them as the purest religion and true faith and if it happened that he should summon his chief men and doctors to his palace and closing the doors look upon them from his throne and propose to them anything of this sort, truly they would flee like asses to the gates.[45]

Ibn Arabshah's testimony highlights the rhetorical nature of the abolition of the Chinggisid *yasa*. In fact, there are other instances in which Shahrukh referred to *yasa* in order to justify his own actions during the later years of his reign. For instance, in 1440, he removed his grandson Sultan Masʿud b. Soyurghatmish from the governorship of Qandahar and Ghazna for his opposition to the Chinggisid customs and rules. Similarly, in 1444, he chastised the influential amir Firuzshah for his disregard of the *töre*, after the amir stormed out of a *diwan* meeting and did not return for a couple of days.[46] One can also mention the fact that the *Muʿizz al-ansab* lists among the officers of Shahrukh's administration both *jarghuchi*s and *yasa'ul*, two individuals who were in charge of implementing the *yasa* and *töre* in the Timurid administrative apparatus.[47]

If Shahrukh continued to keep Chinggisid references as part of his political discourse, and if the Chinggisid practices continued to be cited throughout Shahrukh's reign, then the question of why he made a big deal of abolishing them at the beginning of his reign begs an explanation. I believe the answer to this question must be sought in the specific circumstances in which Shahrukh found himself during the First Timurid Civil War. Shahrukh's letter to the Ming emperor was in fact a response to the letter he received from the emperor Zhu Di in 1412. The Ming emperor's letter, which exists in a longer Persian and shorter Chinese version, is a declaration of Ming universalism and an invitation to Shahrukh to submit to his rule unconditionally. Zhu Di says that he is the ruler of the entire world by divine endorsement and asks Shahrukh to stop his war with Khalil Sultan b. Miranshah (d. 1411) and continue sending his annual tribute regularly.[48]

Ming universalism was not the only rival political ideology that threatened Shahrukh's administration in Herat. His nephew Iskandar b. ʿUmar Shaykh (d. 1415), who ascended to the appanage-governorship of Fars in 1409, was an even more potent threat, coming as it did from another family member. Iskandar posed Shahrukh arguably the most significant challenge during the First Timurid Civil War. Iskandar cultivated the intellectual and political resources of southern Iran in order to launch his own political career. Like many other Timurid princes, Iskandar was a learned individual as well as being a patron of art and sciences. He used his knowledge of esoteric sciences to formulate a novel constitutional vision for the Timurid Empire. During his short reign, Iskandar experimented with various political ideas, and in the end, by relying on his knowledge of astronomy, he attempted to define a kind of absolutism according to which Iskandar himself would be the source of law and legitimacy. Shahrukh saw through Iskandar's rhetoric and understood that it would be a real threat to his authority. He invaded Iran in 1414 and ended Iskandar's political ambitions as well as his experimental eschatological absolutism.[49] It is true that Shahrukh had a superior army, which was immensely helpful in suppressing Iskandar's challenge, but he also knew that serious ideas had to be countered with serious ideas so they could be neutralized. Shahrukh's so-called abolition of the Chinggisid *yasa* and *törä* was an attempt to counter the universalizing political ideologies that had started to gain a foothold in the Timurid Empire. It was also in this context that he adopted the caliphal titles, albeit relatively briefly. The Chinggisid legacy in the Timurid Empire was indeed challenged in the 15th century by competing universalist ideologies, such as eschatological ideas and messianic movements. Gradually, the Chinggisid rhetoric of the 14th and 15th centuries

was absorbed into the broader Chinggisid neo-constitutional system in the 16th century.[50]

THE MONGOL LEGACY IMAGINED

The Timurids imagined themselves as firmly rooted in the Mongol imperial system founded by Chinggis Khan. As discussed, the dynasty was not part of the Chinggisid lineage, but the Chinggisid genealogical framework provided the main ideological paradigm in which the Timurid political and historical imagination took shape. It is not surprising that Miranshah was the only person other than Timur for whom a historical work was written before the death of the dynasty's founder. The *Futuhat-i Miranshahi*, which is extant in fragments quoted in later chronicles, was most probably written between 1391 and 1399 by Mawlana Saʿd Allah Kirmani and narrates the exploits of Miranshah in the 1380s and 1390s.[51] Miranshah married his Chinggisid *yingä* (brother's wife) Khanzada Sevin Beg sometime after 1376 and started using the title *güregen* (son-in-law). He and his children appear to have been very comfortable with presenting themselves as upholders of Chinggisid traditions. Therefore, it is worth asking if the existence of a very early Miranshahid chronicle can be explained by the fact that Miranshah's Chinggisid discourse made it easier for Kirmani to locate the prince's activities in a broader historiographical framework.

The Timurid dynasty was the most successful one of all *qarachu* (commoner) dynasties that emerged in the 14th century in Iran and Central Asia. Their predecessors, such as the Injuids, Jalayirids, Qongrat Sufis of Khwarazm, Sarbadarids, Muzaffarids, and many other smaller polities, were absorbed into the Timurid system before they were able to develop a consistent and coherent historiographical framework that would facilitate a clear definition of what *qarachu* rule in the framework of Chinggisid political principles would and should look like. Therefore, the Timurid scholars had to experiment until they properly located the Timurid dynasty in a historiographical scheme. There appears to be a tension in Timurid historical imagination about how to interpret the enormously successful founder of the dynasty. The author of the earliest extant Timurid chronicle (*Zafarnama*), Nizam al-Din Shami (d. before 1411), appears to be a proponent of a form of proto-Machiavellianism. Timur's persona was probably a convenient vehicle in which he read his views on absolutist politics into historical narrative.[52] The same argument can be made for the other famous biographer of Timur, Sharaf al-Din ʿAli Yazdi (d. 1454). Yazdi initially played with the idea of locating Timur and the Timurids in a broader Chinggisid framework, but he appears to have abandoned this idea in favor of a structure that presented Timur as a sacral king in his chronicle, which was also known as the *Zafarnama*.[53] Yazdi's work on the Chinggisids, titled *Muqaddima*, was not published during his lifetime but much later, in 1480, when it was "rediscovered" and prefaced to his *Zafarnama*.[54]

The first historiographical text that thoroughly locates the Timurid dynasty in a Chinggisid framework appears to be Husayn b. ʿAli Shah's untitled genealogical tree. Written most probably in Samarqand during Khalil Sultan b. Miranshah's short reign between 1405 and 1409, the genealogical tree firmly associates the Timurid dynasty with the Chinggisid dynasty, making the former a cadet branch of the Mongol ruling dynasty descended from Alan Qo'a, the ancestress of the Chinggisid

family.[55] The next historian who narrated Timurid history as part of Chinggisid historiography was Muʿin al-Din Natanzi, who was a keen observer of Mongol society and politics in the 15th century. Natanzi wrote three different historical works, two universal histories, one of which is untitled and the other one titled *Muntakhab al-tavarikh-i Muʿini*, and one tabulated universal history. In all these works he presented the Timurid dynasty as a post-Mongol independent dynasty, although the connections between the Timurids and the Mongols were frequently highlighted in Natanzi's text.[56]

It was actually Hafiz-i Abru who really put the Timurid dynasty in the Chinggisid framework. In a series of cascading chronicles, written between *ca.* 1412 and 1427, which emulated the Ilkhanid historian Rashid al-Din's grand world history, *Jamiʿ al-tavarikh*, he established the historiographical canon, which firmly confirmed the identity of the Timurid dynasty as a Mongol dynasty. Especially in his *Muʿizz al-ansab*, which was modeled after Rashid al-Din's *Shuʿab-i Panjgana*, Hafiz-i Abru places the Chinggisid and Timurid dynasties in a continuum, descending from the same ancestress, Alan Qoa. His final work, titled *Majmaʿ al-ansab*, was a universal chronicle that included a lengthy account of the Mongol Empire in its third part, and its fourth part, separately titled *Zubdat al-tavarikh-i Baysunghuri*, is a Timurid dynastic chronicle from Timur's birth to 1427.[57] Finally, the two genealogical inscriptions in the Gur-i Mir, the Timurid royal mausoleum, and the Shah-i Zinda necropolis in Samarqand, situated the Timurid dynasty alongside the Chinggisids.[58] Therefore, by the 1430s, a political discourse firmly locating the Timurid dynasty in the context of the Mongol Empire had already taken root in the Timurid Empire. They posited the Timurid Empire as just a new phase in the history of the Mongol Empire. Hafiz-i Abru points at the fact that the death of the last effective Ilkhanid ruler, Abu Saʿid, coincided with the birth of Timur in the Islamic lunar year of 736/1335–1336. Therefore, what happened in that auspicious year was a kind of *translatio imperii*: royal power passed from one branch of Alan Qoaa's descendants to another branch of her descendants.[59]

John Woods convincingly argued that the emergence of Chinggisid rhetoric beyond the practice of dual kingship was actually a conscious policy choice on the part of Timur. When Timur's protégé and the Jochid khan Toqtamish invaded Mawarannahr in 1388, he reconsidered how he formulated his political authority. Obviously, he realized that the system of dual kingship he had established in 1370 by installing Soyurghatmish Khan as his nominal sovereign was no longer enough because Toqtamish, a Chinggisid ruler himself, did not need a nominal sovereign to rule as a member of the Chinggisid family. Facing Toqtamish's challenge, Timur started devising further strategies that would put him firmly in the broader Chinggisid framework. He argued that the foundation of the Ilkhanate by a member of the Toluid house of the Chinggisid family contradicted Chinggis Khan's original will because Chinggis Khan had made Iran and Central Asia an appanage of his son Chaghadai. Furthermore, the election of Möngke as the great khan was also illegal because Chinggis Khan had wished the great khanate to remain in the Ögödeid line. Hence, Timur was the defender and restorer of the rights of the Chaghadaid and Ögödeid houses, who were deprived of their legal rights due to the actions of the Toluids and Jochids.[60] From this point onward, the Chinggisid discourse gradually moved to center stage of the Timurid historical consciousness, and by the time

Hafiz-i Abru composed his universal chronicle *Majmaʿ al-tavarikh* in 1427, the Mongol nature of the Timurid Empire was the strongest historiographical theme in the Timurid Empire, only challenged by Yazdi's biography-oriented emphasis on sacral kingship. For later Timurid historians, the Timurid dynasty was firmly rooted in the history of the Mongol Empire.

The Mongols shaped the history of Eurasia in general, and Iran and Central Asia in particular, after the 13th century. No aspect of life prior to the modern period, whether social, economic, political, or cultural, can be understood without taking into account the Mongol impact. However, this impact was not a static or one-off event. The Mongol Empire and its various aspects were constantly rediscovered, reimagined, and reinvented well into the modern period, but it was never codified. The Timurids were no different. They imagined themselves as part of a wider Mongol commonwealth. Their relationship with the Mongols and the Chinggisid dynasty was not an organic or ahistorical one. Timur and his followers consciously chose to be part of that commonwealth. Surely, they had other options, and some members of the Timurid family did try to distance themselves from the idea of the Mongol Empire, but no other political alternative was strong or flexible enough to make politics, religion, and economy converge under the rule of the Timurid dynasty. The Timurids knew they were not Chinggisids, but one can also argue that they tried to save the Mongol Empire from the Chinggisids, albeit unsuccessfully. The Chinggisids returned to Mawarannahr with a vengeance in the first decade of the 16th century, under the command of Shaybani Khan, but they did not bring the Mongol Empire with them.

NOTES

1 Grousset 1970, 409–465. Grousset's work was originally published in 1939 in French.
2 Morgan 1986. Also see the discussion between David Morgan and Beatrice Forbes Manz regarding the Timurids' relationship with the Mongol Empire, Morgan 2000, 233–241; Manz 2016, 281–291.
3 Others date the dissolution of the empire to 1259; when Möngke died, civil wars erupted. Jackson 2009, 39–40.
4 Hodgson 1974, II, 371–373, 374–381.
5 Woods 1999, 7; Wing 2016, 129–134. Unless absolutely necessary, I will cite only the secondary literature in this article. For further references to primary sources, the reader is invited to check the books and references cited in this article.
6 McChesney 2009, 277–302.
7 Fleischer 1986, 273–292.
8 Terzioğlu 1999, 350.
9 Emecen 2001, 63–76; Kırımlı et al. 2017, 501–503.
10 Sultanov 2001.
11 McChesney 1996, 122.
12 Komaroff 1986, 211–213; Woods 1984, 333.
13 Erdoğan 2014, 37. The name of the nominal Chinggisid sovereign is cited as Sultan Ahmad b. Jalal al-Din Soyurghatmish on this coin, and Timur's name is cited as Timur Mahmud. The coin is part of a hoard discovered in Sürekli (Diêm in Kurdish), a village in the southwest of Mardin, in 2009. According to Hafiz-I Abru, Soyurghatmish had two sons and one daughter: Sultan Bayazid, Sultan Mahmud, and Orun Sultan. See Hafiz-i Abru, *Muʿizz al-ansab*, f. 44a.

14 Fischel 1952, 37; Budge 1932, II/xxviii; Şırnak. Akalın 2015, 15–18, 19 (The author of this short Syriac chronicle was later identified as Adday of Basibrina [d. 1502], a monk from Basibrina [Haberli] in Şırnak); Woods 1990a, 101.
15 Woods 1990a, 105–106.
16 Woods 1990a, 105–108. Although Timur abandoned the dual kingship model at the end of his life, his grandson Khalil Sultan b. Miranshah, who briefly controlled Samarqand between 807/1405 and 811/1409, after the death of Timur, revived the idea. On his coins he presented Muhammad Jahangir b. Muhammad Sultan as his overlord. See Woods 1990a, 114.
17 Woods 1990a, 109.
18 The practice of *yingä*, that is, marrying the widowed wife of a deceased relative, should be emphasized here. Timur's Chinggisid wife was Saray Malik Khanum bt. Qazan Sultan Chaghatay. ʿUmar Shaykh's Chinggisid wife was Malikat Agha b. Khiżr Oghlan Chaghatay, who later became the *yingä* of Shahrukh. Jahangir married Khanzada Sevin Beg bt. Aq Sufi Qongrat, who later became the *yingä* of Miranshah. Miranshah also married Urun Sultan Khanika, the daughter of the aforementioned Soyurghatmish Khan. See Woods 1990b, 18, 20, 29, 33, 43.
19 Miranshah did not mint coins, but he used the title *küregen* on his edicts. See, for instance, Matsui et al. 2015, 55. Both Ulugh Bek and Sultan Abu Saʿid used the title on their coins. See Komaroff, "The Epigraphy," 220, 223. Sultan Abu Saʿid's Turkic edict to Uzun Hasan Aqqoyunlu in Uyghur script also includes the title *küregen*. See Kurat 1940, 120–121. Pir Muhammad b. Jahangir used the title on his coins minted in Balkh. See Islamic Coin Collection of the University of Tübingen (FINT) Inventory Nos. FINT 91–1–247 (minted in 807/1404–05); 2002–16–133 (minted in 808/1405–06).
20 For the allegory of the "scaffolding of sovereignty," see the editors' introduction in Benite et al. 2017, 3.
21 John E. Woods' forthcoming volume titled *The Timurid Aristocratic Order* will significantly improve our knowledge on the Timurid appanage allocations. See John E. Woods, *The Timurid Aristocratic Order* (Leiden: Brill, Forthcoming).
22 Manz 2007, 245–276; Binbaş 2016, 51–67.
23 Barthold 1963, 175–177; Alan 2007, 224–225; Album 2011, 265.
24 Woods 1999, 20; Subtelny 2007; 36–38.
25 Manz 2007, 16–34; Binbaş 2014, 276–281.
26 Manz 2007, 257–270.
27 Togan 2019, I/403–417; Petrushevsky 1949a, 227–246; Petrushevsky 1949b, 144–183; Fragner 1986, 504–511; Subtelny 1988, 479–505; İnalcık 2006, 119–124; Subtelny 2007, 37–38).
28 Togan 2019, I/414–417; Fragner 1986, 511–512; Alan 1999. 231–248; Favereau 2018, 165–168.
29 Aigle 2004, 971–996; Morgan 2005, 291–308; Togan 2013, 67–101.
30 Togan 2019, II/758; Hinz 1949, 748; Özyetgin 2004, 75–83, 86–91, 121–125. As Özyetgin's work demonstrates, the origins of these taxes may go back to the pre-Mongol period.
31 Fragner 1986, 533–534.
32 Subtelny 2007, 25.
33 Binbaş 2013, 24–25.
34 Barthold 1963, 128, 155–156.
35 Paul 1991, 538.
36 Togan 1994, 10–11.
37 Welsford 2013, 84–85.
38 Barthold 1966, 332; Floor 1998, 531–532.

39 Kallek 2003, 583–588.
40 Subtelny 2007, 95–99.
41 McChesney 1996, 128. See also Woods 1999, 144, for the historian Fazlullah Khunji-Isfahani's remarks.
42 Woods 1990a, 100–101; McChesney 2000, 63–64.
43 Kauz 2005, 102–103.
44 Binbaş 2016, 260; Banister 2021, 147–148.
45 Ibn Arabshah 1936, 299.
46 Togan 1949, 527; Yüksel 2009, 57–58.
47 Ando 1992, 120. For further references to *yasa*, *yarghu*, *törä*, *yarghuchi* and *yasa'ul* in late medieval sources, see Doerfer 1963–75, I, 264–267 (for *törö/törä*), II, 554–568 (for *tamgha* and *tamghachi*), IV, 58–66 (for *yarghu* and *yarghuchi*), 71–82 (for *yasa*(*q*) and *yasaqchi*).
48 Kauz 2005, 95–97. Khalil Sultan was the nephew of Shahrukh, the ruler of Samarqand, and one of the pretenders to Timur's throne. He was already dead by this time, but the news of his passing had probably not reached the Ming capital when the letter was composed.
49 Binbaş 2014, 290–293.
50 McChesney 2009, 283–286.
51 Woods 1987, 83; Binbaş 2016, 168, 179–180. *Futuhat-i Miranshahi* is most probably the earliest Timurid historiographical source.
52 Binbaş 2016, 173.
53 Binbaş 2016, 251. Also see Jean Aubin, who argued that Yazdi saw in Timur's political persona a theocratic sovereign. Although the terminology he chose to describe Yazdi's discourse was inaccurate, Aubin's argument highlights a very significant aspect of the Timurid political discourse. Aubin 1956, 145.
54 Woods 1987, 99–105; Binbaş 2016, 203–212.
55 Woods 1990a, 109–113.
56 Woods 1987, 89–93; Woods 1990a, 103; Binbaş 2018, 177–185.
57 Woods 1987, 96–99; Woods 1990a, 85–86; Binbaş 2011, 517–521. Also see Subtelny 2007, 112–114.
58 Woods 1990a, 86–87; Binbaş 2016, 278–286.
59 Woods 1990a, 105.
60 Woods 1990a, 105–108.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-SEVEN

RESCUING LEGITIMATE NARRATIVE BY RE-IMAGING QUBILAI QA'AN*

Qiu Yihao

Qubilai Qa'an has been many things to many people. He was qa'an of the entire Chinggisid *Ulus*, emperor of the Yuan dynasty (r. 1279–1368), a great nomadic warrior who conquered South China and then a patron of Confucianism in the newly founded dynasty.[1] Qubilai's achievements were significant and multifaceted, influencing not only the subsequent Yuan emperors but also the following rulers who usurped the throne from his Chinggisid descendants, in particular, the ruler of the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398, r. 1368–1398), who wished to build legitimacy for the new dynasty by reshaping the political image of Qubilai Qa'an.[2]

As previous scholars have demonstrated, the Ming court's political discourse on Chinggisid legitimacy oscillated between Han ethnic-nationalism and Confucian universalism.[3] Yet both types of Ming court discourse presented Qubilai Qa'an as an exception. From the perspective of the Ming court, Qubilai was unlike the first four qa'ans (i.e. Chinggis, Ögödei, Güyük and Möngke), who were regarded as alien dominators, or his successors, who were accused of being responsible for the collapse of the empire. On the contrary, Qubilai's achievements and personality were praised by Ming emperors and their advisers.

Why did Qubilai Qa'an become an exception in the quasi-ethnic revolutionary atmosphere that prevailed and sometimes even turned radical during the early Ming era? Some previous researchers believed the Ming court's discourse was, to a great extent, influenced by the intellectuals who had lived under Mongol rule and then served the Ming emperors.[4] Thus, they held onto the official evaluation of Qubilai Qa'an presented by the Yuan government. If this was the case, how did the late Yuan intellectuals depict Qubilai's image in a dynastic narrative? Meanwhile, being inspired by the late Yuan intellectuals, how and why did Ming emperors turn Qubilai Qa'an into a pivotal figure in their own newly constructed political discourse? Based on the official archives, chronicles and literary collected works, this article attempts to identify the evolution of Qubilai Qa'an's image during the Yuan–Ming transition period and explain the motivations behind these changes.

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The Ming court's official historiography can be regarded as a conscious effort to control the memory of the Chinggisid past to build loyalty among their multi-ethnic subjects.[5] Given that the Ming Empire regarded itself, symbolically and practically, as the successor to the "Qa'an *Ulus*" – that is to say, inheriting not only the territory of the Yuan dynasty, which covered Chinese and non-Chinese areas, but also the nominal suzerainty over all four divided Chinggisid states – the audience to which the Ming court's official historiography was intended to appeal represented different successors who shared the common memory and history of the Mongol Empire.[6] Therefore, this article will outline how political legitimacy and charisma were appropriated from the Mongol qa'an.

THE LEGACY OF QUBILAI

In the spring of 1260, when he ascended the throne in Kaiping, Qubilai announced himself as the qa'an of the Mongol Empire, shortly before his brother Ariq Böke's enthronement. It was not only the beginning of the struggle for the throne but an overture to a systemic transformation in the political organization of the empire. Supported by his Chinese advisers, the new qa'an, Qubilai, personally led the transformation: he moved the capital from Qaraqorum to Daidu (i.e. today's Beijing) and organized a dual administration, which would coordinate nomadic political organization and Chinese tradition and balance the influences from the Mongol military elites and Chinese intellectuals respectively. By adopting the style of a traditional Chinese emperor, Qubilai attracted the allegiance and collaboration of the Chinese intellectuals and local warlords. The latter's meritorious services ensured Qubilai's victory in the civil war and the subsequent conquests in southern China.

On the other hand, Qubilai also succeeded to the manifest destiny of Heaven's Will, which mandated the Chinggisid family to conquer and rule the world. Mongol troops invaded the Southern Song (r. 1127–1279) and finally captured its capital, Lin'an, in 1276. The lengthy reign of Qubilai reached its pinnacle of prosperity after the conquest of Southern Song. The achievement of uniting "all within the seas" (*hunyi haiyu*, 混一海宇) undoubtedly gained him prestige and status beyond the famous ancient emperors, e.g. Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (Han Wudi, r. 141–87 BCE) and the Tang Emperor Taizong (r. 626–649 CE).[7] Qubilai Qa'an's policies of encouraging agriculture and facilitating economic growth were undoubtedly the outcome of consultation with his advisers, and to a certain extent seemed effective. Therefore, even in the recently occupied territory, Qubilai's domination won the following compliment from a famous "remnant subject" (*yimin*, 遺民, i.e. Song loyalist), "under the peace of Great Yuan, all people and all things have taken on an entirely new look."[8]

In the first half of his reign,[9] Qubilai did not show an obvious preference for his non-Chinese financial ministers. The latter were mainly promoted from the intimate attendants of the imperial family, like Ahmad Fanakati (d. 1282). The latter's financial policies and imperious manner of working doubtlessly resulted in a schism between the qa'an, their main patron and his Chinese scholar-officials. Yet at least until 1279, Qubilai maintained his central government in good operation by preserving a delicate balance among his multi-cultural bureaucracy. For this reason Yuan intellectuals who lived under Qubilai's successors agreed that the era from

Zhongtong (r. 1260–1264) to the early years of Zhiyuan (r. 1264–1294) were a Yuan Golden Age.

Qubilai's prestige increased continuously even after his death. From the middle period of the Yuan dynasty, people described him as a unique creator of laws and regulations. Emperor Qaishan's (i.e. Wuzong, r. 1307–1311) intimate eunuch, Li Bangning, admired Qubilai's thrift and concluded that "all of *Shizu*'s words, without exception, set the example for posterity."[10] Furthermore, in his successor Temür Öljeitü Qa'an's (i.e. Chengzong, r. 1294–1307) era, the formulaic phrase "*Shizu*'s [i.e. Qubilai] perfect example" started to frequently appear in imperial edicts and governmental documents.[11] This phrase indicates that in the post-Qubilai era, his achievements and policies were deemed as a perfect example to follow for subsequent Yuan emperors. Almost all the subsequent Yuan emperors mentioned this phrase in their edicts announcing enthronements, appointing crown princes and proclaiming a new reign name.[12] Likewise, Yuan ministers also frequently cited this phrase in their memorials addressed to the emperor, to emphasize the legitimacy of their suggestions or to stress the necessity of following Qubilai's precedent.[13]

Throughout his life, Qubilai Qa'an was unswerving in his aspiration to become a universal and undisputed ruler of all the Chinggisid domains. Yet, his suzerainty was rejected by some of his relatives, who insisted on defending the Mongolian heritage, e.g. Ögödeid prince Qaidu. They displayed implacable enmity to Qubilai's Sinicized transformation and meanwhile accused the latter of betraying the Mongol tradition.[14] In 1304 a Great Rapprochement between the four main Chinggisid states marked a turning point. At the assembly the four main Chinggisid rulers finally solved the long-disputed problem, namely, which territory belonged to whom.[15] Along with the recognition of each family's territory and sovereignty the notion of Chinggisid unity was revived too. This notion emphasized that all the Chinggisid rulers belonged to the same family of Golden Kin, which could be traced back to Chinggis Khan. This shared kinship was deployed in an effort to solve internal disputes between the four Chinggisid states.[16]

Henceforth Qubilai's successors established nominal Yuan suzerainty over the whole Mongol world.[17] In contemporary Islamic sources the Yuan emperor was titled the "Great Qa'an" (*Qan al-kabir*, or *Qan al-aʿzam*),[18] and in parallel with this, the territory of the Yuan dynasty was honoured with the name of "Great Qa'an's state" (Per. *ulus-i Qa'an*, *mamalik-i Qa'an*; Arabic *mamlikat al-Qan al-kabir*).[19] Given that the other three Chinggisid states were named as "state of Qaidu's family", "state of Batu (or Berke)'s family" and "state of Hülegü's family" respectively,[20] the notion of relating a certain territory to a certain Chinggisid family was widely prevalent from the beginning of the 14th century, both inside and outside the Mongol world. It is doubtless that the title "Great Qa'an", namely, Qubilai and his descendants, was fixedly related to the territory under the domination of the Yuan dynasty.

Toghan Temür (i.e. Shundi, r. 1333–1368), the last emperor who ruled the Chinese territory of the Yuan dynasty, was the son of Qoshila (Mingzong, r. 1329). Shortly after his father's murder Toghan Temür was exiled to an island off the coast of Korea at the age of ten, and then to Jingjiang (today's Guilin, Guangxi Province), a remote place far from the court. Therefore, when he was recalled to the capital and finally installed as emperor in July 1333, his authority was very limited. Leveraging Qubilai's high prestige to evoke memories of the past golden era among his subjects

and, more importantly, encouraging loyalty to the current regime unsurprisingly became a shared strategy between the new emperor and his main chancellors.

An imperial edict issued in 1335 mentioned that, according to astrologers' suggestions, Toghan Temür announced he would re-adopt Qubilai's second reign title *Zhiyuan*. Just as the title *Zhiyuan* ("achieving the proper beginning") indicates, the emperor aspired to revive the old norms and to make his empire prosper again.[21] Toghan Temür and his advisers tried to correct the inadequacies of the bureaucratic system by frequently citing the "old statutes of *Shizu*". Besides, during the whole of Toghan Temür's reign, his advisers always attempted to emphasize the emperor's tie to Qubilai by establishing political monuments and spreading propaganda to improve Toghan Temür's prestige.[22]

As time passed, Toghan Temür lost his enthusiasm for political reform. He condoned pervasive factionalism, which corrupted his inner court and administrative system, with a *laissez-faire* attitude. In this period, anecdotes about secret palace affairs spread widely among Chinese intellectuals. In these exaggerated stories, Toghan Temür was depicted as being surrounded by his non-Chinese courtiers, indulging himself in lascivious and exotic religious rituals (i.e. the rites of Tibetan Buddhist sects).[23] All these things widened the schism between the emperor and his Chinese subjects. Discontented Chinese intellectuals sometimes expressed their nostalgia for Qubilai's reign, thereby alluding to their disappointment towards Toghan Temür. For instance, when the famous poet Yuan Kai learned of the assassination of Bolad Temür, a domineering warlord who had arrogated power from the Yuan emperor by the threat of force, he wrote a poem on this event with a little satire. He described the assassination as "an epic success no less than *Shizu*'s [i.e. Qubilai's] achievement and seemingly, the current Emperor's [i.e. Toghan Temür's] reverence grows by the day."[24]

Thus, we have every reason to believe that until the last years of the dynasty, Qubilai Qa'an was not merely an exemplary ruler but an icon synthesizing heavenly destiny, personal virtue and charisma. He was recognized as an inseparable symbol of dynastic legitimacy.

RECASTING THE IMAGE OF QUBILAI QA'AN: THE RED TURBANS UPRISING AND ANTI-MONGOL DISCOURSE

In 1351 the Red Turbans uprising erupted in Yingzhou (in present-day Northwestern Anhui Province), a centre of anti-dynastic agitation, and led to the disintegration of the Yuan Empire. The populace, which had been assembled to dredge the Grand Canal, rebelled under Liu Futong's leadership. Liu took full advantage of nationalistic propaganda, especially the Chinese people's memory of the former Southern Song dynasty, to attract more followers. Han Shandong, who was claimed as the eighth generation grandson of Emperor Song Huizong (r. 1100–1126), was installed on the throne by Liu.[25] In their march northward to Shandong and Henan Provinces, the insurgents planted a banner with the following slogan: as "three thousand tiger-like soldiers are marching toward the regions of Youyan (i.e. You Zhou); 'a flying dragon in the sky' is [an omen] of reopening the Heaven of Great Song."[26] Liu's Red Turbans seized the city of Bianliang (present-day Kaifeng, Henan Province) and established it as the capital of the Song dynasty.

In Southern China, Zou Pusheng and Xu Shouhui led another group of insurgents. They occupied Qishui (in present-day Hubei Province) and established a parallel Song regime (also called Tianwan) there.[27] Aside from these two regimes, several independent local forces, e.g. the Zhang Shicheng brothers' insurgency, acted in the coastal area of Taizhou (in today's Jiansu Province) Circuit.[28] To evoke people's memory of the last Han Chinese dynasty, the two main insurgent regimes coincidentally chose "Song" as the title of their regimes. Along with the dynastic title, they also revived the legitimacy of the Song dynasty as well as the Chinese nationalistic discourse.

However, these insurgent troops became entangled in long-standing and frequent struggles with the local defence forces. The latter were organized by the local elites who still maintained their loyalty, to varying degrees, to the Yuan emperor. In view of the situation, some intellectuals suggested that the insurgent leaders should utilize the Chinese nationalistic discourse, namely, the notion of the "distinction between Chinese and foreign", to ease the hostility between the rebels and local defenders. In 1258, a local literati, Liu Xia, addressed a letter to Xu Shouhui from Ji'an (today's Jiangxi Province), in which he pointed out,

> From ancient times, the destiny of the barbarian rulers never lasts over one hundred years. . . . The monarch and the ministers of our dynasty, with a deep insight on this [truth], therefore propagate the legitimacy of Great Song and get rid of barbarians' illegitimate authority.[29]

According to Fang Zhenhua's study, the nationalistic statement that the "non-Han (*hu*) regimes' fortune can never last over one hundred years" initially appeared in the later period of the Southern Song. When confronted with foreign invasions, Chinese intellectuals would make this statement to emphasize that the Southern Song was the exclusive legitimate regime. Although a few Song loyalists occasionally used this statement to reveal an uncooperative attitude towards the Yuan, as a political slogan it no longer had any practical significance under the Yuan.[30] However, in the last years of the Yuan dynasty, negative sentiments towards the Mongol ruler and the court prevailed among the intellectuals of southern China, especially when they found themselves legally excluded from high-level offices in the government. The following words accurately depicted such negative sentiments: "Rulers of the Yuan dynasty, after the State was united, generally regarded the Northern State as internal and regarded [the] Central State as external, and treated Northern people with confidence but kept Southern people at a distance."[31] Therefore, amid the mid-14th century's uprisings, the statement that "non-Han regimes never last over one hundred years" was an effective device of self-consolation and a sharp weapon to win the hearts of sympathizers.

ZHU YUANZHANG'S LEGITIMATE PROPAGANDA

The founder of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang, started his career as a corporal in the guard squad of Guo Zixing, a military commander of the Red Turban Army, and later became his son-in-law. The year 1356 marked a watershed of Zhu's political career. In July, his troops seized the city of Jiqing (Nanjing). Because of his merits,

Zhu was "acclaimed Duke of Wu (*wuguogong*) by his generals and he established the Jiangnan Branch Central Secretariat at Nanjing. He assumed personal control of it."[32] According to the *Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty* (*ming shilu*, hereafter cited as MSL), the system of this branch of the Central Secretariat copied the administrative structure of the Yuan.

Now Zhu Yuanzhang was a semi-independent warlord, despite nominally showing his respect for the sovereign of the Song regime. He continued the nationalistic discourse, denying the Mongols' legitimacy. It is said that he had people plant a banner in front of the office of the Central Secretariat with the words "Mountains, rivers, all the territory of China; Sun and Moon unfold again the Heaven of the Great Song."[33] This kind of policy, aiming to revive Chinese tradition, was not just propaganda but was actually implemented. For instance, in Zhu's territory, the name of the local administrative unit "Circuit" (*lu*) was adapted to the "Superior prefecture" (*fu*) because the latter was a typical name of local administration prevalent in the pre-Mongol era. Likewise, from the 1360s Zhu Yuanzhang ordered the restoration of the toponyms and official titles of the Song dynasty.[34] Nevertheless, compared to the other branches of the insurgency, Zhu's policies seemed more moderate. His critique mainly focused on the last Yuan emperor, who was accused of debauchery and failure to overcome the turbulence. At the same time, Zhu tried to keep a good relationship with the intellectuals who remained loyal to the Yuan.[35]

From 1361 to 1367 Zhu's troops annihilated several of his main contenders in Southern China, i.e. Chen Youliang, Zhang Shichen and Fang Guozhen. At the beginning of 1367 the nominal Song emperor Han Lin'er, Zhu's overlord, was murdered in a deliberate boating accident. After renouncing his loyalty to the Song, Zhu was enthroned as the emperor of the Ming dynasty at the end of 1367. In the meantime, the northern arm of the Ming army advanced speedily. In the following year, they marched northward along the Grand Canal to Shandong Province and conquered a series of the strategic cities on their itinerary, e.g. Bianliang and Luoyang. In the Taiyuan battle, the Ming army finally defeated the last main force of the Yuan. By then, there was no way the Yuan dynasty could escape collapse. Toghan Temür, his princes and a few loyal attendants escaped just before the arrival of the Ming army and left the capital, Daidu, to the rebels.[36]

With the military victory an apparent change took place in Zhu Yuanzhang's political discourse, as reflected in the imperial edicts issued by him from 1366 to 1368.[37] The contents of the edicts were similar. In them Zhu repeatedly emphasized that the Mongols had lost heaven's support because they had "lost the virtue" (*shide*, 失德); they had been doomed by the principle that "non-Han (*hu*) regimes' fortunes can never last over one hundred years." Finally, Zhu attributed his success to the "favour and blessing of Heaven above".[38] In the meantime, there was an upsurge of nationalist statements in the Ming official documents. Zhu's ministers claimed that he was "a new sage ruler" to "expel the barbarians and restore Chinese civilization".[39] Given the fierce conflicts between the Ming army and the Yuan loyalists along the north-western border of China (e.g. Xian'xi, Lintao, the fringe of Tibet), the changes in Zhu's political propaganda might reflect the military pressure he faced.[40]

When Zhu talked about the Yuan emperor's ancestors he depicted them ambiguously as the "Tatar tribe which rose in the desert",[41] but avoided mentioning any particular emperor's name. Obviously Zhu used the term

"desert" (or "northern desert") as a propaganda tactic to emphasize their alien origin and steppe background, especially when compared with the Ming territory, which had been defined by Zhu as "the old territory of us the Chinese".[42] It is apparent that during this period Zhu had not yet singled Qubilai out from his nomadic predecessors.

RESCUING THE IMAGE OF QUBILAI FROM THE NOMADIC TRADITION

Soon after his enthronement, Zhu Yuanzhang was keen to cut off the relationship between the newly founded dynasty and the former Song. The "Song" here referred to both the Southern Song and the Song-Tianwan to which Zhu personally pledged allegiance. In doing so, Zhu singled himself out from the "flock of the hero" and hence redeemed the newly founded dynasty from its disreputable origin, i.e. the rebels against the Yuan dynasty.

Another crucial reason the Ming court had to adjust the anti-Mongol policy was the change of situation. When Zhu Yuanzhang established his dominion over Northern China after 1368 he and his ministers had to administer a multi-ethnic population and contest with various non-Chinese opponents. Therefore, it was reasonable to replace the Han-ethnic discourse with Confucian universalism.

Evidence for this shift comes from the title of the state, Ming. As Du Hongtao has noted, the title Ming as well as the title Yuan were drawn from the same section of *the Book of Changes*.[43] The two terms (Yuan and Ming) share equal nobility and represent the beginning of the universe and its regular cycles respectively. Thus, when Zhu Yuanzhang adopted the term "Ming" for his state in 1368 it was equivalent to proclaiming that his new founding state inherited its legitimacy from the Yuan dynasty.

Another measure was the compilation of the *Yuan shi* (*Official History of the Yuan Dynasty*). The compilation started in 1369 and ended merely one year later (1370), several months after Toghan Temür's death. In April 1370 the Ming cavalry under the command of Li Wenzhong, Zhu's nephew, attacked Toghan Temür's government-in-exile stationed near Yingchang. The resistance of the Yuan refugees was dissolved in no time. Toghan Temür passed away whilst trying to escape, and his grandson Maidelibala was captured. This event reversed Zhu Yuanzhang's opinion on the legitimacy of the Yuan dynasty. He publicly proclaimed that Yuan was a legitimate Chinese dynasty and, in accordance with earlier political tradition, he ordered all the former Yuan officials to pledge their personal respect and loyalty to the former dynasty and their old rule.[44]

In a 1370 edict issued two months after Toghan Temür's death Zhu Yuanzhang described the rise and decline of the Yuan dynasty as:

> [Song emperor's] descendants became weak and the territory shrank by the day. Therefore Heaven ordered your *Shizu* [i.e. Qubilai] of the Yuan to replace them. Till Toghan Temür's reign, [the ruler] was debauched and fatuous, and had no interest in governmental affairs, nor sympathy with the people's misery. Therefore, the villains and bandits arose together, the world fell into confusion, and the people lost their monarch.[45]

This was the first reference to Qubilai (i.e. Shizu) in the Ming court's historical narrative, and contrary to the accusation against Toghan Temür, Qubilai was portrayed as an ideal ruler, a perfect embodiment of virtue.

It is worth noting that just two years before (1368), Zhu Yuanzhang openly criticized Qubilai because "he substituted the system of the Middle Kingdom with foreign customs."[46] These words might reflect the general opinion of Zhu and his advisers at that time. Liang Yin, a famous literati who served in the office compiling the *Official History of the Yuan Dynasty*, supplied a comprehensive judgement of Qubilai's political construction:

> Shizu (Qubilai) established a ruling system that was based on lenience and benevolence and was furthermore comprehensive and detailed. To the extent that this much of his system was transmitted intact to his successors, it should have produced no flaws. However, the essence of good rule lies in employing worthies whatever their origins; in making the study of antiquity a prerequisite for entering officialdom; and in using decorum, righteousness, probity, and sense of shame as the four mainstays of the state. Shizu (Qubilai), however, determined that no Chinese could become prime minister, and so all the prime ministers were ethnic Mongols. He did not set up remonstrating officials, and so the avenue of loyal and frank advice was blocked.[47]

However, in the "Memorial of submitting the *Yuanshi*", Qubilai was praised: "(He) enlightened the barbarians by Chinese ceremony; hence he expanded his domain to the remotest place and laid the foundation of the Grand Unity."[48] The memorial totally reversed the earlier evaluation of Qubilai by the Ming court. The reversal aimed to isolate his ideal image from the failure of the Yuan dynasty.

In stark contrast to the idealization of Qubilai's image, Chinggis Khan's name was scornfully mentioned as "Your ancestor [who] rose from poverty and obscurity in the steppe" in Zhu Yuanzhang's eulogy for Ayushiridara.[49] These words intentionally belittled Chinggis Khan by emphasizing his humble origin, and in the meantime broke the bond between Qubilai and his ancestors.

According to the MSL, from 1370 to 1382 there were several conversations between Zhu Yuanzhang and his advisers on the following question: which excellent qualities of Qubilai made it possible for him to accomplish such a great achievement, i.e. that he conquered the vast territories and ruled his nomadic and sedentary subjects successfully? Zhu's advisers listed several merits of Qubilai, like valiance, the ability to employ worthies and thriftiness.

Among the aforesaid qualities, Qubilai's thriftiness seems to have left a deep impression on the Ming emperor. In subsequent years, Zhu Yuanzhang brought it up on multiple occasions to educate his ministers and attendants. As the MSL recorded, Zhu once ordered two palace commissioners to be beaten because he saw them running in the rain in dry leather boots. Zhu criticized them for damaging the boots and quoted a story in which Qubilai had criticized an attendant who dressed in ornamental leather boots for wasting the materials.[50]

In May 1376 Zhu again explained the rise and collapse of the Yuan dynasty to his attendants. He concluded,

> Shizu of the Yuan personally practiced thrifty and simple [life] during his reign, and thus was able to achieve the feat of grand unity. However, *Genshen* Emperor [i.e. Togan Temür] triggered both Heavenly and human resentment because he indulged his extravagant and dissipated habit, and even fed the dogs and pigs with rich-tasting foods. Therefore, his overindulgence could not be continued and his defeat was like this.[51]

Zhu Yuanzhang even encouraged his wife, Empress Ma, to follow the example of Qubilai's wife Chabui Khatun, by boiling the strings of bows to collect materials for clothing.[52] Additionally Zhu used these stories of virtue to teach his princes and royal sons-in-law.

These stories of Qubilai's virtues are, to a certain degree, supported by the historical accounts. Wang Yun, a contemporary of Qubilai's reign, in his memorial praised the latter, saying, "after enthronement, [Qubilai] was as thrifty as a pioneer." For instance, Wang Yun illustrated that Qubilai refused to dress in exquisite silk clothes but replaced them with rough textile ones.[53] Likewise, a late Yuan author, Ye Ziqi supplied an anecdote about Qubilai's thriftiness,

> Emperor Yuan Shizu once remembered the hardship of Taizu's pioneering work; thus he took a blade of grass and transplanted it in the imperial palace, in front of the scarlet staircase, and called it the "grass of [marking] the oath of thrift", in order to let his descendants know the virtue of thriftiness.[54]

Yet there is also a certain amount of counter-examples recorded by Yuan authors. Qubilai obviously abandoned his restraint in the later period of his reign. Some Chinese advisers strictly criticized his extravagance and waste, which were considered the cause of a financial crisis.[55] As for the later historians, Zhao Yi's critique is one of the most typical. He claimed that Qubilai's "avarice and militarism were rooted in his nature, and never changed throughout his life."[56]

It is, however, ironic that in late Yuan accounts, Toghan Temür, who was labelled by Zhu Yuanzhang as a dissolute and dissipated ruler, instead was a paragon of virtue. According to Yang Yü, it was Toghan Temür who refused his vice supervisor of the Court for the Palace Revenues's suggestion of decorating the emperor's boots with gold and ordered that they be decorated with copper wire instead.[57] The plot of this anecdote is similar to Qubilai's story, probably sharing the same prototype.

We can, therefore, assume that the depiction of Qubilai as an ideal model in the Ming court's discourse was based upon traditional Confucian morals, despite drawing upon some factual accounts. Zhu Yuanzhang and his advisers reshaped Qubilai's image to single Qubilai out from other Mongol rulers. As a key point of establishing his new legitimacy Zhu combined Qubilai's personal image with Chinese notions of political morality.[58] By emphasizing Qubilai's virtues and by following his example, Zhu deliberately proved that heavenly destiny would favour and bless the founding emperor who possessed them.

Another reason for reshaping Qubilai's image is related to the theory of legitimate authority. The Ming court's discourse on legitimate authority was influenced by Yang Weizhen's opinion that the Yuan dynasty was first established in 1276, after the conquest of the Southern Song. He believed the qualification for founding

a new dynasty was the realization of the "Grand Unity" (*dayitong*, 大一統), a term derived from the Confucian concept that all the [Chinese] territories were united under a superior emperor.[59] Although snubbed by the Yuan Court, Yang Weizhen's opinion subsequently won the support of Chinese intellectuals from the Ming court. Some editors in the office compiling the official history of the Yuan – e.g. Wang Hui and Xu Yikui – were enthusiastic supporters of Yang Weizhen's theory of legitimate authority.[60]

The duration of the Yuan dynasty in Ming official documents was also adjusted to meet the new theory of legitimate authority. From 1356 to 1369 "the fortune of the Yuan lasted more than a hundred years" was a standard expression that appeared ten times in the MSL.[61] According to this expression we can conclude that the beginning of the Yuan dynasty was dated to around 1260, the year of Qubilai's enthronement. But after 1370 Zhu Yuanzhang clearly defined the duration of the Yuan dynasty as 93 years, namely, from the year of 1276.[62] Additionally the duration of the Yuan dynasty, after adjustment, perfectly matched the notion that "non-Han regimes' fortune can never last over one hundred years."

Likewise, the phrase "unity of all under Heaven" gradually replaced the former nationalistic "distinction between the Chinese and barbarians" in Ming official documents. In the Yuan dynasty, Qubilai's legitimacy was based on his achievement of "uniting all within the seas", and now the secretaries serving in the Ming court started to define the new emperor's legitimacy in the same way. Song Lian announced, "the Emperor had [been] enthroned for three years and united the Chinese and foreigners of the civilized world."[63] The concept of "Grand Unity" prompted Zhu Yuanzhang to continue his war against the remaining Yuan forces on the steppe to regain all Qubilai's territory. Moreover, enthusiasm for realizing "Grand Unity" speedily infected everyone within the literati circle who served at the Ming court. In 1369–1370 the poet Gao Qi, who worked as an editor of the *Yuanshi* in Nanjing, wrote one of his most famous poems:

> I live in a fortunate time to witness a Sage arising from South Country,
> Soon after having pacified disastrous turbulences, recuperation ensued.
> I now eternally make my home within Four Oceans and no longer
> Let Grand River delimit a north-south boundary of our motherland.[64]

Zhu Yuanzhang recomposed the historical narrative of the Yuan dynasty by reshaping the image of Qubilai Qa'an. The final version, written in Chinese and Mongolian, was included in several diplomatic letters addressed to different Mongol warlords in 1388–1389.[65] The text is as follows:

> In the past, [the] Chinese Great Emperor of the Song dynasty ruled the world in excess of three hundred and ten years and then, his descendants did not respect Heaven nor care for the people. Therefore, Emperor Taizu [i.e. Chinggis Khan] who was born and, on Heaven's behalf, rose from the North desert and pacified all the foreign rulers of Tatar and Muslim people. The grandson of Taizu was Emperor Shizu [i.e. Qubilai], who was famous for his mercy and virtue. He united the various non-Chinese peoples all under Heaven and brought the foreign countries all overseas back to a grand unity. In one hundred years, which

> people did not yearn for his grace and virtue? Which people dared to disrespect his laws and orders? At that time, there was safety in all directions, people lived in peace and products were rich. After Emperor Toghan Temür was enthroned, the powerful ministers took authority; laws and orders were not respected. In consequence, Heaven threw the realm into chaos. The people were plunged into misery on the wild field and military uprisings occurred at the same time. I was in the Huai District at that time. In view of the people's suffering, I thus collected the military force with the townsmen and heroes and pacified the flock of the insurgents in the following four-five years.[66]

Chinggis Khan's personal career in this version is abstracted as "pacified all the foreign rulers of Tatar and Muslim people." According to the parallel Mongolian version, this sentence was translated as: "(Chinggis Khan), who had subjected all the princes who were on the Mongolian land, also subjugated the princes in the Muslim countries."[67] The term referring to the foreign rulers in the Mongolian translation is *qari* (pl. *qaris*, *qaritan*). Professor Wulan defined the word *qari* in classic Mongolian (from Yuan to mid-Ming era) as "foreign country" (*waibang*, 外邦) and "foreign enemy" (*waidi*, 外敌).[68] This word was usually applied to emphasize people of a different ethnic identity. Thus, in the previous context Zhu tried to underline that Chinggis Khan united all the non-Chinese people during his reign. By contrast, the previous text described Qubilai's achievement as "united non-Chinese people all under Heaven." In the parallel Mongolian version this sentence is: "the people of the interior and the people regardless [of] where they were, he [Sečen Qaγan, i.e. Qubilai] subdued them all."[69] In the Mongolian context, the term *irgen* corresponded to the meaning of "subject" or "subject people", an antonym of *qari* (foreigner).

Therefore, we can conclude that the Ming emperor carefully distinguished the careers of Chinggis Khan and Qubilai. From Zhu Yuanzhang's perspective Chinggis Khan was the conqueror of all non-Chinese people, despite his conquests of Northern China under Jurchen rule. By contrast, Qubilai united and dominated the Chinese people as well as various ethnic groups. This view probably reveals Zhu Yuanzhang's intention to rewrite the history of the Yuan dynasty to reject the notion that the Mongol Empire was solely the achievement of Chinggis Khan.[70] In his new historical narrative of the Yuan dynasty, the conquest of the Southern Song was identified as a milestone, and Qubilai was installed as the most prominent figure. Accordingly, the career and image of Qubilai were isolated from his ancestors, the Eurasian nomadic conquerors. In this way Zhu Yuanzhang successfully transferred the charismatic authority from Qubilai to himself whilst keeping his distance from the latter's nomadic background.

QUBILAI'S *ULUS* IN THE WORLD OF THE GREAT MING

The strategy of appropriating the legitimacy of the Yuan dynasty provided Zhu Yuanzhang with the legal basis for claiming sovereignty in the areas that were located outside the traditional Chinese territory (e.g. Yunnan and Liaodong). Considering that the heavenly destiny that had chosen Qubilai, as the Ming court repeatedly proclaimed, already transferred its fortune to Zhu Yuanzhang, he ruled not only the Chinese people but also all the non-Chinese subjects as a universal emperor. This

concept also appeared in Zhu Yuanzhang's announcement, "I had already been the ruler of all-under-Heaven, and Chinese and foreigners had been closely united. [I] would take care of all the peoples no matter what family names they had."[71] After 1370, in the imperial decrees of the Ming, the Sino-centric expression "Chinese/China" (*huaxia*, 華夏) was gradually replaced by the term "Chinese and foreign" (*huayi*, 華夷).

For the Ming emperor, another crucial question was how to situate his state in a world where different regional regimes were linked by ties of Chinggisid kinship. The concept of the Mongol Empire still held currency with the rulers of the later 14th century. As Manz pointed out, "an ambitious man might rise to power within one Mongol successor state, but the stage on which he acted and the audience to which he appealed represented the whole of the Mongol heritage."[72] Therefore, although the Ming Court tried to revive the Chinese tributary system, Qubilai's image served as a link between the legacy of the Mongol Empire and the Chinese concept of "All-under-Heaven". When Zhu Yuanzhang proclaimed the transfer of the heavenly destiny from the Yuan emperor to himself, he also inherited an extensive worldview of the Mongol Empire and its diplomatic policies towards foreign countries.

The Ming Emperor also continued to claim dominion over a number of autonomous kingdoms in East Asia, following Yuan precedent. In a decree of 1370 Zhu Yuanzhang ordered an examination of his new empire, given that "I have united the Chinese and foreigners and [have] started to enjoy the rule of great peace with all the subjects." He also dispatched envoys to Korea, Annam (i.e. Dai Viet or modern northern Vietnam) and Champa (*zhancheng*, southern Vietnam) with his decrees in order to carry out examinations in those countries as well.[73] A Korean candidate, Jin Tao (or Gim Do), passed the examination of 1371 and was accepted as the fifth member of the Associate Metropolitan Graduates. After that, Jin Tao was appointed as a local official in the Ming, as the assistant magistrate of An'qiu County (Shandong Province).[74]

Further evidence that the Ming emperors inherited the world view of the Mongol Empire is provided by the official sacrifices to mountains and rivers. From the Han dynasty (r. 202 BCE–220 CE) onwards the sacrificial ritual to mountains and rivers, usually in the Chinese territory, was displayed as a symbol of supreme kingship and was therefore monopolized by the Chinese emperor.[75] Yet during Zhu Yuanzhang's reign, the list of official sacrifices included the mountains and rivers in foreign countries. In 1369 Zhu Yuanzhang consulted the ritual officials about which holy mountains and rivers in Korea and Annam would be fit for sacrifice; one year later, he dispatched two groups of envoys to Korea, Annam and Champa to hold the sacrificial rituals there.[76] Emperor Yongle (Zhu Di, r. 1403–1424) expanded the scope of this sacrifice to the mountains located in Japan, Boni (Brunei), Bengal and Kezhi (Cochin, in south-western India) respectively.[77]

Likewise, the Ming court converted the ritual of celebrating the emperor's birthday, which was originally applied in the Yuan court and provincial administrations, to the Guest Ritual of Foreign Rulers. In other words, the Ming court continued the rite system of the Yuan dynasty and applied the domestic ritual principles of the Yuan on diplomatic occasions.[78] This indicates that, despite the Ming court's claim to have revived the ancient Chinese rite system, they actually coloured their practices with Mongol protocols.

The world view and practice of the Mongol Empire also clearly appeared in the Ming court's arrangements of the captive Yuan princes. For instance, in 1388 Zhu Yuanzhang asked to escort the late Yuan emperor Ayushiridara's son Dibaonu to his residence on Ryukyu Island.[79] In the next year Prince Pai-pai's (i.e."Baba") son Liushinu and the eunuch Khwaja Nibu, who were captured by the Ming army during their conquest of Yunnan, were exiled to Jeju Island in Korea; in the meantime he exiled a Tatar prince and another 80 households to Tamna (also Tamra, ancient name of Jeju).[80] These arrangements obviously followed the precedent of Qubilai, who in 1289 exiled the rebellious prince Shiregi, the fourth son of Great Qa'an Möngke, to Renwu, an island off the southern coastline of Korea with extremely foul air.[81]

The previous cases exemplify the fact that Zhu Yuanzhang, unlike the emperors of the Tang and Song dynasties whom he claimed to emulate, did not regard Korea and Annam as independent tributary countries, but rather, following the precedent of the Yuan emperors, regarded them as the property of the empire.

When the Ming court turned its attention to the Western Regions of China and Central Asia, the Mongolian world view also prevailed in both practical and ideological ways. The MSL states: "after Taizu conquered the Western Regions, the princes and royal sons-in-law were all appointed as [local] rulers" and lists the places Mongol princes dominated, such as Beshbaliq, Anding, Shazhou and Qamil (Hami), as well as territories like Xifan and Oirat controlled by Chinggisid sons-in-law.[82]

Clearly the Ming court tried to mirror the landscape of the Mongol Empire to help them deal with foreign rulers – most of them Chaghadaid and Timurid princes, who occupied positions in the hierarchy of Chinggisid kinship. This concept influenced the geographical knowledge and diplomatic practices of the Ming era.

Based on the aforementioned world view, Ming emperors envisioned themselves enjoying the status of a Great Qa'an. This tactic was successful in a sense. We can evaluate their efforts according to the diplomatic epistles exchanged between the Ming and Timurid rulers. One of Timur's letters addressed to Zhu Yuanzhang referred to him as "Great Emperor of the Great Ming" – "Great Emperor" apparently deriving from the literal translation of "Great Qa'an" (*Qan al-kabir*). In response, the Ming emperor treated Timur as an "imperial son-in-law" (*fuma*, i.e. Güregen), based on a perspective similar to the Yuan emperor.[83] The title "Great Qa'an" also appeared in Timur's great-grandson ʿAla' al-Dawla Bahadur's letter addressed to Ming Yingzong (r. 1436–1449, 1457–1464). In this letter ʿAla' al-Dawla Bahadur entitled the Ming emperor as *Day Mink Qa'an* and *Qa'an-i buzurg-i ʿali miqdar* (great qa'an of superior authority).[84] According to the previous discussion, "Great Qa'an" (*Qan al-kabir*) exclusively referred to the emperor during the Yuan era.

Coincidentally, in Sultan Shahrukh's letter to Zhu Di, he suggested the Ming emperor follow Muhammad's example. To make his suggestion more convincing, he listed the Chinggisid rulers who had converted to the Islamic faith, e.g. the Jochid khans in the Qipchaq Steppe and the Ilkhans in Iran and Iraq. Shahrukh did not mention Chinggis Khan's second son, Chaghadai. Yet by referring to Timur Güregen and the territory of Mawarannahr, the fief of the Chaghadaids, he implied that the Chaghadaid territory had become a part of the *Dar al-Islam* as well.[85] According to Shahrukh's letter only Qubilai's successors had failed to convert to Islam. Therefore,

it is reasonable to believe that Shahrukh treated the Ming Empire as the successor of Qubilai's *Ulus* (i.e. the Yuan dynasty).

As for the local intellectuals living in Timurid Central Asia, the fame of Qubilai caused them to invoke his name in reference to Ming China. A famous Naqshbandi shaykh in 15th-century Samarqand, Khwaja ʿUbayd Allah Ahrar (1404–1490), in his letter to a friend, mentioned:

> It is reported that some of the "**people of Qubilay**" (*mardum-i Qubilay*), because of events of the time, have emigrated from their **homelands** (*auṭan*) and have come to that **country** (*wilayat*). In this **country** they have close relations and children who are burned by the fire of separation and drowned in the sea of longing.[86]

Given that Khwaja Ahrar emphasized these "people of Qubilay" were infidels and therefore separate from the local Muslims, this phrase most likely referred to the refugees who had escaped from China or the territory of the former Yuan dynasty. We have limited information to trace these people and their migration. Yet according to the accounts of a Timurid chronicle, the "events" (*hawadith*) and the subsequent migration might relate to the short-term turbulence that occurred in China after Zhu Yuanzhang's death.[87] In Khwaja Ahrar's view, Qubilai's name appeared as an echo of the past Yuan dynasty.

The northern steppe, centred around Qaraqorum, which was the core of the Mongol Empire, now became a fringe area on the landscape of the Ming Empire. Along with the declining importance of the steppe regions, the political status of the last lineal descendants of the Yuan emperor holding out against the Ming emperor had fallen as well.

In 1388 Toquz Temür was assassinated by Ariq Böke's offspring, Yesüder, and his Oirat allies.[88] This event made the Ming court believe that the exiled Yuan emperor, who came from Qubilai's lineal descendants, had been interrupted, and in the meantime it resulted in changes to the Ming court's Chinggisid discourse. In Ming Chinese documents, Toquz Temür was the last emperor entitled "master" (*zhu*, 主) or "emperor" (*di*, 帝). After his death the subsequent emperors in contact with the Ming court, e.g. Gün-Temür and Guilichi, were entitled as "*Ke-han* of Tatars" (*dada kehan*) by Ming officials in the governmental documents.[89] "*Ke-han*" is a Chinese transliteration of the ancient Turkic ruler's title "Khaqan". During the entire Yuan dynasty this archaic word was occasionally used as a literary idiom and the personal title of pre-Chinggisid tribal chiefs but never appeared as a title of Yuan emperors. In the early Ming era, Zhu Yuanzhang's adviser, Hu Han, once criticized the Tang emperor Taizong because he "adopted the title of Heavenly *Ke-han* [Khaqan] and carved [this title] on the imperial seal; by doing so, he was setting himself up as a barbarian."[90] Use of the term in the Ming court's discourse therefore implied the failure of the exiled Yuan government – they were doomed to break into many hostile tribes. Their condition would inevitably deteriorate to the level of their nomadic ancestors. In this context, reusing the title "*Ke-han*" reflected a *de facto* decline in their political status. The Mongol emperor was no longer treated as an equal monarch on the steppe but a steppe nomadic ruler, occupying a much lower degree in the cosmic hierarchy.

CONCLUSION: APPROACHES TO QUBILAI'S CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY

In the political environment of post-Mongol Eurasia, authority, power and kingship were personal. Sharing charismatic authority was, therefore, also a personal attachment forged between the followers and the individual of the former ruler. In other words, in the political narrative, fictive personality was more important than the historical reality. The context surrounding a specific figure was changeable. The Ming emperor thus attached his dynastic legitimacy to Qubilai, by re-inventing or, rather, partly Sinicizing his image according to the Confucian principle. Moreover, in the Ming court's discourse Qubilai's personal virtues and merits were appropriated as the Ming emperor's precedent.

The Muscovite tsar and Timurid sultans accepted Chinggis Khan as a unique founder of the grand Mongol legacy when they borrowed from the charismatic political attachment belonging to a certain Chinggisid branch. The Ming emperor was exceptional in this respect, as he cut off all associations between himself and Chinggis Khan but nevertheless traced the legitimacy of the Ming back to Qubilai's achievement of uniting "all within the seas". They built the image of Qubilai into a conjunction of Chinese tradition and Mongol legacy and excluded all other Mongol-Yuan rulers from the legitimate narrative.

Inheriting legitimacy through ties of kinship had little potency during the reign of Zhu Yuanzhang. Nevertheless, this approach was never denied completely. From the 17th century a legendary anecdote that Ming emperor Zhu Di (1360–1423, r. 1403–1424, Taizong) was Toghan Temür's posthumous son started to spread in both Chinese and Mongolian sources.[91] This story indicated a personal appeal towards Qubilai's charismatic authority was still effective. Additionally, it showed that even 200 years after the collapse of the Yuan dynasty, the image of Qubilai continued to guide both his Chinese and steppe successors to play their own roles on an old arena.

NOTES

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1 Rossabi 1988; Li 2004.
2 Barrett 1999, 250–259; Guida 2018, 137–160; Robinson 2019a, 503–524.
3 Wu Han 1986, 81–138.
4 Qian Mu 2004, 77–195.
5 Robinson 2008; Robinson 2019b.
6 Kim 2009, 279–305; Manz 2000, 129–149.
7 *YS* 99: 2538.
8 Xie Fangde 1922–, 4: 1a.
9 The *Cambridge History* marks the year 1279 as a watershed in Qubilai's reign. Franke and Twitchett eds. 1994, 473.
10 *YS* 22: 498.
11 Legge 1846, 175.
12 The edict of announcing Temür Qa'an's (Chengzong, r. 1295–1307) enthronement; The edict of Ayurbarvada's (Renzong, r. 1311–1320) enthronement; edict of Shidebala's (Yingzong, r. 1320–23) enthronement; Tuq Temür's (Wenzong, r. 1328–1332) enthronement, *YS* 18: 381; 22: 479; 27: 599; 32: 709.

13 *YS* 175: 4079.
14 Rossabi 1988, 172.
15 Vassaf 1959–60, 454.
16 Kim 2009, 1, 30–37.
17 Umari, 111, 114.
18 Umari, 111; al-Yunini 2007, II, 1312; al-Safadi 2000, XI, 152–154.
19 RDRM, I, 73, II, 909, 911; Umari, 26.
20 al-Yunini 2007, II, 1312–1313, III, 254; 1423; al-Qalaqashandi 1910–20, IV, 473 & 485.
21 The reign title was quoted from *Zhouyi* (*The Book of Changes*), as "至哉坤元，萬物資生", meaning "Complete is the 'great and originating (capacity)' indicated by Khwăn! All things owe to it their birth." See, Legge 1964, 214.
22 Evidence is the multi-lingual epigraph carved on the Juyong Pass in which Toghan Temür was entitled as "wheel-turning rule" (*cakravartin*). Robinson 2009, 285. I thank Robinson for reminding me of this material.
23 Quan Heng 1991, 89.
24 Yuan Kai 2015, 164. The second sentence is cited from the *Shijing* (*The Book of Poetry*).
25 *YS* 42: 891.
26 Tao Zongyi 2004, 342.
27 *YS*, 42: 893; Song Lian 1999, I, 383.
28 *YS* 47: 909.
29 Liu Xia 2013, VIII, 602.
30 Fang Zhenhua 2017, 159–191.
31 Ye Ziqi 1959, 40.
32 Zhang Tingyü 1974, I, 6.
33 Qian Qianyi 1982, I, 25.
34 Li Xinfeng 2010, 25.
35 Zha Jizuo (查繼佐, 1601–1676) collected a series of Yuan loyalists' biographies in his historical work. See, Zha Jizuo 1986, 1340.
36 Yü Ben, *Jishilu jianzheng*, 264.
37 These official letters and decrees include: 1) The letter to Yuan Emperor (written in 1367, TZSL, 25: 374–375, translation see Robinson 2019b, 193–194); 2) Sacrificial announcements to God (TZSL, 28: 439); 3) The letter to the ministers of Central Secretariat (TZSL, 28: 471); 4) A Call to Arms for the Central Plains (TZSL, 26: 10–11); 5) Statement of enthronement (TZSL, 29: 482–483); a similar version recorded in Yü Ben's Chronicle entitled "Decree of adapting the title of State", Yü Ben, *Jishilu jianzheng*, 242–243; 6) Decree on reviving the cloth (TZSL, 30: 525, translation see, Yuan Zujie 2002, 46); 7) The Letters to Yunnan, King of Korea Kingdom, Japan and Java (TZSL, 37: 749, 39: 786, 39: 787).
38 TZSL, 29: 482–483.
39 TZSL, 26: 402–404.
40 Yü Ben, *Jishilu jianzheng*, 282–299.
41 TZSL, 25: 374.
42 TZSL, 37: 749–750.
43 Legge 1964, 213; Du Hongtao 2014, 52–57.
44 TZSL, 53: 1040.
45 TZSL, 53: 1046–1048.
46 TZSL, 30: 525.
47 Liang Yin 2013, 550; Dardess 1983, 104.
48 TZSL, 44: 862–864.
49 Zhu Yuanzhang 2014, 408.
50 TZSL, 57: 1116.

51 TZSL, 106: 1767.
52 TZSL, 147: 2310–2311. For Chabui's story see, *YS* 144: 2871.
53 Wang Yun 1985, 484.
54 Ye Ziqi 1959, IV, 72.
55 Wang Yun 1985, I, 484–485.
56 Zhao Yi 1984, 684.
57 Yang Yü 2006, 199; Tao Zongyi 2004, II, 21.
58 The evidence is: at 1 November 1373, Zhu Yuanzhang ordered to build the temple of the ancient Chinese emperors and the Temple Yuan Shizu located in Beiping (i.e. Beijing). TZSL, 86: 1427.
59 Tao Zongyi 2004, III, 32–38; Bei 2010, 42.
60 Wang Hui 2016, I, 105–106; Xu Yikui 2008, IV, 69.
61 TZSL, 26: 401, 28: 439, 29: 478, 29: 482, 30: 525, 34: 599, 37: 749, 39: 786, 39: 787, 67: 1266.
62 In the text appeared as: "九十三年之間" or "九十三年之治". TZSL, 232: 3391; "Legislative instruction: on barbarian-Yuan dominance" (大誥: 胡元制治), in: *Quanming wen*, vol. 1, 587.
63 Song Lian 1999, 356. "混一四海," See, Wang Hui 2016, 12: 344 & 350.
64 Gao Qi 1985, 451.
65 (a) "Letter addressed to Prince Gunashiri"; *TZSL*, 198: 2977–2978; (b) "Letter addressed to Ajashiri". Both Mongolian and Chinese texts were included in Mostaert 1977, I-II, 15–17.
66 TZSL, 198: 2977–2978. (written 30 December 1389).
67 Mostaert 1977, VII, 22.
68 Wulan 2016, 75–86.
69 Mostaert 1977, VII, 23.
70 Robinson 2019b, 213.
71 TZSL, 53: 1046–1048.
72 Manz 2000, 135.
73 TZSL, 52: 1019–1020; Chŏng Inji 1972, 42: 635–636.
74 Wang Shizhen 1985, 18: 336.
75 The tradition of the sacrifices to "Five Mountains and Four Rivers" (五嶽四瀆) derived from the *Fengshan* (封禪) offerings, which were sacrifices brought to heaven and Earth. Si Maqian 1982, 28: 1371; Ban Gu 1962, 25: 1247–1249.
76 TZSL, 47: 938–939, 48: 954; Chŏng Inji 1972, 42: 632–633; Ngô 2016, 7: 377.
77 *Taizong shilu*, 50: 751, 47: 723, 86: 1133, 183: 1970; Wang Shizhen 1985, 1: 2–3.
78 Guo Jiahui 2020, 1–54.
79 TZSL, 192, 2886; Chŏng Inji 1972, 137: 760.
80 Chŏng Inji 1972, 45: 666–667; TZSL, 144: 2263.
81 Chŏng Inji 1972, 30: 472; RDT, 438; Mao Haiming 2017, 117–120.
82 Zhang Tingyü 1974, 332: 8617–8618. The brief introduction of the *Mingshi* was based on Yan Congjian 2009, 412, 432, 466, 470, 494.
83 TZSL, 234: 3420.
84 Nawa'i 1977, 279.
85 Hafiz-i Abru 1993, II, 466–467.
86 Ahrar 2002, 325–326.
87 Shami said, "In the Chin, Machin and Khitay", after the death of Emperor "Tunghuz Khan" ("Wild-boar Khan", i.e. Zhu Yuanzhang), his state slipped into the chaos (*harj wa marj bi-il wa ulus-i u rah yaft*). Shami 1937, I, 213.
88 TZSL, 196: 2951, 198: 2977; Mostaert 1977, 11.
89 *Taizong shilu*, 6: 56, 8: 105.

90 Hu Han 2013, IV, 445.

91 The discussion based on the Chinese sources, see Zhou Qingshu 2001, 495–525. For parallel research based on the Mongolian historical accounts see Elverskog 2008, 211–243.

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CHAPTER FIFTY-EIGHT

THE LEGACY OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE IN MONGOLIA

Ippei Shimamura

INTRODUCTION

Historical figures are portrayed in different ways at different times. In some cases, a person who has been negatively evaluated is reassessed positively, and vice versa. When it comes to Chinggis Khan, the founder of the Great Mongolian Empire, his portrayal varies depending upon culture, region, era, and individual. Obviously, there is a vast amount of academic research on Chinggis Khan. On top of that, Chinggis continues to be depicted in various fields, such as novels, plays, movies, and music, all over the world. In other words, Chinggis Khan has been the resource for both academic and cultural production across the globe. This is one of the greatest legacies left by Chinggis and the Mongol Empire.

His image differs greatly between the East and the West. Indeed, Chinggis Khan might be the "litmus paper" for testing one's views regarding Asians.[1] In the West and Russia, Chinggis Khan has long been a symbol of brutality and barbarism. As is well known, the "enlightenment" thinkers, such as Rousseau and Montesquieu, disparaged Chinggis and the Mongol Empire, and this tendency carried over to the modern Western world.[2] On the other hand, in East Asia, many Asians came to regard Chinggis as their "racial" and/or national hero after they encountered Western "modernity." For example, some Japanese elites, such as Suematsu Kencho (1855–1920), who studied at the University of Cambridge and was one of Japan's first Doctors of Letters, fabricated the story that Chinggis Khan was Minamoto no Yoshitsune (1159–1189), a famous Japanese military commander, in order to overcome their own inferiority complex toward the West. A Yale alumnus named Oyabe Mata-ichiro (1861–1941) also tried to prove the Japanese Chinggis "hypothesis."[3] In China, despite the fact that the historical Chinggis Khan could not speak or write in Chinese, historians have long considered him as one of the greatest "Chinese" emperors.

When it comes to Mongolia, Chinggis Khan and his great empire are the foremost symbol of national pride in the 21st century. If one walks around the capital Ulaanbaatar, it is very easy to find the name and image of Chinggis everywhere. A giant statue of Chinggis Khan sits in front of the government palace, attended by

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Qubilai and Ögödei on either side. A 40 meter-high equestrian statue of Chinggis was also built in Erdene county, an eastern suburb of the capital Ulaanbaatar. Moreover, in 2012, National Pride Day coincides with the "birthday" of Chinggis Khan on the first day of the first winter month by their traditional lunar calendar, which falls on different days of the Gregorian calendar each year.

In spite of today's glorification, Chinggis Khan was, supposedly, almost forgotten when Mongolia started to modernize after they gained independence from the Qing dynasty in the early 20th century. In fact, the glorification of Chinggis Khan began only after the fall of the socialist regime. The democratization movement, which began in December 1989, was regarded by the Mongols as a kind of "ethno-national revival" to liberate themselves from the yoke of the Soviet Union. Chinggis Khan and his empire was the most important icon for their democratization because they were not allowed to speak of him under pressure from the Soviet Union. When democratization started, the rock band *Khonkh* (the Bell) sung, "Forgive us! We have been unable to sing your precious name during the socialist era. Forgive your poor people for having been afraid to even speak out your name albeit we wanted [to]." The song was enthusiastically supported by the citizens and represented the national sentiment of Mongolia at the time.

Yet can the Mongolian nationalism, symbolized by Chinggis Khan, simply be explained as a reaction to Soviet "oppression" before being "liberated" under the influence of "Western views"? If the name of Chinggis had been completely forgotten during the socialist era, Chinggis would not have suddenly appeared as their nationalistic icon shortly after the democratization movement started. It is more natural to deduce that Chinggis Khan had already been a nationalist icon for Mongols during the socialist era, even if covertly.

As Benedict Anderson argued, the concept of a nation, or the imagined community, was generated in the process of modernization through the proliferation of printing technology, which made it possible for people living in distant regions to imagine themselves as a common literate culture, which he dubbed "print capitalism."[4] What is rather unique about Mongolia is that nationalism was generated by interpreting the "print socialism": modernization and the spread of printing technologies were brought about during the socialist era, and nationalism was constructed by/with socialism.[5] In 1945, under the influence of the Soviet Union, the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced instead of traditional Mongolian script, which had been used since the 13th century. It was, therefore, after the introduction of Cyrillic script that modern education was developed, and the literacy rate increased so rapidly.[6] Thus, it is certain that knowledge of Chinggis started to spread in Mongolia during the socialist period (1924–1992), especially after the late 1940s, when education in the Cyrillic script became widespread.

Yet, all publications in socialist Mongolia were censored by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (hereafter MPRP), which followed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereafter CPSU). In fact, the Soviet Russian scholars intervened to recast Mongolian history because both the Mongol Empire and Chinggis Khan represented national humiliation and the two-century-long Mongol rule of Russia, which was denounced as the "Tatar-Mongol Yoke."[7] The Soviet Russian scholars and media constantly provided negative information on Chinggis to local Mongol scholars.

Mongolian intellectuals, however, constructed their own nationalism, absorbing the knowledge from the Soviet Union and interpreting it through "rhetorical negation": the

more Russians criticized and even demonized Chinggis, the more Mongols saw him as great and a source of Russian fear. This "antonymic understanding" later spread to the general public through word of mouth, which I designate the "reverse of print socialism," which differs much from print capitalism, or the capitalist formation of nationalism.

Christopher Kaplonski cast doubt on the idea that the socialists demonized Chinggis Khan in Mongolia.[8] Nonetheless, local intellectuals would recollect "he was forgotten from our history" and/or "we were not allowed to speak on him during the socialist era." Examining the contradictory discourses between "documented past" and "recalled past," Kaplonski argues it is important for post-socialist Mongols to highlight the negative aspects of socialism to underline Chinggis's contemporary role: a symbol of national pride and the new democracy. As a result, he concluded the post-socialist Mongols "remembered" the "mythico-history" in which "Chinggis was forgotten in the socialist period." Yet, quite oddly, Kaplonski ignored both the contents and compiling process of the *History of the Mongolian People's Republic* (hereafter the *National History*), which should be indispensable materials for examining the socialist discourse on Chinggis Khan.

The *National History*, which was the official history of Mongolia, was compiled three times throughout the socialist period. The first edition was compiled in Russian and translated into Mongolian for publication in 1955.[9] Three volumes of the revised edition came out in 1966, 1968, and 1969,[10] and the third edition was out in 1984.[11] Each edition was compiled in Russian and Mongolian. Thus, in this chapter, I would like to demonstrate how Chinggis Khan was represented in Mongolia during the socialist era and how Chinggis Khan was portrayed as the national hero by interpreting "print socialism," examining the contents and compiling process of the *National History*.

Whereas Chinggis was portrayed as a bloody invader and destroyer of foreign nations in the first edition of 1954 and 1955, the second edition of 1966 saw him in a different way: the founder of the Mongolian independent state. Yet, the third edition returned to the same stance as the first edition. This dramatic change to the discourse on Chinggis indicates the trajectory of the tough negotiation between Mongolia, the Soviet Union, and even China.

REPRESENTATION OF CHINGGIS KHAN IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY

In the early 20th century, Mongolia's traditional image of Chinggis Khan was that of a religious ancestor: a Buddhist deity or a mythical hero from folklore rather than a historical personage.[12] However, after the Qing dynasty collapsed (1911) and Mongolia regained its independence, Mongolian intellectuals gradually acquired geographical and historical information by translating major works of Western and Soviet scholarship on Chinggis and the Mongol Empire.[13] As a result, the Mongolian historical consciousness was both secularized and Europeanized.[14]

It was in *A Brief History of Mongolia* that Mongolian intellectuals first wrote their own history using modern methodology, while also referring to Russian and European scholars such as B. Vladimirtsov, G. Ramstedt, and W. Kotowicz.[15] The author, A. Amar, was the prime minister of Mongolia in the early 20th century (in office 1928–1930, 1936–1939). However, this volume was not a major resource for constructing Mongolian nationalism because it was confiscated soon after its publication. Amar was then arrested and executed in Moscow on July 10 in 1941

because he "betrayed the revolution" and was accused of being a Japanese spy.[16] After Amar's purge, Mongolian intellectuals stopped writing on Chinggis Khan and only committed to translating Russian writings on the topic, which was much safer.

From the 1940s to the early 1950s, Mongol representations of Chinggis disappeared, and instead, translations of Russian writings became the mainstream. For instance, Ts. Damdin-Surun (Damdinsüren) translated Pozniakov's *The Mongol Empire and the Age of Chinggis Khan* into traditional Mongolian in 1941. However, soon after its publication, the literacy policy was reset under the influence of Soviet Russia: the orthography was changed from Mongolian vertical script to Cyrillic script in the same year so that writings such as Amar's work, which praises Chinggis Khan, would not have been widely read by the Mongolian public.

In the postwar period, parallel with the start of the Cold War, the Soviet Union adopted a policy of tightening its grip on the nationalism of non-Russian ethnic groups. At the end of 1948, the first Mongolian textbook, *Ardyn Unshikh Bichig* (The People's Reader), was published.[17] Yet shortly after its publication, Yu. Tsedenbal, the Secretary General of MPRP, officially criticized the book for its "errors" of "praising Chinggis Khan's robbery campaign" and its "exclusively nationalistic tone."[18] Accordingly, this volume was banned, and those involved in editing it were dismissed from their workplaces.[19]

Nonetheless, local scholars tried to publish books about Chinggis Khan. Ts. Damdinsüren translated *The Secret History of Mongols* into Cyrillic Mongolian, mentioning the Marxist view, in which Chinggis Khan was the chief of an oppressive feudal clique, in the preface.[20] In spite of the criticism against Chinggis and the Mongol Empire, this volume became "the best seller" throughout the socialist era, being reprinted four times, thus helping spread knowledge of Chinggis to the general public in Mongolia at that time.

In addition, local Mongol intellectuals translated Vasily Ian's novels, such as *Chinggis Khan* (1939) and *Batu* (1941). The translation project was acceptable for the MPRP and CPSU because these books received a great response in the Soviet Union, and Ian won the Stalin Prize in 1942 at the height of the Soviet–German war. *Chinggis Khan* was written from the perspective of a subject of the Khwarazmshah dynasty, named Rahim, whose home was invaded by Chinggis (1219–1223) and depicted Chinggis Khan as a brutal, barbaric, ugly, and greedy man and the Mongol army as a group of beggarly-dressed ruffians. This volume became widely known in Mongolia because 10,000 copies of the Mongolian translation were published in the country, whose population numbered 758,000 at the time.[21] The Mongolian public accordingly came to learn about Chinggis's conquest of other countries such as China, Central Asia, and Russia through Ian's novel because *The Secret History of the Mongols* does not provide accurate geographical information on the foreign wars against Western countries, such as "*Oros akh nar*" (Russian Elder Brothers).

THE NATIONAL HISTORY COMPILATION PROJECT – FIRST EDITION (1948–1955)

After the death of Kh. Choibalsan (1952) and Stalin (1953), the Soviet–Mongolian *National History of Mongolia* project began. It took political intervention from the Soviet Union to make another country's national history: this volume was de facto written only by the Soviet Russian scholars, albeit the project was named a "joint

work" between the Mongolian Science Committee (MSC, later Mongolian Academy of Sciences) and the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union (hereafter ASSU).

According to the official history of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, the joint National History project began in December 1948 after Tsedenbal's criticism against "the People's Reader," with the agreement of S. I. Vavilov, president of the ASSU, and B. Jargalsaikhan, chairman of the MSC.[22] When the first compilation meeting of the book was held in December 1948, it was already decided that Soviet scholars would write most of the volume, except for the contemporary history. The Russian historians Kozin and Iakbovskii were in charge of writing the section on the history of Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire.[23]

Thus, Chinggis was portrayed as an exploiter of nomads, a bloody invader, and a destroyer of foreign countries in the first edition, despite such demonization having nothing to do with socialist ideology. The first edition was compiled in Russian first and published in Moscow on October 26, 1954. Thereafter, the *National History of Mongolia* was translated into Mongolian and published in April 1955 in Ulaanbaatar. A significant number of volumes were printed both in Russia and Mongolia: 10,000 copies of the Russian version and 25,000 copies of the Mongolian version were printed, although the total Mongolian population at that time was merely 827,000.

The contents of the section on Chinggis Khan and the Mongolian Empire consisted of only 31 pages of the total 539 pages in the Mongolian edition. It avoided Temüjin's youth, which was vividly depicted in *The Secret History of the Mongols*, and less than two pages were devoted to the process of unifying the Mongol tribes before Chinggis ascended to the throne in 1206.[24]

The book contained a strong bias against Chinggis in the first edition. For example, the author concluded that the *nökhör* (companions),[25] Temüjin's chief vassals, "were private servants (*shadar zarts*) who were accomplices of the nobility of the time" and "their role was to subdue the common nomadic people who fought against feudal exploitation and subjugation," citing a passage from *The Secret History of the Mongols* that the *nökhörs* said to Chinggis "We will capture and offer beautiful girls and swift horses (to your majesty), going to many battles."[26]

Whereas the first edition describes very little about Temüjin's early life, it provides detailed information on Chinggis's campaigns against foreign nations, using the special term "robbery campaign" (Mon. *diirmiin ayan dain*), not invasion (*türemgiilel*) nor conquest (*ezegnel, baildan daguulalt*). For example, for the fall of Samarqand, the first edition speaks eloquently from the viewpoint of the conquered people, without citing any primary sources:

> The citizens of Samarkand showed the invaders how they truly loved the hometown, defending the city so tenaciously and heroically. Chinggis Khan's army, however, slaughtered thousands of people and occupied the capital of Khwarazm after the encircling operation for four to five months. Driven by hatred, Mongolian warriors killed countless numbers of people.[27]

Finally, the first edition brands Chinggis's empire as merely a gang of robbers without any economic substructure:

> [Chinggis Khan] directed all the power of the Mongol nation into robbery campaigns to enslave the peoples of Asia, Europe, and elsewhere. Chinggis's

> empire had no economic base (*niitiin ediin zasgiin suuringüi*), and specialized in military organization for conquest so that it was a mishmash of peoples and tribes that gathered under the rule of the Mongol chieftains.[28]

COMPILATION OF THE SECOND EDITION (1955–1966)

Shortly after the publication of the Mongolian version, the Institute of Oriental Studies, ASSU unilaterally sent a letter to N. Jagvaral, chairman of the MSC, on June 8, 1955, informing him that the Standing Committee of the ASSU planned to compile a new three-volume *National History of Mongolia* and asked for Mongolian cooperation in writing and compiling the book.[29] However, the Soviet side had already decided the whole schedule and the editorial members. Writing was to begin in January 1956, and the project was to be completed in December 1959 for publication in 1960. The editorial members from the ASSU included A. A. Guber, S. V. Kiserëv, and L.P. Duman.[30]

In response, the MSC expressed its sincere gratitude to the ASSU and the Soviet scholars who proposed the plan. They promised that Mongolian scholars would "willingly" participate in the new compilation project but also proposed a new deadline of 1965 because there was not enough time to complete the project by 1959. Most notably, the MSC proposed inviting the Chinese Academy of Sciences to participate in this project. The MSC wrote to the ASSU:

> it is essential for us to establish close research cooperation with Chinese scholars because we need Chinese primary sources and also the assistance of Chinese scholars for translating them, in order to write the history of relations between China and Mongolia.[31]

The Soviet Union responded to this proposal on August 17, 1956: "We understood the importance of Chinese primary sources, and agree to the participation of Chinese scholars in our project."[32] Concurrently, they notified the editorial board members and chosen Soviet authors.

Meanwhile, on February 16, 1957, the MSC assigned editors and authors for the second edition and appointed Sh. Natsagdorj to write the part on Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire. On June 19, 1957, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the MPRP established the Preparatory Committee for the Compilation of the Three Volumes of the *National History* from 1958 to 1960. The committee appointed L. Tsend as the chairman, with Sh. Natsagdorj and M. Ser-Odjav as members.[33] Finally, the joint-editorial council, consisting of historians from three countries, gathered in Moscow from December 9 to 18 in 1957. There were 45 participants in total: 33 scholars from the Soviet Union, 3 scholars and 4 interpreters from China, and 6 scholars from Mongolia.[34]

The council approved two changes to the section on Chinggis Khan from the first edition. The first was the inclusion of Temüjin's childhood and the struggles in his youth. The change occurred as most Soviet scholars no longer viewed *The Secret History of the Mongols* as "literature" but as a historical source. Secondly, they added a new section titled "the Unified Mongol State," giving a certain positive evaluation to Chinggis's unification of Mongolia.[35]

However, the Chinese scholars suddenly withdrew from the project. On February 5, 1958, the Chinese deputy minister of culture met with Mr. Sosorbaram, the Mongolian minister of culture, in Beijing and said, "Although the joint project of compiling the history is useful, we have not even finished writing our own history, nor been able to come up with the unified view on when feudalism and capitalism began."[36] According to the archival material in the Institute of History, the message from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated:

> It is not appropriate for our country (China) to participate in the joint compilation of National History of Mongolia by the three countries. However, we are ready to provide all relevant materials in our possession if necessary. If the history of a country is written by historians from another country, it will not be possible to fully and legitimately evaluate the flow of that country's history.[37]

Obviously, Zhou's comments were an indirect criticism of the Soviet-led compilation project. China officially withdrew from the project in February 1958, possibly due to fears the Soviets intended to compile the National History of China in the name of internationalism, which Nikita Khrushchev advocated by criticizing Stalin after his death in 1956 as well as the Sino–Soviet split over the doctrinal interpretation on Marxism. Another consideration was that from the 1930s, Mao Zedong used Chinggis Khan as a resource for building Chinese nationalism, by regarding him a hero of the "Chinese Nation." For example, Mao composed a poem in praise of himself in 1936, saying, "Although Chinggis Khan was the heavenly Hero who achieved much in one generation, he merely knew how to bend a bow and shoot the giant eagle," indicating he was superior to the Mongol leader. Mao also moved the mausoleum of Chinggis Khan from Ordos in Inner Mongolia to Yan'an and held a ceremony for him.[38]

Despite the Chinese withdrawal, the three-volume second edition of *The National History of Mongolia* was published in April 1966. The second edition saw substantial changes in relation to Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire, now covering two-thirds of the first volume, consisting of 24 chapters divided into 2 parts and 6 subsections. Secondly, the chapter titles changed from negative expressions, such as "The Foundation of the Unified Feudal State of Mongolia" and "The Conquest of Chinggis and the Mongol Empire."[39] More importantly, the second edition reevaluated the Mongol Empire as a state with a political system, instead of a mishmash of robber bands. It devoted 13 pages to a section titled "Political Organization of the Mongol State."[40] As mentioned, Temüjin's youth received 43 pages based on *The Secret History of the Mongols*, a source ignored in the first edition.

The second edition adopted "the summer of 1162" as the birth year of Chinggis Khan, based on copies of the *Yuan Shi* provided by Chinese scholars. Although the Chinese scholars withdrew from the project, their brief participation provided Chinggis Khan's birth year, which was "unknown" in the first edition. The second edition also described Chinggis Khan's birth place: "Temüjin was born as the son of Queen Hö'elün, wife of Yesügei Baatar in Delüün Boldog, which is near the Onon river, in Khentii Province of our country."[41] Mongol scholars may have seen it as essential to identify Chinggis's birthplace within the territory of the current Mongolian People's Republic because some foreign scholars located it in Southern Siberia – inside Soviet territory. Also, the evaluation of Chinggis's early life dramatically

changed. He moved from being a spoiled son of the feudal aristocracy to a person who overcame poverty and hardships: whereas Temüjin was described only as "the son of a rich feudal lord" in the first edition, the second edition eloquently describes Yesügei Baatar's murder and the subsequent impoverishment of Temüjin's family.[42]

The second edition kept an "objective" view of Chinggis's character. Reflecting back on how he murdered his brother, Bekter, it stated that: "Temüjin grew up to be extremely pompous and ill-tempered, compared to the other children." On the other hand, it also remarks that "Temüjin was famous among the people for his courage and quick wit," mixing up his strengths and weaknesses.[43] Moreover, dramatic changes were not limited to the treatment of Chinggis's early life but also that of his vassals and his conquest. Rather than describing the *nökör* as "private servants" and "their role was feudal exploitation and subjugation," the second edition evaluated the *nökör* as diametrically opposite: "First of all, we have to describe that the support of *nökhör* and *anda* (sworn brothers) played essential roles for Temüjin's unification of the Mongols."[44]

Regarding Chinggis's external campaigns, especially the battle of Samarqand, the second edition objectively explains not only the brutality of the Mongols but also the reason why Chinggis was able to capture the city. It is clear that Mongol scholars were able to correct the biased description of Chinggis Khan to some degree in the second edition: the text shifted from "They defended Samarkand tenaciously and heroically" to "there were betrayers inside the city" and acknowledged that the Mongol troops did not kill all the citizens but actually killed "three quarters" of them.[45] These changes were made by citing the *Jami' al-tavarikh* and the *Travels to the West* of Qiu Changchun, which the Chinese provided.

On the other hand, the conclusion to the chapter on Chinggis's achievements in the second edition evaluated him on the basis of socialist ideology: "Chinggis concentrated all of his energy for the aristocracy."[46] "He strengthened feudalism, suppressing the people." Likewise, it gave a negative assessment of his external campaign as destructive and stunting the development of those countries.[47]

Meanwhile, the second edition refutes the essentialist discourse made by A. P. Petershevsky, a Soviet historian:

> the Mongols' massacres were so systematic because these were carried out by the direct commands from Chinggis. This system suited the mentality of both Mongolian and Turkic nomads who joined him because this system works only for breaking down resistance, and committing robbery.[48]

The author of the same chapter in the second edition, Sh. Natsagdorj, offered an alternative view by indicating that some of Chinggis's sons opposed the massacres, and that such massacres were drastically reduced in the reign of Ögödei Qa'an (1229–1241). In doing so, Sh. Natsagdorj, "indirectly" argued against Petershevsky's narrative that the massacres were due to the nomads' inherent racial predisposition toward violence.[49]

Thus, the discourse of the second edition, which was mainly written by a Mongolian scholar, is more objective than that of the first edition, which was written by Soviet Russian scholars, because the former examined more of the Chinese and Persian primary sources. Moreover, the second edition was written by referring to many international studies written in English, French, German, and Japanese, whereas the first edition was written mainly by referring to Russian materials. Quite

ironically, the source criticism, which was imported from the Soviet Union, enabled Mongol scholars to refute Russian demonization of Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire. The Mongolian refutation of the Soviet scholars was, however, limited to some degree due to the constraints of socialist ideology, leading to an inconsistent evaluation of Chinggis's achievements.

Despite the drastic change of historical views, the audience of the second edition is unclear. In my fieldwork, aside from intellectuals, I have never encountered a Mongolian citizen who read the second edition during the socialist era, though 10,000 copies were published. This is, perhaps, because a purge against representing Chinggis Khan positively occurred four years before the 1966 publication of the second edition.

THE 800TH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINGGIS KHAN'S BIRTH AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

In 1962, a purge occurred when Mongolia was to commemorate the 800th anniversary of the birth of Chinggis Khan. The commemoration festival was planned very carefully, according to J. Boldbaatar, a local historian who held an important post in MPRP at that time. Although the Mongolian intellectuals of the time shared the desire to hold a celebration for the 800th anniversary, it took much courage to speak out because they were afraid of being criticized as "nationalist."[50] In late 1961, however, shocking news arrived from students studying in China that China was planning to celebrate the 800th anniversary of Chinggis Khan's birth.[51] Flustered by the news, the Institute of History of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences (hereafter MAS) made a plan to celebrate the 800th anniversary immediately.

On January 8, 1962, D. Tsedev, director of the Institute of History, applied to J. Tsedenjav, head of the propaganda section of the MPRP, for permission to hold the 800th anniversary festival. At the same time, he sent a letter to S. D. Dylykov, the director of the division for Mongolian, Korean and Vietnamese Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the ASSU, asking for his opinion on whether it was permissible to hold the commemoration festival, and if so, how the commemoration should be organized.[52]

After some negotiation, D. Tömör-Ochir, the secretary general of the Politburo, proposed a plan for commemorating the 800th anniversary at a meeting held in the Politburo of the Central Committee, MPRP on February 8. On June 10, 1962, the Politburo approved the MAS proposal to honor the 800th anniversary of Chinggis Khan's birth,[53] as he contributed to the development of Mongolian history through the unification of Mongolian tribes and establishing an independent state.[54]

In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo, MAS formulated plans for the anniversary that included the erection of a stone monument to Chinggis Khan at Dadal in Khentii Province – his alleged birthplace – a film production on Chinggis Khan, and commemorative postal stamps. Interestingly, Mongolian scholars had to face the fact that they did not know the precise date of Chinggis Khan's birthday because it was not recorded in the historical sources. Therefore, historians decided the date by Buddhist divination. They asked astrologer-monks at the Gandan Monastery, which survived religious repression. Based on the advice of the monks, the Institute of History of MAS fixed the "precise" date of Chinggis Khan's birth at 6:00 a.m. on May 31, 1162. In accordance with this inference, the Political Bureau of the MPRP also decided to hold the 800th anniversary of his birth on May 31.[55]

On May 31, the Institute of History of the MAS organized a small academic conference to commemorate this anniversary. Initially planned to be held in the main auditorium of the government palace, it was conducted at the National Library, Room 106, without the involvement of the government. People flocked to the conference and filled the room, while those outside tried to listen by standing in front of Stalin's statue at the main entrance of the library.[56]

However, when the conference was about to begin, a telegraph suddenly arrived from Moscow. It contained an article written by I. M. Maiskii criticizing Chinggis Khan. There was no room for doubt that the article was a warning from the Soviet Union because it was unnatural for Maiskii, who was not a professional historian but a geographer, to write an article criticizing Chinggis Khan.[57] Yet, Mongolian scholars dared to open the conference as planned.

The conference began with opening remarks by B. Shirendev, president of MAS. The next speaker, Sh. Natsagdorj, who authored the history of the Mongol Empire in the second edition of the *National History* (1966), stated "Chinggis was the founder of the independent Mongolian state." He supported Chinggis Khan artfully by referring to B. I. Vladimirtsov, a well-known Soviet academician, as follows: "although he had great talent, Chinggis was a man of a different time and a child of a different people so that we should not see him as if he were an extraterrestrial." Then, Natsagdorj asserted Chinggis was a real person in history, saying, "Nevertheless Chinggis is not a people's hero, he was not a legendary or mythical figure." He added, "Chinggis was one of the Mongol aristocrats who were becoming feudalized, and he did his best to serve the aristocracy. We must not forget that he was a brutal conqueror who inflicted hardship and misery on many peoples of Europe and Asia." Finally, Natsagdorj concluded,

> The name of Chinggis is inextricably linked with the history of the struggle for Mongolian national independence in later times. In the minds of our people, it is appropriate that Chinggis has been remembered as a figure of merit as the founder of the independent Mongolian nation.[58]

Ts. Damdinsüren, the next speaker, also agreed with Vladimirtsov's view on Chinggis from the perspective of a scholar of literature. On the other hand, he strongly criticized Vasily Ian's *Chinggis Khan* as a "racist" novel, although he was one of the translators of the book.[59] Having identified the Russo-Western bias against the Mongols, Damdinsüren concluded that Ian's novel "was written with no evidence, nor a shred of truth in his reasoning. There is not even the scent of Marxism in Ian's book."[60] The claims made by Mongolian scholars at the conference were too modest to be termed nationalistic because they only evaluated Chinggis as "the founder of an independent state." Rather, they supported Marxism. They only argued that the overly critical representations of Chinggis Khan made by Soviet scholars and writers had nothing to do with Marxism.

The Mongolians also made objections against deifying Chinggis Khan. Regarding the project on raising a monument to Chinggis Khan, L. Makhval, the sculptor, initially planned to erect a statue of Chinggis riding a horse with wings on its back. However, B. Rinchen and Kh. Perlee, who served as academic advisors, disagreed with the idea of Chinggis riding astride "Pegasus." Thus, the monument simply

depicted Chinggis Khan in his *deel*, or traditional costume. Thus, the academic advisors avoided deifying Chinggis and portrayed him as human.[61]

The Soviet Union replied to this Mongolian "nationalistic movement" with disapproval. *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the CPSU, vehemently condemned the 800th anniversary as the personal worship of Chinggis Khan in an article dated July 21, 1962. This article gave Yu. Tsedenbal an excuse for purging D. Tömör-Ochir, who was the proponent of the 800th anniversary, as well as Tsedenbal's most powerful rival.

On September 10, 1962, at the third general assembly of the Central Committee of the MPRP, Tsedenbal criticized Tömör-Ochir as extremely "nationalistic," saying he made the commemoration events too attractive and took credit away from Choibalsan for establishing the independent state by giving it to Chinggis Khan. Tsedenbal claimed it was not Chinggis Khan but Kh. Choibalsan (1895–1952) who was the founder of independent Mongolia. According to Tsedenbal, "Choibalsan contributed to make Mongolia join the United Nations in 1961." Tsedenbal falsely accused Tömör-Ochir of being pro-Chinese because "Chinese Inner Mongolia also planned to commemorate the 800th anniversary of Chinggis Khan's birth."[62] Although Tömör-Ochir was trying to prevent the Chinese from taking over the commemoration of Chinggis Khan, he was ironically accused of supporting the Chinese. Tömör-Ochir was expelled from the party as the Sino–Soviet conflict deepened.

Scholars who praised Chinggis Khan were also purged. On January 9, 1963, *Ünen*, the official newspaper of the MPRP, severely criticized Ts. Damdinsüren, Sh. Natsagdorj, and B. Rinchen for being "nationalistic."[63] Damdinsüren was thoroughly criticized by Tsedenbal at the 3rd General Assembly of the Central Committee of the MPRP for "making nationalistic and racist remarks at the academic conference of the 800th anniversary." Damdinsüren was demoted from the director of the Institute of Language and Literature at MAS to an ordinary researcher.[64]

Thus, the proceedings of the academic conference on Chinggis Khan were banned from publication. Additionally, the movie of Chinggis Khan, planned for the 800th anniversary, was also canceled.[65] The 800th anniversary was a turning point, after which it became taboo to represent Chinggis positively again. Hence, the *Third Edition of National History* (1981) was almost identical to the first edition of 1955 regarding Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire. Only 16 of the 667 pages of the text were devoted to Chinggis's life.[66]

The Mongolian people, however, started to struggle against the oppressive print socialism through other mediums. A poem on Chinggis Khan, composed by a young student studying in Moscow, spread so quickly through word of mouth because it was not only published in the newspaper of literature (*Utga Zohiolyn Sonin*) but also was read on the radio in Ulaanbaatar. The poem, titled "Chinggis," by D. Purevdorj (1933–2009) begins with a verse that seems to strongly deny what someone else has said. It proclaimed the unification of the Mongols in the face of hardship.

> Chinggis was not born from the land of the bow.
> Chinggis was not born from the tip of an arrow.
> Chinggis was not born of Mother Hö'elün
> Chinggis emerged from the arid land of Mongolia.[67]

Purevdorj said in a later interview that he wrote this poem "with all his heart on his sleeve."[68] It took nerve to do what he did. Why did the poet have to shout as if he was denying someone else's words, repeating "*was not*"? Obviously enough, it was Soviet intellectuals who alleged that "Temüjin *was* born from a bow and arrow." Because the national epic, which the Russians liked to tell about themselves, was the story of a struggle against the horsemen of the Asiatic steppe – "*bow and arrow tribes*" such as Avars, Khazars, Polovtsians, and Mongols.[69]

This poem was banned after its publication in 1962 and criticized as an "expression of nationalism" by the National Thinking Committee, so it did not see the light of day for 28 years, until democratization.[70] However, the poem went viral among the Mongols, first, as it was very easy to memorize. It used alliteration, which was very familiar to the Mongols through traditional oral literature. Second, the poem was evocative for younger generations at that time.

According to the aforementioned Professor Ch. Dagvadorj (1942–), who was a student of the Department of Literature at the National University of Mongolia (NUM) at the time, many students of the NUM were so impressed by this poem that they memorized and recited it. Dagvadorj witnessed that all the students in the Department of Literature were able to recite "Chinggis" by heart. Moreover, not only students but also ordinary people learned the poem by word of mouth.[71] "Chinggis" also won popularity in Moscow: Professor G. Tserenkhand (1938–), an ethnologist, who was studying in Moscow at the time, recalled that many Mongolian students in Moscow were able to recite this poem, regardless of their major.[72]

Sengiin Erdene (1929–2000), a popular novelist, testified to a Japanese journalist that the 800th anniversary inspired him to write about Chinggis Khan. Regarding the scenario for a movie about Chinggis, "Under the Eternal Power of Heaven," which he wrote after democratization, Erdene said that he intended to introduce Chinggis Khan as an "ordinary human to people." He said, "Whereas there are many films about Chinggis Khan made abroad, none of them have represented him as a normal human being from the viewpoint of us, Mongolians."[73]

CONCLUSION: DEMYTHOLOGIZING SOCIALISM

The suppression of Chinggis Khan's discourse by the Soviet Union and its subordinate dictator Tsedenbal on the 800th anniversary caused a strong but quiet reaction in praise of Chinggis Khan. Mongolian intellectuals acquired knowledge from the Soviet Union and other countries, including China, during the compilation of the *National History*. Second, they tried to represent a revised version of Chinggis Khan in response to the demonization of him by the Soviet scholars. This revision was achieved by compiling the second edition and commemorating the 800th anniversary of the birth of Chinggis Khan. Their attempt, however, ended up with failure due to Soviet intervention.

The Mongolian scholars *were not* nationalists opposed to socialism but *were* nationalists who supported socialism. The "socialist" Mongolian scholars agreed Chinggis Khan was a feudal lord who exploited the people and made foreign countries suffer. What was unforgivable for them, however, was that Soviet scholars and writers, irrespective of their ideology, denied Chinggis's personality and represented

him as a devil or a robber. The Mongolian intellectuals only wished to reclaim the demonized Chinggis. The only thing they did not concede was that Chinggis had been born as a human child and rose from poverty to become the founder of Mongolia as an independent nation.

The image of a "human Chinggis" was fostered among Mongolian intellectuals through their education in scientific socialism from Soviet Russians. Thus, the barbarian Chinggis, which the Soviet Union constructed, was demythologized by "Mongolian" socialism. Mongolian nationalism was, therefore, unique insofar as it had been formed by demythologizing their hero (Chinggis) and depicting him as an ordinary human, whereas most modern nation-states formed their nationalism by mythologizing "national heroes."

NOTES

1 Shimamura 2012; Shimamura 2017.
2 cf. Stuart 1997; Weatherford 2004.
3 Miyawaki 2006.
4 Anderson 2006.
5 cf. Bulag 1998.
6 The number of literate people in Mongolian script increased from 10,000 (total population 684,000) in 1926 to 70,000 (total population 738,000) in 1935 and 127,000 (total population 739,000) in 1940 (Tserendorj 1969a, 402). Since adopting Cyrillic script, the literacy rate increased from 20% in 1940 to 90% in 1963 (Tserendorj 1969b, 695).
7 Bulag 2010, 47; Figes 2003, 358–429.
8 Kaplonski 2005.
9 For the first edition, see Grekov et al. 1954. For the Mongolian edition, see Grekov et al. 1955.
10 Natsagdorj 1966; Natsagdorj and Ishjamts 1968; Shirendev and Sanjdorj 1969.
11 Bira et al. 1984.
12 cf. Franke 1994; Nasan Bayar 2007; Hasumi 1993; Harayama 1995.
13 cf. Tseren 1990; Envtüvshin et al. 2011, 29.
14 *EMME*, 101.
15 Amar 2015.
16 Damdinsüren et al. 2005, 294–295; Boldbaatar 2016, 86–95.
17 Jamsranjav 1948.
18 Resolution No, 34/64 of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the MPRP.
19 National Archives of Mongolia, УТА УТНОНББА Х-4, Д-16, Хн-5, х.13.
20 Damdinsüren 1990, 9–11.
21 Ian 1950.
22 Batdorj 2011.
23 Ölziibaatar 2014.
24 Grekov et al. 1955, 107–108.
25 Incidentally, *nökör* is used to mean "comrade" in the socialist period.
26 Grekov et al. 1955, 102–103.
27 Grekov et al. 1955, 112–113.
28 Grekov et al. 1955, 118.
29 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.196–199.
30 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.198–199.

31 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.201.
32 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.210.
33 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.140.
34 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.149. Shirendev, Damdinsüren, Natsagdorj, Perlee, Gonchigdorj, and Ser-Odjav.
35 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.22–23.
36 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.157–160.
37 The Archives of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-7, х.159.
38 Yang 2004, 301–303; Bao 2005, 267.
39 Part 2, sub-part.1 and sub-part.1 chap.3.
40 Volume II, Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 5.
41 Natsagdorj 1966, 203.
42 Natsagdorj 1966, 201.
43 Natsagdorj 1966, 203.
44 Natsagdorj 1966, 212.
45 Natsagdorj 1966, 234.
46 Natsagdorj 1966, 240.
47 Natsagdorj 1966, 241.
48 Natsagdorj 1966, 241.
49 Natsagdorj 1966, 242.
50 Boldbaatar 2012, 8.
51 Institute of History, MAS decided to commemorate the anniversary on December 1, 1961, shortly after they knew the news. Institute of History, MAS ф.23, д.2, хн.415, х.1–2.
52 Boldbaatar 2012, 9.
53 Boldbaatar 2012, 9; Archives of MPRP Ф-04, Д-1, Хн-18.
54 Boldbaatar 2012, 10–11.
55 Boldbaatar 2012, 12–13.
56 Boldbaatar 2012, 23.
57 Chuluun 2012, 245.
58 Institute of History, MAS, Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-12, No.7, *Ünen*, May 31, 1962.
59 Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-12, No.4, х.4.
60 Ф-6, Д-1, Хн-12, No.4, х. 5.
61 Boldbaatar 2012, 28.
62 Boldbaatar 2012, 41.
63 *Ünen*, January 9, 1962.
64 Okada 1988, 277.
65 Boldbaatar 2012, 44–45.
66 Bira et al. 1984, 139–151.
67 Purevdorj 1994, 193–194.
68 Tseveendorj 2007, 147.
69 Figes 2003, 365.
70 Tseveendorj 2007, 146–147.
71 My interview with Ch. Dagvadorj on August 21, 2015, in Ulaanbaatar.
72 My interview with G. Tserenkhand on August 24, 2015, in Ulaanbaatar.
73 Matsuda 1996, 120–122.

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EMME, See List of Abbreviations.

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GLOSSARY

Airagh (distilled milk liquor)
altan orugh/altan urugh (lit. Golden Lineage, family of Chinggis Khan)
amir (Arab. commander)
anda (sworn companion, brother)
aqcha/aqča (Turk. silver currency)
aqtachi/aqtachin (equerry)
aral (island)
arban/alban (Mongol, tribute)
atabeg (Turk. commander with custody for a prince)
a'uruq (base camp)
a'yan (elite families)
azan (call to prayer)
bāč/bāj (road toll)
bagshi/bakhshi (Buddhist teacher)
balish (monetary unit, roughly 4.12 lbs, 2.16 kg)
baraka (blessing)
basqaq (Mongol overseer of conquered people/towns)
ba'urchi/ba'urchin (steward)
bazargan (merchant, trader)
beki (chief of clan)
beylerbeyi (Turk. chief commander)
bichig (edict)
bilig (piece of wisdom)
bitikchi/bitigchi (imperial secretary)
bodun (segment of tribe)
bö'e (shaman)
bökä'ül (royal food taster)
boqtagh (women's headdress)
bu (subgroup of clans)
buirugs (chiefs)
bulghaq (disorder, rebellion, upheaval)

byliny (Rus. poems and songs)
chao (Ch. paper currency)
cherbi (chamberlain of the *keshig*)
cherig (military force)
chislo (census)
dan (measurement, weight of grain)
dan' (Rus. tribute)
danshchiki (collector of tribute, *dan'*)
daruqachi/darugachi (governor, khan's representative in conquered regions)
dayitong (Grand Unity)
deel (item of clothing)
dhimmi (non-Muslims under Islamic protection or rule)
dirham (silver currency)
diwan/divan (Arab. government ministry)
Eduggen/Idughan (Mother Earth, deity)
ejen (lord)
elchi (emissary, messenger)
elteber (tax-collecting chief)
enchü/injü (people owned by the khan)
evoghlan (household servants)
firman (order, edict)
fuma (Ch. imperial son-in-law)
ger (Mong. tent)
gerege/gereg (passport, permission)
gokenin (shogun's warriors)
gur khan (Khitan imperial title)
güregen/küregen (imperial son in law)
haci (right to compensation)
hajj (Islamic pilgrimage)
ḥalqa (elite Mamluk troops)
hoyin irgen (Forest People)
Huihui (West Asian)
idiqut (Uyghur ruler, lit. 'Lord of Happiness')
il (submitted)
Ilkhan (title given to the Hülegüid rulers of the Middle East)
imam (Muslim spiritual leader)
insan-i kamil (perfect person)
iqta' (land, revenue grant)
Iran-zamin (Greater Iran)
'Iraq 'Ajami (Persian Iraq)
'Iraq al-Arabi (Arab Iraq)
irgen (people)
jam/yam (post, road network)
jamuchin/yamchi (operators of the postal network)
jarghu/yarghu/jarqu (trial, interrogation)
jarghuchi/jarghuchin/yarghui/jarquchin (magistrate, judge)
jarliq (*yarliq*, decree, order)

jasaq (*yasa*, command or law attributed to Chinggis Khan and his successors)
ja'un/ja'ud (unit of 100)
jete/jata (brigands, gang)
jeutau (Pacification Commissioner)
Jin shi (dynastic history of the Jin)
jins/jinsiyya (Arab. ethnic solidarity)
junfa (army law)
jüyin (Ch. border guard)
kafir (non-Muslim)
kan (hot-air heating)
Kangnido (*Map of Integrated Lands*)
kantō goryō (Jap. personal holdings)
kebte'ül (nightguards)
kemäči köbrükči (boatman and bridge inspector)
keshig/keshigten (imperial guard)
khaghan/qaghanate (imperial state)
khan (Turk/Mon. ruler)
khanate (political community ruled by a khan)
khanqah (hostel for Sufi Muslims)
kharaj (land tax)
khassakiyya (Arab. special military units)
khatun (lady, princess, queen)
khoshuu (princely shares)
khums (canonical Islamic tax)
khutba (Muslim call to prayer)
khwaja (lit. 'master' – craftsman, teacher, engineer, etc.)
köpek (currency used in the Middle Empire)
Koryŏsa (dynastic chronicle of the Koryo)
külüg (stallions)
kumiz/kumiss (fermented mare's milk)
küriyen (encampment)
li (Ch. proper actions)
Liao Shi (dynastic chronicle of the Liao)
mahdi (lit. rightly guided one, messiah, deliverer)
mahdi al-zaman (messiah of the age)
mal (general designation for taxes)
malaqai (hat, authority)
mamluks (manumitted slave soldiers)
mansab (office)
medekü (rulership)
menlig (father)
Ming shi (dynastic chronicle of the Ming)
minggan/minqan/minggat/minqat (nominal unit of 1,000 soldiers)
mingwang (wise king)
mithqal (measure, weight, roughly 4.25 g)
morin/narin (post road)
mostovshchina (Rus. road toll)

Muʿizz al-Ansāb (Timurid genealogical table)
murshid (spiritual guide, teacher)
myto/myt (old Russian word for road tolls)
naʿib (deputy, royal designee)
naʾib al-saltana (viceroy)
nasij (gold brocade)
nerge (large-scale hunt)
nökör, nököt/nökär (companion, bondsman)
noyan/noyat (Mon. commander)
nuntuq (territory)
nuntu'ucin/nuntuqchin (officials in charge of *nuntuq*)
oboq (extended clan)
omoq/aimag (tribe, pride)
ordu, ordo, orda (camp)
ortaq/ortoq (trader collaborating with Mongol patrons)
ötegü bo'ol (indentured or hereditary servants)
ötögüs/ötögü (elder guards)
paiza (see *gerege/gereg*)
pervane (official in charge of drafting decrees)
peykan (foot messengers)
pinghua (Ch. plain speech)
pir (lit. 'elder,' term of reverence)
podvoda (Rus. horse cart)
pönchen (Tib. chief administrator of Sakyapa)
poshlina/poshliny (Rus. tax)
posol'skii prikaz (Rus. foreign office)
povesti (Rus. tales)
qa'an (emperor, Great Khan)
Qa'an Ulus (Yuan Empire)
qabaqčïlïq (gate fee)
qadi (Islamic magistrate)
qalan (Mong. tax)
qalandar (antinomian Muslim mystic)
qam (shaman)
qantar (weight, roughly 80 kg)
qarachu (person of non-royal lineage)
qaragana (bush formation tactic)
qara ïlqï (tax)
qaravul (sentinel guard)
qaravulluq (fee for sentinel guard)
qari (foreign ruler, foreign place)
qarshi (palace)
qazaq/qazaqliq (adventurer, soldier of fortune)
qi (vital energy, psychophysical stuff)
qiang (ethnicity)
qishlaq (winter pastureland)
qïsmat (tax)

qobchur/qubchur (poll tax, herd tax)
qorchi/qorchin (quiver bearer)
qubi (share or appanage of people, revenues, herds)
quda (marital relations)
qul qaravaš (tax)
qumaš (textile)
quriltai (meeting of notables)
rabad (suburbs)
rahdari (Pers. road guard)
rihla (travelogue)
sahib diwan/sahib divan (Arab. prime minister)
sahib qiran (lit. Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction)
salïğ (tax)
sarai (palace)
Sarta'ul (West Asian Muslims)
Sechen Khan (Wise Khan, Qubilai)
semu ren (Western, Central Asian ethnic designation)
shahna (Arab. imperial overseer)
shahristan (residential/craft area)
shari'a (shariah, Islamic principles, law)
shengren (saint, sage)
shidian (Ch. seasonal rites)
shi'i/shi'ism (Islamic sect)
shi'uchi (chisel tactic)
Shu'ab-i Panjganah (Ilkhanid genealogical table)
shugo (Japanese constable)
shumara (lit. number, census)
ši'üsün/šüsün (relay station)
soyurqal vs. *soyurghal* (grant of revenues or people)
sütüküsün (deputy commander)
tablkhana (amir in command of a nominal unit of forty soldiers)
tailao (animal sacrifice)
taj (Pers. crown)
tamgha (lit. stamp, trade tariff)
tamghachi (collector of the *tamgha*)
tamma (garrison, frontier army)
tammachi/tammachin (garrison soldier, marcher lord)
tanga (money)
tarkhan/darqan (freedman, exempted from certain laws, taxes, and obligations)
tariqa/tariqat (lit. 'way,' 'path,' Sufi order)
Tengri/Tenggeri (Heaven, Supreme Deity)
tergen (post road)
Tianshidao (Daoist sect)
tiraz (fabric)
to'a/to'o (number)
todghasun (station inspectors)
tögrög (present-day Mongolian currency)

toru/törü/tora/tore (social customs, conventions, ethics)
touxia (Ch. appanage)
toyin (Buddhist monk)
tüge'eldü (distribution)
tumen/tumen/tümed (military unit, nominally 10,000 strong)
tuntian (Ch. military farms)
turghaq (hostages, children of notables raised at the court of the ruler)
tuz (Turk. salt)
ula'achin/ulaghchin (horse keeper)
ulagh (steed)
ulagha/ulaya (relay system)
ulema/ulama/'ulama (religious scholars, experts)
üldüchin (sword bearer)
'ulufa (fodder)
ulugh/uluy (great, grand)
ulugh noyan (lit. great commander, Tolui)
ulus (principality, state, also see khanate)
umma (Islamic community, Islamic ecumene)
ünen (newspaper)
ungbang (falcon breeding range)
voevoda (Rus. commander, military leader)
vykhod (tribute)
wafidiyya/wafidun/wufud (group seeking refuge)
wahdat-i wujud (unity of being, existence, expounded by Ibn al-Arabi)
waibang (Ch. foreign country)
waidi (Ch. foreign enemy)
wang (Ch. king)
waqf (Arab. endowment)
waqfnama (deed of endowment)
wazir (vizier, chief minister)
wei (guard created by Qubilai)
xiao (filial piety)
xing (Ch. clan)
xiyu (Western Regions of China)
yaylaq (summer pastures)
Yeke Mongol Ulus/Yeke Monggol Ulus (Great Mongol State)
Yeke Noyan (Great Commander, Tolui)
yimin (leftover subjects)
yingä (brother's wife)
yinyi (Song abstainers, recluses)
yosun/yusun (traditions, customs attributed to Chinggis Khan)
Yuan shi (dynastic chronicle of the Yuan)
yurt (Turk. camp, tent)
yurtchin (administrators of the camp)
zapros (request/demand)
zar-baft (gold trimming/brocade)
zaviya (Sufi retreat)

zhengtong (succession of dynasties)
zhitiia (Rus. vitae)
Zhizheng Tiaoge (*Law code of Yuan*)
zhong (political loyalty)
Zhongguo (Central Territories)
zhud (severe weather that can include ice, snow, or other conditions that prevent animals from having access to pasture)
zhuyi (silk clothes)
zhuz (division of Kazakhs)

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